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Reportable
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5063-5065 of 2005
Shivdev Kaur (D) By Lrs. & Ors. …Appellants
Versus
R.S. Grewal … Respondent
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J:
1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned
judgment and order dated 2.7.2004 passed by the High Court of
Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 257
of 1982 and Regular Second Appeal No. 608 of 1982 and Cross
Objection No. 14-C of 1982 by which the High Court has affirmed the
judgment of the first appellate court as well as the trial court so far as
the nature of the rights of the appellant in the suit property are
concerned.Page 2
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are that:
A. One Dr. Hira Singh had acquired a huge property in his life
time. He executed various deeds creating certain rights in favour of
his sole son Dr. Shivdev Singh Grewal and two daughters, namely,
Smt. Dayawant Kaur and Dr. Shivdev Kaur including the Will dated
16.9.1944, creating certain rights in favour of the appellant. Dr. Hira
Singh died on 11.4.1945.
B. Shri Shivdev Singh Grewal and Smt. Dayawant Kaur died
leaving behind their children. Dr. Shivdev Kaur claimed certain rights
on the basis of the Will dated 16.9.1944, and for the same she filed
Suit No. 161/399/74 on 4.10.1974 against her nephew for mandatory
injunction seeking his eviction from the suit premises claiming
absolute right/ownership over the same in view of the provisions of
Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to
as the `Act 1956’). The respondent/defendant contested the suit
denying such a right.
C. During the pendency of the said suit, the respondent/defendant
also filed Suit No. 80 of 1976, against the appellant/plaintiff for
permanent injunction restraining her from transferring/alienating the
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suit property. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated
28.4.1978 decided the Suit No. 161/399/74, holding that
appellant/plaintiff had no absolute right/ownership over the suit
property. The trial court vide judgment and decree dated 4.6.1979
passed in Suit No. 80/1976, held to the effect that the appellant would
not interfere in any manner in respect of the agricultural lands etc.,
however, she would not be dispossessed from the suit premises and it
would be subject to the final decision of the another suit.
D. Aggrieved, both parties filed appeals and cross-objections. The
appellate court dismissed the appeal filed by the respondent on
22.10.1981. On the same day, appeal filed by the appellant was
allowed to certain extent. However, so far as the issue relating to
conversion of the life interest into absolute title was decided against
the appellant.
E. Aggrieved, respondent filed RSA Nos. 257 and 608 of 1982,
and appellant filed RSA No. 608/1982 and cross-objection bearing
No. 14-C/1982.
F. The appellant executed a Will dated 28.2.1991 in respect of the
suit property creating a trust in the name of her father and appointing
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Shri Sudarshan Singh Deol and Brig Inderjeet Singh Dhillon as the
trustees. She further made Codicil dated 25.8.1995. The appellant died
on 15.2.1998 and thus executors of her Will got impleaded.
G. The High Court allowed both the RSAs filed by the respondent
and dismissed the claim of the appellant.
Hence, these appeals.
3. Shri Devender Mohan Verma, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the appellant, has argued that the appellant had become a
widow at a very young age. She was maintained by her in laws, thus,
her father took pity on her and as she was a destitute, brought her back
and created a “life interest” in her favour in respect of the suit
property by executing a Will dated 16.9.1944. She started residing in
the suit property. Her father died in 1945. After commencement of the
Act 1956, right of “life interest” stood crystallised into absolute right
and title. Therefore, the courts below erred in deciding the issue
against her. Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.
4. Per contra, Shri R.K. Dhawan, learned counsel appearing on
behalf of the respondent, has opposed the appeals contending that the
appellant cannot be permitted to introduce a new case that the
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appellant was a destitute. She was a well qualified person and MBBS
doctor. She had acquired large properties from the family of her late
husband. More so, father of the appellant had created only “life
interest” in her favour in the suit property by executing the Will.
Section 14(2) of the Act 1956 does not provide that such “life
interest” would stand converted into absolute ownership on
commencement of the said Act. There are concurrent findings of facts
on this issue and, thus, the appeals lack merit and are liable to be
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
6. The document creating a limited right, “life interest” in favour
of the appellant i.e. Will dated 16.9.1944 so far as the relevant part is
concerned reads as under:
“I give this Kothi situated at Iqbal Road to my
daughter Bibi Shivdev Kaur subject to the rights
of Bibi Shiv Charan Kaur, mentioned above, for
life time, who after my death will remain abad in
this Kothi and get benefit thereof. If she wishes,
she can get the benefit of its rent also as per
necessity and can use the income of rent.
But
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these rights are only for her life time. She can
not alienate this kothi or the site relating thereto,
in any way, or create any charge thereon, nor she
can mortgage gift, sell or transfer it.
My son
Shibdev Singh aforesaid shall also be the sole
owner of this Kothi subject to the above
mentioned rights.”
7. It is evident from the aforesaid part of the Will that only a life
interest had been created in favour of the appellant by that Will.
Therefore, the sole question for our consideration remains as to
whether such limited right got converted into absolute right on
commencement of the Act 1956.
8. Section 14 of the Act 1956 reads as under:
“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her
absolute property.
(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu,
whether acquired before or after the
commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as
full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.
(2) Nothing contained in sub- section (1) shall
apply to any property acquired by way of gift or
under a will or any other instrument or under a
decree or order of a civil court or under an award
where the terms of the gift, will or other
instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe
a restricted estate in such property.”
(Emphasis added)
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9. The aforesaid statutory provisions provide for conversion of life
interest into absolute title on commencement of the Act 1956,
however, sub-section (2) carves out an exception to the same as it
provides that such right would not be conferred where a property is
acquired by a Hindu female by way of gift or under a Will or any
other instrument prescribing a restricted estate in that property.
10. In Mst. Karmi v. Amru & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 745, a similar
issue was considered by this Court and after examining the contents of
the Will came to the conclusion that where a woman succeeded some
property on the strength of a Will, she cannot claim any right in those
properties over and above what was given to her under that Will. The
life estate given to her under the Will would not become an absolute
estate under the provisions of the Act 1956 and, thus, such a Hindu
female cannot claim any title to the suit property on the basis of the
Will executed in her favour. (See also: Navneet Lal @ Rangi v.
Gokul & Ors., AIR 1976 SC 794; and Jagan Singh (Dead) Through
LRs. v. Dhanwanti & Anr., (2012) 2 SCC 628).
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11. In Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors., AIR 2006
SC 3282, this Court again considered the issue, held as under:
“When he thus validly disposes of his
property by providing for a limited estate to his
heir, the wife or widow has to take it as the
estate falls.
This restriction on her right so
provided, is really respected by the Act. It
provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such
a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on
her right and she cannot claim any higher right
by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act.
In other
words, conferment of a limited estate which is
otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act
by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act
and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of
the Act, even if that provision is held to be
attracted in the case of a succession under the
Act.
Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the
case of a testamentary disposition taking effect
after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2)
redundant or otiose.
It will also make redundant,
the expression “property possessed by a female
Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act.
An
interpretation that leads to such a result cannot
certainly be accepted.
Surely, there is nothing in
the Act compelling such an interpretation.
Sections 14 and 30 both have play.
Section 14(1)
applies in a case where the female had received
the property prior to the Act being entitled to it
as a matter of right, even if the right be to a
limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the
right to maintenance. (Emphasis added)
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12. Shri Verma, learned counsel for the appellant placed a very
heavy reliance on the judgment of this Court
in Balwant Kaur &
Anr. v. Chanan Singh & Ors., AIR 2000 SC 1908,
contending that a
destitute Hindu daughter if acquires such a right, it would stand
crystallised in absolute title.
There is a complete fallacy in his
argument.
In the said case, this Court held that all the clauses of the
Will must be read together to find out the intention of the testator.
The
court held:
“…This is obviously on the principle that
the last clause represents the latest intention
of the testator.
It is true that in the earlier
part of the Will, the testator has stated that
his daughter Balwant Kaur shall be the
heir, owner and title-holder of his entire
remaining moveable and immovable
property
but in the later part of the same
Will he has clearly stated that on the death
of Balwant Kaur, the brothers of the
testator shall be the heirs of the property.
This clearly shows that the recitals in the
later part of the Will would operate and
make Appellant 1 only a limited estateholder in the property bequeathed to her.”
(Emphasis added)
13. Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue can be
summarised to the effect that
if a Hindu female has been given only a
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“life interest”, through Will or gift or any other document referred to in Section 14 of the Act 1956, the said rights would not stand crystallised into the absolute ownership as interpreting the provisions to the effect that she would acquire absolute ownership/title into the property by virtue of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act 1956, the provisions of Sections 14(2) and 30 of the Act 1956 would become otios.
Section 14(2) carves out an exception to rule provided in subsection (1) thereof, which clearly provides that
if a property has been
acquired by a Hindu female by a Will or gift, giving her only a “life interest”,
it would remain the same even after commencement of the
Act 1956, and such a Hindu female cannot acquire absolute title.
14.
Whether person is destitute or not, is a question of fact.
The
expression ‘destitute’ has not been defined under the Act 1956 or
under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, or Code of Civil
Procedure, 1908.
The dictionary meaning is “without resources, in
want of necessaries”. A person can be held destitute when no one is to
support him and is found wandering without any settled place of
abode and without visible means of subsistence. In the instant case,
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no factual foundation has ever been laid by the appellant before the
courts below in this regard. In such a fact-situation, the issue does not
require consideration.
15. All the courts have taken a consistent view rejecting the claim
of the appellant of having acquired an absolute title. We do not see
any cogent reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of facts.
Appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.
….…………..……………………….....................J.
(Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN)
……..………….…………….................................. J.
(FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA)
New Delhi,
March 20, 2013.
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