REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
SPECIAIL LEAVE PETITION(C) No……….of 2012
(CC No. 11497 of 2012)
Girimallappa
…Petitioner
Versus
The Special Land Acquisition …Respondents
Officer M & MIP & Anr.
O R D E R
1. Delay condoned.
2. Facts and circumstances giving rise to this petition are that:
A. A huge area of land was notified under Section 4(1) of the
Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (hereinafter called the `Act’) on 30.5.1984
including the petitioner’s land measuring 11 Acres 32 Guntas at Gobbur
(K) Village in District Gulbarga for the purpose of construction of a
tank. The possession of the said land has been taken by the
respondent authorities on 23.6.1985. The Land Acquisition Collector
made an Award under Section 11 of the Act fixing the market value of
the land at the rate of Rs. 3800/- per Acre.
B. One LAC Case No. 500 of 1993 filed by another person was
decided by the Reference Court under Section 18 of the Act on
28.9.1994. While placing reliance on the same, the petitioner filed
application under Section 28-A of the Act. The said application was
allowed fixing the market value of the dry land at the rate of
Rs.10000/- per Acre. Petitioner preferred a further reference against
that order claiming Rs.45000/- per Acre for dry land and Rs.75000/- per
Acre for irrigated lands. The said reference was decided vide order
dated 27.9.2003 assessing the market value at the rate of Rs. 15000/-
per Acre for dry land and Rs.21500/- per Acre for irrigated land.
C. Aggrieved from the said reference award, petitioner preferred
LAC Appeal No. 64 of 2008 before the District Judge, Gulbarga, seeking
enhancement of compensation assessing the market value of the land at
the rate of Rs.24000/- per Acre which stood allowed vide judgment and
decree dated 27.10.2009.
D. Petitioner filed MSA No. 510 of 2010 against the said judgment
and decree dated 27.10.2009 before High Court which has been dismissed
by the impugned judgment and order dated 12.9.2011.
Hence, this petition.
3. Ms. Kiran Suri, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner,
vehemently submitted that courts cannot defeat the claim based on
substantial justice on mere technicalities. Learned counsel would
submit that when technicalities are pitted against substantial justice,
the latter must prevail; in case petitioner was entitled for a higher
compensation, awarding a lesser amount of compensation, tantamounts to
expropriation of the property in violation of mandate of Article 300-A
of the Constitution of India. Petitioner has been deprived the higher
compensation as he could not afford to pay the court fees though he was
entitled for higher compensation claimed by him.
4. Record of the case reveals that petitioner’s land measuring 11
Acres 32 Guntas had been acquired though there is nothing on record to
show as to whether petitioner had some more land. But the area of land
acquired makes it clear that petitioner was a man of means. We fail to
understand, in case, he did not file a reference under Section 18 of
the Act, under what circumstances his application under Section 28-A of
the Act could be entertained.
5. This Court in State of Orissa & Ors. v. Chitrasen Bhoi, JT 2009
(13) SC 388, considered this aspect and held :
“The scope of provisions of Section 28-A of the Act was
considered by this Court in Mewa Ram v. State of Haryana AIR
1987 SC 45, and the Court placed emphasis particularly on para
2 (ix) of the object and reasons of the Amendment Act, 1987
which provided for a special provision for inarticulate and
poor people to apply for re-determination of the compensation
amount on the basis of the court award in a land acquisition
reference filed by comparatively affluent land owner. The Court
observed as under:
Section 28-A in terms does not apply to the case of the
petitioners..... They do not belong to that class of
society for whose benefit the provision is intended and
meant, i.e. inarticulate and poor people who by reason of
their poverty and ignorance have failed to take advantage
of the right of reference to the civil court under Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.
This Court approved and reiterated the law laid down in
Mewa Ram (Supra) in Scheduled Caste Cooperative Land Owning
Society Ltd. Bhatinda v. Union of India & Ors, AIR 1991 SC 730.
In Babua Ram & Ors. v. State of U.P. & Anr. (1995) 2 SCC 689,
this Court again reiterated the law laid down in Mewa Ram
(Supra) observing as under:-
Legislature made a discriminatory policy between the poor
and inarticulate as one class of persons to whom the
benefit of Section 28-A was to be extended and
comparatively affluent who had taken advantage of the
reference under Section 18 and the latter as a class to
which the benefit of Section 28-A was not extended.
Otherwise, the phraseology of the language of the non-
obstante clause would have been differently worded..... It
is true that the legislature intended to relieve hardship
to the poor, indigent and inarticulate interested persons
who generally failed to avail the reference under Section
18 which is an existing bar and to remedy it, Section 28-A
was enacted giving a right and remedy for re-
determination......The legislature appears to have presumed
that the same state of affairs continue to subsist among
the poor and inarticulate persons and they generally fail
to avail the right under sub-section (1) of Section 18 due
to poverty or ignorance or avoidance of expropriation.
Thus, it is apparent that the legislature has carved out
an exception in the form of Section 28-A and made a special
provision to grant some relief to a particular class of
society, namely poor, illiterate, ignorant and inarticulate
people. It is made only for “little Indians”. (Emphasis
added)
6. Petitioner cannot claim, by any means to fall under the said
category of “little Indians”. However, as the said order has not been
challenged by the respondent(s), we cannot examine the issue further,
even if the order is totally unwarranted.
7. Petitioner’s claim in the first appeal before the learned
District Judge had been only to the tune of Rs.24000/- per Acre. The
prayer before the learned District Judge in LAC No. 64 of 2008 reads as
under:
“ Hence, it is prayed that the Hon’ble Court may kindly be
pleased to set aside the order passed by the court below in LAC
No. 193/01 and enhance it to Rs.24,000/- per Acre with all
statutory benefits and excluding the interest for the delayed
period in the interest of justice for which the appellants
shall ever pray.”
8. It may be pertinent to mention here that while hearing the
appeal, the learned District Judge at Gulbarga condoned the delay of
1717 days in filing the appeal.
9. In the appeal before the High Court, no specific amount was
demanded by the petitioner. The prayer made before the High Court reads
as under:
“Therefore, it is most humbly prayed that the Hon’ble Court may
be pleased to allow this appeal and modify the judgment and
Award dated 27.10.2009 passed in L.A.C. Appeal No. 64/2008 by
the learned III Addl. District Judge at Gulbarga, modifying the
judgment and award dated 27.9.2003 passed in LAC No. 193/2001
by the Prl. Civil Judge (Sr.Dn.) Gulbarga and pass any other
appropriate orders, in the interest of justice.”
10. Thus, it is apparent that no specific demand was raised by the
petitioner before the High Court. The Memo of Appeal reveals that
Rs.25/- was paid as the court fees. The High Court dealt with the
issue elaborately taking note of earlier proceedings/orders including
the order passed under Section 28-A of the Act, and condonation of
delay of 1717 days by the first appellate court. Finally the High Court
held that the claim itself was restricted to Rs. 24000/- per Acre.
There was no justification to interfere as the claim of the petitioner
stood fully satisfied by the order passed in the first appeal.
11. This special leave petition is filed with a delay of 154 days,
with an explanation that petitioner suffered from the ailment and could
not approach the court within limitation.
12. The question does arise as to whether such a vague prayer can
be entertained by the court. The memo of appeal before the High Court
does not even reveal as to what was his demand. Reliance is being
placed on the judgment of this Court in Chandrashekhar & Ors. v. Addl.
Special Land Acquisition Officer, AIR 2009 SC 3012, wherein after
considering the earlier judgments, this Court held that court should
not be too technical in awarding the compensation in case there is a
shortfall of court fees. The said judgment is not an authority on the
proposition advanced before us in this petition that court is bound to
enhance the amount of compensation though no specific amount is
demanded by the petitioner.
13. It was not a case where an order could be challenged on the
ground that the same is a nullity for want of competence of the issuing
authority and proper pleadings including appropriate grounds
challenging the same have been taken, but no prayer has been made for
quashing the said order. In such an eventuality the order can be
examined only after considering the statutory provisions involved
therein. The court may reach a conclusion that the order suffers from
lack of jurisdiction. (See: Godrej Sara Lee Limited v. Assistant
Commissioner (AA) & Anr., (2009) 14 SCC 338).
14. In case, the petitioner was serious about the matter, he could
have amended the Memo of Appeal and that application could have been
considered sympathetically by the High Court as held by this Court in
Harcharan v. State of Haryana, AIR 1983 SC 43.
15. The facts mentioned in this petition depict entirely different
picture and it gives an impression as if the High Court had not
enhanced the compensation though demanded by the petitioner for want of
payment of court fees which he could not afford to pay due to paucity
of funds.
16. The case relied upon by Ms. Kiran Suri is the case where the
prayer was for a particular enhancement and it was further made clear
that the applicants therein could not afford to pay the court fees for
financial constraints. In the instant case, the first appeal filed by
the petitioner was barred by 1717 days and the delay was condoned. This
petition is also barred by 154 days. Petitioner for the reasons best
known to him did not make the demand for a specific enhancement. Mere
making a reference in the Memo of Appeal that the High Court had
awarded a higher amount in respect of a land covered by the same
Notification under Section 4 of the Act, is not enough. The claimant
has to satisfy the court that his land was similar in quality and had
same geographical location or was situated in close vicinity of the
land covered by the exemplar relied upon by him. In the instant case,
no such attempt has ever been made by the petitioner. Thus, it is not
that a meritorious case has been thrown out and the cause of justice
stood defeated.
More so, the exemplar cited first time before the High Court in
Second Appeal has not been referred to in the First Appeal. In absence
thereof, it is beyond imagination as how findings recorded by the first
Appellate Court could be termed as perverse and be a subject matter of
appeal.
17. Justice is an illusion as the meaning and definition of
‘justice’ varies from person to person and party to party. Party feels
having got justice only and only if it succeeds before the court,
though it may not have a justifiable claim.
Justice is the virtue, by which the Society/Court/Tribunal
gives to a man what is his due, opposed to injury or wrong. Justice is
an act of rendering what is right and equitable towards one who has
suffered a wrong. Therefore, while tempering the justice with mercy,
the Court has to be very conscious that it has to do justice in exact
conformity to some obligatory law for the reason that human actions are
found to be just or unjust as they are in conformity with or in
opposition to the law. (Vide: Delhi Administration v. Gurudeep Singh
Uban, AIR 2000 SC 3737).
18. Thus, in view of the above, we do not see any justification to
accept the submission on behalf of the petitioner that the High Court
preferred technicalities over substantial justice.
Petition lacks merit and is accordingly dismissed.
....…………….....................J.
( Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN
)
.…………............................J.
( SWATANTER KUMAR )
New Delhi,
July 16, 2012
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