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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Tuesday, October 28, 2025

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 96 — Appeal from original decree — Scope — Reappreciation of evidence — Appellate Court, while hearing a first appeal under S. 96 CPC, has power to reappreciate entire oral and documentary evidence and arrive at its own findings. Where trial court’s judgment is based on improper appreciation of evidence and erroneous application of law, interference by the appellate court is justified. (B) Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 101–103 — Burden of proof — Declaration of title and possession — Onus lies on plaintiff — In a suit for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. Mere possession in the past or payment of land revenue does not confer ownership. Followed: Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269; Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31; Sajana Granites v. Manduva Srinivasa Rao, 2001 (6) ALD 270. (C) Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 — Ss. 3(g), 11 — Tank bed land — No Ryotwari patta can be granted — Land classified as “Cheruvu Padaka” (tank bed) or “Ava tank poramboke” is not ryoti land within the meaning of the Act. No person can claim Ryotwari patta over such land. Plaintiffs’ reliance on old pattas and tax receipts could not override the statutory prohibition. Held, that tank bed land vests in the Government and cannot be claimed as private property. (D) Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 65 — Adverse possession and limitation for possession — Computation — Suit for declaration of title and possession must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Plaintiffs alleged dispossession “after 29-6-1976” but produced no specific evidence of continued possession thereafter. Oral evidence revealed dispossession around 1974–76; suit filed on 17-6-1988 held barred by limitation. Held, vague pleadings about dispossession cannot extend limitation (E) Civil Law — Declaratory relief — Multiple plaintiffs claiming distinct parcels of land — When numerous plaintiffs claim independent parcels under separate alleged grants, each must independently prove title and possession. A composite suit for collective declaration of ownership is not maintainable unless a common right or cause of action is established. Plaintiffs’ joint claim failed for want of individual proof. (F) Land Law — Estates Abolition — Classification of land — Zeroyiti vs. Poramboke — Conversion of land classification by Settlement authorities cannot be interfered with by Civil Court unless shown to be without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory procedure. No such proof shown in this case; plaintiffs’ claim that zeroyiti lands were wrongly reclassified as poramboke rejected. (G) Result — Appeals allowed — Judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 05.10.2001 in O.S. No. 288/1988 set aside — Suit dismissed — Each party to bear its own costs.

(A) Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — S. 96 — Appeal from original decree — Scope — Reappreciation of evidence —

Appellate Court, while hearing a first appeal under S. 96 CPC, has power to reappreciate entire oral and documentary evidence and arrive at its own findings. Where trial court’s judgment is based on improper appreciation of evidence and erroneous application of law, interference by the appellate court is justified.

(B) Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 101–103 — Burden of proof — Declaration of title and possession — Onus lies on plaintiff —

In a suit for declaration of ownership and recovery of possession, the plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own title and not on the weakness of the defendant’s case. Mere possession in the past or payment of land revenue does not confer ownership.

 Followed:

Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd., (2014) 2 SCC 269;



Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos v. Thukalan Paulo Avira, AIR 1959 SC 31;



Sajana Granites v. Manduva Srinivasa Rao, 2001 (6) ALD 270.



(C) Madras Estates (Abolition and Conversion into Ryotwari) Act, 1948 — Ss. 3(g), 11 — Tank bed land — No Ryotwari patta can be granted —

Land classified as “Cheruvu Padaka” (tank bed) or “Ava tank poramboke” is not ryoti land within the meaning of the Act. No person can claim Ryotwari patta over such land. Plaintiffs’ reliance on old pattas and tax receipts could not override the statutory prohibition.

 Held, that tank bed land vests in the Government and cannot be claimed as private property.

(D) Limitation Act, 1963 — Art. 65 — Adverse possession and limitation for possession — Computation —

Suit for declaration of title and possession must be filed within 12 years from the date of dispossession. Plaintiffs alleged dispossession “after 29-6-1976” but produced no specific evidence of continued possession thereafter. Oral evidence revealed dispossession around 1974–76; suit filed on 17-6-1988 held barred by limitation.

 Held, vague pleadings about dispossession cannot extend limitation

(E) Civil Law — Declaratory relief — Multiple plaintiffs claiming distinct parcels of land —

When numerous plaintiffs claim independent parcels under separate alleged grants, each must independently prove title and possession. A composite suit for collective declaration of ownership is not maintainable unless a common right or cause of action is established. Plaintiffs’ joint claim failed for want of individual proof.

(F) Land Law — Estates Abolition — Classification of land — Zeroyiti vs. Poramboke —

Conversion of land classification by Settlement authorities cannot be interfered with by Civil Court unless shown to be without jurisdiction or in violation of mandatory procedure. No such proof shown in this case; plaintiffs’ claim that zeroyiti lands were wrongly reclassified as poramboke rejected.

(G) Result —

Appeals allowed — Judgment and decree of Trial Court dated 05.10.2001 in O.S. No. 288/1988 set aside — Suit dismissed — Each party to bear its own costs.



The State Of A.P.Dist.Collector,Eg ... vs Vinit Suryakantham 95 Ors on 27 October, 2025

APHC010338842001

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                                 AT AMARAVATI                [3397]

                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)


          MONDAY,THE TWENTY SEVENTH DAY OF OCTOBER

               TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE


                                PRESENT


    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENUTHURUMALLI GOPALA

                      KRISHNA RAO


                      FIRST APPEAL NO: 2533/2001


Between:


President,atchampeta Sannakaru Vyavasaya Karmika    ...APPELLANT(S)

Sangham&2 and Others


                                 AND


Vinta Suryakantham 80 Others and Others            ...RESPONDENT(S)


Counsel for the Appellant(S):


  1. INAPURAPU SURYANARAYANA


  2. SRIMAN


Counsel for the Respondent(S):


  1. K S MURTHY


  2. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL


  3. .


  4. P DURGA PRASAD


  5. M SRI ATCHYUT

                                   2

                                                             VGKR, J.

                                               as_2533_2001&921_2002





               FIRST APPEAL NO: 921/2002


Between:


The State Of A.p.dist.collector,eg Dist   ...APPELLANT


                            AND


Vinit Suryakantham 95 Ors and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)


Counsel for the Appellant:


   1. THE ADVOCATE GENERAL


Counsel for the Respondent(S):


   1. E V V S RAVI KUMAR


   2. SRIMAN


The Court made the following:

                                           3

                                                                            VGKR, J.

                                                              as_2533_2001&921_2002


          THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO

                        APPEAL SUIT NO.2533 OF 2001

                                   AND

                        APPEAL SUIT NO.921 OF 2002


COMMON JUDGMENT:

-


These Appeals, under Section 96 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [hereinafter referred to as "CPC"], are filed by the Appellants challenging the decree and judgment, dated 05.10.2001 in O.S.No.288 of 1988 passed by learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada [hereinafter referred to as "the trial Court"].


2. The defendants 2 to 4 in the said suit proceedings filed A.S.No.2533 of 2001 and the 1st defendant filed A.S.No.921 of 2002 against the same decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada.


3. Since both the appeals are filed against the decree and judgment passed in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, both the appeals are clubbed together and common judgment is being pronounced in both these appeals.


4. The appellants in A.S.No.2533 of 2001 are the defendants 2 to 4 and the appellant in A.S.No.921 of 2002 is the 1st defendant in O.S.No.288 of 1988. The respondents 1 to 57 in both the appeals are the plaintiffs in O.S.No.288 of 1988.


5. The respondents / plaintiffs filed the suit for declaration of their title to the plaint schedule property, for possession, profits and for costs of the suit.


The suit was originally filed by 22 plaintiffs. During pendency of the suit, some of the plaintiffs died and their legal representatives were brought on record as plaintiffs 23 to 57.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


6. Both the parties in the Appeals will be referred to as they are arrayed before the trial Court.


7. The brief averments of the plaint in O.S.No.288 of 1988 are as under:


(i) In the erstwhile Pithapuram Estate, the schedule lands are situated in Thimmapuram village and they are zeroyiti lands.

These lands and several other neighbouring survey numbers are low lying marshy lands called AVA lands. These survey numbers are noted as ryoti lands in 1913 Record of Rights Register. The lands were granted on Zeroyiti lands by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of all the schedule lands till they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants in June, 1976. The plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of the property for more than 80 years by 1976. The names of the plaintiffs and their predecessors have been entered in 1913 Record of Rights Register and Fair Land Registers.


(ii) In about the year 1960, there was survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas for the said land. Due to some mistake that has crept in Government records subsequently, the said lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. The said land is not a poramboke or Government land or land intended for public purpose. The Government has no right to change the category of classification of the land from zeroyiti into poramboke to the detriment of owners without VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 notice to owners in a suomoto enquiry. The alleged change is not even in a primary enquiry as seen from records, but in an alleged appeal by one V.Kondaiah filed against the grant of conditional patta and requesting for an unconditional patta, the Assistant Settlement Officer seems to have granted a conditional patta to V.Kondaiah who filed an appeal against the same Settlement Officer requesting for removal of conditions and for grant of a permanent patta and the Settlement Officer seems to have directed change of category of the schedule land to poramboke even without notice to parties effected by the said change. These facets were revealed in the trial of O.S.No.149 of 1977 on the file of Principal Sub Court, Kakinada, where the records were filed. But the taxes on the respective lands were being collected from plaintiffs on zeroyiti lands upto 1976. Hence plaintiffs and others were also not aware of such wrong classification.


(iii) In about 1976, some persons came to know of the fact that these lands were classified as poramboke lands and induced several landless poor people to form into societies or Sangham with a view to occupy the lands called Ava cheruvu. The defendants Sanghams 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the plaintiffs possession after 9.6.1976 basing on the alleged proceedings of Taluk Office, Kakinada in Ref.B.5/1447/76 dated 29.6.1976. The plaintiffs could not resist dispossession whereas some people like Pabbineedi Venkatarao and others filed suits for injunction like O.S.No.1083/76 on the file of District Munsif, Kakinada and got injunction against Sanghams and could safeguard their possession. The principle is once a zeroyiti land is always a zeroyiti land and it cannot be transferred into Poramboke land in a suo moto enquiry and VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 even without notice to persons entitled to it and also in possession as of right. Such an act is illegal and liable to be quashed by the Civil Court, as such, transformation is done illegally under colour of authority which is not there.


(iv) The 1st plaintiff Vinti Suryakantham is the owner of Ac.7-92 cents in old S.No.103/1, new S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram village. The 1" Plaintiff got the same as per Registered Gift Deed dt.24.2.1955 from Chodisetti Manikyam W/o. Venkataraju and others and has been in enjoyment by paying taxes till dispossession. The 2nd plaintiff Kambala Chakram is the owner of Ac.3-09 cents in Old. S.No.103/, New S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram. The 3rd plaintiff Tummalapalli Sathiraju is the owner of Ac.1-17 cents in Old S.No.143/5, new S.No.176/5 and another Ac.0-81 cents in Old S.No.149/6, new S.No.182/7 in all total Ac.1-98 cents. His title and possession to the land is proved by several tax receipts filed and he obtained the said properties by way of gift deed dt.14.2.1958. He was enjoying the property till he is dispossessed. The 4th plaintiff Chodisetti Kameswara Rao and the 5th plaintiff Chodisetty Satyanarayana are the owners of Ac.5-18 cents in old S.No.131/5, 143/1, 143/4 and 143/6 and new S.Nos. 172/1, 176/1, 176/4 and 176/6 respectively. The 6th plaintiff Vakada Narayana Murty and the 7th plaintiff Vakada Dharamaraju are the owners of Ac.6-57 cents in old S.Nos.139/7, 143/3 and 137/3, new S.Nos.172/1, 176/3 and 170/5 respectively. These plaintiffs were in possession of the property since more than 50 years. The 8 th plaintiff Karri Venkataraju is the owner of Ac.1-78 cents in old S.No.91, new S.No.122 of Timmapuram. The 9th plaintiff Pedapudi Ramulu is the owner of Ac.1-42 cents in old S.No.138/2, new S.No.171/2 of Timmapuram. He has been VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 paying taxes on this land since times immemorial. The 10th plaintiff Pothula Lakshminarayana, the 11th plaintiff Pothula Prabhakara Rao and the 12th plaintiff Pothula Narasimha Rao are the owners of ac.3-57 cents in old S.no.136/2 and new S.No.169/3 and 135/3. This property was the ancestral property of these plaintiffs and they were enjoying the same from 1936 till they were dispossessed by paying taxes in their own name.


(v) The 13th plaintiff Jiyyanna Srimannarayana is the owner of Ac.0-70 cents in old S.No.137/2, new S.No.135/3 of Timmapuram. He purchased the said property as per registered sale deed dt.25.1.1959 from Chelikani Venkata Surya Rao and from then he has been in possession and enjoyment of the same by paying taxes till dispossession. The 14th plaintiff is the son of Chodisetti Subba Rao and the 15th plaintiff Hanumanthu Booraiah are the owners of Ac.3-19 cents in Old S.No.145, 270/5, new S.Nos.178, 128/7 and 158/2 respectively. The 1"


item was obtained by 12th plaintiff by a registered sale deed dt.5.2.1923 from Savaram Yegulu and others and the Rajah of Pithapuram recognized their rights and granted yearly pattas. The 12th plaintiff settled ac.1-00 of land on his sister and mother of the 13th plaintiff on whose death here only son the 13th plaintiff became the owner of the said land. Since then, the 13 th plaintiff has been paying taxes to Government and enjoying the same since times immemorial. The 16th and 17th plaintiffs Muddana Rambabu and Atchutaramaiah are the owners of Ac.1-27 cents in S.No.172/7 and 170/1. The 18th plaintiff Pedapudi Seshagiri Rao is the owner of Ac.4-26 cents in old S.Nos.136, 138/2 and 139, new S.Nos.169/1, 171/2 and 171/3 respectively. The 18th plaintiff died during the pendency of this suit on 16.8.2000. The 19th plaintiff Gangumalla Somulu is the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 owner of Ac.2-62 cents in old S.No.135, new S.No.168/4 of Timmapuram village. The 20th plaintiff Vakada Padmanabham is the owner of Ac.2-50 cents in old S.No.145, new S.No.178 of Timnapuram village. The 21st plaintiff Karri Kondalah is the owner of Ac.1-00 in old S.No.140/4 of Timmapurum village. The 22nd plaintiff Bandey Veerraju is the owner of Ac.2-16 cents in old S.No.97, new S.No.135/1, total Ac.2-97 cents of Timmapuram village. The defendants 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the possession of plaintiffs after 29.06.1976 based on the alleged proceedings of Taluk office, dated 29.06.1976. Therefore, the plaintiffs constrained to file the suit for the reliefs of title and recovery of possession.

8. The defendant No.3 is set ex parte.

The 1st defendant filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and further contended as follows:

The suit is not maintainable and that the plaintiffs‟ claim to be interested in different properties. The schedule property is part of Ava Tank poramboke and is government land for which, the plaintiffs and anybodyelse cannot claim title or possession. Because the schedule properties are low- lying land, they are called Ava cheruvu lands. The plaint schedule land form part of Ava Tank. Ava Tank was in the erstwhile Pithapuram Estate Abolition Act, 1948 during 1950. The Ava Tank is securely bounded by bunds on South and North. There is Kakinada- Pithapuram road in the East and patta lands on the West. The total extent of this Ava Tank is Ac.240.12 cents. This tank receives excess water from Yeleru canal and is being stored. The Ava tank is having an ayacut of Ac.700.00. After the tank is taken over by the Government, it is declared as poramboke during survey and settlement. If really the plaintiffs are in possession of this tank at the time of taking over by the Government, they would have preferred claims before the Settlement Officer. He denied that the schedule lands are noted as Ryoti lands in the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 Records of Rights Register of 1913. The claims of the plaintiffs were rejected by the Settlement Officer, Director of Settlements, Board of Revenue and the High Court. The civil Court has no jurisdiction and the plaintiffs have no right to re-agitate their claims. They denied that the plaintiffs are paying taxes till 1976 as zeroyiti lands and that they are not aware of the alleged wrong classification. The schedule lands are registered as Ava tank poramboke to the knowledge of the plaintiffs. The ineligible encroachers are evicted from the tank bed and the Collector instructed for taking acting for granting the lands on lease for raising 2nd crop only strictly adhering to the instructions issued by the Government. Accordingly, all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during Fasli 1381. Subsequently, during Fasli 1382 and Fasli 1383, same persons encroached again, who formed into two societies during Fasli 1384, relinquished their claims and about Ac.70-00 of tank bed lands were leased out to the three societies defendants 2 to 4. If really, the plaintiffs are dispossessed in 1976, there is no reason for not taking any action till 1988. For all the notices received during 1975-76, the Government issues replies and every time, no replies need be sent. The plaint schedule lands were declared as Government poramboke lands. The suit lands are not zeroyiti lands. They are Government poramboke lands. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

9. The 2nd defendant filed written statement denying the averments made in the plaint and contended as follows:

The suit lands along with other lands having vested in the 1st defendant and after the abolition of the Pithapuram Estate, the 1st defendant alone has got title to the said lands. The 1st defendant having granted the lands on lease to the Sangham and this defendant thus having been in possession of the lands that were leased out to them, the plaintiffs cannot now question either the title of the 1st defendant or the lease that was granted by the 1st defendant to this Sangham and other Sanghams, as the VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 paramount title holder of the said lands. Some of the ryots might have been granted conditional pattas for the lands by the Survey and Settlement authorities. Later the mistake was rectified by the Director of Settlements, who cancelled these conditional pattas as the lands are Cheruvu Padaka lands and hence treated them as poramboke lands. There is no change in the category of classification of lands. The Director of Settlement held that it is a poramboke land, but not a ryoti land based on the estate records. They denied that these defendants 2 to 4 have trespassed into the lands in the possession of the plaintiffs after 29.6.1976 claiming that the Government granted them one-year lease for the said lands. In fact, this defendant Sangham was constituted in the year 1974, and this defendant was granted lease of certain lands and thereafter, there were some changes in the allotment of lands and ultimately, the said extent of Ac.60.18 cents was leased out to this Sangham in 1976. The plaintiffs have to prove their right, title and possession and enjoyment of the said lands and that the plaintiffs‟ suit is barred by time. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

10. The 4th defendant filed its written statement denying the plaint allegations and supported the same version as contended by the 2nd defendant and further contended as follows:

The entire land of Ava tank is poramboke land vested with the Government. In the Survey and Settlement, the concerned authorities are having every right to survey to ascertain the nature of the tenure of the land and the Government issued notices in general and the nature of the land changed by the Government by virtue of the decision given by the concerned Settlement authorities, the lands are notified according to their findings. Several poor people form into societies in Atchampeta as well as Timmapuram requesting the Government to lease out the lands, which are, belongs to them, which were in their possession, then lease was granted and they inducted into possession as lessees. They denied the dispossession as contended by the plaintiffs. It is a tank bed land and it is VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 tank bed poramboke vested with D-1. Therefore, there is no question of conversion of zeroyiti land into poramboke land. Hence, sought for dismissal of the suit.

11. Based on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed the following issues:

(1) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title as prayed for?

(2) Whether plaintiffs are entitled to evict the defendants and to deliver vacant possession of the schedule lands as prayed for? (3) Whether the Civil Court has no jurisdiction to scrutinize the proceedings of the Settlement authorities?

(4) Whether the suit is bad for minjoinder of cause of action? (5) Whether the plaint schedule is a part of area tank poramboke as pleaded in the written statement filed by D-1?

(6) Whether the plaintiffs‟ suit is barred by time?

(7) To what relief?

The trial Court has framed the following additional issues:

(1) Whether the plaint schedule properties are ryoti lands in the Pithapuram estate and surveyed as ryoti lands in the records of rights register?

(2) Whether Ava tank of Timmapuram (V) was vested with the Government due to abolition of estate?

(3) Whether conditional patta issued by the Estate Holder only to show pyru crop will come within the purview of the amendment of Sec.20(a) and (b) of Estate Land Act, 1908?

12. During the course of trial in the trial Court, on behalf of the plaintiffs, P.Ws.1 to 19 were examined and Exs.A.1 to A.172 were marked. On behalf of the defendants, D.Ws.1 to 5 were examined and Exs.B.1 to B.11, Exs.X.1 to X.10 and Exs.C.1 and C.2 were marked.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


13. After completion of the trial and hearing the arguments of both sides, the trial Court decreed the suit vide its judgment, dated 05.10.2001, against which the present appeals are preferred by the defendants in the suit questioning the decree and judgment passed by the trial Court.


14. Heard Sri Inapurapu Suryanarayana and Sri Sriman, learned counsel for the appellants / defendants 2 to 4, Sri D.Yathindra Dev, learned Special Government Pleader attached to the office of learned Advocate General, for the appellant / 1st defendant and Sri M.Sri Atchyuth, learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs.


15. Learned counsel for the appellants / defendants 2 to 4 and learned Special Government Pleader for appellant / defendant No.1 would contend that the judgment and decree of the trial Court are contrary to law, weight of evidence and probabilities of the case. They would further contend that the Court below erred in holding that the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title and delivery of vacant possession of the schedule land. They would further contend that the trial Court erred in holding that the suit land is not a part of the tank bed land and that it is ryoti land. They would further contend that the plaintiffs had neither possession nor title to the suit property, instead of dismissing the suit, the learned trial Judge decreed the suit. They would further contend that the plaint schedule land is not a zeroyiti land and the plaint schedule property is part of Ava tank poramboke and the same is Government land, in which the plaintiffs or anybodyelse cannot claim any right, title or possession and further contend that the learned trial Judge without proper appreciation of the evidence on record, decreed the suit and both the appeals may be allowed by setting aside the decree and judgment passed by the learned trial Judge.


16. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondents / plaintiffs would contend that on appreciation of the entire evidence on record, the learned VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 trial Judge rightly decreed the suit and there is no need to interfere with the findings arrived by the learned trial Judge


17. Now the points for determination in the present appeals are:


1) Whether the plaintiffs are having valid right and title in the suit schedule property and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title in the suit schedule property?

2) Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation?

3) Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property?

4) Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

18. Point No.1:


Whether the plaintiffs are having valid right and title in the suit schedule property and whether the plaintiffs are entitled for declaration of title in the suit schedule property?

The claim of the plaintiffs as per plaint averments is that 22 plaintiffs filed the present suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession. The contention of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands and the lands were granted by way of zeroyiti pattas by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment of all these schedule lands till they were forcibly dispossessed by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. Another plea taken by the plaintiffs is that in the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas to the suit schedule land.

19. The 1st defendant contended in the written statement that the suit for declaration of title as sought by the plaintiffs is not maintainable and the plaintiffs are not having possession or title in the plaint schedule property. The 1st defendant further pleaded that the plaint schedule property is a part VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 of Ava tank poramboke and the schedule property is a Government land, in which the plaintiffs or anybodyelse cannot claim any right, title or possession. The 1st defendant further contended that the Ava tank is having an extent of Ac.700 and after the tank is taken over by the Government, it is declared as a poramboke during the survey and settlement. The 1st defendant further pleaded that the plaint schedule lands are registered as Ava tank poramboke to the knowledge of the plaintiffs and ineligible encroachers are evicted from the tank bed and the Collector instructed for taking action for granting the lands on lease for raising the second crop only strictly adhering to the instructions issued by the Government. The 1st defendant further contended in the written statement itself that all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during fasali 1381 and subsequently during the fasali 1382 and fasali 1383, some persons encroached again , who formed into two societies during the fasali 1584, relinquished their claims and at about Ac.70.00 of tank bed land was leased out to three societies / defendants 2 to 4. The 1st defendant further contended that as per the policy of the Government, the tank bed lands were granted on one year lease basis to ryot cooli Sangham and small farmers Sangham in the year 1976. The 2nd and 4th defendants also supported the contention of the 1st defendant. They pleaded that the suit claim of the plaintiffs is barred by law of limitation.


20. The claim of the plaintiffs is strongly disputed by the defendants. Therefore, it is for the plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property.


In a case of Union of India and others vs. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Limited and others1, the Apex Court held as follows:


"In a suit for declaration of title, burden always lies on the plaintiff to make out and establish a clear case for granting such a declaration and the weakness, if any, of the case set up by the defendants would (2014) 2 Supreme Court Cases 269 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 not be a ground to grant relief to the plaintiff. The legal position, therefore, is clear that the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title and possession could succeed only on the strength of its own title and that could be done only by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus on it, irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not. We are of the view that even if the title set up by the defendants is found against, in the absence of establishment of plaintiff‟s own title, plaintiff must be non-suited."


In a case of Moran Mar Basselios Catholicos vs. Thukalan Paulo Avira & others2, the Apex Court held as follows:


"It is perfectly clear that in a suit of this description if the plaintiffs are to succeed they must do so on the strength of their own title."

In a case of Sajana Granites, Madras and another vs. Manduva Srinivasa Rao and others3, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as follows:


"The Supreme Court in M.P. Athanastus case (supra), M.M. Catholices v. Polo Avira case (supra) and this Court in C. Audilakshmamma case (supra) held that plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title, and for recovery of possession, can succeed only on the strength of his own title and that it is not obligatory on the defendants to plead and prove the possible defects in the plaintiffs title and so if the plaintiff fails to establish his title, even if the defendant fails to establish his own title, plaintiff must be non suited. In this case since appellants are seeking declaration of their title to the suit property they have to establish their title; and cannot expect relief on the basis of the weakness of the case of respondents 1 and 2, or on the basis that the evidence adduced by respondents 1 and 2 does not establish their title to the suit property."

In a case of K. Venkatasubba Reddy vs. Bairagi Ramaiah (died) by L.Rs.4, the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad, held as follows:


"A Division Bench of this Court also in Chakicherla Adilakshmamma v. Almakuru Rama Rao and Ors,- (3) AIR 1973 AP 149. Relying on the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1954 SC 526 (cited supra) held that "in a suit for ejectment, the plaintiff is liable to be nonsuited, if he 1958 SCC OnLine Supreme Court 136 2001 SCC OnLine AP 666 1999 (1) APLJ 416 (HC) VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 fails to establish his own title irrespective of the question whether the defendants have proved their case or not."

The law laid down by the Supreme Court and also by the Division Bench of this Court in the ejectment suits is also applicable to the suits for declaration of title. Thus, the plaintiff must succeed by establishing his own title, by adducing satisfactory evidence and he cannot succeed on the weakness of the defendant's case.


21. In a case of Brahma Nand Puri vs. Neki Puri Since deceased represented by Mathra Puri and another5, the Apex Court held as follows:


"The plaintiff‟s suit being one for ejnectment he has to succeed or fail on the title that he establishes and if he cannot succeed on the strength of his title his suit must fail notwithstanding that the defendant in possession has no title to the property, assuming learned counsel is right in that submission".

In a case of Jagdish Narain vs. Nawab Sai Ahmed Khan6, the Privy Council held as follows:


"In a suit in ejectment the plaintiffs can succeed only on the strength of their own title, and there is no obligation upon the defendants to plead possible defects in the plaintiffs‟ title which might manifest themselves when the title is disclosed. It is sufficient that in the written statement the defendants deny the plaintiffs‟ title, and under this plea, they can avail themselves of any defect which such title discloses."

In a case of A. Ramloo and others vs. G. Sreeramachandra Murthy and others 7 , the composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad held as follows:


In a ruling reported in Moran Mar Basselios Catheolicos and another v. Most Rev. Mar Poulose Athanasius and others, AIR 1954 SC 526, it has been held by their Lordships as under:

"That the plaintiff in ejectment suit must succeed on the strength of his own title. This can be done by adducing sufficient evidence to discharge the onus that is on him irrespective of whether the defendant has proved his case or not. A mere destruction of the AIR 1965 SC 1506 1945 SCC OnLine PC 56 1999 SCC OnLine AP 80 VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 defendants title, in the absence of establishment of his own title carries the plaintiff nowhere."

22. The claim of the plaintiffs is that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands and zeroyiti pattas were granted by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and in the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas to the suit land. The plaintiffs relied on Exs.A.81 and A.89. Ex.A.81 is the patta said to have been issued in the year 1958 in the name of Pedapudi Ramulu / 9th plaintiff for Ac.1.22 cents by the Assistant Settlement Officer. Ex.A.89 is in the name of Chodisetti Bangaraiah, which was said to have been issued in the year 1935. The said Chodisetti Bangaraiah or his children are not parties to the suit. Ex.A.37 stands in the name of plaintiff No.24. Ex.A.52 patta stands in the name of Nacharla Gangaraju. The said Nacharla Gangaraju is not plaintiff in the suit. Except plaintiff Nos.9 and 24, none of the plaintiffs or their predecessors in title, filed the alleged pattas before the trial Court. The 9th plaintiff / P.W.8 filed his alleged patta said to have been issued in the year 1958 and its extent is Ac.1.22 cents. As per the evidence of 9th plaintiff / P.W.8, his family used to have Ac.1.40 cents only in suit schedule land and the suit land was given by the King to their parents. The 9th plaintiff also relied on Exs.A.53 to A.73 land revenue receipts. All the said land revenue receipts except Ex.A.70, are much prior to 15.05.1972. Ex.A.70 is dated 15.05.1972. The 9th plaintiff / P.W.8 admits in cross-examination that they were not in possession from 1976 and they voluntarily vacated the suit land and then the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and part of the schedule land was given by the Government to the Sangham people. His evidence clearly shows that they themselves voluntarily vacated the suit land without any protest and the Government has taken over the possession and later part of the said lands were given to the Sangham people. Except the 9th plaintiff and 24th plaintiff, VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas to prove their possession in the schedule property. Though the 9th plaintiff relied on the aforesaid patta, he admits the king gave the land to them and they voluntarily vacated the suit land and the Government taken over the possession and later part of the plaint schedule property was given to Sangham people.


23. Some of the plaintiffs filed land revenue receipts. All the said land revenue receipts are prior to 1975, except Exs.A.141 to A.143 land revenue receipts dated 16.02.1975. Exs.A.141 to A.143 relates to Hanumanthu Buraiah / 15th plaintiff. Ex.A.42 relates to Chodisetti Subba Rao. The said Chodisetti Subba Rao is not one of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also relied on Exs.A.162 to 166 land revenue receipts in the name of 19th plaintiff. It does not mean that the 19th plaintiff is in possession of his property till the year 1976. The latest receipt filed by the 19th plaintiff is Ex.A.166, dated 08.02.1975. Except the 9th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff and 19th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their land revenue receipts for the year 1975. None of the plaintiffs filed their land revenue receipts from the month of March, 1975 onwards. Moreover, payment of land revenue by the 9th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff and 19th plaintiff, does not mean that they were in possession of their lands till February, 1975. The law is well settled that the payment of land revenue does not confer any title in the plaint schedule property, that too in a suit filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession over the schedule property.


24. The plaintiffs have not filed either 10-1 revenue Adangals or cultivation Adangals. As stated supra, except the 9th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas said to have been obtained by erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. The 24th plaintiff filed the alleged patta. But the 24th plaintiff has not filed any suit and the 24th plaintiff was added as legal representative of deceased 7th plaintiff during pendency of the suit. The 24th plaintiff did not enter into the witness box.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


25. It is the contention of the plaintiffs in the plaint itself that the suit schedule lands are zeroyiti lands. No document is filed by the plaintiffs to show that it is a zeroyiti land. Another contention taken by the plaintiffs is that all the schedule properties are zeroyiti lands and they were granted zeroyiti pattas by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram to the predecessors of the plaintiffs and their predecessors were in possession and enjoyment over the schedule property till they were forcibly evicted by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. The plaintiffs also specifically pleaded that in or about the year 1960, there was a survey and settlement conducted by the Government and in the said survey and settlement, the plaintiffs were granted conditional pattas for the said land and due to some mistake that was crept into the Government records, subsequently the said lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to the plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. The plaintiffs further pleaded that the suit land is not a poramboke or Government land or the land intended for the public purpose. Admittedly, none of the plaintiffs questioned the said alleged change of classification of zeroyiti land to Ava tank poramboke before the appropriate authorities. The 1st defendant / Government is claiming that the suit schedule land is a Government poramboke land. Even according to the own case of the plaintiffs, in the survey and settlement operations in the year 1960, the schedule property is notified as Ava tank poramboke land. Even assume if the said statement of the plaintiffs in the plaint is correct, they have to challenge the said change of classification as Ava tank poramboke before appropriate authority. Even assume if the said statement of the plaintiffs in the plaint is correct, they have to challenge the said change of classification before the appropriate authority. But, they have not challenged the same from 1960 onwards before the appropriate authorities.


26. As stated supra, the plaintiffs approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of declaration of title and also recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the entire burden is casts upon the VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property. If they fail to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property, they are not entitled the consequential relief of recovery of possession as sought in the plaint by the plaintiffs.


27. The 1st plaintiff pleaded that she is the owner of Ac.7.92 cents in old S.No.103/1, now S.No.136/2 of Timmapuram Village and she got the same under a registered gift deed dated 24.02.1955 from Chodisetti Manikyam and others and she has been in enjoyment by paying taxes till dispossession. But admittedly, no „D‟ patta of the said Manikyam is filed. P.W.1 admits in her evidence in cross-examination that Ex.A.1 is the registration extract of gift deed dated 24.02.1955 and except the registration extract of the gift deed, no document is filed to prove her possession and enjoyment over the schedule property. The plaintiffs also relied on Exs.A.4 to A.6 land revenue receipts. Ex.A.4 is dated 11.09.1975. It is not in the name of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A.5 is dated 30.06.1973. It is in the name of 1st plaintiff. Ex.A.6 land revenue receipt dated 16.05.1969. It is also not in the name of 1st plaintiff. Though the 1st plaintiff relied on Exs.A.4 to A6 land revenue receipts, except Ex.A.5, remaining two land revenue receipts are not in the name of 1st plaintiff. The 1st plaintiff as P.W.1 admits that the Sangham people taken over the possession of the said lands in the year 1976. She further admits her land and the plots of the other plaintiffs are different or at different places, but not side by side i.e. continuous plots and she was dispossessed by third parties in the month of June, 1976 and her son Venkataramana informed her about the dispossession by Sangham people. The aforesaid admission clearly goes to show that she is not having any personal knowledge about the dispossession of the lands of the 1st plaintiff. She further admits the patta given in favour of her ancestors is not available with her.


28. The plaint averments shows that the 2nd plaintiff is the owner of Ac.3.09 cents in old S.No.103/1 corresponding new S.No.136/2 of VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 Timmapuram Village. No documents are filed by the 2nd plaintiff. The 2nd plaintiff / P.W.3 deposed that he is the 2nd plaintiff in the suit and the same is ancestral property and one Papa Rao is his father and he is the only son to his parents. There are no documents either in favour of him and his father or his grandfather in respect of item No.2 of the schedule properties. He relied on three tax receipts Exs.A.16 to A.18. Those are dated 23.06.1958, 10.03.1962 and 09.03.1969. He further admits that he does not know the contents in the plaint and P.W.2 taken over the documents and went to the Advocate‟s office and got drafted the plaint and filed the same into the Court. He pleaded ignorance in almost all the crucial aspects. In the case at hand, though he pleaded that he is the owner of Ac.3.09 cents, which is acquired by him by way of ancestral, no document is filed by the 2 nd plaintiff to show that it is his ancestral property.


29. It is the specific case of the 3rd plaintiff that he is the owner of Ac.1.17 cents in old S.No.143/5 corresponding new S.No.176/5 and his title and possession to the land is proved by filing tax receipts. But the 3rd plaintiff did not enter into the witness box. On behalf of the 3rd plaintiff, his son is examined as P.W.4. As per his evidence, one Chodisetti Nagaraju is maternal grandmother and his mother and grandmother executed a gift deed dated 14.02.1958 in favour of his father. He also relied on land revenue receipts much prior to 1975. He admits that the defendants occupied the land in the year 1976, but he did not give any report to the police.


30. The case of the 4th plaintiff is that the 4th and 5th plaintiffs are the owners of Ac.5.18 cents in Timmapuram Village. The 4th plaintiff is examined as P.W.5. The 5th plaintiff is not examined as a witness. P.W.5 deposed in his evidence that he is the 4th plaintiff and 5th plaintiff is his brother and the document of title for Ac.5.18 cents were not traced out either in favour of their father and their grandfather except the land revenue receipts. They relied on Exs.A.32 to A.35 land revenue receipts. Those are VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 much prior to more than 35 years prior to filing of the suit. He further admits that all the aforesaid land revenue receipts stands in the name of his paternal grandfather Atchaiah. He further admits that in or around 1976, the defendants Sangham people trespassed into the land and other ryots lands and they were evicted from Ava lands. He further admits that the Timmapuram Village lands are higher in level than the suit land. He further admits that he does not know exactly whether after taken over the possession by the Government, on the application submitted by ryoti Sanghams, the Government evicted them and handed over the land to the Sangham people as leasehold rights and delivered possession and since then, the Sangham people are cultivating their respective lands.


31. The 6th and 7th plaintiffs relied on the evidence of P.W.6. P.W.6 is the 6th plaintiff in the suit. As per his evidence, the 7th plaintiff is his elder brother. As per his evidence, in the year 1976, Sangham people trespassed into the lands and forcibly taken away the crops in their lands. He further admits that Ex.A.37 is the patta given by the Pithapuram Zamindar dated 16.11.1937 in favour of his father. Exs.A.42 to A.46 are land revenue receipts. Ex.A.47 is the land revenue receipt dated 21.02.1978 in the name of his favour. As stated supra, even as per his own evidence, he was evicted in the year 1976 itself.


32. P.W.7 deposed in his evidence that he is the owner of Ac.1.78 cents in old S.No.91 corresponding new S.No.122 of Timmapuram Village. As per his evidence, the 8th plaintiff is his senior paternal uncle. He further admits that the land was purchased by his father and 8th plaintiff under a registered sale deed dated 08.01.1950 and the original sale deed was lost in the fire accident and Ex.A.50 is the registration extract of the said sale deed. Admittedly, he did not choose to file the alleged patta said to have been issued either in the name of his father or his grandfather. He further admits that after dispossession, his father and 8th plaintiff got issued a notice to the District Collector and Sangham people and the said legal notice is Ex.A52 VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 dated 09.06.1977 and they cultivated the land and enjoyed the usufruct till 1976 and in the year 1976, some persons came suddenly and knocked them out and occupied Ac.1.80 cents of land. Admittedly, the 8th plaintiff did not choose to enter into the witness box. On behalf of the 8th plaintiff, his relative was examined as P.W.7.


33. The case of the 9th plaintiff is that he is the owner of Ac.1.42 cents in old S.No.138/2 connected with new S.No.171/2 of Timmapuram Village. The 9th plaintiff is examined as P.W.8. As per his evidence, their family possessed Ac.1.40 cents in the suit schedule land and the land was given by the King to their parents and the said land was enjoyed by their family and in the year 1976, three Sangham people evicted them from that land and also surrounding ryoti lands. He also relied on Exs.A.54 to A.73. But he failed to file the land revenue receipts stands in the name of P.W.8 from 1975 onwards. He relied on Ex.A.77 land revenue receipt dated 03.03.1980 and Ex.A.78 land revenue receipt dated 31.01.1983. Even as per his own case, he was dispossessed in the year 1976. Therefore, no credence will be given to the said land revenue receipts. He further admits that the suit land was not in his possession from 1976 and they voluntarily evicted the suit land and then the Government taken over the possession of the suit land, later given a part of the suit land to each Sangham people and the entire schedule land was given by the Government to the Sangham people. Therefore, his own evidence is not supporting the case of the plaintiffs.


34. As per the plaint averments, the 10th plaintiff, 11th plaintiff and 12th plaintiff possessed Ac.3.59 cents of Timmapuram Village. On their behalf, P.W.9 was alone examined. As per the evidence of P.W.9, he is the 11th plaintiff in the suit and 10th and 12th plaintiffs are his brothers. He further admits in the year 1976, one Surya Rao came and informed him that Sangham people came with sticks and material and taken away their possession by saying that they are not having any right in the said property. It clearly goes to show that he is not having any personal knowledge about VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 the dispossession of the plaintiffs 10 to 12 from out of the plaint schedule property.


35. The case of the 13th plaintiff is that he is the owner of Ac.0-70 cents of land in old S.No.137/2 connected with new S.No.135/3. As per his evidence, the said Ac.0-70 cents stands in the name of his father and his father purchased the same from Venkata Surya Rao and he lost the original sale deed. Ex.A.87 is the registration extract of sale deed dated 25.01.1959. As per the own case of the plaintiffs, it is a patta land. He further admits that himself and his father enjoyed the said Ac.0-70 cents of land till 1976.


36. The 14th plaintiff is examined as P.W.11. The 15th plaintiff is not examined as a witness before the trial Court. As per the evidence of P.W.11, their family enjoyed Ac.3.19 cents of land till 1976 and later the Sangham people forcibly evicted them claiming that the Government given the said land to them and in the same manner, they have also evicted not only himself and other ryots from their respective portions of the lands. He relied on Exs.A.104 to A.145 land revenue receipts. In cross-examination, he admits that he deposed before the Court in his chief examination based on the evidence on record, but not with the personal knowledge. He deposed before the trial Court in his chief examination based on evidence on record, but not the personal knowledge. He further admits that in the records filed into the Court, the suit land is classified as Cheruvu Padaka. He further admits that in Ex.A.94, it was noted as Cheruvu Padaka. He further admits that the Government gave a patta of the land to defendants 2 to 4 and he does not know whether each Sangham taken possession of their respective bit of land out of the suit land. He further admits that the Government given pattas to the Sangham people and thereby the Sangham people occupied the suit land.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


37. According to the plaint averments, the 16th and 17th plaintiffs are the owners of Ac.1.27 cents of Timmapuram Village. They relied on the evidence of P.W.12. P.W.12 is the 16th plaintiff in the suit. As per his evidence, their family got the land from their father and his father purchased the property of Ac.0-64 cents by his father under a sale deed, the original sale deed is not traced out and their vendors‟ vendor document is Ex.A.147. He further deposed after death of his father, himself and 17th plaintiff are cultivating the landed property and in the year 1976, some Sangham people came and evicted them and other ryots from the suit schedule land.


38. As per the plaint averments, the 18th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.4.26 cents. As per his evidence, he does not know whether there is any document for the property of two plots and they paid taxes to the Government for their lands and he kept the documentary proof in a thatched house, but the said documents are misplaced and they enjoyed the property till 1976, later the Sangham people trespassed into the land and taken over the possession. As per his evidence, he is not having any document to show that they are having right and title in the plaint schedule property and all the documents were misplaced.


39. As per the plaint averments, the 19th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.62 cents at Timmapuram Village. The 19th plaintiff is examined as P.W.14. He admits that there are no documents either in favour of himself or his father for the land, except the land revenue receipts. He admits that they are in possession till 1976.


40. As per the plaint averments, the 20th plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.50 cents. As per his evidence, the document and land revenue receipts belongs to them was lost, since their house was collapsed about 30 years back and he has not obtained any copies of the documents from the revenue authorities to establish his right and title in the schedule property. As per the plaint averments, the 21st plaintiff is the owner of Ac.1.00. The VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 21st plaintiff is not examined before the trial Court. His son is examined as P.W.16. As per his evidence, he does not know what is the extent of land and he does not know the exact place of land. He admits the Sangham people occupied the land in the year 1976. He further admits that no record is available with him for his Ac.1.00 land as claimed.


41. As per the plaint averments, the 22nd plaintiff is the owner of Ac.2.16 cents. As per the evidence of 22nd plaintiff / P.W.17, except the two land revenue receipts, the other land revenue receipts and title documents are lost by him and they were not traced.


42. The evidence of the aforesaid witnesses failed to establish that all the plaintiffs are having right and title in the plaint schedule property. As stated supra, some of the plaintiffs relied on the land revenue receipts. The present suit is filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and recovery of possession of the plaint schedule property. Therefore, the burden is heavily casts on the plaintiffs to prove their right and title in the plaint schedule property, but they are not supposed to depend upon the weaknesses in the case set up by the defendants. Except the 9th plaintiff, none of the plaintiffs filed their alleged pattas said to have been given by the erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. Though the 9th plaintiff relied on the alleged patta, he himself admits that he voluntarily vacated his property and the Government taken over the property and later pattas were given to the Sangham people / defendants 2 to 4. His own evidence is not supporting the case of the plaintiffs.


43. As seen from the judgment of the learned trial Judge in its judgment, the trial Court has not even discussed the evidence of all the witnesses and not even discussed the material admissions in the cross- examination of the depositions of the witnesses. Admittedly, the 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff not even enter into the witness box and no pattas alleged VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 to have been issued are filed except the 9th plaintiff. Though the 6th plaintiff relied on the patta said to have been issued in the name of his father, the same is not proved that the 6th plaintiff is having right in the suit property. It is the case of the plaintiffs in the plaint itself that they were dispossessed in the year 1976. As stated supra, payment of land revenue does not confer rights in the plaint schedule property. Except some of the plaintiffs, the remaining plaintiffs have not filed land revenue receipts to show that they paid land revenue to the Government. Though some of the plaintiffs relied on land revenue receipts, those are much prior to March, 1975. The suit for recovery of possession filed by the plaintiffs is based on the title. It is the specific case of the plaintiffs that they are having valid right and title in the plaint schedule property. But the evidence placed by the plaintiffs failed to prove that they are having right and title in the plaint schedule property.


44. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the Ava lands situated in Timmapuram Village i.e. the plaint schedule lands are zeroyiti lands. Even in the plaint itself, it was recited that due to mistake crept into the Government records, subsequently the classifications of lands were noted as Ava tank poramboke without notice to the plaintiffs or others and without any enquiry. Admittedly, the plaintiffs have not challenged the said change of classification of the lands from 1960 onwards before the appropriate authority. As per the own document filed by the plaintiffs i.e. Ex.A.11 ROR Register 1913, the lands in S.No.135/1 to 149/8 of Timmapuram Village are Cheruvu Padaka lands, but not the zeroyiti lands. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the defendants have failed to discharge their burden of proof. In view of the settled legal position, as stated supra, in a suit for declaration of title, the burden heavily lies on the plaintiffs. They have to prove their title, but not by the defendants. The own admissions of the plaintiffs‟ witnesses itself are not supporting the claim of the plaintiffs.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


45. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance on L.Ramesh v. State of Andhra Pradesh8.


The facts in the aforesaid case law relates to writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. In the present case, the plaintiffs approached the civil Court for seeking the relief of declaration of title. The 22 plaintiffs filed the single suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title. As stated supra, two plaintiffs alone filed their alleged pattas which are relates to more than 50 years ago prior to institution of the suit. Except the said two plaintiffs, the other plaintiffs have not filed their pattas. Even though the said two plaintiffs filed their pattas, their own evidence itself is not supporting the claim of the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs failed to file 10-1 account and cultivation account before the trial Court.


46. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs placed reliance on State of Andhra Pradesh, represented by District Collector v. Kothacheruvu Plantations and Industries Private Limited and others 9 , wherein the Composite High Court of Andhra Pradesh held as follows:


"204. Such delivery of possession pending suit would therefore be only subject to the result in the suit/appeal. Even alienations pending suit are subject to result of the suit under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Therefore, if the plaintiff/appellant is held entitled to the reliefs of declaration claimed by it, then in exercise of power of this Court under Order 41 Rule 33 CPC, this Court is entitled to grant relief of delivery of possession also to the appellant, even if it was not prayed for in the suit since on the date of the suit it is in possession of the property and the defendants got into possession after the present suit was filed."

The facts in the aforesaid case law are, pending suit proceedings, the suit property was delivered to others. In the case at hand, even as per the own case of the plaintiffs, in the year 1976 itself, they were dispossessed 2022 (2) ALD 234 2014 (4) ALT 380 VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 from out of the plaint schedule property. The present suit is filed on 17.06.1988.


47. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs / respondents contended that the issues consisting declaration of title and recovery of possession have already been adjudicated by the trial Court apart from this Court in a judgment in between State of Andhra Pradesh v. Ramajan and others 10. The facts in the aforesaid case law are the suit for declaration of title and possession and mesne profits was filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in the year 1977 vide O.S.No.149 of 1977, but not in the year 1988 and the trial Court decreed the said suit for all reliefs, but the first appellate Court negatived the relief of declaration of title and possession was restored by holding that the plaintiffs in the said suit are forcibly dispossessed by the 2nd defendant after March, 1976. The 1st defendant filed second appeal and the plaintiffs therein filed a cross appeal and the second appeal has been dismissed and cross appeal was allowed. Whereas, the facts in the present case, even as per the own pleadings pleaded by the plaintiffs, they were dispossessed after 29.06.1976 and they filed a civil suit for declaration of title and possession before the learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada in the month of June, 1988. The plaintiffs in the present suit and plaintiffs in that suit are different. The plaintiffs herein are not the parties to the said suit. The present suit is filed for relief of declaration of title. The suit for declaration of title is a right in personam not a right in rem.


48. None of the plaintiffs herein stated that they were forcibly evicted by the defendants in the month of June, 1976. Simply, they pleaded that they were evicted in the month of June, 1976. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed in his evidence that they voluntarily vacated the suit land and the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and later 1991 (1) L.S. 257 VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 Government given up part of the suit land to the Sangham people. P.W.1 simply deposed that he was dispossessed in the month of June, 1976. The aforesaid suit O.S.No.149 of 1977 was filed by the plaintiffs 1 to 5 in the said suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title in S.No.90/1, 93/1, 2, 94, 95/3 in a total extent of Ac.14.63 cents. Whereas in the present case, the survey numbers in the present case are different and the property is situated at same village. As noticed supra, the 22 plaintiffs filed a single suit and they are claiming title in different survey numbers. Therefore, it is the duty of the each plaintiff to prove his title and possession independently as pleaded by the plaintiffs.


49. The 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff are not even enter into the witness box. None of the plaintiffs except the 6th plaintiff and 9th plaintiff filed the alleged „D‟ pattas said to have been obtained from erstwhile Zamindar of Pithapuram. The plaintiffs failed to file revenue Adangals, cultivation account before the trial Court. Therefore, the finding given in the said suit vide O.S.No.149 of 1977 are not yet binding in the present suit. In the present case, the Advocate-commissioner was appointed by the trial Court and he visited the suit schedule property and his report is marked as Ex.C.1. Ex.C.1 goes to show that the suit schedule property is low-lying and below the level of surrounding land.


50. In the case at hand, in the ROR Register, in the year 1926 / Ex.A.11 which was relied by the plaintiffs, it is noted as a tank bed "Cheruvu Padaka". It is well settled that the tank is outside the purview of zeroyiti land, as per Section 3(g) of Abolition Act, it is abundantly clear that a ryot is entitled only to such rights, as were conveyed on him under the Act and that the Act does not contemplate the issue of ryotwari patta in respect of a tank.


VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002


51. For the aforesaid reasons, it is evident that the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in the plaint schedule property. Accordingly, point No.1 is answered against the plaintiffs / respondents.


52. Point No.2:


Whether the suit is barred by law of limitation?

Learned Government Pleader for defendant No.1 would contend that all the plaintiffs were evicted during the year 1971 itself and the Government taken over the possession of the properties and subsequently those lands were given to defendants 2 to 4 Sangham people. In the written statement itself, the 1st defendant pleaded that all the encroachers were evicted after due enquiry during fasali 1381, corresponding with the year 1971 and subsequently in the year 1972 and 1973, some persons encroached again, who formed into two societies during the year 1974, relinquished their claims and about Ac.70.00 of tank bed land was leased out to three societies / defendants 2 to 4. The 1st defendant specifically pleaded as per the policy of the Government, the tank bed lands were granted on one year lease basis to ryot cooli Sangham and small farmers Sangham in the year 1976. The recitals in the plaint shows that the plaintiffs were dispossessed in the year 1976. The same is specifically denied by the plaintiffs. Therefore, it is for the plaintiffs to produce oral and documentary evidence to show that on which date and in which month, they were evicted by the defendants. The defendants contend that the suit is barred by law of limitation.

53. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that the trial Court had categorically dealt with the issue of limitation in accordance with the governing principles of law. As seen from the plaint averments in the plaint, it was specifically contended that they were dispossessed after 29.06.1976. The plaintiffs have cleverly not mentioned the date, month and year of dispossession in the plaint itself. The suit is filed in the month of VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 June, 1988 i.e. on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the exact date and month of dispossession are crucial to decide the subject matter of the limitation.


54. P.W.1 admits she was dispossessed in the month of June, 1976. P.W.3 admits he does not know the contents in the plaint and P.W.3 admits in his evidence before the trial Court on 20.07.1999 that "Sangham people occupied his land at about 23 to 25 years back". It means, in or about 1974 to 1976, they were dispossessed. P.W.4 deposed that the defendants occupied the land in the year 1976, but no report was given to the police. P.W.5 deposed that in or around the year 1976, he was dispossessed. P.W.6 deposed in his evidence that in the year 1976, he was evicted. P.W.7 on behalf of 8th plaintiff deposed that he was evicted in the year 1976. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed that the suit land was not in his possession from 1976 and they have voluntarily vacated the suit land, then the Government has taken over the possession of the suit land and later given the part of the suit land to Sangham people. P.Ws.9 and 10 admits that they enjoyed the properties till 1976, but they stated that the Sangham people came and trespassed into the land in the year 1976. P.Ws.11 and 12 admits that they were dispossessed in the year 1976. P.W.13 deposed that he enjoyed the property till 1976. Admittedly, the 3rd plaintiff, 5th plaintiff, 7th plaintiff, 10th plaintiff, 12th plaintiff, 15th plaintiff, 17th plaintiff and 22nd plaintiff did not enter into the witness box.


55. As stated supra, in the plaint itself, it was simply pleaded that the plaintiffs were dispossessed after 29.06.1976. Admittedly, the suit was filed on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the date, month and year of dispossession are crucial to decide the subject matter of limitation. Learned counsel for the plaintiffs would contend that in computing the period of limitation for any suit of which notice has been given or for which, the previous consent or sanction of the Government or any other authority is required in accordance with the requirement of any law for the time being in force, the period of VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 such notice or as the case may be, the time required for obtaining such consent or sanction should be excluded.


56. The plaintiffs relied on Ex.A.9 legal notice. Ex.A.9 is the legal notice said to have been issued on 12.02.1988 by all the plaintiffs, except the 14th plaintiff. The 14th plaintiff has not issued any notice. Ex.A.8 is legal notice dated 22.02.1988 said to have been issued by the 15th plaintiff and one Chodisetti Subba Rao. The 6th and 7th plaintiffs said to have been issued the legal notice under Ex.A.49 dated 27.12.1976. Ex.A.52 is the another legal notice said to have been issued by Karri Venkata Raju and Karri Ramamurthy on 09.06.1977, they are not the plaintiffs in the suit. Ex.A.146 is another notice dated 25.04.1977 got issued by the 15 th plaintiff and another. The 14th plaintiff has not issued any notice. As seen from the aforesaid legal notices, the 6th and 7th plaintiffs said to have been issued legal notice on 27.12.1976. The 15th plaintiff said to have been issued a legal notice dated 25.04.1977. Ex.A.9 is the latest notice said to have been issued by all the plaintiffs except the 14th plaintiff dated 12.02.1988. If the plaintiffs wants to enjoy the benefit under Section 5(2) of the Limitation Act, they are entitled to avail the same from the date of Ex.A.9 notice from 12.02.1988 but not from 17.04.1988. The suit is filed on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the date of dispossession is crucial to decide the limitation aspect. But, none of the plaintiffs stated in their evidence about the exact date of dispossession. Even in the plaint also, the date, month and year of dispossession is not stated by the plaintiffs.


57. The suit is filed for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession of the plaint schedule property. The Court fees was paid by the plaintiffs for declaratory relief alone. No separate Court fees has been paid for recovery of possession. Therefore, the relief of recovery of possession is a consequential relief. As stated supra, the plaintiffs failed to prove their title in the plaint schedule property. Since the plaintiffs failed to plead and VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 prove about the exact date, month and year of dispossession in the plaint itself, they simply pleaded in the plaint in para No.IX that after 29.06.1976, they were dispossessed by the defendants. P.W.8 / 9th plaintiff deposed that they voluntarily vacated the land and the Government taken over the possession of the suit land and later given part of the land to the Sangham people.


58. Some of the plaintiffs filed the land revenue receipts. Among those land revenue receipts, two land revenue receipts relates to the month of February, 1975. Remaining plaintiffs have not even filed their land revenue receipts relates to the year 1975. None of the plaintiffs produced any evidence to show that they are in possession of the schedule property from 1975 onwards atleast. As stated supra, the plaintiffs failed to produce 10-1 cultivation account and revenue Adangals to prove their possession over the schedule property.


59. For the aforesaid reasons and considering the aforesaid circumstances, it is evident that the plaintiffs were dispossessed prior to 1976. But for the reasons best known to the plaintiffs, they filed the suit on 17.06.1988. Though the plaintiffs relied on notice under Section 80 CPC said to have been issued to the 1st defendant in the month of February, 1988, the plaintiffs leisurely approached the civil Court as per their choice and they filed the suit for seeking the relief of declaration of title and possession on 17.06.1988. Therefore, the suit is hopelessly barred by limitation. Accordingly, point No.2 is answered.


60. Point No.3:


Whether the plaintiffs are entitled for possession of the plaint schedule property?

In view of my findings on point Nos.1 and 2, since the plaintiffs are not entitled for primary relief of declaration of title, they are not entitled the relief VGKR, J.

as_2533_2001&921_2002 of recovery of possession of the schedule property. Accordingly, point No.3 is answered.

61. Point No.4:


Whether the trial Court is justified in decreeing the suit?

For the reasons stated above and having regard to the facts of the case, this Court is of the view that the plaintiffs failed to establish their case. The findings and conclusion recorded by the trial Court are not based on proper appreciation on record. Therefore, the judgment of the trial Court is erroneous and cannot be sustained and the same is liable to be set aside and both the appeals are deserves to be allowed.

62. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the judgment and decree dated 05.10.2001 passed by the trial Court in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, is hereby set aside. Consequently, the suit in O.S.No.288 of 1988 on the file of learned II Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, is dismissed. Each party do bear their own costs in the appeal.


As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in the Appeal shall stand closed.


_________________________ V. GOPALA KRISHNA RAO, J Date: 27.10.2025 ARR VGKR, J.


as_2533_2001&921_2002 THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE V.GOPALA KRISHNA RAO APPEAL SUIT NO.2533 OF 2001 AND APPEAL SUIT NO.921 OF 2002 Date: 27.10.2025 ARR


(1) NDPS Act, 1985 — Section 20(b)(ii)(B) read with Section 8(c) — Possession of intermediate quantity of ganja — Bail — Considerations. Where the accused, a woman, was found in possession of 4.038 kilograms of ganja (intermediate quantity) and had no prior criminal record, and the investigation was substantially completed, continued detention was held to be unnecessary. Bail can be granted subject to stringent conditions, as the embargo under Section 37 NDPS Act applies only to commercial quantity. (Paras 3–5) (2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 437 and 439 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Sections 480 and 483 — Grant of bail — Discretion of Court. Discretion under Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. (and corresponding provisions of BNSS, 2023) should be exercised in favour of the accused when the investigation is almost complete, the accused has a fixed place of residence, and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence. (Paras 3–4) (3) Criminal Procedure — Bail to Women Accused — Judicial Approach. Special consideration to be given to women accused under the proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in granting bail to female offenders, particularly when they are first-time offenders and the alleged quantity is not commercial. (Para 3) (4) Bail — Conditions — Stringent safeguards imposed. Bail granted subject to conditions: execution of personal bond and sureties, weekly appearance before SHO, restriction on leaving the State, prohibition on influencing witnesses, and cooperation with investigation. (Para 5) Held: A woman accused of possessing an intermediate quantity of narcotic substance, with no criminal antecedents and a fixed abode, is entitled to bail when investigation is substantially completed, subject to appropriate conditions ensuring her presence and cooperation.


(1) NDPS Act, 1985 — Section 20(b)(ii)(B) read with Section 8(c) — Possession of intermediate quantity of ganja — Bail — Considerations.

Where the accused, a woman, was found in possession of 4.038 kilograms of ganja (intermediate quantity) and had no prior criminal record, and the investigation was substantially completed, continued detention was held to be unnecessary. Bail can be granted subject to stringent conditions, as the embargo under Section 37 NDPS Act applies only to commercial quantity.

(Paras 3–5)


(2) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Sections 437 and 439 — Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 — Sections 480 and 483 — Grant of bail — Discretion of Court.

Discretion under Sections 437 and 439 Cr.P.C. (and corresponding provisions of BNSS, 2023) should be exercised in favour of the accused when the investigation is almost complete, the accused has a fixed place of residence, and there is no likelihood of absconding or tampering with evidence.

(Paras 3–4)


(3) Criminal Procedure — Bail to Women Accused — Judicial Approach.

Special consideration to be given to women accused under the proviso to Section 437(1) Cr.P.C. Courts should adopt a liberal approach in granting bail to female offenders, particularly when they are first-time offenders and the alleged quantity is not commercial.

(Para 3)


(4) Bail — Conditions — Stringent safeguards imposed.

Bail granted subject to conditions: execution of personal bond and sureties, weekly appearance before SHO, restriction on leaving the State, prohibition on influencing witnesses, and cooperation with investigation.

(Para 5)


Held:


A woman accused of possessing an intermediate quantity of narcotic substance, with no criminal antecedents and a fixed abode, is entitled to bail when investigation is substantially completed, subject to appropriate conditions ensuring her presence and cooperation.Asma Bibi vs The State Of Andhra Pradesh on 23 October, 2025

APHC010543612025

                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

                                 AT AMARAVATI               [3521]

                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)


           THURSDAY, THE TWENTY THIRD DAY OF OCTOBER

                TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE


                               PRESENT


          THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO


                   CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10577/2025


Between:


  1. ASMA BIBI, W/O. MD. HUSSAIN, AGED ABOUT 32 YEARS, RJO.

     D.NO.J-281/5A, VIJAY COLONY, USMANPUR, STREET NO.6,

     SHASTRI PARK, EAST DELHI, DELHI.


                                            ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED


                                 AND


  1. THE STATE OF ANDHRA PRADESH, Rep by its Public Prosecutor,

     High Court of Andhra Pradesh.


                                       ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT


Counsel for the Petitioner/accused:


  1. GOLLAPALLI MAHESWARA RAO


Counsel for the Respondent/complainant:


  1. PUBLIC PROSECUTOR

                                           2


                                                                            Dr.YLR, J

                                                               Crl.P.No.10577 of 2025


The Court made the following:


ORDER:

The Criminal Petition has been filed under Sections 437 and 439 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for brevity 'the Cr.P.C.') and Sections 480 & 483 of the Bharatiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for brevity 'the BNSS'), seeking to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail in Crime No.205 of 2025 of IV Town Police Station, Visakhapatnam Commissionerate, Visakhapatnam District, was registered against the Petitioner/Accused herein for the offences punishable under Section 20(b)(ii)(B), read with 8(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for brevity 'the NDPS Act').



2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and the learned Assistant Public Prosecutor. Perused the record.



3. The petitioner is a lady aged about 32 years and permanent resident of Delhi and she has got fixed abode. She was found in possession of 4.038 Kilograms of Ganja and was arrested on 21.09.2025. She has been in judicial custody for the past 32 days. There was no criminal antecedents against the petitioner. So far, four witnesses were examined, they are the official witnessess. The petitioner may not be in a position to threaten the official witnesses or tamper the official witnessess. The material portion of the investigation to the alleged role of the petitioner is substantially completed.


Dr.YLR, J


4. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the nature and gravity of allegations levelled against the Petitioner/Accused, this Court is inclined to enlarge the Petitioner/Accused on bail.


5. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed with the following stringent conditions:



i. The Petitioner/Accused shall be enlarged on bail subject to he executing a personal bond for a sum of Rs.10,000/- (Rupees Ten Thousand only) with two sureties for the like sum each to the satisfaction of the learned I Additional District and Sessions Judge-Special Judge for Trial of Offences under NDPS Act, Visakhapatnam, Visakhapatnam District. ii. The Petitioner/Accused shall appear before the Station House Officer concerned, on every Saturday in between 10:00 am and 05:00 pm, till filing of the charge sheet. iii. The Petitioner/Accused shall not leave the limits of the State of Andhra Pradesh without prior permission from the Station House Officer concerned. iv. The Petitioner/Accused shall not commit or indulge in commission of any offence in future. v. The Petitioner/Accused shall not, directly or indirectly, make any inducement, threat or promise to any person Dr.YLR, J acquainted with the facts of the case so as to dissuade him/her from disclosing such facts to the court or to any police officer.

vi. The petitioner/Accused shall cooperate with the investigating officer in further investigation of the case and shall make himself available for interrogation by the investigating officer as and when required.

_________________________ DR. Y. LAKSHMANA RAO, J Date: 23.10.2025 MSI Dr.YLR, J THE HONOURABLE DR JUSTICE Y. LAKSHMANA RAO CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 10577/2025 Date: 23.10.2025 MSI

Contempt of Court – Willful Disobedience – Non-Compliance of Court Order – Filling of Aided Teacher Posts – G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 – RTE Act, 2009 – Alleged Violation. Writ Mandamus – Implementation of Earlier Order: Petitioners sought to punish respondents for alleged willful disobedience of the order dated 20.02.2023 in W.P.No.4058 of 2023, wherein the Court had directed the authorities to permit filling of aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education), dated 01.01.1994, and as per the schedule under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009. Respondents’ Compliance: Counter affidavits revealed that the 4th respondent (Joint Director, Model Schools) granted permission on 13.03.2024 to fill the two vacant aided SGT posts, and the petitioner was instructed to proceed after issuing newspaper notifications. The petitioner failed to submit documentary proof of the advertisements and the list of applicants. Despite being advised to give wider publicity, the petitioner did not cooperate. Later, pursuant to Government Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited online (07.12.2024–15.12.2024) and a Deputy Educational Officer was nominated to oversee recruitment. Court’s Observation: The record demonstrated that the respondents had taken active steps to implement the Court’s earlier order. The delay or non-completion of the recruitment process was due to non-cooperation of the petitioner institution, not because of any willful disobedience by the officials. No Willful Violation: The Court held that the respondents had acted bona fide and complied substantially with the order. There was no deliberate or intentional violation of the Court’s directions. Result: Contempt case dismissed — No willful disobedience established. All connected miscellaneous petitions closed. Held: “The respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.”


Contempt of Court – Willful Disobedience – Non-Compliance of Court Order – Filling of Aided Teacher Posts – G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 – RTE Act, 2009 – Alleged Violation.

  1. Writ Mandamus – Implementation of Earlier Order:
    Petitioners sought to punish respondents for alleged willful disobedience of the order dated 20.02.2023 in W.P.No.4058 of 2023, wherein the Court had directed the authorities to permit filling of aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education), dated 01.01.1994, and as per the schedule under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009.

  2. Respondents’ Compliance:
    Counter affidavits revealed that the 4th respondent (Joint Director, Model Schools) granted permission on 13.03.2024 to fill the two vacant aided SGT posts, and the petitioner was instructed to proceed after issuing newspaper notifications.

    • The petitioner failed to submit documentary proof of the advertisements and the list of applicants.

    • Despite being advised to give wider publicity, the petitioner did not cooperate.

    • Later, pursuant to Government Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited online (07.12.2024–15.12.2024) and a Deputy Educational Officer was nominated to oversee recruitment.

  3. Court’s Observation:
    The record demonstrated that the respondents had taken active steps to implement the Court’s earlier order. The delay or non-completion of the recruitment process was due to non-cooperation of the petitioner institution, not because of any willful disobedience by the officials.

  4. No Willful Violation:
    The Court held that the respondents had acted bona fide and complied substantially with the order. There was no deliberate or intentional violation of the Court’s directions.

  5. Result:
    Contempt case dismissed — No willful disobedience established.
    All connected miscellaneous petitions closed.

Held:

“The respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.”St Josephs Primary School vs Sri Praveen Prakash Ias on 24 October, 2025

     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA


                     CONTEMPT CASE NO.6800 OF 2023


ORDER

1. This contempt case is filed complaining the willful disobedience in implementing the Order dated 20.02.2022 passed by this Court in W.P.No.4058 of 2023.



2. The petitioners filed W.P.No. 4058 of 2023 to issue writ of mandamus declaring the action of respondents in not granting permission to fill up the vacant aided posts in the petitioner institution as per G.O.Ms.No.40 dated 30.06.2017 and consequential proceedings in Rc.No.90/PS1/20103 dated 20.07.2017 despite representation made by the petitioner on 08.09.2021 as illegal, arbitrary and consequently direct Respondent Nos.2 to 3 to permit the petitioner institution to fill up the two vacant aided posts as per G.O.Ms.No.40 dated 30.06.2017.



3. On 20.02.2023, this Court disposed of the writ petition in terms of the common order dated 05.01.2023 passed in W.P.No.30927 of 2022 & batch. The operative portion of the order in W.P.No.30927 of 2022 & batch dated 05.01.2023, reads as follows:



"i) The respondent-authorities are hereby directed to permit the petitioners-institutions to fill up all the Aided vacancies in terms of NV,J G.O.Ms.No.1, Education, dated 01.01.1994 and also as per the Schedule prescribed under Sections 19 & 25 of the Act,2009;

ii) In future also, whenever vacancies arise, the institutions have to make applications to the Competent authorities for filling up the vacancies ;

iii) On such applications, the Competent authorities shall inform the institution about the availability of qualified surplus staff, within a period of four (04) weeks from the date of application and allot said surplus staff on permanent basis;

iv) If surplus staff are not available, the Competent authority shall inform the same and permit the petitioners institutions to fill up the vacancies in accordance with the above said Rule, preferably within a period of two (02) months;

v) So far as minority institutions are concerned, the above procedure is not applicable insofar as allotment of surplus staff are concerned, in view of the Judgments of Division Bench of this Court rendered in Modern High School, Zamisthanpur V. Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others 1 and Ester Axene Res. High School and Others V. State of Andhra Pradesh and Others2

4. Originally, Respondent Nos.1 to 3 were arrayed as party respondents.

Vide orders of this Court in I.A.No.1 of 2024 dated 19.10.2024, Respondent No.3 was discharged from this contempt case. Further, vide 2002 (1) ALD 96 MANU/AP/0045/2019 NV,J order in I.A.No.2 of 2024 dated 19.010.2024, Respondent No.4 was impleaded as party respondent and vide order in I.A.No.1 of 2025 dated 19.03.2025, Respondent Nos.5 to 7 were impleaded as party respondents to the present contempt case, as they are proper and necessary parties to the lis.



5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that, inspite of specific directions of this Court vide order dated 20.02.2023, the respondent authorities have not permitted the petitioner to fill up the Aided vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 (Education) dated 01.01.1994 and also as per the Schedule prescribed under Sections 19 & 25 of the Right of Children to Free and Compulsory Education Act, 2009, for the reasons best known to them and the respondents have deliberately avoiding to implement the orders of this Court and deliberately flouted the orders of this Court. The failure on the part of the respondents in implementing the orders of this Court would amount to disobedience of the orders of this Hon'ble Court, and, therefore, they are liable for punishment under Sections 10 to 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Complaining the same, the petitioners filed the present Contempt Case.



6. Respondent Nos.1, 2, 5, 6 did not file their counter affidavits.


NV,J


7. Respondent No.4 & 7 - Joint Director, Model Schools and District Educational Officer, Krishna District, Machilipatnam, filed their respective counter affidavits. It is submitted that, permission was granted to the petitioner on 13.03.2024 to fill two vacant aided SGT posts, in accordance with G.O.Ms.No.1 dated 01.01.1994. The petitioner submitted a letter dated 16.03.2024, indicating that the institution had issued a newspaper advertisement and requested necessary orders to proceed further. However, the petitioner did not provide any documentary evidence of the newspaper notification or details of the candidate applications. Since the petitioner has not submitted information relating to copies of notification published in the newspapers and particulars of candidates who have submitted applications, the 4th respondent requested data from the District School Educational Officer, NTR, on 03.09.2024. Subsequently, the petitioner submitted a letter dated 19.09.2024, stating that notifications were published on 15.03.2024 in two newspapers viz., Praja Shakti and Andhra Jyothi. Despite this, only 52 applications were received in response to the advertisement, which was deemed insufficient for filling two aided SGT posts. The 4th respondent advised the petitioner to widely publicize the vacancies again to attract larger number of applicants, in the public interest. However, neither report nor updated information was submitted by the petitioner. Due to the petitioner's non-cooperation, and following instructions from the 2nd respondent vide NV,J Memo dated 25.09.2024, applications were invited from eligible candidates through an online portal, accompanied by wide press publicity to encourage large number of applications for recruitment in private aided institutions. The application portal opened on 07.12.2024 and closed on 15.12.2024. It is submitted that the 4th respondent appointed the Deputy Educational Officer as the nominee responsible for filling the two aided SGT posts at the petitioner's school, as authorized by the Government and the Commissioner of School Education. It is submitted that the recruitment process for the aided teacher posts at the petitioner's school is to be carried and will be completed in accordance with established norms. As such, they did not violate the orders of this Court and tendered unconditional apology to this Hon'ble Court for any inconvenience caused by them and requested to close contempt case against them.



8. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner and learned counsel appearing for the respondents/contemnors.



9. The major contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that the respondent authorities are not permitting the petitioner to fill up the Aided Vacancies in terms of G.O.Ms.No.1 Education dated 01.01.1994. But, it is evident from the counter affidavits that the 4th respondent has accorded necessary permission on 13.03.2024 to the petitioner to fill up the vacant NV,J aided teaching post by recruitment by duly following the procedure laid down in G.O.Ms.No.1 date 01.01.1994. Correspondence has taken place between the petitioner and the 4th respondent for issuance of necessary orders to proceed further. However, it is observed that, due to non-submission of required documentary evidence of press notification, etc, approvals were not issued, during the Model Code of Conduct. Even when the petitioner submitted that requisite number of applications were not received for filling up 2 aided SGT Posts, the 4th respondent has once again given another opportunity to the petitioner to call for applications and gave wide publicity, in the interest of public and to submit report within 7 days. But, there was no response from the petitioner. Since there was no response from the petitioner, the 4th respondent has invited applications from the eligible candidates to apply through online, by following the instructions in Memo dated 25.09.2024 of the 2nd respondent. Further, a Deputy Educational Officer, was already nominated for filling up the two aided SGT posts in the petitioner institution. Thus, from the above, it appears that the petitioner is not cooperating with the respondents and in-turn making them responsible them for non-complying the orders of this Court. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the respondents have taken utmost care in filling up the two SGT posts in compliance of the orders of this Court.


NV,J


10. Therefore, in view of the entire facts and circumstances of the case, this Court is of the considered opinion that the respondents did not commit any willful and deliberate violation of the order passed by this Court. Accordingly, the contempt case is closed.



13. Consequently, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, in this contempt case shall stand closed.



_____________________________________ JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA Date:24.10.2025 SP NV,J THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE VENKATESWARLU NIMMAGADDA CONTEMPT CASE NO.6800 OF 2023 Date: 24.10.2025 SP

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 163-A, 166, 168 & 169 – A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Rule 476 – Claims Tribunal – Evidence and Basis of Award – Standard of Proof Rule 476(7) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Documentary Basis for Award – Nature of Proof Required – Certified copies of FIR, post-mortem certificate, inquest, and MVI report are sufficient basis for the Claims Tribunal to determine the occurrence of accident, involvement of the vehicle, and death of the victim. – Rule 476(7) provides a statutory foundation for considering such records as prima facie evidence, dispensing with the strict rules of the Evidence Act. – [Ref. Bimla Devi v. HRTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530; Anitha Sarma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171.] Proceedings before MACT – Summary in Nature – Standard of Proof – Proof beyond reasonable doubt not required; the Tribunal must proceed on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities. – Motor accident claims are social welfare proceedings and cannot be rejected on mere technicalities or procedural lapses. – (Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509.) Section 163-A – No-fault Liability – Examination of Negligence and Involvement of Vehicle Section 163-A – Necessity to Prove Negligence – Scope of Tribunal’s Power – In a claim under Section 163-A, claimant need not plead or prove negligence, but the Tribunal is not precluded from examining whether the accident was caused due to the involvement of the vehicle or whether any defence such as false implication or non-involvement is made out. – The burden on the claimant is limited to establishing involvement of the vehicle, not the fault of its driver. Multi-vehicle Accidents under Section 163-A – Apportionment of Liability – When two vehicles are involved, and evidence indicates participation of both in the occurrence, apportionment of liability is permissible even in a Section 163-A claim. – The Tribunal is empowered to fix proportionate responsibility between owners and insurers of both vehicles based on the circumstances of the case. – [Applied A.P.S.R.T.C. v. K. Hemlatha, (2008) 6 SCC 767; T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748.] Negligence – Composite and Contributory Negligence – Determination Composite Negligence – Joint and Several Liability – When two or more vehicles jointly cause an accident resulting in injury or death to a third party, the tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and the claimant can recover entire compensation from any of them. Contributory Negligence – Evaluation – Negligence must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable driver under the circumstances. – Mere failure to avoid an accident does not constitute contributory negligence. – (Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, (2002) 6 SCC 455; Swadling v. Cooper, 1931 AC 1.) Liability of Insurers – Pay and Recovery – Absence of Driving Licence Driving Licence – Pay and Recovery – Absence of a valid driving licence with the rider/driver at the time of the accident constitutes a violation of policy conditions, entitling the insurer, upon payment to the claimants, to recover the amount from the offending owner or driver. – The insurer cannot be completely exonerated where statutory liability exists, but may be granted liberty of recovery. – [Ref. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297.] Pay and Recovery – When Not Automatic – Pay and recovery is not a mechanical consequence of every licence violation; the Tribunal must find a causal link between breach and accident. – In the absence of such link, the insurer cannot be absolved of liability merely because the driver held no valid licence. Compensation – Quantum – Multiplier – Principles of Computation Assessment of Income and Multiplier – When there is no documentary evidence of income, notional income under Second Schedule (Rs.15,000 per annum) may be adopted, subject to judicial updating for inflation. – Multiplier method as per Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, applied; for age 40, multiplier of 15 held appropriate. Heads of Compensation – Conventional Sums – Future Prospects – Compensation must include fixed heads: Loss of dependency Loss of consortium Loss of estate Funeral expenses – Enhancement of compensation permissible in light of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, though quantum in this case upheld for want of proof of higher income. Pillion Rider – Status as Third Party – Entitlement to Compensation Pillion Rider – Third Party Status – A pillion rider is treated as a third party vis-à-vis the insurer of the motorcycle, and his legal heirs are entitled to claim compensation against the insurer and owner. – Rejection of claim on the ground that pillion rider is not a third party is contrary to settled law. – [Ref. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003) 2 SCC 223; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 404.] Result and Holdings Held – (i) In a claim under Section 163-A, while negligence need not be proved, the Tribunal may examine the participation of vehicles and fix apportionment where both are involved. – (ii) FIR, inquest, post-mortem and MVI reports are sufficient to establish involvement of the vehicle. – (iii) Both the lorry and motorcycle contributed to the accident; apportionment of liability at 50% each between the insurers (Oriental and Bajaj Allianz) is upheld. – (iv) Pay-and-recovery direction in respect of Bajaj Allianz against the unlicensed rider sustained. – (v) Quantum of compensation at Rs.1,59,500/- upheld as per notional income scale and multiplier method. – (vi) Appeals dismissed; award of the Tribunal confirmed.

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Sections 163-A, 166, 168 & 169 – A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Rule 476 – Claims Tribunal – Evidence and Basis of Award – Standard of Proof

  1. Rule 476(7) of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 – Documentary Basis for Award – Nature of Proof Required
    – Certified copies of FIR, post-mortem certificate, inquest, and MVI report are sufficient basis for the Claims Tribunal to determine the occurrence of accident, involvement of the vehicle, and death of the victim.
    – Rule 476(7) provides a statutory foundation for considering such records as prima facie evidence, dispensing with the strict rules of the Evidence Act.
    – [Ref. Bimla Devi v. HRTC, (2009) 13 SCC 530; Anitha Sarma v. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., (2021) 1 SCC 171.]

  2. Proceedings before MACT – Summary in Nature – Standard of Proof
    – Proof beyond reasonable doubt not required; the Tribunal must proceed on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities.
    – Motor accident claims are social welfare proceedings and cannot be rejected on mere technicalities or procedural lapses.
    – (Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz, (2013) 10 SCC 646; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta, (2011) 10 SCC 509.)

Section 163-A – No-fault Liability – Examination of Negligence and Involvement of Vehicle

  1. Section 163-A – Necessity to Prove Negligence – Scope of Tribunal’s Power
    – In a claim under Section 163-A, claimant need not plead or prove negligence, but the Tribunal is not precluded from examining whether the accident was caused due to the involvement of the vehicle or whether any defence such as false implication or non-involvement is made out.
    – The burden on the claimant is limited to establishing involvement of the vehicle, not the fault of its driver.

  2. Multi-vehicle Accidents under Section 163-A – Apportionment of Liability
    – When two vehicles are involved, and evidence indicates participation of both in the occurrence, apportionment of liability is permissible even in a Section 163-A claim.
    – The Tribunal is empowered to fix proportionate responsibility between owners and insurers of both vehicles based on the circumstances of the case.
    – [Applied A.P.S.R.T.C. v. K. Hemlatha, (2008) 6 SCC 767; T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748.]

Negligence – Composite and Contributory Negligence – Determination

  1. Composite Negligence – Joint and Several Liability
    – When two or more vehicles jointly cause an accident resulting in injury or death to a third party, the tortfeasors are jointly and severally liable, and the claimant can recover entire compensation from any of them.

  2. Contributory Negligence – Evaluation
    – Negligence must be evaluated from the perspective of a reasonable driver under the circumstances.
    – Mere failure to avoid an accident does not constitute contributory negligence.
    – (Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, (2002) 6 SCC 455; Swadling v. Cooper, 1931 AC 1.)

Liability of Insurers – Pay and Recovery – Absence of Driving Licence

  1. Driving Licence – Pay and Recovery
    – Absence of a valid driving licence with the rider/driver at the time of the accident constitutes a violation of policy conditions, entitling the insurer, upon payment to the claimants, to recover the amount from the offending owner or driver.
    – The insurer cannot be completely exonerated where statutory liability exists, but may be granted liberty of recovery.
    – [Ref. National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Swaran Singh, (2004) 3 SCC 297.]

  2. Pay and Recovery – When Not Automatic
    – Pay and recovery is not a mechanical consequence of every licence violation; the Tribunal must find a causal link between breach and accident.
    – In the absence of such link, the insurer cannot be absolved of liability merely because the driver held no valid licence.

Compensation – Quantum – Multiplier – Principles of Computation

  1. Assessment of Income and Multiplier
    – When there is no documentary evidence of income, notional income under Second Schedule (Rs.15,000 per annum) may be adopted, subject to judicial updating for inflation.
    – Multiplier method as per Sarla Verma v. DTC, (2009) 6 SCC 121, applied; for age 40, multiplier of 15 held appropriate.

  2. Heads of Compensation – Conventional Sums – Future Prospects
    – Compensation must include fixed heads:

    • Loss of dependency

    • Loss of consortium

    • Loss of estate

    • Funeral expenses
      – Enhancement of compensation permissible in light of National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, though quantum in this case upheld for want of proof of higher income.

Pillion Rider – Status as Third Party – Entitlement to Compensation

  1. Pillion Rider – Third Party Status
    – A pillion rider is treated as a third party vis-à-vis the insurer of the motorcycle, and his legal heirs are entitled to claim compensation against the insurer and owner.
    – Rejection of claim on the ground that pillion rider is not a third party is contrary to settled law.
    – [Ref. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Asha Rani, (2003) 2 SCC 223; United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Tilak Singh, (2006) 4 SCC 404.]

Result and Holdings

  1. Held
    – (i) In a claim under Section 163-A, while negligence need not be proved, the Tribunal may examine the participation of vehicles and fix apportionment where both are involved.
    – (ii) FIR, inquest, post-mortem and MVI reports are sufficient to establish involvement of the vehicle.
    – (iii) Both the lorry and motorcycle contributed to the accident; apportionment of liability at 50% each between the insurers (Oriental and Bajaj Allianz) is upheld.
    – (iv) Pay-and-recovery direction in respect of Bajaj Allianz against the unlicensed rider sustained.
    – (v) Quantum of compensation at Rs.1,59,500/- upheld as per notional income scale and multiplier method.
    – (vi) Appeals dismissed; award of the Tribunal confirmed.


Mrs.Veerla Akkamma 4 Ors vs D.Satyanarayana 3 Ors on 24 October, 2025
                                  1

APHC010656862012
                   IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH
                                 AT AMARAVATI               [3520]
                          (Special Original Jurisdiction)

             FRIDAY,THE TWENTY FOURTH DAY OF OCTOBER
                   TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

                              PRESENT

    THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

    MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 73/2012

Between:

  1. MRS.VEERLA AKKAMMA & 4 ORS,               W/O.LATE VEERLA
     VENKATESWARLU, HINDU R/O.YADAVA          BAZAR, MACHERLA,
     GUNTUR DISTRICT.

  2. VEERLA RAMA KRISHNA, S/O.LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU,
     HINDU R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

  3. VEERLA VIJAYA LAXMI, D/O.LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU,
     HINDU [P3 BEING MINOR REP BY HER MOTHER NATURAL
     GUARDIAN I.E. P! R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR
     DISTRICT.

  4. MR.VEERLA CHINA MUTTAIAH, S/O.CHINA JANAIAH SHEET
     BUSINESS R/O.YADAVA BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

  5. MR.VEERLA CHOWDAMMA, S/O.CHINA MUTTAIAH R/O.YADAVA
     BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

                                                   ...APPELLANT(S)

                                AND

  1. D SATYANARAYANA 3 ORS, S/O.POORNA CHANDRA RAO OWNER
     OF LORRY NO.AP 16 U 9735 R/O.II FLOOR, GAYATRI COMPLEX,
     NEAR BENZ CIRCLE, VIJAYAWADA.
                                     2

  2. M/S ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO LTD, REP BY ITS DIVISIONAL
     MANAGER O/O.DIVISIONAL OFFICE: OPP.KRISHNA PICTURE
     PALACE, GUNTUR.

  3. MELKAVAAGU KRISHNA YADAV, S/O.PEDANASARAIAH R/O.21ST
     WARD, OLD TOWN, MACHERLA-522 426.

  4. M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE CO LTD, REP BY ITS
     MANAGER O/O.3-B, BALAJI'S MANGALAGIRI CHAMBERS, VIP ROAD,
     CBM COMPOUND, VISAKHAPATNAM - 530 003.

                                                    ...RESPONDENT(S):

     Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased to

Counsel for the Appellant(S):

  1. CH RAVINDRA BABU

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

  1. GUDI SRINIVASU

  2.

  MOTOR ACCIDENT CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL NO: 1221/2014

Between:

  1. M/S BAJAJ ALLIANZ GENERAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED,,
     REP.BY ITS MANAGER, 3-B, BALAJI'S MANGALAGIRI CHAMBERS,
     VIP ROAD, CBM COMPOUND,

                                                          ...APPELLANT

                                  AND

  1. SMT VEERLA AKKAMMA, W/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU
     R/O YADAV BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

  2. VEERLA RAMAKRISHNA, S/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU R/O
     YADAV BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.
                                          3

   3. VEERLA VIJAYA LAXMI, D/O LATE VEERLA VENKATESWARLU
      MINOR, REP.BY RES.NO.1 [MOTHER] R/O YADAV BAZAR,
      MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

   4. VEERLA CHINA MUTTAIAH, S/O CHINA JANAIAH R/O YADAV BAZAR,
      MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

   5. SMT VEERLA CHOWDAMMA, W/O CHINA MUTTAIAH R/O YADAV
      BAZAR, MACHERLA, GUNTUR DISTRICT.

   6. D SATYANARAYANA, S/O POORNA CHANDEER RAO 2ND FLOOR,
      GAYATHRI COMPLEX, NEAR BENZ CIRCLE,

   7. M/S ORIENTAL INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED, REP.BY ITS
      DIVISIONAL MANAGER, OPP: KIRSHNA PICTURE PALACE,
      GUNTUR.

   8. SRI M KRISHNA YADAV, S/O PEDA NARASAIAH R/O 21ST WARD,
      OLDTOWN, MACHERLA.

                                                           ...RESPONDENT(S):

     Appeal filed under Order 41 of CPC praying thet the Highcourt may be
pleased to

IA NO: 1 OF 2009(MACMAMP 2014 OF 2009

      Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased
condone the delay of 36 days in preferring the appeal against the orders in
OP.NO.465 of 2006

IA NO: 2 OF 2009(MACMAMP 2085 OF 2009

      Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
grant stay of all further proceedings including the execution proceedings if any
in OP.No. 465/2006 on the file of the MACT cum X Addl. District and Sessions
Jduge (FTC) Guntur Narasaraopet, order dated 19.08.2008 pending disposal of
the above MACMA.
                                         4

IA NO: 1 OF 2010(MACMAMP 540 OF 2010

      Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased to
vacate the interim order of stay dated 17.04.2009 made in MACMAMP.No.
2085/2009 in MACMA(SR).No. 11684/2009

IA NO: 1 OF 2011(MACMAMP 49626 OF 2011

      Petition under Section 151 CPC praying that in the circumstances stated
in the affidavit filed in support of the petition, the High Court may be pleased

Counsel for the Appellant:

   1. P RAJASEKHAR

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

   1. GUDI SRINIVASU

   2. CH RAVINDRA BABU

The Court made the following:
                                         5

     THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

                M.A.C.M.A.Nos.73 of 2012 and 1221 of 2014
COMMON JUDGMENT:
Introductory:

1. Claimants in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 on the file of Motor Vehicles Accidents Claims Tribunal-cum-X Additional District & Sessions Judge (FTC), Guntur at Narasaraopet (for short "the learned MACT") filed M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012 and Respondent No.4 / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited before the learned MACT filed M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014.
2. Claiming compensation for the death of one Veerla Venkateswarlu (hereinafter referred to as "the deceased") in a road traffic accident, his legal representatives and dependents filed the claim petition M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 with a prayer for awarding compensation.
3. The deceased was a pillion rider on a motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC-0198. A lorry bearing No.AP 16 U 9735 (hereinafter referred to as "the offending vehicle"), driven by its driver in a rash and negligent manner came from behind, dashed the motorcycle and ran over them, causing multiple injuries and instantaneous death.
4. For the sake of convenience, the parties will be referred to as the claimants and the respondents as and how they are arrayed before the learned MACT.
5. Respondent No.1 is the owner of the offending vehicle. Respondent No.2 is the Insurance Company with which the offending vehicle was insured.
Respondent No.3 is the owner and rider of the motorcycle on which the deceased was travelling and the same was insured with Respondent No.4.

6. The learned MACT, under the impugned judgment, awarded compensation of Rs.1,59,500/-, apportioning the liability at 50% each between Respondent Nos.2 and 4, granting liberty to Respondent No.4 to recover the compensation amount paid by it from Respondent No.3.

7. Respondent Nos.1 and 3 remained ex parte before the learned MACT.

8. The claimants are questioning the just and reasonable nature of compensation awarded. Respondent No.4 is questioning the liability imposed. There is no appeal by respondent No.2. However, the respondent No.2 is supporting the judgment of the learned MACT as to apportionment of the liability at 50% among respondent Nos.2 and 4, while opposing enhancement of compensation.

9. Heard the learned counsel for claimants/appellants in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012, the learned counsel for appellant in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014, and also the learned counsels for respondent Nos.2 and 4 before the learned MACT. Perused the record available. Thoughtful consideration is given to the arguments advanced by both sides.

Case of the claimants:

10. Claimant No.1 is the wife, claimant Nos.2 and 3 are children and claimant Nos.4 and 5 are parents of the deceased. The deceased was aged about „40‟, doing sheep business, earning Rs.8,000/- per month and contributing the same for the family. On the fateful day viz. 01.12.2004 at about 06:30 am, the deceased, along with respondent No.3 was proceeding to Dhulipalla via Piduguralla and whey they reached Buggavagu near Piduguralla on their motorcycle, the offending vehicle came in a rash and negligent manner from behind, dashed the motorcycle and ran over the deceased causing instantaneous death.

11. A case in Crime No.255 of 2004 for the offences under section 304-A IPC was registered against the driver of the offending vehicle and he was subsequently charge sheeted. The negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle/lorry viz. the respondent No.1 is the cause for the accident. Petitioners lost all valuable support, both financial and emotional. Hence, entitled for just and reasonable compensation.

Plea of Respondent No.2:

12. The petitioners shall prove the accident, negligence of the driver of the offending vehicle/lorry, age, occupation, income and dependency of the claimants, apart from proving the valid and effective driving license, coverage of risk under the Insurance Policy and in any event, the quantum of compensation claimed is excessive.

Plea of Respondent No.4:

13. The claimants shall prove coverage of policy. There is no driving license for respondent No.3. There is negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry / the offending vehicle alone. There was no negligence on the part of the rider of the motorcycle. Further, the deceased being a pillion rider he is not a third party. Hence, respondent No.4 is not liable to pay compensation. The claimants shall prove age, occupation and income of the deceased and their dependency as well as entitlement for compensation.

14. On the strength of pleadings, the learned MACT settled the following issues for trial:

1) Whether the accident occurred due to rash and negligent driving of the driver of Ashok Leyland Lorry bearing No.AP16U-9735?
2) To what compensation the petitioners are entitled and from whom?
3) To what relief?
15. Evidence before the learned MACT:

                                Description                     Remarks
Oral evidence       P.W.1: Veerla Akkamma                  Claimant     No.1/
                                                           wife     of     the
                                                           deceased
                    P.W.2: Mellavagu Krishna               Eye witness to the
                                                           accident.
                    R.W.1: G. Chandra Sekhar               Junior Executive-
                                                           Legal
                    R.W.2: J. Vijaya Durga                 Junior Assistant-
                                                           RTO‟s       office,
                                                           Narasaraopet.


Documentary        Ex.A1: Attested copy of FIR.
evidence           Ex.A2: Attested copy of post-mortem
                   report.
                   Ex.A3: Attested copy of inquest report.    On behalf of the
                   Ex.A4: Attested copy of MVI report.        petitioner(s).
                   Ex.A5: Attested copy of scene
                   observation report.
                   Ex.A6: Charge Sheet
                   Ex.B1: Authorization letter (Xerox).
                   Ex.B2: Attested copy of Policy.            On behalf of the
                   Ex.B3: Letter issued by Bajaj Allianz      Respondents.
                   General Insurance Company.

                   Ex.B4: Notice issued by Bajaj Allianz
                   General Insurance Company.
                   Ex.B5: Extract copy of DL of
                   respondent No.3.
                   Ex.B6: Issued RTA certificate by RTA
                   by R.W.2.

Findings of the learned MACT:

On the point of Negligence:

16. Since the claim is made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, the claimants need not plead negligence on the part of the offending vehicle. It is sufficient if they establish the involvement of the vehicle at the time of the accident. Attested copies of Ex.A1-FIR, Ex.A2-Post-mortem Report, Ex.A3- Inquest Report and Ex.A4-MVI report are sufficient to believe the involvement of the vehicle and death of the deceased due to the accident.

17. Evidence of P.W.2 shows that the respondent No.1 is the owner of the lorry/ offending vehicle, Respondent No.2 is the insurer. P.W.2 is the owner of the motorcycle and respondent No.4 is the insurer of the same. P.W.2 was driving the motorcycle at the relevant time. Therefore, both drivers are responsible for the accident. Ex.A1 to A6 supports the evidence of P.W.2. On quantum of compensation:

18. The deceased was aged about 40 years as per the charge sheet and inquest report. Multiplier applicable is „15‟. Notional income at Rs.15,000/- per annum can be adopted. If 1/3rd is deducted towards personal expenditure of the deceased. Rs.10,000/- can be taken as loss of dependency. Upon application of the multiplier „15‟, the entitlement comes to Rs.1,50,000/-. Towards funeral expenses Rs.2,000/-, towards loss of estate Rs.2,500/-, Rs.5,000/- as loss of consortium to claimant No.1 / wife of the deceased can be awarded. Therefore, in all, the claimants are entitled to Rs.1,59,500/-, as per the learned MACT.

On liability:

19. R.W.1 deposed that there is negligence of respondent No.1. There is no driving license to respondent No.3 by the date of accident. The license was issued on 21.02.2005, whereas the date of accident is 01.12.2004. Therefore, there is a violation. Further, the driving license is non-transport category of motorcycle with gear. For the mistake of respondent No.3 for the legitimate claim cannot be defeated. However, respondent No.4, on payment, is entitled to recover from respondent No.3. Both Respondent Nos.2 and 4 are liable to pay the compensation awarded at the rate of 50% each. Arguments in the appeals:

For the claimants / appellants in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012:
20(i). The compensation awarded is not in tune with the settled law and practices.
(ii). The income of the deceased adopted at Rs.15,000/- per annum is baseless and very low.
(iii). The quantification of compensation done under various heads is not matching with the uniformity of practice and scales to be adopted as advised by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
(iv). The imposition of liability, pay and recovery etc. ordered are not in tune with the law. However, the claimants are entitled for more compensation payable by appropriate respondents as may be decided by the Court.
For Respondent No.4-Insurance Company/appellant in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014 :

21(i). When it is found that there was negligence on the part of the driver of the lorry / the offending vehicle, proceedings against the owner and Insurance Company of the motorcycle are not necessary. When the learned MACT found that there was no driving license, ordering pay and recovery is not correct. Instead, respondent No.4 Insurance Company should have been totally exonerated from the liability.
(ii). The entitlement of the pillion rider for compensation and his status as a third party though pleaded, said point is not properly addressed by the learned MACT and the liability imposed on the respondent Nos.3 and 4 is an error in the facts and circumstances of the case and in the light of the evidence.
For Respondent No.2-Insurance Company of the offending vehicle:

22. When a claim is made under Section 163-A and when two vehicles are involved, apportionment of liability among the two vehicles involved is proper.
In view of the absence of evidence as to income of the deceased, adoption of notional income by the learned MACT cannot be found fault with. There are no grounds to interfere and both the appeals are liable to be dismissed. Points for consideration:

23. In the light of the factual matrix and arguments canvassed by all parties, the points that arise for determination in these appeals are:
1) Whether negligence of the riders / drivers of the offending vehicle can be considered in a claim filed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, if so, when and to what extent? and what was the contribution of negligence by the rider of the motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC 0198 and the driver of the offending vehicle bearing No.AP 16 U 9735?
2) Whether the apportionment of negligence and liability among the owners and Insurance Companies of the motorcycle bearing No.AP 07 TR AC 0198 and the lorry / offending vehicle bearing No.AP 16 U 9735 done by the learned MACT is proper?
3) Whether pay and recovery ordered against respondent No.4 in the impugned proceedings is proper and sustainable?
4) Whether the compensation awarded in a sum of Rs.1,59,500/- is just, reasonable and adequate or require any enhancement, if so, to what quantum and on what grounds?
5) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012?
6) What is the result of the appeal in M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014?
Point Nos.1 and 2:

24. Since both the points are interlinked, they are being answered together under the common discussion under one head.
Statutory and Precedential Guidance:

Statutory Guidance:
25(i). It is relevant to note that the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 are applicable in deciding the cases by Motor Accidents Claims Tribunals and they are made in exercise of powers conferred under Section 176 of the Motor Vehicles Act which reads as follows:
176. Power of State Government to make rules.--A State Government may make rules for the purpose of carrying into effect the provisions of sections 165 to 174, and in particular, such rules may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:--
(a) the form of application for claims for compensation and the particulars it may contain, and the fees, if any, to be paid in respect of such applications;
(b) the procedure to be followed by a Claims Tribunal in holding an inquiry under this Chapter;
(c) the powers vested in a Civil Court which may be exercised by a Claims Tribunal;
(d) the form and the manner in which and the fees (if any) on payment of which an appeal may be preferred against an award of a Claims Tribunal; and
(e) any other matter which is to be, or may be, prescribed.
(ii). Chapter „11‟ of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 commencing from Rule 455 to Rule 476A deals with the powers of the Tribunal and all other allied aspects like form of application, registration, notice to parties, appearance and examination of parties, local inspection, summary examination of parties, method of recording evidence, adjournments, framing and determination of issues, judgments and enforcements of awards, Court fee relating to claim petitions applicability of Civil Procedure Code and the application for claim basis to award the claim by the claims tribunal. Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989 reads as follows:
Rule 476: Application for claim :-
(7) Basis to award the claim :- The Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of;-
(i) Registration Certificate of the Motor Vehicle involved in the accident;
(ii) Insurance Certificate or Policy relating to the insurance of the Motor Vehicle against the Third party risk;
(iii) Copy of First Information Report;
(iv) Post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the Medical Officer; and
(v) The nature of the treatment given by the Medical Officer who has examined the victim.
(7A) Specification of amount of compensation awarded by the Tribunal to each victim:- Where compensation is awarded to two or more persons, the Claims Tribunal shall also specify the amount payable to each of them.
26. As per Rule 476 of the A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules, 1989, the crime record can be the basis. The official acts done are presumed to be proper until a contrary is proved particularly when some statutory recognition is given to such official records.


27. It is relevant to note that in view of the summary nature and mode of enquiry contemplated under Motor Vehicles Act and social welfare nature of legislation the Tribunal shall have holistic view with reference to facts and circumstances of each case. It is sufficient if there is probability. The principle of standard of proof, beyond reasonable doubt cannot be applied while considering a claim seeking compensation for the death or the injury on account of road accident. The touch stone of the case, the claimants shall have to establish is preponderance of probability only. The legal position to this extent is settled and consistent.

Precedential Guidance:

28(i). The Hon‟ble Apex Court in Bimla Devi and others Vs. Himachal Road Transport Corporation1, in para 15 observed as follows:
"15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied. For the said purpose, the High Court should have taken into consideration the respective stories set forth by both the parties.."
(ii). In a case between Bhagwan Ram and Ors. Vs. Deen Dayal and Ors.2, while considering the nature of proof is required for believing the negligent driving in Motor Accident Claims, the Hon‟ble High Court of Rajasthan found that Certificate and the copies of documents prepared by the Police on the spot, including the Challan, First Information Report etc. are admissible, even in the absence of statement of eye witnesses and the same can be the basis to believe the negligent driving of the driver of the offending vehicle, vide para-11 which reads as follows:

"11. The fact that any of the eye witness or the police personnel and authorities, who had prepared the documents - certified copies of challan Exhibit-1, First Information Report as Exhibit-2, Naksha Mauka as Exhibit-4, Halat Mauka as Exhibit-5, Postmortem Report as Exhibit-10 were not examined is of no consequence. The said documents being certified copies 2009 (13) SCC 530 2013 (0) sc (Raj) 812 of public documents even in absence of such statements are admissible in evidence as held by this Court in the case of Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation and Anr. v. Devilal & Ors., reported at 1991 ACJ 230 and Shrwan Kumar v. Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation & Ors., reported at 1995 ACJ 337. It was held by this Court in the case of Shrwan Kumar as under:-
"18. Public documents like the first information report and the report of the mechanical inspection of the bus can be taken into consideration and this point is no longer res integra so far as this court is concerned. In Rajasthan State Road Transport Corporation v. Devilal, 1991 ACJ 230 (Rajasthan) , it was observed that strictly speaking, provisions of Evidence Act are not applicable before the Tribunal; if a document is a certified copy of a public document it need not be proved by calling a witness or the person who prepared it."
(iii). In Anitha Sarma and Others Vs. New Indian Assurance Company Ltd.3, the Honble Apex Court observed that in Motor Accident Claims, standard of proof required is the preponderance of possibilities but not beyond reasonable doubt; approach and role of the Courts, while examining the evidence in accident cases, ought not to be to find fault with non-examination of the best eye witnesses, as may happen in criminal Trial, but instead should be only to analyse the material placed on record by the parties to ascertain whether the claimant‟s version is more likely than not true. The observations in para-17 are as follows:-

"17. Unfortunately, the approach of the High Court was not sensitive enough to appreciate the turn of events at the spot, or the appellant- 2021(1) SCC 171 claimants' hardship in tracing witnesses and collecting information for an accident which took place many hundreds of kilometers away in an altogether different State. Close to the facts of the case in hand, this Court in Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand [Parmeshwari v. Amir Chand, (2011) 11 SCC 635 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 828 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 605] , viewed that :
(SCC p. 638, para 12) "12. The other ground on which the High Court dismissed [Amir Chand v.
Parmeshwari, 2009 SCC OnLine P&H 9302] the case was by way of disbelieving the testimony of Umed Singh, PW 1. Such disbelief of the High Court is totally conjectural. Umed Singh is not related to the appellant but as a good citizen, Umed Singh extended his help to the appellant by helping her to reach the doctor's chamber in order to ensure that an injured woman gets medical treatment. The evidence of Umed Singh cannot be disbelieved just because he did not file a complaint himself. We are constrained to repeat our observation that the total approach of the High Court, unfortunately, was not sensitized enough to appreciate the plight of the victim.

...

„15. In a situation of this nature, the Tribunal has rightly taken a holistic view of the matter. It was necessary to be borne in mind that strict proof of an accident caused by a particular bus in a particular manner may not be possible to be done by the claimants. The claimants were merely to establish their case on the touchstone of preponderance of probability. The standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt could not have been applied.'"

(iv). In a case between New India Assurance Company Ltd., Vs. Kethavarapu Sathyavathi and Ors.4, the Hon‟ble Division Bench of High Court of Andhra Pradesh has referred to Section 168, 169 of M.V. Act and Rule 476(7) of A.P. Motor Vehicles Rules and also catena of decisions. The point 2009 Supreme (AP) 136=2010(2) ALD 403=2009(3) ALT 260 for consideration before the Hon‟ble Division Bench was that in holding an inquiry in terms of Motor Vehicles Act, what is the procedure to be followed and whether the F.I.R. can be basis for considering the claim. Observations in para 5 to 7 are as follows:
"5. Point:
Under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (for short "the Act"), the Claims Tribunal shall give the parties an opportunity of being heard, hold an inquiry into the claim and make an award determining just compensation, etc. In holding any such inquiry, Section 169 of the Act mandates the Tribunal to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit subject to rules. The Tribunal was conferred with the powers of a civil Court for the specified purposes and under Rule 476 of the Rules, the Claims Tribunal was directed to follow the procedure of summary trial as contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. The Tribunal was cautioned not to reject any application on the ground of any technical flaw and was also obligated to obtain whatever information necessary from the police, medical and other authorities. It is true that sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules states that the Claims Tribunal shall proceed to award the claim on the basis of registration certificate of the motor vehicle, insurance certificate or Policy, copy of first information report, post-mortem certificate or certificate of inquiry from the medical officer and the nature of treatment given by the medical Officer.
6. The said sub-rule obviously refers to the relevant dependable criteria for assessment of the compensation, which is patently illustrative and can never be considered to be exhaustive. This Sub-rule stating the basis to award the claim, is obviously subject to the prohibition against depending on any technical flaw and the procedure for summary trial to be followed by the Tribunal. The said sub-rule cannot travel beyond the statutory obligation imposed on the Tribunal to determine the just compensation after an inquiry, in which an opportunity of being heard is given to the parties. The judicial determination of the questions in controversy before the Tribunal in terms of Sections 168 and 169 of the Act cannot be confined to consideration of the five documents referred to in sub-rule (7) of Rule 476 of the Rules alone and exclude any other oral or documentary evidence. The procedure of summary trial under the Code of Criminal Procedure which the Tribunal shall follow under Rule 476 of the Rules itself mandates taking all such evidence as may be produced by both sides in support of their respective versions, apart from the evidence which the Court, of its own motion, causes to be produced as per Section 262 read with Sections 254 and 255 of the said Code. Sub-rule (7) to be understood in the light of the object and scheme of the Act, is a directory provision referring to some of the documents which can offer guidance to the Tribunal in discharge of its statutory duty and the word "shall" used in the said: subrule has to be necessarily understood as "may".
7. That apart, to say that the, first information report alone should be the conclusive basis for determining the manner of the accident, even in spite of the availability of other dependable evidence on record on that aspect, will be offending the plain language of the statute and if that were the purport of sub-rule (7), it cannot be considered valid, as any such delegated legislation cannot travel beyond the legislation itself."

(v). In Dulcina Fernandes v. Joaquim Xavier Cruz5, the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed in Para 7 to 9, as follows:-

" 7. It would hardly need a mention that the plea of negligence on the part of the first respondent who was driving the pick-up van as set up by the claimants was required to be decided by the learned Tribunal on the touchstone of preponderance of probabilities and certainly not on the basis of proof beyond reasonable doubt. (Bimla Devi v. Himachal RTC [(2009) 13 SCC 530] (2013) 10 SCC 646
8. In United India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Shila Datta [(2011) 10 SCC 509 :
(2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] while considering the nature of a claim petition under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 a three-Judge Bench of this Court has culled out certain propositions of which Propositions
(ii), (v) and (vi) would be relevant to the facts of the present case and, therefore, may be extracted hereinbelow : (SCC p. 518, para 10) "10. (ii) The rules of the pleadings do not strictly apply as the claimant is required to make an application in a form prescribed under the Act. In fact, there is no pleading where the proceedings are suo motu initiated by the Tribunal.
.....

(v) Though the Tribunal adjudicates on a claim and determines the compensation, it does not do so as in an adversarial litigation. ...

(vi) The Tribunal is required to follow such summary procedure as it thinks fit. It may choose one or more persons possessing special knowledge of and matters relevant to inquiry, to assist it in holding the enquiry."

9. The following further observation available in para 10 of the Report would require specific note : (Shila Datta case [(2011) 10 SCC 509 : (2012) 3 SCC (Civ) 798 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 328] , SCC p. 519) "10. ... We have referred to the aforesaid provisions to show that an award by the Tribunal cannot be seen as an adversarial adjudication between the litigating parties to a dispute, but a statutory determination of compensation on the occurrence of an accident, after due enquiry, in accordance with the statute."

(vi). Hon‟ble Supreme Court in a case between Pavan Kumar and Another vs. Harkishan Dass Mohan Lal and others6, after referring to T.O.Anthony (2014) 3 SCC 590 vs. Karvarnan and others7 and Andhra Pradesh State Road Transport Corporation and Another vs. K. Hemlatha and others8 addressed as to distinction between the principles of composite and contributory negligence vide para Nos.7, 8 and 9 as follows:

7. The distinction between the principles of composite and contributory negligence has been dealt with in Winfield & Jolowicz on Tort (Chapter 21) (15th Edn. 1998). It would be appropriate to notice the following passage from the said work:
"Where two or more people by their independent breaches of duty to the plaintiff cause him to suffer distinct injuries, no special rules are required, for each tortfeasor is liable for the damage which he caused and only for that damage. Where, however, two or more breaches of duty by different persons cause the plaintiff to suffer a single injury the position is more complicated. The law in such a case is that the plaintiff is entitled to sue all or any of them for the full amount of his loss, and each is said to be jointly and severally liable for it. This means that special rules are necessary to deal with the possibilities of successive actions in respect of that loss and of claims for contribution or indemnity by one tortfeasor against the others. It is greatly to the plaintiff's advantage to show that he has suffered the same, indivisible harm at the hands of a number of defendants for he thereby avoids the risk, inherent in cases where there are different injuries, of finding that one defendant is insolvent (or uninsured) and being unable to execute judgment against him. The same picture is not, of course, so attractive from the point of view of the solvent defendant, who may end up carrying full responsibility for a loss in the causing of which he played only a partial, even secondary role.
*** (2008) 3 SCC 748 (2008) 6 SCC 767 The question of whether there is one injury can be a difficult one.
The simplest case is that of two virtually simultaneous acts of negligence, as where two drivers behave negligently and collide, injuring a passenger in one of the cars or a pedestrian, but there is no requirement that the acts be simultaneous...."

8. Where the plaintiff/claimant himself is found to be a party to the negligence the question of joint and several liability cannot arise and the plaintiff's claim to the extent of his own negligence, as may be quantified, will have to be severed. In such a situation the plaintiff can only be held entitled to such part of damages/compensation that is not attributable to his own negligence. The above principle has been explained in T.O. Anthony [T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] followed in K. Hemlatha [A.P. SRTC v. K. Hemlatha, (2008) 6 SCC 767 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 34].

9. Paras 6 and 7 of T.O. Anthony [T.O. Anthony v. Karvarnan, (2008) 3 SCC 748 : (2008) 1 SCC (Civ) 832 : (2008) 2 SCC (Cri) 738] which are relevant may be extracted herein below : (SCC p. 751) "6. „Composite negligence‟ refers to the negligence on the part of two or more persons. Where a person is injured as a result of negligence on the part of two or more wrongdoers, it is said that the person was injured on account of the composite negligence of those wrongdoers. In such a case, each wrongdoer is jointly and severally liable to the injured for payment of the entire damages and the injured person has the choice of proceeding against all or any of them. In such a case, the injured need not establish the extent of responsibility of each wrongdoer separately, nor is it necessary for the court to determine the extent of liability of each wrongdoer separately. On the other hand where a person suffers injury, partly due to the negligence on the part of another person or persons, and partly as a result of his own negligence, then the negligence on the part of the injured which contributed to the accident is referred to as his contributory negligence. Where the injured is guilty of some negligence, his claim for damages is not defeated merely by reason of the negligence on his part but the damages recoverable by him in respect of the injuries stand reduced in proportion to his contributory negligence.

7. Therefore, when two vehicles are involved in an accident, and one of the drivers claims compensation from the other driver alleging negligence, and the other driver denies negligence or claims that the injured claimant himself was negligent, then it becomes necessary to consider whether the injured claimant was negligent and if so, whether he was solely or partly responsible for the accident and the extent of his responsibility, that is, his contributory negligence. Therefore where the injured is himself partly liable, the principle of „composite negligence‟ will not apply nor can there be an automatic inference that the negligence was 50 : 50 as has been assumed in this case. The Tribunal ought to have examined the extent of contributory negligence of the appellant and thereby avoided confusion between composite negligence and contributory negligence. The High Court has failed to correct the said error."

29. In the light of the above, I am of the view as to the parameters that the learned MACT can consider while assessing negligence are:

       1)      Whether there is denial by proper person.

       2)      There must be convincing evidence from disputing party.

       3)      There must be at least oath against oath and tested by cross-

       examination.

       4)      Examination of eye witnesses reflected in charge sheet filed by

Police is preferable. However, the same cannot be the thumb rule.

5) Examination of witnesses present at the scene of offence, at relevant time.

6) The driver of the offending vehicle, if takes witness stand and denies the negligence, it will have some importance, in cases of contributory negligence.

7) In cases of serious dispute as to planting of either witnesses or vehicles, summoning the investigating officers and eliciting the probabilities or improbabilities is necessary.

8) The rough sketch of scene of offence and Motor Vehicles Inspector Report indicating the damage to the vehicles etc. will be helpful to draw some inference.

9) However, no straight jacket and standard formula is possible and each matter has to be considered on its own merits and facts and circumstances including the relevant and reliable evidence placed before the tribunal.

10) Finally the Tribunal shall have holistic view of the matter.

30. While addressing the defence of contributory negligence, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in the case of Sushma Vs. Nitin Ganapati Rangole and others9, at Paragraph Nos.36 and 37 made reference to other judgments and extracted relevant observations which are as follows:


2024 (6) ALD (SC)=2024 SCC OnLine SC 2584
36. In the case of Pramodkumar Rasikbhai Jhaveri v. Karmasey Kunvargi Tak, {(2002) 6 SCC 455}, this Court while referring to a decision of the High Court of Australia in Astley v. Austrust Ltd., {(1999) 73 ALJR 403}, went on to hold that:
"... where, by his negligence, if one party places another in a situation of danger which compels that other to act quickly in order to extricate himself, it does not amount to contributory negligence, if that other acts in a way which, with the benefit of hindsight is shown not to have been the best way out of the difficulty."
37. In the very same judgment, this Court also referred to and approved the view taken in Swadling v. Cooper, {1931 AC 1}, as below:

"Mere failure to avoid the collision by taking some extra ordinary precaution, does not in itself constitute negligence."
Analysis:

31. P.W.2 is an eye witness to the accident. His evidence is that while he was riding a motorcycle on the left side of the road, suddenly the offending vehicle / lorry, driven by its driver, came from behind without blowing horn and dashed, whereby the accident occurred, as the lorry ran over the deceased, who died on the spot. On his complaint, crime under Ex.A1-FIR was registered for the offences under Section 304-A. Rash and negligent driving of the driver of the lorry / offending vehicle is the cause for the accident.
32. During cross examination, he also asserted that the negligence of the driver of the lorry / offending vehicle is the cause for the accident. Ex.A1-FIR is indicating the driver of the lorry as the accused. Ex.A6-charge sheet is indicating the driver of the lorry one S. Yadaiah as the accused.
33. To lay a claim under section 163-A, the involvement of the vehicle is sufficient, but when negligence is specifically disputed by the person concerned with the vehicle, whether there is at least prima facie indicating the negligence or involvement requires examination is a pertinent question.
34. Mere physical presence or involvement with some negligence is the mandate for fastening liability require consideration in some cases, although not in every case. When two vehicles are involved and there is no little finger raised against one of such vehicles as to contribution in occurrence of the accident, merely, on account of presence of vehicle at occurrence of accident, whether liability of such vehicle is automatic in a claim under Section 163-A is a serious and important question. When the record and evidence are clinching that, there was no role at all of a particular vehicle or the particular person concerned with such vehicle and that the substantial role from the inception stage to the end is with the one vehicle, making the spectator vehicle or the person concerned with it accountable cannot be appreciated or accepted.
35. Another importance facet require examination is that, if the claim is made by a victim who is not a tortfeasor, the negligence, if any, of the tortfeasors is joint and several, as the negligence would be composite but not contributory.
The aspect of contributory negligence and apportionment generally arises where the claim is made by or the dependents of one of the tortfeasors. But, in case of composite negligence, the third-party victim is entitled to proceed against both the tortfeasors and the liability of both tortfeasors is joint, several and equal and each one is liable for the full extent. Their right to seek contribution from a co-tortfeasor is a different aspect, depending on the contribution of negligence.

36. For examining whether there was any contribution of negligence for the purpose of apportionment, when there is disowning of total negligence by one of the tortfeasors and when there is attribution of negligence on the other tortfeasor, examination of the contribution of negligence by both tortfeasors becomes necessary. However, mere presence of the vehicle per se is not a ground to avoid examining absence of negligence and extent of negligence in every case, particularly in cases like the present one, merely because the claim is under Section 163-A. Since the persons concerned with the two vehicles involved are throwing blame on each other. Looking at the applying fault theory is necessary. For the said purpose, examination of evidence is also necessary.

37. From the angle of claimants, it may not be necessary to prove negligence but from the angle of the answering respondents, the examination of extent of negligence becomes necessary. No doubt, the burden to prove negligence cannot be cast on the claimants. The language of Section 163-A is clear that the claimant has no role or burden other than to show the involvement of the vehicle. The burden to prove absence of negligence or to disown the liability cast on the respondents. In such an event, the tribunal will be put to consider the evidence as to whose fault the accident occurred. Section 163-A is an enabling provision to exempt the claimant / victim to prove the negligence but it does not shut the doors of the respondents or the Court to examine the absence of negligence in deserving cases.

38. There may be cases of planting a vehicle and that the vehicle in question is not involved. There may be cases of complete self-negligence of the victim. A straightjacket formula cannot be drawn as to which are the cases examination of negligence is necessary but the facts and circumstances of each case matters. Rule is that, the claimant need not prove negligence, but that does not mean there is no scope for examination of the absence of negligence. Involvement of the vehicle, means involvement in the process of accident, but not mere spectator involvement. In the present case, when a lorry came from behind, as per the evidence covered by Ex.A1 and Ex.A6 also the evidence of P.W.2, an eye witness, what can be the role of rider of motorcycle i.e. Respondent No.3 and what can be the accountability of the motorcycle which had no role in occurrence of the accident, except being a victim of the accident. Therefore, making such a spectator / victim accountable is not a correct application of the provision. The objective of that provision patently gets defeated, if such exercise is allowed.

39. In view of the discussion made above, point Nos.1 and 2 are answered as follows:

a) The negligence of the riders/drivers of the offending vehicle can be considered even in a claim filed under 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, depending on the context and circumstances, as to whether there is involvement of the vehicle in the process of the accident, but not merely presence and where multiple vehicles are involved. The doors are not completely closed for examining the absence of negligence of one of the multiple vehicles involved in the accident.
b) In the present case, there is no evidence to believe the negligence of the rider of the motorcycle. Therefore, the findings of the learned MACT imposing liability on the owner and the Insurance Company of the motorcycle is not proper.
Point No.3:

40. The learned MACT found that there is no driving license. Then ordering pay and recovery does not arise. Neither statutory nor precedential guidance is relied on for such ordering by the learned MACT. Therefore such findings are not proper.

41. In view of the findings on point Nos.1 and 2 and for the reasons stated above, the imposition of liability on respondent No.4 and ordering pay and recovery under the impugned decree found not proper, hence unsustainable. Point No.3 is answered accordingly.

Point No.4:

Precedential guidance:-
a) Adoption of Multiplier, Multiplicand and Calculation:
42(i). Hon‟ble Apex Court to have uniformity of practice and consistency in awarding just compensation provided certain guidelines in Sarla Verma (Smt.) and Ors. Vs. Delhi Transport Corporation and Anr.10 vide paragraph Nos.18 and 19, while prescribing a table directed adoption of suitable multiplier mentioned in column No.4 of the table. As per the observations in the judgment the claimants have to establish the following:
1. Age of the deceased.
2. Income of the deceased.
3. Number of dependents.
(ii). Hon‟ble Apex Court directed certain steps while determining the compensation, they are:

Step No.1:
Ascertain the multiplicand, which shall be the income of the deceased he / she should have contributed to the dependents and the same can be arrived after deducting certain part of personal living expenses of the deceased.
Step No.2:
Ascertaining Multiplier with reference to the age of the deceased. This shall be as per the table provided in judgment itself.
2009 (6) SCC 121 Step No.3:
Calculation of the compensation.
Final Step:
After calculation adding of certain amount towards conventional heads towards loss of estate, loss of consortium, funeral expenditure, cost of transport, cost of medical expenses for treatment of the deceased before the death etc. are advised.
b) Adding of future prospects:
43(i). Enhancing the scope for awarding just compensation, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in National Insurance Company Ltd. v. Pranay Sethi and Others11 case guided for adding of future prospect. In respect of permanent employment, 50% where the deceased is below 40 years, 30% where the deceased is 40-50 years and 15% where the deceased is 50-60 years.
(ii). The actual salary to be taken shall be after deducting taxes. Further, in respect of self employed on fixed salary addition is recommended, at 40% for the deceased below 40 years, at 25% where the deceased is between 40-50 years, at 10% where the deceased is between 50-60 years. Further, adding of compensation for loss of estate, loss of consortium and funeral expenses at Rs.15,000/- and Rs.40,000/- and Rs.15,000/- respectively is recommended by Hon‟ble Apex court with an addition of 10% for every three years in Pranay Sethi's case.
2017(16) SCC 680

c) Loss of Consortium under the heads of parental and filial consortium:

44. Further enlarging the scope for awarding just and reasonable compensation in Magma General Insurance Company Ltd. v. Nanu Ram and Others12, Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that compensation can be awarded under the heads of loss of consortium not only to the spouse but also to the children and parents under the heads of parental and filial consortium.
d) Just Compensation:

45. In Rajesh and others vs. Rajbir Singh and others13, the Hon‟ble Supreme Court in para Nos.10 and 11 made relevant observations, they are as follows:
10. Whether the Tribunal is competent to award compensation in excess of what is claimed in the application under Section 166 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, is another issue arising for consideration in this case. At para 10 of Nagappa case [Nagappa v. Gurudayal Singh, (2003) 2 SCC 274 : 2003 SCC (Cri) 523 : AIR 2003 SC 674] , it was held as follows: (SCC p. 280) "10. Thereafter, Section 168 empowers the Claims Tribunal to „make an award determining the amount of compensation which appears to it to be just‟. Therefore, the only requirement for determining the compensation is that it must be „just‟. There is no other limitation or restriction on its power for awarding just compensation."
The principle was followed in the later decisions in Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Mohd. Nasir [(2009) 6 SCC 280 : (2009) 2 (2018) 18 SCC 130 (2013) 9 SCC 54 SCC (Civ) 877 : (2009) 2 SCC (Cri) 987] and in Ningamma v. United India Insurance Co. Ltd. [(2009) 13 SCC 710 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 241 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1213]

11. Underlying principle discussed in the above decisions is with regard to the duty of the court to fix a just compensation and it has now become settled law that the court should not succumb to niceties or technicalities, in such matters. Attempt of the court should be to equate, as far as possible, the misery on account of the accident with the compensation so that the injured/the dependants should not face the vagaries of life on account of the discontinuance of the income earned by the victim.

Analysis:

Precedential guidance with regard to quantifying compensation in a claim filed under Section 163-A beyond the caps contemplated under the said provision viz. Section 163-A:-
46. The claim in the present case is laid invoking Section 163-A of Motor Vehicles Act which suggests for adoption of II schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act in the process of quantifying the compensation. The relevant factors to be considered are:
(i). Adoption of annual income with reference to age of the deceased and multiplier mentioned therein. Even the compensation part is also specifically mentioned in II schedule in thousands. It is further mentioned that 1/3rd of the income shall be reduced towards personal expenses of the deceased. Towards general damages for funeral expenses, loss of consortium, loss of estate, medical expenditure amounts mentioned therein shall be granted. The claim made under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act permits awarding and quantification of compensation as per the II schedule, the amount mentioned under each head are as follows:
3.General Damage(in case of death):
The following General Damages shall be payable in addition to compensations outlined above:
(i) Funeral expenses -- Rs. 2,000/-
(ii) Loss of Consortium, if beneficiary is the spouse -- Rs. 5,000/-
(iii) Loss of Estate -- Rs. 2,500/-
(iv) Medical Expenses actual expenses incurred before death supported by bills/vouchers but not exceeding -- Rs. 15,000/-
47. This schedule was inserted pursuant to Act No.54 of 1994 w.e.f. 14.11.1994 while amending Motor Vehicles Act, 1998. With regard to adding of future prospects taking note of notional income, necessity to consider more income than what is mentioned in the table contemplated in terms of Section 163-A and awarding compensation under the conventional heads etc., Hon‟ble Apex Court in a case between Kurvan Ansari Alias Kuran Ali and Another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another14, discussed the legal position with reference to earlier directions of the Apex Court in the context of considering a claim of a minor boy (non earning group) and adherence to cap of Rs.15000/- per annum as the income of the deceased. Relevant observations are made in paragraph Nos.12 to 15 of the judgment as to non-binding nature of caps fixed under Section 163-A and necessity to take increase notional income by taking (2022) 1 SCC 317 note of inflation and devolution of rupee and increase cost of living. The observations are as follows:

12. In the judgment in Puttamma [Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 : (2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] , this Court has observed that the Central Government was bestowed with the duties to amend Schedule II in view of Section 163-A(3) of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, but it failed to do so. In view of the same, specific directions were issued to the Central Government to make appropriate amendments to Schedule II keeping in mind the present cost of living. In the said judgment, till such amendments are made, directions were issued for award of compensation by fixing a sum of Rs 1,00,000 (Rupees one lakh only) towards compensation for the non-earning children up to the age of 5 (five) years old and a sum of Rs 1,50,000 (Rupees one lakh fifty thousand only) for the non-earning persons of more than 5 (five) years old.
13. In R.K. Malik [R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 :
(2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] also, this Court has observed that the notional income fixed under Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 as Rs 15,000 per annum should be enhanced and increased as the same continued to exist without any amendment since 14-11-1994. In Kishan Gopal [Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2014) 1 SCC 244 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] where the deceased was a ten-year-old child, this Court has fixed his notional income at Rs 30,000 per annum.
14. In this case, it is to be noted that the accident was on 6-9- 2004. In spite of repeated directions, Schedule II is not yet amended.

Therefore, fixing notional income at Rs 15,000 per annum for non- earning members is not just and reasonable.

15. In view of the judgments in Puttamma [Puttamma v. K.L. Narayana Reddy, (2013) 15 SCC 45 : (2014) 4 SCC (Civ) 384 :

(2014) 3 SCC (Cri) 574] , R.K. Malik [R.K. Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 265 : (2010) 1 SCC (Cri) 1265] and Kishan Gopal [Kishan Gopal v. Lala, (2014) 1 SCC 244 : (2014) 1 SCC (Civ) 184 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 241] , we are of the view that it is a fit case to increase the notional income by taking into account the inflation, devaluation of the rupee and cost of living. In view of the same, the judgment in Rajendra Singh [Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co. Ltd., (2020) 7 SCC 256 : (2020) 4 SCC (Civ) 99 :
(2020) 3 SCC (Cri) 134] relied on by the learned counsel for Respondent 2 insurance company would not render any assistance to the case of the insurance company.
48. Further, the Hon‟ble Apex Court in Meena Devi vs. Nunu Chand mahto alias Nemchand Mahto & Others15, while referring to Kurvan Ansari Alias Kuran Ali and Another vs. Shyam Kishore Murmu and another case adopted more income than fixed in the II schedule in the Motor Vehicles Act in a case filed in terms of Section 163-A of M.V.Act, at para Nos. Nos.14 and 15 of the judgment.


2023 (1) SCC 204

49. In view of the legal position and precedential guidance, the following points will emerge:

(i) Even in claims under Section 163-A, the caps contemplated under section 163-A as to adopting the income at a particular scale with reference to the II Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act can be deviated from if the circumstances justify.
(ii) Even in respect of claimants under Section 163-A, awarding compensation under the heads of loss of consortium, loss of estate, funeral expenses etc. under the heads of general damages is permissible beyond the caps fixed in II schedule taking aid of the scales adopted by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court.
(iii) It is also relevant to note that, after the amendments to the Motor Vehicles Act, 2019, under Act No.32 of 2019, the provision under Section 163-A is omitted. Consequently, the II Schedule is also omitted by Act No.32 of 2019. However, the applicability of the same to pending matters and earlier causes of action is a different aspect.
(iv) The Motor Vehicles Act being social welfare in nature and its intention being beneficial and as there are earlier directions of the Hon‟ble Apex Court to take appropriate call by the legislature, it can be deemed that the limitations and caps contemplated under Section 163-A will not have any conspicuous significance in quantification and awarding of just compensation where the claimants are entitled for the same in the facts and circumstances of such case.
(v) However, we should keep in view of the basic concept of no-fault liability contemplated under Section 163-A while calculating compensation under the head of loss of dependency.
(vi) In respect of general damages referred to in the II Schedule, like funeral expenses, loss of estate, loss of consortium, transport expenses etc., it is clear that strict adherence to the caps in the Schedule will result in defeating the object and even the purpose of law when the amounts fixed are seen.
50. Claimants invoking Section 163-A of the Motor Vehicles Act need not plead or prove negligence, but at the instance of tortfeasor or their indemnifier, the Court may proceed to examine negligence and apply the fault theory in appropriate cases. Then, the cap under Section 163-A need not be followed and the tortfeasor or their indemnifier, having invited examination of negligence which is contemplated under Section 166, cannot ask the claimants to be confined to the cap under Section 163-A. The purpose of any system of justice is to provide remedies to the victims and to restore the victims of a tort or crime to their original positions to the extent possible. Therefore, the concerns of all stakeholders connected to the process of redress and reparation should focus on providing adequate compensation. The development and culture of any society will be seen from how it treats its criminals and victims. The evolution of legal system from retribution to restoration is clear in this century. If the aim of the law is to restore what is lost and to undo the wrong, then providing adequate compensation to the victim should be considered as important as punishing or reforming the wrongdoer.

51. PW.2 stated that he is engaged in the sheep business along with the deceased and they were getting Rs.8,000/- per month. It is only oral evidence, there is no other evidence. However, upon considering the age of the deceased i.e. „40‟ years and the social responsibilities of the deceased and more so, in the light of the evidence of P.W.2, who is a contemporary of the deceased involved in the same business, the income of the deceased during relevant period can be safely accepted at Rs.3,000/- per month. On adding future prospects at 30%, the income can be taken at Rs.4,000/- per month and the same comes to Rs.48,000/- per annum (Rs.4000/- x12). Since the dependents being five in number, 1/4th of the income of the deceased can be deducted towards personal expenditure. Then his contribution can be accepted as 3/4th to the family, whereby his contribution can be taken at Rs.3,000/- per month and Rs.36,000/- per annum. Rs.36,000/- can be considered as the multiplicand. The Multiplier applicable is „15‟. Then, the entitlement of claimants for compensation under the head of loss of dependency comes to Rs.5,40,000/- (Rs.36,000/- x 15).

52. Under the conventional heads in the light of the precedential guidance mentioned above, an amount of Rs.15,000/- each towards funeral expenditure and loss of estate can be awarded. Further, under loss of consortium, all the claimants viz. for the parents towards filial consortium, for the wife towards spousal consortium and for the children towards parental consortium entitled at the rate of Rs.40,000/- each. Then, the entitlement of the claimants for compensation comes to Rs.7,70,000/-.

53. In view of the reasons and evidence referred above, the entitlement of the claimants for reasonable compensation in comparison to the compensation awarded by the learned MACT is found as follows:

                     Head              Compensation               Fixed by this
                                       awarded          by        Court
                                       the learned MACT
  (i)    Loss of dependency                       Rs.1,50,000/-        Rs.5,40,000/-
 (ii)    Loss of estate                              Rs.2,500/-          Rs.15,000/-
 (iii)   Loss of Consortium                          Rs.5,000/-        Rs.2,00,000/-
                                                                        @ Rs.40,000/- to
                                                                         each claimant

 (iv)    Funeral expenses                            Rs.2,000/-          Rs.15,000/-
         Total compensation awarded              Rs.1,59,500/-        Rs.7,70,000/-
         Interest (per annum)                            7.5%                 7.5%

54. For the reasons aforesaid and in view of the discussion made above, the point No.4 framed is answered concluding that the claimants are entitled for compensation of Rs.7,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization and the judgment and decree dated 19.08.2008 passed by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 require modification accordingly.

Granting of more compensation than what claimed, if the claimants are otherwise entitled:-

55. The legal position with regard to awarding more compensation than what claimed has been considered and settled by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court holding that there is no bar for awarding more compensation than what is claimed. For the said preposition of law, this Court finds it proper to refer the following observations of the Hon‟ble Supreme Court made in:

(1) Nagappa Vs. Gurudayal Singh and Others16, at para 21 of the judgment, that -
"..there is no restriction that the Tribunal/Court cannot award compensation amount exceeding the claimed amount. The function of the Tribunal/Court is to award "just" compensation, which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record."
(2) Kajal Vs. Jagadish Chand and Ors.17 at para 33 of the judgment, as follows:-

"33. We are aware that the amount awarded by us is more than the amount claimed. However, it is well settled law that in the motor accident claim petitions, the Court must award the just compensation and, in case, the just compensation is more than the amount claimed, that must be awarded especially where the claimant is a minor."
(3) Ramla and Others Vs. National Insurance Company Limited and Others18 at para 5 of the judgment, as follows:-

"5. Though the claimants had claimed a total compensation of Rs 25,00,000 in their claim petition filed before the Tribunal, we feel that the compensation which the claimants are entitled to is higher than the same as mentioned supra. There is no restriction that the Court cannot award (2003) 2 SCC 274 2020 (04) SCC 413 (2019) 2 SCC 192 compensation exceeding the claimed amount, since the function of the Tribunal or Court under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 is to award "just compensation". The Motor Vehicles Act is a beneficial and welfare legislation. A "just compensation" is one which is reasonable on the basis of evidence produced on record. It cannot be said to have become time-barred. Further, there is no need for a new cause of action to claim an enhanced amount. The courts are duty-bound to award just compensation."
Point Nos.5 and 6:

56. For the aforesaid reasons and in view of the conclusions drawn under point Nos.1 to 4, Point Nos.5 and 6 are answered as follows:

(i) M.A.C.M.A.No.73 of 2012 filed by the claimants is allowed.
(ii) M.A.C.M.A.No.1221 of 2014 filed by the appellant / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited is allowed.
(iii) Compensation awarded by the learned MACT in M.V.O.P.No.465 of 2006 at Rs.1,59,500/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum is modified and enhanced to Rs.7,70,000/- with interest at the rate of 7.5% per annum from the date of petition till the date of realization.
(iv) Liability imposed on Respondent No.4 / M/s. Bajaj Allianz General Insurance Company Limited is hereby set-aside.

(v) Apportionment:

(a) Claimant No.1 / wife of the deceased is entitled to Rs.3,70,000/- with proportionate interest and costs.

(b) Claimant Nos.2 and 3 / children of the deceased are entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each with proportionate interest.

(c) Claimant Nos.4 and 5 / parents of the deceased are entitled to Rs.1,00,000/- each with proportionate interest.

(d) The apportionment shall be with proportionate interest and it shall be inclusive of the compensation awarded under the head of loss of consortium.

(vi) Claimants are liable to pay the Court fee for the enhanced part of the compensation, before the learned MACT.

(vii) Respondent Nos.1 and 2 before the learned MACT are jointly and severally liable. However, Respondent No.2 / M/s. Oriental Insurance Company Limited shall be liable to pay the compensation amount in view of the Insurance Policy.

(viii) Claimants are entitled to withdraw the compensation amount at once on deposit.

      (ix)      Time for deposit is two months.

      (x)       There shall be no order as to costs, in these appeals.

As a sequel, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in these appeals shall stand closed.


____________________________ A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J Date:24.10.2025 Note:L.R. copy to be marked.

(B/o).

Knr HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA M.A.C.M.A.Nos.73 of 2012 & 1221 of 2014 24.10.2025 Knr