REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6342-6343 OF 2012
V. Chandrasekaran & Anr.
…Appellants
Versus
The Administrative Officer & Ors.
…Respondents
J U D G M E N T
Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.
1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned
judgment and order dated 24.1.2012, passed by the High Court of
Judicature at Madras in Writ Appeal Nos. 805-806 of 2011, by which,
the Division Bench reversed the judgment and order of the learned
Single Judge, dated 1.11.2010 passed in relation to land acquisition
proceedings.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to these appeals are as
under:
A. A Notification under Section 4(1) of the Land Acquisition Act,
1894 (hereinafter referred to as `the Act’), was issued on 15.5.1978
with respect to land measuring 58.59 acres, in the revenue estate of
Tambaram Village, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpet District, Tamil Nadu,
including the suit land measuring 2.26 acres in Survey Nos. 283/1
(extent of 27 cents), 284/1 (extent of 70 cents), 284/2 (extent of 65
cents) and 284/3 (extent of 64 cents). As the provisions of the
Urgency Clause under Section 17 of the Act were not invoked, the
persons interested were at liberty to file objections under Section 5-
A of the Act. A declaration under Section 6 of the Act with respect
to the said land was issued on 6.6.1981. Very few among the persons
interested, challenged the land acquisition proceedings by way of
filing 8 writ petitions, including Writ Petition Nos. 8897 and 8899 of
1983 etc. which were filed by some of the original tenure-holders of
the suit land on several grounds. However, the said petitioners did
not challenge the acquisition proceedings so far as the suit land is
concerned, rather they chose to restrict their cases to the other
parts of their lands. The batch of said writ petitions was allowed
by way of a common judgment and order, dated 16.12.1983, quashing the
declaration issued under Section 6 of the Act on the ground that the
inquiry was not conducted fairly, and that the objections raised by
the said writ petitioners under Section 5-A, were also not dealt with
properly. However, the learned Single Judge upheld the Notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act and hence, granted liberty to the
Government of Tamil Nadu to continue with the said acquisition
proceedings, in accordance with law.
B. Being aggrieved by this, the writ petitioners including the
predecessors-in-interest of the appellants, preferred Writ Appeal Nos.
214 to 225 and 435 of 1984, before the Division Bench of the High
Court, against the judgment and order dated 16.12.1983, praying for
quashing of the Notification issued under Section 4 of the Act, as
well. The Government did not challenge the judgment and order dated
16.12.1983. The said writ appeals were allowed vide judgment and order
dated 23.8.1985, and the said notification under Section 4(1) of the
Act, only in respect of the land, which constituted the subject matter
of the aforementioned appeals, was quashed. Against the judgment and
order dated 23.8.1985, the Government of Tamil Nadu preferred a
Special Leave Petition before this Court, which was dismissed vide
order dated 6.5.1992. Thus, those orders attained finality.
C. In the meantime, an Award was passed with respect to the said
land, including the suit land, on 28.6.1983, to the extent of 4.26
acres i.e. Survey Nos. 283/1, 284/1 and 284/3.
D. A second batch of writ petitions was filed before the High Court
challenging the acquisition proceedings, as well as the Award. All the
said writ petitions were allowed, following the earlier judgments
dated 16.12.1983 and 23.8.1985 vide judgment and order dated
22.12.1986.
E. A second award was made on 14.8.1986, in relation to the
remaining part of said land, including a part of the suit land, i.e.
Survey No. 284/2.
F. So far as the suit land is concerned, the persons-
interested/tenure-holders never filed any objection under Section 5-A
of the Act, and nor have they challenged the acquisition proceedings,
at any stage. Instead, they accepted the compensation amount under
protest. Possession of the suit land was taken over by the authority
subsequently. There is nothing on record to show whether the claimants
had filed any application for making a reference under Section 18 of
the Act.
G. The tenure-holders/persons-interested in the suit land, after
receiving compensation, and handing over the possession to the
respondents authorities with respect to the suit land, transferred the
said land to some persons, and ultimately, after undergoing multiple
sales, the suit land was purchased by the appellants herein, vide sale-
deeds dated 4.3.2004, 10.11.2004, 7.7.2005 and 11.8.2005. As a result
thereof, they claim to have acquired possession of the said suit land.
The appellants planned to construct flats upon the said land, for the
purpose of which, they had also obtained permission from the Chennai
Metropolitan Development Authority on 16.3.2007. Applications were
filed by the original tenure-holders for re-conveyance of the suit
land which stood as rejected vide order dated 7.7.2008.
H. Being aggrieved, the appellants filed Writ Petition No. 6108 of
2009 for the quashing of the Notification dated 15.5.1978, issued
under Section 4 of the Act, pertaining to the land that comprised 9
Survey Numbers, including the suit land contending that the
declaration under Section 6 had been quashed in toto and no fresh
declaration was subsequently issued. The proceedings therefore,
automatically lapsed as there could be no Award without a fresh
declaration, and therefore, all subsequent proceedings would be void
ab-initio. Another Writ Petition No. 20896 of 2009, was also filed
seeking totally inconsistent/contrary reliefs i.e. praying for the
quashing of the letter dated 7.7.2005, as also for the issuance of
directions to re-convey the suit land in favour of the appellants.
I. A learned Single Judge, vide judgment and order dated 1.11.2010
allowed both Writ Petitions, observing that as the Section 6
declaration had been quashed in toto and no fresh declaration was
issued thereafter, the land acquisition proceedings had lapsed and the
suit land was hence, free from any and all acquisition proceedings.
J. Being aggrieved, the Tamil Nadu Housing Board (hereinafter
referred to as `the Board’) – the respondents, then filed writ appeals
which have been allowed vide impugned judgment and order dated
24.1.2012, reversing the judgment and order of the learned Single
Judge.
Hence, these appeals.
3. Dr. Abhishek M. Singhvi and Mr. Rajiv Dutta, learned senior
counsel appearing for the appellants, have submitted that, since the
Section 6 declaration dated 6.6.1981 has been quashed in toto and no
fresh declaration was made thereafter, subsequent proceedings are void
ab-initio. The appellants, before purchasing the suit land made
various inquiries and were informed in writing by various authorities,
that the said land was not the subject matter of any acquisition
proceedings at the relevant time. More so, a high powered committee,
constituted by the Board itself, submitted a report that the suit land
was not required by the Board, and that even though the possession of
the land had been taken, the land vested in the State. There was no
approach road to the suit land and thus, the said land could not be
utilised for the purpose for which, it was acquired. The Board was not
in a position to utilise the suit land and, thus, it could be released
in favour of the appellants, subject to refunding the compensation
amount received by the land owners. More so, the compensation amount
received by the persons aggrieved in 1983 was received under protest,
and was refunded to them in 2010, by way of demand draft, though the
same was not accepted by the Board and was therefore, returned to the
tenure-holders. The appellants are still willing to refund the amount
of compensation received by the persons- interested, in pursuance of
the illegal and void awards, dated 28.6.1983 and 14.8.1986.
Therefore, the impugned judgment and order are liable to be set aside
and the present appeals should be allowed.
4. On the contrary, Shri S. Gomathi Nayagam, learned Additional
Advocate General appearing for the respondents, has vehemently opposed
the appeals, contending that the predecessor-in-interest, of the
appellants did not raise any objection under Section 5-A of the Act,
with respect to such acquisition proceedings at any stage, rather they
accepted the compensation granted under protest. To receive an award
under protest is a legal requirement for the purpose of making a
reference under Section 18 of the Act. The quashing of the
declaration under Section 6 of the Act would not automatically apply
to the suit land, as it was not the subject matter of challenge with
respect to the acquisition proceedings before court. The appellants
did not make any inquiry whatsoever, with respect to the title of the
suit land, though inquiry was sought to be made in relation to the
said land, by different persons in altogether different contexts. The
report of the high powered committee appointed by the Board itself, is
self-contradictory, as they clearly provided that possession had been
taken and, in view of the fact that once possession is taken, the
said land vests in the State, free from all encumbrances under Section
16 of the Act, the same cannot be divested. Therefore, the question
of re-conveying the suit land in favour of the appellants cannot
possibly arise. Land can be released from acquisition proceedings
either under Section 48 of the Act, or in exercise of powers under
the General Clauses Act, 1897, but this can be done only prior to the
vesting of the land in the State, which in itself is prior to taking
possession thereof. The appellants, being purchasers of the said
suit land, after more than 20 years of the Award, cannot challenge the
acquisition proceedings at such a belated stage. More so, the vendors
were not competent to make any transfer, as none of them had good
title over the suit land. Therefore, any and all sale transactions
are illegal and void. The sale-deeds executed in favour of the
appellants, do not confer upon them, any title. More so, the
subsequent purchasers cannot challenge the validity of the land
acquisition. The appeals lack merit and are therefore liable to be
dismissed.
5. We have considered the rival submissions made by the learned
counsel for the parties and perused the records.
However, before coming to the merit of the case, it is desirable
to consider the legal issues involved herein.
Whether subsequent purchaser can challenge the acquisition
proceedings:
6. The issue of maintainability of the writ petitions by the person
who purchases the land subsequent to a notification being issued under
Section 4 of the Act has been considered by this Court time and again.
In Pandit Leela Ram v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 2112, this
Court held that, any one who deals with the land subsequent to a
Section 4 notification being issued, does so, at his own peril. In
Sneh Prabha v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1996 SC 540, this Court
held that a Section 4 notification gives a notice to the public at
large that the land in respect to which it has been issued, is needed
for a public purpose, and it further points out that there will be "an
impediment to any one to encumber the land acquired thereunder." The
alienation thereafter does not bind the State or the beneficiary under
the acquisition. The purchaser is entitled only to receive
compensation. While deciding the said case, reliance was placed on an
earlier judgment of this Court in Union of india v. Shri Shiv Kumar
Bhargava & Ors., JT (1995) 6 SC 274.
7. Similarly, in U.P. Jal Nigam v. M/s. Kalra Properties Pvt. Ltd.,
AIR 1996 SC 1170, this Court held that, purchase of land after
publication of a Section 4 notification in relation to such land, is
void against the State and at the most, the purchaser may be a person-
interested in compensation, since he steps into the shoes of the
erstwhile owner and may therefore, merely claim compensation. (See
also: Star Wire (India) Ltd. v. State of Haryana & Ors., (1996) 11 SCC
698).
8. In Ajay Kishan Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 1996 SC 2677;
Mahavir & Anr. v. Rural Institute, Amravati & Anr., (1995) 5 SCC 335;
Gian Chand v. Gopala & Ors., (1995) 2 SCC 528; and Meera Sahni v.
Lieutenant Governor of Delhi & Ors., (2008) 9 SCC 177, this Court
categorically held that, a person who purchases land after the
publication of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not
entitled to challenge the proceedings for the reason, that his title
is void and he can at best claim compensation on the basis of vendor’s
title. In view of this, the sale of land after issuance of a Section 4
notification is void and the purchaser cannot challenge the
acquisition proceedings. (See also: Tika Ram v. State of U.P., (2009)
10 SCC 689).
9. In view of the above, the law on the issue can be summarized to
the effect that a person who purchases land subsequent to the issuance
of a Section 4 notification with respect to it, is not competent to
challenge the validity of the acquisition proceedings on any ground
whatsoever, for the reason that the sale deed executed in his favour
does not confer upon him, any title and at the most he can claim
compensation on the basis of his vendor’s title.
The acquisition challenged by one – whether others can also take the
benefit of the same.
10. The relief obtained by some persons, by approaching the Court
immediately after the cause of action has arisen, cannot be the basis
for other persons who have belatedly filed their petition, to take the
benefit of earlier relief provided, for the reason that, such persons
cannot be permitted to take impetus of an order passed by the court,
at the behest of another more diligent person. (Vide: Ratan Chandra
Sammanta & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2276; State of
Karnataka & Ors. v. S.M. Kotrayya & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 267; and Jagdih
Lal & Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 2366).
11. In Abhey Ram (dead) by L.Rs. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors.,
AIR 1997 SC 2564, a three Judge Bench of this Court, dealt with an
issue similar to the one involved herein. The question that arose was
whether the quashing of the notification/declaration under the Act by
the court in respect of other matters, would confer benefit upon non-
parties also. The Court held as under:
“The question then arises is whether the quashing of the
declaration by the Division Bench in respect of the other
matters would enure the benefit to the appellants also.
Though, prima facie, the argument of the learned counsel is
attractive, on deeper consideration, it is difficult to give
acceptance to the contention….. If it were a case entirely
relating to Section 6 declaration as has been quashed by the
High Court, necessarily that would enure the benefit to
others also, though they did not file any petition, except to
those whose lands were taken possession of and were vested
in the State under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act free from
all encumbrances.”
(Emphasis added)
12. In H.M.T. House Building Co-operative Society v. Syed Khader &
Ors., AIR 1995 SC 2244, this Court quashed the land acquisition
proceedings in toto, wherein the land had been acquired by the
Government for the use of the cooperative society which had planned a
housing scheme upon it, in view of the conclusion that it could not be
called a “public purpose”, within the meaning of the Act. The Court
further directed the respondents therein to restore the possession of
the land to the tenure-holders/persons-interested, and such persons
were thereafter, directed to refund the amount received by them as
compensation. (See also: H.M.T. House Building Cooperative Society v.
M. Venkataswamappa & Ors., (1995) 3 SCC 128)
13. The said judgment has subsequently been approved and followed by
this Court, in Delhi Admn. v. Gurdip Singh Uban & Ors., AIR 1999 SC
3822, wherein this Court held as follows:
“Quashing the notification in the cases of individual writ
petitions cannot be treated as quashing the whole of it. That
was what was held in Abhey Ram case (supra). The main points
raised before us are fully covered by the judgment of the
three-Judge Bench in Abhey Ram’s case.”
14. In Om Prakash v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 2010 SC 2430, this
Court considered a similar issue and reiterated the view taken by this
Court in Abhey Ram (supra), wherein it was held that, in case a person
interested has not filed any objection to the notice issued under
Section 5-A of the Act, or challenged the acquisition proceedings, he
cannot claim that the order of quashing the declaration in some other
matter, would also cover his case. The Court held as under:
“The facts of the aforesaid cases would show that in the case
in hand as many as four declarations under Section 6 of the
Act were issued from time to time. Finally when declaration
is quashed by any Court, it would only enure to the benefit
of those who had approached the Court. It would certainly not
extend the benefit to those who had not approached the Court
or who might have gone into slumber.”
15. Therefore, the law on the issue can be summarised to state that,
in the event that the person interested has not filed objections in
response to a notice issued under Section 5-A, and has not challenged
the acquisition proceedings, the quashing of the declaration issued
under Section 6 in some other case, would not enure any benefit to
such person. More so, where the possession of land has already been
taken, and such land stands vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances as provided under Sections 16 and 17(2) of the Act, prior
to the date of decision of the Court quashing the declaration in toto,
no benefit can be taken by him. Where a party has not filed objections
to the notice issued under Section 5-A, the declaration qua such
persons is generally neither quashed, nor does it stand vitiated qua
him, by any error of law warranting interference. There is also
another view with respect to this matter, which is that, in case the
said land has been acquired for a Scheme, which does not fall within
the ambit of “public purpose” then, in such a case, it would not be a
case of acquisition under the Act, instead, it would amount to
colourable exercise of power.
Land once vested in the Government – whether can be divested:
16. It is a settled legal proposition, that once the land is vested
in the State, free from all encumbrances, it cannot be divested and
proceedings under the Act would not lapse, even if an award is not
made within the statutorily stipulated period. (Vide: Avadh Behari
Yadav v. State of Bihar &. Ors., (1995) 6 SCC 31; U.P. Jal Nigam v.
Kalra Properties (P) Ltd. (Supra); Allahabad Development Authority v.
Nasiruzzaman & Ors., (1996) 6 SCC 424, M. Ramalinga Thevar v. State of
Tamil Nadu & Ors., (2000) 4 SCC 322; and Government of Andhra Pradesh
v. Syed Akbar & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 492).
17. The said land, once acquired, cannot be restored to the tenure
holders/persons-interested, even if it is not used for the purpose for
which it was so acquired, or for any other purpose either. The
proceedings cannot be withdrawn/abandoned under the provisions of
Section 48 of the Act, or under Section 21 of the General Clauses Act,
once the possession of the land has been taken and the land vests in
the State, free from all encumbrances. (Vide: State of Madhya
Pradesh v. V.P. Sharma, AIR 1966 SC 1593; Lt. Governor of Himachal
Pradesh & Anr. v. Shri Avinash Sharma, AIR 1970 SC 1576; Satendra
Prasad Jain v. State of U.P. & Ors., AIR 1993 SC 2517; Rajasthan
Housing Board & Ors. v. Shri Kishan & Ors., (1993) 2 SCC 84 and
Dedicated Freight Corridor Corporation of India v. Subodh Singh &
Ors., (2011) 11 SCC 100).
18. The meaning of the word 'vesting', has been considered by this
Court time and again. In Fruit and Vegetable Merchants Union v. The
Delhi Improvement Trust, AIR 1957 SC 344, this Court held that the
meaning of word 'vesting' varies as per the context of the Statute,
under which the property vests. So far as the vesting under Sections
16 and 17 of the Act is concerned, the Court held as under.-
"In the cases contemplated by Sections 16 and 17, the
property acquired becomes the property of Government
without any condition or ; limitations either as to title
or possession. The legislature has made it clear that
vesting of the property is not for any limited purpose or
limited duration.”
19. In Gulam Mustafa & Ors. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1977
SC 448, in a similar situation, this Court held as under:-
"Once the original acquisition is valid and title has
vested in the Municipality, how it uses the excess land is
no concern of the original owner and cannot be the basis
for invalidating the acquisition. There is no principle of
law by which a valid compulsory acquisition stands voided
because long later the requiring Authority diverts it to a
public purpose other than the one stated in the
….declaration.”
20. Similarly, in State of Kerala & Anr. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai &
Anr., (1997) 5 SCC 432, this Court held as under:
“It is settled law that if the land is acquired for a
public purpose, after the public purpose was achieved, the
rest of the land could be used for any other public
purpose. In case there is no other public purpose for which
the land is needed, then instead of disposal by way of sale
to the erstwhile owner, the land should be put to public
auction and the amount fetched in the public auction can be
better utilised for the public purpose envisaged in the
Directive Principles of the Constitution.
(See also: C. Padma & Ors. v. Deputy Secretary to the Government of
Tamil Nadu & Ors., (1997) 2 SCC 627; Bhagat Singh v. State of U.P. &
Ors., AIR 1999 SC 436; Niladri Narayan Chandradhurja v. State of West
Bengal, AIR 2002 SC 2532; Northern Indian Glass Industries v. Jaswant
Singh & Ors., (2003) 1 SCC 335; and Leelawanti & Ors. v. State of
Haryana & Ors., (2012) 1 SCC 66).
21. In Government of Andhra Pradesh & Anr. v. Syed Akbar (Supra),
this Court considered this very issue and held that, once the land has
vested in the State, it can neither be divested, by virtue of Section
48 of the Act, nor can it be reconveyed to the persons-
interested/tenure holders, and that therefore, the question of
restitution of possession to the tenure holder, does not arise. (See
also: Pratap v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1996 SC 1296; Chandragaudaj
Ramgonda Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1996) 6 SCC 405; State of
Kerala & Ors. v. M. Bhaskaran Pillai & Anr., AIR 1997 SC 2703;
Printers (Mysore) . Ltd. v. M.A. Rasheed & Ors. (2004) 4 SCC 460;
Bangalore Development Authority v. R. Hanumaiah, (2005) 12 SCC 508;
and Delhi Airtech Services (P) Ltd. & Anr. v. State of U.P. & Anr.
(2011) 9 SCC 354).
22. In view of the above, the law can be crystallized to mean, that
once the land is acquired and it vests in the State, free from all
encumbrances, it is not the concern of the land owner, whether the
land is being used for the purpose for which it was acquired or for
any other purpose. He becomes persona non-grata once the land vests in
the State. He has a right to only receive compensation for the same,
unless the acquisition proceeding is itself challenged. The State
neither has the requisite power to reconvey the land to the person-
interested, nor can such person claim any right of restitution on any
ground, whatsoever, unless there is some statutory amendment to this
effect.
23. The general rule of law is undoubted, that no one can transfer a
better title than he himself possesses; Nemo dat quod non habet.
However, this Rule has certain exceptions and one of them is, that the
transfer must be in good faith for value, and there must be no
misrepresentation or fraud, which would render the transactions as
void and also that the property is purchased after taking reasonable
care to ascertain that the transferee has the requisite power to
transfer the said land, and finally that, the parties have acted in
good faith, as is required under Section 41 of the Transfer of
Property Act, 1882. (Vide: Asa Ram & Anr. v. Mst. Ram Kali & Anr.,
AIR 1958 SC 183; State Bank of India v. Rajendra Kumar Singh & Ors.,
AIR 1969 SC 401, Controller of Estate Duty, Lucknow v. Aloke Mitra,
AIR 1981 SC 102; Hanumant Kumar Talesara v. Mohal Lal, AIR 1988 SC
299; and State of Punjab v. Surjit Kaur (Dead) through LRs., JT (2001)
10 SC 42).
24. This Court has earlier taken the view that, in case the award is
not accepted under protest, the persons interested cannot make an
application to make a reference under Section 18, (Vide: Wardington
Lyngdoh & Ors. v. Collector, Mawkyrwat, (1995) 4 SCC 428), wherein
this Court held that, a person who has received the amount of award
made under Section 11 of the Act, without protest, will not be
entitled to make an application under Section 18 of the Act.
Therefore, receipt of the said amount under protest, is a condition
precedent for making an application under Section 18, within the
limitation prescribed under the Act.
25. The aforesaid view however, has not been consistently
reiterated, as is evident from the judgment in Ajit Singh & Anr. v.
State of Punjab & Ors., (1994) 4 SCC 67, wherein it was held that,
merely an application under Section 18 of the Act would make it clear
that the person-interested has not accepted the award made by the
authority.
26. The instant case requires to be examined in the light of the
aforesaid legal propositions.
From the facts it is evident that, the predecessor-in-interest
of the appellants approached the court by filing Writ Petitions as
well as writ appeals, with respect to some of their lands, but for the
reasons best known to them, they did not challenge the acquisition
proceedings so far as the suit land is concerned. The appellants
filed a writ petition for quashing the land acquisition proceedings
and/or seeking a declaration to the effect that the notification
issued under Section 4 of the Act on 15.5.1978, in relation to Survey
Nos. 282/1, 282/2, 283/1, 283/2, 284/1, 284/2, 284/3, 284/4 situated
in Tambaram Village, Chennai, had lapsed and become inoperative and
consequently, to issue a mandamus, barring the respondents, their men,
their agents, subordinates, servants or anyone acting under them, from
interfering in any manner, with the peaceful enjoyment of the
properties belonging to the appellants, as stipulated in the
aforementioned surveys.
27. The appellants also filed another writ petition for quashing the
orders passed in relation to the applications of their predecessors-in-
interest with respect to re-conveyance of the said land. The reliefs
claimed therein inter-alia, are as under:
“Issue a writ of Certiorarified Mandamus or any other
order or direction in the nature of a writ of Certiorarified
Mandamus by calling for the records comprised in the
proceedings of the 4th respondent bearing Letter No.
2899/LAI(1)/2007-6 dated 7.7.2008 and quash the same as
illegal and unconstitutional and consequently issue a Writ of
Mandamus directing the respondents to reconvey the property
situate at Survey No. 283/1 measuring about 0.27 cents,
Survey No. 284/1 measuring about 0.70 cents, Survey No.284/2
measuring about 0.65 cents and Survey No.284/3 measuring
about 0.64 cents in 166 of Tambaram Village, Old State Bank
Colony, Saidapet Taluk, Chengalpat District as per the
provisions contained in Sec.48-B of the Land Acquisition
(Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act 1996 (Tamil Nadu Act of 16 of
1997) and pass such further or other orders as this Hon'ble
Court may deem fit and proper in the facts and circumstances
of the case and thus render justice.”
28. It is evident from the relief clauses of the two writ petitions
filed by the appellants, that the reliefs sought by them are mutually
inconsistent and contradictory. In the event that the appellants
wanted a declaration to the effect that the acquisition proceedings in
pursuance of issuance of the Section 4 notification, dated 15.5.1978
had lapsed or were void, the question of seeking re-conveyance of the
said land could not arise. More so, it is difficult to understand, how
the appellants can claim relief in respect of 9 survey numbers. In
the present appeals, relief is restricted only to 4 of the survey
numbers. Dr. A.M. Singhvi has not pressed for the relief of
reconveyance. However, it is apparent that the appellants’ claim
cannot co-exist and can be said to be blowing hot and blowing cold,
simultaneously.
29. In Cauvery Coffee Traders, Mangalore v. Hornor Resources
(International) Company Limited, (2011) 10 SCC 420, this Court
considered a large number of judgments on the issue of estoppels and
held as under:
“A party cannot be permitted to “blow hot and cold”,
“fast and loose” or “approbate and reprobate”. Where one
knowingly accepts the benefits of a contract or conveyance
or an order, is estopped to deny the validity or binding
effect on him of such contract or conveyance or order. This
rule is applied to do equity, however, it must not be
applied in a manner as to violate the principles of right
and good conscience…..
……….The doctrine of estoppel by election is one of the
species of estoppels in pais (or equitable estoppel), which
is a rule in equity. By that law, a person may be precluded
by his actions or conduct or silence when it is his duty to
speak, from asserting a right which he otherwise would have
had.”
30. In the instant case, the tenure holders/person-interested
neither filed objections under Section 5-A of the Act, nor have they
challenged the land acquisition proceedings, so far as the suit land
is concerned, instead they chose to withdraw the compensation awarded
in 1983 and 1986; after the expiry of about three decades and hence,
they cannot be permitted to challenge the acquisition proceedings on
any ground whatsoever. The appellants cannot claim title/relief better
than what the original vendors were entitled to.
31. In fact, the appellants have claimed reliefs in the writ
petitions with respect to not just the suit land but also in relation
to the land which was the subject matter of an earlier litigation by
their predecessors-in-interest. We fail to understand for what
purpose the relief of quashing the acquisition proceedings has been
sought when, in respect of the said land, the proceedings already
stood quashed.
32. The High Court dealt with the proceeding, issued in RC No.
8222/95/F5, which is purported to have been issued by one K.Muthu,
Special Tahsildar (Land Acquisition), and observed that the said
proceeding itself stood cancelled and somehow a xerox copy of the said
proceeding was obtained by the appellants and they utilised the same
to secure permission for sanctioning their plan of construction of
flats on the said land. Thus, the appellant have played fraud upon
the authorities in order to obtain the said sanction. Even as per the
RC No. 8222/95/F5, it is evident that the possession of the suit land
was taken over ages ago and therefore, the said suit land was the
subject matter of the earlier litigation.
33. The High Court also recorded findings to the effect that the
appellants have “managed”, not only to obtain certain orders from the
department, but have also misused the process of the court to achieve
a sinister design. The court further took note that one of the
appellants had filed an additional affidavit before the High Court in
a writ petition by way of which, had attempted to mislead the court
through furnishing of false information.
It has even been admitted at the Bar, that the letter dated
7.7.2005 which was placed on the record by the appellants before the
High Court, was in fact, a forged document.
34. The appellants have not approached the court with clean hands,
and are therefore, not entitled for any relief. Whenever a person
approaches a Court of Equity, in the exercise of its extraordinary
jurisdiction, it is expected that he will approach the said court not
only with clean hands but also with a clean mind, a clean heart and
clean objectives. Thus, he who seeks equity must do equity. The legal
maxim “Jure Naturae Aequum Est Neminem cum Alterius Detrimento Et
Injuria Fieri Locupletiorem”, means that it is a law of nature that
one should not be enriched by causing loss or injury to another.
(Vide: The Ramjas Foundation & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1993
SC 852; Nooruddin v. (Dr.) K.L. Anand, (1995) 1 SCC 242; and Ramniklal
N. Bhutta & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra & Ors., AIR 1997 SC 1236).
35. The judicial process cannot become an instrument of oppression
or abuse, or a means in the process of the court to subvert justice,
for the reason that the court exercises its jurisdiction, only in
furtherance of justice. The interests of justice and public interest
coalesce, and therefore, they are very often one and the same. A
petition or an affidavit containing a misleading and/or an inaccurate
statement, only to achieve an ulterior purpose, amounts to an abuse of
process of the court.
36. In Dalip Singh v. State of U.P. & Ors., (2010) 2 SCC 114, this
Court noticed an altogether new creed of litigants, that is, dishonest
litigants and went on to strongly deprecate their conduct by observing
that, the truth constitutes an integral part of the justice delivery
system. The quest for personal gain has become so intense that those
involved in litigation do not hesitate to seek shelter of falsehood,
misrepresentation and suppression of facts in the course of court
proceedings. A litigant who attempts to pollute the stream of
justice, or who touches the pure fountain of justice with tainted
hands, is not entitled to any relief, interim or final.
37. The truth should be the guiding star in the entire judicial
process. “Every trial is a voyage of discovery in which truth is the
quest”. An action at law is not a game of chess, therefore, a
litigant cannot prevaricate and take inconsistent positions. It is one
of those fundamental principles of jurisprudence that litigants must
observe total clarity and candour in their pleadings. (Vide: Ritesh
Tewari & Anr. v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors., (2010) 10 SCC 677; and
Amar Singh v. Union of India, (2011) 7 SCC 69).
38. In Maria Margarida Sequeria Fernandes & Ors. v. Erasmo Jack de
Sequeria (dead), (2012) 5 SCC 370), this Court taking note of its
earlier judgment in Ramrameshwari Devi v. Nirmala Devi, (2011) 8 SCC
249 held:
“False claims and defences are really serious problems with
real estate litigation, predominantly because of ever-
escalating prices of the real estate. Litigation pertaining
to valuable real estate properties is dragged on by
unscrupulous litigants in the hope that the other party
will tire out and ultimately would settle with them by
paying a huge amount. This happens because of the enormous
delay in adjudication of cases in our courts. If pragmatic
approach is adopted, then this problem can be minimised to
a large extent.”
The Court further observed that wrongdoers must be denied
profit from their frivolous litigation, and that they should be
prevented from introducing and relying upon, false pleadings and
forged or fabricated documents in the records furnished by them to the
court.
39. In view of the above, the appellants have disentitled themselves
for any equitable relief.
40. Section 16-A has been added to the Act by the State Amendment
Act, 1996, and the same imposes a complete restriction on the sale of
acquired land by the tenure holder. In case the land is transferred
in contravention of these provisions, the Government may, by way of
an order, declare the transfer to be null and void, and on such
declaration, the land shall, as penalty, be forfeited to, and vest
in, the Revenue Department of the Government, free from all
encumbrances.
In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the
sale deeds in favour of the appellants are void and unenforceable.
41. In such a fact-situation, we fail to understand how the
appellants came to possess the suit land which had been vested in the
State ages ago, in the years 1983 and 1986. Such a course is not
possible without the collusion of the officers of the State/Board.
42. After considering the entire material on record, we reach the
following inescapable conclusions:-
i) The suit land stood notified under Section 4 of the Act as on
15.5.1978. There is nothing on record to show, nor have the
appellants made any pleadings to the effect that, the persons
interested at the relevant time ever filed any objections whatsoever,
in response to the notice issued under Section 5-A of the Act.
ii) Predecessors-in-interest of the appellants have filed two writ
petitions challenging the validity of acquisition of some of their
land but they did not raise the issue of validity of the acquisition
in respect of the suit land.
iii) Award no.14/1983 was made on 28.6.1983, in respect of Survey
Nos.283/1, 284/1 and 284/3. The amount of compensation, was withdrawn
by the original tenure holders/persons-interested, though of course,
under protest, and the same was limited to the extent of quantum of
compensation, so that they could approach the Collector for making a
reference to the Court under Section 18 of the Act.
iv) The judgment of the learned Single Judge is subsequent to the
aforesaid award. As the compensation related to the land had been
withdrawn, and the land stood vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances, quashing the declaration under Section 6 in cases filed
by others, would not enure any benefit to the original tenure
holders/appellants, as has been explained by this Court in the case of
Abhey Ram (supra), and furthermore, even if the declaration stood
quashed in toto, it could not save the suit land, as its possession
had already been taken over.
v) In the instant case, the High Court did not declare the
acquisition proceedings to be void, or the purpose for which the land
had been acquired not to be a “public purpose” within the meaning of
the Act. There has also been no direction whatsoever, to restore the
possession of the said land to the tenure holders, upon refund of the
compensation amount by them.
vi) Another award no.11/1986 in respect of Survey No.284/2 was made
on 14.8.1986. Compensation awarded in relation to the said piece of
land was withdrawn. The land thus, vested in the State, free from all
encumbrances.
vii) In the instant case, as the original vendors i.e. vendors of the
first sale were not vested with any title over the said land, the
transfer by them, was itself void and all subsequent transfers would
also, as a result, remain ineffective and unenforceable in law.
Therefore, sale deeds executed in the years 2004-05 would not confer
any title on the appellants.
viii) The appellants claimed to have made some enquiries in
relation to the acquisition proceedings qua the suit land, to which
the competent authorities replied, that the land was free from
acquisition proceedings and therefore, the appellants proceeded to
purchase the said suit land. The letters written by the Authorities
dated 4.3.2004, 7.7.2005 and 12.5.2006 do not make any reference to
the present appellants, nor was any information sought by any of them
in this regard. Some of the said letters had been addressed to the
original tenure holders and other were merely found to be inter-
departmental communications.
ix) Letter dated 7.7.2005, filed by the appellants before the Court
is admittedly a forged document.
x) So far as the matter relating to the proceedings issued in R.C.
No.8222/95/F-5, it is clearly revealed that the appellants have used
unfair means to obtain sanction for their plan of construction of
flats.
xi) The appellants filed an affidavit before the High Court only to
mislead the court by furnishing false information.
xii) The appellants also managed to obtain certain orders from the
Department and further have abused the process of the court.
xiii) The appellants did neither approach the statutory
authority nor the court with clean hands.
xiv) Compensation was paid to the original tenure holders in 1983 and
1986. The same was refunded by the present appellants in the name of
the original tenure holders in 2010 i.e. after 27 years, and the same
has not been accepted by the Board and has been duly returned to the
appellants.
xv) The recommendations of the High Level Committee contained in
Annexure-P.11 make it clear that the said Committee was constituted,
only upon the request of the appellants to consider their grievances.
The recommendations suggest that although possession of the suit land
was taken, as the land was inaccessible, it remained unutilized for
the purpose for which it was acquired. Therefore, reconveyance of the
same was suggested.
xvi) An application for re-conveyance was filed by the original
tenure holders and their legal heirs, and not by the appellants with
respect to the said part of the suit land, as is evident from the
orders dated 18.12.2007 and 7.7.2008. The said letters, in fact, were
addressed to Tmt. K. Palaniammal, Tmt. Girija, Tmt. Nagammal, Thiru
A.E. Kothandaraman Mudaliar, and Thiru M. Mahalingam in response to an
application made by them.
xvii) It is evident from the record that there was no application for
reconveyance of the land in Survey No.284/2, though the appellants
have sought relief in relation to this land also.
xviii) The appellants filed applications for re-conveyance
through the original tenure holders/legal heirs. This clearly reveals
that the appellants themselves had been of the view that the suit land
had already vested in the State, otherwise there could be no question
of re-conveyance.
(xix) The land once vested in the State, free from all encumbrances
cannot be divested.
xx) The appellants had attempted to be succeeded in
illegally/unauthorisedly encroaching upon public land, by connivance
with the officers of the State Govt./Board and raised a huge
construction upon the said land, after getting the Plan sanctioned
from the competent statutory authority.
xxi) The State/Board authorities never made an attempt to stop the
construction. Nor the Board approached the court to restrain the
appellants from encroaching upon its land and construction of the
flats. Connivance of the officers of the Board in the scandal is writ
large and does not require any proof.
Facts of the case reveal a very sorry state of affairs as how
the public property can be looted with the connivance and collusion of
the so called trustees of the public properties. It reflects on the
very bad governance of the State authorities.
43. The aforesaid conclusions do not warrant any relief to the
appellants. The appeals are dismissed with the costs of Rupees Twenty
Five lacs, which the appellants are directed to deposit with the
Supreme Court Legal Services Authority within a period of six weeks.
44. In addition thereto, the Chief Secretary of Tamil Nadu is
requested to examine the issues involved in the case and find out as
who were the officials of the State or Board responsible for this loot
of the public properties and proceed against them in accordance with
law. He is further directed to ensure eviction of the appellants from
the public land forthwith.
…………..………………………J.
(Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)
……….….………………………J.
(JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)
New Delhi,
September 18, 2012
