Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 3 & 9 Abatement of appeal — Death of sole appellant Where the sole appellant dies and no application for substitution of legal representatives is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal abates automatically by operation of law — Setting aside abatement requires strict compliance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [Paras 2, 7, 17–18]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 3 & 9

Abatement of appeal — Death of sole appellant

Where the sole appellant dies and no application for substitution of legal representatives is filed within the prescribed period, the appeal abates automatically by operation of law — Setting aside abatement requires strict compliance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
[Paras 2, 7, 17–18]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Strict scrutiny

Burden lies on the applicant to establish sufficient cause for condonation of delay — Vague, inconsistent or false explanations, negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 4–6, 13, 17]

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Abatement — Accrued rights of opposite party

Once appeal abates, a valuable right accrues in favour of the respondents — Such right cannot be lightly taken away unless delay is satisfactorily and bona fide explained.
[Paras 7, 13, 16]

---

Liberal approach — Limits

Though courts may adopt a liberal approach in applications to set aside abatement, liberal construction does not mean condonation as a matter of course — Liberal approach cannot be extended to cases of deliberate inaction, negligence or want of bona fides.
[Paras 11, 13–16]

---

Pleadings — Clean hands — Contradictory averments

An applicant seeking discretionary relief must approach the Court with clean hands — Contradictory stands and incorrect statements in applications disentitle the applicant from equitable relief of condonation.
[Paras 6, 17]

---

Counsel reliance — No blanket excuse

Ignorance of pendency of appeal or failure to inform counsel of death of appellant, without plausible explanation, is not a sufficient cause — Litigant cannot absolve himself of responsibility by merely blaming counsel.
[Paras 6, 17]

---

Precedents — Distinguishing liberal condonation cases

Judgments condoning delay on peculiar facts (e.g., illiteracy or bona fide mistake) cannot be treated as precedents for condoning inordinate delay lacking bona fide explanation.
[Paras 11–12]

---

II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Automatic Abatement and Statutory Scheme

The Court reiterates that abatement under Order XXII CPC is automatic on expiry of limitation for substitution. Once abatement occurs, the appeal comes to an end unless abatement is set aside in accordance with Order XXII Rule 9 CPC read with Section 5 of the Limitation Act (Paras 7, 13).

---

B. Meaning of “Sufficient Cause”

The judgment gives a strict and structured meaning to “sufficient cause”:

• The explanation must be true, plausible and bona fide.

• It must disclose why the applicant was prevented from acting within time.

• Mere assertions of ignorance or vague excuses are insufficient.

The Court emphasises that sufficiency is judged not by sympathy but by judicial satisfaction (Paras 4–6, 13).

---

C. Liberal Approach — Not Unfettered

While recognising that courts are generally liberal in applications to set aside abatement, the Court draws a clear boundary:

• Liberal approach is intended to prevent injustice due to unintended lapses.

• It does not apply where delay is the result of negligence, callousness or falsehood.

• Liberal construction cannot render limitation provisions redundant (Paras 13–16).

---

D. Clean Hands and Credibility of Explanation

A decisive factor in this case is the lack of bona fides:

• Applicants took inconsistent stands regarding residence and knowledge.

• One legal representative had actively participated in trial proceedings.

• No document (such as counsel’s alleged letter) was produced.

• No explanation was given for prolonged silence even after knowledge.

Such conduct, the Court holds, disentitles the applicants from discretionary relief (Paras 6, 17).

---

E. Accrued Rights and Balance of Justice

The Court balances two competing considerations:

1. Preference for adjudication on merits, and

2. Protection of accrued rights of the opposite party.

It holds that where applicants are grossly negligent and dishonest, justice to the vigilant party must prevail (Paras 7, 13, 16).

---

III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Sole appellant died on 28-11-2007 (Para 2).

• Applications for substitution and condonation filed only in April 2010, after 778 days delay (Paras 2–4).

• Explanation offered: ignorance of pendency of appeal and late intimation by counsel (Para 5).

• Court found:

  • contradictory averments regarding residence and knowledge,

  • participation of one LR in trial as witness,

  • absence of documentary support,

  • no explanation for prolonged inaction (Paras 6, 17).

---

IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• No sufficient cause made out for condonation of delay.

• Application under Order XXII Rule 9 CPC dismissed.

• Appeal held to have abated and dismissed.

• No order as to costs.
  [Paras 17–18]

---

Ratio (Concise)

Though courts adopt a liberal approach in setting aside abatement, inordinate delay caused by negligence, contradictory pleadings and lack of bona fides cannot be condoned; valuable rights accrued on abatement cannot be defeated on vague or false explanations.

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice. [Paras 5, 14–15]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — Second appeal — Knowledge of decree

Where appellant pleads lack of knowledge of the appellate decree and explains delay on that basis, rejection of condonation application without proper enquiry into such explanation is unsustainable — Delay of 650 days condoned in the interest of justice.
[Paras 5, 14–15]

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 100

Second appeal — Dismissal at threshold on limitation

Second appeal cannot be dismissed mechanically on the ground of limitation when explanation for delay raises triable issues — High Court required to examine whether sufficient cause exists before foreclosing statutory remedy.
[Paras 13–16]

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Ex parte decree — Appellate stage

Lack of opportunity of hearing

Where decree for specific performance is passed ex parte at appellate stage, denial of opportunity to contest on merits is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 16

Specific performance — Discretionary relief

Decree for specific performance being discretionary in nature, courts should be slow to deny opportunity of hearing on technical grounds of limitation, particularly when serious factual and legal issues arise.
[Paras 7, 12, 15]

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Limitation — Appeals pending at appellate stage

Liberal approach

In matters pending at appellate stage, particularly where appeals are not listed periodically, courts should adopt a liberal approach in condoning delay, following principles laid down in Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom.
[Paras 8, 15]

---

Natural justice — Substantial justice over technicality

Procedural law should not be applied in a manner that defeats substantial justice — Technical dismissal on limitation, without examining bona fides of explanation, is liable to be interfered with.
[Paras 14–16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Scope of “Sufficient Cause” under Section 5

The Court reiterates that while limitation law must be applied, condonation of delay depends on acceptability of explanation, not merely length of delay. Explanation based on lack of knowledge of decree warrants judicial scrutiny and cannot be rejected summarily (Paras 5, 14).

---

B. Liberal Approach at Appellate Stage

Relying on Perumon Bhagvathy Devaswom, the Court emphasises that when matters are pending at appellate stage:

• litigants often rely on counsel for intimation;

• appeals may not be listed for long periods;

• strict standards applied at institution stage are diluted.

Hence, a lenient and justice-oriented approach is required (Paras 8, 15).

---

C. Ex parte Decree for Specific Performance

The Court places weight on the fact that:

• specific performance is discretionary;

• decree was passed ex parte in first appellate court;

• appellant was denied effective opportunity of hearing.

Such circumstances justify condonation to enable adjudication on merits (Paras 7, 12, 15).

---

D. Error in High Court’s Approach

The Supreme Court finds fault with the High Court for:

• disbelieving explanation of change of address without enquiry;

• giving overriding importance to accrued rights of respondent;

• dismissing appeal solely on limitation.

This approach was held contrary to settled principles governing condonation of delay (Paras 13–15).

---

E. Balance between Limitation and Justice

While acknowledging long pendency and accrued rights, the Court holds that substantial justice must prevail, especially where refusal to condone delay results in irreversible consequences (Paras 14–16).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Suit for specific performance filed in 2001 based on agreement dated 18-02-1998 (Paras 3, 12).

• Trial Court partly decreed suit only for refund (Para 3).

• First appellate court decreed specific performance ex parte (Para 4).

• Appellant filed second appeal with 650 days delay, explaining lack of knowledge due to non-service and change of address (Paras 5, 14).

• High Court rejected condonation solely on limitation (Paras 6, 13).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Impugned judgment of High Court set aside.

• Delay in filing second appeal condoned.

• High Court directed to consider second appeal for admission expeditiously and dispose of it on merits.

• Observations not to affect merits of appeal.
  [Paras 15–18]

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Ratio (Concise)

In second appeals, particularly where an ex parte decree for specific performance is involved, delay attributable to lack of knowledge of decree should be examined liberally; dismissal on limitation without proper enquiry defeats substantial justice.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11 Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given. [Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 — Order XXII Rules 4, 9, 10-A & 11

Abatement of appeal — Death of respondent — Ignorance of death

Abatement occurs by operation of law on expiry of limitation for substitution — However, ignorance of the death of a respondent constitutes sufficient cause for setting aside abatement, particularly when appeal is pending without periodic listing and no notice of death is given.
[Paras 4.2–4.5, 5, 14–15]

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Sections 5, Articles 120 & 121

Condonation of delay — Liberal approach in abatement matters

Applications for setting aside abatement and substitution of legal representatives must be considered liberally — Length of delay is immaterial; sufficiency and acceptability of explanation is decisive — Courts are more liberal in abatement cases than in cases of delay in filing appeals.
[Paras 6, 8(ii), 8(iii)]

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“Sufficient cause” — Meaning and scope

Section 5, Limitation Act

Expression “sufficient cause” must receive a pragmatic, practical and justice-oriented interpretation — Delay not attributable to negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides ought to be condoned to advance substantial justice.
[Paras 6, 8(i)]

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Duty of counsel — Order XXII Rule 10-A CPC

Counsel for a deceased party has a statutory duty to inform the Court of the death — Failure to report death is a relevant factor while considering condonation of delay and setting aside abatement.
[Paras 4.5, 11, 15]

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Pending appeals — High Courts — No duty of constant vigilance

Where an appeal is admitted and remains pending for years without being listed, appellant is not expected to make periodic enquiries about the life or death of respondents — Want of diligence cannot be imputed in such circumstances.
[Paras 8(v), 10, 14]

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Institutions / Bodies — Change of management — Ignorance of proceedings

Where appellant is an institution acting through a managing committee, change of management resulting in ignorance of pending appeal and death of respondent constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay.
[Paras 3, 15]

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Abatement — Preference for adjudication on merits

Courts should ordinarily set aside abatement and decide matters on merits rather than terminate proceedings on technical grounds, unless deliberate negligence or mala fides is shown.
[Paras 8(ii), 14]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Nature of Abatement

The Court clarifies that abatement under Order XXII CPC:

• occurs automatically by operation of law on expiry of limitation;

• does not require a formal judicial declaration to take effect;

• nevertheless requires judicial cognizance to close proceedings (Paras 4.2–5).

---

B. Liberal Approach in Abatement Matters

The judgment draws a clear distinction between:

• delay in filing an appeal, and

• delay in taking steps in a pending appeal.

Courts are required to be far more liberal in the latter category, as refusal would foreclose adjudication on merits (Paras 6, 8(ii)).

---

C. Ignorance of Death as Sufficient Cause

By reference to Order XXII Rule 4(5) CPC, the Court holds that:

• ignorance of the death of a respondent is a statutorily recognised ground;

• such ignorance, if bona fide and uncontradicted, constitutes sufficient cause;

• no diligence can be expected where the appellant is unaware of the death (Paras 4.4–4.5, 12–15).

---

D. Role of Rule 10-A CPC

The Court emphasises that:

• counsel for the deceased party has a duty to inform the Court of death;

• failure to discharge this duty weighs in favour of the appellant seeking condonation;

• delay effectively runs from date of knowledge, not date of death (Paras 11, 15).

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E. High Court Appeals — Practical Realities

A significant jurisprudential contribution of this judgment is recognition of ground realities:

• appeals in High Courts often remain unlisted for years;

• litigants are not expected to keep constant vigil;

• expecting periodic enquiry into life status of respondents is unrealistic (Paras 8(v), 10).

---

F. Balancing Accrued Rights vs Substantial Justice

While acknowledging that abatement confers a valuable right on legal representatives, the Court holds that:

• such right should not defeat adjudication on merits where delay is bona fide;

• procedural law is a handmaid of justice, not its mistress (Paras 8(ii), 14).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Second appeal admitted in 1993 and not listed for hearing for several years (Paras 2, 10).

• Sole respondent died on 17-04-2002 (Para 2).

• Death was not reported by counsel or LRs to the High Court (Paras 11, 15).

• Appellant institution underwent change of management; new committee unaware of appeal (Paras 3, 15).

• Applications for substitution and setting aside abatement filed promptly after knowledge (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Delay held satisfactorily explained.

• Orders of High Court refusing condonation and setting aside abatement set aside.

• Delay condoned; abatement set aside.

• Legal representatives permitted to be brought on record.

• High Court directed to hear the appeal on merits.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

In appeals pending without periodic listing, bona fide ignorance of the respondent’s death—especially where counsel failed to report it—constitutes sufficient cause for condonation of delay and setting aside abatement; courts must prefer adjudication on merits over technical termination.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of de...: advocatemmmohan Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5 Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope Delay can be condoned only on proof of ...

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

Limitation Act, 1963 — Section 5

Condonation of delay — “Sufficient cause” — Scope

Delay can be condoned only on proof of “sufficient cause” — The expression means an adequate and enough reason which prevents a party from approaching the Court within limitation — Negligence, inaction or lack of bona fides cannot constitute sufficient cause.
[Paras 9, 11, 15]

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Limitation — Inordinate delay — Discretion of Court

Where delay is gross and unexplained, Court has no jurisdiction to condone the same — Discretion under Section 5 must be exercised judiciously and not on sympathetic or equitable considerations.
[Paras 6, 15, 16]

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Equality — Article 14 — Negative equality

Article 14 does not permit perpetuation of illegality — Erroneous or illegal orders passed in other cases cannot be relied upon to claim similar relief — Doctrine of negative equality is impermissible.
[Para 8]

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Limitation — Conditional condonation — Illegality

Condoning delay by imposing conditions (such as denial of interest for the delay period) without recording satisfaction of “sufficient cause” is impermissible — Such orders are contrary to statutory mandate.
[Paras 7, 15]

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Limitation law — Mandatory application

“Dura lex sed lex”

Law of limitation must be applied with full rigour — Courts have no power to extend limitation on equitable or sympathetic grounds — Hardship is irrelevant where statute is clear.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Public policy — Limitation statutes

Limitation statutes are founded on public policy to ensure certainty, suppress stale claims, and compel diligence — Courts cannot dilute legislative intent by judicial discretion.
[Paras 12, 13]

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Land Acquisition Act, 1894 — Section 54

Appeal — Delay

Appeals under Section 54 are governed strictly by limitation — Inordinate delay of more than five years, without satisfactory explanation, is fatal.
[Paras 1–6, 16]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Meaning of “Sufficient Cause”

The Court undertakes an authoritative exposition of the expression “sufficient cause” and holds that:

• It must be adequate, bona fide, and reasonable;

• It excludes negligence, inaction, or casual conduct;

• The applicant must establish that delay was unavoidable despite due diligence (Paras 9–11).

The Court reiterates that while interpretation may be liberal, it cannot be elastic to the point of defeating limitation law.

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B. Judicial Discretion under Section 5

The discretion to condone delay is not unfettered. The Court stresses that:

• Discretion must be exercised strictly within statutory parameters;

• Courts cannot substitute sympathy for legal standards;

• Absence of sufficient cause ousts jurisdiction to condone delay (Paras 15–16).

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C. Rejection of “Parity” Argument

A central issue addressed is the plea that other similarly placed litigants had obtained condonation. The Court unequivocally holds:

• Article 14 does not envisage negative equality;

• Illegal or erroneous orders cannot form the basis for claiming similar relief;

• Illegality cannot be multiplied by judicial endorsement (Para 8).

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D. Conditional Condonation — Disapproved

The Court strongly disapproves the practice of condoning delay by imposing conditions such as:

• Denial of interest for the delay period.

Such orders, without first establishing sufficient cause, are held to be illegal and jurisdictionally flawed (Paras 7, 15).

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E. Limitation as Public Policy

The judgment reiterates the foundational rationale of limitation law:

• To prevent uncertainty and stale litigation;

• To ensure diligence and repose;

• To protect settled rights.

Courts are reminded that they cannot dilute statutory limitation on equitable grounds (Paras 12–13).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Land acquisition awards were passed between 1997–2002 (Paras 1–2).

• Appeals under Section 54 of the Land Acquisition Act were filed in 2007, with a delay of about 5½ years (Para 6).

• Sole explanation offered was illness of one appellant (Paras 3, 6).

• High Court rejected applications for condonation of delay (Para 2).

• Appellants relied on earlier High Court orders condoning delay conditionally (Para 7).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• No sufficient cause shown for inordinate delay.

• Article 14 plea rejected.

• Conditional condonation practice disapproved.

• Appeals dismissed; High Court order affirmed.
  [Para 16]

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Ratio (Concise)

Condonation of delay is a matter of jurisdictional discretion confined strictly to proof of “sufficient cause”; courts cannot condone inordinate delay on equitable grounds, impose conditions in lieu of statutory compliance, or perpetuate illegality by invoking Article 14.

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC. [Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

 

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 499, 500

Criminal defamation — Ingredients — Publication based on public record

Publication based substantially on public records and official documents, without embellishment, does not per se constitute defamation — Truthful reporting of facts drawn from public records, if made in good faith, attracts the protection of the First Exception to Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.2, 18, 52–55, 60–64]

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Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 202, 204, 482

Quashing of process — Scope

High Court can quash criminal proceedings where the complaint, even if taken at face value, does not disclose the essential ingredients of the offence — Criminal law should not be permitted to be used as a tool for harassment or intimidation.
[Paras 9.4–9.9, 55–57, 99–103]

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Defamation — Per se defamatory statements — Test

Statements are not defamatory per se merely because they are critical or uncomfortable — To constitute defamation, imputations must lower the moral or intellectual character of the complainant in the estimation of right-thinking members of society.
[Paras 5.2, 56–58]

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Defamation — Mens rea — Requirement

Mens rea is a necessary ingredient of criminal defamation — Absence of malice, coupled with bona fide journalistic conduct, negatives the offence under Section 499 IPC.
[Paras 5.5, 61–63, 71–73]

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Journalism — Questionnaire — Fair opportunity

Issuance of a questionnaire seeking the version of the person concerned prior to publication, and publication of substantial portions of the reply, evidences bona fides and militates against allegation of malice.
[Paras 5.5, 62–64]

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Defamation — Public figures — Higher threshold

Public figures and persons connected with public life must tolerate a higher degree of scrutiny — Criminal defamation cannot be invoked to stifle investigative journalism on matters of public interest.
[Paras 5.3, 66–69, 74–76]

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Editors / Publishers — Vicarious liability

Criminal liability for defamation cannot be mechanically fastened on editors and persons connected with publication without specific averments of their role and intent — Vicarious liability is unknown to criminal law except where statutorily provided.
[Paras 56, 78–83]

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Abuse of process — Chilling effect on free speech

Allowing prosecution to continue in absence of prima facie defamation would have a chilling effect on free speech and investigative reporting — Courts must prevent misuse of criminal process.
[Paras 97–103]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Essential Ingredients of Criminal Defamation

The Court reiterates that for an offence under Sections 499–500 IPC, the following must coexist:

1. Making or publishing an imputation;

2. Concerning a person;

3. With intention, knowledge or reason to believe that such imputation will harm reputation.

Absent mens rea or defamatory imputation, criminal prosecution cannot survive (Paras 56–58, 61).

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B. Public Record, Truth, and Good Faith

A central legal finding is that:

• The article was substantially based on publicly available records (ROC filings, financial statements).

• Truthful reporting of such records, without distortion, falls within Exception 1 to Section 499 IPC.

• Public good and good faith are evident from the nature and source of information (Paras 60–64).

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C. Role of Mens Rea

The Court gives significant weight to:

• Sending a questionnaire;

• Receiving a detailed reply;

• Publishing substantial portions of the response.

This conduct negates deliberate intent to defame and demonstrates journalistic fairness (Paras 62–64).

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D. Public Figures and Democratic Accountability

Relying on constitutional jurisprudence, the Court holds that:

• Individuals connected with public power or political families cannot claim insulation from scrutiny.

• Criminal defamation should not be used to silence critical reporting on matters having public ramifications (Paras 66–76).

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E. Limits of Magistrate’s Power at Section 202 Stage

Although the scope of inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is limited, the Magistrate must still ensure that:

• The complaint discloses a prima facie offence;

• The essential ingredients are made out.

Mechanical issuance of process, without applying mind to the statutory exceptions, amounts to legal error (Paras 9.4–9.9, 99–101).

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F. Abuse of Criminal Process

The Court strongly cautions that:

• Criminal defamation must not become a weapon of vendetta.

• Continuation of proceedings in the absence of offence would be an abuse of process warranting interference under Section 482 CrPC (Paras 97–103).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Impugned article titled “The Golden Touch of Jay Amit Shah” was published on The Wire (Paras 4.1–4.2).

• Article relied on ROC data and financial disclosures (Paras 5.2, 60).

• Prior to publication, a questionnaire was sent and a reply received (Paras 5.5, 62).

• Substantial portions of the reply were published (Paras 62–64).

• Magistrate issued process under Sections 500/114 IPC after inquiry under Section 202 CrPC (Para 4.7).

• Petitioners invoked Section 482 CrPC seeking quashing (Para 3).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Complaint and order issuing process quashed.

• Continuation of criminal proceedings held to be abuse of process of law.

• Article held not per se defamatory and protected by exceptions to Section 499 IPC.

• Criminal law cannot be invoked to suppress investigative journalism.
  [Paras 101–109]

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Ratio (Concise)

Truthful publication based on public records, made in good faith after seeking the affected party’s version, does not constitute criminal defamation; criminal process cannot be used to stifle investigative journalism or public scrutiny of matters of public interest.