Page 1
REPORTAB
LE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL MISC. PETITION NO.17870 OF 2014
IN
SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.2838 OF 2000
ABDUL RAZZAQ …
APPELLANT
VERSUS
STATE OF U.P. …
RESPONDENT
J U D G M E N T
ADARSH KUMAR GOEL, J.
1. This application has been filed under Section 7-A of
the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act,
2000 (for short “the Act”) seeking release of the petitioner
who has been found to be juvenile. Since special leave
petition and review petition have been dismissed and we
are inclined to allow the application, orders dismissing the
special leave petition and review petition will stand recalled.
2. The petitioner was tried for the offence under Section
302 of the Indian Penal Code (‘IPC’) for causing the death of
Amir Ullah on 18th February, 1979 at Firozabad, Uttar
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Pradesh. He was convicted under Section 302 and
sentenced to undergo life imprisonment by the Court of
Sessions Judge, Agra in Sessions Trial No.325 of 1979 vide
judgment dated 29th September, 1980.
3. The conviction and sentence of the petitioner was
affirmed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad on 21st
February, 2000. This Court vide Order dated 29th
September, 2000 dismissed the special leave petition.
Review Petition filed against the said order was dismissed
on 20th July, 2010.
4. Thereafter, the High Court of Allahabad vide order
dated 24th May, 2012 in Crl. (PIL) Misc. W.P. No.855 of 2012
Sister Sheeba Jose vs. State of U.P. & Ors. directed suo
motu action under proviso to Section 7-A of the Act. The
U.P. State Legal Services Authority took steps for
implementation of the said judgment. The Juvenile Justice
Board, Agra vide Order dated 2nd July, 2013 examined the
case of the petitioner and held that on the date of incident,
the petitioner was less than 18 years of age.
5. On above basis, the present application has been filed
with a prayer that the petitioner be released from custody.
It has also been stated in the application that the petitioner
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has already undergone more than 14 years of
imprisonment.
6. Notice was issued by this Court on 8th October, 2014,
in response to which, the State of U.P. has entered
appearance.
7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties.
8. Learned counsel for the petitioner pointed out that
since the petitioner was a juvenile on the date of
occurrence, he is entitled to the benefit of provisions of the
Act. It has also been pointed out that his date of birth was
noted to be 18th September, 1962 in the judgment of the
High Court. Since he was taken to be more than 16 years of
age while the age of juvenility prior to the present Act was
18 years, the petitioner was not held entitled to the benefit
of the said Act. The law having changed with retrospective
effect, the petitioner claims the 76 benefit of juvenility.
9. The legal position on the subject is well settled. A
person below 18 years at the time of the incident can claim
benefit of the Act any time. Reference may be made to
Section 7-A and 20 of the Act and
Rule 12 of the Juvenile Justice (Care & Protection of
Children) Rules, 2007 which are as follows:
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Crl. M.P. No.17870/2014 in SLP (Crl.) No.2838 of 2000
“Section 7-A. Procedure to be followed when
claim of juvenility is raised before any court.—
(1) Whenever a claim of juvenility is raised
before any court or a court is of the opinion
that an accused person was a juvenile on the
date of commission of the offence, the court
shall make an enquiry, take such evidence as
may be necessary (but not an affidavit) so as
to determine the age of such person, and shall
record a finding whether the person is a
juvenile or a child or not, stating his age as
nearly as may be:
Provided that a claim of juvenility may be
raised before any court and it shall be
recognised at any stage, even after final
disposal of the case, and such claim shall be
determined in terms of the provisions
contained in this Act and the rules made
thereunder, even if the juvenile has ceased to
be so on or before the date of commencement
of this Act.
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile
on the date of commission of the offence under
sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to
the Board for passing appropriate order, and
the sentence if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect.”
“Section 20. Special provision in respect of
pending cases.—Notwithstanding anything
contained in this Act, all proceedings in respect
of a juvenile pending in any court in any area
on the date on which this Act comes into force
in that area, shall be continued in that court as
if this Act had not been passed and if the court
finds that the juvenile has committed an
offence, it shall record such finding and instead
of passing any sentence in respect of the
juvenile, forward the juvenile to the Board
which shall pass orders in respect of that
juvenile in accordance with the provisions of
this Act as if it had been satisfied on inquiry
under this Act that a juvenile has committed
the offence:
Provided that the Board may, for any adequate
and special reason to be mentioned in the
order, review the case and pass appropriate
order in the interest of such juvenile.
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Explanation.—In all pending cases including
trial, revision, appeal or any other criminal
proceedings in respect of a juvenile in conflict
with law, in any court, the determination of
juvenility of such a juvenile shall be in terms of
clause (l) of Section 2, even if the juvenile
ceases to be so on or before the date of
commencement of this Act and the provisions
of this Act shall apply as if the said provisions
had been in force, for all purposes and at all
material times when the alleged offence was
committed.”
“Rule 12. Procedure to be followed in
determination of age.—(1) In every case
concerning a child or a juvenile in conflict with
law, the court or the Board or as the case may
be the Committee referred to in Rule 19 of
these Rules shall determine the age of such
juvenile or child or a juvenile in conflict with
law within a period of thirty days from the date
of making of the application for that purpose.
(2) The court or the Board or as the case may
be the Committee shall decide the juvenility or
otherwise of the juvenile or the child or as the
case may be the juvenile in conflict with law,
prima facie on the basis of physical appearance
or documents, if available, and send him to the
observation home or in jail.
(3) In every case concerning a child or juvenile
in conflict with law, the age determination
inquiry shall be conducted by the court or the
Board or, as the case may be, the Committee
by seeking evidence by obtaining—
(a)(i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available; and in the absence
whereof;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the school
(other than a play school) first attended; and in
the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a corporation
or a municipal authority or a panchayat;
(b) and only in the absence of either (i), (ii) or
(iii) of clause (a) above, the medical opinion
will be sought from a duly constituted Medical
Board, which will declare the age of the
juvenile or child. In case exact assessment of
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the age cannot be done, the Court or the Board
or, as the case may be, the Committee, for the
reasons to be recorded by them, may, if
considered necessary, give benefit to the child
or juvenile by considering his/her age on lower
side within the margin of one year,
and, while passing orders in such case shall,
after taking into consideration such evidence
as may be available, or the medical opinion, as
the case may be, record a finding in respect of
his age and either of the evidence specified in
any of the clauses (a)(i), (ii), (iii) or in the
absence whereof, clause (b) shall be the
conclusive proof of the age as regards such
child or the juvenile in conflict with law.
(4) If the age of a juvenile or child or the
juvenile in conflict with law is found to be
below 18 years on the date of offence, on the
basis of any of the conclusive proof specified in
sub-rule (3), the court or the Board or as the
case may be the Committee shall in writing
pass an order stating the age and declaring the
status of juvenility or otherwise, for the
purpose of the Act and these Rules and a copy
of the order shall be given to such juvenile or
the person concerned.
(5) Save and except where, further inquiry or
otherwise is required, inter alia, in terms of
Section 7-A, Section 64 of the Act and these
Rules, no further inquiry shall be conducted by
the court or the Board after examining and
obtaining the certificate or any other
documentary proof referred to in sub-rule (3) of
this Rule.
(6) The provisions contained in this Rule shall
also apply to those disposed of cases, where
the status of juvenility has not been
determined in accordance with the provisions
contained in sub-rule (3) and the Act, requiring
dispensation of the sentence under the Act for
passing appropriate order in the interest of the
juvenile in conflict with law.”
10. The above provisions clearly show that even if a
person was not entitled to the benefit of juvenilities under
the 1986 Act or the present Act prior to its amendment in
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2006, such benefit is available to a person undergoing
sentence if he was below 18 on the date of the occurrence.
Such relief can be claimed even if a matter has been finally
decided, as in the present case.
11. In Hari Ram vs. State of Rajasthan and Anr.1
, it
was observed:
“49. The effect of the proviso to Section 7-A
introduced by the amending Act makes it clear
that the claim of juvenility may be raised
before any court which shall be recognised at
any stage, even after final disposal of the case,
and such claim shall be determined in terms of
the provisions contained in the Act and the
Rules made thereunder which includes the
definition of “juvenile” in Sections 2(k) and 2(l)
of the Act even if the juvenile had ceased to be
so on or before the date of commencement of
the Act.
(e
mphasis supplied)
50. The said intention of the legislature was
reinforced by the amendment effected by the
said amending Act to Section 20 by
introduction of the proviso and the Explanation
thereto, wherein also it has been clearly
indicated that in any pending case in any court
the determination of juvenility of such a
juvenile has to be in terms of Section 2(l) even
if the juvenile ceases to be so “on or before
the date of commencement of this Act”
and it was also indicated that the provisions of
the Act would apply as if the said provisions
had been in force for all purposes and at all
material times when the alleged offence was
committed.
(emphasis
supplied)
51. Apart from the aforesaid provisions of the
2000 Act, as amended, and the Juvenile Justice
1 (2009) 13 SCC 211
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Rules, 2007, Rule 98 thereof has to be read in
tandem with Section 20 of the Juvenile Justice
Act, 2000, as amended by the Amendment Act,
2006, which provides that even in disposed of
cases of juveniles in conflict with law, the State
Government or the Board could, either suo
motu or on an application made for the
purpose, review the case of a juvenile,
determine the juvenility and pass an
appropriate order under Section 64 of the Act
for the immediate release of the juvenile whose
period of detention had exceeded the
maximum period provided in Section 15 of the
Act i.e. 3 years.
52. In addition to the above, Section 49 of the
Juvenile Justice Act, 2000 is also of relevance
and is reproduced hereinbelow:
“49. Presumption and determination of
age.—(1) Where it appears to a
competent authority that person brought
before it under any of the provisions of
this Act (otherwise than for the purpose
of giving evidence) is a juvenile or the
child, the competent authority shall
make due inquiry so as to the age of that
person and for that purpose shall take
such evidence as may be necessary (but
not an affidavit) and shall record a
finding whether the person is a juvenile
or the child or not, stating his age as
nearly as may be.
(2) No order of a competent authority
shall be deemed to have become invalid
merely by any subsequent proof that the
person in respect of whom the order has
been made is not a juvenile or the child,
and the age recorded by the competent
authority to be the age of person so
brought before it, shall for the purpose of
this Act, be deemed to be the true age of
that person.”
53. Sub-section (1) of Section 49 vests the
competent authority with the power to make
due inquiry as to the age of a person brought
before it and for the said purpose to take such
evidence as may be necessary (but not an
affidavit) and shall record a finding as to
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whether the person is a juvenile or a child or
not, stating his age as nearly as may be.
54. Sub-section (2) of Section 49 is of equal
importance as it provides that no order of a
competent authority would be deemed to have
become invalid merely on account of any
subsequent proof that the person, in respect of
whom an order is made, is not a juvenile or a
child, and the age recorded by the competent
authority to be the age of the person brought
before it, would, for the purpose of the Act, be
deemed to be the true age of a child or a
juvenile in conflict with law.
55. Sub-rule (3) of Rule 12 indicates that the
age determination inquiry by the court or
Board, by seeking evidence, is to be derived
from:
(i) the matriculation or equivalent
certificates, if available, and in the
absence of the same;
(ii) the date of birth certificate from the
school (other than a play school) first
attended; and in the absence whereof;
(iii) the birth certificate given by a
corporation or a municipal authority or a
panchayat;
56. Clause (b) of Rule 12(3) provides that only
in the absence of any such document, would a
medical opinion be sought for from a duly
constituted Medical Board, which would declare
the age of the juvenile or the child. In case
exact assessment of the age cannot be done,
the court or the Board or as the case may be,
the Child Welfare Committee, for reasons to be
recorded by it, may, if considered necessary,
give benefit to the child or juvenile by
considering his/her age on the lower side
within a margin of one year.
57. As will, therefore, be clear from the
provisions of the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000, as
amended by the Amendment Act, 2006 and the
Juvenile Justice Rules, 2007, the scheme of the
Act is to give children, who have, for some
reason or the other, gone astray, to realise
their mistakes, rehabilitate themselves and
rebuild their lives and become useful citizens of
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society, instead of degenerating into hardened
criminals.
58. Of the two main questions decided in
Pratap Singh case [(2005) 3 SCC 551: 2005
SCC (Cri) 742], one point is now well
established that the juvenility of a person in
conflict with law has to be reckoned from the
date of the incident and not from the date on
which cognizance was taken by the Magistrate.
The effect of the other part of the decision was,
however, neutralised by virtue of the
amendments to the Juvenile Justice Act, 2000,
by Act 33 of 2006, whereunder the provisions
of the Act were also made applicable to
juveniles who had not completed eighteen
years of age on the date of commission of the
offence.
59. The law as now crystallised on a conjoint
reading of Sections 2(k), 2(l), 7-A, 20 and 49
read with Rules 12 and 98, places beyond all
doubt that all persons who were below the age
of 18 years on the date of commission of the
offence even prior to 1-4-2001, would be
treated as juveniles, even if the claim of
juvenility was raised after they had attained
the age of 18 years on or before the date of
commencement of the Act and were
undergoing sentence upon being convicted.”
12. The above view was reiterated by a bench of three
Judges in Abuzar Hossain alias Gulam Hossain vs.
State of West Bengal2
, as follows:-
“39.1. A claim of juvenility may be raised at
any stage even after the final disposal of the
case. It may be raised for the first time before
this Court as well after the final disposal of the
case. The delay in raising the claim of juvenility
cannot be a ground for rejection of such claim.
The claim of juvenility can be raised in appeal
even if not pressed before the trial court and
can be raised for the first time before this
Court though not pressed before the trial court
and in the appeal court.
2 (2012) 10 SCC 489
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39.2. For making a claim with regard to
juvenility after conviction, the claimant must
produce some material which may prima facie
satisfy the court that an inquiry into the claim
of juvenility is necessary. Initial burden has to
be discharged by the person who claims
juvenility.
39.3. As to what materials would prima facie
satisfy the court and/or are sufficient for
discharging the initial burden cannot be
catalogued nor can it be laid down as to what
weight should be given to a specific piece of
evidence which may be sufficient to raise
presumption of juvenility but the documents
referred to in Rules 12(3)(a)(i) to (iii) shall
definitely be sufficient for prima facie
satisfaction of the court about the age of the
delinquent necessitating further enquiry under
Rule 12. The statement recorded under Section
313 of the Code is too tentative and may not
by itself be sufficient ordinarily to justify or
reject the claim of juvenility. The credibility
and/or acceptability of the documents like the
school leaving certificate or the voters’ list, etc.
obtained after conviction would depend on the
facts and circumstances of each case and no
hard-and-fast rule can be prescribed that they
must be prima facie accepted or rejected. In
Akbar Sheikh (2009) 7 SCC 415 : (2009) 3 SCC
(Cri) 431 and Pawan (2009) 15 SCC 259 :
(2010) 2 SCC (Cri) 522 these documents were
not found prima facie credible while in Jitendra
Singh (2010) 13 SCC 523 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri)
857 the documents viz. school leaving
certificate, marksheet and the medical report
were treated sufficient for directing an inquiry
and verification of the appellant’s age. If such
documents prima facie inspire confidence of
the court, the court may act upon such
documents for the purposes of Section 7-A and
order an enquiry for determination of the age
of the delinquent.
39.4. An affidavit of the claimant or any of the
parents or a sibling or a relative in support of
the claim of juvenility raised for the first time in
appeal or revision or before this Court during
the pendency of the matter or after disposal of
the case shall not be sufficient justifying an
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enquiry to determine the age of such person
unless the circumstances of the case are so
glaring that satisfy the judicial conscience of
the court to order an enquiry into
determination of the age of the delinquent.
39.5. The court where the plea of juvenility is
raised for the first time should always be
guided by the objectives of the 2000 Act and
be alive to the position that the beneficent and
salutary provisions contained in the 2000 Act
are not defeated by the hypertechnical
approach and the persons who are entitled to
get benefits of the 2000 Act get such benefits.
The courts should not be unnecessarily
influenced by any general impression that in
schools the parents/guardians understate the
age of their wards by one or two years for
future benefits or that age determination by
medical examination is not very precise. The
matter should be considered prima facie on the
touchstone of preponderance of probability.
39.6. Claim of juvenility lacking in credibility or
frivolous claim of juvenility or patently absurd
or inherently improbable claim of juvenility
must be rejected by the court at the threshold
whenever raised.
13. Again, in Union of India vs. Ex-GNR Ajeet Singh3
it
was held:-
“19. The provisions of the JJ Act have been
interpreted by this Court time and again, and it
has been clearly explained that raising the age
of “juvenile” to 18 years from 16 years would
apply retrospectively. It is also clear that the
plea of juvenility can be raised at any time,
even after the relevant judgment/order has
attained finality and even if no such plea had
been raised earlier. Furthermore, it is the date
of the commission of the offence, and not the
date of taking cognizance or of framing of
charges or of the conviction, that is to be taken
into consideration. Moreover, where the plea of
juvenility has not been raised at the initial
stage of trial and has been taken only on the
appellate stage, this Court has consistently
3 (2013) 4 SCC 186
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maintained the conviction, but has set aside
the sentence.
(See Jayendra v. State of U.P. [(1981) 4 SCC
149 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 809 : AIR 1982 SC 685],
Gopinath Ghosh v. State of W.B. [1984 Supp
SCC 228 : 1984 SCC (Cri) 478 : AIR 1984 SC
237], Bhoop Ram v. State of U.P. [(1989) 3 SCC
1 : 1989 SCC (Cri) 486 : AIR 1989 SC 1329] ,
Umesh Singh v. State of Bihar [(2000) 6 SCC 89
: 2000 SCC (Cri) 1026 : AIR 2000 SC 2111],
Akbar Sheikh v. State of W.B. [(2009) 7 SCC
415 : (2009) 3 SCC (Cri) 431], Hari Ram v.
State of Rajasthan [(2009) 13 SCC 211 : (2010)
1 SCC (Cri) 987], Babla v. State of Uttarakhand
[(2012) 8 SCC 800 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 1067]
and Abuzar Hossain v. State of W.B. [(2012) 10
SCC 489 : (2013) 1 SCC (Cri) 83])”
14. Reference may also be made to Jintendra Singh
alias Babboo Singh and Anr. vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh4
laying down as follows:
“80. The settled legal position, therefore, is
that in all such cases where the accused was
above 16 years but below 18 years of age on
the date of occurrence, the proceedings
pending in the court concerned will continue
and be taken to their logical end except that
the court upon finding the juvenile guilty would
not pass an order of sentence against him.
Instead he shall be referred to the Board for
appropriate orders under the 2000 Act.
Applying that proposition to the case at hand
the trial court and the High Court could and
indeed were legally required to record a finding
as to the guilt or otherwise of the appellant. All
that the courts could not have done was to
pass an order of sentence, for which purpose,
they ought to have referred the case to the
Juvenile Justice Board.
81. The matter can be examined from another
angle. Section 7-A(2) of the Act prescribes the
procedure to be followed when a claim of
4 (2013) 11 SCC 193
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juvenility is made before any court. Section 7-
A(2) is as under:
“7-A. Procedure to be followed when claim
of juvenility is raised before any court.—
(1)***
(2) If the court finds a person to be a juvenile
on the date of commission of the offence under
sub-section (1), it shall forward the juvenile to
the Board for passing appropriate order, and
the sentence if any, passed by a court shall be
deemed to have no effect.”
82. A careful reading of the above would show
that although a claim of juvenility can be raised
by a person at any stage and before any court,
upon such court finding the person to be a
juvenile on the date of the commission of the
offence, it has to forward the juvenile to the
Board for passing appropriate orders and the
sentence, if any, passed shall be deemed to
have (sic no) effect. There is no provision
suggesting, leave alone making it obligatory for
the court before whom the claim for juvenility
is made, to set aside the conviction of the
juvenile on the ground that on the date of
commission of the offence he was a juvenile,
and hence not triable by an ordinary criminal
court. Applying the maxim expressio unius est
exclusio alterius, it would be reasonable to hold
that the law insofar as it requires a reference to
be made to the Board excludes by necessary
implication any intention on the part of the
legislature requiring the courts to set aside the
conviction recorded by the lower court.
Parliament, it appears, was content with
setting aside the sentence of imprisonment
awarded to the juvenile and making of a
reference to the Board without specifically or
by implication requiring the court concerned to
alter or set aside the conviction. That perhaps
is the reason why this Court has in several
decisions simply set aside the sentence
awarded to the juvenile without interfering with
the conviction recorded by the court concerned
and thereby complied with the mandate of
Section 7-A(2) of the Act.”
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15. Faced with the above, learned counsel for the State
fairly stated that the petitioner may be entitled to the relief
sought. He, however, points out that a person claiming
juvenile must approach the trial court first. Since in the
present case, the High Court has declined to entertain an
application as per order dated 2 December, 2014 a copy of
which has been produced, we consider it appropriate to
entertain this application.
16. In view of the above undisputed legal position, we
have no option but to allow this application and while
leaving the conviction undisturbed, set aside the sentence.
The petitioner may be released from custody forthwith
unless required in any other case.
……..…………………………….J.
[T.S. THAKUR]
.….………………………………..J.
[ ADARSH KUMAR GOEL ]
NEW DELHI
MARCH 16, 2015
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