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REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
REVIEW PETITION (C) NO. 739 OF 2012
IN
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7944 OF 2010
Union of India .... Petitioner(s)
Versus
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores
Ltd. & Ors. ....
Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
P. Sathasivam, J.
1) This review petition has been filed by the Union of India,
Ministry of Mines, seeking review of the judgment and order
dated 13.09.2010 passed in Sandur Manganese & Iron
Ores Ltd. vs. State of Karnataka & Others, 2010 (13)
SCC 1 (Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2010 and Civil Appeal Nos.
7945-54 and 7955-61 of 2010).
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2) In Sandur (supra), this Court had interpreted various
provisions of the Mines and Minerals (Development and
Regulation) Act, 1957 (in short “the MMDR Act”) and the
Mineral Concession Rules, 1960 (in short “the MC Rules”)
framed thereunder. It is the grievance of the petitioner
herein that this review is instituted since the Ministry of
Mines, Government of India, could not put forth its view on
the interpretation of the provisions of the MMDR Act in
Sandur (supra) for the reason that the copy of the special
leave petition was not served upon the review petitioner
which is a necessary and relevant party to the subject-matter
in issue/dispute and the review petitioner did not get an
opportunity of being heard.
3) It is also brought to our notice that vide notification
dated 30.01.2003, the Ministry of Coal and Mines was
bifurcated into separate Ministries since the petitioners in
various SLPs furnished the name of the Ministry as “Ministry
of Coal and Mines” in all the matters and according to them,
it was not noticed by the Department concerned, namely, the
Department of Mines.
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4) We are conscious of the fact that the principles of
natural justice guarantee every person the right to represent
his/her case in the court of law, wherein the final verdict of
the court would adversely affect his/her interest. Considering
the above principle, this Court, vide order dated 04.10.2012,
granted the opportunity to the Union of India to represent its
case.
5) Before considering the claim of the Union of India about
acceptability or otherwise of various conclusions in the
impugned judgment, we have to consider whether the
petitioner has shown sufficient cause for condoning the delay
of 320 days.
6) The details furnished in I.A. No. 1 of 2011 filed for
condoning the delay in filing the above review petition
sufficiently prove that steps were taken at various levels in
the Ministry of Mines, accordingly, we accept the reasons
furnished therein. In view of the same, the delay is
condoned.
7) Taking note of the reasons stated for the delay and the
stand of the Department that the Ministry concerned,
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namely, Department of Mines was not duly projected and
represented before this Court, we heard Mr. Goolam E.
Vahanvati, learned Attorney General for the review
petitioner, on merits, particularly, with reference to the
points formulated for consideration and ultimate conclusion
arrived therein and Mr. Fali S. Nariman, Mr. Mukul Rohatgi,
Mr. A.M. Singhvi, Mr. Krishnan Venugopal, Mr. L.N. Rao,
learned senior counsel for the contesting respondents and
Ms. Anita Shenoy, learned counsel for the State of Karnataka.
8) Now, let us consider whether the review petitioner has
made out a case for reviewing the judgment and order dated
13.09.2010 and satisfies the criteria for entertaining the
matter in review jurisdiction.
Review Jurisdiction
9) Article 137 of the Constitution of India provides for
review of judgments or orders by the Supreme Court which
reads as under:
“Subject to the provisions of any law made by Parliament or
any rules made under Article 145, the Supreme Court shall
have power to review any judgment pronounced or order
made by it.”
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10) Further, Part VIII Order XL of the Supreme Court Rules,
1966 deals with the review and consists of four rules. Rule 1
is important for our purpose which reads as under:
“The Court may review its judgment or order, but no
application for review will be entertained in a civil
proceeding except on the ground mentioned in Order
XLVII Rule 1 of the Code and in a criminal proceeding
except on the ground of an error apparent on the face of
the record.”
11) Order XLVII, Rule 1(1) of the Code of Civil Procedure,
1908 provides for an application for review which reads as
under:
“Any person considering himself aggrieveda) by a decree or order from which an appeal is allowed, but
from which no appeal has been preferred,
b) by a decree or order from which no appeal is allowed, or
c) by a decision on a reference from a Court of Small Causes,
and who, from the discovery of new and important matter or
evidence which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not
within his knowledge or could not be produced by him at the
time when the decree was passed or order made, or on
account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the
record, or for any other sufficient reason, desires to obtain a
review of the decree passed or order made against him, may
apply for a review of judgment to the court which passed the
decree or made the order.”
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12) Thus, in view of the above, the following grounds of
review are maintainable as stipulated by the statute:
i) Discovery of new and important matter or evidence
which, after the exercise of due diligence, was not
within knowledge of the petitioner or could not be
produced by him;
ii) Mistake or error apparent on the face of the record;
iii)Any other sufficient reason
13) The words “any other sufficient reason” has been
interpreted in Chhajju Ram vs. Neki, AIR 1922 PC 112 and
approved by this Court in Moran Mar Basselios
Catholicos vs. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius &
Ors., (1955) 1 SCR 520, to mean “a reason sufficient on
grounds at least analogous to those specified in the rule”.
With the above statutory provisions, let us discuss the claim
of the petitioner-Union of India.
Discussion
14) The respondent – Company (Sandur Manganese & Iron
Ores Ltd.) by filing S.L.P.(C) No. 22077 of 2009 (converted
into Civil Appeal No. 7944 of 2010) challenged before this
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Court the final judgment and order dated 05.06.2009 passed
by the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Appeal
No. 5084 of 2008 and allied matters wherein the High Court
dismissed the appeals and held that the decision of the State
Government in not recommending mining lease to the
Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and instead preferring
two other Companies for grant of mining lease does not
suffer from any irregularity, illegality, discrimination,
arbitrariness, unreasonableness or violative of principles of
natural justice.
15) This Court, in Sandur (supra), allowed the appeal filed
by Sandur Manganese & Iron Ores Ltd. and quashed the
impugned order dated 05.06.2009 passed by the Division
Bench of the High Court of Karnataka in Writ Appeal No. 5084
of 2008 etc. etc. as well as the decision of the State
Government dated 26/27.02.2002 and the subsequent
decision of the Central Government dated 29.07.2003 and
directed the State Government to consider all applications
afresh in light of this Court’s interpretation of Section 11 of
the MMDR Act and Rules 35, 59 and 60 of the MC Rules in
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particular, and make recommendation to the Central
Government within a period of four months.
16) Consequently, the UOI has raised mainly two issues on
merits of the case, thereby challenging the impugned
judgment. They are:-
(1) Firstly, that the impugned judgment has incorrectly
reported the ‘Report of the Committee to Review the
Existing Laws and Procedures for Regulation and
Development of Minerals’. As a consequence, the ratio of
impugned judgment, which relies on this Expert
Committee Report, shall stand erroneous in the eyes of
law.
(2) Secondly, Section 11(2) and Section 11(4) should be
applicable to both virgin and previously held areas.
Now we shall discuss the above mentioned issues
respectively.
First Contention:
17) The first contention of learned Attorney General is two
fold viz., that the Expert Committee’s Report was misquoted
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and as a result the impugned judgment which relies on the
same, shall stand erroneous on the face of law. We accede to
the above contention partially. It is true that the Expert
Committee’s Report has been misquoted to the extent of
adding four lines, which was originally not a part of the
report. Thus, this Court has the power to modify the
impugned judgment to the extent of deletion of the
misquoted statement under review jurisdiction.
18) The Report of the Committee to Review the Existing Laws
and Procedures for Regulation and Development of Minerals,
referred in the impugned judgment reads as under:
Para 2.1.21 of the Report:
“49…… The concept of first-come, first-serve has
become necessary in view of the fact that the Act does
not provide for inviting applications through
advertisement for grant of PL/ML in respect of virgin
areas. No doubt, there is provision in Rule 59 of the MC
Rules for advertisement of an area earlier held under
PL/ML with provision for relaxation. In this
background, the Committee recommended the
introduction of the proviso to S. 11(2) permitting
calling for applications by way of a notification.
There is a distinction between virgin areas and
areas covered under Rule 59 and S. 11(2) ought
to be interpreted to cover virgin areas alone.”
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19) Hence, the above underlined portion of the report which
is misquoted in the impugned judgment owing to clerical
mistake requires to be deleted, accordingly, we do so.
20) However, we are not in agreement with learned Attorney
General that the impugned judgment is erroneous on the
face of law merely because the Expert Committee Report
was misquoted. In our considered view, the impugned
judgment stands good of reason even without these
misquoted lines as well. Hence, mere deletion of these lines
along with removal of certain portion of para 51 of the
impugned judgment will clarify the mistake.
Portion of Para 51 of Sandur (supra) to be deleted:
“51…..The analysis of the Report makes it clear that
the main provision in Section 11(2) applies to
“virgin areas”. It further makes it clear that to the
extent that an area that is previously held or
reserved would require a notification for it to
become available.”
Thus the first contention is considered as per the above
terms.
Second Contention:
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21) With regard to the second contention that both Section
11(2) and Section 11(4) should be applicable to both virgin
and previously held areas, the same has been well reasoned
in the impugned judgment and the mere fact that different
views on the same subject are possible is no ground to
review the earlier judgment passed by this Bench.
22) It has been time and again held that the power of review
jurisdiction can be exercised for the correction of a mistake
and not to substitute a view. In Parsion Devi & Ors. vs.
Sumitri Devi & Ors., (1997) 8 SCC 715, this Court held as
under:-
“9. Under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC a judgment may be open to
review inter alia if there is a mistake or an error apparent
on the face of the record. An error which is not self-evident
and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can
hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of the
record justifying the court to exercise its power of review
under Order 47 Rule I CPC. In exercise of the jurisdiction
under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC it is not permissible for an
erroneous decision to be "reheard and corrected". A review
petition, it must be remembered has a limited purpose and
cannot be allowed to be "an appeal in disguise".
23) This Court, on numerous occasions, had deliberated upon
the very same issue, arriving at the conclusion that review
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proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be
strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of
CPC.
24) In the present case, the error contemplated in the
impugned judgment is not one which is apparent on the face
of the record rather the dispute is wholly founded on the
point of interpretation and applicability of Section 11(2) and
11(4) of the MMDR Act. In review jurisdiction, mere
disagreement with the view of the judgment cannot be the
ground for invoking the same. As long as the point is already
dealt with and answered, the parties are not entitled to
challenge the impugned judgment in the guise that an
alternative view is possible under the review jurisdiction.
Hence, in review jurisdiction, the court shall interfere only
when there is a glaring omission or patent mistake or when a
grave error has crept in the impugned judgment, which we
fail to notice in the present case.
25) For the above reasons, the second ground for review
petition is liable to be rejected.
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26) Further, the contention regarding MoU entered into by
the State Government and investments made thereunder is
concerned, this Court has noticed this fact and rejected the
contention made by the respondents in Sandur (supra). It
is relevant to point out that
the State of Karnataka is stated
to have committed to JSW Steels Limited on 11.10.1994 for
grant of mining leases but the same has been invoked by
JSW Steels after a lapse of 8 years and more precisely, after
5 years of commencing commercial operations in its steel
plant by making an application on 24.10.2002. Once an area
is notified for re-grant and applications are invited from the
mining public for grant of mining lease, the applications must
be disposed of in terms of the provisions of the MMDR Act
and the MC Rules and not de hors.
In para 80 of Sandur
Manganese (supra), this Court has held as follows:
“80. It is clear that the State Government is purely a
delegate of Parliament and a statutory functionary, for the
purposes of Section 11(3) of the Act, hence it cannot act in
a manner that is inconsistent with the provisions of
Section 11(1) of the MMDR Act in the grant of mining
leases. Furthermore, Section 2 of the Act clearly states
that the regulation of mines and mineral development
comes within the purview of the Union Government and
not the State Government. As a matter of fact, the
respondents have not been able to point out any other
provision in the MMDR Act or the MC Rules permitting
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grant of mining lease based on past commitments.
As
rightly pointed out, the State Government has no authority
under the MMDR Act to make commitments to any person
that it will, in future, grant a mining lease in the event that
the person makes investment in any project.
Assuming
that the State Government had made any such
commitment, it could not be possible for it to take an
inconsistent position and proceed to notify a particular
area. Further, having notified the area, the State
Government certainly could not thereafter honour an
alleged commitment by ousting other applicants even if
they are more deserving on the merit criteria as provided
in Section 11(3).
Hence, the petitioner cannot be permitted to re-argue the
very same point.
27) Regarding the issue of Mineral Policies, this Court has
already held in Sandur (supra) that in view of the specific
parliamentary declaration as discussed and explained by this
Court in various decisions, there is no question of the State
having any power to frame a policy de hors the MMDR Act
and the MC Rules.
28) In view of the above, the petitioner-Union of India has
not invoked any valid ground for exercising the power under
review jurisdiction. In addition to the same, after the
judgment in Sandur (supra), another coordinate Bench of
this Court followed the ratio decidendi in Monnet Ispat and
Energy Ltd. vs. Union of India & Ors., 2012 (11) SCC 1.
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29) For the aforesaid reasons, we are unable to accept any
of the contentions raised by Learned Attorney General,
therefore, the review petition is disposed of by deleting the
misquoted lines in the Expert Committee Report.
30) In view of the above order and the directions issued by
us in para 98 of Sandur (supra), we grant a further period
of 4 months from the date of receipt of copy of this order to
comply with the same.
31) In view of the dismissal of the review petition filed by
the Union of India, the impleadment applications stand
dismissed.
...…………………………………J.
(P. SATHASIVAM)
...…………………………………J.
(H.L. DATTU)
NEW DELHI;
APRIL 23, 2013
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