LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Thursday, August 14, 2014

Service Matter - Seniority - Promotion - mere having B.Ed. Degree can the junior as a senior in Trained Graduates cadre over power the senior candidate and can be designated as senior for promotion - Apex court set aside the order of High court and held that we find that in the case at hand there is a specific Rule, namely, Rule 12 of the Rules, which deals with seniority. The clear and unambiguous criteria for determining seniority is the continuous officiation counted from the date of acquiring the educational qualification as prescribed under Schedule “B”. since the appellant was holding the requisite qualifications, i.e. D.Ed., for appointment to the post of Assistant Teacher in Primary School, as prescribed under Schedule “B” to the Rules, her seniority was to be counted on the basis of continuous officiation. Since she joined the post of Assistant Teacher on 24.08.1979 and respondent No.4 came to be appointed subsequently, i.e. on 01.09.1980. The appellant would naturally be senior to respondent No.4.Insofar as manning the post of Head of the School is concerned, Rule 3 of the Rules provides for the qualifications. It is not in dispute that as on the date of which the Head of the School was to be appointed, the appellant fulfilled all the requisite qualifications mentioned in the said Rule. Further, as already found, she was senior to respondent No.4 as well. Therefore, it is the appellant who was the rightful claimant to the post of Head of the School. Depriving her of this legitimate right and making the appointment of respondent No.4 as the Head Master of the School was, therefore, clearly erroneous, which resulted in infringement of the rights of the appellant to hold that post. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed. Judgment of the High Court is set aside and a direction is issued to appoint the appellant as Head of the School by replacing respondent No.4 therefrom. This direction shall be carried out within a period of four weeks from today.= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7699 OF 2014 (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 29696 of 2013) |VIMAN VAMAN AWALE |.....APPELLANT(S) | |VERSUS | | |GANGADHAR MAKHRIYA CHARITABLE TRUST & |.....RESPONDENT(S) | |ORS. | | = 2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41826

 Service Matter - Seniority - Promotion - mere having B.Ed. Degree can the junior  as a senior in Trained Graduates cadre over power the senior candidate and can be designated as senior for promotion - Apex court set aside the order of High court and held that we find that in the case at  hand  there  is  a  specific  Rule, namely, Rule 12 of the Rules, which deals with  seniority.   
The  clear  and unambiguous  criteria  for   determining   seniority   is   the   continuous
officiation  counted  from   the   date   of   acquiring   the   educational qualification as prescribed under Schedule “B”.  since  the  appellant  was   holding   the   requisite qualifications, i.e.  D.Ed.,  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  Assistant Teacher in Primary School, as prescribed under Schedule “B”  to  the  Rules, her seniority was to be counted on  the  basis  of  continuous  officiation. Since she joined the post of Assistant Teacher on 24.08.1979 and  respondent No.4 came to be appointed subsequently, i.e. on 01.09.1980.   The  appellant would naturally be senior to respondent No.4.Insofar as manning the post of Head of the School is concerned,  Rule  3  of
the Rules provides for the qualifications.  It is not in dispute that as  on the date of which the Head of the School was to be appointed, the  appellant fulfilled all the requisite  qualifications  mentioned  in  the  said  Rule. Further, as already found, she  was  senior  to  respondent  No.4  as  well. Therefore, it is the appellant who was the rightful claimant to the post  of Head of the School.  Depriving her of this legitimate right and  making  the appointment of respondent No.4  as  the  Head  Master  of  the  School  was, therefore, clearly erroneous, which resulted in infringement of  the  rights of the appellant to hold that post. Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.  Judgment of  the  High  Court  is  set aside and a direction is issued to appoint the  appellant  as  Head  of  the School by replacing respondent No.4  therefrom.   This  direction  shall  be carried out within a period of four weeks from today.=

 Both the appellant as well as respondent No.4 are  working
as teachers in Seth Gangadhar Makhriya High School, Mahabaleshwar,  District
Satara in Maharashtra.
It is not in dispute that the appellant  had  joined
the said school as Assistant Teacher before respondent No.4 and  was  senior
to him in the post of  Assistant  Teacher.  
However,  respondent  No.4  had
acquired B.Ed. degree prior to  the  appellant  and  on  that  basis  he  is
treated senior to  the  appellant  in  the  category  of  'Trained  Graduate
Teachers'.  
Whether this consequence follows as a result  of  the  rules  is
the matter of examination in the present case .=

The view taken by us also finds support from  the  judgment  of
this Court
in Union of India v.  B.  Jayaraman,  (1994)  Supp  (1)  SCC  95,
wherein considering a similar argument this Court held: (SCC Headnote)

“The note in column 11 is only for purposes of  giving  eligibility  to  the
erstwhile Assistants working as Superintendents Grade  II  for  purposes  of
being considered for promotion to the post of  Superintendent  Grade  I  and
not for the purpose of seniority at all.

                                                        (Emphasis supplied)”


That apart, we find that in the case at  hand  there  is  a  specific  Rule,
namely, Rule 12 of the Rules, which deals with  seniority.   
The  clear  and
unambiguous  criteria  for   determining   seniority   is   the   continuous
officiation  counted  from   the   date   of   acquiring   the   educational
qualification as prescribed under Schedule “B”. 
 It is stated  at  the  cost
of  repetition  that  since  the  appellant  was   holding   the   requisite
qualifications, i.e.  D.Ed.,  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  Assistant
Teacher in Primary School, as prescribed under Schedule “B”  to  the  Rules,
her seniority was to be counted on  the  basis  of  continuous  officiation.
Since she joined the post of Assistant Teacher on 24.08.1979 and  respondent
No.4 came to be appointed subsequently, i.e. on 01.09.1980.   The  appellant
would naturally be senior to respondent No.4.

Insofar as manning the post of Head of the School is concerned,  Rule  3  of
the Rules provides for the qualifications.  
It is not in dispute that as  on
the date of which the Head of the School was to be appointed, the  appellant
fulfilled all the requisite  qualifications  mentioned  in  the  said  Rule.
Further, as already found, she  was  senior  to  respondent  No.4  as  well.
Therefore, it is the appellant who was the rightful claimant to the post  of
Head of the School.  Depriving her of this legitimate right and  making  the
appointment of respondent No.4  as  the  Head  Master  of  the  School  was,
therefore, clearly erroneous, which resulted in infringement of  the  rights
of the appellant to hold that post.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.  Judgment of  the  High  Court  is  set
aside and a direction is issued to appoint the  appellant  as  Head  of  the
School by replacing respondent No.4  therefrom.   This  direction  shall  be
carried out within a period of four weeks from today.
                 Since the respondents have not appeared, we are not  making
any order as to costs.

2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41826

J. CHELAMESWAR, A.K. SIKRI
                                                             NON-REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7699 OF 2014
      (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 29696 of 2013)


|VIMAN VAMAN AWALE                        |.....APPELLANT(S)              |
|VERSUS                                   |                               |
|GANGADHAR MAKHRIYA CHARITABLE TRUST &    |.....RESPONDENT(S)             |
|ORS.                                     |                               |



                               J U D G M E N T


A.K. SIKRI, J.

                 Leave granted.

Dispute in this appeal pertains to the seniority of the appellant  vis-a-vis
respondent No.4.  Both the appellant as well as respondent No.4 are  working
as teachers in Seth Gangadhar Makhriya High School, Mahabaleshwar,  District
Satara in Maharashtra.  It is not in dispute that the appellant  had  joined
the said school as Assistant Teacher before respondent No.4 and  was  senior
to him in the post of  Assistant  Teacher.   However,  respondent  No.4  had
acquired B.Ed. degree prior to  the  appellant  and  on  that  basis  he  is
treated senior to  the  appellant  in  the  category  of  'Trained  Graduate
Teachers'.  Whether this consequence follows as a result  of  the  rules  is
the matter of examination in the present case.

This question has arisen in the following circumstances:
            The appellant joined the service with respondent No.3 School  as
Assistant Teacher on 24.08.1979, whereas respondent  No.4  joined  the  same
post in the same School on 01.09.1980.  At the  time  of  her  joining,  the
appellant had not completed her graduation, though  it  is  not  in  dispute
that the appellant fulfilled the requisite  qualifications  for  appointment
as Assistant Teacher. She completed her BA in the  year  1984.   Thereafter,
she did B.Ed. as well, with due permission of the  School  authorities,  and
passed the said course on 20.05.1986.  To improve her academic  record,  the
appellant even acquired the qualification of MA in the year  1997.   On  the
other hand, the academic graph of respondent  No.4  discloses  that  he  was
already BA when he joined the service as Assistant  Teacher  on  01.09.1980.
He also did B.Ed. and completed that course on 01.11.1984 (that  is,  before
the appellant, who had acquired the same qualification on 20.05.1986).

A seniority list was circulated by the School authorities (from the  record,
the date of this list is not discernible) wherein the  appellant  was  shown
as junior to respondent No.4.  The appellant claimed  that  she  was  senior
and,  therefore,  filed  objections  to  the  said  seniority  list,  which,
however, did not yield any result.

The then Headmaster of the School, one Mr. K.R. Lakeri, was  due  to  retire
on attaining the age of superannuation on 31.12.2009. The appellant  claimed
that she should be promoted as Headmistress, being the senior  most  teacher
on the retirement of Mr. Lakeri and submitted an application to this  effect
on  16.05.2009,  which  was  followed   by   another   communication   dated
01.12.2009.  In reply, she received the communication dated 29.12.2009  from
respondent No.1, which is a Charitable Trust running the School, asking  for
grounds and explanations on the basis of which she was staking her claim  to
the post of Headmistress.  However, without waiting for  the  reply  of  the
appellant and on the same day, that is on 29.12.2009, the Management of  the
School passed Resolution No.3 resolving to appoint respondent  No.4  as  the
Headmaster of the School.  Appointment  letter  dated  11.01.2010  was  also
issued in this behalf in favour  of  respondent  No.4.   This  proposal  was
forwarded by the School authorities to the  Education  Officer  (Secondary),
Zilla  Parishad,  Satara  (respondent  No.5  herein)  seeking  approval  for
appointment of respondent No.4 as  the  Headmaster,  which  was  granted  by
respondent No.5.

Feeling aggrieved  by  the  promotion  of  respondent  No.4,  the  appellant
approached the School Tribunal  by  filing  an  appeal  bearing  No.  5/2010
seeking quashing of the orders  of  the  authorities  appointing  respondent
No.4. as the Headmaster of the School.  This appeal  was  contested  by  the
School authorities as well as the  Education  Officer  taking  the  position
that respondent No.4 was senior to  the  appellant.   The  School  Tribunal,
after hearing the matter, passed  orders  dated  26.09.2012  dismissing  the
appeal preferred by the appellant.  The appellant challenged that  order  by
filing the writ petition in the High Court of Bombay.   This  writ  petition
has also been dismissed by the High  Court  vide  orders  dated  25.02.2013.
Undettered by two unsuccessful attempts, the appellant has  approached  this
Court maintaining the posture that she is  senior  to  respondent  No.4  and
rightful claimant to the post of Headmistress, as per the extant Rules.

The aforesaid, thus, is the brief narration of the background in  which  the
dispute has arise, viz. whether  it  is  the  appellant  who  is  senior  to
respondent No.4 or it is respondent No.4 who is senior to the appellant.

The  reason  given  by  the  School  Tribunal  in  accepting  the  claim  of
respondent No.4 is that at the time  of  entry  of  both  these  persons  as
Assistant Teachers in the  School,  both  of  them  were  not  having  B.Ed.
qualification but were only D.Ed.  Therefore, they were placed in  Category-
D of Schedule 'F'.  Further, as far as B.Ed.  qualification  was  concerned,
the same was acquired by the appellant in the year 1986, whereas  respondent
No.4  got  this  qualification  on  31.05.1984.   According  to  the  School
Tribunal, seniority is to be considered from  the  date  of  acquisition  of
this  professional qualification, that is being the 'Trained  Teacher'.   In
this context, the School Tribunal took note  of  the  fact  that  respondent
No.3 School is a Secondary School, having classes of V to X and as such,  as
per Rule 3(1)(b),  the  required  qualification  must  be  graduate  teacher
possessing bachelor's degree in teaching and five years teaching  experience
and out of this two years experience shall  be  after  acquiring  bachelor's
degree.   Further,  Schedule-B  of  the  Maharashtra  Employees  of  Private
Schools (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1981 (hereinafter referred to as  the
'Rules')   provides  the  degree  qualification  for  secondary  teacher  as
Graduate  plus  B.Ed.   On  that  reckoning,  the  date  of  acquiring   the
professional qualification becomes relevant, which was B.Ed., and  since  it
is respondent No.4 who stole the march over the appellant by acquiring  this
qualification earlier in point of time, he was to be treated  as  senior  to
the appellant.  The School Tribunal, in support of this conclusion that  the
date of acquisition of professional  qualification  would  be  the  date  of
determining the seniority, relied upon a Full Bench judgment of  the  Bombay
High Court in the case  of  Shri  Vaijanath  s/o.  Tatyarao  Shinde  v.  The
Secretary, Marathwada Shikshan Prasarak Mandal (Writ Petition  No.  4907  of
2002 decided on 15.11.2006).

The High Court, while dismissing the writ petition  of  the  appellant,  has
concurred with the aforesaid view of the School Tribunal.

Notice in this case was duly served upon the respondents. However,  none  of
the respondents chose to enter appearance.  In these circumstances,  we  had
no option but to hear the counsel for the appellant in the  absence  of  the
respondents.  However, we have ourselves  minutely  perused  the  record  as
well as the relevant statutory provisions.

The submission of the learned counsel for the appellant  was  that  criteria
followed by the courts below in determining the seniority, namely, the  date
of acquisition of professional qualification, is totally extraneous  and  is
not reflected in the relevant provisions, namely, the Maharashtra  Employees
of Private Schools (Conditions of Service) Regulation Act, 1977 (for  short,
the 'Act') and the Rules framed thereunder.  His submission was  that  there
are specific  Rules  determining  the  seniority  and  respondent  No.1  was
supposed to follow those Rules.  According to him, the  relevant  Rules  did
not prescribe acquisition of a particular qualification as the criteria  for
fixing the seniority.  He referred to the provisions of  Section  4  of  the
Act as well as Rules 3 and 12 of the Rules,  read  with  Schedule-F  to  the
said Rules and submitted that  these  provisions,  which  are  statutory  in
nature, not only provide the qualification required  for  the  post(s),  but
also provide formula for determining  the  inter-se  seniority  as  well  as
criterion for appointment of the Headmaster of a Private School.

In order to appreciate the aforesaid contention, it is necessary  to  glance
through the Rules in question.

Section 2(9) of  the  Act  defines  'Head  of  a  School'.   Section  2(24A)
provides the definition of 'Assistant Teacher  (Probationary)'.  Section  3,
which pertains to the applicability of the Act, inter  alia,  provides  that
this Act shall apply to all private schools in  the  State  of  Maharashtra,
whether receiving a grant-in-aid from the State Government or not.   Section
4 of the Act provides for the terms and conditions of service  of  employees
of private schools. Section 5 cast  certain  obligations  of  Management  of
private schools, which includes filling up of permanent  vacancies  in  such
schools by appointment of a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy.

We would like  to  reproduce,  verbatim,  provisions  of  Section  2(9)  and
Section 2(24A) as well as Section 4 of the Act, which are as under:
“Section 2(9)

“Head of a School”, or Head means the person, by whatever  name  called  in-
charge of the academic and administrative duties and functions of  a  school
conducted by any management and recognised or deemed to be recognised  under
this Act, and  includes  a  principal,  vice-Principal,  head  master,  head
mistress, assistant head master, assistant head-mistress, or  superintendent
thereof;

Section 2(24A)

Assistant Teacher (Probationary) means  a  member  of  base  teaching  cadre
appointed on  honorarium  and  subject  to  such  terms  and  conditions  as
specified in the Government Resolution published in  Maharashtra  Government
Gazet6te, Extra-ordinary, No.12, Part-I-Central Sub-section, dated the  15th
February 2007, for eventual appointment as a teacher;

Section 4

Terms and conditions of service of employees of Private schools.

(1)   Subject to the provisions of this section, the  State  Government  may
make  rules  providing  for  the  minimum  qualification   for   recruitment
(including its procedure),  duties,  pay,  allowances,  post-retirement  and
other benefits, and other conditions of  service  of  employees  of  private
schools and for reservation of adequate  number  of  posts  for  members  of
backward classes:

Provided that, neither the pay  nor  the  rights  in  respect  of  leave  of
absence, age of retirement and post-retirement benefits and  other  monetary
benefits of an employee in the employment of an existing private  school  on
the appointed date shall be varied to the disadvantage of such  employee  by
any such rules.

(2)   Every employee of a private school shall be governed by such  Code  of
Conduct as may be prescribed.  On the violation of  any  provision  of  such
Code of Conduct, the employee shall be liable to disciplinary  action  after
conducting an enquiry in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3)   If the scales  of  pay  and  allowances,  post  retirement  and  other
benefits of the employees of any private school  are  less  favourable  than
those provided by the rules made under sub-section (1), the  Director  shall
direct in writing the Management of such school to bring the same  upto  the
level provided by the said rules, within such period or extended  period  as
may be specified by him.

(4)   Failure to  comply  with  any  direction  given  by  the  Director  in
pursuance of sub-section (3) may result in the  recognition  of  the  school
concerned being withdrawn,  provided  that  the  recognition  shall  not  be
withdrawn unless the Management of the school concerned  has  been  given  a
reasonable opportunity of being heard.

(5)   No employee working in a private school shall  work  in  any  coaching
class.  If any employee, in contravention of this provision,  works  in  any
coaching class, his services  shall  be  liable  to  be  terminated  by  the
Management, provided that no such  order  of  termination  shall  be  issued
unless the employee concerned has been given  a  reasonable  opportunity  of
being heard.

(6)   No employee of a private  school  shall  be  suspended,  dismissed  or
removed or his services shall not be otherwise terminated or  he  shall  not
be reduced in rank,  by  the  Management,  except  in  accordance  with  the
provisions of this Act and the rules made in that behalf.”



Relevant Rules with which  we  are  concerned  are  Rule  3  (providing  for
qualification and appointment of Head); Rule 6  (stipulating  qualifications
needed  for  appointment  as  teachers)  and  Rule  12  (dealing  with   the
seniority).  Relevant portion of these Rules are as under:
“3.  Qualifications and appointment of Head.

(1)   A person to be appointed as the Head -

(a)         xx             xx                 xx

(b)   of a secondary school including night school or a  Junior  College  of
Education shall be a graduate possessing Bachelor's degree  in  teaching  or
education of a statutory University or any  other  qualification  recognised
by Government as equivalent  thereto  and  possessing  not  less  than  give
years', total full-time teaching experience after graduation in a  secondary
school or a Junior College of Education out of which  at  least  two  years'
experience shall  be  after  acquiring  Bachelor's  degree  in  teaching  or
education:

                 xx             xx                  xx

(3)   The Management of a school including a night school shall fill up  the
post of the Head by appointing the seniormost member of the  teaching  staff
(in accordance with the guidelines laid down in Schedule  “f”  from  amongst
those employed in a school (if it is the only school run by the  Management)
or schools [if there are more  than  one  school  (excluding  night  school)
conducted by it] who fulfills the conditions laid down in sub-rule  (1)  and
who has a satisfactory record of service.

                 xx             xx                  xx


6.    Qualifications of Teachers.

      The minimum qualifications for the  post  of  teachers  and  the  non-
teaching staff in the primary schools, secondary  schools,  Junior  Colleges
and Junior Colleges of Education shall be as specified in Schedule “B”.

                 xx             xx                  xx


                                Schedule 'B'

                          (See rules 2(1)(j) and 6)

                   I. Qualifications for Primary Teachers

      Appointment to the  posts  of  Primary  school  teachers  (other  than
special teachers-Drawing teachers) shall be made by nomination from  amongst
candidates who have passed S.S.C. examination or  Matriculation  examination
or Lokshala examination or any  other  examination  recognised  as  such  by
Government and the Primary Teachers Certificate examination  or  Diploma  in
Education examination, or a Diploma in Education (per-primary of two  years'
duration).

Note. - A person holding a Diploma in Education (pre-primary of  two  year's
duration)  shall  be  qualified  to   teach   standards   I   to   IV   only
notwithstanding anything contained in the foregoing provisions -

                 xx             xx                  xx

   II. Qualifications for trained Teachers in Secondary Schools and Junior
                            Colleges of Education

1.    For Graduate Teachers:

                 xx             xx                  xx

(iv)   A Diploma in Education of the Graduates Basic Training Centres;

                 xx             xx                  xx

12.  SENIORITY LIST

(1)   Every Management shall prepare and  maintain  seniority  list  of  the
teaching staff including head master and  Assistant  Head  master  and  non-
teaching staff in the school in accordance with the Guidelines laid down  in
Schedule “F”.  The Seniority List so prepared shall  be  circulated  amongst
the members of the staff concerned and their signatures for having  received
a copy of the list shall be obtained.  Any subsequent  change  made  in  the
list from time to time shall also be brought to the notice  of  the  members
of the staff concerned and their  signature  for  having  noted  the  change
shall be obtained.

(2)   Objections, if any, to the seniority list or to  the  changes  therein
shall be duly taken into consideration by the management.

(3)   Disputes, if any,  in  the  matter  of  inter-se  seniority  shall  be
referred to the Education Officer for his decision.

                                Schedule “F”

1.    Guidelines for fixation  of  seniority  of  teachers  in  the  primary
schools:

The Seniority of primary school teachers in Primary Schools shall  be  based
on  continuous  officiation  counted  from  the  date   of   acquiring   the
educational qualification as  prescribed  under  “Schedule  B'  appended  to
these rules.

2.    Guidelines for fixation of seniority  of  teachers  in  the  secondary
schools, Junior Colleges of Education and Junior  College  Classes  attached
to secondary schools and Senior College:

For the purpose of Fixation  of  Seniority  of  teachers  in  the  secondary
schools, Junior Colleges of Education and Junior  College  classes  attached
to Secondary Schools the teachers should be categorized as follows:

Category A: Heads of Secondary  Schools  having  an  enrolment  of  students
above 500 and Principals of Junior Colleges of Education  having  more  than
four Divisions on the basis of their appointments to the respective posts.

Category B: Heads of Secondary  Schools  having  an  enrolment  of  students
above 500, Principals of Junior Colleges of Education having  four  or  less
divisions and Assistant Heads of  Secondary  Schools  having  more  than  20
classes on the basis of their appointments to the respective posts.

Category C:

      M.A./M.Sc./M.Com, B.T./B.Ed., or its equivalent; or

      B.A./B.Sc./B.Com. B.T./B.Ed., or its equivalent; or

      B.A./B.Sc./B.Com. Dip.T (old two years course); or

      B.A./B.Sc./B.Com., S.T.C./Dip.Ed./Dip.T. (One  year  course)  with  10
years post – S.T.C. etc. services

Category D:

      B.A./B.Sc./B.Com., S.T.C./Dip.T. (One year course)  Senior  or  Junior
Hindi Shikshak Sanad or its equivalent

Category E:

      S.S.C., S.T.C./ Dip.Ed/ Dip.T. (One  year  course)  Senior  or  Junior
Hindi Shikshak Sanad or its equivalent

Category F:

      Untrained Graduates or holders of equivalent qualification

Category G:

      Untrained Matriculates or holders of equivalent qualification



Category H:

      All teachers other than those mentioned in categories A to G.

                 xx             xx                  xx


Note 2:     The following training qualifications which can be  secured  two
years  after  S.S.C.   examination   shall   be   considered   as   training
qualification for the purpose of seniority even after 1.10.1970:

(1)   D.Ed. (2 years)

(2)   T.D. (Bombay University)

(3)   Dip. Ed. (Nagpur University).

                 xx             xx                  xx

Note  4:      The  categories  mentioned  above  represent  the  ladder   of
seniority and have been mentioned in descending order.”


When we read the aforesaid Rules in the context of  the  present  case,  the
position which emerges is that for appointment of  a  Primary  Teacher,  the
qualification that is stipulated in Schedule-B is  that  he  or  she  should
have passed S.S.C. examination  or  matriculation  examination  or  lokshala
examination or any other examination recognised as such  by  Government  and
the  Primary  Teachers  Certificate  examination  or  Diploma  in  Education
examination,  or  a  Diploma  in  Education  (per-primary  of   two   years'
duration).   Thus,  among  various  alternate   qualifications   which   are
prescribed for appointment to the post of Primary School  Teachers,  one  of
the prescribed qualification is Diploma in  Education  Examination  (D.Ed.).
Therefore,  a  person  holding  this  qualification  would  be  treated   as
satisfying the qualification stipulated in Rule 6.   As  a  consequence,  he
would be treated as 'Trained Graduate', as defined in  Rule  2(1)(j),  which
means a person possessing the qualifications mentioned  in  sub-clauses  (i)
to (vi) of clause (1) of item II in Schedule “B”.

The appellant herein entered  the  service  in  respondent  No.3  School  as
Assistant Teacher of a Primarcy  School  with  Diploma  in  Education,  i.e.
D.Ed. qualification.  She, thus, fulfilled the qualification for that  post.
 B.Ed. degree is not the essential qualification prescribed for  this  post.
This is a relevant factor which is to be kept  in  mind  for  resolving  the
controversy in issue.

In the aforesaid backdrop, it is to be seen as  to  whether  acquisition  of
B.Ed. degree by respondent No.4 (who joined as Assistant Teacher  after  the
appellant and was junior to her as Assistant Teacher) earlier  in  point  of
time than the appellant would tamper with the  seniority  of  the  appellant
and steal a march over her?  The School Tribunal as well as the  High  Court
has referred to the Full Bench judgment of the Bombay  High  Court  in  Shri
Vaijanath (supra) while answering this question  in  the  affirmative.   The
question which was referred for determination by  the  Full  Bench  in  that
case was to the following effect:
“For promotion to the post of Head  Master  of  a  Primary  School,  whether
seniority of the  teacher  is  to  be  counted  from  the  date  of  initial
appointment, or from the date of acquisition  of  educational  and  training
qualification?”

The Full Bench of the High Court answered the aforesaid question by  holding
that  seniority  shall  be  determined  from  the  date  of  acquisition  of
educational and training qualification.   For  providing  this  answer,  the
Full Bench took into consideration provisions of Section 5  of  the  Act  as
per which permanent vacancy in a private  school  is  to  be  filled  up  by
appointing a person duly qualified to fill such vacancy.  In  the  facts  of
that case, the Court noted that since the petitioner there, when  he  joined
the school, did not have the necessary qualification for the said  post,  he
could not be treated as a person duly qualified in  terms  of  Rule  6  read
with Schedule “B” of the Rules.  On  that  basis,  the  Court  came  to  the
conclusion that as the said petitioner acquired the  qualification  required
for the post at a later date, it is  only  on  the  acquisition  of  such  a
qualification that he became eligible and qualified for being  appointed  to
the post and, therefore, his seniority would be determined from the date  of
acquisition of the qualification and not before.   For  such  a  conclusion,
the High Court relied upon the judgment of  this  Court  in  Shitala  Prasad
Shukla v. State of U.P. & Ors., (1986) II LLJ 298 SC.

In the present case, as already mentioned above, the  appellant  was  having
the  requisite  minimum  qualification  for  appointment  to  the  post   of
Assistant  Teacher  in  the  Primary  School  and  it  was  not  a  case  of
appointment of an unqualified teacher when the appellant  was  appointed  to
the said post on 24.08.1979. This makes all the difference and  renders  the
judgment in the case of Shri Vaijanath (supra) as inapplicable to the  facts
of the present case.  The High Court has  failed  to  notice  this  relevant
distinction and mechanically applied the  ratio  of  the  judgment  in  Shri
Vaijanath (supra).

In the present case, when we find that the appellant  was  qualified  to  be
appointed as Assistant  Teacher  in  Primary  School  on  the  date  of  his
appointment, acquisition of higher qualification at a later date, even  when
such a higher qualification is requisite qualification for the higher  post,
will not be determinative for fixing the seniority.  Direct  answer  thereto
is provided by this Court in R.B. Desai & Anr. v.  S.K.  Khanolker  &  Ors.,
(1999) 7 SCC 54.    The appellants therein were appointed  to  the  post  of
Forest Officer in the year 1964-65 and after the  required  training  joined
the Forest Department of the Government of  Goa  as  Foresters  with  effect
from 27.01.1965.  They were promoted to the next higher cadre  of  RFO  with
effect from 08.03.1974.  The first respondent  therein  directly  joined  as
RFO on 01.11.1975 a  date  subsequent  to  the  date  of  promotion  of  the
appellants.  In the various seniority lists, including the  final  seniority
list, prepared and published on 30.07.1991 of the officers in the  cadre  of
RFOs, the appellants were shown at S.Nos. 5 and 8  whereas  respondent  No.1
was placed at S.No. 11.  The ranking assigned in  that  seniority  list  was
not been challenged at any point of time.  Next promotion was  to  the  post
of ACF.  As per the relevant Rules, the said post was a selection  post  and
the method of recruitment to this post was in the ratio of 75% by  promotion
and 25% by direct recruitment.  In the case of  promotion,  the  eligibility
criteria was fixed as under:
“(i)  Range Forest Officers with 5 years' regular service in the  grade  and
possessing diploma of Forest Rangers' Training from Forest  Rangers  College
in India or equivalent.

(ii)  Unqualified Range Forest Officers trained in  Forest  School  with  10
years' regular service in the grade.

Note  1.–  The  eligibility  list  for  promotion  shall  be  prepared  with
reference to the date of  completion  by  the  officers  of  the  prescribed
qualifying service in the respective grade/posts.

Note  2.–  Unqualified  Range  Forest  Officers  shall  after  promotion  as
Assistant Conservator of Forests would be required to complete  successfully
refresher courses at FRI&C.
                                                        (Emphasis supplied)”


            Interpreting Note 1, the  High  Court  had  held  that  date  of
completion of the prescribed qualifying service would be relevant and  since
the appellants therein, when they were senior as  RFOs,  had  completed  the
qualifying service (which was 10 years in their case) and  respondent  No9.1
had completed qualifying service earlier in point of time  (which  was  only
five years), respondent No.1 was senior.  This Court reversed the  aforesaid
view of the High Court by accepting the contentions of the  appellants  that
once they entered  the  eligible  list,  the  date  of  eligibility  had  no
preferential benefit and it is only the seniority vis  a  vis  the  eligible
candidates, as shown in the seniority list of the RFOs that would  be  taken
into consideration.  Interpretation given to Note 1 by the  High  Court  was
also rejected.  The entire issue, while taking the aforesaid view, is  dealt
with by this Court in the following manner:
“9.   We are unable to agree with this reasoning  of  the  High  Court.   As
noticed above, promotion to the post of AFOs is made from the post  of  RFOs
to the extent of 75% of the vacancies.  There is no dispute  that  both  the
appellants and the first respondent belong to the cadre of RFOs.   The  only
difference between them being that the  appellants  were  promotees  in  the
said cadre while the first respondent  was  a  direct  recruit.   It  is  an
accepted  principle  in  service  jurisprudence  that  once   persons   from
different sources enter a common cadre, their  seniority  will  have  to  be
counted from the date of their continuous officiation in the cadre to  which
they are appointed.  On facts, there  is  no  dispute  that  the  appellants
entered the RFOs' cadre on a date anterior to that of the first  respondent,
therefore, in the cadre of RFOs, the appellants  are  senior  to  the  first
respondent.  However, to be considered  for  promotion,  the  rule  required
RFOs to  acquire  the  eligibility  as  provided  therein.   Therefore,  the
question  for  consideration  is:  can  the  acquisition   of   an   earlier
eligibility give an  advantage  to  the  first  respondent  as  against  the
appellants when an avenue for promotion opens in  the  cadre  of  ACFs  even
though at what point of time the appellants had also acquired  the  required
eligibility?  We are of the opinion that if at  the  time  of  consideration
for promotion the candidates concerned have acquired the  eligibility,  then
unless the rule specifically gives an advantage to a candidate with  earlier
eligibility,  the  date  of  seniority  should  prevail  over  the  date  of
eligibility.  The rule under consideration does not give any  such  priority
to the  candidates  acquiring  earlier  eligibility  and,  in  our  opinion,
rightly so.  In service law, seniority has its own weightage and unless  and
until the rules specifically exclude this weightage of seniority, it is  not
open to the authorities to ignore the same.

10.   The High Court has relied upon the language of Note 1 to the  rule  to
come to the conclusion that the persons with  earlier  date  of  eligibility
have a weightage over others solely on the basis that the note required  the
list  of  eligibility  to  be  maintained  on  the  basis  of  the  date  of
acquisition of such  eligibility,  hence  eligibility  has  preference  over
seniority.  Our reading of the said note does not persuade us  to  give  any
such preference.  If the rule did contemplate such advantage, it would  have
stated so in specific terms.  We also do not see any  special  objective  in
giving  preference  to  the  date  of  eligibility  as  against   seniority.
Eligibility, of course, has a relevant object but  date  of  acquisition  of
eligibility, when both competing persons have the eligibility  at  the  time
of consideration cannot, in our opinion, make any difference.

11.   If on the date of consideration,  the  appellants  did  not  have  the
eligibility then certainly it is the first  respondent  who  ought  to  have
been considered for the said promotion and if he  was  so  promoted  earlier
than the  appellants  he  would  have  acquired  a  higher  ranking  in  the
seniority list of ACFs.  That not being the case, we  are  unable  to  agree
with the view taken by the High Court, as stated above, because on the  date
on which the avenue for promotion to the  cadre  of  ACFs  opened  both  the
appellants as well as the first respondent  had  the  necessary  eligibility
and their names figured in the eligibility list.  That being so,  as  stated
above, it is the appellants whose case ought to have been  considered  first
and it was so done and they having been found otherwise suitable, they  were
rightly promoted earlier than the first respondent.  Consequently, they  are
entitled to a higher ranking in the cadre  of  ACFs  vis  a  vis  the  first
respondent.  The view taken by us also finds support from  the  judgment  of
this Court in Union of India v.  B.  Jayaraman,  (1994)  Supp  (1)  SCC  95,
wherein considering a similar argument this Court held: (SCC Headnote)

“The note in column 11 is only for purposes of  giving  eligibility  to  the
erstwhile Assistants working as Superintendents Grade  II  for  purposes  of
being considered for promotion to the post of  Superintendent  Grade  I  and
not for the purpose of seniority at all.

                                                        (Emphasis supplied)”


That apart, we find that in the case at  hand  there  is  a  specific  Rule,
namely, Rule 12 of the Rules, which deals with  seniority.   The  clear  and
unambiguous  criteria  for   determining   seniority   is   the   continuous
officiation  counted  from   the   date   of   acquiring   the   educational
qualification as prescribed under Schedule “B”.  It is stated  at  the  cost
of  repetition  that  since  the  appellant  was   holding   the   requisite
qualifications, i.e.  D.Ed.,  for  appointment  to  the  post  of  Assistant
Teacher in Primary School, as prescribed under Schedule “B”  to  the  Rules,
her seniority was to be counted on  the  basis  of  continuous  officiation.
Since she joined the post of Assistant Teacher on 24.08.1979 and  respondent
No.4 came to be appointed subsequently, i.e. on 01.09.1980.   The  appellant
would naturally be senior to respondent No.4.

Insofar as manning the post of Head of the School is concerned,  Rule  3  of
the Rules provides for the qualifications.  It is not in dispute that as  on
the date of which the Head of the School was to be appointed, the  appellant
fulfilled all the requisite  qualifications  mentioned  in  the  said  Rule.
Further, as already found, she  was  senior  to  respondent  No.4  as  well.
Therefore, it is the appellant who was the rightful claimant to the post  of
Head of the School.  Depriving her of this legitimate right and  making  the
appointment of respondent No.4  as  the  Head  Master  of  the  School  was,
therefore, clearly erroneous, which resulted in infringement of  the  rights
of the appellant to hold that post.

Accordingly, this appeal is allowed.  Judgment of  the  High  Court  is  set
aside and a direction is issued to appoint the  appellant  as  Head  of  the
School by replacing respondent No.4  therefrom.   This  direction  shall  be
carried out within a period of four weeks from today.
                 Since the respondents have not appeared, we are not  making
any order as to costs.

                             .............................................J.
                                                            (J. CHELAMESWAR)



                             .............................................J.
                                                                (A.K. SIKRI)

New Delhi;
August 13, 2014.

Writ - Civil Suit by Auction Purchaser - Inter pleader suit by Tenant against the owner who purchased the property under court auction sale and also Union of India who claims to be owner under a Grant - who are entitled for rents is the question to be decided - High court held that since there are complicated issues writ not maintainable - with out evicting the auction purchaser due to process of law - Union of India not entitled for any rent from inter pleader suit plaintiff/ tenant and dismissed the writ and decreed the inter pleader suit in second appeal - Apex court held that The subject matter of the inter-pleader suit and the proceedings arising therefrom clearly pertains to the entitlement of the presently contesting parties to receive rent in respect of the property in question. The subject matter of the two proceedings i.e. inter-pleader suit and the appeals arising therefrom and the writ petitions filed by the appellant are, therefore, not directly and substantially the same so as to attract the principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. the High Court had dismissed the Writ Petitions leaving it open for the appellant to avail the remedy of civil suit to get the title to the property adjudicated by a competent civil court, no fault, muchless any infirmity, can be found so as to warrant our interference. Accordingly, the civil appeal will have to be dismissed which we hereby do.The stand of the cantonment authority in the Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.175 of 1969, noted by us, is based on the terms of the old grant issued by the Governor General in Council on 12.09.1836. The legal effect of the terms of the said grant has been dealt with by this Court in Chief Executive Officer Vs. Surendra Kumar Vakil & Ors.[1]and Union of India & Ors. Vs. Kamla Verma[2] and have been understood to be conveying a lease of the building standing on the cantonment land with the power of resumption in the cantonment authority subject to payment of compensation for the cost of the building and not as a lease of the land itself. The above position has been emphasised for being kept in mind while dealing with all possible future litigations concerning the property in question without, of course, expressing any opinion on the merits of the claims/contention of any of the parties.= CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2147 OF 2006 PURSHOTTAM DAS TANDON DEAD BY LRS. … APPELLANT (S) VERSUS MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER & ORS. …RESPONDENT (S) = 2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41825

Writ  - Civil Suit by Auction Purchaser - Inter pleader suit by Tenant against the owner who purchased the property under court auction sale and also Union of India who claims to be owner under a Grant  - who are entitled for rents is the question to be decided - High court held that since there are complicated issues writ not maintainable - with out evicting the auction purchaser due to process of law - Union of India not entitled for any rent from inter pleader suit plaintiff/ tenant and dismissed the writ and decreed the inter pleader suit in second appeal - Apex court held that The  subject  matter  of the  inter-pleader  suit  and  the  proceedings  arising  therefrom  clearly pertains to the entitlement of the presently contesting parties  to  receive
rent in respect of the property in question. The subject matter of the two proceedings i.e. inter-pleader suit  and  the appeals arising therefrom and the writ  petitions  filed  by  the  appellant
are, therefore, not directly and substantially the same  so  as  to  attract the principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 of the Code  of  Civil Procedure.  the High Court had  dismissed  the Writ Petitions leaving it open for the appellant  to  avail  the  remedy  of civil suit to get the title to  the  property  adjudicated  by  a  competent civil court, no fault, muchless  any  infirmity,  can  be  found  so  as  to warrant our interference.  Accordingly, the civil appeal  will  have  to  be
dismissed which we hereby do.The stand of the cantonment authority in the Civil Misc.  Writ
Petition No.175 of 1969, noted by us, is based  on  the  terms  of  the  old grant issued by the Governor General in Council on  12.09.1836.   The  legal effect of the terms of the said grant has been dealt with by this  Court  in Chief Executive Officer Vs. Surendra  Kumar  Vakil  &  Ors.[1]and  Union  of India & Ors. Vs. Kamla Verma[2] and have been understood to be  conveying  a
lease of the building standing on the cantonment  land  with  the  power  of resumption in the cantonment authority subject to  payment  of  compensation for the cost of the building and not as a lease of the land itself. The above position has been emphasised for being kept  in  mind  while
dealing with all possible future  litigations  concerning  the  property  in question without, of course, expressing any opinion on  the  merits  of  the claims/contention of any of the parties.=

The suit property  is  Bungalow  No.  29,  Chaitham  Lines,  Allahabad
covered by Survey No. 143, Old Cantonment, Allahabad.  There is  no  dispute
that late  Lala  Manohar  Lal  grandfather  of  the  present  appellant  had
purchased the said property for a sum of Rs. 2900/- in a Court auction  held
on 25.11.1848.  The auction sale was confirmed by the Court  on  27.12.1848.
The possession of  the  property  of  the  predecessors-in-interest  of  the
appellant and thereafter of the appellant is not in dispute.=

 The Union of India issued a  resumption  notice  dated  26.12.1968  in
respect of the property in question.  The appellant instituted  Civil  Misc.
Writ Petition No. 175 of 1969 before the  Allahabad  High  Court  contending
that the property was purchased by  his  predecessors-in-interest   and  had
fallen to his share in a family settlement.  The Union of  India  sought  to
resist the claim of the appellant by asserting that the land  on  which  the
property stood was the subject of old grant dated 12.09.1836 issued  by  the
Governor General in Council under which a right of resumption was vested  in
the Union.  It was further contended on behalf of the Union  of  India  that
under the clauses of the aforesaid grant it was  only   the  building  which
was conveyed to the predecessors of the appellant and the same could  always
be resumed subject to payment of compensation to be assessed on the cost  of
the building.  It appears that the Union of India had  also  asserted  that,
in any event, under the terms of  the  old  grant  title  to  the  land  had
remained with the Union and  was  not  and  in  fact  could  not  have  been
transferred to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant.=
 Around this time the appellant instituted Civil Suit No. 147  of  1971
in the Court of the Additional District Judge,  Allahabad  seeking  eviction
of Allahabad Polytechnic and Harijan Sewak Sangh who were  the  tenants  and
sub-tenants in the property.  The Union of  India  served  notice  upon  the
aforesaid two occupants of the property demanding rent claiming  to  be  the
owner thereof.  Allahabad Polytechnic,  therefore,  filed  an  inter-pleader
suit No. 161 of 1973 in the Court of the Civil Judge,  Allahabad  impleading
the appellant and the Union of India as Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit.   In
the said suit it was prayed that the defendants may inter-plead so that  the
right to collect rent of the property in dispute could  be  determined.   In
Second Appeal No.2866 arising out of the aforesaid suit, the decree  of  the
learned trial court that the appellant  and  not  the  Union  of  India  was
entitled to receive rent was  affirmed.   The  said  decree  was,  in  turn,
affirmed by this Court on 22.02.1984  by  dismissal  of  the  special  leave
petition filed by the Union of India.=
     A reading of the judgment dated 27.11.1981  passed  in  Second  Appeal
No. 2866 of 1978 clearly indicates that while deciding  on  the  entitlement
of the appellant to receive rent in respect of the property the  High  Court
had held that without taking recourse to  legal  proceedings  to  evict  the
appellants from the  property,  the  Union  of  India  could  not  have  the
demanded rent in respect thereof.
 In fact, in the aforesaid judgment  dated
27.11.1981 passed in Second Appeal No.2866 of 1978 it was  clearly  observed
that :

“The Union of India should first have taken  proceedings  for  ejectment  of
the appellant and then alone after success  in  the  ejectment  suit  should
have been a demand for rent and without that the appellant’s right  to  rent
could not be disturbed.  This also leads to the conclusion that  it  is  the
appellant to whom the rent is payable by the  Allahabad  Polytechnic  unless
the appellant is evicted by due process of law.”

14.   From the above, it is abundantly clear that the  issue  of  title  was
kept open in the proceedings of the Second Appeal.  The  subject  matter  of
the  inter-pleader  suit  and  the  proceedings  arising  therefrom  clearly
pertains to the entitlement of the presently contesting parties  to  receive
rent in respect of the property in question.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the
writ petitions, the appellant, claiming ownership, had sought  mutation,  as
a owner, in  the  cantonment  records  and  also  the  permission  to  raise
construction, a right flowing from the incidence of ownership of  the  land.
 The subject matter of the two proceedings i.e. inter-pleader suit  and  the
appeals arising therefrom and the writ  petitions  filed  by  the  appellant
are, therefore, not directly and substantially the same  so  as  to  attract
the principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 of the Code  of  Civil
Procedure.  Certainty of the above principle would not require us  to  trace
the elaborate case law readily available on the subject.

15.   Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the highly  contentious
issue raised, if in view of the earlier order  dated  06.07.1970  passed  in
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.175 of 1969, the High Court had  dismissed  the
Writ Petitions leaving it open for the appellant  to  avail  the  remedy  of
civil suit to get the title to  the  property  adjudicated  by  a  competent
civil court, no fault, muchless  any  infirmity,  can  be  found  so  as  to
warrant our interference.  Accordingly, the civil appeal  will  have  to  be
dismissed which we hereby do.

16.   Before parting, we deem  it  necessary  to  mention  that  though  the
litigation between the parties in the present case has  been  going  on  for
nearly five decades there is some lack of clarity whether  it  is  title  to
Bungalow No.29, Chaitham Lines, Allahabad or is it title to  the  land  over
which the said property is located that has  been  the  bone  of  contention
between the parties over this great expanse of time.  Though the  resumption
notice dated 26.12.1968 leading to Civil Misc.  Writ  Petition  No.  175  of
1969 was in respect of the bungalow, the subsequent claim of the  appellants
seem to be to the land itself in view of the reliefs  sought  in  the  Civil
Misc. Writ Petition  No.  13353  of  1992  and  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition
No.28558 of 2002.  The same, as noticed, were instituted after rejection  of
the appellant’s claims made in the application/representations filed  before
the cantonment authority for reliefs that were based on claims of  ownership
of the land.  The stand of the cantonment authority in the Civil Misc.  Writ
Petition No.175 of 1969, noted by us, is based  on  the  terms  of  the  old
grant issued by the Governor General in Council on  12.09.1836.   The  legal
effect of the terms of the said grant has been dealt with by this  Court  in
Chief Executive Officer Vs. Surendra  Kumar  Vakil  &  Ors.[1]and  Union  of
India & Ors. Vs. Kamla Verma[2] and have been understood to be  conveying  a
lease of the building standing on the cantonment  land  with  the  power  of
resumption in the cantonment authority subject to  payment  of  compensation
for the cost of the building and not as a lease of the land itself.

17.   The above position has been emphasised for being kept  in  mind  while
dealing with all possible future  litigations  concerning  the  property  in
question without, of course, expressing any opinion on  the  merits  of  the
claims/contention of any of the parties.

2014- Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41825

RANJAN GOGOI, M.Y. EQBAL
                             REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

                        CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2147 OF 2006


PURSHOTTAM DAS TANDON DEAD BY
LRS.                                             … APPELLANT (S)

                      VERSUS

MILITARY ESTATE OFFICER & ORS.     …RESPONDENT (S)



                               J U D G M E N T



RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    The challenge in  this  appeal  is  against  the  common  order  dated
27.05.2005 passed by the High Court of  Judicature  at  Allahabad  in  Civil
Misc. Writ Petition No. 13353 of 1992 and  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition  No.
28558 of 2002.  The High Court, by the impugned order,  has  dismissed  both
the writ petitions filed by the appellant and  has  further  held  that  the
entitlement of the appellant to the reliefs claimed therein will have to  be
adjudicated in a suit for declaration of title.

2.    The elaborate facts will  necessarily  have  to  be  recited  for  the
purposes of bringing out the controversy involved and also to embark upon  a
scrutiny of the correctness of the  impugned  conclusions  recorded  by  the
High Court in the order under challenge.

3.    The suit property  is  Bungalow  No.  29,  Chaitham  Lines,  Allahabad
covered by Survey No. 143, Old Cantonment, Allahabad.  There is  no  dispute
that late  Lala  Manohar  Lal  grandfather  of  the  present  appellant  had
purchased the said property for a sum of Rs. 2900/- in a Court auction  held
on 25.11.1848.  The auction sale was confirmed by the Court  on  27.12.1848.
The possession of  the  property  of  the  predecessors-in-interest  of  the
appellant and thereafter of the appellant is not in dispute.

4.    The Union of India issued a  resumption  notice  dated  26.12.1968  in
respect of the property in question.  The appellant instituted  Civil  Misc.
Writ Petition No. 175 of 1969 before the  Allahabad  High  Court  contending
that the property was purchased by  his  predecessors-in-interest   and  had
fallen to his share in a family settlement.  The Union of  India  sought  to
resist the claim of the appellant by asserting that the land  on  which  the
property stood was the subject of old grant dated 12.09.1836 issued  by  the
Governor General in Council under which a right of resumption was vested  in
the Union.  It was further contended on behalf of the Union  of  India  that
under the clauses of the aforesaid grant it was  only   the  building  which
was conveyed to the predecessors of the appellant and the same could  always
be resumed subject to payment of compensation to be assessed on the cost  of
the building.  It appears that the Union of India had  also  asserted  that,
in any event, under the terms of  the  old  grant  title  to  the  land  had
remained with the Union and  was  not  and  in  fact  could  not  have  been
transferred to the predecessors-in-interest of the appellant.

5.    The writ petition was disposed of  by  the  Allahabad  High  Court  on
06.07.1970 by holding that as highly disputed questions of fact relating  to
title had arisen such issues would not be appropriate  for  adjudication  in
the exercise  of  the  writ  jurisdiction.   The  parties,  therefore,  were
relegated to the remedy of a civil suit.  However, in  the  said  proceeding
an undertaking was made on behalf of the Union of India that  the  appellant
would not be evicted from the property except in accordance with law.

6.    Around this time the appellant instituted Civil Suit No. 147  of  1971
in the Court of the Additional District Judge,  Allahabad  seeking  eviction
of Allahabad Polytechnic and Harijan Sewak Sangh who were  the  tenants  and
sub-tenants in the property.  The Union of  India  served  notice  upon  the
aforesaid two occupants of the property demanding rent claiming  to  be  the
owner thereof.  Allahabad Polytechnic,  therefore,  filed  an  inter-pleader
suit No. 161 of 1973 in the Court of the Civil Judge,  Allahabad  impleading
the appellant and the Union of India as Defendants 1 and 2 in the suit.   In
the said suit it was prayed that the defendants may inter-plead so that  the
right to collect rent of the property in dispute could  be  determined.   In
Second Appeal No.2866 arising out of the aforesaid suit, the decree  of  the
learned trial court that the appellant  and  not  the  Union  of  India  was
entitled to receive rent was  affirmed.   The  said  decree  was,  in  turn,
affirmed by this Court on 22.02.1984  by  dismissal  of  the  special  leave
petition filed by the Union of India.

7.    It appears that on the strength of the aforesaid order passed by  this
Court the appellant moved an application before  the  Executive  Officer  of
the Cantonment Board, Allahabad, for mutation of his name in respect of  the
property in question and for permission to deposit  the  property  tax  etc.
The aforesaid application was filed on the claim that the appellant  is  the
owner of the property.  It also appears that  the  appellant  had  filed  an
application dated 08.04.1977 seeking exemption  of  excess  land  under  the
provisions of the U.P. Urban Land Holding Ceiling Act, 1932  on  the  ground
that he intended to raise  accommodation  thereon  for  economically  weaker
sections.  What happened thereafter is not  very  relevant  except  that  on
21.04.1992 Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 13353 of  1992  was  filed  by  the
appellant for “issue a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to  mutate
the name of the petitioners as owners of Bungalow  No.  29  Chaitham  Lines,
Allahabad and also  to  accept  the  property  tax.”    The  aforesaid  writ
petition was dismissed  on  07.01.2000  by  holding  that  in  view  of  the
judgment dated 6.7.1970 passed in Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 175 of  1969
which was binding on the  parties  the  dispute  required  resolution  in  a
regular civil suit which could be filed by either of the  parties  in  terms
of the judgment of the  High  Court  dated  06.07.1970.   The  issue  as  to
whether the judgment of the High Court in Second Appeal  No.  2866  of  1978
arising out of the inter-pleader suit would operate as  a  res  judicata  on
the question of title to the property was not decided  by  the  High  Court.
The aforesaid judgment and order of the High Court dated 07.01.2000 was  the
subject matter of challenge before this Court in Civil Appeal  No.  7284  of
2001 at the instance of the appellant.

8.    It appears that the appellant had also  filed  an  application  before
the competent authority under Section 181 of the Cantonment  Act,  1924  for
sanction of plans for raising further additional construction on  the  land.
The said application was rejected on 14.03.2002.   The  order  of  rejection
available in the original records of the case indicates that  the  rejection
was made in view of the  resumption  order  dated  26.12.1968  and  also  on
account of objections  of  the  cantonment  authority  with  regard  to  the
ownership of the appellant to  the  land.  Aggrieved,  the  appellant  filed
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No. 28558 of 2002.   In  the  said  writ  petition
while the appellant asserted his ownership of the property i.e. Bungalow  as
well as the appurtenant land the  Union  of  India  denied  such  ownership.
The High Court of Allahabad by its order dated 05.03.2003  disposed  of  the
writ petition by requiring the appeal filed by the appellant  under  Section
274 of the Cantonment Act against the order of  rejection  dated  14.03.2002
which was pending, to be disposed  of.   However,  the  High  Court  in  its
aforesaid order  dated  05.03.2003  recorded  findings/observations  to  the
effect that in Second Appeal No. 2866 of 1978, arising  out  of  the  inter-
pleader suit, the property in dispute has already  been  held  by  the  High
Court to be belonging to the  appellant  and  that  the  said  decision  was
upheld by this Court on 22.02.1984.   On  the  said  basis  the  High  Court
recorded its conclusion that the question  of  title  to  the  property  had
become res judicata and cannot be raked up again.

9.    The aforesaid judgment dated 05.03.2003  was  challenged  before  this
Court by the Cantonment Board in Civil Appeal No. 6637 of  2003.   Both  the
appeals were disposed of by  this  Court  on  19.12.2003  by  remanding  the
matter to the High court in view of the apparent inconsistency  in  the  two
orders of the High  Court  on  the  issue  of  res  judicata.   The  present
impugned order dated 27.05.2005 of the High Court has been  passed  pursuant
to the aforesaid remand made by this court by its order dated 19.12.2003.

10.   We have  heard  Shri  S.R.  Singh,  learned  senior  counsel  for  the
appellant and Shri R.S. Suri, learned senior counsel for the respondents.

11.   The High Court, by the impugned order, has taken  the  view  that  the
judgment and decree passed in the inter-pleader suit holding  the  appellant
to be entitled to receive the rent in respect  of  the  property  would  not
operate as a res judicata so as to confer  any  finality  to  the  issue  of
title in respect of the  property.   Thereafter,  taking  into  account  the
judgment dated 06.07.1970 rendered by the High Court  in  Civil  Misc.  Writ
Petition No. 175 of 1969, the High Court left the parties  with  the  option
of moving the civil court for adjudication of title.  Accordingly, the  writ
petitions were dismissed.

12.   The aforesaid conclusion of the High  Court  appear  to  be  based  on
three principal grounds.  Firstly, the High Court held that  the  decree  in
the proceedings arising out of the inter-pleader suit as  affirmed  by  this
Court merely decided the entitlement of the appellant  to  receive  rent  in
respect of the property and in fact the question of title  to  the  property
was neither in issue in the said proceedings nor was the same  decided.   In
this regard the  High  Court  specifically  noticed  that  in  the  judgment
rendered in  the  Second  Appeal  No.  2866  of  1978  the  High  Court  had
specifically recognized the right of the Union of India to  take  out  legal
proceedings for eviction of the appellant thereby  clearly  indicating  that
the issue of title was  not  conclusively  determined  in  the  said  inter-
pleader suit and the  proceedings  arising  therefrom.   Alternatively,  the
High Court held that if the said decree  is  to  be  understood  as  one  of
determination  of  title  to  the  property  the  same  would   be   without
jurisdiction as a decree declaring title in an inter-pleader suit  filed  by
a tenant is barred under the provisions of Order XXXV Rule 5 of the Code  of
Civil Procedure.

13.   A reading of the judgment dated 27.11.1981  passed  in  Second  Appeal
No. 2866 of 1978 clearly indicates that while deciding  on  the  entitlement
of the appellant to receive rent in respect of the property the  High  Court
had held that without taking recourse to  legal  proceedings  to  evict  the
appellants from the  property,  the  Union  of  India  could  not  have  the
demanded rent in respect thereof.  In fact, in the aforesaid judgment  dated
27.11.1981 passed in Second Appeal No.2866 of 1978 it was  clearly  observed
that :

“The Union of India should first have taken  proceedings  for  ejectment  of
the appellant and then alone after success  in  the  ejectment  suit  should
have been a demand for rent and without that the appellant’s right  to  rent
could not be disturbed.  This also leads to the conclusion that  it  is  the
appellant to whom the rent is payable by the  Allahabad  Polytechnic  unless
the appellant is evicted by due process of law.”

14.   From the above, it is abundantly clear that the  issue  of  title  was
kept open in the proceedings of the Second Appeal.  The  subject  matter  of
the  inter-pleader  suit  and  the  proceedings  arising  therefrom  clearly
pertains to the entitlement of the presently contesting parties  to  receive
rent in respect of the property in question.  On  the  other  hand,  in  the
writ petitions, the appellant, claiming ownership, had sought  mutation,  as
a owner, in  the  cantonment  records  and  also  the  permission  to  raise
construction, a right flowing from the incidence of ownership of  the  land.
 The subject matter of the two proceedings i.e. inter-pleader suit  and  the
appeals arising therefrom and the writ  petitions  filed  by  the  appellant
are, therefore, not directly and substantially the same  so  as  to  attract
the principle of res judicata enshrined in Section 11 of the Code  of  Civil
Procedure.  Certainty of the above principle would not require us  to  trace
the elaborate case law readily available on the subject.

15.   Having regard to the nature of the dispute and the highly  contentious
issue raised, if in view of the earlier order  dated  06.07.1970  passed  in
Civil Misc. Writ Petition No.175 of 1969, the High Court had  dismissed  the
Writ Petitions leaving it open for the appellant  to  avail  the  remedy  of
civil suit to get the title to  the  property  adjudicated  by  a  competent
civil court, no fault, muchless  any  infirmity,  can  be  found  so  as  to
warrant our interference.  Accordingly, the civil appeal  will  have  to  be
dismissed which we hereby do.

16.   Before parting, we deem  it  necessary  to  mention  that  though  the
litigation between the parties in the present case has  been  going  on  for
nearly five decades there is some lack of clarity whether  it  is  title  to
Bungalow No.29, Chaitham Lines, Allahabad or is it title to  the  land  over
which the said property is located that has  been  the  bone  of  contention
between the parties over this great expanse of time.  Though the  resumption
notice dated 26.12.1968 leading to Civil Misc.  Writ  Petition  No.  175  of
1969 was in respect of the bungalow, the subsequent claim of the  appellants
seem to be to the land itself in view of the reliefs  sought  in  the  Civil
Misc. Writ Petition  No.  13353  of  1992  and  Civil  Misc.  Writ  Petition
No.28558 of 2002.  The same, as noticed, were instituted after rejection  of
the appellant’s claims made in the application/representations filed  before
the cantonment authority for reliefs that were based on claims of  ownership
of the land.  The stand of the cantonment authority in the Civil Misc.  Writ
Petition No.175 of 1969, noted by us, is based  on  the  terms  of  the  old
grant issued by the Governor General in Council on  12.09.1836.   The  legal
effect of the terms of the said grant has been dealt with by this  Court  in
Chief Executive Officer Vs. Surendra  Kumar  Vakil  &  Ors.[1]and  Union  of
India & Ors. Vs. Kamla Verma[2] and have been understood to be  conveying  a
lease of the building standing on the cantonment  land  with  the  power  of
resumption in the cantonment authority subject to  payment  of  compensation
for the cost of the building and not as a lease of the land itself.

17.   The above position has been emphasised for being kept  in  mind  while
dealing with all possible future  litigations  concerning  the  property  in
question without, of course, expressing any opinion on  the  merits  of  the
claims/contention of any of the parties.

                        ....………….…………………J.
                                                    [RANJAN GOGOI]


                                                          …………....……………………J.
                                                    [M. Y. EQBAL]
NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 13, 2014.

-----------------------
[1]    (1999) 3 SCC 555
[2]    (2010) 13 SCC 511

-----------------------
12


Arbitration proceedings -Court can appoint any arbitrator other than the prescribed arbitrator as per the terms of agreement - disputes between contractors and Railways - as per the terms of agreement a railway Officer was to be appointed as arbitrator - decades lapsed no award was passed - High court appointed former Chief Justice of the Sikkim High Court - challenged as invalid and beyond conditions of arbitration agreement - Apex court held thatA period of nearly two decades has elapsed since the contractor had raised his claims for alleged wrongful termination of the two contracts. The situation is distressing and to say the least disturbing. The power of the Court under the Act has to be exercised to effectuate the remedy provided thereunder and to facilitate the mechanism contemplated therein. In a situation where the procedure and process under the Act has been rendered futile, the power of the Court to depart from the agreed terms of appointment of arbitrators must be acknowledged in the light of the several decisions noticed by us. We are, therefore, of the view that no infirmity muchless any illegality or failure of justice can be said to be occasioned by the order passed by the High Court so as to warrant any interference. We, therefore, unhesitatingly dismiss this appeal filed by the appellant-railways. = CIVIL APPEAL NO.6275 OF 2014 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20427 OF 2013) NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY & ORS. ... APPELLANT (S) VERSUS TRIPPLE ENGINEERING WORKS ... RESPONDENT (S) = 2014- Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41824

    Arbitration proceedings -Court can appoint any arbitrator other than the prescribed arbitrator as per the terms of agreement -   disputes between contractors and Railways - as per the terms of agreement a railway Officer was to be appointed as arbitrator - decades lapsed no award was passed - High court appointed  former Chief Justice of the  Sikkim  High  Court - challenged as invalid and beyond conditions of arbitration agreement - Apex court held that A period of nearly two decades has elapsed since the contractor had  raised his claims for alleged wrongful  termination  of  the  two  contracts.  The situation is distressing and to say the least  disturbing.  
The  power  of the Court under the Act  has  to  be  exercised  to  effectuate  the  remedy
provided there under and to facilitate the  mechanism  contemplated  therein. In a situation where the procedure  and  process  under  the  Act  has  been rendered futile, the power of the Court to depart from the agreed  terms  of appointment of arbitrators must be acknowledged in the light of the  several decisions noticed by  us.    We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  no infirmity muchless any illegality or failure of justice can be  said  to  be occasioned by the order passed by the  High  Court  so  as  to  warrant  any interference. We, therefore, unhesitatingly dismiss this  appeal  filed  by the appellant-railways.  =
Admittedly, the General Conditions of Contract  of the Railways, which included an arbitration clause,  governed  the  parties.
After  the  termination  of  the  two  contracts  the  respondent-contractor approached the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition challenging  the terminations. =

Though a panel of arbitrators as per Clauses  64(3)(a)(ii)  and  (iii)
of the General Conditions of Contract was appointed as far back  as  in  the
year 1996, till date the award(s) in respect of the disputes arising out  of
either of the  two  contracts  is  yet  to  be  passed.  =

 In the present case Clauses 64(3)(a)(ii)  and  (iii)  of  the  General
Conditions of Contract do not prescribe any specific  qualification  of  the
arbitrators that are to be appointed under the agreement  except  that  they
should be railway officers.
As already noticed,  even  if  the  arbitration
agreement was to specifically provide for  any  particular  qualification(s)
of an arbitrator the same would not denude the power  of  the  Court  acting
under Section 11(6), in an appropriate case to depart therefrom.
 In  Singh
Builders Syndicate (supra) pendency of arbitration proceedings  for  over  a
decade was found by this Court to be a  mockery  of  the  process.=
 In  the
present case, admittedly the award in respect of  disputes  and  differences
arising out of the contract No. CAO/CON/722 is yet  to  be  passed.
Though
the appellant-Railway has in its pleadings made a feeble attempt to  contend
that the process of arbitration arising out of the said  Contract  has  been
finalized, no material, whatsoever,  has  been  laid  before  the  Court  in
support thereof.
The arbitration proceedings to resolve  the  disputes  and
differences arising out of Contract No. CAO/CON/738 has not even  commenced.
 A period of nearly two decades has elapsed since the contractor had  raised
his claims for alleged wrongful  termination  of  the  two  contracts.
The
situation is distressing and to say the least  disturbing.  
The  power  of
the Court under the Act  has  to  be  exercised  to  effectuate  the  remedy
provided thereunder and to facilitate the  mechanism  contemplated  therein.
In a situation where the procedure  and  process  under  the  Act  has  been
rendered futile, the power of the Court to depart from the agreed  terms  of
appointment of arbitrators must be acknowledged in the light of the  several
decisions noticed by  us.    
We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  no
infirmity muchless any illegality or failure of justice can be  said  to  be
occasioned by the order passed by the  High  Court  so  as  to  warrant  any
interference.
We, therefore, unhesitatingly dismiss this  appeal  filed  by
the appellant-railways.
However, in the facts of the case we  do  not  deem
it appropriate to burden the appellant with any costs.
 2014- Aug. Part - http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41824
RANJAN GOGOI, M.Y. EQBAL
                           REPORTABLE

                        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
                        CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
                        CIVIL APPEAL  NO.6275 OF 2014
                 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 20427 OF 2013)


NORTH EASTERN RAILWAY & ORS.            ...    APPELLANT (S)

                                   VERSUS

TRIPPLE ENGINEERING WORKS                  ...  RESPONDENT (S)



                               J U D G M E N T

RANJAN GOGOI, J.

1.    The challenge in this appeal is  to  order  dated  27.06.2012  of  the
Patna High Court by which a former Chief Justice of the  Sikkim  High  Court
had  been  appointed  as  the  arbitrator  to  resolve  the   disputes   and
differences between the parties to the present proceedings  arising  out  of
two contracts bearing  No.  CAO/CON/722  dated  01.11.1993  and  CAO/CON/738
dated 28.04.1994.

2.     Both  the  contracts  awarded  to  the   respondent-contractor   were
terminated on 7.11.1994.  Admittedly, the General Conditions of Contract  of
the Railways, which included an arbitration clause,  governed  the  parties.
After  the  termination  of  the  two  contracts  the  respondent-contractor
approached the Patna High Court by means of a writ petition challenging  the
terminations.   The  writ  petition  was  dismissed,  which  dismissal   was
challenged before this Court in SLP(C) No.  17189/1995.   The  said  special
leave  petition  was  also  dismissed  leaving  parties   to   resolve   the
differences in an appropriate proceeding i.e. a civil suit or  by  reference
to arbitration, as the case may be.

3.    Though a panel of arbitrators as per Clauses  64(3)(a)(ii)  and  (iii)
of the General Conditions of Contract was appointed as far back  as  in  the
year 1996, till date the award(s) in respect of the disputes arising out  of
either of the  two  contracts  is  yet  to  be  passed.   According  to  the
appellant-railways, the proceedings of arbitration  has  been  completed  in
respect of the disputes  arising  out  of  Contract  No.  CAO/CON/722  dated
01.11.1993.  Even if the said statement of the appellant-railways is  to  be
accepted, though no material has been laid in support thereof,  what  cannot
be denied is the fact that  till  date  the  award  is  yet  to  be  passed.
Admittedly, the arbitration in  respect  of  the  contract  No.  CAO/CON/738
dated 28.04.1994 has not even commenced.  This is on  account  of  the  fact
that in the year 2002 the North Eastern Railway, which had entered into  the
contracts with the respondent-contractor, was bifurcated into North  Eastern
Railway and East Central Railway.  As the jurisdiction  in  respect  of  the
aforesaid contract No. CAO/CON/738 was to be exercised by the  East  Central
Railway it appears that the  appellant  has  disclaimed  all  responsibility
with regard to holding of arbitration proceedings in  respect  of  the  said
contract and at the same time the East Central Railway has not responded  in
any positive manner to the several demands for  arbitration  lodged  by  the
contractor.



Insofar as contract  No.  CAO/CON/722  is  concerned,  naturally,  both  the
parties have tried to lay  the  blame  for  the  delay  in  the  process  of
arbitration on each other and the huge number  of  correspondence  exchanged
in this regard and the frequent change of the arbitration panel  on  account
of exigencies of service of the panel members  (retirement,  transfer  etc.)
has made it impossible to pinpoint the responsibility in this regard on  any
one of the contracting parties.  But  what  is  glaring  is  the  fact  that
though the arbitration proceedings in  respect  of  the  said  contract  No.
CAO/CON/722 had commenced as far back as in the year 1996 the award  is  yet
to see the light of the day  notwithstanding  the  assertions  made  by  the
Union that the proceedings have been completed though as already noted,   no
clinching material in this regard has been brought on record; not  to  speak
about the award of the arbitrators though such an award would have been  the
natural consequence of the completion of arbitration proceedings.  It is  in
the totality of these facts that the High Court had  thought  it  proper  to
travel beyond the  framework  of  Clauses  64(3)(a)(ii)  and  (iii)  of  the
General Conditions of Contract and appoint a retired Chief  Justice  as  the
arbitrator.

4.    The correctness of the said decision necessarily has to be  judged  in
the light of the facts and circumstances enumerated  above.   The  necessary
legal discourse that would be  required  to  be  gone  into  to  answer  the
question as posed above could begin by extracting the provisions of  Clauses
64(3)(a)(ii) and (iii) of the General Conditions of Contract.

“64(3)(a)(ii) In cases not  covered  by  clause  64(3)(a)(i),  the  Arbitral
Tribunal shall consist of a panel of three Gazette Rly. Officers  not  below
JA grade, as the arbitrators.  For this purpose, the  Railway  will  send  a
panel of more than 3  names  of  Gazetted  Rly.  Officers  of  one  or  more
departments, of the Rly. to the contractor who will be asked to  suggest  to
General Manager up to 2 names out of panel for appointment  as  contractor’s
nominee.  The General Manager shall appoint at least one out of them as  the
contractor’s nominee and  will,  also  simultaneously  appoint  the  balance
number of arbitrators either from the panel or from outside the panel,  duly
indicating the ‘presiding arbitrator  from  amongst  the  3  arbitrators  so
appointed.  While nominating the arbitrators it will be necessary to  ensure
that one of them is from the Accounts department.  An officer  of  Selection
Grade of the Accounts department shall be considered of equal status to  the
officers in SA grade of departments of  the  Railways  for  the  purpose  of
appointment of arbitrators.

64(3)(a)(iii) – If one  or  more  of  the  arbitrators  appointed  as  above
refuses to act as arbitrator, withdraws from his office  as  arbitrator,  or
vacates his/their office/offices or is/are unable or  unwilling  to  perform
his functions as arbitrator for any reason whatsoever  or  dies  or  in  the
opinion of the General  Manager  fails  to  act  without  undue  delay,  the
General  Manager  shall  appoint  new  arbitrator/arbitrators  to   act   in
his/their   place   in   the   same   manner   in    which    the    earlier
arbitrator/arbitrators had been  appointed.   Such  re-constituted  Tribunal
may, at its discretion, proceed with the reference from the stage  at  which
it was left by the previous arbitrator(s)”.



      From the provisions of the General Conditions of Contract it is  clear
that the panel of arbitrators as  per  the  agreement  between  the  parties
necessarily has to be Gazetted Railway Officers; any vacancy  in  the  panel
of arbitrators has to be filled up in the same manner in which  the  initial
panel is required to be constituted.

 5.   The “classical notion” that the High Court while exercising its  power
under Section 11 of the Arbitration & Conciliation  Act,  1996  (hereinafter
for short ‘the Act’)  must  appoint  the  arbitrator  as  per  the  contract
between the parties saw a significant erosion in Ace Pipeline Contracts  (P)
Ltd. Vs. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Ltd.[1] wherein this Court  had  taken
the view that though the contract between the parties must  be  adhered  to,
deviations therefrom in exceptional circumstances would be  permissible.   A
more significant development had come  in  a  decision  that  followed  soon
thereafter in Union of  India  Vs.  Bharat  Battery  Manufacturing  Co.  (P)
Ltd.[2] wherein following a three Judges Bench decision in Punj  Lloyd  Ltd.
Vs. Petronet MHB Ltd.[3] it was held that once an aggrieved party  files  an
application under Section 11(6) of the Act to the High Court,  the  opposite
party would lose its right of appointment of the arbitrator(s)  as  per  the
terms of the contract.    The implication that the Court would  be  free  to
deviate from the terms of the contract is obvious.  The  apparent  dichotomy
in ACE Pipeline (supra)  and  Bharat  Battery  Manufacturing  Co.  (P)  Ltd.
(supra)  was reconciled by a three Judges Bench of this  Court  in  Northern
Railway  Administration,  Ministry  of  Railway,   New   Delhi   Vs.   Patel
Engineering Company Limited[4] where the  jurisdiction  of  the  High  Court
under Section 11(6) of the Act was sought to be emphasized  by  taking  into
account the expression “to take the necessary  measure”  appearing  in  sub-
section (6) of  Section  11  and  by  further  laying  down  that  the  said
expression has to be read alongwith the requirement of  sub-section  (8)  of
Section 11 of the Act.  The position was further  clarified  in  Indian  Oil
Corporation Limited  and  Others  Vs.  Raja  Transport  Private  Limited[5].
Paragraph 48 of the report wherein the scope of Section 11 of  the  Act  was
summarized may be  quoted  by  reproducing  sub-paragraphs  (vi)  and  (vii)
herein below.
“(vi) The Chief Justice or his designate while exercising power  under  sub-
section (6) of Section 11 shall endeavour to give effect to the  appointment
procedure prescribed in the arbitration clause

(vii)  If circumstances exist, giving rise to justifiable doubts as  to  the
independence  and  impartiality  of  the  person  nominated,  or  if   other
circumstances warrant appointment of an independent arbitrator  by  ignoring
the procedure prescribed, the  Chief  Justice  or  his  designate  may,  for
reasons to be recorded ignore the designated arbitrator and appoint  someone
else.”



6.    The above discussion will not be complete  without  reference  to  the
view  of  this  Court  expressed  in  Union  of  India  Vs.  Singh  Builders
Syndicate[6] wherein the appointment of a  retired  Judge  contrary  to  the
agreement requiring appointment of specified officers was held to  be  valid
on the ground that the arbitration proceedings had not concluded for over  a
decade making a mockery of the process.  In fact, in  paragraph  25  of  the
report in Singh Builders Syndicate (supra) this  Court  had  suggested  that
the  government,  statutory  authorities  and  government  companies  should
consider phasing  out  arbitration  clauses  providing  for  appointment  of
serving officers and encourage professionalism in arbitration.

7.    A pronouncement of  late  in  Deep  Trading  Company  Vs.  Indian  Oil
Corporation and Others[7]  followed the legal position  laid  down  in  Punj
Lloyd Ltd. (supra) which in turn had followed a two  Judges  Bench  decision
in  Datar  Switchgears  Ltd.  Vs.  Tata  Finance  Ltd.[8].   The  theory  of
forfeiture of the rights of a party  under  the  agreement  to  appoint  its
arbitrator  once  the  proceedings  under  Section  11(6)  of  the  Act  had
commenced came to be even more formally embedded  in  Deep  Trading  Company
(supra) subject, of course,  to  the  provisions  of  Section  11(8),  which
provision in any event, had been held  in  Northern  Railway  Administration
(supra) not to be mandatory, but only embodying  a  requirement  of  keeping
the same in view at the time  of  exercise  of  jurisdiction  under  Section
11(6) of the Act.

8.    In the present case Clauses 64(3)(a)(ii)  and  (iii)  of  the  General
Conditions of Contract do not prescribe any specific  qualification  of  the
arbitrators that are to be appointed under the agreement  except  that  they
should be railway officers.  As already noticed,  even  if  the  arbitration
agreement was to specifically provide for  any  particular  qualification(s)
of an arbitrator the same would not denude the power  of  the  Court  acting
under Section 11(6), in an appropriate case to depart therefrom.   In  Singh
Builders Syndicate (supra) pendency of arbitration proceedings  for  over  a
decade was found by this Court to be a  mockery  of  the  process.   In  the
present case, admittedly the award in respect of  disputes  and  differences
arising out of the contract No. CAO/CON/722 is yet  to  be  passed.   Though
the appellant-Railway has in its pleadings made a feeble attempt to  contend
that the process of arbitration arising out of the said  Contract  has  been
finalized, no material, whatsoever,  has  been  laid  before  the  Court  in
support thereof.  The arbitration proceedings to resolve  the  disputes  and
differences arising out of Contract No. CAO/CON/738 has not even  commenced.
 A period of nearly two decades has elapsed since the contractor had  raised
his claims for alleged wrongful  termination  of  the  two  contracts.   The
situation is distressing and to say the least  disturbing.    The  power  of
the Court under the Act  has  to  be  exercised  to  effectuate  the  remedy
provided thereunder and to facilitate the  mechanism  contemplated  therein.
In a situation where the procedure  and  process  under  the  Act  has  been
rendered futile, the power of the Court to depart from the agreed  terms  of
appointment of arbitrators must be acknowledged in the light of the  several
decisions noticed by  us.      We  are,  therefore,  of  the  view  that  no
infirmity muchless any illegality or failure of justice can be  said  to  be
occasioned by the order passed by the  High  Court  so  as  to  warrant  any
interference.  We, therefore, unhesitatingly dismiss this  appeal  filed  by
the appellant-railways.  However, in the facts of the case we  do  not  deem
it appropriate to burden the appellant with any costs.


                         …....…………………………J.
                                                    [RANJAN GOGOI]




                                                          .…....…………………………J.
                                                      [M. Y. EQBAL]


NEW DELHI,
AUGUST 13, 2014.

-----------------------
[1]    (2007) 5 SCC 304
[2]     (2007) 7 SCC 684
[3]    (2006) 2 SCC 638
[4]    (2008) 10 SCC 240
[5]    (2009) 8 SCC 520
[6]    (2009) 4 SCC 523
[7]    (2013) 4 SCC 35
[8]    (2000) 8 SCC 151

-----------------------
12