Item No.10 of Schedule V of the Act in employing the concerned workmen as temporary, badli and part-time employees against permanent posts doing perennial nature of work and continuing them as such for number of years. This is a clear case of unfair labour practice as defined under Section 2(ra) of the Act which is statutorily prohibited under Section 25T of the Act and the said action of the Corporation amounts to penalty under Section 25U of the Act. For this reason also, the findings and reasons recorded in the Award of the CGIT in answering the points of dispute referred to it by Central Government in favour of the concerned workmen is legal and valid. The High Court has erred in not noticing the aforesaid important, relevant, factual and legal aspect of the case of the concerned workmen and has erroneously set aside the Award of the CGIT passed in favour of the concerned workmen in exercise of its judicial power. The High Court has erred in not following the legal principles laid down by this Court in the case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation[9], wherein it is held thus:- "17. Before concluding, we consider it necessary to observe that while exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to keep in mind that the Industrial Disputes Act and other similar legislative instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to be interpreted keeping in view the goals set out in the preamble of the Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general and Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that the State should secure a social order for the promotion of welfare of the people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution of material resources of the community to sub-serve the common good and also ensure that the workers get their dues. More than 41 years ago, Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and economic justice is a living concept of revolutionary import; it gives sustenance to the rule of law and meaning and significance to the ideal of welfare State" - State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923." The said principle has been reiterated by this Court recently in the case of Jasmer Singh v. State Of Haryana & Anr. (C.A. No. 346 OF 2015). For the aforesaid reasons also, the case of the concerned workmen/appellants must succeed and the impugned judgment and order must be set aside. Accordingly, it is set aside. Answer to point (iii) It is needless to mention that since we are of the view that the Award passed by the CGIT in I.D. No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid, it shall be restored and implemented by the Corporation by absorbing the concerned workmen in the permanent posts and if they have attained the age of superannuation, the Corporation will be liable to pay all consequential benefits including monetary benefits taking into consideration the pay scale and revised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.

                                  REPORTABLE
                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6950 OF 2009

 TAMILNADU TERMINATED FULL TIME
 TEMPORARY LIC EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION   .........APPELLANT

                                     Vs.

  LIFE INSURANCE CORPORATION OF
  INDIA & ORS.                         ......RESPONDENTS

                     WITH
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6951 OF 2009,
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6952 OF 2009,
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6953 OF 2009,
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6954 OF 2009,
                                     AND
                        CIVIL APPEAL NO.6956 OF 2009



                               J U D G M E N T


V.GOPALA GOWDA, J.

This group of appeals  has  been  filed  by  various  appellant-Associations
questioning the correctness of the common impugned judgment and order  dated
21.03.2007 passed in Letters Patent Appeal No. 690 of 2004 along with  batch
matters  by  the  Delhi  High  Court  in  dismissing  the  appeals  of   the
appellant/concerned workmen by issuing certain directions contained at  para
20(a) of the said impugned judgment in affirming the judgment and  order  of
learned single Judge in allowing the Writ Petitions filed by the respondent-
Life Insurance Corporation of  India  (for  short  "the  Corporation").  The
appellant-Associations have filed  these  appeals  urging  various  relevant
facts and legal contentions  with  a  prayer  to  restore  the  Award  dated
18.06.2001 passed by the Central Government Industrial Tribunal,  New  Delhi
(for short "the CGIT") in I.D. No.27 of 1991.
The facts of the case are stated here under for the purpose of  appreciating
the factual and rival legal contentions urged on behalf of the parties  with
a view to ascertain whether the appellants/concerned  workmen  are  entitled
to the relief as prayed for   in these appeals:-
The  concerned  workmen  are  the  members  of  the  appellant-Associations,
Federation  of  Employees  Association,  Workers   Association   and   other
concerned individual workmen  who  were  working  in  the  branches  of  the
Corporation at various places  in  the  country  have  raised  the  existing
industrial dispute between the concerned workmen and the management  of  the
Corporation regarding their absorption  as  regular  and  permanent  service
employees in their  respective  posts  of  the  Corporation.  The  concerned
workmen in all these appeals have been working as temporary, badli and part-
time workmen claiming that they have been appointed  by  the  management  of
the Corporation on daily wage basis against the leave  vacancies  and  other
vacancies of its employees in Class III  and  IV  posts  in  various  branch
offices and Divisions of the Corporation.  Their  claim  for  regularisation
were based on two Awards passed of the  National  Industrial  Tribunal  (for
short 'the NIT') (i) the Award passed by Justice R.D. Tulpule on  17.04.1986
with regard to absorption of similarly placed  workmen  by  the  Corporation
who had been working on temporary/badli/part-time basis in Class III and  IV
category posts in their respective branches of the Corporation  and  (ii)the
Award passed by Justice S.M. Jamdar dated 26.08.1988,  in  pursuant  to  the
reference made by  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  Government  of  India,  under
Section 36A of the Industrial Disputes Act,  1947  (for  short  'the  Act'),
where the NIT clarified and affirmed the Award dated  17.04.1986  passed  by
Justice R. D. Tulpule.
The present dispute  that  arose  between  the  concerned  workmen  and  the
Corporation was referred to the CGIT by  the  Ministry  of  Labour,  Central
Government, in exercise of its statutory power under Section  10(1)(d)  read
with Section 2A of the Act  vide  Order  No.  L-17011/107/90-IR-B(II)  dated
04.03.1991 on the basis of the report of the Conciliation  Officer  for  its
adjudication on the following question :-
"Whether the action of the  management  of  Life  Insurance  Corporation  of
India in not absorbing Badli/temporary and part  time  workmen  employed  in
the establishment of LIC after 20.5.1985  is  justified,  if  not,  to  what
relief the workmen are entitled?"

The said industrial dispute has been raised by the Associations,  Federation
of workmen and concerned workmen in  their  individual  capacity  which  was
supported by the Unions and Associations of these workmen of  the  divisions
and zones of the Corporation across India and workmen who  have  represented
their case on individual basis. Apart from the  said  Unions,  Associations,
Federation of some of  the  workmen  from  Tamilnadu  Terminated  Full  Time
Temporary LIC Employees Association and E.  Prabhawati  and  Ors.  had  also
been impleaded as parties in the dispute before  the  CGIT.   E.  Prabhawati
and Ors. were impleaded vide order  dated  01.12.1993  and  The  Tamil  Nadu
Terminated Temporary Full Time LIC Association was impleaded in the  pending
reference case vide order dated 06.04.1995.
The Corporation is  a  creature  of  the  Statute,  namely,  Life  Insurance
Corporation Act, 1956 (for short "the LIC Act"). Section 48 of the  LIC  Act
enables the Central Government to make rules to carry  out  the  performance
of the Act by notification in the official gazette.  Section  49(1)  of  the
LIC Act empowers the Corporation to make regulations not  inconsistent  with
the provisions of the LIC Act and the rules made  there  under  provide  for
all matters for which provision is  expedient  for  the  purpose  of  giving
effect to the provisions of the LIC Act with the previous  approval  of  the
Central Government by notification in the gazette of  India.  Section  49(2)
of the LIC Act lists certain matters  for  which  Regulations  may  be  made
without prejudice to the generality of the power  conferred  by  sub-section
(1). The LIC  Act  was  amended  by  the  Amendment  Act  17  of  1957  with
retrospective effect by incorporating sub-clause (bb) of  sub-section  2  of
Section 49 of the Amended Act, 1957 which was omitted  later  by  Act  1  of
1981 (w.e.f. 31.1.1981) which provides for terms and conditions  of  service
of the persons who have  become  employees  of  the  Corporation  under  its
Section 11 sub-Section (1) of the  Act.  By  the  authority  vested  in  the
Corporation under clause (bb) of  sub-Section  (2)  of  Section  49  of  the
amended Act, the Corporation  framed  Regulations  defining  the  terms  and
conditions of service of the staff of the Corporation known as LIC of  India
(Staff) Regulations, 1960 (for short "the Staff  Regulations,  1960")  which
was notified in the Gazette of India No. IV dated 23.7.1960  and  came  into
force with effect from 1.7.1960. It  is  pertinent  to  note  that  although
according to the Staff  Regulations,  1960  there  are  only  two  types  of
employment that have been provided for in the Regulations  (i)  regular  and
(ii) temporary. The employment in the capacity of badlis, part-time  is  not
provided  thereunder.  There  is  no  specific  nomenclature  in  the  Staff
Regulations, 1960, in this regard,  but  the  said  type  of  employment  is
prevalent in the  Corporation  both  in  the  Center  and  also  in  various
Divisions, Zonal offices throughout India. The concerned workmen  have  been
continuously  working  in  different  capacities  such  as  peons,   hamals,
watchman-cum-pump man,  lift  man,  house  attendants,  sweepers,  cleaners,
assistant typist etc. on  daily  wage  basis  against  permanent  and  other
vacancies during that period.
Between the years 1981-85, a large number of employees of Class III  and  IV
posts were employed by the Corporation in the capacity of badlis,  temporary
and part-time workers. Their wage, conditions for the  absorption  into  the
regular cadre and other conditions of service were  the  subject  matter  of
the Industrial Dispute. Thus, the reference was made in this regard  to  the
National Industrial Tribunal as reference No. NTB-I of 1985. At the  initial
stage, the Western Zone Insurance  Employees  Association,  Bombay  and  the
Central Zone National  Life  Insurance  Corporation  Employees  Association,
Kanpur were the only parties  to  the  reference  besides  the  Corporation.
Later on, all the Unions of all the Regions and the  Zones  in  the  country
joined as parties and filed their respective  claim  statements  before  the
NIT. During the course of said proceedings an interim Award  was  passed  by
the National Industrial Tribunal on the prayer of the  workmen,  restricting
the Corporation from  recruiting  or  absorbing  any  person  in  the  posts
without prior permission of the Tribunal. According  to  the  interim  Award
passed by the NIT, the  Corporation  was  restrained  from  making  any  new
appointments except where persons had to be appointed  over  and  above  the
then existing vacancies against which posts the badli,  temporary  or  part-
time workmen who had been working or had worked  with  the  Corporation  and
those who would be concerned in the  reference  had  to  be  appointed  from
amongst the badlis, temporary  or  part-time  workmen  against  any  vacancy
continued, provided an undertaking is  given  to  the  Corporation  by  such
workmen stating that no benefit would be claimed.
After adjudication of the said Industrial Dispute between the  parties,  the
Award was passed by Justice R.D. Tulpule on 17.4.1986. The  said  Award  was
based on the  suggestions  invited  both  from  the  workmen  and  from  the
management of the Corporation.  The parties had given  the  mandate  to  the
NIT to base its Award on any of the suggestions given by the  parties  after
making necessary modifications.
In the Award dated 17.04.1986, it was held that only those workmen  who  had
worked in the Corporation during the period  January  1,  1982  to  May  20,
1985, the date of the  reference  was  to  be  considered  as  eligible  for
absorption. The Award held that the workmen  claiming  absorption  in  Class
III posts should have worked for 85 days in a period of two  calendar  years
and the workman claiming absorption in Class IV post should have worked  for
70 days in a period of three calendar years. It was further held by the  NIT
that the calculation of the number of days of work should be up to the  date
of reference. The Corporation was further directed to  appoint  a  screening
committee to consider suitability and desirability of such eligible  workmen
for their absorption in the posts of the Corporation. It was  also  directed
by the NIT to the Corporation that the workmen  considered  to  be  suitable
and desirable for the absorption should be absorbed against vacancies  which
existed in the Corporation  as  on  31.3.1985  and  those  which  may  arise
subsequently. The Corporation was also directed not to recruit outsiders  in
a particular Division till such lists of workmen were exhausted.  Directions
given in the Award on the question of absorptions  have  been  mentioned  in
paras 40 to 60 and 66 of the Award of Justice R.D. Tulpule.
Aggrieved by the said Award of Justice R.D.  Tulpule  dated  17.4.1986,  the
Corporation filed Writ Petition No. 1801 of 1986 before the  High  Court  of
Judicature of Bombay challenging its legality.  The  Writ  Petition  of  the
Corporation was dismissed by the High Court vide order dated 14.8.1986,  but
at the same time, the High Court gave a certificate to the  Corporation  for
seeking clarification of the said Award under Section 36A  of  the  Act.  In
compliance  with  the  Award  dated  17.04.1986,  the   Corporation,   while
interpreting the Award with respect to the  absorption  of  the  workmen  as
recruitment,  had  issued  six  circulars  commencing  from   17.9.1986   to
25.2.1987.  The  Workers  Union  and  Associations  disputed  the  aforesaid
instructions issued by the Corporation.  Therefore,  an  Industrial  Dispute
was raised once again. The Central Government  in  the  Ministry  of  Labour
made a reference under Section 36A of the Act  to  the  NIT  being  presided
over by Justice S.M. Jamdar and the same was registered as NTB(1)  of  1987,
which reads thus :-
"Can the Award dated 17.4.1986 with special reference to paragraphs 44,  45,
46, 48, 49, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 60, 64 and  66  and  the  interim  order
dated 14.3.1986 be interpreted to mean that the Central Office of  the  Life
Insurance    Corporation    of    India    is     empowered     to     issue
instructions/guidelines as  contained  in  their  circular  issued  in  this
behalf to implement the directions of the Award. If not, what could  be  the
correct interpretation of various directions covered by the said  paragraphs
in the circumstances of the case. Whether the term "absorption" referred  to
at various places in the Award can be interpreted in mean "recruitment".


During the course of the hearing of the said  reference,  an  interim  order
was passed by the NIT restraining the Corporation to  make  any  recruitment
from the open market during the pendency of the proceedings. The NIT,  after
hearing the parties and examining the points of dispute, answered  the  term
of reference and gave its own interpretation of the earlier Award passed  by
Justice R.D. Tulpule holding  that  the  observations  contemplated  by  the
earlier Award did not mean recruitment. An Award dated 26.8.1988 was  passed
accordingly by Justice S.M. Jamdar clarifying the Award  passed  by  Justice
Tulpule that absorption of workmen does not mean recruitment.

 Aggrieved by the said Award, the Corporation preferred  SLP  No.  14906  of
1988 titled The Management of Life Insurance Corporation of India  v.  Their
Workmen before this Court urging various legal contentions. It is  the  case
of the Corporation that during the course of the said SLP, a compromise  was
entered into between the Corporation and 8 out of the 9 Unions of the  above
SLP. Accordingly, this Court passed an order dated 1.3.1989 on the basis  of
the said compromise.  The  terms  and  conditions  of  the  said  compromise
between the parties therein will be extracted in the  reasoning  portion  of
this Judgment.

  In pursuant to the said compromise between the  parties  in  the  SLP,  as
directed by this Court, the Corporation gave appointments to a large  number
of such workmen working on temporary,  badli  and  part-time  basis  to  the
posts in the Class III as well as Class  IV  in  various  Divisions  of  the
Corporation. The said appointments were given to the  persons  recruited  on
temporary basis between 1.1.1982 to  20.5.1985.  Thereafter,  the  employees
who were employed as temporary, badli and part-time workers after  20.5.1985
raised the demand for their absorption and regularisation of  their  service
as permanent  employees.  When  their  demands  were  not  accepted  by  the
Corporation, several writ petitions in this respect were  filed  before  the
High Court of Madras between the years 1989 to 1991. The writ  petition  No.
10367 of 1989 filed between the Terminated Full Time Temporary  LIC  Welfare
Association and Senior Divisional Manager, LIC,  Khanjawar,  along  with  18
other writ petitions were listed for hearing before the full  bench  of  the
High Court of Madras. After hearing the parties of all the  writ  petitions,
the High Court dismissed the same which decision is  reported  in  1993  (1)
LLJ 1030.
 Being aggrieved by the said judgment, SLP  (C)  Nos.  10393-10413  of  1992
titled E. Prabhawati and Ors. v. LIC of India & Ors. were filed before  this
Court. In the said SLPs, on the direction of  this  Court,  the  Corporation
framed a Scheme for the regularization of the  employees  in  their  service
who were granted ad-hoc appointments for 85 days at intervals from  time  to
time and placed the same before this Court. After hearing the parties,  this
Court by means of an interim order dated 23.1.1992 found the  Scheme  to  be
reasonable and approved clauses (a) to  (d)  of  paragraph  1  of  the  said
Scheme and the  Corporation  was  directed  to  proceed  to  regularize  the
employees eligible in their service in accordance with the said Scheme.
 It is also  pertinent  to  note  that  during  the  pendency  of  the  writ
petitions before the High Court  of  Madras,  the  industrial  dispute  that
arose between the concerned workmen and the  Corporation  in  these  appeals
were referred to the CGIT  by  the  Ministry  of  Labour  vide  order  dated
4.3.1991. Further, during the continuance of the proceedings of the  present
reference E. Prabhawati and Ors. their impleadment application  was  allowed
vide order dated 1.12.1993. However, they  did  not  implead  in  the  above
dispute proceedings.
Thereafter, G. Sudhakar and Ors.  (similarly  placed  employees)  approached
the High Court of Andhra Pradesh seeking relief for the absorption in  their
employment of the Corporation in the Divisions where they were working.  The
High Court of Andhra Pradesh after hearing the parties  gave  directions  to
the Corporation to frame a Scheme on par with the E. Prabhavathy Scheme  for
regularisation  of  such  workmen.  Aggrieved  by  the   said   order,   the
Corporation filed C.A. No. 2104 of 2000 titled LIC of India  &  Ors.  v.  G.
Sudhakar & Ors.[1]  before this Court which was  disposed  of  by  observing
that the Scheme as has been passed in the case of E. Prabhavati & Ors.  case
(supra) will also be applicable to the case of G. Sudhakar and Ors.
 The CGIT conducted an inquiry to answer  the  points  of  disputes  arising
from the industrial dispute raised by the concerned workmen  in  this  case.
The CGIT on the basis of the pleadings, evidence on record and also  on  the
basis of the Award passed by Justice R.D. Tulpule  which  was  clarified  in
the Award passed by Justice S.M. Jamdar referred to  supra,  held  that  the
same are applicable to the concerned workmen in this  dispute.  Accordingly,
the CGIT passed an Award dated 18.06.2001 in terms of Justice  R.D.  Tulpule
and Justice S.M. Jamdar, giving directions  to  the  Corporation  for  their
absorption in their respective posts.
 The Corporation being aggrieved by the  Award  passed  by  the  CGIT  filed
Civil Writ Petition No. 4346 of 2001 before the  Delhi  High  Court  placing
strong reliance upon the order passed by this Court wherein it accepted  the
terms and conditions of the compromise arrived at  between  the  parties  in
the The Management of Life Insurance Corporation of India v.  Their  Workmen
(SLP No 14906 of 1988) referred to supra which was filed by the  Corporation
against the Awards of the NIT by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  Justice  S.M.
Jamdar Awards. Further, reliance was placed on E.  Prabhavati  &  Ors.  case
(supra) which  was  disposed  of  as  per  the  Scheme  worked  out  by  the
Corporation pursuant to the orders of this Court  in  that  case.  The  said
Scheme was as per the decision in the case of State of  Haryana  &  Ors.  v.
Piara Singh & Ors. wherein, this Court indicated how regularisation  of  ad-
hoc/temporary employees in the Government  and  Public  Sector  Undertakings
should be effected. Thereafter, the case of G.  Sudhakar  &  others  (supra)
was also disposed of as per terms in the E. Prabhavathi Scheme. Further,  it
was contended by the Corporation before the  learned  single  Judge  of  the
High Court that the CGIT without accepting the said  order/Scheme  which  is
binding upon  it  under  Article  141  of  the  Constitution  of  India  has
erroneously answered the points  of  dispute  in  favour  of  the  concerned
workmen.  The  said  contention  of  the  Corporation  was  opposed  by  the
Association, Unions, the Federation and concerned workmen involved in  these
appeals. The learned single Judge accepted  the  contention  raised  by  the
Corporation by relying on decisions rendered by this Court in  the  case  of
E.  Prabhavathy  &  Ors.  (supra)  and  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  (supra)   and
thereafter, held that on plain reading of the above said decisions  of  this
Court, the term of reference before the CGIT stood answered when this  Court
decided E. Prabhavathy  &  Ors.  (supra),  which  again  was  concluded  and
reiterated in the decision of this Court in  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  (supra).
Consequently, the Award passed by the CGIT  in  relation  to  the  concerned
workmen of these appeals was set  aside  by  the  learned  single  Judge  by
assigning his reasons in judgment and order passed by him.
 Aggrieved by the Judgment and order passed by the learned single  Judge  of
the High Court, the concerned workmen challenged the same by  filing  L.P.A.
No. 690 of 2004 and other connected appeals before  the  Division  Bench  of
the Delhi High Court  inter  alia  urging  that  the  findings  and  reasons
recorded by the learned single Judge in his judgment are not only  erroneous
in law but also suffer from error in law as the  learned  single  Judge  has
accepted the binding settlement between the Corporation  and  the  similarly
placed workmen. It was further contended that Section 18 (3) and Section  19
(3) & (6) of the Act were not properly examined keeping  in  mind  that  the
said settlement arose out of the Awards of the NIT being  challenged  before
this Court in SLP No. 14906 of 1988, however this  Court  at  no  point  set
aside the NIT Awards in spite of  the  compromise  arrived  at  between  the
parties therein, therefore, the learned  single  Judge  failed  to  consider
that the said Awards were still binding upon the Corporation. Therefore,  it
was contended by the concerned workmen before  the  Division  Bench  of  the
High Court of Delhi that the learned single Judge was not right  in  setting
aside the Award passed by the  CGIT  in  favour  of  the  concerned  workmen
involved in these appeals and prayed for setting aside the same by  allowing
the Letters Patent Appeals. The  Division  Bench  of  High  Court  of  Delhi
examined the points of  dispute  arising  out  of  the  Industrial  Disputes
raised by the workmen of the Corporation, facts and rival legal  contentions
and the correctness of the finding recorded by the learned single  Judge  in
setting aside the Award of the CGIT. It was held by the Division Bench  that
the  appointment  letters  issued  to  the  various  employees  specifically
stipulated that their appointments are temporary for a specified period  and
the same would be terminated on the expiry or the period  specified  therein
and that during  the  period  of  the  temporary  appointment  none  of  the
provisions of the LIC (Staff) Regulations, 1960 would apply. It was  further
held that the appellants had accepted the  aforesaid  terms  of  appointment
and therefore, they  cannot  raise  a  claim  for  their  regularisation  or
automatic absorption in the permanent posts. It was further held  that  this
Court in the decisions of E. Prabhavathy &  Ors.  and  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.
(supra)  also  declined  regularisation  of   workmen   and   directed   the
Corporation for conducting selection process  for  regular  appointment  and
that none of the appellants as on the date  of  raising  of  the  industrial
dispute were continuing in their respective posts as  their  services  stood
terminated on the expiry of the tenure of  their  temporary  employment  and
even if they had continued to serve it  was  because  of  orders  passed  by
various courts. It was further held by the Division Bench that the  reliance
placed on paragraph 53 of the Secretary, State of Karnataka v.  Uma  Devi[2]
by the appellants was misplaced as the ratio laid down in the said  case  is
not applicable to the facts of the present case under any  circumstance.  It
was further held that in the present cases, there is a specific  rule  which
provides as to how recruitment has  to  be  made  to  the  vacant  posts  on
regular basis, and the workmen herein were recruited under different set  of
instructions altogether which  were  meant  for  engagement  of  workmen  on
temporary basis and permit recruitment of temporary staff who would  not  be
entitled  for  absorption  in  the  posts  of  Class  III  and  IV  of   the
Corporation. Therefore, the Division Bench held that none of  the  cases  of
the  appellants  would  attract  for  issuance  of  the  direction  to   the
Corporation to absorb them automatically in their posts  and  dismissed  the
Letter Patent Appeals filed by the concerned  workmen.  Hence,  the  present
appeals urging various legal grounds.
 The correctness of the said findings of the  impugned  judgment  and  order
passed  by  the  Division  Bench  are  challenged  by  the  learned  counsel
appearing on behalf of the concerned workmen in these  appeals  inter  alia,
contending that the Award of the CGIT passed after  adjudication  of  points
of dispute was in relation to the concerned workmen who have been  appointed
by  the  Corporation  as  temporary,  badli  and  part-time  workmen   after
20.5.1985. These workmen have been  appointed  by  following  the  procedure
under the LIC (Staff) Regulations issued by the  Corporation  from  time  to
time and they  have  been  discharging  permanent  nature  of  work  against
permanent and regular vacancies as temporary, badli  and  part-time  workmen
in the various offices,  Zones  and  Divisions  of  the  Corporation  across
India. Further, it is contended  that  the  Awards  passed  by  the  NIT  by
Justice R.D. Tulpule, the same being clarified and affirmed by Justice  S.M.
Jamdar vide reference under Section  36A  of  the  Act,  were  passed  after
determination of the  points  of  dispute  in  relation  to  the  industrial
dispute raised by similarly placed  workmen  of  the  Corporation  who  were
appointed and had been working  on  such  permanent  and  regular  posts  on
temporary, badli and part-time basis in  Class  III  and  IV  categories  of
employees of the Corporation between 01.01.1982  to  20.05.1985.  Therefore,
the NIT Awards clarified that those similarly placed workmen  were  entitled
for absorption in terms of the direction given in the Award of Justice  R.D.
Tulpule which was clarified subsequently by the  Award  passed  in  1988  by
Justice S. M. Jamdar. Of course, the said Awards by the NIT were  challenged
before this Court in the SLP No. 14906 of 1988 at the  end  of  which  eight
out of nine unions therein entered into a compromise  with  the  Corporation
and the same was permitted by this  Court  by  way  of  an  interim  measure
without any prejudice to the rights and contentions of the  members  of  the
other Union who had not entered into such compromise. Accordingly, the  said
SLP was disposed of by this Court vide order dated  01.3.1989.  Further,  it
is contended by the  learned  counsel  that  the  CGIT  has  rightly  placed
reliance upon the terms and conditions of the Awards of Justice Tulpule  and
Justice Jamdar. Though the said Awards were  challenged  before  this  Court
and the matter was disposed  of  in  terms  of  the  compromise  arrived  at
between  the  parties  therein,  the  NIT  Awards  were  not  set  aside  or
terminated by the Corporation or by any other Award or order passed  by  NIT
or any other Court. Hence, the same will be operative  and  binding  between
the parties under Section 18(3)(d) read with  Section  19  sub-section(3)  &
(6) of the Act. In support of their contention,  reliance  was  placed  upon
the decision of The Life Insurance Corporation Of India v. D. J.  Bahadur  &
Ors.[3].
It is also contended by  Mr.  Shekhar  Naphade,  learned  amicus  curiae  on
behalf of the workmen that the  industrial  dispute  was  raised  under  the
provision of Section 2(k) read with Section 10 and 12  of  the  Act  by  the
concerned workmen who have been working as temporary,  badli  and  part-time
workmen in the posts of Class III and Class IV of the Corporation for  their
absorption in the permanent posts. The said claim of the  concerned  workmen
was disputed  by  the  Corporation;  the  Central  Government  referred  the
existing industrial dispute to the CGIT for adjudication of  the  points  of
dispute as it has got the jurisdiction to  adjudicate  the  said  industrial
dispute. He placed strong reliance upon Schedule IV of the Act  and  invited
our attention to Item No. 6 in Schedule II under which  matters  other  than
those specified in the III Schedule  are  within  the  jurisdiction  of  the
Labour Court and also  Item  No.  11  of  Schedule  IV  which  provides  for
Conditions of Service for Change of which Notice  is  to  be  given  by  the
Corporation in case of any increase or reduction (other than casual) in  the
number of persons employed or to be employed in any  occupation  or  process
or department or shift,  [not occasioned by  the  circumstances  over  which
the employer has no control]. Since the  Corporation  is  a  Statutory  Body
which has come into existence under the LIC Act, 1956,  it  is  required  to
follow the provisions of the Act with regard to service  conditions  of  the
workmen, including better  service  conditions,  absorption,  regularisation
etc. He has also placed reliance upon the Item No. 10 of V Schedule  to  the
Act, wherein it states that it is an unfair labour practice on the  part  of
the employer to employ workmen  as  "badlis",  casuals  or  temporaries  and
continue them as such for years, with the object of depriving  them  of  the
status and privileges of permanent workmen and the same is prohibited  under
Section 25T of the Act. Further, strong reliance was placed by him upon  the
provisions under Section 25T and 25U under  Chapter  VC  of  the  Act,  with
regard to the Unfair Labour Practices on the part of  the  employer  wherein
it is stated that an employee or a workman and Trade Union shall not  commit
any unfair labour practice in relation to the matter as enumerated in the  V
Schedule referred to supra and further Section 25U of the  Act  contemplates
that any person either employer or Trade Unions  of  Employers  who  commits
unfair labour practice as enumerated in the V  schedule  shall  be  punished
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six  months  or  with  fine
which may extend to Rs.1,000/- or both. Therefore, it is contended  that  in
the case on hand, the workmen concerned have  been  employed  on  temporary,
badli  and  part-time  basis  for  several  years,  depriving  them  of  the
privileges of permanent workmen which is  a  clear  case  of  unfair  labour
practice on the part of the Corporation under Item 10 Schedule V,  which  is
prohibited under Section 25T of the Act and the Corporation would be  liable
for penalty under Section 25U of the Act. Therefore, the CGIT has got  ample
power to adjudicate the existing industrial dispute between the  parties  on
the basis of the points of dispute referred to it with respect to the  claim
raised by the concerned workmen. Further, in  justification  of  the  Awards
passed by  the  NIT  in  giving  direction  to  the  Corporation  to  absorb
similarly situated workmen from 01.01.1982 till 20.05.1985, strong  reliance
was placed by him  upon  the  case  of  Bharat  Bank  Ltd.  v.  Bharat  Bank
Employees Union[4] wherein, this Court discussed the  powers  of  Industrial
Tribunal to override the contracts. Therefore, the aforesaid  Awards  passed
by the NIT are binding between the parties under Section 18(3) of  the  Act.
The Awards passed by the NIT in a similar dispute  are  still  operative  as
the same are not terminated by either  of  the  parties  as  provided  under
Section 19(6) of the Act, even after the expiry of the period  of  operation
under Section 19(3) of the Act, & therefore, the Awards  shall  continue  to
be operative & binding on the parties until  a  period  of  two  months  has
elapsed  from  the  date  on  which  notice  is  given  by  the  Corporation
intimating its intention to terminate the Awards. He further contended  that
in the case on hand, no such notice is issued by either of the  parties  and
therefore the Awards are operative and binding in law upon the parties.
The aforesaid contentions, are rebutted by the learned  senior  counsel  Mr.
Kailash Vasdev, appearing on  behalf  of  the  Corporation,  placing  strong
reliance on a series of judgments of this Court to show that the  compromise
was entered into between the Corporation and 99% of the employees on  behalf
of the workmen involved in the SLP 14906 of 1988 filed  by  the  Corporation
questioning the correctness of the Awards passed  by  Justice  R.D.  Tulpule
and Justice S.M. Jamdar. Therefore, the said compromise is  binding  between
the parties as provided under Section 18(3) of  the  Act.  Further,  he  has
urged that the case of D. J. Bahadur (supra), upon which reliance  has  been
placed  by  the  learned  counsel  for  the  appellants,  is  sought  to  be
distinguished by him by  relying  on  paragraphs  43  and  47  of  the  said
judgment in support of the case of the Corporation contending that the  said
decision does not render any assistance to the workmen in these appeals.  He
placed  reliance  on  the  decisions  of  this  Court   in   the   case   of
Herbertsons'[5], Transmission  Corporation,  A.P.  Ltd.  v.  P.  Ramachandra
Rao[6], ITC Ltd. Workers' Welfare Association v.  ITC  Ltd.[7]  and  Jaihind
Roadways v. Maharashtra Rajya Mathadi Transport &  General  Kamgar  Union[8]
to contend that the said Award of Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  and  clarified  by
Justice S.M. Jamdar Award  are  replaced  and  merged  with  the  compromise
arrived at between the parties before this Court in SLP 14906 of  1988,  and
the said compromise is binding on the Corporation and  the  parties  to  the
compromise that Awards are not in operation, therefore, the CGIT  has  erred
in placing reliance upon the same to grant relief in favour of  the  workmen
which has been rightly set aside by the High Court. It is further  contended
by him that in the SLP filed against the judgment of full Bench of the  High
Court of Madras by E. Prabhavati and Ors., wherein, the  Scheme  was  framed
by the Corporation in these cases on the direction of this Court, which  was
accepted by the parties and the Special Leave Petition was  disposed  of  in
the aforesaid terms by this Court by its order  dated  23.10.1992.  Further,
it is  contended  that  thereafter,  the  decision  of  the  High  Court  of
Judicature of Andhra Pradesh in the Writ Petition filed by G.  Sudhakar  and
Ors. (supra) was also challenged by the Corporation before  this  Court  and
disposed of in the same in terms of  the  Scheme  as  in  E.  Prabhavathy  &
Ors.(supra) case. Further, it is submitted that the Award of  absorption  of
the concerned workmen passed by the CGIT has been rightly set aside  by  the
learned single Judge and the said decision of the learned single  Judge  has
been rightly affirmed in the judgment  and  order  passed  by  the  Division
Bench of the Delhi High  Court  by  giving  cogent  and  valid  reasons  and
therefore, the same  does  not  call  for  interference  by  this  Court  in
exercise of its Appellate Jurisdiction.
In view of the factual and rival legal  contentions  urged  by  the  learned
counsel on behalf of the parties and the amicus curiae, we  have  to  answer
the same by recording our reasons as to (i) whether  the  setting  aside  of
the Award passed by  the  CGIT  by  the  learned  single  Judge  by  placing
reliance upon compromise reached between the  parties  in  SLP  No.14906  of
1988, which was filed against the Award of Justice Tulpule, which Award  was
clarified and affirmed by  Justice  S.M.  Jamdar  is  justified,  legal  and
valid?, (ii) whether the judgment and order  of  the  learned  single  Judge
being affirmed by the Division Bench of High Court in its judgment is  legal
and valid? and (iii) what Award/Order the  appellants  are  entitled  to  in
law?
We answer point (i) and (ii)  together  as  the  same  are  interrelated  by
assigning the following reasons-
Undisputedly, the concerned workmen in the above references before the  CGIT
have been working in different offices and Zones, Divisional offices of  the
Corporation in various posts namely peons,  hamals,  watchman-cum-pump  man,
lift man, house attendants, sweepers,  cleaners,  assistant  typist  etc  in
different parts of the country who were appointed  by  following  the  Rules
and Instructions of the Corporation which were relevant  at  that  point  of
time. The concerned workmen in industrial dispute referred to the CGIT  have
been discharging perennial nature of  work  against  the  regular  permanent
posts in the Corporation. The industrial dispute raised by similarly  placed
workmen, who were appointed between the period  01.01.1982  till  20.05.1985
was adjudicated on the points of dispute by  the  NIT  with  regard  to  the
justification of absorption of the said  workmen  as  permanent  workmen  in
their respective posts by Justice R.D. Tulpule. The relevant portion of  the
Award  is  extracted  as  under  for  better  appreciation  of  rival  legal
submissions made by the learned counsel on behalf  of  the  parties  with  a
view to examine the correctness of the findings recorded by the High Court:-

"65.  In the light of the directions above with regard  to  observation  and
creation of additional post by the Corporation I do  not  think  that  there
would be any occasion in future for the corporation  to  employ  workman  in
the temporary  and  badlee  categories  existing   for  the  occasional  and
temporary increase in work which necessitate employment of  temporary  staff
in all probability  would be only amongst class III  cadre,  in  which  case
there could be no occasion and there  need  not  be  I  think  any  case  or
situation require consideration or grant of any  other  benefit  apart  from
the wage to such workman.
66.I hope and expect that in the light of  what has been  said  and  a  past
exercise of  the  corporation   situation  where  a  large  number  of  such
employees  could  be  engaged  without  adherence  to  any  formalities   or
procedures by the various local managements would be  completely  eliminated
and done away with and this kind of employment in  the  corporation  history
would  be  the  last  occasion.  Excepting  the  temporary  employment   the
corporation will have no occasion or necessity to employ  badly  workmen  it
is hoped in future. Though part  time  employees  will  continue  to  be  in
existence for some more time as I have indicated, the corporation will  also
see its own way to absorb the part time employees in its regular  employment
as far as possible and reduce the number  of  part  time  employees  to  the
minimum however, whenever, hereafter  any  occasion  or  vacancy  arises  of
regular employment in part time  categories and employment, then  those  who
have worked part time in accordance with their  seniority  should  be  given
preference  for  absorption  in  the  regular  cadre  of  the  Corporation's
employment. This should be irrespective of the qualifying age for the  entry
into corporation's service qualification but  subject  to  his  being  found
suitable."

Upon the reference under Section 36A of the Act being made by  the  Ministry
of Labour to Justice S. M. Jamdar to  clarify  the  Award  of  Justice  R.D.
Tulpule, it was held that the Award of Justice Tulpule  was  very  clear  as
the same directs only for the absorption of the  workmen  concerned  in  the
said dispute in the various offices,  Divisions  and  Zones  throughout  the
country. Therefore, it does not amount to recruitment.
Aggrieved by the said Award, the Corporation had  filed  SLP  No.  14906  of
1988 before this Court urging various grounds. In the said SLP,  this  Court
in its order dated 1.3.1989 has observed that eight out of the nine  workmen
Unions said to be representing about 99% of the workers have entered into  a
compromise with the management of the Corporation.  This  Court  further  in
the course of the order has observed and permitted  the  management  of  the
Corporation and the said eight Unions to implement the  said  compromise  by
way  of  an  interim  measure  without  any  prejudice  to  the  rights  and
contentions of the members of the other Union, who  have  not  entered  into
such compromise with the Corporation. The relevant terms and  conditions  of
the compromise read thus :-
"The Management agrees  to  consider  the  temporary/part-tim/badli  workmen
employed by the petitioner for 85 days in an two years in a Class  III  post
and for 70 days in any three years  in  a  Class  IV  post  in  any  of  its
establishments during the period 1.1.82 to 20.5.85, for  regular  employment
on the basis and in the manner stated hereinbeloe. ... the selection of  the
candidate shall be made on the basis of the  folloing  qualifications,  age,
test, interview and also having regard to the number of days worked  by  the
candidates. A panel of selected candidates shall be made  and  the  selected
candidates shall be appointed in regular employment from  the  pane  in  the
order of merit  propectivity  from  the  dates  to  be  notifdies  and  when
vacancies in sanctioned posts for regular employment are  filled  from  time
to time"
Pursuant to the above compromise, this Court passed the following  order  in
SLP No. 14906 of 1988 on 1.3.1989 :-
"Special leave is granted. It appears that out of nine Unions  eight  Unions
said to be representing about  99%  of  the  workers  have  entered  into  a
compromise with the Management.  In  the  circumstances  pending  the  final
disposal of the appeal, we permit the Management  and  the  members  of  the
said eight Unions to implement the terms of compromise  by  way  of  interim
measure without however, any prejudice to the rights and contentions of  the
members of the other Union, who have not entered into such  compromise  with
the management."
                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)


25. From the perusal of the above order of this Court in SLP 14906 of  1988,
nowhere it has been stated in  the  terms  of  the  compromise  between  the
parties that the Award of Justice R.D.  Tulpule  which  was  clarified  upon
reference made by the Central Government under Section 36A  of  the  Act  by
Justice Jamdar, is either  set  aside  by  this  Court  or  substituted  the
compromise terms in the place of the Award  except  the  order  referred  to
supra passed in the above SLP 14906 of 1988. In fact, on the other  hand  it
is clearly stated that the compromise terms are between the parties  to  the
said SLP  and  that  it  shall  not  prejudice  the  respective  rights  and
obligations in relation to the members of the other  union.  Therefore,  the
effect of the Award of Justice R. D. Tulpule with regard  to  the  direction
given to the Corporation regarding absorption of badli, temporary  employees
as permanent employees has not been substituted by terms and  conditions  of
the compromise. The Award of Justice  R.D.  Tulpule  reiterated  by  way  of
clarification  in  the  Award  passed  by  Justice  Jamdar  in  the  dispute
subsequently has  been  operative  even  after  the  compromise  arrived  at
between the parties to the compromise in the SLP  No.14906  of  1988  before
this Court. Therefore, the contention  of  the  learned  senior  counsel  on
behalf of the Corporation that the said Awards  are  not  in  operation  and
that only the terms and conditions of compromise and orders  of  this  Court
are binding upon  the  concerned  workmen  in  these  appeals  is  not  both
factually and legally correct. This  above  said  argument  of  the  learned
senior counsel on behalf of the Corporation is not tenable in  view  of  the
categorical statement made by  this  Court  in  its  orders  passed  in  SLP
referred to supra, wherein, this Court  has  permitted  the  management  and
members of the said 8 Unions to implement the terms of compromise by way  of
interim measure without any prejudice to the rights and contentions  of  the
members of other Union  who  have  not  entered  into  compromise  with  the
management of the Corporation. It is not the  case  of  the  Corporation  in
these appeals either before the CGIT or before the High Court  or  in  these
proceedings the concerned workmen have also  accepted  the  said  terms  and
conditions of the compromise arrived between the  parties  in  the  SLP  No.
14906 of 1988. This Court in the order passed in the above  said  SLP  which
is extracted hereinabove has made it very clear  that  the  said  compromise
entered into between unions therein, but it does not  prejudice  the  rights
and contentions of the concerned workmen whose disputes are in  relation  to
their  absorption  in  their  respective  posts  who  were  appointed  after
20.05.1985. Further, even if some of the workmen are bound  under  the  said
compromise that arose out of SLP No. 14906 of 1988, this in  no  way  deters
their right to raise the industrial dispute and  get  the  same  adjudicated
vide order of reference by the  appropriate  Government  to  the  CGIT.  The
Award  of  the  CGIT  was  concluded  after  rightly  examining  the  facts,
circumstances of the case and the legal principles laid down in  the  Awards
passed by Justice Tulpule and Justice  Jamdar.  More  importantly  the  CGIT
Award was passed after rightly appreciating the points of  dispute  referred
to it and on the  merits  of  the  case.   Furthermore,  as  per  the  legal
principle laid down by this Court in the case of Bharat  Bank  (supra),  the
Industrial Court while adjudicating an industrial dispute has the  right  to
override contracts and  create  rights  which  are  opposed  to  contractual
rights.  The CGIT has rightly adjudicated the  industrial  dispute  referred
to it by the Central Government at the instance of the concerned workmen  on
the points of dispute, on the basis of pleadings and evidence on record  and
legal principles laid down in the Awards passed by  the  NIT.  The  relevant
para from the above said case upon  which  the  learned  amicus  curiae  has
rightly placed reliance reads thus:-
"9. The first contention is that the Industrial Tribunal cannot be  said  to
perform a judicial or quasi-judicial function, since it is not  required  to
be guided by any recognized substantive law in deciding disputes which  come
before it. On the other hand, in deciding industrial  disputes,  it  has  to
override contracts and  create  rights  which  are  opposed  to  contractual
rights. In these circumstances, it is said that  the  very  questions  which
arose before the Privy Council in Moses v. Parker Ex-parte Moses(1896(  A.C.
245: (65 L.J.P.C. 19) arise in this case, these questions being:
(1) How can the propriety of the Tribunal's decision be  tested  on  appeal,
and
(2)   What are the canons by which the appellate court is to  be  guided  in
deciding the appeal?
Their Lordships of the  Privy  Council  undoubtedly  felt  that  these  were
serious questions, but they had no hesitation in saying  that  "if  it  were
clear that appeals ought to be allowed, such  difficulties  would  doubtless
be met somehow". This,  in  my  opinion,  is  a  sufficient  answer  to  the
difficulty raised. The Tribunal has to adjudicate  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act.  It  may  sometimes  override
contracts, but so can a court which has to administer law according  to  the
Bengal or Bihar Money-lenders Act, Encumbered Estates Act and other  similar
Acts. The Tribunal has to observe the provisions of the  special  law  which
it has to administer though that law may be different from the law which  an
ordinary court of justice administers. The appellate court,  therefore,  can
at least see that the rules according  to  which  it  has  to  act  and  the
provisions which are binding upon it are observed, and its  powers  are  not
exercised in an arbitrary or capricious manner.
........

61. We would not examine the process by which an Industrial  Tribunal  comes
to its decisions and I have  no  hesitation  in  holding  that  the  process
employed is not judicial process at all. In settling  the  disputes  between
the employers and the workmen, the function of the Tribunal is not  confined
to administration of justice in accordance with law. It  can  confer  rights
and privileges on either party which it  considers  reasonable  and  proper,
though they may not be within the terms of any existing  agreement.  It  has
not merely to interpret  or  give  effect  to  the  contractual  rights  and
obligations of the  parties.  It  can  create  new  rights  and  obligations
between them which it considers essential for keeping industrial  peace.....
The Tribunal is not bound  by  the  rigid  rules  of  law.  The  process  it
employees  is  rather  an  extended  form  of  the  process  of   collective
bargaining and is more akin to administrative than to judicial function.


In describing the true position of an Industrial Tribunal  in  dealing  with
labour disputes, this Court  in  Western  India  Automobile  Association  v.
Industrial  Tribunal,  Bombay,  and  others [1949]  F.C.R.  321 quoted  with
approval a passage from Ludwig Teller's well  known  work  on  the  subject,
where the learned author observes that

"industrial arbitration may involve the extension of an  existing  agreement
or the making of a new one or in general the creation of new obligations  or
modification of old ones, while commercial  arbitration  generally  concerns
itself with interpretation of existing obligations and disputes relating  to
existing agreements."

The views expressed in these observations were adopted in  its  entirety  by
this Court. Our  conclusion,  therefore,  is  that  an  Industrial  Tribunal
formed under the Industrial Disputes Act is not a judicial tribunal and  its
determination is not a judicial determination in the proper sense  of  these
expressions."
                                               (emphasis laid by this Court)

Therefore, keeping in mind this principle laid down by  this  Court  in  the
above referred  case,  we  are  of  the  view  that  the  CGIT  has  rightly
overridden the compromise arising out of SLP No. 14906 of  1988  and  passed
the Award in favour of the concerned workmen.
Further, with respect to the E. Prabhavathy case referred  to  supra,  which
was filed before this Court, on preliminary hearing of the said  case,  this
Court directed the Corporation to  frame  a  Scheme  for  regularisation  of
those employees  who  were  granted  ad  hoc  appointment  for  85  days  at
intervals from time to time. In accordance  with  the  same,  a  Scheme  was
framed as per the decision of this Court in the case of State of Haryana  v.
Piara Singh (supra).  The  relevant  portion  of  the  Scheme  is  extracted
hereunder:
 "(a) All those temporary employees who have worked for 85 days in  any  two
consecutive calendar years  with  the  Life  Insurance  Corporation  between
20.5.1985 uptill  date  and  who  confronted  to  the  required  eligibility
criteria for regular recruitment on the dates  of  their  initial  temporary
appointment will be permitted to compete for the  next  regular  recruitment
to be made by the Life Insurance Corporation after the  regular  recruitment
for these posts currently scheduled for November, 1992;
(b)   These candidates will be considered on their  merits  with  all  other
candidates who may apply for such appointments,  including  those  from  the
open market.
(c)   These candidates will be given an  age  relaxation  for  applying  for
regular recruitment provided that they were eligible on the  date  of  their
first temporary appointment for securing regular appointment with  the  Life
Insurance Corporation.
(d)   If these  candidates  are  otherwise  eligible,  they  can  apply  for
regular recruitment in the normal course."

Thereafter, this Court granted leave  and  disposed  of  the  Civil  Appeals
incorporating the essential features of the Scheme as a part of  its  order.
Further, this Court opined that the said Scheme was also applicable  to  the
case of G. Sudhakar & Ors. (supra)  and  passed  an  order  accordingly  and
disposed of that case also. The learned senior counsel for  the  respondents
has made his endeavour by taking  us  through  the  said  scheme  which  was
framed on the basis of the decision of this  Court  in  the  case  of  Piara
Singh's case (supra) and  that  the  same  was  prevalent  in  1992.  It  is
pertinent to note that the said Scheme framed in  the  E.  Prabhavathy  case
(supra) was the outcome of the order passed in Writ Petition  filed  by  the
concerned workmen in those cases and not the adjudication of the  industrial
dispute  as  per  points  of  dispute  referred  to  the  CGIT/NIT  by   the
Appropriate Government as per Section 10  of  the  Act.  Therefore,  placing
reliance on the above Scheme by the learned senior counsel on behalf of  the
Corporation in justification of the impugned judgment and order of the  High
Court and the said Scheme formulated by the Corporation  being  accepted  by
the workmen in  those  proceedings  does  not  in  any  way  take  away  the
statutory and fundamental rights of the concerned workmen in these  appeals,
who have raised the industrial dispute for  their  absorption  into  regular
permanent posts of Class III and Class IV of the Corporation. Further, by  a
careful reading of the said order in the SLP No. 14906 of 1988, it has  been
made clear that the Awards passed by the NIT (by Justice Jamdar and  Justice
Tulpule) after adjudicating the points of dispute in the industrail  dispute
raised by similarly placed workmen is  not  disturbed  by  substituting  the
terms and conditions of  compromise  between  the  parties  therein  in  SLP
No.14906 of 1988.  Therefore, the Awards in relation to  the  absorption  of
the workmen as permanent workmen  in  the  Corporation  have  got  statutory
force. This is what is stated by the CGIT in  its  Award  on  the  basis  of
pleadings and evidence on record, which was erroneously  set  aside  by  the
High Court by assigning erroneous reasons which is sought  to  be  justified
by the senior counsel on behalf of the Corporation by placing reliance  upon
the orders and Scheme framed in E. Prabhavathy &  Ors.  and  G.  Sudhakar  &
Ors. cases which scheme has no application to  the  case  of  the  concerned
workmen involved in these appeals referred to supra. Therefore, the  learned
amicus curiae Mr. Naphade has rightly placed reliance upon the  decision  of
this Court in the case of D. J. Bahadur (supra) to  substantiate  his  legal
contention that the Awards passed by Justice R.D. Tulpule and reiterated  by
Justice Jamdar by clarifying the same in the reference under Section 36A  of
the Act are still binding upon the parties as the  same  have  neither  been
set aside nor terminated by either of the parties or orders  of  this  Court
or Scheme framed by the Corporation. The relevant paragraphs  of  the  above
said case are extracted hereunder:
"138. The court then proceeded to consider specifically the  situation  that
would obtain in the 3rd period in relation to an award and held:
"Quite apart from this, however, it appears to us that even if an award  has
ceased to be in operation or in force and has ceased to be  binding  on  the
parties under the provisions of Section 19(6) it will continue to  have  its
effect as a contract between the parties that has been  made  by  industrial
adjudication in place of the old contract. So long as the award  remains  in
operation under Section 19(3), Section  23(c)  stands  in  the  way  of  any
strike by the workmen and lock-out by the employer in respect of any  matter
covered by the award. Again, so long as the award is  binding  on  a  party,
breach of any of its terms will make  the  party  liable  to  penalty  under
Section 29 of the Act, to imprisonment which may extend  to  six  months  or
with fine or with both. After the period  of  its  operation  and  also  the
period for which the award is binding have elapsed Section  23  and  Section
29 can have no operation. We can however see nothing in the  scheme  of  the
Industrial Disputes Act to justify a conclusion that  merely  because  these
special provisions as regards prohibition of strikes and  lock-outs  and  of
penalties for breach of award cease to be  effective  the  new  contract  as
embodied in the award should also cease to be effective.  On  the  contrary,
the very purpose for  which  industrial  adjudication  has  been  given  the
peculiar authority and right of making new contracts between  employers  and
workmen makes it  reasonable  to  think  that  even  though  the  period  of
operation of the award and the period for which it remains  binding  on  the
parties - in respect of both of which  special  provisions  have  been  made
under Sections 23 and 29 respectively - may expire, the new  contract  would
continue to govern the relations between the parties till  it  is  displaced
by another contract. The objection that no such  benefit  as  claimed  could
accrue to the respondent after March 31, 1959 must therefore be rejected."

139. It is the underlined portion of this paragraph which impelled the  High
Court to come to the conclusion that even a notice under  Section  19(6)  of
the ID Act would not terminate a settlement (which, according  to  the  High
Court,  stands  on  the  same  footing  as  an  award  and,   in   fact   is
indistinguishable there from for the purpose of Section 19) but  would  have
the effect of  merely  paving  the  way  for  fresh  negotiations  resulting
ultimately in a new settlement -  a  conclusion  which  has  been  seriously
challenged on behalf of the Corporation  with  the  submission  that  Chacko
case has no application whatsoever to the present  controversy  inasmuch  as
the special law comprised of Sections 11 and 49 of the LIC Act fully  covers
the  situation  in  the  3rd  period  following  the  expiry  of  the   1974
settlements. The submission is well based. In Chacko  case  this  Court  was
dealing  with  the  provisions  of  the  ID  Act  alone  when  it  made  the
observations last extracted and was not concerned  with  a  situation  which
would cover the 3rd period in relation to an award (or  for  that  matter  a
settlement) in accordance with a specific mandate from Parliament. The  only
available course for filling the void created by  the  Sastry  Award  was  a
continuation of its terms till they were replaced by something else  legally
enforceable which, in the circumstances before  the  court,  could  only  be
another contract (in the shape of an  award  [pic]or  a  settlement),  there
being no legal provision requiring the void to be filled otherwise.  In  the
present case the law intervenes to indicate how the void  which  obtains  in
the 3rd period shall be filled and, if it has been so filled,  there  is  no
question of its  being  filled  in  the  manner  indicated  in  Chacko  case
wherein,  as  already  pointed  out,  no  such  law   was   available.   The
observations in that case must thus be taken to mean that the expired  award
would continue to govern  the  parties  till  it  is  displaced  by  another
contract or by a relationship otherwise substituted  for  it  in  accordance
with law."

In view of the statement of law  laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the  above
referred case, the reliance placed upon para 43 and  47  of  D.  J.  Bahadur
case and other cases relied upon by  the  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
Corporation are misplaced and the same  do  not  support  the  case  of  the
Corporation.
27. In view of the law laid by this Court in the  case  referred  to  supra,
both the Award of Justice Tulpule reiterated by way of  clarification  Award
by Justice Jamdar are still operative as the  same  are  not  terminated  by
either of the parties as provided  under  Section  19(6)  of  the  Act.  The
compromise between the parties in SLP No.  14906  of  1988  and  the  Scheme
formed in E. Prabhavathy & Ors. and  G.  Sudhakar  &  Ors.  (supra)  do  not
amount to substitution of the Awards passed by Justice R. D. Tulpule and  by
Justice S.  M.  Jamdar.  Hence,  in  view  of  the  aforesaid  reasons,  the
submissions made by Mr. Naphade, learned amicus curiae, in justification  of
the Award passed by the CGIT is based on the terms and conditions laid  down
in the Awards passed by the NIT (by Justice Tulpule and Justice  Jamdar)  in
favour of the workmen for absorption  as  they  have  been  rendering  their
service to the Corporation in the perennial nature of work for a  number  of
years and hence, the High Court was not justified in  interfering  with  the
said Award passed by the CGIT. The said  contention  urged  by  the  learned
amicus curiae is accepted by us, as the impugned judgment and order  of  the
High Court is contrary to the Awards referred to supra,  the  provisions  of
the Industrial Disputes Act and the law laid  down  by  this  Court  in  the
aforesaid  cases.  The  Awards  passed  by  the  NIT  is  binding  upon  the
Corporation till it is substituted by another Award or replaced  by  another
settlement in relation to the service  conditions  of  the  workmen  of  the
Corporation in accordance with law as provided under Section  12  read  with
Section 18(3) of the Act or another Award that is required to be  passed  by
the Jurisdictional CGIT in relation to the above subject  matter  after  the
Awards which are in operation are terminated by either  of  the  parties  as
provided under Section 19(6) of the Act. Until then, the said  Award  passed
by the NIT will still be operative in law.  Therefore,  the  same  has  been
rightly applied to the fact situation on hand in the  Award  passed  by  the
CGIT and it could not have been set aside by the High Court.  Thus,  we  are
of the opinion that the learned  single  Judge  erroneously  set  aside  the
Award passed by the CGIT and the said judgment of the learned  single  judge
has been further erroneously affirmed by the  Division  Bench  of  the  High
Court. The said judgments of the High Court are clearly contrary to law  and
legal principles laid down by this Court in cases referred to supra.  Hence,
the same are liable to be set aside by allowing these appeals and  restoring
the Award of the CGIT.
28.  The learned amicus curiae  rightly  placed  reliance  upon  entry  Item
No.10 of Schedule V of  the  Act  in  employing  the  concerned  workmen  as
temporary, badli and  part-time  employees  against  permanent  posts  doing
perennial nature of work and continuing them as such for  number  of  years.
This is a clear case of unfair labour  practice  as  defined  under  Section
2(ra) of the Act which is statutorily prohibited under Section  25T  of  the
Act and the said action of the Corporation amounts to penalty under  Section
25U of the Act. For this reason also, the findings and reasons  recorded  in
the Award of the CGIT in answering the points of dispute referred to  it  by
Central Government in favour of the concerned workmen is  legal  and  valid.
The High Court has erred in not noticing the aforesaid important,  relevant,
factual and legal aspect of the  case  of  the  concerned  workmen  and  has
erroneously set aside the  Award  of  the  CGIT  passed  in  favour  of  the
concerned workmen in exercise of its judicial  power.  The  High  Court  has
erred in not following the legal principles laid down by this Court  in  the
case of Harjinder Singh v. Punjab State Warehousing Corporation[9],  wherein
it is held thus:-

"17. Before concluding, we consider  it  necessary  to  observe  that  while
exercising jurisdiction under Articles 226 and/or 227  of  the  Constitution
in matters like the present one, the High Courts are duty bound to  keep  in
mind  that  the  Industrial  Disputes  Act  and  other  similar  legislative
instruments are social welfare legislations and the same are required to  be
interpreted keeping in view the  goals  set  out  in  the  preamble  of  the
Constitution and the provisions contained in Part IV thereof in general  and
Articles 38, 39(a) to (e), 43 and 43A in particular, which mandate that  the
State should secure a social order for  the  promotion  of  welfare  of  the
people, ensure equality between men and women and equitable distribution  of
material resources of the community to sub-serve the common  good  and  also
ensure  that  the  workers  get  their  dues.  More  than  41   years   ago,
Gajendragadkar, J, opined that "the concept of social and  economic  justice
is a living concept of revolutionary import;  it  gives  sustenance  to  the
rule of law and meaning and significance to  the  ideal  of  welfare  State"
- State of Mysore v. Workers of Gold Mines AIR 1958 SC 923."

The said principle has been reiterated by this Court recently  in  the  case
of Jasmer Singh v. State Of Haryana & Anr. (C.A. No. 346 OF 2015).

      For  the  aforesaid  reasons  also,  the   case   of   the   concerned
workmen/appellants must succeed and the impugned judgment and order must  be
set aside.  Accordingly, it is set aside.
 Answer to point (iii)
It is needless to mention that since we are  of  the  view  that  the  Award
passed by the CGIT in I.D. No. 27 of 1991 is legal and valid,  it  shall  be
restored and implemented by  the  Corporation  by  absorbing  the  concerned
workmen in the permanent  posts  and  if  they  have  attained  the  age  of
superannuation, the Corporation will be  liable  to  pay  all  consequential
benefits including monetary  benefits  taking  into  consideration  the  pay
scale and revised pay scale from time to time by the Corporation.
     Mr. Shekar  Naphade,  learned  amicus  curiae  has  rendered  excellent
assistance to this Court at our request to arrive  at  just  conclusions  in
these cases. The same is appreciated and placed on record.
     This Judgment and order shall be implemented within  eight  weeks  from
the date of receipt of the copy of this Judgment and the  compliance  report
of the same shall be submitted for perusal of this Court.
     Accordingly, the appeals are allowed in the above said terms.  All  the
applications are disposed of. No costs.

   ..................................................................J.
                                        [V. GOPALA GOWDA]



    ..................................................................J.
   [C. NAGAPPAN]



New Delhi,
March 18, 2015



ITEM NO.1A-For Judgment       COURT NO.9               SECTION XV

               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Civil Appeal  No(s).  6950/2009

T.NADU TERMD.FULL TIME TEM.LIC EMP.ASSN.           Appellant(s)

                                VERSUS

LIFE INSURANCE CORP.OF INDIA & ORS.                Respondent(s)

WITH
C.A. No. 6951/2009

C.A. No. 6952/2009

C.A. No. 6953/2009

C.A. No. 6954/2009

C.A. No. 6956/2009

Date : 18/03/2015 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of
JUDGMENT today.

For Appellant(s)
                     Mr. M. A. Chinnasamy,Adv.
                     Mr. V. Senthil Kumar, Adv.

                     Ms. Asha Jain Madan,Adv.

                        Mr. S. Nandakumar, Adv.
                        Mr. P. Vasu, Adv.
                        Mr. M. Soundarasaran Kumar, Adv.
                     Mr. V. N. Raghupathy,Adv.

                     Mr. B. K. Pal,Adv.

                     Ms. Kusum Chaudhary,Adv.

                     Mr. Bankey Bihari Sharma,Adv.

For Respondent(s)
                     Mr. Ashok Panigrahi,Adv.


            Hon'ble Mr. Justice V.Gopala Gowda pronounced  the  judgment  of
the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon'ble Mr. Justice C. Nagappan.
            The appeals are  allowed  in  terms  of  the  signed  Reportable
Judgment.
            All the applications are disposed of.

    (VINOD KR.JHA)                              (MALA KUMARI SHARMA)
      COURT MASTER                                COURT MASTER
            (Signed Reportable Judgment is placed on the file)
-----------------------
[1]    (2001) 2 Suppl.  JT 143

[2]    (2006) 4 SCC 1

[3]    (1981) 1 SCC 315

[4]    AIR 1950 SC 188

[5]    (1976) 4 SCC 736

[6]    (2006) 9 SCC 623

[7]    (2002) 3 SCC 411

[8]    (2005) 8 SCC 51

[9]    (2010) 3 SCC 192