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Friday, May 25, 2012

Rape case failed to established.The Apex court set aside the High court orders and released the accused= “…….It cannot be lost sight of that rape causes the greatest distress and humiliation to the victim but at the same time a false allegation of rape can cause equal distress, humiliation and damage to the accused as well. The accused must also be protected against the possibility of false implication….. there is no presumption or any basis for assuming that the statement of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment or exaggeration.” However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the offence it seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt and cannot take support from the weakness of the case of defence. There must be proper legal evidence and material on record to record the conviction of the accused. Conviction can be based on sole testimony of the prosecutrix provided it lends assurance of her testimony. However, in case the court has reason not to accept the version of prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration. In case the evidence is read in its totality and the story projected by the prosecutrix is found to be improbable, the prosecutrix case becomes liable to be rejected. The court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence in totality of the background of the entire case and not in the isolation. Even if the prosecutrix is of easy virtue/unchaste woman that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court is required to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim on the occasion complained of.


                                                          REPORTABLE


                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                       CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION


                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs.2066-67 OF 2009






    Narender Kumar                                 …Appellant




                                   Versus




    State (NCT of Delhi)                                      …Respondent






                                  JUDGMENT


    Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.




    1.      These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment
    and order dated 25.3.2009 passed by the High  Court  of  Delhi  at  New
    Delhi in Criminal Appeal No.53 of 2000, by which it  has  affirmed  the
    judgment and order  of  the  trial  Court  dated  7.12.1999  passed  in
    Sessions Case No. 77/99, convicting the appellant under Section 376  of
    Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter  called  ‘IPC’)  and  awarded  the
    punishment of rigorous imprisonment for a period of 7 years vide  order
    dated 8.12.1999 and imposed a fine of Rs.2000/- .


    2.      Facts and circumstances giving rise to this case are that:
    A.       Smt. Indira PW.1 (prosecutrix) filed an  FIR  No.886/98  dated
    16.9.1998 to the effect that when she was going from village Khirki  to
    Chirag Delhi on that day at about 8 p.m., the appellant  met  her  near
    Ganda Nala, he caught hold of her hand  and  dragged  her  towards  the
    bushes on the edge of the road and committed rape on  her.   She  could
    not raise the noise due to fear. After commission of the  offence,  the
    appellant left her there and ran away.  The  prosecutrix  went  to  her
    husband at his working place and from there went to the police  station
    alongwith her husband to lodge the FIR.


    B.      The prosecutrix was medically examined. Appellant was  arrested
    on 1.11.1998. Statement of the prosecutrix was recorded  under  Section
    164 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called  ‘Cr.P.C.’)
    on 20.11.1998 before the Metropolitan  Magistrate,  New  Delhi.   After
    completion  of  investigation,  charge  sheet  was  filed  against  the
    appellant under Section 376 IPC on 21.4.1999.  Prosecution examined  11
    witnesses in support of its case.  The appellant, in  addition  to  his
    own statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C., also examined 2  witnesses  in
    defence.
    C.      On conclusion of the trial, the  learned  Sessions  Court  vide
    judgment and order dated 7/8.12.1999 convicted the  appellant  for  the
    offences under Section 376 IPC and imposed the sentence as referred  to
    hereinabove.
    D.      Aggrieved, the appellant preferred  Criminal  Appeal  No.53  of
    2000 before the High Court  which  has  been  dismissed  vide  impugned
    judgment and order dated 25.3.2009.
           Hence, these appeals.


    3.      Shri Yakesh Anand, learned Amicus Curiae,  has  submitted  that
    Indira,  prosecutrix (PW.1) cannot be relied upon  because  there  have
    been material contradictions in her deposition. She had been confronted
    on large number of issues/facts with her statement  under  Section  161
    Cr.P.C.  Embellishments/improvements had been of such a large magnitude
    that her statement itself became unreliable.  The  prosecutrix  was  an
    unchaste woman, having illicit relationship with  many  young  persons.
    The courts below erred in not appreciating properly the evidence of the
    defence witnesses examined by the appellant.  The medical evidence,  in
    a case like this where the prosecutrix was married and 25 years of age,
    is inconsequential.  Thus, the appeals deserve to be allowed.
    4.      Per contra, Smt. Rekha Pandey, learned  counsel  appearing  for
    the respondent-State has opposed the appeal vehemently contending  that
    the appellant has rightly been convicted on the sole testimony  of  the
    prosecutrix and both the courts below have  appreciated  the  facts  in
    correct perspective.  The findings so recorded by the courts  below  do
    not warrant any interference.  Thus,  the  appeals  are  liable  to  be
    dismissed.


    5.      We have  considered  the  rival  submissions  made  by  learned
    counsel for the parties and perused the record.


    6.      The Trial Court as well as the High Court  recorded  conviction
    of   the  appellant  merely  placing  a  very  heavy  reliance  on  the
    deposition of the prosecutrix  and considering the  deposition  of  Dr.
    Nisha (PW.9). Admittedly, the defence version taken by the appellant in
    his statement under Section 313  Cr.P.C.  and  the  deposition  of  two
    defence witnesses to the extent  that  the  prosecutrix  had  developed
    intimacy with the appellant and some other young persons and Sahib  Rao
    (PW.3) her husband, had raised the grievance in this regard,  have  not
    even been referred to by either of the courts  below,  though  the  law
    required the court to appreciate the defence  version  and  decide  its
    veracity in accordance with law.


    7.      In order to test the veracity of the deposition of Smt.  Indira
    –Prosecutrix (PW.1), it may be relevant to make reference to the  same.
     In her examination-in-chief  she stated as under:
           “The accused was not personally known to me prior to the day  of
           incident, except that he had teased me prior to the incident and
           I lodged the complaint with the parents of the accused and  with
           the police.  I have not given any copy of the complaint  to  the
           police in this case.  It is incorrect to say  that  the  accused
           had been living in my house about one year prior to the  day  of
           the incident.”


          In cross-examination she could not point out as which part of  her
    Salwar had been torn.  Prosecutrix, when in the dock was confronted  on
    various points with her statement under Section  161  Cr.P.C.  and  the
    said contradiction read as under:
        (i)   I had also told the police in my statement that I had  raised
        alarm at the time of rape.
        (ii)          The accused was not personally known to me  prior  to
        the date of the incident except that he had teased me prior to  the
        incident and I lodged the complaint with the parents of the accused
        and with the police.


              So far as the “injury on her person” is concerned, she deposed
      as under:
           “I did not receive any injury except scratches on my throat  and
           I had told the doctor about the incident.”


        8.  Sahib Rao (PW.3), husband of  the  prosecutrix  in  his  cross-
           examination admitted that he knew the  appellant  very  well  as
           both of them had been the residents  of  the  same  village.  He
           further admitted that there used to be quarrel between  him  and
           his wife.  Sahib  Rao  (PW.3),  was  also  confronted  with  his
           statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. on various narrations.

        9. Dr. Nisha (PW.9) deposed as under:
           “There were nail marks on her breast and from that  I  say  that
           she might have been raped. The nail marks which  were  found  on
           the  breast of the victim  could  have  been  self-inflicted….On
           internal examination of the victim, it could not be  found  that
           she was raped except seeing her condition that her clothes  were
           torn and there were  nail marks on her breast.”

     (Emphasis added)


    10.     SI, Lekh Raj (PW.6) who was posted at P.S. Malviya  Nagar,  New
    Delhi  was examined and he deposed as under:
           “On the night intervening 30.10.1998 and 1.11.1998 , complainant
           Indira came to the P.S. at about 11.45 p.m. She told me that the
           person who had committed rape on her is sitting  on  a  stop  of
           Khirki. Thereafter, I alongwith complainant  and Constable Jagat
           Singh went there and accused present in court  was  arrested  on
           the pointing out of Indira by me…..The arrest memo   of  accused
           Ex.PW.1/F was also prepared…..


           …………No public person from the area was  called  from  where  the
           accused was arrested. I did not prepare the  site  plan  of  the
           place from where the  accused  was  arrested.   The  prosecutrix
           Indira had come to me on that night in the police station alone.
           The distance between the house of  the  prosecutrix  and  police
           station is 3 Kms.”




    11.     R.N. Chowdhary  (PW.11),  Investigating  Officer  deposed  that
    there was fencing just near the road and  there  was  electricity  pole
    installed at the divider of the road and the electricity was  on.   The
    residential houses were at some distance and the road was situated at a
    distance of about 20 paces from the place of occurrence.


    12.     The appellant in his statement under Section 313 Cr.P.C. stated
    as under:
           “I was having good relations with family of the prosecutrix  and
           we were staying in the same village.  The   prosecutrix  desired
           to keep me in her house, to which I refused and for that reason,
           the false case has been planted on me.  I am innocent and I have
           been falsely implicated in this case by police at  the  instance
           of the prosecutrix and her husband  as  I  did  not  accept  the
           proposal of the prosecutrix to live in her  house.  Her  husband
           has also given  severe  beatings  to  the  prosecutrix  on  that
           account.”             (Emphasis added)




    13.     Chandan Singh (DW.1) was examined by the appellant  in  defence
    who deposed that he knew Indira (Prosecutrix)  and  her  husband  being
    their  neighbour.   The  prosecutrix  was  having  intimacy  with   the
    appellant for the last 3 years.  His house is at a distance of 40 yards
    from the house of the  prosecutrix.   There  remained  quarrel  between
    prosecutrix and her husband.  Her husband Sahib Rao (PW.3) did not like
    the entry of appellant in his house.


   14. Surendra Kumar (DW.2) supported  the  defence  version  stating   as
       under:
           “I know Sahib Rao and  his  wife  Indira.  Sahib  Rao  had  been
           working in my ration shop for last 7 years.  Sahib Rao  used  to
           tell me that one boy whose name I do not know used to visit  the
           house of Sahib Rao which was not  liked  by  him  and  for  that
           reason the husband and wife had been quarreling.  The said  boy,
           who is present in the court had come to my shop  also  alongwith
           Indra.”




    15.      If  the  evidence  on  record  referred  to   hereinabove   is
    appreciated, the following picture emerges:
    (i)     Prosecutrix and appellant were known to each other for a   long
    time and there had been some relationship/intimacy between them.
    (ii)    Sahib Rao (PW.3), husband of the prosecutrix did not  like  the
    said relationship.
    (iii)   There has been some incident two-three days prior to the actual
    incident on 16.9.1998  as Indira-prosecutrix had lodged some  complaint
    against the appellant in the police as well as with the parents of  the
    appellant.
    (iv)    The complaint lodged by the prosecutrix two-three days prior to
    16.9.1998 with the police had never been placed  on record.
    (v)      The alleged incident dated 16.9.1998 had occurred on the  side
    of the main road which remains busy and had  sufficient  light  and  in
    spite of the fact that the prosecutrix raised hue and cry, nobody  came
    to help her.
    (vi)    There are  contradictions  on  the  issue  as  to  whether  the
    prosecutrix went to the working place of her husband and from there she
    proceeded to police station with him as evidence on record is  also  to
    the contrary i.e she straightaway went to the police  station  and  one
    Constable had gone and called her husband.
      vii) Medical evidence does not positively support  the  case  of  the
           prosecution  as  Dr.  Nisha  (PW.9)  deposed  that  seeing   her
           condition and torn clothes it could be said that the prosecutrix
           might had been raped.
     viii) Admittedly, there  is  a  most  material  contradiction  in  the
           medical evidence and  ocular  evidence.  Dr.  Nisha  (PW.9)  had
           categorically recorded in the report and deposed  in  the  court
           that the prosecutrix was having nail marks  on her breast though
           the case of  Indira-prosecutrix had been  that  she  was  having
           nail marks on her throat.
    (ix)    Deposition of Lekh Raj (PW.6), S.I., about the  arrest  of  the
    appellant between intervening night  of  30.10.1998  and  1.11.1998  at
    about 11.45 p.m., seems  to  be  improbable.   According  to  him,  the
    prosecutrix walked from her house to the police station at  a  distance
    of 3 Kms. at midnight to inform  the  police  that  the  appellant  was
    sitting on the stop of Khirki, Press Enclave. The witness reached there
    with  prosecutrix  and   police  constables.  He  found  the  appellant
    sitting at the said stop and from there he was arrested.   The  witness
    did not prepare the arrest  memo  with  the  help  of  any  independent
    witness.  If the appellant was sitting at the bus stop at midnight some
    other persons could have been also there.
    (x)     The defence version taken by the appellant and  depositions  of
    Chandan Singh (DW.1) and Surendra Kumar  (DW.2)   in  support  thereof,
    have not only been ignored/brushed aside  by the courts below rather no
    reference has been made to the same.
    (xi)    The contradictions referred to hereinabove and particularly  in
    respect of the nail marks on her body could not  be  said  only  to  be
    minor contradictions which did not go to the root of the  matter.  Some
    of  the  contradictions/embellishments/improvements  are   of   greater
    magnitude  and had serious impact on the case.
    (xii)   The  F.S.L.  report  dated  6.5.1999  reveal  that  the   blood
    stains/semen on the prosecutrix kurta/ salwar belonged to the AB  blood
    group though the blood group of the appellant is “O”(+) and  thus,  the
    FSL report does not support the case of the prosecution.


    16.     It is a settled legal proposition that once  the  statement  of
    prosecutrix inspires confidence and is accepted by the court  as  such,
    conviction  can  be  based  only  on  the  solitary  evidence  of   the
    prosecutrix and no corroboration would be  required  unless  there  are
    compelling reasons which necessitate the court for corroboration of her
    statement. Corroboration of testimony of the prosecutrix as a condition
    for judicial reliance is not a requirement of law  but  a  guidance  of
    prudence under the given facts and circumstances. Minor  contradictions
    or insignificant discrepancies  should not be a ground for throwing out
    an otherwise reliable prosecution case.  A prosecutrix  complaining  of
    having been a victim of the offence of rape is not an accomplice  after
    the crime. Her testimony has to be  appreciated  on  the  principle  of
    probabilities just as the testimony of any other witness; a high degree
    of probability having been shown to exist in view of the subject matter
    being a criminal charge. However,  if the court finds it  difficult  to
    accept the version of the prosecutrix on its face value, it may  search
    for evidence, direct or substantial, which may lend  assurance  to  her
    testimony.  (Vide: Vimal Suresh Kamble v. Chaluverapinake Apal  S.P.  &
    Anr., AIR 2003 SC 818; and Vishnu v. State of Maharashtra, AIR 2006  SC
    508).


    17.          Where evidence of the prosecutrix is found suffering  from
    serious  infirmities   and   inconsistencies   with   other   material,
    prosecutrix making deliberate improvements on  material  point  with  a
    view to rule out consent on her part and there being no injury  on  her
    person even though her version may be otherwise,  no  reliance  can  be
    placed upon her evidence. (Vide: Suresh N. Bhusare & Ors. v.  State  of
    Maharashtra, (1999) 1 SCC 220)


    18.       In Jai Krishna Mandal & Anr. v. State of Jharkhand, (2010) 14
    SCC 534, this Court while dealing with the issue held:
             “The only evidence of rape was the statement of the prosecutrix
             herself and when this evidence was read in  its  totality,  the
             story projected by the prosecutrix was so  improbable  that  it
             could not be believed.”




    19.     In Rajoo & Ors. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR  2009  SC  858,
    this Court held that ordinarily the evidence of  a  prosecutrix  should
    not be suspected and should be believed, more so as her  statement  has
    to be evaluated on par with that of  an  injured  witness  and  if  the
    evidence  is  reliable,  no  corroboration  is  necessary.   The  court
    however, further observed:
           “…….It cannot be lost sight of that  rape  causes  the  greatest
           distress and humiliation to the victim but at the  same  time  a
           false allegation of rape can cause equal  distress,  humiliation
           and damage to the accused as well.  The  accused  must  also  be
           protected against the possibility of false implication…..  there
           is no presumption or any basis for assuming that  the  statement
           of such a witness is always correct or without any embellishment
           or exaggeration.”




    20.     In   Tameezuddin @ Tammu v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2009) 15 SCC
    566,  this Court held has under:
              “It is true that in a  case  of  rape  the  evidence  of  the
           prosecutrix must be given predominant consideration, but to hold
           that this evidence has to be  accepted  even  if  the  story  is
           improbable and belies logic, would be doing violence to the very
           principles which  govern  the  appreciation  of  evidence  in  a
           criminal matter.”


    21.     Even in cases where there is some material  to  show  that  the
    victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, no inference of the victim
    being a woman of “easy virtues” or a women of “loose  moral  character”
    can be  drawn.  Such a woman has a right to  protect  her  dignity  and
    cannot be subjected to rape only for that reason. She has  a  right  to
    refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone  and  everyone
    because she is not a vulnerable  object  or  prey  for  being  sexually
    assaulted by anyone and everyone. Merely because a  woman  is  of  easy
    virtue, her evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone rather it
    is to be cautiously appreciated. (Vide: State of Maharashtra & Anr.  v.
    Madhukar Narayan Mardikar, AIR 1991 SC 207; State of Punjab  v.  Gurmit
    Singh & Ors., AIR 1996 SC 1393; and State of U.P. v. Pappu  @  Yunus  &
    Anr., AIR 2005 SC 1248).


    22.     In view of the provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the Evidence
    Act, 1872, unless the character of the prosecutrix itself is in  issue,
    her  character is not a relevant factor to be taken into  consideration
    at all.


    23.     The courts while trying an accused on the charge of rape,  must
    deal  with the case with  utmost  sensitivity,  examining  the  broader
    probabilities of a case and not get swayed by minor  contradictions  or
    insignificant discrepancies in the evidence of witnesses which are  not
    of a substantial character.
                 However, even in a case of rape, the onus is always on the
    prosecution to prove, affirmatively each ingredient of the  offence  it
    seeks to establish and such onus never shifts. It is  no  part  of  the
    duty of the defence to explain as to how and why in  a  rape  case  the
    victim  and  other  witness   have  falsely  implicated  the   accused.
    Prosecution case has to stand on its own legs and cannot  take  support
    from the weakness of the case of defence. However great  the  suspicion
    against the accused and however strong the moral belief and  conviction
    of the court, unless the offence of the accused is  established  beyond
    reasonable doubt on the basis of legal evidence  and  material  on  the
    record, he cannot be convicted for an  offence.  There  is  an  initial
    presumption of innocence of the accused  and  the  prosecution  has  to
    bring home the offence against the accused by  reliable  evidence.  The
    accused is entitled to the benefit of every reasonable  doubt.   (Vide:
    Tukaram & Anr. v. The State of Maharashtra,,  AIR 1979 SC 185; and Uday
    v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2003 SC 1639).


    24.     Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable  doubt  and
    cannot take support from the weakness of the case  of  defence.   There
    must be proper legal evidence and material  on  record  to  record  the
    conviction of the accused.   Conviction can be based on sole  testimony
    of the prosecutrix  provided  it  lends  assurance  of  her  testimony.
    However, in case the court has reason not  to  accept  the  version  of
    prosecutrix on its face value, it may look for corroboration.  In  case
    the evidence is read in its totality and the  story  projected  by  the
    prosecutrix is found to be improbable,  the  prosecutrix  case  becomes
    liable to be rejected.
            The court must act with sensitivity and appreciate the evidence
    in totality of the background  of  the  entire  case  and  not  in  the
    isolation.  Even if the prosecutrix is of  easy  virtue/unchaste  woman
    that itself cannot be a determinative factor and the court is  required
    to adjudicate whether the accused committed rape on the victim  on  the
    occasion complained of.


    25.  The instant case is required to be decided in  the  light  of  the
    aforesaid settled legal propositions.
                We have appreciated the evidence on record and reached  the
    conclusions mentioned hereinabove. Even by any stretch  of  imagination
    it cannot be held that the prosecutrix was not  knowing  the  appellant
    prior to the incident. The  given  facts  and  circumstances,  make  it
    crystal clear that if the evidence of  the  prosecutrix  is  read   and
    considered  in  totality  of  the  circumstances  alongwith  the  other
    evidence on record,  in which the  offence  is  alleged  to  have  been
    committed, we are of the view that  her  deposition  does  not  inspire
    confidence.  The prosecution has not disclosed the true genesis of  the
    crime. In such a fact-situation, the appellant becomes entitled to  the
    benefit of doubt.
            In view of above, the appeals succeed  and  are  allowed.   The
    judgment and order dated 25.3.2009 passed by the High Court of Delhi in
    Criminal Appeal No. 53 of 2000  and  that  of  the  trial  court  dated
    7.12.1999 are hereby set aside. The appellant is on bail, his bail bond
    stands discharged.
            Before parting with the case,  we  would  like  to  record  our
    appreciation to Mr. Yakesh Anand, learned Amicus Curiae  for  rendering
    commendable assistance to the court. Mr. Anand shall be entitled to Rs.
    7,000/-  as  his fees payable by the State Government.


                                        ..……………………….J.
                                       (Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN)



                                                                          .
      ………………………..J.
                                         (DIPAK MISRA)
    New Delhi,
    May 25, 2012
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