Whether the alienation of the property pending the suit can be set aside in contempt of proceedings for voiltion of injunciton orders restraing from alienation ? - No- the appellant filed a suit against PABC's for specific performance in the year 1993 basing on sale agreement 0f the year 1981 and the same was decreed and sale deed was executed in the year 2003 - in the mean while in the year 1994 a suit was filed against the properties PABC - in the year 2003 the Madara High court granted interim injunciton not to alinate the properties of PABC- a contempt petition filed - Madras High court set aside the sale and order to restoration of the property - Appellant is not the party before the Madaras High court - Apex court held that in the present appeal, the case of the appellant that it was in pursuance of the decree passed by the Civil Court in Andhra Pradesh in a suit for specific performance that the appellant had obtained the sale deed through the process of the Court, could not have been negated in the summary manner in which the High Court had proceeded to pass orders in the exercise of its contempt jurisdiction. Moreover, it is not in dispute that the appellant is not a party to the suit pending before the Madras High Court. The issue as to Whether the alienation of the property by PABC is valid or otherwise must be adjudicated upon in the course of the hearing of the suit. That is also the basis of the order dated 26.04.2013 passed by this Court in the earlier civil appeals, noted above. In the circumstances, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the High Court in purported exercise of its contempt jurisdiction should be set aside in so far as the appellant is concerned. It is ordered accordingly. We however, clarify that it will be open to the plaintiffs to seek appropriate remedies in the suit which is pending before the Madras High Court.

 HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
1
IN THE SUPREME COURT  OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2641/2011
ALLU VENKATRAMAN AND ANR.   ��. APPELLANT(S)
                                VERSUS
     
      G.D.D. DIWAKAR, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR   ��  RESPONDENT(S)
      AND ANR.
   
     with
CIVIL   APPEAL   NO.2646/2011     &     CIVIL   APPEAL   Nos.2644-
2645/2011.
   
O R D E R
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2641/2011
This appeal arises from the judgment and order of   a
Division   Bench   of   the   Madras   High   Court   dated   17.06.2006
in   a   batch   of   contempt   petitions.   The   present   appeal
relates   to   the   order   of   the   High   Court   in   contempt
petition   No.370   of   2006   and   Sub   Application   No.126   of
2006.
  The   contempt   petition   was   disposed   of   by   the   High
Court in terms of the following order:-
�There   is   no   representation   on   behalf   of   the
petitioner.     Heard   the   parties.     Except   to   suspend
the   sale   made   under   the   teeth   of   injunction   and   to
permit the purchasers to seek appropriate relief in
the manner known to law, to protect their right and

2
interest and to restore status quo ante on the date
of   the   orders   of   injunction   with   regard   to   the
possession   of   the   plaintiffs,     which   were   being
complained as willfully disobeyed in these contempt
petitions,   no   further   order   is   required   in   the
contempt   petitions.     Accordingly   the   same   are
closed.     Consequently,   Sub   Application   Nos.   227,
278 to 293 of 2003, 170 to 185 and 187 of 2004, 370
of 2005 and 125 to 127 of 2006 are also closed.�
A   suit   (C.S.   No.124   of   1994)   has   been   instituted   on
the   Original   Side   of   the   Madras   High   Court   under   Section
92 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 .   There are five
plaintiffs   including   D.   Jayaraju,   who   is   the   second
respondent   in   the   present   appeal.     Among   the   reliefs
sought in the suit, the plaintiffs seek the removal of the
Property   Association   of   Baptist   Churches   Private   Limited
(PAPB) from trusteeship of the properties mentioned in the
schedule   thereto.     An   inquiry   has   been   sought   into   the
affairs   of   the   company   and   into   several   transfers   of
immovable   properties   effected   by   or   on   behalf   of   the
trustee company after 1979. 
  On   25.07.2000,     a   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court
while dealing with an application for the sale of certain
property   at   Kodaikanal   directed   that   no   other   properties
should   be   sold   pending   the   disposal   of   the   suit.     This
order was passed in OSA  No. 69 of 1999 and CMP No.7306 of
1999.   During   the   course   of   the   proceedings   in   the   suit,
following   order   was   also   passed     by   a   Division   Bench   of

3
the High Court on 27.06.2003 (in Sub-Application No.274 of
2003 in contempt Petition No.441 of 2003):-
�The   first   respondent   or   its   office   bearers   or
power of attorneys or custodians or care takers or
allottees   so   also   the   other   respondents   are   hereby
restrained   by   means   of   an   injunction   from
alienating   by   way   of   sale,   mortgage,   lease   of   the
properties   fully   described   in   the   Schedule.     They
should   not   enter   into   any   kind   of   agreement
whatsoever   with   anyone   else   with   reference   to   the
said   property.     All   activities   in   the   premises
should   be   stopped   and   advertisement   board,   if   any,
exhibited shall be removed forthwith.�
In 1993, the appellant instituted a suit for specific
performance     before   the     Principal   Senior   Civil   Judge,
Narasaraopet,   Andhra   Pradesh   (O.S.No.109/1993).     This   suit
was   filed   in   respect   of   an   agreement   to   sell   which   was
allegedly     executed   by   PABC,   on   14.05.1981.   The   suit   was
decreed   on   18.04.2003.     The   sale   deed   was   stated   to   have
been   executed   on   31.12.2003,   in   the   course   of   execution
proceedings through the Court.  
In   the   contempt   petition   which   was   filed   by   the
second   respondent,   it   was   alleged   that   the   above   sale   was
in   breach   of   the   interim   order   of   injunction   which   was
passed   by     the   High   Court.   Various   other   transactions
involving   the   sale   of   the   property   belonging   to   the   Trust
appear  to  have  taken  place  giving  rise  to  several  contempt
proceedings.   It   was   in   the   course   of   the   hearing   of   the
batch   of   contempt   petitions   that   the   impugned   order   has
been passed.

4
We have heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of
the   appellant   and   learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of
second respondent who are the contesting parties.
    The   submission   which   has   been   urged   is   that   in   the
exercise   of   its   contempt   jurisdiction,   the   High   Court
manifestly   erred   in   directing   the   suspension   of   the   sale
made and for the restoration of the status quo ante on the
date of the order of injunction.
  This   Court   has   been   apprised   of   the   fact   that   in   Civil
Appeal   No.4124   and   4125   of   2013,     a   bench   of   two   learned
Judges   of   this   Court   while   dealing   with   the   same   order   of
the High Court passed the following order on 26.04.2013:
�Heard   learned   senior   counsel   for   the
appellants.
  Leave granted.
In   spite   of   service,   none   appears   on   behalf
of respondents.
After   hearing   learned   senior   counsel
appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   and   the
relief   as   prayed   for   in   contempt   petition   before
the   High   Court,     we   are   satisfied   that   the   High
Court   is   not   justified   in   passing   the   impugned
order without dealing with any of the claim in the
contempt petition.  Inasmuch as the main suit which
is   of   the   year   1994   are   still   pending   on   the   file
of   the   High   Court,     we   are   inclined   to   remit   the
matter   for   disposal   of   the   contempt   petition
afresh,   but we feel that ends of justice would be
met by setting aside the impugned order and request
the   High   Court   to   take   all   endeavour   for   early
disposal   of   the   suit   viz.   C.S.   124   of   1994
preferably   within   a   period   of   six   months   from   the
date of receipt of copy of this order.
The civil appeals are allowed.�

5
In the present appeal, the case of the appellant that
it   was   in   pursuance   of     the   decree   passed   by   the   Civil
Court in Andhra Pradesh in a suit for specific performance
that   the   appellant   had   obtained   the   sale   deed   through   the
process   of   the   Court,   could   not   have   been   negated   in   the
summary   manner   in   which   the   High   Court   had   proceeded   to
pass orders in the   exercise of its contempt jurisdiction.
Moreover, it is not in dispute that the appellant is not a
party to the suit pending before the Madras High Court.
The   issue   as   to   whether   the   alienation   of   the
property by PABC is valid or otherwise must be adjudicated
upon   in   the   course   of   the   hearing   of   the   suit.       That   is
also the basis of the order dated 26.04.2013 passed by this
Court in the earlier civil appeals, noted above.
In   the   circumstances,     we   are   of   the   view   that   the
impugned   order   passed   by   the   High   Court   in   purported
exercise of its contempt jurisdiction should be   set aside
in   so   far   as   the   appellant   is   concerned.   It   is   ordered
accordingly.
We   however,   clarify   that   it   will   be   open   to   the
plaintiffs   to   seek   appropriate   remedies   in   the   suit   which
is   pending   before   the   Madras   High   Court   (O.S.   No.124   of
1994). Nothing contained in the order shall be construed as

6
any   opinion   of   this   Court   on   the   disposition   which   is
claimed by the appellant(s).
Having   due   regard   to   the   order   passed   by   this   Court
on 26.04.2013 for the expeditious disposal of the suit, we
once   impress   upon   the   High   Court   the   need   for   the
expeditious disposal of the suit.
The   civil   appeal   is   accordingly   disposed   of   in   the
above terms.
Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.
CIVIL APPEAL NO.2646/2011
This   appeal   is   directed   against   the   judgment   and
order of the Division Bench of the Madras High Court dated
15.09.2006 which seeks to clarify the previous order dated
02.08.2006   passed     in   the   exercise   of   its   contempt
jurisdiction.     The   present   appeal   has   been   heard   together
with   companion     civil   appeal   No.2641/2011.   As   the   facts
narrated   in   the   judgment   indicate,   an   order   was   initially
passed on 17.06.2006 by the High Court which was sought to
be   modified   in   certain   respects   on     02.08.2006   and
clarified by  the order dated 15.09.2006.  The order dated
17.06.2006   has   been   set   aside   in   companion   civil   appeal
No.2641/2011.     Since   the   main   order   has   been   set   aside,
the   clarification   will   not,   in   consequence,   survive   and
the civil appeal shall accordingly disposed of. No costs.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.

7
CIVIL APPEAL Nos.2644-2645/2011
In   view   of   the   order   passed   in   Civil   Appeal
No.2641/2011, civil  appeal Nos.2644-2645/2011  are disposed
of.
Pending applications, if any, also stand disposed of.
���������������������������.J.
                                    [D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
�������������������������....J.
                                    [VINEET SARAN]
   New Delhi
   20 th
 November,2018.

8
ITEM NO.104               COURT NO.11               SECTION XII
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).2641/2011
ALLU VENKATRAMAN AND ANR. & ANR.                   Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
G.D.D. DIWAKAR AND ANR. & ANR.                     Respondent(s)

WITH
C.A. No. 2644-2645/2011 (XII)
C.A. No. 2646/2011 (XII)

Date : 20-11-2018 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :  HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE D.Y. CHANDRACHUD
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE   VINEET SARAN
       
For Appellant(s) Mr. Ratnakar Dass,Sr.Adv.
Ms. Promila,Adv.
                    Mr. S. Thananjayan, AOR
104.1 and 104.2 Mr. V.Prabhakar,Adv.
Ms. Jyoti Parasher,Adv.
Mr. N.J.Ramchandar,Adv.
                    Mr. R. Chandrachud, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. Ajit Kr. Sinha,Sr.Adv.
Mr. Dhruv Kumar Jha,Adv.
                    Mr. Bijan Kumar Ghosh, AOR
                    Mr. R. Chandrachud, AOR
                    Ms. D. Bharathi Reddy, AOR
Mr. K. K. Mani, AOR
Ms. T.Archana,Adv.
Mr. V.Prabhakar,Adv.
Ms. Jyoti Parasher,Adv.
Mr. N.J.Ramchandar,Adv.
                    Mr. R. Chandrachud, AOR

9
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   Civil   Appeals   are   disposed   of   in   terms   of 
the signed order.
Pending   applications,   if   any,   also   stand 
disposed of.
(INDU MARWAH)                                 (SUMAN JAIN)
COURT MASTER                                 BRANCH OFFICER
(Signed order is placed on the file) 

Whether it is an individual property or joint family property? merely becuase mutation of entires are effected in his name and tax and electicity bills etc. paid in his name - with out having any legal possession and without having any capcity to raise a building etc., Suit for restoration of possession, mesne profits and for a permanent injunction with respect to House - The plaintiff acquired the leasehold rights on plot under the perpetual lease deed granted by the President of India in his favour and registered on 31.01.1966. -raised a construction over the plot and obtained the necessary sanction from the competent authority as per the site plan and got installed electricity, water, and sewerage connections in the premises.- entire family started living in the said house. - The marriage of plaintiff, as well as defendants and all sisters, were solemnized from the house in question. - When the relationship of Defendant No.2- the sister of the plaintiff, became strained with her husband, she started living in the said house along with her daughter. - Defendant No.1 for some time in 1971 had resided out of Delhi. - Father of the parties Kashmiri Lal Dhall died on 10.08.1980, leaving behind several properties at Delhi. - Defendant No.1 started living separately with effect from the year 1986. - He acquired a house and one more residential accommodation, - the mother of the parties died in the premises in question in the year 1990. The house remained in the custody/ possession of the Defendant No.2. At the relevant point of time, the plaintiff was posted at Bombay.-Plaintiff came back to Delhi in the year 1993. However, at the same time, Defendant No.2 was permitted to occupy the house. Later on, it was found that Defendant No.1 had also started living in the said house. - The defendants version is that Father acquired the property in the name of his eldest daughter and he constructed the house therein and later at the time of her marrige , he transferred the same in the name of plaintiff - at the time , the plaintiff is a student - no capacity to earn money - the defendant No.1 from 1996 has been resideing init as of its owner - Trail court decreed the suit - High court confirmed the same - Apex court held that Firstly, the plaintiff has not come up with the case that the property was acquired in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata in the year 1963 and it was she who had spent the money for getting the land allotted from DDA and in the construction of the house. No case has been set up in the plaint to show that Kumari Sneh Lata had spent the money in the construction of the house. He has suppressed the fact of allotment in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata. On the contrary, it had been admitted in the plaint itself that family started residing in the premises right from the beginning. On the contrary, there is admission made by the plaintiff that he never resided in the house. Apart from that when we come to the source of money for the purpose of purchase of plot, admittedly, the plaintiff was a student and he was admitted in the year 1961 at IIT, Kharagpur. At the time when the land was allotted in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata, he was still a student and he had no source of income at the relevant time in 1963 or in January 1966, when the allotment was changed in his name owing to the marriage of Kumari Sneh Lata. Thus, obviously, it was Kashmiri Lal who had spent the money in getting the land allotted and also had raised the construction in the year 1965-66. Though the plaintiff has stated that the construction was made sometime in the year 1966, his version cannot be said to be reliable. Apart from that, the plaintiff has admitted that when he came to Delhi on posting at All India Institute of Medical Sciences, he started living in the rented accommodation, as there was a paucity of accommodation for his stay in the house in question. Thus, all the facts and circumstances indicate that it was a family property and not the exclusive property of the plaintiff . Thus, the Courts below have acted not only perversely but in a most arbitrary and illegal manner, while accepting the ipse dixit of the plaintiff and in decreeing the suit. Such finding of facts which are impermissible and perverse cannot be said to be binding. The legal inferences from admitted facts have not been correctly drawn. Merely the fact that house tax receipt, electricity and water bills and other documents are in the name of Dharampal would carry the case no further, as it was the father who got the name changed of Kumari Sneh Lata in question in the name of Dharampal. The receipts were only to be issued in the name of the recorded owner, but Dharampal never resided in the house as he was in service out of Delhi, obviously, the amount was paid by family, not by Late Dharampal. Thus, we find that no benefit could have been derived from the aforesaid documents. In view of the aforesaid, we have no hesitation in allowing the appeals and dismiss the suit filed by the plaintiff-respondents.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4534-4535_OF 2018
(Arising out of SLP(c) Nos.35337-35338 of 2017)
VINOD KUMAR DHALL    ..APPELLANT
VERSUS
DHARAMPAL DHALL (DECEASED)
THROUGH HIS LRS. & ORS.    ..RESPONDENT(S)
O R D E R
1. Leave granted.
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
3. The   defendant   is   in   appeal   aggrieved   by   the   judgment
and   decree  passed   by  the   trial  court,   as  affirmed   by  the
High   Court   in   first   appeal   and   review   applied   had   also
been   rejected   by   the   High   Court.     The   plaintiff-
respondent,   Dharampal   Dhall   (since   deceased),   filed   a
suit for restoration of possession,   mesne profits   and for
a   permanent   injunction   with   respect   to   House   No.ED-48,
Tagore Garden, New Delhi.

2
4. The plaintiff � Dharampal Dhall came with a case that
he   acquired   the   leasehold   rights   on   plot   admeasuring
149.33   square   yards   under   the   perpetual   lease   deed
granted   by   the   President   of   India   in   his   favour   and
registered   on   31.01.1966.     The   plaintiff   raised   a
construction   over   the   plot   and   obtained   the   necessary
sanction   from   the   competent   authority   as   per   the   site
plan   and   got   installed   electricity,   water,   and   sewerage
connections   in   the   premises.     However,   it   was   stated   in
the   plaint   itself   that   entire   family   started   living   in
the   said   house.     The   marriage   of   plaintiff,   as   well   as
defendants   and   all   sisters,   were   solemnized   from   the
house   in   question.     When   the   relationship   of   Defendant
No.2-   the   sister   of   the   plaintiff,   became   strained   with
her   husband,   she   started   living   in   the   said   house   along
with   her  daughter.     Defendant   No.1  for   some  time   in  1971
had   resided   out   of   Delhi.     Father   of   the   parties   �
Kashmiri   Lal   Dhall   died   on   10.08.1980,   leaving   behind
several   properties   at   Delhi.     Defendant   No.1   started
living   separately   with   effect   from   the   year   1986.     He
acquired   a   house   at   Moti   Nagar,   New   Delhi,   and   one   more
residential   accommodation,   i.e. ,   GH-1/318,   Pashchim

3
Vihar, New Delhi.
5. It  was   further  averred   in  the   plaint  that   the  mother
of   the   parties   died   in   the   premises   in   question   in   the
year 1990.   The house remained in the custody/ possession
of   the   Defendant   No.2.     At   the   relevant   point   of   time,
the   plaintiff   was   posted   at   Bombay.     The   house   was
furnished.   Furniture of the plaintiff was still lying in
the   house.     Plaintiff   came   back   to   Delhi   in   the   year
1993.   However,   at   the   same   time,   Defendant   No.2   was
permitted   to   occupy   the   house.     Later   on,   it   was   found
that   Defendant   No.1   had   also   started   living   in   the   said
house.     The   plaintiff   asked   defendants   to   vacate   the
premises.  They did not do so. Though, Defendant No.2 had
shifted   residence   in   January   1995.     Hence,   the   suit   was
filed,   after   serving   notice   dated   30.6.1995.     Defendant
No.1 was ousted from the house by the mother in the year
1986. Thus, he had no right in the house. The conduct of
Defendant No.1 was not proper with the plaintiff.
6. In   the   written   statement   filed   by   Defendant   No.1,   it
was contended that the suit was not properly valued.  The
defendant   had   been   occupying   the   premises   since   the   year
1966.     The   suit   was   barred   by   limitation   and   was   not

4
maintainable.     The   allotment   of   the   plot   was   obtained
initially   in   the   name   of   Kumari   Sneh   Lata,   who   was   the
eldest   child   of   late   Kashmiri   Lal   Dhall.     The   father   of
the   parties   obtained   it   in   the   year   1963   from   the   Delhi
Development   Authority   (DDA).     The   entire   amount   was   paid
by   late   Kashmiri   Lal   to   the   DDA.     Subsequently,
construction was raised in 1965-66 by Kashmiri Lal out of
his own money. At that time. Plaintiff was only a student
studying   at   IIT,   Kharagpur,   West   Bengal.     The   possession
of   the   defendant   was   in   the   capacity   of   the   owner.     The
plaintiff   had   no   source   of   income   at   the   relevant   point
of   time.     No   gift   deed   had   been   made   by   any   person   in
plaintiff�s   favour.     They   are   four   sisters   and   two
brothers,   left   as   legal   representatives   of   late   Shri
Kashmiri   Lal.     The   suit   was   bad   for   non-joinder   of
necessary parties.   The plaintiff was, thus, not entitled
to any relief.
7. The   trial   court   had   decreed   the   suit.     The   judgment
and   decree   had   been   affirmed   by   the   High   Court.
Aggrieved thereby, the appellant has come up in appeals.
8. We   have   heard   learned   counsel   for   the   parties   at
length.     It   was   submitted   by   Mr.   Mahabir   Singh,   learned

5
senior   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   that
the   property   was   admittedly   acquired   in   the   name   of
Kumari   Sneh   Lata.     Later   on,   at   the   time   when   her
marriage was performed in the year 1966, the property was
transferred   in   the   name   of   Dharampal.     At   the   time   when
the   property   was   acquired   in   the   name   of   Kumari   Sneh
Lata,   in   the   year   1963,   Dharampal,   the   plaintiff   was   a
student   at   IIT,   Kharagpur.   He   had   no   source   of   earning.
Thus, obviously, the money came from father and house was
constructed in the year 1965-66.   Thus, the plaintiff had
no source of income which could have been invested in the
house   at   the   relevant   point   of   time.     As   per   the
statement   made   by   the   plaintiff,   he   joined   the   services
in   April   1966.     By   that   time,   the   house   was   already
constructed.     Thus,   it   was   the   property   owned   by   the
family.     The   father   had   spent   the   money   for   construction
of the house and for allotment of plot and thus it was a
family   property.     It   was   used   as   the   residence   of   the
entire   family,   marriages   of   the   children   and   the   factum
of   enjoyment   clearly   indicated   that   it   was   not   the
property   exclusively   owned   by   the   plaintiff.     It   was   the
family property even as per the case set up in the plaint
as   well  as   the  vital   admissions  made   by  the   plaintiff  in

6
his deposition.
9. Mr.   E.C.   Agrawala,   learned   counsel   appearing   on
behalf   of   the   respondents,   has   submitted   that   the
property,   in   fact,   was   acquired   by   Kumari   Sneh   Lata,   out
of   her   earning,   she   was   the   teacher.     It   was   also
submitted that a letter for change in the name was issued
at   her   address   of   school   where   she   was   serving.     Thus,
Kumari   Sneh   Lata   had   acquired   the   plot   from   DDA   out   of
her own earning.  Thus, it could be said to be the family
property   got   allotted   by   father   Kashmiri   Lal   Dhall.
Thus,   it   was   open   to   Kumari   Sneh   Lata   to   give   it   to   the
plaintiff.     Thus,   it   would   not   become   the   family
property.     Though   it   was   occupied   by   the   family,   from
time   to   time   the   plaintiff   used   to   come   and   reside
therein.     He   had   permitted   Defendant   No.2   to   reside   only
due   to   the   fact   that   her   relationship   with   husband   was
strained   and   Defendant   No.1   was   ousted   by   the   mother   in
1986.     He   had   obtained   two   other   properties   in   different
localities   at   Delhi,   i.e. ,   Moti   Nagar,   New   Delhi   and
Pashchim   Vihar,   New   Delhi.     He   had   reoccupied   the
property   in   question   behind   the   back   of   the   plaintiff   in
the   year   1995-1996.     Thus,   the   plaintiff   was   entitled   to
restoration   of   possession   of   the   property   and   mesne

7
profit.   Both the Courts have concurrently found the fact
that   the   plaintiff   was   the   owner.   It   was   purely   the
finding   of   fact   and   no   case   for   interference   in   the
appeals by this Court was made out.
10. The learned counsel for the appellant had relied upon
the   decision   in   Surendra   Kumar   v.   Phoolchand   (Dead)
Through Lrs. & Anr.   (1996) 2 SCC 491 in which this Court
had laid down that there is no presumption that a family,
because   it   is   joint,   possessed   the   joint   property   and
therefore   the   person   asserting   the   property   to   be   joint
had   to   establish   that   the   family   was   possessed   of   some
property with the income of which the property could have
been   acquired.   But   where   it   is   established   or   admitted
that the family which possessed joint property which from
its   nature   and   relative   value   may   have   formed   sufficient
nucleus from which the property in question may have been
acquired,   the   presumption   arises   that   it   was   the   joint
property   and   the   burden   shifts   to   the   party   alleging
self-acquisition   to   establish   affirmatively   that   the
property   was   acquired   without   the   aid   of   the   joint
family.     When   the   property   was   purchased   by   Manager   of
the   joint   family   in   the   name   of   the   appellant   who   was

8
then   minor   in   the   absence   of   material   to   establish   that
consideration   money   was   paid   out   of   separate   funds,   it
was   opined   that   the   property   was   rightly   held   to   be   the
joint property by the courts below. 
11. In  Union of India v. Moksh Builders & Financiers Ltd.
&   Ors.   (1977)   1   SCC   60,   this   Court   has   observed   that
where   it   is   asserted   that   an   assignment   in   the   name   of
one   person  is   in  reality   for  the   benefit  of   another,  the
real   test   is   the   source   whence   the   consideration   came   as
also   to   find   out   who   has   been   in   the   enjoyment   of   the
benefits   of   the   transaction.     The   case   of   the   appellant
must be dealt upon the reasonable probabilities and legal
inferences   arising   from   proved   or   admitted   facts.   The
burden   of   proof   is   not   static   and   may   shift   during   the
course of the evidence.   Thus, while the burden initially
rests   on   the   party   who   would   fail   if   no   evidence   is   led
at   all  after   the  evidence   is  recorded,   it  rests   upon  the
party   against   whom   judgment   would   be   given   if   no   further
evidence   were   adduced   by   either   side   on   the   evidence   on
record.  Once the evidence has been adduced the case must
always   be   adjudged   on   the   evidence   led   by   the   parties.
This Court has laid down thus:

9
  "15.   It   is   nobody's   case   that   the   sale   of
the house to defendant 2 was fictitious and that
the   title   of   the   transferor   was   not   intended   to
pass.   What   we   have   to   examine   is   whether   the
title,   on   the   sale   of   the   house   in   December
1946,   was   transferred   to   defendant   3,   who   was
the   real   purchaser,   and   not   to   defendant   2,   who
was   only   the   ostensible   transferee   and   was   no
more   than   a   "benamidar".   It   has   been   held   in
Gangadara Ayyar and Ors. v. Subramania Sastrigal
and Ors.  AIR 1949 FC 88, that
"in   a   case   where   it   is   asserted   that   an
assignment   in   the   name   of   one   person   is   in
reality for the benefit of another, the real
test   is   the   source   whence   the   consideration
came." 
It   is   also   necessary   to   examine   in   such
cases   who   actually   have   enjoyed   the   benefits   of
the   transfer.   Both   these   tests   were   applied   by
this   Court   in   Meenakshi   Mills,   Madurai   v.   The
Commissioner of Income-Tax Madras.   [1955] S.C.R.
691.   It   is,   therefore,   necessary   in   the   present
case,   to   find   out   the   source   of   the
consideration   for   the   transfer,   as   also   to   find
out   who   has   been   in   the   enjoyment   of   the
benefits   of   the   transaction.   It   is   equally   well
settled   that,   although   the   onus   of   establishing
that   a   transaction   is   'benami'   is   on   the
plaintiff.
�where   it   is   not   possible   to   obtain
evidence   which   conclusively   establishes   or
rebuts the allegation, the case must be dealt
with   on   reasonable   probabilities   and   legal
inferences   arising   from   proved   or   admitted
facts."
16.   The   burden   of   proof   is,   however   not
static,   and   may   shift   during   the   course   of   the
evidence.   Thus   while   the   burden   initially   rests
on   the   party   who   would   fail   if   no   evidence   is
led   at   all   after   the   evidence   is   recorded,   it
rests upon the party against whom judgment would
be   given   if   no   further   evidence   were   adduced   by

10
either   side   i.e.   on   the(evidence   on   record.   As
has   been   held   by   this   Court   in   Kalwa   Devadattam
and Ors. v. The Union of India and Ors.  [1964] 3
SCR   191   that   where   evidence   has   been   led   by   the
contesting   parties   on   the   question   in   issue,
abstract   considerations   of   onus   and   out   of
place,   and   the   truth   of   otherwise;   of   the   case
must   always   be   adjudged   on   the   evidence   led   by
the   parties.   This   will   be   so   if   the   court   finds
that   there   is   no   difficulty   in   arriving   at   a
definite   conclusion.   It   is   therefore   necessary
to weigh the evidence in this case and to decide
whether,   even   if   it   was   assumed   that   there   was
no conclusive evidence to establish or rebut the
"benami"   allegation,   what   would,   on   a   careful
assessment   of   the   evidence,   be   a   reasonable
probability   and   a   legal   inference   from   relevant
and admissible evidence.�
12. In   Sri   Marcel   Martins   v.   M.   Printer   &   Ors.   (2012)   5
SCC   342   it   was   held   that   Benami   Transactions
(Prohibition)   Act,   1988   (for   short,   �the   Act�)   would
apply   only   in   case   property   was   held   benami.     In   case
Section   4(3)   is   applicable   it   could   not   be   said   that
property was held benami as such the provision of the Act
would not apply.
13. Section   2(a)   of   Act   defined   �benami   transactions�   as
under:
�2. Definitions- In this Act, unless the context
otherwise requires,-- 
(a) benami   transaction   means   any   transaction   in
which   property   is   transferred   to   one   person
for   a   consideration   paid   or   provided   by
another person;
(b) .....�

11
Section 4 of the Act is reproduced as under:
�4.   Prohibition   of   the   right   to   recover
property held benami- 
(1)   No   suit,   claim   or   action   to   enforce   any
right   in   respect   of   any   property   held   benami
against   the   person   in   whose   name   the   property
is   held   or   against   any   other   person   shall   lie
by   or  on   behalf  of   a  person   claiming  to   be  the
real owner of such property. 
(2) No defence based on any right in respect of
any   property   held   benami,   whether   against   the
person   in   whose   name   the   property   is   held   or
against   any   other   person,   shall   be   allowed   in
any   suit,  claim   or  action   by  or   on  behalf   of  a
person   claiming   to   be   the   real   owner   of   such
property. 
(3) Nothing in this section shall apply,--

(a) where the person in whose name   the property
is   held   is   a   coparcener   in   a   Hindu   undivided
family and the property is held for the benefit
of the coparceners in the family ; or 
(b) where the person in whose name the property
is   held   is   a   trustee   or   other   person   standing
in   a   fiduciary   capacity,   and   the   property   is
held for the benefit of another person for whom
he   is   a   trustee   or   towards   whom   he   stands   in
such capacity.
(emphasis supplied)
The bare reading of the aforesaid provision contained
in   Section   4(3)   of   the   Act   makes   it   clear   that   where   a
person   in  whose   name  a   property  is   held  as   coparcener  in
a Hindu Undivided Family and the property is held for the
benefits of the coparcener in the property, provisions of

12
Section   4   containing   prohibition   of   the   right   to   recover
the   property   held   benami   would   not   be   applicable.     The
bar   of   the   Act   is   not   applicable   to   a   transaction   as
contained in section 4(3) (a) and (b). If the property is
held   in   fiduciary   capacity   or   is   held   as   a   trustee   for
the   benefits   of   another   person   for   whom   he   is   a   trustee
or   towards   whom   he   stands   in   such   capacity.     Thus,   the
provision   of   Act   could   not   be   said   to   be   applicable   in
the instant case.
14. In   Vathsala   Manickavasagam   &   Ors.   v.   N.   Ganesan   &
Anr.   (2013) 9 SCC 152, this Court considered the question
whether   the   property   was   held   benami   or   was   joint   family
property. Where there was a tacit admission that the suit
property   was   purchased   by   his   father   in   his   name   for
which   he   was   not   responsible,   it   was   held   to   be   joint
family property.  
15. After   hearing   learned   counsel   for   the   parties,
considering   the   aforesaid   legal   position,   we   are   of   the
considered   opinion   that   the   appeals   deserve   to   be
allowed.   Firstly,   the   plaintiff   has   not   come   up   with   the
case that the property was acquired in the name of Kumari
Sneh   Lata   in   the   year   1963   and   it   was   she   who   had   spent

13
the   money   for   getting   the   land   allotted   from   DDA   and   in
the construction of the house. No case has been set up in
the   plaint   to   show   that   Kumari   Sneh   Lata   had   spent   the
money   in   the   construction   of   the   house.     He   has
suppressed   the   fact   of   allotment   in   the   name   of   Kumari
Sneh Lata.   On the contrary, it had been admitted in the
plaint   itself   that   family   started   residing   in   the
premises   right   from   the   beginning.     In   paragraphs   4   and
5, following is the pleading made by the plaintiff:
�4. That on completion of the house all family
member including defendant started living in the
aforesaid   house,   the   marriage   of   plaintiff   as
well   as   the   defendant   and   all   sister   were
solemnized from the house in dispute.
5. That   the   relation   between   the   defendant
No.2   and   her   husband   became   strain   consequently
she   was   been   given   shelter   in   the   premises   in
dispute by the plaintiff.�
16. It is apparent that the entire family was residing in
the   house   in   question   right   from   the   beginning   and   the
marriages   of   the   plaintiff   as   well   as   the   defendants   and
all   other   sisters   were   solemnized   in   the   house   in
question.     It   is   apparent   that   Defendant   No.2   was   also
residing   in   the   house   continuously   right   from   the
beginning   and   also   the   mother   and   she   had   also   died   in
the   house   in   question,   as   per   the   case   set   up   by   the

14
plaintiff   in   the   year   1990.     Thereafter,   the   house
remained   in   occupation   of   the   family   members,   is   also
apparent.     On   the   contrary,   there   is   admission   made   by
the   plaintiff   that   he   never   resided   in   the   house.     The
following   is   the   relevant   portion   of   the   deposition   of
the plaintiff set out hereunder:
�It   is   correct   that   I   never   remained   in   the
house   in   dispute   since   its   construction.     It   is
incorrect   to   say   that   after   completion   of   the
house,   my   parents   and   all   the   four   sisters
including   defendant   No.2   and   brother   defendant
No.1   not   started   living   with   me   at   the   house   in
dispute.�
From   the   aforesaid   statement,   it   is   clear   that   the
plaintiff   never   resided   in   the   house   and   was   not   in
possession   and   enjoyment   of   the   house   at   any   point   in
time.  
17. Apart from that, when we come to the source of money
for   the   purpose   of   purchase   of   plot,   admittedly,   the
plaintiff   was   a   student   and   he   was   admitted   in   the   year
1961   at   IIT,   Kharagpur.     At   the   time   when   the   land   was
allotted in the name of Kumari Sneh Lata, he was still a
student   and   he   had   no   source   of   income   at   the   relevant
time   in   1963   or   in   January   1966,   when   the   allotment   was
changed   in  his   name  owing   to  the   marriage  of   Kumari  Sneh

15
Lata.   Thus,   obviously,   it   was   Kashmiri   Lal   who   had   spent
the   money   in   getting   the   land   allotted   and   also   had
raised   the   construction   in   the   year   1965-66.     Though   the
plaintiff   has   stated   that   the   construction   was   made
sometime   in  the   year  1966,   his  version   cannot  be   said  to
be reliable.  The plaintiff was silent in the plaint when
the   construction   was   raised.     The   defendant   has   come   up
with   a   specific   case   that   the   construction   was   raised   in
the   year   1965-66   and   that   is   reliable.   Apart   from   that
even   if   construction   was   made   in   1966   the   plaintiff   had
admitted   that   he   obtained   employment   only   in   April   1966
and when the house was constructed in 1966, the plaintiff
was   not   having   enough   earning   so   as   to   invest   in   the
house   or   to   purchase   the   plot   in   1963.     He   was   not   even
in   a   position   to   say   his   salary   was   Rs.400   or   not.     It
was   obviously   owing   to   the   marriage   of   Kumari   Sneh   Lata
that   the   plot   was   transferred   in   the   name   of   Dharampal,
who   happens   to   be   the   elder   son   of   Kashmiri   Lal.     Thus,
apparently   no   money   was   paid   by   Dharampal   for   allotment
of the land to the DDA and obviously, it was paid in 1963
by   Kashmiri   Lal.     The   money   was   also   spent   in
construction   by   the   father   Kashmiri   Lal.     Occupation   and
enjoyment   of   the   house   were   with   the   entire   family   right

16
from   the   beginning   and   till   today   the   family   is   residing
in   the   house.     Apart   from   that,   the   plaintiff   has
admitted   that   when   he   came   to   Delhi   on   posting   at   All
India Institute of Medical Sciences, he started living in
the   rented   accommodation,   as   there   was   a   paucity   of
accommodation   for   his   stay   in   the   house   in   question.
Thus,   all   the   facts   and   circumstances   indicate   that   it
was   a   family   property   and   not   the   exclusive   property   of
the   plaintiff   �   Dharampal.   Thus,   the   Courts   below   have
acted   not   only   perversely   but   in   a   most   arbitrary   and
illegal   manner,   while   accepting   the   ipse   dixit   of   the
plaintiff   and   in   decreeing   the   suit.     Such   finding   of
facts which are impermissible and perverse cannot be said
to   be   binding.     The   legal   inferences   from   admitted   facts
have not been correctly drawn.
18. Merely   the   fact   that   house   tax   receipt,   electricity
and   water   bills   and   other   documents   are   in   the   name   of
Dharampal   would  carry   the  case   no  further,   as  it   was  the
father   who   got   the   name   changed   of   Kumari   Sneh   Lata   in
question   in   the   name   of   Dharampal.     The   receipts   were
only to be issued in the name of the recorded owner, but
Dharampal never resided in the house as he was in service

17
out   of   Delhi,   obviously,   the   amount   was   paid   by   family,
not   by   Late   Dharampal.   Thus,   we   find   that   no   benefit
could have been derived from the aforesaid documents.
19. In   view   of   the   aforesaid,   we   have   no   hesitation   in
allowing   the   appeals   and   dismiss   the   suit   filed   by   the
plaintiff-respondents.   Thus,   we   order   accordingly.   No
order   as   to   costs.     Pending   application,   if   any,   shall
stand disposed of.
...................J.
[ARUN MISHRA]
...................J.
[UDAY UMESH LALIT]
NEW DELHI
26 TH
 APRIL, 2018

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ITEM NO.9               COURT NO.10               SECTION XIV
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s).4534-4535/2018
VINOD KUMAR DHALL                                  Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
DHARAMPAL DHALL (DECEASED) THROUGH HIS LRS. & ORS. Respondent(s)
Date : 26-04-2018 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
CORAM :
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MISHRA
         HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE UDAY UMESH LALIT
For Appellant(s) Mr. Mahabir Singh,Sr.Adv.
Mr. K.R. Chawla,Adv.
Mr. Ajai Kumar Bhatia,AOR
Mr. Vijay S. Bishnoi,Adv.
                 
For Respondent(s) Mr. E.C. Agrawala,Adv.
Mr. Shwetan K. Sailakwal,Adv.
Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal,Adv.
Mr. Vibhor Verdhan,AOR
                 
          UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
                             O R D E R
The   appeals   are   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed
reportable order.
      (Sarita Purohit)                         (Jagdish Chander)
       Court Master                              Branch Officer
(Signed reportable order is placed on the file) 

whether, the appellants, daughters of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their share on the ground that they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, cannot be treated as coparceners? Alternate question is as to whether, with the passing of Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005, the appellants would become coparcener by birth in their own right in the same manner as the son and are, therefore, entitled to equal share as that of a son? suit for partition - plaintiff filed this suit against his father, his father's brother , his father's sisters and his paternal grandmother who are the sons ,daughters and wife of late Gurulingappa Savadi - stating that the two sons and widow were in joint possession of the aforesaid properties as coparceners and properties mentioned in Schedule B was acquired out of the joint family nucleus in the name of Gurulingappa Savadi. Case set up by him was that the appellants herein were not the coparceners in the said joint family as they were born prior to the enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 - that is maternal aunts - that is daughters' of late Gurulingappa - The trial court, while decreeing the suit held that the appellants were not entitled to any share as they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, could not be considered as coparceners. The trial court also rejected the alternate contention that the appellants had acquired share in the said properties, in any case, after the amendment in the Act vide amendment Act of 2005. - This view of the trial court has been upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgement dated January 25, 2012 thereby confirming the decree dated August 09, 2007 passed in the suit filed for partition. - Apex court held that :- Sec. 6 of Hindu Succession Act - Before amendment - . Devolution of interest in coparcenary property. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left him surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative specified in that class who claims through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation 1 . For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. Explanation 2 . Nothing contained in the proviso to this section shall be construed as enabling a person who had separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the deceased or any of his heirs to claim on intestacy a share in the interest referred to therein. we hold that according to Section 6 of the Act when a coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule to the Act or male relative specified in that class claiming through such female relative, his undivided interest in the Mitakshara coparcenary property would not devolve upon the surviving coparcener, by survivorship but upon his heirs by intestate succession. Explanation 1 to Section 6 of the Act provides a mechanism under which undivided interest of a deceased coparcener can be ascertained and i.e. that the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. It means for the purposes of finding out undivided interest of a deceased coparcener, a notional partition has to be assumed immediately before his death and the same shall devolve upon his heirs by succession which would obviously include the surviving coparcener who, apart from the devolution of the undivided interest of the deceased upon him by succession, would also be entitled to claim his undivided interest in the coparcenary property which he could have got in notional partition. The amended provision reads as under: sec.6 of Hindu Succession Act 2005 . Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.? (1) On and from the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), in a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener shall, (a) by birth become a coparcener in her own right the same manner as the son; (b) have the same rights in the coparcenery property as she would have had if she had been a son; (c) be subject to the same liabilities in respect of the said coparcenery property as that of a son, and any reference to a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect or invalidate any disposition or alienation including any partition or testamentary disposition of property which had taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004. (2) Any property to which a female Hindu becomes entitled by virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents of coparcenary ownership and shall be regarded, notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law for the time being in force, as property capable of being disposed of by her by testamentary disposition. (3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), his interest in the property of a Joint Hindu family governed by the Mitakshara law, shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship, and the coparcenery property shall be deemed to have been divided as if a partition had taken place and, (a) the daughter is allotted the same share as is allotted to a son; (b) the share of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as they would have got had they been alive at the time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and (c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son or of a pre-deceased daughter, as such child would have got had he or she been alive at the time of the partition, shall be allotted to the child of such pre-deceased child of the pre-deceased son or a pre-deceased daughter, as the case may be. Explanation. For the purposes of this sub-section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. (4) After the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), no court shall recognise any right to proceed against a son, grandson or great-grandson for the recovery of any debt due from his father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of the pious obligation under the Hindu law, of such son, grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt: Provided that in the case of any debt contracted before the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), nothing contained in this sub-section shall affect (a) the right of any creditor to proceed against the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or (b) any alienation made in respect of or in satisfaction of, any such debt, and any such right or alienation shall be enforceable under the rule of pious obligation in the same manner and to the same extent as it would have been enforceable as if the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005) had not been enacted. Explanation. For the purposes of clause (a), the expression son, grandson or great-grandson shall be deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be, who was born or adopted prior to the commencement of the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005). (5) Nothing contained in this section shall apply to a partition, which has been effected before the 20th day of December, 2004. Explanation. For the purposes of this section partition means any partition made by execution of a deed of partition duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or partition effected by a decree of a court.] we hold that the rights under the amendment are applicable to living daughters of living coparceners as on 9-9-2005 irrespective of when such daughters are born. Disposition or alienation including partitions which may have taken place before 20-12-2004 as per law applicable prior to the said date will remain unaffected. Any transaction of partition effected thereafter will be governed by the Explanation. The section stipulates that a daughter would be a coparcener from her birth, and would have the same rights and liabilities as that of a son. The daughter would hold property to which she is entitled as a coparcenary property, which would be construed as property being capable of being disposed of by her either by a will or any other testamentary disposition. These changes have been sought to be made on the touchstone of equality, thus seeking to remove the perceived disability and prejudice to which a daughter was subjected. Section 6, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son . It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth . The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth . The section uses the words in the same manner as the son . It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth . It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth . Devolution of coparcenary property is the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and as is well recognized. One of the incidents of coparcenary is the right of a coparcener to seek a severance of status. Hence, the rights of coparceners emanate and flow from birth (now including daughters) as is evident from sub-s (1)(a) and (b). According to the Mitakshara School of Hindu Law all the property of a Hindu joint family is held in collective ownership by all the coparceners in a quasi-corporate capacity. The textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family members then living and thereafter to be born (See Mitakshara, Ch. I. 1-27). The incidents of coparcenership under the Mitakshara law are : first, the lineal male descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on birth ownership in the ancestral properties is common; secondly, that such descendants can at any time work out their rights by asking for partition; thirdly, that till partition each member has got ownership extending over the entire property, conjointly with the rest; fourthly, that as a result of such co-ownership the possession and enjoyment of the properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property is possible unless it be for necessity, without the concurrence of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased member lapses on his death to the survivors. Hence, it is clear that the right to partition has not been abrogated. The right is inherent and can be availed of by any coparcener, now even a daughter who is a coparcener. Apex court held that In the present case, no doubt, suit for partition was filed in the year 2002. However, during the pendency of this suit, Section 6 of the Act was amended as the decree was passed by the trial court only in the year 2007. Thus, the rights of the appellants got crystallised in the year 2005 - On facts, there is no dispute that the property which was the subject matter of partition suit belongs to joint family and Gurulingappa Savadi was propositus of the said joint family property. - In view of our aforesaid discussion, in the said partition suit, share will devolve upon the appellants as well. Since, Savadi died leaving behind two sons, two daughters and a widow, both the appellants would be entitled to 1/5 th share each in the said property. Plaintiff (respondent No.1) is son of defendant No.1. Since, Def.No.1 will have 1/5 th share, it would be divided into five shares on partition i.e. between defendant No.1 , his wife- defendant No.2, his two daughters - defendant Nos.3 and 4 and son/plaintiff (respondent No.1). In this manner, the plaintiff/respondent No.1 would be entitled to 1/25 th share in the property. - The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms and decree of partition shall be drawn by the trial court accordingly.

Hon'ble Mr. Justice Arjan Kumar Sikri 

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 188-189 OF 2018
[@SLP(C) Nos. 10638-10639 of 2013]
DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR. .....APPELLANT(S)
VERSUS
AMAR & ORS. .....RESPONDENT(S)
J U D G M E N T
A.K. SIKRI, J.
The   appellants   herein,   two   in   number,  are   the   daughters   of   one,
Gurulingappa   Savadi,   propositus   of   a   Hindu   Joint   Family.     Apart   from
these   two   daughters,   he   had   two   sons,   namely,  Arunkumar   and   Vijay.
Gurulingappa Savadi died in the year 2001 leaving behind the aforesaid
two daughters, two sons and his widow, Sumitra.  After his death, Amar,
S/o  Arunkumar   filed   the   suit   for   partition   and   a   separate   possession   of
the  suit   property  described  at   Schedule  B  to  E  in  the  plaint  stating  that
the   two   sons   and   widow   were   in   joint   possession   of   the   aforesaid
properties as coparceners and properties mentioned in Schedule B was
acquired   out   of   the   joint   family   nucleus   in   the   name   of   Gurulingappa
Savadi.  Case set up by him was that the appellants herein were not the
coparceners   in   the   said   joint   family   as   they   were   born   prior   to   the

2
enactment of Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as the
�Act�).   It was also pleaded that they were married daughters and at the
time   of   their   marriage   they   had   received   gold   and   money   and   had,
hence, relinquished their share.  
2) The appellants herein contested the suit by claiming that they were also
entitled   to   share   in   the   joint   family   properties,   being   daughters   of
Gurulingappa  Savadi   and  for   the  reason  that   he  had  died   after   coming
into force the Act of 1950. 
3) The trial court, while decreeing the suit held that the appellants were not
entitled to any share as they were born prior to the enactment of the Act
and, therefore, could not be considered as coparceners.   The trial court
also   rejected   the   alternate   contention   that   the   appellants   had   acquired
share in the said properties, in any case, after the amendment in the Act
vide   amendment   Act   of   2005.     This   view   of   the   trial   court   has   been
upheld by the High Court in the impugned judgement dated January 25,
2012   thereby   confirming   the   decree   dated   August   09,   2007   passed   in
the suit filed for partition. 
4) In   the   aforesaid   backdrop,   the   question   of   law   which   arises   for
consideration  in  this  appeal  is  as  to  whether,  the  appellants,   daughters
of Gurulingappa Savadi, could be denied their share on the ground that
they were born prior to the enactment of the Act and, therefore, cannot
be treated as coparceners?  Alternate question is as to whether, with the

3
passing   of   Hindu   Succession   (Amendment)   Act,   2005,   the   appellants
would   become   coparcener   �by   birth�   in   their   �own   right   in   the   same
manner as the son� and are, therefore, entitled to equal share as that of
a son?  
5) Though, we have mentioned the gist of the  lis  involved in this case along
with   brief   factual   background   in   which   it   has   arisen,   some   more   facts
which may be necessary for understanding the genesis of issue involved
may   also   be   recapitulated.     We   may   start   with   the   genealogy   of   the
parties, it is as under:
� Guralingappa=Sumitra
     (Def.8)
---------------------------------------------------------------
Mahandanda    Arunkumar @ Arun=Sarojini Vijay    Danamma
(Def. 7)      (Def.1) (dead)      (Def.2)   (Def.5)  (Def. 6)
----------------------------------------------
       Sheetal      Amar        Triveni
    (Def. 3)       (Plff)   (Def. 4) �
6)   Respondent   No.   1   herein   (the   plaintiff)   filed   the   suit   on   July   01,   2002
claiming 1/15 th
  share in the suit schedule properties. In the said suit, he
mentioned the properties which needed partition.
7) The plaint schedule C compromised of the house properties belonging to
the joint family.  The plaint schedule D comprised of the shop properties

4
belonging   to   the   joint   family.    The   plaint   schedule   E   comprised   of   the
machineries   and   movable   belonging   to   the   joint   family.     The   plaintiff
averred   that   the   plaint   schedule   properties   belonged   to   the   joint   family
and   that   defendant   no.   1,   the   father   of   the   plaintiff   was   neglecting   the
plaintiff   and   his   siblings   and   sought   partition   of   the   suit   schedule
properties.    The  plaintiff  contended  that   all  the  suit   schedule  properties
were the joint family properties.   The plaintiff contended in para 5 of the
plaint that the propositus, Guralingappa died 1 year prior to the filing of
the suit.  In para 7 of the plaint, the plaintiff contended that defendant no.
1 had 1/3 rd
 share and defendant no. 5 and 8 had 1/3 rd
 share each in the
suit schedule properties.   The plaintiff also contended that defendants 6
and 7 did not have any share in the suit schedule properties.
8) Defendant no. 1 (father of the plaintiff) and son of  Guralingappa Savadi
did not file any written statement.   Defendant nos. 2, 3 and 4 filed their
separate   written   statements   supporting   the   claim   of   the   plaintiff.
Defendant   no.   5   (respondent   no.   5   herein   and   son   of   Guralingappa
Savadi), however, contested the suit.  He, inter alia, contended that after
the   death   of   Guralingappa,   an   oral   partition   took   place   between
defendant   no.   1,   defendant   no.   5   and   others   and   in   the   said   partition,
defendant no. 1 was allotted certain properties and defendant no. 5 was
allotted   certain   other   properties   and   defendant   no.   8,   Sumitra,   wife   of
Guralingappa   Savadi   was   allotted   certain   other   properties.     Defendant

5
no.   5   further   contended   that   defendant   nos.   6   and   7   were   not   allotted
any properties in the said alleged oral partition.
9) Defendant   no.   5   further   contended   that   one   of   the   properties,   namely,
C.T.S.   No.   774   and   also   certain   other   properties   were   not   joint   family
properties.
10) The appellants claimed that they were also entitled to their share in
the   property.   After   framing   the   issues   and   recording   the   evidence,   the
trial  court   by  its   judgment   and   decree   dated  August   09,   2007   held   that
the suit schedule properties were joint family properties except CTS No.
774 (one of the house properties in plaint C schedule).
11) The   trial   court   held   that   the   plaintiff,   defendant   nos.   2   to   4   were
entitled to 1/8 th
 share in the joint family properties.  The trial court further
noted that defendant no. 8 (wife of Gurulingappa Savadi) died during the
pendency   of   the   suit   intestate   and   her   share   devolved   in   favour   of
defendants no. 1 and 5 only and, therefore, defendant nos. 1 and 2 were
entitled to � share in the said share.  The trial court passed the following
order:
� The suit of the plaintiff is decreed holding that the plaintiff
is   entitled   for   partition   and   separate   possession   of   his
1/8 th
  share in the suit �B�, �C� and �D� schedule properties
(except   CTS   No.   774)   and   also   in   respect   of   the
Machinery�s   stated   in   the   report   of   the   commissioner.
The commissioners report Ex. P16 which contains the list
of machinery�s to form part of the decree.

6
The defendants 2 to 4 are each entitled to a/8 th
 share and
the   5 th
  defendant   is   entitled   for   4/8   share   in   the   above
said properties.�
12) The trial court, thus, denied any share to the appellants.
13) Aggrieved   by   the   said   judgment   and   decree   of   the   trial   court,   the
defendant nos. 6 and 7 filed an appeal bearing R.F.A.  No. 322 of 2008
before   the   High   Court   seeking   equal   share   as   that   of   the   sons   of   the
propositus, namely, defendant nos. 1 and 5.
14) The High Court by its impugned judgment and order dated January
25,   2012   dismissed   the   appeal.   Thereafter,   on   March   04,   2012
defendant nos. 6 and 7 filed a review petition bearing no. 1533 of 2012
before the High Court, which met the same fate.
15) We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.   Whereas, the
learned counsel for the appellants reiterated his submissions which were
made  before  the  High  Court   as  well  and  noted  above,   learned  counsel
for   the   respondents   refuted   those   submissions   by   relying   upon   the
reason given by the High Court in the impugned judgment.
16) In the first instance, let us take note of the provisions of Section 6
of   the   Act,   as   it   stood   prior   to   its   amendment   by   the   Amendment   Act,
2005.  This provision reads as under:
� 6.   Devolution   of   interest   in   coparcenary   property. �When   a
male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at

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the   time   of   his   death   an   interest   in   a   Mitakshara   coparcenary
property,   his   interest   in   the   property   shall   devolve   by
survivorship   upon   the   surviving   members   of   the   coparcenary
and not in accordance with this Act:
Provided   that,   if   the   deceased   had   left   him   surviving   a
female   relative   specified   in   Class   I   of   the   Schedule   or   a   male
relative specified in that class who claims through such female
relative,   the   interest   of   the   deceased   in   the   Mitakshara
coparcenary   property   shall   devolve   by   testamentary   or
intestate   succession,   as   the   case   may   be,   under   this  Act   and
not by survivorship.
Explanation   1 .�For   the   purposes   of   this   section,   the
interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to
be   the   share   in   the   property   that   would   have   been   allotted   to
him   if   a   partition   of   the   property   had   taken   place   immediately
before   his   death,   irrespective   of   whether   he   was   entitled   to
claim partition or not.
Explanation   2 .�Nothing   contained   in   the   proviso   to   this
section   shall   be   construed   as   enabling   a   person   who   had
separated himself from the coparcenary before the death of the
deceased   or   any   of   his   heirs   to   claim   on   intestacy   a   share   in
the interest referred to therein.�

17) No   doubt,   Explanation   1   to   the   aforesaid   Section   states   that   the
interest   of   the   deceased   Mitakshara   coparcenary   property   shall   be
deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to
him   if   the   partition   of   the   property   had   taken   place   immediately   before
his death, irrespective whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.
This   Explanation   came   up   for   interpretation   before   this   Court   in   Anar
Devi   &   Ors.   v.   Parmeshwari   Devi   &   Ors. 1
.     The   Court   quoted,   with
approval,  the following passage  from  the  authoritative  treatise  of   Mulla,
Principles   of   Hindu   Law,   17 th
  Edn.,   Vol.   II,   p.   250   wherein   the   learned
1   (2006) 8 SCC 656

8
author   made   following   remarks   while   interpreting   Explanation   1   to
Section 6:
�� Explanation   1   defines   the   expression   �the   interest   of   the
deceased   in   Mitakshara   coparcenary   property�   and
incorporates into the subject the concept of a notional partition.
It   is   essential   to   note   that   this   notional   partition   is   for   the
purpose   of   enabling   succession   to   and   computation   of   an
interest, which was otherwise liable to devolve by survivorship
and   for   the   ascertainment   of   the   shares   in   that   interest   of   the
relatives mentioned in Class I of the Schedule. Subject to such
carving   out   of   the   interest   of   the   deceased   coparcener   the
other incidents of the coparcenary are left undisturbed and the
coparcenary can continue without disruption. A statutory fiction
which  treats  an  imaginary  state  of  affairs   as real  requires  that
the consequences and incidents of the putative state of affairs
must flow from or accompany it as if the putative state of affairs
had   in   fact   existed   and   effect   must   be   given   to   the   inevitable
corollaries of that state of affairs.�
7.   The learned author further stated that:
� [T]he operation of the notional partition and its inevitable
corollaries and incidents is to be only for the purposes of
this   section,   namely,   devolution   of   interest   of   the
deceased   in   coparcenary   property   and   would   not   bring
about total disruption of the coparcenary as if there had
in   fact  been   a  regular   partition   and   severance   of  status
among all the surviving coparceners.�
8.  According to the learned author, at pp. 253-54, the undivided
interest
� of   the   deceased   coparcener   for   the   purpose   of   giving
effect   to   the   rule   laid   down   in   the   proviso,   as   already
pointed   out,   is   to   be   ascertained   on   the   footing   of   a
notional   partition   as   of   the   date   of   his   death.   The
determination   of   that   share   must   depend   on   the
number of persons who would have been entitled to a
share   in   the   coparcenary   property   if   a   partition   had   in
fact   taken   place   immediately   before   his   death   and
such   person   would   have   to   be   ascertained   according
to   the   law   of   joint   family   and   partition.   The   rules   of
Hindu   law   on   the   subject   in   force   at   the   time   of   the
death   of   the   coparcener   must,   therefore,   govern   the
question   of   ascertainment   of   the   persons   who   would

9
have been entitled to a share on the notional partition�.

18) Thereafter the Court spelled out the manner in which the statutory
fiction is to be construed by referring to certain judgments and summed
up the position as follows:
� 11.   Thus we hold that according to Section 6 of the Act when a
coparcener dies leaving behind any female relative specified in
Class I of the Schedule to the Act or male relative specified in
that class claiming through such female relative, his undivided
interest   in   the   Mitakshara   coparcenary   property   would   not
devolve   upon   the   surviving   coparcener,   by   survivorship   but
upon   his   heirs   by   intestate   succession.   Explanation   1   to
Section   6   of   the   Act   provides   a   mechanism   under   which
undivided   interest   of   a   deceased   coparcener   can   be
ascertained   and   i.e.   that   the   interest   of   a   Hindu   Mitakshara
coparcener   shall   be   deemed   to   be   the   share   in   the   property
that   would   have   been   allotted   to   him   if   a   partition   of   the
property   had   taken   place   immediately   before   his   death,
irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.
It means for the purposes of finding out undivided interest of a
deceased   coparcener,  a   notional   partition   has   to   be   assumed
immediately before his death and the same shall devolve upon
his   heirs   by   succession   which   would   obviously   include   the
surviving   coparcener   who,   apart   from   the   devolution   of   the
undivided   interest   of   the   deceased   upon   him   by   succession,
would   also   be   entitled   to   claim   his   undivided   interest   in   the
coparcenary   property   which   he   could   have   got   in   notional
partition.�

19) This case clearly negates the view taken by the High Court in the
impugned judgment.
20) That   apart,   we   are   of   the   view   that   amendment   to   the   aforesaid
Section vide Amendment Act, 2005 clinches the issue, beyond any pale
of doubt, in favour of the appellants.  This amendment now confers upon
the  daughter   of   the  coparcener   as  well   the   status   of   coparcener   in   her
own   right   in   the   same   manner   as   the   son   and   gives   same   rights   and

10
liabilities   in   the   coparcener   properties   as   she   would   have   had   if   it   had
been son.  The amended provision reads as under:
� 6. Devolution of interest in coparcenary property.?(1) On and
from   the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession
(Amendment)  Act,   2005   (39   of   2005),   in   a   Joint   Hindu   family
governed by the Mitakshara law, the daughter of a coparcener
shall,?
(a)   by   birth   become   a   coparcener   in   her   own   right   the   same
manner as the son;
(b)   have   the   same   rights   in   the   coparcenery   property   as   she
would have had if she had been a son;
(c)   be   subject   to   the   same   liabilities   in   respect   of   the   said
coparcenery property as that of a son,
and   any   reference   to   a   Hindu   Mitakshara   coparcener   shall   be
deemed to include a reference to a daughter of a coparcener:
Provided that nothing  contained  in this  sub-section  shall
affect   or   invalidate   any   disposition   or   alienation   including   any
partition   or   testamentary   disposition   of   property   which   had
taken place before the 20th day of December, 2004.
(2) Any  property  to  which  a  female  Hindu  becomes  entitled   by
virtue of sub-section (1) shall be held by her with the incidents
of   coparcenary   ownership   and   shall   be   regarded,
notwithstanding anything contained in this Act or any other law
for   the   time   being   in   force,   as   property   capable   of   being
disposed of by her by testamentary disposition.
(3) Where a Hindu dies after the commencement of the Hindu
Succession   (Amendment)  Act,   2005   (39   of   2005),   his   interest
in   the   property   of   a   Joint   Hindu   family   governed   by   the
Mitakshara   law,   shall   devolve   by   testamentary   or   intestate
succession,   as   the   case   may   be,   under   this   Act   and   not   by
survivorship, and the coparcenery property shall be deemed to
have been divided as if a partition had taken place and,?
(a)   the   daughter   is   allotted   the   same   share   as   is   allotted   to   a
son;
(b)   the   share   of   the   pre-deceased   son   or   a   pre-deceased
daughter,  as   they   would   have   got   had   they   been   alive   at   the

11
time of partition, shall be allotted to the surviving child of such
pre-deceased son or of such pre-deceased daughter; and
(c) the share of the pre-deceased child of a pre-deceased son
or   of   a   pre-deceased   daughter,  as   such   child   would   have   got
had   he   or   she   been   alive   at   the   time   of   the   partition,   shall   be
allotted   to   the   child   of   such   pre-deceased   child   of   the
pre-deceased   son   or   a   pre-deceased   daughter,   as   the   case
may be.
Explanation.?For   the   purposes   of   this   sub-section,   the
interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to
be   the   share   in   the   property   that   would   have   been   allotted   to
him   if   a   partition   of   the   property   had   taken   place   immediately
before   his   death,   irrespective   of   whether   he   was   entitled   to
claim partition or not.
(4)   After   the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession
(Amendment) Act, 2005 (39 of 2005), no court shall recognise
any   right   to   proceed   against   a   son,   grandson   or
great-grandson   for   the   recovery   of   any   debt   due   from   his
father, grandfather or great-grandfather solely on the ground of
the   pious   obligation   under   the   Hindu   law,   of   such   son,
grandson or great-grandson to discharge any such debt:
Provided   that   in   the   case   of   any   debt   contracted   before
the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession   (Amendment)
Act,   2005   (39   of   2005),   nothing   contained   in   this   sub-section
shall affect?
(a)   the   right   of   any   creditor   to   proceed   against   the   son,
grandson or great-grandson, as the case may be; or
(b)   any   alienation   made   in   respect   of   or   in   satisfaction   of,   any
such   debt,   and   any   such   right   or   alienation   shall   be
enforceable   under   the   rule   of   pious   obligation   in   the   same
manner   and   to   the   same   extent   as   it   would   have   been
enforceable   as   if   the   Hindu   Succession   (Amendment)   Act,
2005 (39 of 2005) had not been enacted.
Explanation.?For   the   purposes   of   clause   (a),   the
expression   �son�,   �grandson�   or   �great-grandson�   shall   be
deemed to refer to the son, grandson or great-grandson, as the
case   may   be,   who   was   born   or   adopted   prior   to   the
commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession   (Amendment)   Act,
2005 (39 of 2005).
(5)   Nothing   contained   in   this   section   shall   apply   to   a   partition,

12
which   has   been   effected   before   the   20th   day   of   December,
2004.
  Explanation.?For the purposes of this section �partition�
means   any   partition   made   by   execution   of   a   deed   of   partition
duly registered under the Registration Act, 1908 (16 of 1908) or
partition effected by a decree of a court.]�

21) The   effect   of   this   amendment   has   been   the   subject   matter   of
pronouncements   by   various   High   Courts,   in   particular,   the   issue   as   to
whether   the  right  would  be conferred  only  upon  the  daughters  who  are
born after September 9, 2005 when Act came into force or even to those
daughters   who   were   born   earlier.     Bombay   High   Court   in   Vaishali
Satish   Gonarkar   v.   Satish   Keshorao   Gonarkar 2
  had   taken   the   view
that the provision cannot be made applicable to all daughters born even
prior   to   the   amendment,   when   the   Legislature   itself   specified   the
posterior date from which the Act would come into force. This view was
contrary   to   the   view   taken   by   the   same   High   Court   in   Sadashiv
Sakharam Patil  v.  Chandrakant Gopal Desale 3
.  Matter was referred to
the   Full   Bench   and   the   judgment   of   the   Full   Bench   is   reported   as
Badrinarayan   Shankar   Bhandari   v.   Omprakash   Shankar   Bhandari 4
.
The Full Bench held that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 6 would
be  prospective  in operation  whereas  clause (b)  and  (c)  and other  parts
of   sub-section   (1)   as   well   as   sub-section   (2)   would   be   retroactive   in
operation.     It   held   that   amended   Section   6   applied   to   daughters   born
2   AIR 2012 Bom 110
3   2011 (5) Bom CR 726
4   AIR 2014 Bom 151

13
prior   to  June   17,   1956   (the   date   on   which  Hindu   Succession  Act   came
into   force)   or   thereafter   (between   June   17,   1956   and   September   8,
2005)   provided   they   are   alive   on   September   9,   2005   i.e.   on   the   date
when Amended Act, 2005 came into force.  Orissa, Karnataka and Delhi
High Court have also held to the same effect 5
.
22) The   controversy   now   stands   settled   with   the   authoritative
pronouncement   in   the   case   of   Prakash   &   Ors.   v.   Phulavati   &   Ors. 6
which has approved the view taken by the aforesaid High Courts as well
as Full Bench of the Bombay High Court.  Following discussion from the
said judgment is relevant:
� 17.   The   text   of   the   amendment   itself   clearly   provides   that   the
right conferred on a �daughter of a coparcener� is �on and from
the   commencement   of   the   Hindu   Succession   (Amendment)
Act, 2005�. Section 6(3) talks of death after the amendment for
its applicability. In view of plain language of the statute, there is
no   scope  for   a  different   interpretation  than  the  one  suggested
by the text of the amendment. An amendment of a substantive
provision   is   always   prospective   unless   either   expressly   or   by
necessary   intendment   it   is   retrospective.   [ Shyam
Sunder   v.   Ram Kumar , (2001) 8 SCC 24, paras 22 to 27] In the
present case, there is neither any express provision for giving
retrospective   effect   to   the   amended   provision   nor   necessary
intendment   to   that   effect.   Requirement   of   partition   being
registered   can   have   no   application   to   statutory   notional
partition   on   opening   of   succession   as   per   unamended
provision, having regard to nature of such partition which is by
operation   of   law.  The   intent   and   effect   of   the   amendment   will
be considered a little later. On this finding, the view of the High
Court cannot be sustained.
18.   The   contention   of   the   respondents   that   the   amendment
should   be   read   as   retrospective   being   a   piece   of   social
5   AIR 2008 Ori 133: Pravat Chandra Pattnaik v. Sarat Chandra Pattnaik; ILR 2007 Kar
4790: Sugalabai v. Gundappa A. Maradi and 197 (2013) DLT 154: Rakhi Gupta v. Zahoor Ahmad
6   (2016) 2 SCC 36

14
legislation cannot be accepted. Even a social legislation cannot
be   given   retrospective   effect   unless   so   provided   for   or   so
intended by the legislature. In the present case, the legislature
has expressly made the amendment applicable on and from its
commencement and only if death of the coparcener in question
is   after   the   amendment.   Thus,   no   other   interpretation   is
possible   in   view   of   the   express   language   of   the   statute.   The
proviso keeping dispositions or alienations or partitions prior to
20-12-2004   unaffected   can   also   not   lead   to   the   inference   that
the   daughter   could   be   a   coparcener   prior   to   the
commencement   of   the   Act.   The   proviso   only   means   that   the
transactions   not   covered   thereby   will   not   affect   the   extent   of
coparcenary   property   which   may   be   available   when   the   main
provision   is   applicable.   Similarly,   Explanation   has   to   be   read
harmoniously with the substantive provision of Section 6(5) by
being   limited   to   a   transaction   of   partition   effected   after
20-12-2004.   Notional   partition,   by   its   very   nature,   is   not
covered   either   under   the   proviso   or   under   sub-section   (5)   or
under the Explanation.
19.   Interpretation   of   a   provision   depends   on   the   text   and   the
context.   [ RBI   v.   Peerless   General   Finance   &   Investment   Co.
Ltd. , (1987) 1 SCC 424, p. 450, para 33] Normal rule is to read
the words of a statute in ordinary sense. In case of ambiguity,
rational meaning has to be given. [ Kehar Singh   v.   State (Delhi
Admn.) ,   (1988)   3   SCC   609   :   1988   SCC   (Cri)   711]   In   case   of
apparent   conflict,   harmonious   meaning   to   advance   the   object
and   intention   of   legislature   has   to   be   given.   [ District   Mining
Officer v.   T ISCO , (2001) 7 SCC 358]
20.   There   have   been   number   of   occasions   when   a   proviso   or
an   explanation   came   up   for   interpretation.   Depending   on   the
text,   context   and   the   purpose,   different   rules   of   interpretation
have   been   applied.   [ S.   Sundaram   Pillai   v.   V.R.   Pattabiraman ,
(1985) 1 SCC 591]
21.   Normal   rule   is   that  a   proviso  excepts  something  out  of   the
enactment which would otherwise be within the purview of the
enactment   but   if   the   text,   context   or   purpose   so   require   a
different rule may apply. Similarly, an explanation  is to explain
the   meaning   of   words   of   the   section   but   if   the   language   or
purpose   so   require,   the   explanation   can   be   so   interpreted.
Rules   of   interpretation   of   statutes   are   useful   servants   but
difficult   masters.   [ Keshavji   Ravji   &   Co.   v.   CIT ,   (1990)   2   SCC
231   :   1990   SCC   (Tax)   268]   Object   of   interpretation   is   to
discover the intention of legislature.
22.   In this background, we find that the proviso to Section 6(1)

15
and   sub-section   (5)   of   Section   6   clearly   intend   to   exclude   the
transactions   referred   to   therein   which   may   have   taken   place
prior   to   20-12-2004   on   which   date   the   Bill   was   introduced.
Explanation   cannot   permit   reopening   of   partitions   which   were
valid   when   effected.   Object   of   giving   finality   to   transactions
prior   to   20-12-2004   is   not   to   make   the   main   provision
retrospective   in   any   manner.   The   object   is   that   by   fake
transactions available property at the introduction of the Bill is
not   taken   away   and   remains   available   as   and   when   right
conferred   by   the   statute   becomes   available   and   is   to   be
enforced.   Main   provision   of   the   amendment   in   Sections   6(1)
and   (3)   is   not   in   any   manner   intended   to   be   affected   but
strengthened   in   this   way.   Settled   principles   governing   such
transactions  relied   upon  by   the  appellants  are  not  intended  to
be   done   away   with   for   period   prior   to   20-12-2004.   In   no   case
statutory   notional   partition   even   after   20-12-2004   could   be
covered by the Explanation or the proviso in question.
23.   Accordingly,  we   hold   that   the   rights   under   the   amendment
are   applicable   to   living   daughters   of   living   coparceners   as   on
9-9-2005   irrespective   of   when   such   daughters   are   born.
Disposition   or   alienation   including   partitions   which   may   have
taken   place   before   20-12-2004   as   per   law   applicable   prior   to
the   said   date   will   remain   unaffected.   Any   transaction   of
partition   effected   thereafter   will   be   governed   by   the
Explanation.�

23) The law relating to a joint Hindu family governed by the  Mitakshara
law   has   undergone   unprecedented   changes.   The   said   changes   have
been   brought   forward   to   address   the   growing   need   to   merit   equal
treatment   to   the   nearest   female   relatives,   namely   daughters   of   a
coparcener.   The   section   stipulates   that   a   daughter   would   be   a
coparcener from her birth, and would have the same rights and liabilities
as   that   of   a   son.   The   daughter   would   hold   property   to   which   she   is
entitled   as   a   coparcenary   property,   which   would   be   construed   as
property being capable of being disposed of by her either by a will or any
other testamentary disposition. These changes have been sought to be

16
made   on   the   touchstone   of   equality,   thus   seeking   to   remove   the
perceived   disability   and   prejudice   to   which   a   daughter   was   subjected.
The   fundamental   changes   brought   forward   about   in   the   Hindu
Succession Act, 1956 by amending it in 2005, are perhaps a realization
of the immortal words of   Roscoe Pound   as appearing in his celebrated
treaties,   The Ideal Element in Law,   that �the law must be stable and yet
it   cannot   stand   still.   Hence   all   thinking   about   law   has   struggled   to
reconcile the conflicting demands of the need of stability and the need of
change.�
24) Section   6,   as   amended,   stipulates   that   on   and   from   the
commencement   of   the   amended   Act,   2005,   the   daughter   of   a
coparcener shall   by birth   become a coparcener in her own right in   the
same manner as the son . It is apparent that the status conferred upon
sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as
coparceners   since   birth .     The   amended   provision   now   statutorily
recognizes   the   rights   of   coparceners   of   daughters   as   well   since   birth .
The   section   uses   the   words   in   the   same   manner   as   the   son .   It   should
therefore   be   apparent   that   both   the   sons   and   the   daughters   of   a
coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners   by
birth .     It   is   the   very   factum   of   birth   in  a  coparcenary   that   creates  the
coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become
coparceners   by   virtue   of   birth .   Devolution   of   coparcenary   property   is

17
the later stage of and a consequence of death of a coparcener. The first
stage of a coparcenary is obviously its creation as explained above, and
as is well recognized. One of the incidents of coparcenary is the right of
a   coparcener   to   seek   a   severance   of   status.     Hence,   the   rights   of
coparceners  emanate  and  flow  from   birth  (now  including  daughters)   as
is evident from sub-s (1)(a) and (b).
25) Reference to the decision of this Court, in the case of   State Bank
of India  v.  Ghamandi  Ram 7
  in essential to understand the  incidents of
coparceneryship   as   was   always   inherited   in   a   Hindu   Mitakshara
coparcenary:
� According   to   the   Mitakshara   School   of   Hindu   Law   all   the
property of  a Hindu joint  family  is held  in collective  ownership
by   all   the   coparceners   in   a   quasi-corporate   capacity.   The
textual authority of the Mitakshara lays down in express terms
that the joint family property is held in trust for the joint family
members   then   living   and   thereafter   to   be   born   (See
Mitakshara,   Ch.   I.   1-27).   The   incidents   of   coparcenership
under   the   Mitakshara   law   are :   first,   the   lineal   male
descendants of a person up to the third generation, acquire on
birth   ownership   in   the   ancestral   properties   is   common;
secondly, that such descendants can at any time work out
their   rights   by   asking   for   partition;   thirdly,  that   till   partition
each   member   has   got   ownership   extending   over   the   entire
property,   conjointly   with   the   rest;   fourthly,   that   as   a   result   of
such   co-ownership   the   possession   and   enjoyment   of   the
properties is common; fifthly, that no alienation of the property
is  possible   unless  it  be  for  necessity, without  the  concurrence
of the coparceners, and sixthly, that the interest of a deceased
member lapses on his death to the survivors.�
26) Hence, it is clear that the right to partition has not been abrogated.
The right is  inherent  and can be availed of by  any  coparcener,  now
7   AIR 1969 SC 1330.

18
even a daughter who is a coparcener.
27) In the present case, no doubt, suit for partition was filed in the year
2002.     However,  during   the   pendency   of   this   suit,   Section   6   of   the  Act
was   amended   as   the   decree   was   passed   by   the   trial   court   only   in   the
year 2007.  Thus, the rights of the appellants got crystallised in the year
2005 and this event should have been kept in mind by the trial court as
well  as by the High  Court.   This  Court  in   Ganduri  Koteshwaramma  &
Anr.   v.   Chakiri   Yanadi   &   Anr. 8
    held   that   the   rights   of   daughters   in
coparcenary   property   as   per   the   amended   S.   6   are   not   lost   merely
because a preliminary decree has been passed in a partition suit. So far
as partition suits are concerned, the partition becomes final only on the
passing  of  a  final  decree.    Where  such  situation  arises,   the  preliminary
decree would have to be amended taking into account the change in the
law by the amendment of 2005.
28) On   facts,   there   is   no   dispute   that   the   property   which   was   the
subject  matter  of  partition  suit  belongs  to  joint  family  and  Gurulingappa
Savadi   was   propositus   of   the   said   joint   family   property.    In   view   of   our
aforesaid   discussion,   in   the   said   partition   suit,   share   will   devolve   upon
the appellants as well.  Since, Savadi died leaving behind two sons, two
daughters   and   a   widow,   both   the   appellants   would   be   entitled   to   1/5 th
share   each   in   the   said   property.     Plaintiff   (respondent   No.1)   is   son   of
8   (2011) 9 SCC 788

19
Arun Kumar (defendant No.1).   Since, Arun Kumar will have 1/5 th
  share,
it   would   be   divided   into   five   shares   on   partition   i.e.   between   defendant
No.1 Arun Kumar, his wife defendant No.2, his two daughters defendant
Nos.3   and   4   and   son/plaintiff   (respondent   No.1).     In   this   manner,   the
plaintiff/respondent No.1 would be entitled to 1/25 th
 share in the property.
29) The   appeals   are   allowed   in   the   aforesaid   terms   and   decree   of
partition shall be drawn by the trial court accordingly. 
No order as to costs.
.............................................J.
(A.K. SIKRI)
.............................................J.
(ASHOK BHUSHAN)
NEW DELHI;
FEBRUARY 1, 2018.

20
ITEM NO.1501               COURT NO.6               SECTION IV-A
               S U P R E M E  C O U R T  O F  I N D I A
                       RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal  No(s).  188-189/2018
DANAMMA @ SUMAN SURPUR & ANR.                      Appellant(s)
                                VERSUS
AMAR & ORS.                                        Respondent(s)
(HEARD BY HONBLE A.K. SIKRI AND HONBLE ASHOK BHUSHAN, JJ.)
Date : 01-02-2018 These appeals were called on for hearing today.
For Appellant(s)    Mr. S. N. Bhat, AOR
                 
For Respondent(s)
                    Mr. H. Chandra Sekhar, AOR
                 
       
 Hon'ble Mr. Justice A.K. Sikri pronounced the judgment of the
Bench   comprising   His   Lordship   and   Hon'ble   Mr.   Justice   Ashok
Bhushan.
The   appeals   are   allowed   in   terms   of   the   signed   reportable
judgment.
Pending   application(s),   if   any,   stands   disposed   of
accordingly.
(Ashwani Thakur)    (Mala Kumari Sharma )
   COURT MASTER          COURT MASTER
(Signed reportable judgment is placed on the file)