whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a certain date; the fact that on that date, A was at Lahore is relevant." 23. The Latin word alibi means "elsewhere" and that word is used for convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when the occurrence took place he was so far away from the place of occurrence that it is extremely improbable that he would have participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal case, in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical injury to another person, the burden is on the prosecution to prove that the accused was present at the scene and has participated in the crime. The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused in such cases need be considered only when the burden has been discharged by the prosecution satisfactorily. But once the prosecution succeeds in discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts the plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. When the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence has been established satisfactorily by the prosecution through reliable evidence, normally the court would be slow to believe any counter- evidence to the effect that he was elsewhere when the occurrence happened. But if the evidence adduced by the accused is of such a quality and of such a standard that the court may entertain some reasonable doubt regarding his presence at the scene when the occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that purpose, it would be a sound proposition to be laid down that, in such circumstances, the burden on the accused is rather heavy. It follows, therefore, that strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi. [Emphasis supplied] The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v. State of Haryana[12], S.K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra[13] and Jitender Kumar v. State of Haryana[14]. 24. Applying the aforesaid test, we have to x-ray the evidence on record. The father of the deceased, PW-8, has stated in categorical terms that the appellant-accused was there at home. Nothing has been elicited in the cross-examination. The prosecution has been able to establish that the occurrence took place at 11.00 p.m. There is conclusive medical evidence that the deceased did not suffer the injuries because of accidental fire. There is no reason to disbelieve the testimony of the father of the deceased or to discard the medical evidence. On the contrary, the evidence is beyond reproach. 25. In our considered opinion, when the trial court as well as the High Court have disbelieved the plea of alibi which is a concurrent finding of fact, there is no warrant to dislodge the same. The evidence that has been adduced by the accused to prove the plea of alibi is sketchy and in fact does not stand to reason. It is not a case where the accused has proven with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence. The evidence adduced by the accused is not of such a quality that the Court would entertain a reasonable doubt. The burden on the accused is rather heavy and he is required to establish the plea of alibi with certitude. In the instant case, nothing has been brought on record that it was a physical impossibility of the presence of the accused to be at the scene of the offence by reason of his presence at another place. The plea can succeed only if it is shown that the accused was so far away at the relevant time that he could not be present at the place where the crime was committed. [See Dudh Nath Pandey v. State of U.P.[15]]. The evidence of the sister, DW-1, does not inspire any confidence. The cumulative effect of the evidence as regards the presence of the accused at the scene of occurrence cannot be disbelieved on the basis of bald utterance of the sister which is not only sketchy but also defies reason. Hence, we are obliged to concur with the findings recorded on this score by the learned trial Judge that has been given the stamp of approval by the High Court. 26. Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2153 OF 2011

Vijay Pal                                    ... Appellant
                                   Versus
State (GNCT) of Delhi                              ... Respondent


                               J U D G M E N T

Dipak Misra, J.
      In this appeal,  the  assail  is  to  the  judgment  and  order  dated
31.8.2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Appeal  No.  417  of
2001 whereby the Division Bench has dismissed  the  appeal  while  affirming
the judgment and order dated 17.01.2001 of the learned  Additional  Sessions
Judge, Delhi in Sessions Case No. 27 of 1998 whereunder the trial Court  had
convicted the appellant under Section 302 of  the  Indian  Penal  Code  (for
short "the I.P.C.") and sentenced him to suffer  rigorous  imprisonment  for
life.
2.    Filtering the unnecessary details the case of the prosecution is  that
the deceased, Savitri, had entered into wedlock with  the  appellant  herein
prior to almost eleven years of the date of occurrence i.e. 2.11.1997.   The
parental home of  the  deceased  was  situated  at  a  distance  of  half  a
kilometer.  On the fateful day i.e. 2.11.1997 about 11:00 p.m.,  Seema,  PW-
3, daughter of the deceased, aged about  ten  years,  came  running  to  the
house of her grandfather Shivcharan, PW-8,  and  informed  him  as  well  as
Satish, brother of the deceased, PW-1, that her father  was  threatening  to
burn her mother.  The information compelled PWs 1  and  8  to  rush  to  the
house of the deceased and, as the factual matrix  would  show,  PW-1,  being
young in age, reached the house of his sister earlier than  his  father  and
found his sister was burning and she told  him  that  it  was  the  accused-
appellant who had put her ablaze by pouring kerosene.   The  brother  poured
water on the deceased in order to extinguish the fire  and  thereafter  took
her to Deen Dayal Upadhyay Hospital where she could not be admitted  due  to
lack of facility and thereafter they  brought  her  to  Safdarjung  Hospital
where she was admitted.  Despite availing treatment, she breathed  her  last
on 3.11.1997 about noon.  It is necessary to mention  here  that  after  the
deceased was  taken  by  her  father  and   brother  to  the  hospital,  two
neighbours, namely, Shanker Lal and Surender,  PW-2  and  PW-4  respectively
went to the Police Station at Mangol Puri and  gave  the  information  about
the incident by DD-73 dated 2.11.1997  on  the  basis  of  which,  the  S.I.
Vijender Singh, PW-21, went to the place of the occurrence where he met  PW-
3, the daughter of the deceased, and came to  learn  that  her  parents  had
quarreled and her mother had suffered burn injuries and  was  taken  to  the
hospital.
3.    In the meantime, information was received at the police  station  from
Safdarjung Hospital that the deceased had been admitted  there  and  on  the
basis of the said information, the police rushed to the hospital where  they
met PWs 1 and 8.  As the prosecution case would  further  unfurl  after  the
death took place they proceeded with the  investigation,  seized  the  burnt
clothes, a quilt, one plastic cane, one match-box and match stick  and  sent
the dead body for post  mortem.   The  investigating  agency  in  course  of
investigation arrested the husband on 03.11.1997  and  after  recording  the
statements of number of witnesses  laid  the  chargesheet  for  the  offence
punishable under Section 302 IPC before the competent Court, which  in  turn
committed the matter to the Court of Session and eventually it was tried  by
the learned Additional Sessions Judge.
4.    The accused abjured his guilt and pleaded that he was not at  home  as
he had gone to his sister's place, Shyamwati, DW-1 at MJ-1/61,  Vikas  Puri,
Delhi and claimed to be tried.
5.    The prosecution in order to substantiate the charges  leveled  against
the accused person, examined as many as  21  witnesses  and  got  number  of
documents exhibited.  On  the  basis  of  the  ocular  and  the  documentary
evidence, the learned trial Judge came to  hold  that  the  prosecution  had
established the  charge  levelled  against  the  accused  to  the  hilt  and
accordingly convicted him under Section 302, I.P.C and imposed the  sentence
as has been stated hereinbefore.
6.    On an appeal  being  preferred,  the  High  Court  reappreciating  the
evidence and  placing  reliance  on  the  oral  dying  declaration  and  the
testimony of the brother and further accepting the post mortem report  found
that the learned trial  Judge  had  really  not  faulted  in  recording  the
conviction.  Being of this view, it dismissed the appeal.
7.    We have heard Ms. Nupur Choudhary, Advocate (Amicus  Curiae)  for  the
appellant and Mr. W.A. Quadri, counsel for the State.
8.    It is submitted by Ms. Nupur Choudhary,  learned  Amicus  Curiae  that
the learned trial Judge as well as the High Court has  erroneously  recorded
the conviction against the  appellant  though  PW-3,  the  daughter  of  the
deceased, had not supported the case of the prosecution and  she  being  the
principal witness, the accused deserved to be acquitted.  It has been  urged
by her that High Court has flawed by placing  reliance  on  the  oral  dying
declaration of the deceased when she had  suffered  serious  burn  injuries,
and in such a situation  it could not  be  possible  on  her  part  to  tell
anything to her brother.  She has seriously criticized the judgment  of  the
High Court in not accepting the plea of alibi advanced by the accused  which
had a  solid  foundation,  for  the  fateful  day  was  "Bhaiya  Dooj"  and,
therefore, the accused had gone to his sister's place as per the  tradition.

9.    Mr. Quadri, learned counsel for the State, per contra,  would  contend
that though the daughter of the deceased, PW-3, has turned hostile  yet  her
evidence cannot totally be brushed aside as both  the  prosecution  and  the
defence can rely on such parts of the  testimony  which  are  favourable  to
them.  It is his further submission that the oral  dying  declaration  which
has been stated by the brother of the deceased in  his  testimony  has  been
proven beyond any trace of doubt and despite the  roving  cross-examination,
he has remained absolutely firm and nothing has  been  elicited  to  discard
his version and, therefore, neither the learned trial  Judge  nor  the  High
Court has faulted in placing reliance on it.   Pertaining  to  the  plea  of
alibi, learned counsel  would  submit  that  the  said  plea  has  not  been
established by the accused as  required  under  the  law  and  the  material
brought  on record by the prosecution do clearly  demonstrate  that  at  the
relevant time he was at home.  In essence, it is  urged  by  him  that  when
these aspects are appreciated in a  seemly  manner,  the  cumulative  effect
would go a  long  way  to  show  that  the  appellant  has  been  appositely
convicted by the learned trial Judge  and  the  High  Court  has  absolutely
correctly concurred with the same.
10.   To appreciate the rivalised submissions raised at  the  bar,  we  have
perused the judgments of the trial Court and the High Court  with  concerned
anxiety and cautiously scrutinized the evidence  on  record.   As  we  find,
there are basically seven witnesses whose evidence are important,  they  are
Satish, brother of the deceased, PW-1, Shivcharan, father of  the  deceased,
PW-8, Dr.  G.K.  Chaubey,  who  conducted  the  post  mortem,  PW-5,  Seema,
daughter of the deceased, PW-3, Shanker Lal, PW-2  and  Surender,  PW-4  who
informed the police at the first instance and  Vijender  Singh,  PW-21,  the
sub-Inspector  who  recorded  the  statement.   At  this  juncture,  it   is
necessary to mention that apart from  PW-3,  PWs  2,  4  and  8,  were  also
declared hostile by the prosecution and were cross-examined  by  the  state.
In this backdrop, it is to be seen whether the material  brought  on  record
is sufficient enough to sustain the conviction on a scrutiny of  the  Exbts.
PW-1/A, PW-1/B, PW-1/D, PW-1/E, PW-1/F and Exbt. P-2 that were seized.
11.   From the oral  evidence  and  the  seized  items  from  the  place  of
occurrence, it is quite vivid that the deceased had suffered  burn  injuries
which lead to her death.  It was PW-3, the daughter  of  the  deceased,  who
witnessed the quarrel and rushed to  the  home  of  her  grandparents.   The
learned trial Judge has put  the  relevant  question  to  her  to  find  out
whether she was in a position to understand  the  questions  and  depose  in
Court.  In her evidence, she had stated that on the fateful day about  11.00
p.m. her mother was preparing  food  for  the  children  and  for  the  said
purpose she was pouring kerosene oil in  the  stove  as  it  was  empty  and
thereafter when she tried to light the  stove,  the  kerosene  oil  was  not
coming from the nozzle of the stove, then the deceased  inserted  a  pin  in
the nozzle and the oil sprinkled on her and in the process she caught  fire.
 On being declared hostile, she was cross-examined.  It is relevant to  note
here that she has first deposed that she was not aware who had  removed  her
mother to the hospital and thereafter changed her  stand  stating  that  her
uncle had removed her mother.  As her  testimony  would  show  she  has  not
mentioned whereabouts of her father at  the  time  of  the  incident.    Her
ignorance about how the mother was shifted to the  hospital  shows  that  as
the High Court has correctly analysed, she has  not  spoken  anything  about
her father in order to protect him.  Keeping in abeyance  whether  the  plea
of alibi taken by the accused is proven or not to be dealt with at  a  later
stage, we think it apposite to scan the evidence of other witnesses.   PW-1,
the brother of the accused, has unequivocally  deposed  that  after  getting
the information from Seema, PW-3, his father and he rushed to the  house  of
the deceased.  As is evincible from the testimony, he reached the  house  of
the sister first and found she  was  burning  and  she  told  him  that  his
brother-in-law had poured kerosene and put her ablaze.  She has also  stated
that the children should not be given to the accused.  He  has,  in  detail,
spoken about going to the hospital and how the site plan  was  prepared  and
the items  were  seized  in  presence  of  the  witnesses.   In  the  cross-
examination, no suggestion has been given about the absence  of  husband  in
the house, contrivance of the dying declaration by  him  or  anything  which
would create a dent in his testimony.  What has been sought  to  be  brought
in the cross-examination is that no one was  present  in  the  room  of  the
deceased and certain other questions which  have  nothing  to  do  with  the
incident.  It has been suggested to him that his sister and the accused  had
kept Rs.90,000/- with his father, PW-8, for purchasing a house and  as  they
refused to return the money,  they  had,  getting  an  opportunity,  falsely
implicated the accused.  It has also come out in the cross-examination  that
the accused was a habitual drinker and gambler and his family was  supported
by the in-laws.
12.   At this stage it would be appropriate to state that  the  trial  court
and the High Court have placed reliance  on  the  post-mortem  report.   Dr.
G.K. Choubey, PW5, who had conducted the post-mortem on  the  dead  body  of
the deceased had found the following injuries:-
      "Superficial to deep burn  injury  over  all  the  body  surface  area
      including scalp, skin  peeled  off  at  various  places,  margins  red
      underneath tissues bright red and there was blackening  of  skin  over
      various area.  Skin was  peeled  off  at  soles,  but  not  at  palms.
      Venisection at left leg above medial malleolus was present."
           It was 100 per cent antemortem deep burns. Internal  examination
      revealed that Larynx contained soot particles and rest of  the  organs
      were found to be congested."

13.   In the cross-examination he has categorically  denied  the  suggestion
that the injuries  received  by  the  deceased  could  have  been  sustained
because of  kerosene oil from the stove fell on her body due to the  pinning
of the stove and also by fall of a tin of kerosene oil  on  the  floor.   He
has deposed without any equivocation that the  burn  injuries  sustained  by
the deceased were not possible due to accidental burns.  The High Court  has
taken note of the FSL Report, Ext. PW 20/B, from which it  is  evident  that
the analysis by gas liquid  chromatography  showed,  kerosene  oil  residues
were found on the scalp hair of the deceased.  It is apt to  note  that  the
presence of kerosene on the scalp hair of the deceased and presence of  dust
particles in the larynx of the deceased clearly  evince  that  kerosene  oil
was poured on the skull of the deceased which could  not  have  happened  by
accident.  The testimony of the daughter, Seema, PW-3, a young girl  of  ten
years that the kerosene oil accidentally spilled on the body of  her  mother
is thus absolutely unbelievable.   We are  disposed  to  think  so  when  we
weigh the medical testimony vis-a vis  the ocular testimony.   There  is  no
dispute that  the value  of  medical  evidence  is  only  corroborative.  It
proves that the injuries could have been caused in  the  manner  as  alleged
and nothing more. The  use  which  the  defence  can  make  of  the  medical
evidence is to prove that the injuries could not possibly have  been  caused
in the manner alleged  and  thereby  discredit  the  eye-witnesses.  Unless,
however the medical evidence in its turn goes  so  far  that  it  completely
rules out all possibilities whatsoever  of  injuries  taking  place  in  the
manner alleged by eyewitnesses, the testimony of  the  eye-witnesses  cannot
be thrown out on the ground of alleged  inconsistency  between  it  and  the
medical evidence.  It is also true that the post-mortem report by itself  is
not a substantive  piece  of  evidence,  but  the  evidence  of  the  doctor
conducting the post-mortem can by no means be ascribed to be  insignificant.
The significance of the evidence of the doctor lies vis--vis  the  injuries
appearing on the body of the deceased person and likely use  of  the  weapon
and it would then be the  prosecutor's  duty  and  obligation  to  have  the
corroborative evidence  available  on  record  from  the  other  prosecution
witnesses.  It is also  an  accepted  principle  that  sufficient  weightage
should be given to the evidence of the doctor who has  conducted  the  post-
mortem, as compared to the statements found in  the  textbooks,  but  giving
weightage does not ipso facto mean that each and every statement made  by  a
medical witness should be accepted on its face value even when it  is  self-
contradictory.  It is also a settled principle that the opinion given  by  a
medical witness need not be the last word on the subject.  Such  an  opinion
shall be tested by the  Court.   If  the  opinion  is  bereft  of  logic  or
objectivity, the court is not obliged to go by that  opinion.   That  apart,
it would be erroneous to accord undue primacy to  the  hypothetical  answers
of medical witnesses to exclude the eyewitnesses' account which  are  to  be
tested independently and not treated as the 'variable' keeping  the  medical
evidence as the  'constant'.   Where  the  eyewitnesses'  account  is  found
credible and trustworthy, a medical  opinion  pointing  to  the  alternative
possibilities cannot be accepted as  conclusive.  [See:  Solanki  Chimanbhai
Ukabhai v. State of Gujrat[1], State  of  Haryana  v.  Ram  Singh[2],  Mohd.
Zahid v. State of T.N.[3], State of Haryna v. Bhagirath[4] and Abdul  Sayeed
v. State of M.P.[5]]
14.   Having stated about the medical evidence that  has  been  brought   on
record and how such an evidence is to be valued, we think it  apt  to  dwell
upon the oral dying declaration which has been placed reliance upon  by  the
trial Court as well as  the  High  Court.    As  per  the  evidence  of  the
brother, Satish, PW-1, he after reaching the place of occurrence  found  his
sister ablaze and she had stated that her husband  has  poured  kerosene  on
her and put her  ablaze.   There  is  material  to  show  that  the  father,
Shivcharan, PW-8, arrived after his  son.   The  prosecution  has  explained
about the delayed arrival of the father.
15.   The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant  is  that  the
oral dying declaration  lacks  intrinsic  truth  and  it  does  not  deserve
acceptance.  At this juncture we think it appropriate to  refer  to  certain
authorities how an oral dying declaration is to be scrutinized.
16.   In the case of Laxman v. State  of  Maharashtra[6],  the  Constitution
Bench has held thus:
      "The juristic theory regarding acceptability of a dying declaration is
      that such declaration is made in extremity, when the party is  at  the
      point of death and when every hope of this world is gone,  when  every
      motive to falsehood is silenced, and the man is induced  by  the  most
      powerful consideration to speak only the  truth.  Notwithstanding  the
      same, great caution must be exercised in considering the weight to  be
      given to this species of evidence on account of the existence of  many
      circumstances which may affect their truth. The situation in  which  a
      man is on the deathbed is so solemn and serene, is the reason  in  law
      to accept the veracity of his statement. It is  for  this  reason  the
      requirements of oath and cross-examination are dispensed  with.  Since
      the accused has no power of cross-examination, the courts insist  that
      the dying declaration should be of such a nature as  to  inspire  full
      confidence of the court  in  its  truthfulness  and  correctness.  The
      court, however, has always to be on guard to see that the statement of
      the deceased was not as a result of either tutoring or prompting or  a
      product of imagination. The court also must further  decide  that  the
      deceased was in a fit state of mind and had the opportunity to observe
      and identify the assailant. Normally, therefore, the court in order to
      satisfy whether the deceased was in a fit mental condition to make the
      dying declaration looks up to  the  medical  opinion.  But  where  the
      eyewitnesses state that the deceased was in a fit and conscious  state
      to make the declaration, the medical opinion will not prevail, nor can
      it be said that since there is no certification of the  doctor  as  to
      the fitness of the mind of the declarant, the dying declaration is not
      acceptable. A dying declaration can be oral  or  in  writing  and  any
      adequate method of communication whether  by  words  or  by  signs  or
      otherwise will suffice provided the indication  is  positive  [pic]and
      definite."

17.   The aforesaid judgment  makes  it  absolutely  clear  that  the  dying
declaration  can  be  oral  or  in  writing  and  any  adequate  method   of
communication whether by words  or  by  signs  or  otherwise  will  suffice,
provided the communication is positive and definite.  There  cannot  be  any
cavil over the proposition that a dying declaration cannot  be  mechanically
relied upon.  In fact, it is the duty  of  the  Court  to  examine  a  dying
declaration  with  studied  scrutiny  to  find  out  whether  the  same   is
voluntary, truthful and made in a conscious state of mind and further it  is
without any influence.
    18. At this juncture, we may quote a passage from Babulal v.  State  of
        M.P.[7] wherein the value of dying declaration in evidence has been
        stated:-
      "7. ... A person who is facing imminent death, with even a  shadow  of
      continuing in this world practically  non-existent,  every  motive  of
      falsehood is obliterated. The  mind  gets  altered  by  most  powerful
      ethical reasons to speak only the truth. Great solemnity and  sanctity
      is attached to the words of a dying person because  a  person  on  the
      verge of death is not likely to tell lies or to concoct a case  so  as
      to implicate an innocent person. The maxim is "a man will not meet his
      Maker with a lie in his mouth" (nemo moriturus  praesumitur  mentiri).
      Mathew Arnold said, "truth sits on the  lips  of  a  dying  man".  The
      general principle on which the species of evidence is admitted is that
      they are declarations made in extremity, when  the  party  is  at  the
      point of death, and when every hope of this world is gone, when  every
      motive to falsehood is silenced and mind induced by the most  powerful
      consideration to  speak  the  truth;  situation  so  solemn  that  law
      considers the same as creating an obligation equal to  that  which  is
      imposed by a positive oath administered in a court of justice."

19.   Dealing with the oral dying declaration, a two-Judge Bench in  Prakash
V. State of M.P.[8] has stated thus:
      "11. ... In the ordinary course, the members of the  family  including
      the father were expected to ask the victim the names of the assailants
      at the first opportunity and if  the  victim  was  in  a  position  to
      communicate, it is reasonably expected that he would give the names of
      the assailants if he had recognised the  assailants.  In  the  instant
      case there is no occasion to hold that  the  deceased  was  not  in  a
      position to identify the assailants because it is nobody's  case  that
      the deceased did not know the accused [pic]persons.  It  is  therefore
      quite  likely  that  on  being  asked  the  deceased  would  name  the
      assailants. In the facts and circumstances of the case the High  Court
      has accepted the dying declaration and we do not  think  that  such  a
      finding is perverse and requires to be interfered with."

20.   Thus, the law  is  quite  clear  that  if  the  dying  declaration  is
absolutely credible and nothing is brought on record that the  deceased  was
in such a condition, he or she could not have made a dying declaration to  a
witness, there is no justification to discard  the  same.   In  the  instant
case, PW-1 had immediately rushed to the house of the deceased and  she  had
told him that her husband had poured kerosene on her.   The  plea  taken  by
the appellant that he has been falsely  implicated  because  his  money  was
deposited with the in-laws and they were not inclined to  return,  does  not
also really breathe the truth, for there  is  even  no  suggestion  to  that
effect.
21.   It is contended by the learned counsel  for  the  appellant  when  the
deceased  sustained  100%  burn  injuries,  she  could  not  have  made  any
statement to her brother.  In this regard, we may profitably  refer  to  the
decision in Mafabhai Nagarbhai Raval v. State of Gujarat[9] wherein  it  has
been held a person suffering 99%  burn  injuries  could  be  deemed  capable
enough for the purpose of making a dying  declaration.   The  Court  in  the
said case opined that  unless  there  existed  some  inherent  and  apparent
defect, the trial Court should not have substituted its opinion for that  of
the doctor.  In the light of the facts of the case,  the  dying  declaration
was found to be worthy of reliance.
22.   In State of Madhya Pradesh v. Dal Singh and  Others[10],  a  two-Judge
Bench placed reliance on the dying  declaration  of  the  deceased  who  had
suffered 100% burn injuries on the ground that  the  dying  declaration  was
found to be credible.
23.   At this juncture, we think it apt to deal with the plea of alibi  that
has been put forth by the appellant.  As is demonstrable,  the  trial  court
has discarded the plea of alibi.  When a  plea  of  alibi  is  taken  by  an
accused, burden is upon him to establish  the  same  by  positive  evidence,
after  onus  as  regards  presence  on  the  spot  is  established  by   the
prosecution.  In this context, we may profitably reproduce a few  paragraphs
from Binay Kumar Singh V. State of Bihar[11]:
      "22. We must bear in mind that an alibi is not an  exception  (special
      or general) envisaged in the Indian Penal Code or any other law. It is
      only a rule of evidence recognised in Section 11 of the  Evidence  Act
      that facts which are inconsistent with the fact in issue are relevant.
      Illustration (a) given under the provision  is  worth  reproducing  in
      this context:


           "The question is whether A committed a crime at  Calcutta  on  a
        certain date; the fact that on  that  date,  A  was  at  Lahore  is
        relevant."

      23. The Latin word alibi means "elsewhere" and that word is  used  for
      convenience when an accused takes recourse to a defence line that when
      the occurrence took place he  was  so  far  away  from  the  place  of
      occurrence  that  it  is  extremely  improbable  that  he  would  have
      participated in the crime. It is a basic law that in a criminal  case,
      in which the accused is alleged to have inflicted physical  injury  to
      another person, the burden is on the prosecution  to  prove  that  the
      accused was present at the scene and has participated  in  the  crime.
      The burden would not be lessened by the mere fact that the accused has
      adopted the defence of alibi. The plea of the accused  in  such  cases
      need be considered only when the burden has  been  discharged  by  the
      prosecution satisfactorily.  But  once  the  prosecution  succeeds  in
      discharging the burden it is incumbent on the accused, who adopts  the
      plea of alibi, to prove it with absolute certainty so  as  to  exclude
      the possibility of his presence at the place of occurrence.  When  the
      presence  of  the  accused  at  the  scene  of  occurrence  has   been
      established  satisfactorily  by  the  prosecution   through   reliable
      evidence, normally the court would be slow  to  believe  any  counter-
      evidence to the effect that  he  was  elsewhere  when  the  occurrence
      happened. But if the evidence adduced by the  accused  is  of  such  a
      quality and of such a standard  that  the  court  may  entertain  some
      reasonable  doubt  regarding  his  presence  at  the  scene  when  the
      occurrence took place, the accused would, no doubt, be entitled to the
      benefit of that reasonable doubt. For that  purpose,  it  would  be  a
      sound proposition to be laid down that,  in  such  circumstances,  the
      burden on the accused is rather heavy.  It  follows,  therefore,  that
      strict proof is required for establishing the plea of alibi.
                                                         [Emphasis supplied]

      The said principle has been reiterated in Gurpreet Singh v.  State  of
Haryana[12], S.K. Sattar v. State of Maharashtra[13] and Jitender  Kumar  v.
State of Haryana[14].
24.   Applying the aforesaid test, we have to x-ray the evidence on  record.
 The father of the deceased, PW-8, has stated in categorical terms that  the
appellant-accused was there at home.   Nothing  has  been  elicited  in  the
cross-examination.  The prosecution has been  able  to  establish  that  the
occurrence took place at 11.00 p.m.  There is  conclusive  medical  evidence
that the deceased did not suffer the injuries because  of  accidental  fire.
There is no reason  to  disbelieve  the  testimony  of  the  father  of  the
deceased or to discard the medical evidence.  On the contrary, the  evidence
is beyond reproach.
25.   In our considered opinion, when the trial court as well  as  the  High
Court have disbelieved the plea of alibi which is a  concurrent  finding  of
fact, there is no warrant to dislodge the same.  The evidence that has  been
adduced by the accused to prove the plea of alibi is  sketchy  and  in  fact
does not stand to reason.  It is not a case where  the  accused  has  proven
with absolute certainty so as to exclude the possibility of his presence  at
the place of occurrence.  The evidence adduced by  the  accused  is  not  of
such a quality that the Court  would  entertain  a  reasonable  doubt.   The
burden on the accused is rather heavy and he is required  to  establish  the
plea of alibi with certitude.    In  the  instant  case,  nothing  has  been
brought on record that it was a physical impossibility of  the  presence  of
the accused to be at the scene of the offence by reason of his  presence  at
another place.  The plea can succeed only if it is shown  that  the  accused
was so far away at the relevant time that he could not  be  present  at  the
place where the crime was committed. [See  Dudh  Nath  Pandey  v.  State  of
U.P.[15]].   The  evidence  of  the  sister,  DW-1,  does  not  inspire  any
confidence.  The cumulative effect of the evidence as regards  the  presence
of the accused at the scene of  occurrence  cannot  be  disbelieved  on  the
basis of bald utterance of the sister which is not  only  sketchy  but  also
defies reason.  Hence, we are obliged to concur with the  findings  recorded
on this score by the learned trial Judge that has been given  the  stamp  of
approval by the High Court.
26.   Consequently, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.



                                  ........................................J.
                                   [DIPAK MISRA]

                                  ........................................J.
                                        [N.V. RAMANA]
NEW DELHI
MARCH 10, 2015.

-----------------------
[1] (1983) 2 SCC 174
[2] (2002) 2 SCC 426
[3] (1999) 6 SCC 120
[4] (1999) 5 SCC 96
[5] (2010) 10 SCC 259
[6]  (2002) 6 SCC 710
[7] (2003) 12 SCC 490
[8]  (1992) 4 SCC 225
[9] (1992) 4 SCC 69
[10] (2013) 14 SCC 159
[11]  (1997) 1 SCC 283
[12]  (2002) 8 SCC 18
[13]  (2010) 8 SCC 430
[14]  (2012) 6 SCC 204
[15]  (1981) 1 SCC 166