Both the above suits were clubbed together. Evidence was recorded in Original Suit No.32/1974, whereupon, it was held, that the appellant was a cultivating tenant in respect of the above agricultural land, long prior to the notified date (-17.01.1959), and that, the appellant had occupancy rights over the above land, prior to taking over of the ‘Inam Estates’ by the State Government, under the 1948 Act. And further that, with effect from the notified date – 17.01.1959, the relationship of landlord and tenant, between the erstwhile landowner Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu – respondent no.1, and the ryot stood terminated. And that, the appellant was entitled to a “ryotwari patta” for the suit land. This determination was recorded in Original Suit No.32/74, consequent upon the appellant being able to establish the above position, through the evidence of an “archaka” and a “trustee” (P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively), of the temple in question. The appellant was also able to demonstrate, that the appellant and his predecessors-in-interest, were cultivating tenants of the suit land, long prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959. It is in the aforesaid view of the matter, that Original Suit No.32/1974 came to be decreed. 11. As against the above, the Estate Officer, Devasthanam, could not establish the execution of the alleged rent deed (kadapa), dated 29.11.1970, in favour of the appellant. And as such, the Devasthanam could not establish the relationship of landlord and tenant, between Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and the appellant, as alleged. It was therefore, that Suit No.73/1974 was dismissed. The judgment and decree in Original Suit Nos.32/1974 and 73/1974 were passed on 31.10.1977. It is not a matter of dispute between the rival parties, that the aforesaid determination attained finality between the parties.

                                                                  Reportable

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CIVIL APPEAL NO.  11306     2016
                  (Arising out of SLP(C) No.14895 of 2010)

Dokiseela Ramulu
.......Appellant
                                   versus

Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu and others                   .......Respondents




                               J U D G M E N T

Jagdish Singh Khehar, J.

1.    Leave granted.

2.    The present controversy admittedly relates to 1 acre and 80-1/2  cents
of agricultural land.  Out of the above land,  33-1/2  cents  is  in  Survey
No.123/5, and the remaining 1 acre and 47 cents is in  Survey  No.129/2,  of
the  revenue  estate  of  Sangam  Agraharam  Village  in   Vangana   Mandal,
Srikakulam District, in the State of Andhra Pradesh. It is the case  of  the
appellant before this Court, that he is a poor landless  person,  and  that,
his family has been in occupation of the  above  land  for  many  years.  In
fact, it is the appellant’s case, that his forefathers had been  cultivating
the above land, which eventually passed on to him, and members of his  joint
family.
3.    The Rent Reduction Act was applied to Sangam  Agraharam  Village  vide
G.O.M.S.No.3724 dated 31.03.1950.  As indicated above, the land in  question
was a part of Sangam Agraharam village. Sangam village was  declared  as  an
‘Inam Estate’, within the meaning of Section 3(2)(d) of the  Madras  Estates
Land Act.  Eventually the same, was abolished  through  the  Andhra  Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion  into  Ryotwari),  Act  1948
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1948 Act’).
4.    The State Government notified Sangam Agraharam village, under  Section
3 of the 1948 Act, vide Notification No.28 dated 17.01.1959.  It  is  not  a
matter of dispute, that the land which is  subject  matter  of  the  instant
controversy, was notified and published in Part-I of  the  State  of  Andhra
Pradesh Gazette, under the 1948 Act.
5.    On 25.02.1959, the notified land  in  Sangam  Agraharam  village,  was
taken over by the State Government.  The  appellant,  and  before  him,  his
forefathers were cultivating tenants in respect of  the  land  in  question,
for many years prior to the taking over of the  above  land/estate,  by  the
State Government. On and with effect from the notified  date,  the  landlord
and tenant relationship between the appellant and the erstwhile  landlord  –
respondent no.1 (– Sri Sangameswara Swamy  Varu)  herein,  therefore,  stood
terminated statutorily.  The landlord's right thereafter, was  only  limited
to compensation. Possession of such  lands,  was  also  transferred  to  the
State Government, except  land  in  possession  of  persons  entitled  to  a
“ryotwari patta”. A cultivating tenant was  entitled  to  “ryotwari  patta”,
under Section 11 of the 1948 Act. In order to demonstrate the  position,  as
expressed hereinabove, Sections  3  and  11  of  the  said  Act,  are  being
extracted hereunder:
“3. Consequences of Notification of estate:-- With effect on  and  from  the
notified date and save as otherwise expressly provided in this Act-

(a) the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Permanent Settlement Regulation,  1802,
the Estates Land Act, and all enactments applicable to the  estate  as  such
except the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates  Land  (Reduction  of  Rent)
Act, 1947, shall be deemed to have been repealed  in  their  application  to
the estate;

(b) the entire  estate  (including  minor  inams  (post-settlement  or  pre-
settlement) included in the assets of the zamindari estate at the  permanent
settlement of that estate; all communal lands  and  porambokes;  other  non-
ryoti lands; waste lands; pasture lands; lanka  lands;  forests;  mines  and
minerals;  quarries;  rivers  and  streams;  tanks  and  irrigation   works;
fisheries; and ferries), shall stand transferred to the Government and  vest
in them, free of all encumbrances; and  the  Andhra  Pradesh  (Andhra  Area)
Revenue Recovery Act, 1864, the  Andhra  Pradesh  (Andhra  Area)  Irrigation
Cess Act, 1865 and all other enactments applicable to ryotwari  areas  shall
apply to the estate;

(c) all rights and interests created  in  or  over  the  estate  before  the
notified date by the Government cease and determine;

(d) the Government may, after removing any obstruction that may be  offered,
forthwith take possession  of  the  estate,  and  all  accounts,  registers,
pattas, muchilikas, maps, plans and other documents relating to that  estate
which the Government may require for the administration thereof:

Provided that the Government shall not dispossess any person of any land  in
the estate in respect  of  which  they  consider  that  he  is  prima  facie
entitled to a ryotwari patta –

(i) if such person is  a  ryot,  pending  the  decision  of  the  Settlement
Officer as to whether he is actually entitled to such patta;

(ii) if such person is a landholder pending the decision of  the  Settlement
Officer and the Tribunal on appeal, if any, to  it,  as  to  whether  he  is
actually entitled to such patta;

(e) the principal or any other landholder and any other person whose  rights
stand transferred under clause (b) or cease and determine under clause  (c),
shall be entitled only to compensation from the Government  as  provided  in
this Act;

(f) the relationship of landholder  and  ryot  shall  as  between  them,  be
extinguished;

(g) ryots in the estate and persons holding under  them  shall,  as  against
the Government, be entitled only  to  such  rights  and  privileges  as  are
recognized or conferred on them by or under this Act, and any  other  rights
and privileges which may have accrued to  them  in  the  estate  before  the
notified date against the principal or any other  landholder  thereof  shall
cease and determine and shall not be enforceable against the  Government  or
such landholder.
            xxx             xxx              xxx
11. Lands in which ryot is entitled to ryotwari patta :-
Every ryot in an estate shall, with effect on and from  the  notified  date,
be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of –

(a) all ryoti  lands  which,  immediately  before  the  notified  date  were
properly included or ought to have been properly  included  in  his  holding
and which are not either  lanka  lands  or  lands  in  respect  of  which  a
landholder or some other person is entitled to a ryotwari  patta  under  any
other provision of this Act; and

(b) all lanka lands in his occupation immediately before the notified  date,
such lands having been in his occupation or in that of his  predecessors-in-
title continuously from the 1st day of July, 1939;

Provided that no person who has been admitted into possession  of  any  land
by a landholder on or after the first day of July, 1945 shall, except  where
the Government, after an examination  of  all  the  circumstances  otherwise
direct, be entitled to a ryotwari patta in respect of such land.

Explanation:-- No lessee of any lanka and no  person  to  whom  a  right  to
collect the rent of any land has  been  leased  before  the  notified  date,
including an jaradar or a farmer on rent,  shall  be  entitled  to  ryotwari
patta in respect of such land under this section.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

6.    The appellant having felt threatened of being  dispossessed  from  the
above agricultural land, over which he  was  a  “ryotwari  pattadar”,  filed
Original Suit No.32/1974 before  the  District  Munsif,  at  Palakonda.  The
appellant prayed for a declaration, that the land in question,  was  a  part
of Sangam Agraharam village, to  which  the  Rent  Reduction  Act  had  been
applied vide G.O.M.S.No.3724 dated  31.03.1950,  and  further,  that  Sangam
Agraharam village was an ‘Inam Estate’ within the meaning  of  Section  3(2)
of the Madras Estates Land Act, and hence, was subject to the provisions  of
the 1948 Act.  And  that,  the  ‘Inam  Estate’  stood  abolished  after  the
enactment of the 1948 Act.  The appellant also prayed for an injunction,  so
as to restrain the erstwhile landlord – respondent no.1 (– Sri  Sangameswara
Swamy Varu) from interfering with the appellant's possession.
7.    Simultaneously, Suit No.73/1974  was  filed  by  the  Estate  Officer,
Devasthanam,  asserting  that  the  deity  Sri  Sangameswara  Swamy  Varu  –
respondent no.1, was the absolute owner of the land  in  question,  situated
in Sangam Agraharam village.  It was also the case of the Devasthanam,  that
the appellant was inducted into the above land, at an agreed rent of Rs.103-
78 per year.  It was  the  case  of  Devasthanam,  that  the  appellant  had
executed a kadapa (rent-deed) in favour of the Devasthanam,  on  29.11.1970.
And that, the appellant had been cultivating the  above  land  as  a  tenant
under, the Devasthanam.  Since the appellant had  allegedly  failed  to  pay
rent for the years 1970-71 to 1972-73, despite several demands made  by  the
Devasthanam, the above suit was filed for  the  recovery  of  an  amount  of
Rs.311-34 being rent/damages, for use of the land in  question,   and  also,
for interest and cost thereon.
8.    In Original Suit No.32/1974, filed by  the  appellant,  the  following
issues were framed:
“1.   Whether the plaintiff is entitled to the injunction prayed for?
2.    Whether the suit is framed is not maintainable?
3.    To what relief?”

7.    The following additional issue is framed on 1-8-77:-

      “Whether the plaintiff is entitled for the declaration prayed  in  the
suit?”

9.    In Suit No.73/1974, filed by respondent  no.1,  the  following  issues
were framed:-
“1)    Whether  the  plaintiff  is  entitled  to  collect  rents  from   the
defendant?
2)    Whether the defendant acquired occupancy rights  over  the  lands  for
which rent is claimed?
3)    To what relief?”

10.     Both the above suits were clubbed together.  Evidence  was  recorded
in Original Suit No.32/1974, whereupon, it was held, that the appellant  was
a cultivating tenant in respect of the above agricultural land,  long  prior
to the notified date (-17.01.1959), and that, the  appellant  had  occupancy
rights over the above land, prior to taking over of the  ‘Inam  Estates’  by
the State Government, under the 1948 Act.  And  further  that,  with  effect
from the notified date  –  17.01.1959,  the  relationship  of  landlord  and
tenant, between the  erstwhile  landowner  Sri  Sangameswara  Swamy  Varu  –
respondent no.1, and the ryot stood terminated. And that, the appellant  was
entitled to a “ryotwari patta” for the suit land.   This  determination  was
recorded in Original Suit No.32/74,  consequent  upon  the  appellant  being
able to establish the above position, through the evidence of  an  “archaka”
and a “trustee” (P.W.2 and P.W.3 respectively), of the temple  in  question.
The appellant was also able to  demonstrate,  that  the  appellant  and  his
predecessors-in-interest, were cultivating tenants of the  suit  land,  long
prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959.  It is in  the  aforesaid  view  of
the matter, that Original Suit No.32/1974 came to be decreed.
11.   As against the above,  the  Estate  Officer,  Devasthanam,  could  not
establish  the  execution  of  the  alleged  rent   deed   (kadapa),   dated
29.11.1970, in favour of the appellant. And as such, the  Devasthanam  could
not  establish  the  relationship  of  landlord  and  tenant,  between   Sri
Sangameswara Swamy Varu and the appellant, as alleged.   It  was  therefore,
that Suit No.73/1974 was dismissed.  The judgment  and  decree  in  Original
Suit Nos.32/1974 and 73/1974 were passed on 31.10.1977.  It is not a  matter
of dispute between the  rival  parties,  that  the  aforesaid  determination
attained finality between the parties.
12.   Whilst the claim of the appellant before this Court, was  based  on  a
collective reading of Sections 3 and 11 of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Area)
Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion  into  Ryotwari)  Act,  1948   (already
extracted above), the claim of the Estate Officer,  Devasthanam  (on  behalf
of Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu) was  based  on  Section  82  of  the  Andhra
Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions & Endowments  Act,  1987
(hereinafter referred to as ‘the 1987 Act’).  Section 82 aforementioned,  is
being extracted hereunder:
“82. Lease  of  Agricultural  Lands:-(1)  Any  lease  of  agricultural  land
belonging to or given or endowed for  the  purpose  of  any  institution  or
endowment subsisting  on  the  date  of  commencement  of  this  Act  shall,
notwithstanding anything in any other law for the time being in force,  held
by a person who is not a landless poor person stand cancelled.

(2) In respect of leases  of  agricultural  lands  other  than  those  lands
situated in Municipalities and Municipal Corporations held by landless  poor
person for not less than six years continuously, such person shall have  the
to purchase such lands for a consideration of seventy  five  per  centum  of
the prevailing market value of similarly  situated  lands  at  the  time  of
purchase and such consideration shall be paid in four equal  instalments  in
the manner prescribed. Such sale may be effected otherwise than  by  tender-
cum-public auction:

Provided that if such small  and  marginal  farmers  who  are  not  able  to
purchase the land will continue as tenants provided, if they  agree  to  pay
at least two third of the market rent for similarly placed  lands  as  lease
amount.

Explanation:- For the purpose of this  sub-section  ‘landless  poor  person’
means a person whose total extent of land held by him either as owner or  as
cultivating tenant or as both does not exceed  1.011715  hectares  (two  and
half acres) of wet land or 2.023430 hectares (five acres) of  dry  land  and
whose monthly income other than from such lands  does  not  exceed  thousand
rupees per mensum or twelve thousand rupees per  annum.  However,  those  of
the tenants who own residential property exceeding two hundred square  yards
in Urban Area shall not be considered as landless poor for  the  purpose  of
purchase of endowments property.

Explanation II:- For the purpose of this  sub-section,  small  and  marginal
farmer means a person who being a lessee  is  holding  lands  in  excess  of
acres 0.25 cents of wet land or acres 0.50 cents of dry land over and  above
the ceiling limits of acres 2.50 wet or acres  5.00  dry  land  respectively
they may be allowed to continue in lease subject  to  payment  of  2/3rd  of
prevailing market rent and excess land held  if  any  more  than  the  above
limits shall be put in public auction.

(3) The authority to sanction  the  lease  or  licence  in  respect  of  any
property or any or interest thereon belonging to or  given  or  endowed  for
the purpose of any charitable or religious  institution  or  endowment,  the
manner in which and the period for which such  lease  or  licence  shall  be
such as may be prescribed.

(4) Every lease or  licence  of  any  immovable  property,  other  than  the
Agricultural land belonging to, or given or endowed for the purpose  of  any
charitable or religious institution or endowment subsisting on the  date  of
the commencement of this Act, shall continue to be in force subject  to  the
rules as may be prescribed under sub-section (3).

(5) The provisions of the Andhra Pradesh (Andhra  Area)  Tenancy  Act,  1956
(Act XVIII of 1956) and the Andhra  Pradesh  (Telangana  Area)  Tenancy  and
Agricultural Lands Act, 1950 (Act XXI of 1950) shall not apply to any  lease
of land belonging to or given or endowed for the purpose of  any  charitable
or religious institutions or endowment as defined in this Act.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

The case of respondent no.1 – Sri  Sangameswara  Swamy  Varu  is,  that  any
lease of agricultural land belonging  to,  or  given,  or  endowed  for  the
purpose  of  any  institution  or  endowment,  subsisting  on  the  date  of
commencement of the instant Act, shall stand cancelled.   Based  on  Section
82, it was asserted,  that  all  existing  rights  in  the  appellant  would
automatically stand terminated on the coming into force of the 1987 Act.
13.   In order to support his aforestated contention,  learned  counsel  for
the respondent institution placed reliance on  Muddada  Chayanna  v.  Karnam
Narayana, AIR 1979 SC 1320, on the following:
“3. It is not disputed that the lands are situated in Bhommika  village.  It
is not also disputed that Bhommika village was in Inam estate  and  that  it
was taken over by the Government under the provisions of the Andhra  Pradesh
(Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and  Conversion  into  Ryotwari)  Act.  The
appellant claims that he is the lawful ryot of  the  lands  in  dispute  and
that the respondents are his tenants. On  the  other  hand  the  respondents
claim that they are the lawful ryots of the holding. The question  at  issue
between the parties therefore is, whether the appellant or  the  respondents
are the lawful ryots of the holding.  Under  Sec.  56(1)(c)  of  the  Andhra
Pradesh (Andhra Area) Estates (Abolition and Conversion into  Ryotwari)  Act
"where, after an estate is notified, a dispute arises as to (a) whether  any
rent due from a ryot for any fasli year is in arrear or (b) what  amount  of
rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot in respect of any  holding  is,
the dispute shall be decided  by  the  Settlement  Officer".  Section  56(2)
provides for an  appeal  to  the  Estates  Abolition  Tribunal  against  the
decision of the Settlement Officer and further provides  that  the  decision
of the Tribunal shall be final and shall not be liable to be  questioned  in
any Court of law. Prima facie, therefore, the question  as  to  who  is  the
lawful ryot of any holding, if such question arises for  decision  after  an
estate is notified, has to be resolved by the Settlement Officer and by  the
Estates Abolition Tribunal under Secs. 56(1)(c)  and  56(2)  of  the  Andhra
Pradesh Estates Abolition Act. The Andhra Pradesh Estates Abolition  Act  is
a self contained code in which provision is also made for  the  adjudication
of various types of  disputes  arising  after  an  estate  is  notified,  by
specially  constituted  Tribunals.  On  general  principles,   the   special
Tribunals constituted by the Act must necessarily be held to have  exclusive
jurisdiction to decide disputes entrusted by the statute to them  for  their
adjudication.
            xxx             xxx              xxx
5. A brief resume of the provisions of  the  Andhra  Pradesh  (Andhra  Area)
Estates (Abolition and  Conversion  into  Ryotwari)  Act  relevant  for  our
present purpose is permissible here. As stated in the preamble the  Act  was
enacted  to  provide  for  the  repeal  of  the  Permanent  Settlement,  the
acquisition of  the  Rights  of  land-holders  in  permanently  settled  and
certain other estates and the introduction of  the  ryotwari  settlement  in
such estates. Section 1(4) provides for  the  notification  of  estates  and
Sec. 3 enumerates the consequences of notifying an estate  under  Sec.  1(4)
of the Act. In particular Sec. 3(b) provides that the  entire  estate  shall
stand  transferred  to  the  Government  and  vest  in  them  free  of   all
encumbrances. Section 3(c) provides that all rights  and  interests  created
in/or over the estate by  the  land-holder  shall  cease  and  determine  as
against the  Government.  Section  3(d)  empowers  the  Government  to  take
possession of the estate but saves from dispossession  any  person  who  the
Government considers is prima facie entitled to a ryotwari patta  until  the
question whether he is actually entitled to such patta  is  decided  by  the
Settlement Officer in the case of a ryot or by the  Settlement  Officer  and
the Tribunal on appeal in the case of a land-holder. Section  3(f)  provides
that the relationship of the landholder and ryot shall, as between them,  be
extinguished. Section 3(g) provides that  ryots  in  the  estate  shall,  as
against the Government be entitled only to such  rights  and  privileges  as
are recognised or conferred on them by or under the Act. Section 11  confers
on every ryot in an estate the right to obtain a ryotwari patta  in  respect
of ryoti land which was included or ought  to  have  been  included  in  his
holding on the notified date. Sections 12, 13 and 14  confer  on  the  land-
holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of private land in  a
Zamindari,  Inam  and  Under-tenure  estate  respectively.   Section   15(1)
provides for enquiry by the Settlement Officer into claims by a  land-holder
for a ryotwari patta, Under Secs. 12, 13 and 14. Section 15(2) provides  for
an appeal to the Tribunal from the decision of the  Settlement  Officer  and
it declares that the decision of the Tribunal shall be final and not  liable
to be questioned in any Court of law. Section 16 imposes  on  every  person,
whether a land-holder or a ryot who becomes entitled  to  a  ryotwari  patta
under the Act  in  respect  of  any  land,  the  liability  to  pay  to  the
Government the  assessment  that  may  be  lawfully  imposed  on  the  land.
Sections 21 to  23  provide  for  the  survey  of  estates,  the  manner  of
affecting ryotwari settlement and the  determination  of  the  land-revenue.
Secs. 55 to 68 occur under the heading "Miscellaneous". Section 55  provides
for the collection of rent which  had  accrued  before  the  notified  date.
Section 56 provides for the decision of certain disputes  arising  after  an
estate is notified. It provides for the decision of  a  dispute  as  to  (a)
whether any rent due from a ryot for any fasli year  is  in  arrear  or  (b)
what amount of rent is in arrear or (c) who the lawful ryot  in  respect  of
any holding is. The dispute is required to  be  decided  by  the  Settlement
Officer. Against the decision  of  the  Settlement  Officer,  an  appeal  is
provided to the Tribunal and the decision of the Tribunal is declared  final
and not liable to be questioned in any Court of law.

6. Now the Act broadly confers on every tenant in an  estate  the  right  to
obtain a ryotwari patta in respect of ryoti lands  which  were  included  or
ought to have been included in his holding before the notified date  and  on
the land-holder the right to obtain a ryotwari patta  in  respect  of  lands
which belonged to him before the notified date as  his  private  lands.  The
Act makes express provision for the determination of claims  by  landholders
for the grant of ryotwari patta in respect of the alleged private lands.  If
there is provision for the determination of the claims of a  landholder  for
the grant of ryotwari  patta  in  respect  of  his  alleged  private  lands,
surely, in  an  Act  aimed  at  the  abolition  of  intermediaries  and  the
introduction of ryotwari settlement, there  must  be  a  provision  for  the
determination of the claims of  ryots  for  the  grant  of  ryotwari  patta.
Section 56(1) is clearly such a  provision.  But  in Cherukuru  Muthayya  v.
Gadde Gopalakrishnayya (AIR 974 Andh Pra  85)  (FB)  it  was  held  that  an
enquiry as to  who  was  the  lawful  ryot  was  permissible  under  Section
56(1)(c) for the limited purpose of fastening the liability  to  pay  arrear
of rent which had accrued before a notified date and for no  other  purpose.
The conclusion of the Full Bench was based entirely on the supposed  context
in which the provision occurs. The learned Judges held  that  Sec.  56(1)(c)
occurred so closely on the heels of S. 55 and S. 56(1)(a) and (b), that  the
applicability  of  Sec.  56(1)(c)  must  be  held  to  be  "intimately   and
integrally connected" with those provisions. We think that the  approach  of
the Full Bench was wrong. Apart from the fact that Secs.  55  and  56(1)(a),
(b) and (c) occur under  the  heading  "Miscellaneous",  and,  therefore,  a
contextual interpretation may not  be  quite  appropriate,  the  Full  Bench
overlooked the serious anomaly created by its  conclusion.  The  anomaly  is
that while express provision is  found  in  Sec.  15  of  the  Act  for  the
adjudication of claims by land-holders for the  grant  of  ryotwari  pattas,
there is, if the Full Bench is correct, no provision  for  the  adjudication
of claims by ryots for the grant of ryotwari  pattas.  It  would  indeed  be
anomalous and ludicrous and  reduce  the  Act  to  an  oddity,  if  the  Act
avowedly aimed at reform by the conferment of ryotwari pattas on  ryots  and
the abolition of intermediaries, is to be held not to contain any  provision
for the determination of the vital question as to who was  the  lawful  ryot
of a holding.   The object of the Act is to protect ryots and not  to  leave
them in the wilderness.  When  the  Act  provides  a  machinery  in  Section
56(1)(c) to discover who the lawful ryot of a holding was,  it  is  not  for
the Court to denude the Act of all meaning by confining  the  provisions  to
the bounds of Secs. 55 and 56(1)(a) and (b) on  the  ground  of  "contextual
interpretation". Interpretation of a statute, contextual or  otherwise  must
further and not frustrate the object of the statute. We are,  therefore,  of
the view that Cherukuru  Muthayya  v.  Gadde  Gopalakrishnayya  (supra)  was
wrongly decided in so far as it  held  that  ambit  of  Sect.  56(1)(c)  was
controlled by Sec. 55 and S. 56(1)(a) and (b). We do not think it  necessary
to  consider  the  matter  in  further  detail  in  view  of  the  elaborate
consideration which has been given to the case by the later  Full  Bench  of
five Judges of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh in T.  Munnaswami  Naidu  v.
R. Venkata Reddi (AIR 1978 Andhra Pra 200) except to add that to  adopt  the
reasoning of the Full Bench of three Judges, in Cherukuru Muthayya v.  Gadde
Gopalakrishnayya  would  lead  to   conflict   of   jurisdiction   and   the
implementation of the Act would be thrown into disarray.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

14.    We  have  given  our  thoughtful  consideration  to  the  submissions
advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the rival  parties.   First
and foremost, it needs to be determined, whether there is an existing  lease
of agricultural land  between  the  appellant  and  respondent  no.1  –  Sri
Sangameswara Swamy Varu.  It is only if there was a  subsisting  lease  when
the 1987 Act was promulgated, Section 82 can be invoked.  We are  satisfied,
that consequent upon issuance of a  notification  under  Section  3  of  the
Andhra  Pradesh  (Andhra  Area)  Estates  (Abolition  and  Conversion   into
Ryotwari), Act 1948 on 17.01.1959, the agricultural land in question in  the
revenue Estate of  Sangam Agraharam village, was duly declared as  an  ‘Inam
Estate’.  The right of the appellant  in  the  aforesaid  ‘Inam  Estate’  is
obviously dependent on  the  determination  of  the  tenancy  claim  of  the
appellant prior to 17.01.1959, i.e., the notified date.  Insofar as  instant
issue is concerned, Original Suit No.32/1974 was decreed in  favour  of  the
appellant, and it was duly declared that the appellant was in possession  of
the land in question.  The appellant and his ancestors were also held to  be
in continuous possession of the land in question, well before  the  notified
date – 17.01.1959.  That being the position, in terms of Section 11  of  the
1948 Act,  the  appellant  automatically  became  entitled  to  a  “ryotwari
patta”.  We say so because, it is only when the  possession  and  occupation
of the agricultural land is subsequent to the first day of July, 1945,  that
the State Government would examine  the  circumstances  of  each  case,  and
thereupon, in an appropriate case, issue a direction, that “ryotwari  patta”
was to be extended to the tenant of such agricultural land.  However,  since
Original Suit No.32/1974 clearly declared, that  the  agricultural  land  in
question was under the tenancy of  the  appellant  and  his  ancestors  well
prior to the notified date – 17.01.1959,  the  appellant  was  automatically
entitled to “ryotwari patta”, in respect of the land in question.
15.   Having concluded as above, we are satisfied, that Section  82  of  the
1987 Act, is inapplicable to the present controversy, because the  appellant
cannot be treated as a lease holder of agricultural land  belonging  to,  or
given, or endowed for purpose of any institution  or  endowment,  subsisting
on the date of commencement of the 1987 Act,  namely,  on  21.04.1987.   The
above position also emerges from the dismissal of Suit No.73/1974  filed  by
the Estate Officer, Devasthanam, wherein the assertion  made  on  behalf  of
Sri  Sangameswara  Swamy  Varu,  that  there  existed  a   landlord   tenant
relationship with the appellant herein, on the basis of  an  alleged  kadapa
(rent-deed)  dated  29.11.1970,  was  rejected.    The   aforesaid   finding
admittedly assumed finality between the parties.  For the above reason,  the
reliance placed on the judgment in the Muddada Chayanna case (supra), is  of
no avail to the respondent institution, because in the  above  judgment  the
undisputed position noticed in paragraph 3 (extracted above) was,  that  the
appellant was the lawful ryot  of  the  lands  in  dispute,  and  that,  the
respondents were his tenants.  The appellant herein, is not  the  tenant  of
Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu.
16.   It is also relevant for us to notice, that  in  order  to  escape  the
binding liability emerging out of the judgment and decree  dated  31.10.1977
(passed in Original Suit Nos. 32 of  1974  and  73  of  1974),  wherein  the
relationship between the appellant and the Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu,  was
held to be not as of tenant and landlord,  learned  counsel  for  respondent
no.1, vehemently contended, that the civil courts  had  no  jurisdiction  in
the matter, and as such, the appellant could not  derive  any  benefit  from
the above judgment.  It is not necessary for us to deal in any detail,  with
the  provisions  relied  upon  by  learned  counsel,  because  the   precise
submission advanced on behalf of respondent no.1, was examined in  State  of
Tamil Nadu v. Ramalinga Samigal Madam, (1985) 4 SCC 10, wherein  this  Court
held as under:
“12.  Now  turning  to  the  question  raised  in  these  appeals  for   our
determination  (it is true that Section 64-C of the Act  gives  finality  to
the orders   passed by  the Government  or other authorities in  respect  of
the matters  to be determined by them under  the Act   and  sub-section  (2)
thereof provides that no such orders shall be  called  in  question  in  any
court of law. Even so, such a provision by itself is not, having  regard  to
the two propositions quoted  above  from   Dhulabhai's  case  (1968)  3  SCR
662,  decisive   on  the   point   of   ouster   of   the    Civil   Court's
jurisdiction  and several  other  aspects  like  the  scheme  of   the  Act,
adequacy and sufficiency of  remedies provided by it etc., will have  to  be
considered  to  ascertain  the  precise   intendment  of   the  Legislature.
Further, having  regard  to   the  vital   difference  indicated  above,  in
between the two sets of provisions dealing  with grant  of  ryotwari  pattas
to  landholders  on  the  one  hand  and  ryots  on  the   other   different
considerations may arise while deciding the issue of  the  ouster  of  Civil
Court's jurisdiction to adjudicate upon the  true nature  of  character   of
the concerned land. Approaching the  question from this  angle  it  will  be
seen in the first  place that  Section 64-C itself in  terms  provides  that
the finality  to the  orders passed  by  the   authorities   in  respect  of
the matters to be determined by them under the Act is "for the purposes   of
this Act" and not generally nor for any other  purpose.  As  stated  earlier
the main object and purpose of the Act is to abolish all the estates of  the
intermediaries like Zamindars, Inamdars, Jagirdars or  under-tenure  holders
etc. and  to  convert  all  land-holdings  in  such  estates  into  ryotwari
settlements  which  operation  in  revenue  parlance  means  conversion   of
alienated lands into non-alienated lands, that is to  say,  to  deprive  the
intermediaries of their right to collect all  the  revenues  in  respect  of
such lands and vesting the same back in the Government.  The  enactment  and
its several provisions are thus intended to serve the  revenue  purposes  of
the Government, by way of securing to the Government its sovereign right  to
collect all the revenues from all the lands and to facilitate  the  recovery
thereof by the Government and in that process, if necessary,  to  deal  with
claims of occupants of lands, nature of the lands,  etc.  only  incidentally
in a summary manner and that too for identifying and registering persons  in
the revenue records from whom such recovery of revenue is to  be  made.  The
object of granting a ryotwari patta is also  to  enable  holder  thereof  to
cultivate the land  specified  therein  directly  under  the  Government  on
payment to it of such assessment or cess that may  be  lawfully  imposed  on
the land. Section  16 is  very  clear  in  this  behalf  which  imposes  the
liability to pay such ryotwari or other assessment imposed upon the land  to
the Government by the patta-holder. The  expression  "for  the  purposes  of
this Act" has been designedly used in the section which  cannot  be  ignored
but must be given cogent meaning and on  a  plain  reading  of  the  section
which uses such expression  it  is  clear  that  any  order  passed  by  the
Settlement Officer either granting or refusing to grant a ryotwari patta  to
a ryot under Section 11 of the Act must be regarded as  having  been  passed
to achieve the purposes of the Act, namely, revenue  purposes,  that  is  to
say for fastening the liability on him to pay the assessment or  other  dues
and to facilitate the recovery of such revenue from him by  the  Government;
and therefore any decision impliedly rendered on the  aspect  of  nature  or
character of the  land  on  that  occasion  will  have  to  be  regarded  as
incidental to and merely for the purpose of passing the  order  of  granting
or refusing to grant the patta and for no other purpose.”
                                                         (emphasis supplied)

For reason of the above legal position declared by this  Court,  it  is  not
possible to accept, that the judgment and decree dated 31.10.1977,  was  not
binding on the Sri Sangameswara Swamy Varu.
17.   It is also not possible for us to accept, that  the  claim  raised  by
the appellant was barred by limitation. It was never in dispute between  the
parties, that the appellant was in  possession  of  the  land.   Only  that,
respondent no.1 claimed that the appellant was in possession  of  the  land,
as its tenant.   Our  instant  determination  on  the  issue  of  limitation
emerges  from  the  fact,  that  the  appellant  had   preferred   Execution
Application No.18/2007 when respondent no.1  allegedly  tried  to  interfere
with the possession of the agricultural land  in  question,  on  06.07.2005.
There was no justification for determining  limitation,  with  reference  to
the date when the decree  in  Original  Suit  No.32/1974  was  passed.   The
relevant  date  for  determining  limitation  was   06.07.2005,   when   the
appellant's possession was  allegedly  threatened.   Viewed  as  above,  the
claim raised by the appellant, was certainly not barred by limitation.
18.   Having concluded as above, we  are  of  the  view,  that  the  instant
appeal deserves to be allowed, and the same is accordingly allowed, and  the
impugned order passed by the High Court is set aside.



                                                                        ……..
.....................................J.
               (JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR)




      …….......................................J.
                           (ARUN MISHRA)

New Delhi;
November 29, 2016.



-----------------------
16

The authorities could not and should not have relied upon said enquiry report as basis in fresh enquiry for holding the appellant guilty of the charge and to award punishment of withholding of pension and gratuity. In the circumstances, we do not find that there was sufficient reason for the respondent authorities to exercise the powers under Rule 43 (b) read with Rule 139 of Bihar Pension Rules as neither there was pecuniary loss to the State, nor the present case is of a grave misconduct on the part of the appellant. 13. For the reasons as discussed above, we are inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court. Therefore, the appeal is allowed. The orders dated 24.09.1997 and 17.06.1998, passed by the respondent authorities shall stand quashed. No order as to costs.

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3829 OF 2011


Bindeshwari Chaudhary                              …  Appellant

                                   Versus

State   of   Bihar   &   Ors.                                              …
Respondents







                               J U D G M E N T

Prafulla C. Pant, J.


      This appeal is directed against judgment and order  dated  20.05.2008,
passed by High Court of Judicature at Patna, whereby Letters  Patent  Appeal
No. 436 of 2000 was disposed of allowing respondent authorities to  withhold
50% of gratuity and 50% of pension, of the appellant.

2.    Brief facts  of  the  case  are  that  appellant  who  was  posted  as
Executive Engineer with Irrigation Department of  State  of  Bihar,  in  the
District of Singhbhum, awarded a contract on 29.08.1989  to  one  M/s.  D.K.
Road Lines, for bed and slope lining of canal in Galudih. In  terms  of  the
contract, the contractor was required to furnish  bank  guarantee,  and  the
same was submitted by him for an  amount  of  Rs.23,61,500/-.  In  order  to
verify the genuineness of the bank guarantee furnished  by  the  contractor,
the appellant sent his Accounts Clerk to Punjab &  Sindh  Bank,  Jamshedpur,
with letter dated 29.08.1989 (Annexure-P1).  In  response  to  said  letter,
appellant received letter dated 01.09.1989  (Annexure-P-3)  from  Shri  T.S.
Gandhok, Branch Manager of the bank,  confirming  the  bank  guarantee.  The
appellant made payment of Rs.15,00,000/- on 02.09.1989 towards  mobilization
advance to the contractor. On 04.09.1989,  Superintending  Engineer,  issued
letter (Annexure P-4), directing the  appellant  not  to  make  mobilization
advance. But, subsequently said authority  allowed  the  appellant  to  make
second  mobilization  advance  to  the  contractor  vide  its  letter  dated
27.10.1989, consequently the appellant released payment of Rs.8,60,000/-  on
31.10.1989 towards second mobilization advance.   After  three  months,  the
Superintending  Engineer,  vide  letter  dated   23.12.1989   (Annexure-P-5)
approved the work done by M/s D.K. Road Lines assessing  the  work  done  at
Rs.42,79,021/-.  On  12.02.1990,  the  appellant  made  further  payment  of
Rs.2.55 lacs.

3.    Meanwhile, when new Manager took over the charge of Jamshedpur  Branch
of Punjab & Sindh  Bank,  issued  letter  dated  13.02.1990  (Annexure-P-7),
asking the appellant to send photocopy of the bank  guarantee  in  question.
And vide letter dated 20.03.1990 (Annexure-P-8)  the  new  Manager  informed
the appellant that no such bank guarantee  has  been  issued  by  the  bank.
Appellant has pleaded that he received said letter  on  10.04.1990,  and  by
then the appellant had released further  payment  of  Rs.7.33  lacs  towards
bill  of  the  contractor.  On  04.05.1990,  bank  cancelled   its   earlier
communication dated 01.09.1989.  The appellant finally released Rs.4.4  lacs
towards current bill of the contractor, whereafter  he  was  transferred  on
11.06.1990  to  Daltanganj.  It  appears  that  C.B.I.  registered  a   case
RC37(A)/91, Patna in  pursuance  to  the  fraudulent/forged  bank  guarantee
furnished by the contractor.


4.        On  04.04.1991,  appellant  was   placed   under   suspension   in
contemplation of departmental proceedings. The  appellant  challenged  order
of suspension in Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 2673 of  1991  before  the  High
Court which was disposed of with the observation that  if  charge  sheet  is
not served within three weeks on the appellant, the suspension  order  shall
stand quashed. On 13.06.1991 the respondent authorities served charge  sheet
(dated 02.05.1991) on  the  appellant,  relating  to  payment  of  unsecured
advance of Rs.14.5 lacs to the contractor. The appellant then filed  another
Writ Petition C.W.J.C. No. 4439 of 1991 once again seeking quashing  of  the
suspension order, and the  High  Court  vide  its  order  dated  10.10.1991,
quashed the same. The respondent authorities  vide  order  dated  05.12.1991
(Annexure–P12) revoked the suspension order, and  departmental  enquiry  was
dropped.  Consequently  on  14.01.1992,  the  appellant   joined   his   new
assignment as a Technical Advisor to Water Nigam Circle, Dumka.


5.    After investigation, C.B.I. submitted  charge  sheet  against  accused
T.S. Gandhok, Manager  of  Punjab  &  Sindh  Bank  who  confirmed  the  bank
guarantee,  and  accused  Ramdahin  Singh,  Senior  Accounts  Clerk  of  the
Irrigation Department who received the bank guarantee  from  the  contractor
and verified. The appellant has pleaded  that  he  is  not  accused  in  the
charge sheet, still  on  18.06.1993,  after  the  departmental  enquiry  was
earlier dropped, the respondent authorities awarded punishment  against  the
appellant withholding his three increments with cumulative effect, and  also
‘censured’ for the year 1989-90.  As such, third C.W.J.C. No.  942  of  1994
was filed by the appellant challenging the above order  of  punishment.  The
said writ petition was allowed on 23.03.1995 by the High Court holding  that
withholding  of  three  increments  with  cumulative  effect  is   a   major
punishment, and could not have been awarded  without  resorting  to  regular
departmental enquiry. However punishment of  “Censure’  was  not  interfered
with by the High Court.


6.     On  20th  May,  1995,  the  respondent  authorities  initiated  fresh
departmental  enquiry  against  the  appellant,  and  second  charge   sheet
(Annexure-P13) was served  on  him  relating  to  the  same  allegations  of
release of unsecured advance of Rs. 14.5 lacs to the contractor against  the
order of Superintending Engineer. The appellant  filed  his  objections  and
participated in the enquiry. The enquiry report dated 18.10.1996  (enclosure
with the Annexure P-17) was submitted by the enquiry officer  to  the  State
Government  with  the  finding  that  part  of  the  charge  stood   proved.
Consequently,  show  cause  notice  dated  23.10.1996  was  issued  to   the
appellant to which he responded on  07.01.1997.   Thereafter  the  appellant
stood  retired  on  31.01.1997.  On  24.09.1997,   appellant   was   awarded
punishment of withholding of 100% pension and gratuity.


7.    Finally, the appellant filed fourth Writ Petition C.W.J.C.  No.  11788
of 1997 before the High  Court  challenging  the  order  of  withholding  of
pension and gratuity. During the pendency of  said  writ  petition,  another
show cause notice dated 17.06.1998 (Annexure-P18)  was  issued  against  the
appellant under Rule 43 (b) read with Rule 139 of Bihar  Pension  Rules,  as
to why the pension benefits be not decided at zero.  The  High  Court,  vide
its order dated 04.12.1998, dismissed the writ petition. Aggrieved  by  said
order, Letters Patent Appeal No. 436 of 2000  was  filed  by  the  appellant
which  was  disposed  of  by  the  High  Court  vide  impugned  order  dated
20.05.2008 restricting withholding of gratuity and pension to the extent  of
fifty percent.

8.     Challenging  the  impugned  order,  Shri  Das,  learned  counsel  for
appellant argued that action of the appellant  in releasing the  payment  to
the contractor was bonafide as the bank guarantee submitted by him  was  got
verified from the Branch Manager of  the  Bank,  and  by  the  communication
dated 01.09.1989 (Annexure-P3), the bank confirmed  the  bank  guarantee  in
question.  In  this  connection,  it  is  further  pointed  out  that  after
investigation, it is only Ramdahin Singh, official of  the  department,  and
Shri T.S. Gandhok, the then Branch Manager  of  the  bank,  are  facing  the
trial, and not the appellant. It is further submitted that it is not a  case
where the appellant has caused pecuniary loss  to  the  department,  as  the
payments  made  to  the  contractor  were  either  permissible  mobilization
advances or against the running bills. It is also contended that  after  the
High  Court  quashed  the  punishment  earlier  awarded  by  the  respondent
authorities vide order dated 23.03.1995 passed in C.W.J.C. No. 942 of  1994,
fresh departmental enquiry was not maintainable.  Lastly,  it  is  contended
that from the evidence on record charge  against  the  appellant  cannot  be
said to have been proved.


9.   On  the  other  hand,  Shri  Shivam  Singh,  learned  counsel  for  the
respondent authorities submitted that Rule  43(b)  read  with  Rule  139  of
Bihar Pension Rules empowers the State Government to  withhold  the  pension
and gratuity of the employee, and the respondent authorities  have  done  so
for the sufficient reasons.

10.   We  have  considered  the  submissions  of  learned  counsel  for  the
parties. The first charge sheet was admittedly served on  the  appellant  on
13.06.1991, which was revoked consequent to order dated  10.10.1991,  passed
by the High Court in C.W.J.C. No.  4439  of  1991,  whereby  the  suspension
order issued against the appellant was quashed.  By  the  same  order  dated
05.12.1991 (Annexure P-12) departmental enquiry  was  also  dropped.   Fresh
charge sheet was served on the appellant on 20.05.1995 in the  same  matter.
It is pertinent to mention here  that  when  High  Court  in  earlier  round
quashed the  major  punishment  of  withholding  of  three  increments  with
cumulative effect,  it  did  not  disturb  the  minor  punishment  ‘censure’
awarded against the employee.  However, the  High  Court  did  observe  that
action can be taken in accordance with law.

11.    The  communication  dated  29.08.1989  (Annexure  P-1)  sent  by  the
appellant from the Branch Manager of the Bank, and  reply  dated  01.09.1989
(Annexure P-3) confirming bank guarantee received  from  the  Bank  are  not
disputed.  It is also not disputed that  after  investigation  C.B.I.  found
evidence against  the  then  Branch  Manager,  and  Ramdahin  Singh,  Senior
Accounts Clerk of  the  appellant,  as  the  persons  responsible  with  the
contractor, in the matter.  It is also  nobody’s  case  that  the  appellant
caused pecuniary loss to the exchequer.  In the  light  of  above,  we  find
force in submission of learned counsel of the appellant that  the  appellant
was bonafide in making the payment in question to the contractor, as he  did
make enquiries from the bank concerned before releasing  mobilizing  advance
to the contractor. Copy of letter dated  29.08.1989  (Annexure-P1)  sent  by
the appellant to Manager of Punjab & Sindh Bank is reproduced below:-


                      “OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE ENGINEER
                        IRRIGATION DIVISION, GALUDIH

Letter      No.      916/Galudih/                           Dated:29-08-1989


To,

The Manager,
Punjab and Sindh Bank,
Jamshedpur

Subject:    Confirmation of Bank Guarantee No. 20/89  dated  29-08-1989  for
Rs. 23,61,500/-  issued  in  the  name  of  Executive  Engineer,  Irrigation
Division on behalf of M/s. D.K. Road Lines.

Dear Sir,

The above Bank Guarantee has been submitted by M/s. D.K.  Road  Lines  as  a
security performance which has been issued by your Bank.

It is,  therefore,  requested  to  please  confirm  the  issue  through  Sri
Ramdahin Singh, S.A.C of this Division, who is deputed in your bank for  the
purpose. It is also requested to please confirm the issue in future  if  any
guarantee issued in my favour without waiting for any request letter.



                                                           Yours faithfully,



                                                                        Sd/-
                                                          Executive Engineer
                                               IRRIGATION DIVISION, GALUDIH”


In response to above, letter dated 01.09.1989 (Annexure-P3) appears to  have
been received by the appellant from the  bank.  The  said  letter  reads  as
under:-

“PUNJAB AND SINDH BANK
JAMSHEDPUR

            Dated: 01-09-1989

To,
The Executive Engineer,
Irrigation Division,
Galudih

Sir,

Ref: Your letter No.916/Galudih dated 29-08-1989.

In response to your letter mentioned above, we hereby confirm having  issued
bank guarantee No. 20/89 dated 29-08-1989 for Rs. 23,61,500/- and  B.G.  No.
21/89 dated 31-08-1989 for Rs. 23,61,500/- in your favour on behalf of  M/s.
D.K. Roadlines.

This is for your information please.



                                                     For PUNJAB & SINDH BANK

                                                          Sd/- T.S. Gandhok,
                                                        Manager, Jamshedpur”


12.   The Enquiry Report dated 18.10.1996 (enclosure to Annexure  P-17),  in
its para 8, shows that though it is mentioned that charge is proved  against
the appellant in the enquiry, but the finding is based  on  earlier  enquiry
report.  The earlier enquiry report was in question in C.W.J.C. No.  942  of
1994 in which punishment of withholding of three increments with  cumulative
effect was quashed.  The authorities could not and should  not  have  relied
upon said  enquiry  report  as  basis  in  fresh  enquiry  for  holding  the
appellant guilty of the charge and to award  punishment  of  withholding  of
pension and gratuity.  In the circumstances, we do not find that  there  was
sufficient reason for the respondent  authorities  to  exercise  the  powers
under Rule 43 (b) read with Rule 139  of  Bihar  Pension  Rules  as  neither
there was pecuniary loss to the State, nor the present case is  of  a  grave
misconduct on the part of the appellant.

13.   For the reasons as discussed above, we are inclined to interfere  with
the impugned order passed by  the  High  Court.  Therefore,  the  appeal  is
allowed.  The  orders  dated  24.09.1997  and  17.06.1998,  passed  by   the
respondent authorities shall stand quashed. No order as to costs.

                                                           ……………………………....J.
                                                            [J. Chelameswar]







                                                           ………………………..……..J.

                                                          [Prafulla C. Pant]

New Delhi;

November 29, 2016.

the recovery of the contraband i.e. Poppy Husk from the conscious possession of the accused persons. That the samples were properly sampled, sealed and forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory through Malkhana also stands established. The certificate of the Chemical Examiner, FSL to the effect that the seal of the samples was found intact and that the same tallied with the specimen seals also rules out the possibility of any tampering therewith. The fact that the contraband was recovered from the car while the same was being driven by one of the accused persons in the company of the other also authenticate the charge of their conscious possession thereof. The haul of six bags of Poppy Husk is substantial so much so that it negates even the remote possibility of the same being planted by the police. Furthermore no evidence with regard to bias or malice against the Investigating Agency has been adduced. (19) In the wake of the above, we are of the unhesitant opinion in the face of the evidence on record, that the prosecution has been able to prove the charge against the accused persons beyond all reasonable doubt. The Courts below have appreciated the materials on record in the correct legal and factual perspectives and the findings recorded do not merit any interference. The appeal is thus dismissed.

                                                                  REPORTABLE

                             IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                            CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                      CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1096 OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.6093 OF 2015)


DILBAGH SINGH                               .…APPELLANT


                                   VERSUS

STATE OF PUNJAB                                    ....RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T


AMITAVA ROY, J.

(1)   Heard Ms. Aparna Jha, learned counsel for the  appellant  and  Mr.  V.
Madhukar, learned counsel for the respondent.

(2)   The appellant, faced with  concurrent  determinations  culminating  in
his conviction along with another, under Section 15 of  the  Narcotic  Drugs
and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 (for short “the Act”) is  before  this
Court seeking redress.  Whereas the Trial Court, upon the  entering  finding
of guilt had sentenced the accused persons with  rigorous  imprisonment  for
10 years and six months  each  and  fine  of  Rs.1  lac  each  with  default
sentence of rigorous imprisonment for one year, the  High  Court  in  appeal
has confirmed the verdict in toto by the decision impugned herein.

(3)   The prosecution case unfolds with the interception  of  the  appellant
and the co-accused Ranjit Singh by the  patrol  party  on  28.08.2007  while
they were travelling in a car bearing registration  No.MH-04BS-1651  at  the
check point at Khanauri Patran. One Baaj Singh, apart from the police  party
was then present. The appellant and his companion,  on  being  interrogated,
disclosed their names. Their car on search revealed six  bags  stuffed  with
Poppy Husk.

(4)   The Investigation Officer, A.S.I. Satnam Singh introduced himself  and
apprised the appellant and the co-accused of their right to be  searched  in
the presence of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate if they  so  desired  but
they declined and instead reposed confidence in him. After  recording  their
consent in writing the car was searched in presence of the other members  of
the patrol party as well as Baaj Singh and  in  course  thereof  three  bags
each  from  the  rear  seat  and  the  dicky,  containing  Poppy  Husk  were
recovered. Samples were taken and sealed with  specimen  impression  of  the
Investigating Officer.  On  weighment  of  the  remaining  Poppy  Husk,  the
contraband weighed 34 kg. 800 gms in  each  bag  minus  the  samples  taken.
Personal search of the appellant and  the  co-accused  yielded  currency  of
Rs.225/- and Rs.150/- respectively which were also seized.  The  information
of the exercise was forwarded to the police station on which  a  formal  FIR
was lodged.

(5)   The sealed  samples  as  well  as  the  contraband  as  a  whole  were
deposited in the malkhana  and  were  also  produced  before  the  concerned
Magistrate on the next date along with the accused persons.  The  sample  on
chemical examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory disclosed  the  same
to be of Poppy Husk. Eventually, on completion of the investigation  challan
was submitted and the appellant and the co-accused were made to  face  trial
under Sections 15 and 25 of the Act, as they pleaded “not guilty”.

(6)   In support of the  charge,  the  prosecution  examined  PW-1/Constable
Ravinder Singh, PW-2/S.I. Jaswinder Singh, PW-3/M.H.C. Shamsher  Singh,  PW-
4/A.S.I. Satnam Singh, PW-5/H.C. Darbara Singh and PW-6 Parminderpal  Singh,
who had participated in the entire drill.

(7)   All the incriminating  circumstances  were  laid  before  the  accused
persons in course of their examination under Section 313  Cr.P.C.  and  they
denied the correctness thereof and complained of false implication.

(8)   The Trial Court on a consideration  of  the  evidence  on  record  and
after analysing the rival contentions held  the  charge  to  be  proved  and
convicted and sentenced both the accused persons  as  above.  The  appellant
unsuccessfully challenged  the  conviction  and  sentence  before  the  High
Court.

(9)   The learned counsel  for  the  appellant  has  asserted  that  as  the
Investigating  Agency  had  contravened  the  mandatory   prescriptions   of
Sections 50 and 57 of the Act, the conviction recorded by the  Courts  below
is patently illegal and non est in law. According to her,  though  allegedly
Poppy Husk was recovered from the car in which the  appellant  and  the  co-
accused were travelling at the relevant point  of  time,  adherence  to  the
mandate of Section 50 of the Act was indispensable. Similarly, as no  report
of the operation  undertaken  by  the  Investigating  Agency  involving  the
alleged seizure of the contraband had been reported to the superior  officer
concerned, the exercise was in gross defiance of the edict of Section 57  of
the Act rendering the same null  and  void.  The  learned  counsel  for  the
appellant, to reinforce  the  above  pleas  has  pressed  into  service  the
decision of this Court in Mohinder Kumar vs. State, Panaji, Goa –  (1998)  8
SCC 655. No other argument has been advanced.

(10)  As against this, the learned counsel for the respondent  has  insisted
that the investigation had been conducted in meticulous  compliance  of  the
dicta of the law qua Sections 50 and 57 of the Act in particular.  Not  only
the accused persons were duly apprised of their right of search in  presence
of a Gazetted Officer or a Magistrate before the search of their  car,  they
were afforded all opportunities  to  offer  their  defence  in  the  process
undertaken. According to the learned counsel,  the fact of the  interception
of the  accused  persons  and  the  recovery  of  the  contraband  had  been
communicated to the concerned police station and  to  the  Ilaka  Magistrate
through the higher officer i.e., Deputy  Superintendent  of  Police  without
any delay whatsoever.  The sample with the stock of Poppy Husk was  properly
sealed and deposited with the malkhana  immediately  as  per  the  procedure
prescribed as well, he urged. The learned  counsel  further  submitted  that
though in a way, compliance of Section 50 of the Act was inessential in  the
facts  of  the  case,  as  the  vehicle  was  searched  which  yielded   the
contraband, the Investigating Officer by way of abundant caution did  adhere
thereto as well. As the information with regard to the entire gamut  of  the
investigation  had  been  forwarded  to  the  higher  officer  i.e.   Deputy
Superintendent of Police and to the concerned Magistrate without any  delay,
the demur based on Sections 50 and 57 of the Act  is  wholly  misplaced,  he
urged.

(11)  The evidence on record as well as the rival assertions have been  duly
evaluated.

(12)  As the essence  of  the  impeachment  is  the  non-compliance  of  the
enjoinment of Sections 50 and 57 of the  Act,  for  ready  reference,  these
provisions are extracted herein below:

“50. Conditions under which search of persons shall be conducted - (1)  When
any officer duly authorised under Section 42 is about to search  any  person
under the provisions of Section 41, Section 42 or Section 43, he  shall,  if
such person so requires, take such person without unnecessary delay  to  the
nearest Gazetted Officer of any of the departments mentioned in  Section  42
or to the nearest Magistrate.





(2) If such requisition is made, the officer may detain the person until  he
can bring him before the Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate referred  to  in
sub-section (1).

(3) The Gazetted Officer or the Magistrate before whom any  such  person  is
brought shall, if  he  sees  no  reasonable  ground  for  search,  forthwith
discharge the person but otherwise shall direct that search be made.

(4) No female shall be searched by anyone excepting a female.

(5) When an officer duly authorised under section 42 has reason  to  believe
that it is not possible to take the person to be  searched  to  the  nearest
Gazetted Officer or Magistrate without the possibility of the person  to  be
searched parting with  possession  of  any  narcotic  drug  or  psychotropic
substance, or controlled substance or article or document, he  may,  instead
of taking such  person  to  the  nearest  Gazetted  Officer  or  Magistrate,
proceed to search the person as provided under section 100 of  the  Code  of
Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974).

(6) After a search is conducted under sub-section  (5),  the  officer  shall
record the reasons for  such  belief  which  necessitated  such  search  and
within seventy-two hours send a  copy  thereof  to  his  immediate  official
superior.



57.   Report of arrest and seizure - Whenever any person  makes  any  arrest
or seizure under this Act, he shall, within  forty-eight  hours  next  after
such  arrest or seizure, make a full report of



all the particulars of such arrest or  seizure  to  his  immediate  official
superior.




(13)  Whereas the conditions under which,  the  search  as  contemplated  in
Section 50 are limited only to the contingency  of  search  of  any  person,
Section 57 prescribes that whenever any person makes any arrest  or  seizure
under the Act, he would within 48 hours next after such arrest  or  seizure,
make a full report of all the particulars of such arrest or seizure  to  his
immediate official superior. As  it  is  no  longer  res  integra  that  the
application of Section 50 of the Act is comprehended and called for only  in
the case of search of a person as distinguished from search of any  premises
etc. having been authoritatively propounded by the  two  Constitution  Bench
rulings of this Court in State of Punjab vs. Baldev Singh  –  (1999)  6  SCC
172 and Vijaysinh Chandubha Jadeja vs. State of Gujarat – (2011) 1 SCC  609,
further dilation in this regard, in the attendant  facts  and  circumstances
of the case, is considered inessential. This is more so  as  the  contraband
in the case in hand had been recovered from inside  the  car  in  which  the
petitioner and the co-accused were travelling at the relevant point of  time
and not in course of the search of their person.  Noticeably,  it  had  also
not been the plea of the defence ever that the alleged seizure according  to
the accused persons had been from their  person.  In  the  contextual  facts
therefore, Section 50 has  no  application  to  espouse  the  cause  of  the
defence.

(14)  Qua the imputation of non-adherence of the requisites  of  Section  57
of the Act, suffice it to note that both the Courts below, on an  analytical
appreciation of the evidence on record have concurrently concluded that  the
Investigating Officer at the site, had  after  the  arrest  of  the  accused
persons and or seizure of the  contraband  forwarded  the  information  with
regard thereto to his  higher  officer,  namely,  Deputy  Superintendent  of
Police without any delay  and  that  the  related  FIR  with  the  necessary
endorsements therein had reached the Ilaka Magistrate on the same date  i.e.
28.08.2007 at 9 p.m. There is no evidence forthcoming or referred to by  the
learned counsel for the petitioner to either  contradict  or  decimate  this
finding based on records. In this view of the matter as well, the  assertion
of non-compliance of Section 57 of the Act does not commend for  acceptance.
In our view, having regard to  the  facts  available,  the  requirements  of
Section 57 of the Act had been duly complied with as well.

(15)  The decision in Mohinder Kumar (supra) not only is distinguishable  on
facts,  as  the  search  therein  was  of  the  petitioner's  premises,  the
investigation was afflicted as well by several other omissions on  the  part
of the authority conducting the same.  Though  in  this  rendering,  it  was
observed that  in State of Punjab vs. Balbir Singh – (1994) 3 SCC 299    the
provisions of Sections 52 and 57 of the Act had  been held to  be  mandatory
in character, it is pertinent to note that this Court in Sajan  Abraham  vs.
State of Kerala – (2001) 6 SCC 692 had exposited that  Section  57  was  not
mandatory in nature so much so that if a substantial compliance  thereof  is
made, it would not vitiate the case of  the  prosecution.  Incidentally  the
decision rendered in Balbir Singh (supra) was rendered by  a  Coram  of  two
Hon’ble Judges whereas the one in Sajan  Abraham  (supra)  was  by  a  three
Judge Bench.

(16)  In Balbir Singh (supra), a Bench of two Hon'ble Judges of  this  Court
had enunciated, adverting to Sections 52  and  57  of  the  Act  that  these
provisions  contain certain procedural instructions  for  strict  compliance
by the officers, but clarified that if there  was  none,  such  omission  by
itself would not render the acts done by them  null  and  void  and  at  the
most, it may affect the probative value  of the  evidence  regarding  arrest
or search and in some cases, it may invalidate such arrest or  search.  That
the non-compliance had caused prejudice  to  the  accused  persons  and  had
resulted in failure of  justice   was  necessary  to  be  demonstrated,  was
emphasised.  It was ruled that these provisions, which deal with  the  steps
to be taken by the officers after making arrest or seizure under Section  41
and 44 are by themselves not mandatory and if there  was  non-compliance  or
any delay was involved with regard thereto, then it has to be  examined,  to
ascertain  as to whether  any prejudice had been caused to the  accused  and
further whether, such failure would have  a bearing on the  appreciation  of
evidence regarding  arrest or seizure as well as on the merits of the  case.


(17)  Be that as it may, having regard to the evidence  available  attesting
the compliance of the requisites of Section 57 of the  Act  in  the  instant
case, we need not be detained by this issue in praesenti.

(18)  Aside the above, an appraisal of  the  testimony  of  the  prosecution
witnesses and in particular of PW-4 ASI/Satnam  Singh  and  PW-5  HC/Darbara
Singh, the  seizure  witnesses,  fully  substantiate  the  recovery  of  the
contraband i.e. Poppy Husk from the  conscious  possession  of  the  accused
persons.  That the samples were properly sampled, sealed  and  forwarded  to
the Forensic Science Laboratory through Malkhana  also  stands  established.
The certificate of the Chemical Examiner, FSL to the effect  that  the  seal
of the samples was found intact and that the same tallied with the  specimen
seals also rules out the possibility of any tampering  therewith.  The  fact
that the contraband was recovered from the car  while  the  same  was  being
driven by one of the accused persons  in  the  company  of  the  other  also
authenticate the charge of their conscious possession thereof.  The haul  of
six bags of Poppy Husk is substantial so much so that it  negates  even  the
remote possibility of the same being planted by the police.  Furthermore  no
evidence with regard to bias or malice against the Investigating Agency  has
been adduced.

(19)  In the wake of the above, we are of  the  unhesitant  opinion  in  the
face of the evidence on record, that the prosecution has been able to  prove
the charge against the accused persons  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt.  The
Courts below have appreciated the materials on record in the  correct  legal
and factual  perspectives  and  the  findings  recorded  do  not  merit  any
interference. The appeal is  thus  dismissed.  The  Trial  Court  is  hereby
directed to take immediate follow up the steps so  as  to  ensure  that  the
sentence awarded is served out by the accused persons.



.............................................J.
                            (DIPAK MISRA)



 ............................................J.
                            (AMITAVA ROY)
NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER  28, 2016.

On a consideration of the totality of the circumstances attendant on the case, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the appellants under Section 304-Part 1 read with Sections 147,148,149 IPC, as recorded by the High Court, is justified. However, in our view, having regard to the singular facts and circumstances, we are inclined to reduce the sentence for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC to rigorous imprisonment for 7 years. The other sentences are hereby affirmed.

                                                                 REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                      CRIMINAL APPE2LLATE JURISDICTION

                     CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.  1157  OF 2016
              (ARISING OUT OF S.L.P (CRIMINAL) NO.8415 OF 2016)

RAM AUTAR & ORS.                      .…APPELLANT


VERSUS



STATE OF U.P.                                   ....RESPONDENT

                               J U D G M E N T

AMITAVA ROY, J.



(1)   Leave granted.

(2)   The appellants hereby  assail  the  affirmation  of  their  conviction
under Sections 147,148, 149 Indian Penal Code (for short, hereinafter to  be
referred to as  “IPC”) as recorded by the  Trial  Court.   By  the  decision
impugned, the High Court, however has  altered  their  conviction  from  one
under Section 302 IPC to Section 304-Part I IPC.   Thereby,  the  appellants
now stand sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for  10  years  and  to
pay a fine of Rs.5000/-, in  default,  to  suffer  simple  imprisonment  for
further two months for this offence.  All sentences  have  been  ordered  to
accrue concurrently.

(3)   We have heard Dr. J.P. Dhanda, learned counsel for the appellants  and
Mr. Ravi Prakash Mehrotra, learned counsel for the State.

(4)   The genesis of the arraignment  is  traceable  to  the  incident  that
witnessed the deadly assault on Lalni  @  Raj  Kumar,  the  brother  of  the
informant Gaya Prasad, on 04.04.1982 at 1.00 p.m. within  the  precincts  of
the house of the deceased.

(5)   As the first information laid at 3.15 p.m.  on  the  same  date  would
reveal, in the morning thereof, the cattle of the deceased had strayed  into
the fields of Suraj Bali and others and had allegedly  destroyed  the  Arhar
crop of the accused persons.  On being abused  by  them  (accused  persons),
the deceased herded back the cattle and returned  home  crestfallen.   While
he was sitting in his compound in the afternoon at about 1.00  p.m.  and  in
the company of the informant his  brother,  Gaya  Prasad  PW-1  as  well  as
Sitaram PW-2 and Ram Sajeewan @ Dhunna PW-4, altercation broke  out  between
him and the accused persons  including  the  appellants,  who  resided  next
door, on the same issue.   The  heated  exchanges  that  followed  escalated
tempers, whereupon as per the prosecution, the appellants along with   Suraj
Bali and Chandra Bali  pounced  on  the  deceased,  in  a  body.   On  being
exhorted by Suraj Bali to eliminate the  deceased,  appellant  Deo  Munni  @
Putti, at his instance, brought his gun and fired at Lalni.  As Lalni  fell,
being injured, the  other  accused  persons  joined  in  the  assaults  with
lathis.  The informant and  the  other  two  witnesses  though  intended  to
intervene, they were prevented from doing so, by pointing  the  gun  towards
them.  Lalni died at the spot.

(6)   On the lodgement of the FIR with the police at  about  3.15  p.m.,  as
herein before mentioned, case was registered under Sections 302,147,148  and
149 IPC.  In course of the investigation,  inquest  on  the  dead  body  was
conducted and the sketch map of the place of occurrence was prepared.  After
the charge-sheet was laid against the accused  persons,  charge  was  framed
under Section 302, read with Sections 147/149 IPC against them, they  having
 pleaded “not guilty”.  Additionally, charge under Section 148  also  framed
against appellant Deo Munni @ Putti who was armed  with gun,  as  indicated,
herein before.

(7)   The prosecution examined  as  many  as  six  witnesses  including  eye
witnesses, namely; Gaya  Prasad  (PW-1),  Sitaram  (PW-2),  Ram  Sajeewan  @
Dhunna (PW-4), besides Dr. S.C.  Srivastava  (PW-5)  and  Brahm  Dev  Singh,
Investigating Officer (PW-6).

(8)   On the completion of  the  prosecution  evidence,  statements  of  the
accused persons  were  recorded  under  Section  313  Cr.P.C..    They  also
examined Shyam Lal as their witness in defence.

(9)   The Trial Court, on an exhaustive  appreciation  of  the  evidence  on
record, convicted all the accused persons  under  Sections  302,147,148  and
149 IPC as  mentioned  therein.   They  were  amongst  others  sentenced  to
undergo imprisonment for life for the offence under Section 302  IPC.   They
were sentenced as well for the other offences.

(10)  As referred to hereinabove, the High Court  in  appeal  sustained  the
conviction under Sections  147/148/149  IPC  but  moderated  the  conviction
under Section 302 IPC to one under  Section  304-Part  I  and  the  sentence
therefor was ordained to be rigorous imprisonment for 10 years and  fine  of
Rs.5000/-, in default, simple imprisonment for further two months.

(11)  The learned counsel for the appellants  has  assiduously  argued  that
the prosecution having failed to prove that the  appellants  and  their  co-
accused had been the aggressors who  assaulted  the  deceased  and  that  he
succumbed to the injuries sustained thereby, their conviction and  sentence,
if allowed to stand, would signify travesty  of justice.  According  to  the
learned counsel,  the appellants and the  co-accused,  while  escorting  the
cattle of the deceased from the fields to  the  nearby  cattle  pond,   were
attacked by him and his cohorts, for which DW-1 Shyam Lal had to  open  fire
in self defence.  Without prejudice to this, it has been argued that in  any
view of the matter, there was no pre-meditation or pre-concert on  the  part
of the appellants and the co-accused to attack or assault the  deceased  and
having regard to the incident that had occurred in  the  fields  earlier  in
the day, the sentence awarded by the High  Court  is  unduly  harsh  and  is
liable  to  be  appropriately  scaled  down  in  the  attendant  facts   and
circumstances.

(12)  The learned counsel for the respondent, in refutation, has urged  that
it  having  been  proved  beyond  all  reasonable  doubt  by   unimpeachable
testimony of the eye witnesses, Gaya Prasad (PW-1), Sitaram (PW-2)  and  Ram
Sajeewan @ Dhunna (PW-4) that the  appellants  and  their  co-accused  Suraj
Bali and Chandra Bali had formed an  unlawful  assembly  and  had  with  the
intention of eliminating the deceased, had jointly launched a lethal  attack
by using, amongst others, a fire arm, the conviction recorded  by  the  High
Court, does not merit interference.  According to him, having regard to  the
seriousness of the charges proved, the appellants have been let off  lightly
with the substantive sentence of ten years' rigorous imprisonment.

(13)  We have lent our due consideration to the materials on record as  well
as the competing assertions.  Noticeably, the findings on the  incident  are
concluded  by  concurrent  deductions  of  the  two  courts   below.    This
notwithstanding, we have examined in particular, the  evidence  of  the  eye
witnesses Gaya Prasad (PW-1), Sitaram (PW-2) and Ram Sajeewan @ Dhunna  (PW-
4) as well as that of the Dr. S.C. Srivastava (PW-5), who had performed  the
post-mortem examination on the dead body.

(14)  A close scrutiny of the  evidence  of  the  eye  witnesses  leaves  no
manner of doubt that not only they  have  with  noteworthy  consistency  and
cohesion  authenticated  the  case  of  the  prosecution  in  all   material
particulars, they have identified as  well  the  appellants  and  their  co-
accused and also  have  provided  graphic  details  of  the  events  in  the
sequence in which the  same  unfolded  at  the  place  of  occurrence.   The
testimony of the Dr. S.C. Srivastava (PW-5) reveals fire arm wounds  on  the
head, chest and right upper arm of the deceased together with  the  multiple
abrasions and contusions on various parts of the body.   According  to  this
witness, death had occurred due to shock and haemorrhage as a result of  the
ante-mortem injuries.

(15)  Noticeably this  witness also  referred  to  lacerated/incised  wounds
and contusions sustained by the appellants Deo Munni, Ram Autar and the  co-
accused Suraj Bali which, according to  the  medical  expert,  were  however
simple in nature.

(16)  Though an attempt had been made at the trial by the defence  to  shift
the place of occurrence to fit in with their version, as offered  in  course
of the statements under Section 313 Cr.P.C., and  urged  in  course  of  the
arguments, the evidence of the Investigating Officer Brahm  Dev  Singh  (PW-
6), when considered along with the sketch map, Ex.  A-12,  the  same  stands
belied.  That the place of occurrence was, as cited by the  prosecution  is,
also corroborated by the blood stained earth collected therefrom  in  course
of the investigation. That the blood was  human blood   also  stands  proved
by the report of the chemical  analyst.   These  proved  facts,  in  a  way,
demolish the defence version totally in all respects.

(17)   Though,  at  the  trial  as  well  as  before  the  High  Court,  the
prosecution  case  was  sought  to  be  discredited  for  the   absence   of
explanation of the injuries suffered by some  of  the  accused  persons,  in
absence of  any  evidence  forthcoming  that  at  the  relevant  time,   the
deceased was armed or that the prosecution witnesses  present did  launch  a
counter attack, the courts below rightly  dismissed  this  plea.   The  High
Court, noticing the injuries, which the Dr. S.C. Srivastava  had  identified
to be simple in nature, did conclude, had been self inflicted  in  order  to
contrive a defence.  Bearing in mind the evidence available and the  overall
scenario, this finding, in our estimate, cannot be repudiated to  be  absurd
or illogical.

(18)   In  the  ultimate  analysis,  however,  one   cannot   overlook   the
progression of events that occurred since the incident of  trespass  of  the
cattle of the deceased in the fields of Suraj Bali  and  others  leading  to
abuse and unpleasantness between them earlier in the day.  The  second  bout
of bickerings precipitated in the  afternoon  on  the  same  day  while  the
deceased, appellants and the co-accused were  sitting  in  their  respective
compounds, abutting each other.  The witnesses of the  incident  though,  at
the preliminary stages, did advise  the  deceased  to  go  in  and  avoid  a
brewing confrontation, he  obdurately  refused  to  do  so  and  stoked  the
growing indignation so much so that eventually  he  was  shot  at  and  also
assaulted by the appellants and their companions.  The materials  on  record
do suggest that the deceased did also contribute to the  escalating  tension
and in the process the accused persons jointly unleashed attack  on  him  by
lathis and also shot him.  A sudden  spurt  of  irreversible    events  thus
got triggered thereby.

(19)  In the fact situation that developed in quick succession,  we  are  of
the comprehension that there was as such no pre-meditation or prior  concert
on the part of the accused persons to commit murder of Lalni.  The  incident
happened on the spur of the moment and in an uncontrollable, embittered  and
agitated state of enragement, thus depriving the accused  persons  of  their
power of self control.  Though during  the  assaults,  the  accused  persons
were understandably aware of the likely results thereof, it is difficult  to
perceive that they had any common object of eliminating the deceased.   This
is more so as the evidence  discloses  that  the  accused-appellants,  first
informant as well as the deceased  did descend from a  common  ancestor  and
that their grandfathers were  real  brothers.   The  evidence   demonstrates
that the accused- appellants do not have any  infamous  criminal  background
as well.  The incident had occurred in the year 1982 and as  on  date,  more
than three decades have passed.

(20)  On a consideration of the totality of the circumstances  attendant  on
the case, we are of the opinion that the conviction of the appellants  under
Section 304-Part 1 read with Sections 147,148,149 IPC, as  recorded  by  the
High Court, is justified.  However,  in  our  view,  having  regard  to  the
singular facts and circumstances, we are inclined  to  reduce  the  sentence
for the offence under Section 304-Part I/149 IPC  to  rigorous  imprisonment
for 7 years.  The other sentences are hereby affirmed.

(21)  The appeal is thus partly allowed with the above  modifications.   The
Trial Court would take the necessary follow up  steps  to  ensure  that  the
appellants serve out the sentence as awarded.




.............................................J.
                                      (DIPAK MISRA)




…...........................................J.
                                      (AMITAVA ROY)

NEW DELHI;
NOVEMBER 28, 2016.