LAW FOR ALL

Saturday, May 9, 2026

Electricity Act, 2003 — Sections 2(17), 2(19), 14 & 42 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11(g) & (h) — Indian Railways not a deemed distribution licensee — Internal consumption of electricity — Liability to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge. Indian Railways claimed status of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14 of Electricity Act on ground that Railways, being entity of Central Government and “Appropriate Government”, was authorised under Section 11 of Railways Act to erect, maintain and operate electric traction equipment, power supply and distribution installations. Railways contended that it was entitled to non-discriminatory open access without payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge. Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) held that Railways was not a deemed distribution licensee and was liable to pay surcharge under Section 42. Held, mere establishment and operation of “distribution installations” under Section 11(g) of Railways Act does not amount to operation of “distribution system” within meaning of Sections 2(17) and 2(19) of Electricity Act. Distribution system under Electricity Act must ultimately connect to installation of consumers and supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Railways merely conveys electricity within its self-contained operational network for its own consumption in locomotives, signalling systems and station facilities and does not supply electricity to consumers against consideration. Activities of Railways therefore do not satisfy statutory requirements of a distribution licensee or deemed distribution licensee. Railways remains consumer under Electricity Act and is liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge when availing open access. (Paras 16 to 37,

Electricity Act, 2003 — Sections 2(17), 2(19), 14 & 42 — Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11(g) & (h) — Indian Railways not a deemed distribution licensee — Internal consumption of electricity — Liability to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge.

Indian Railways claimed status of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14 of Electricity Act on ground that Railways, being entity of Central Government and “Appropriate Government”, was authorised under Section 11 of Railways Act to erect, maintain and operate electric traction equipment, power supply and distribution installations. Railways contended that it was entitled to non-discriminatory open access without payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge. Appellate Tribunal for Electricity (APTEL) held that Railways was not a deemed distribution licensee and was liable to pay surcharge under Section 42.

Held, mere establishment and operation of “distribution installations” under Section 11(g) of Railways Act does not amount to operation of “distribution system” within meaning of Sections 2(17) and 2(19) of Electricity Act. Distribution system under Electricity Act must ultimately connect to installation of consumers and supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Railways merely conveys electricity within its self-contained operational network for its own consumption in locomotives, signalling systems and station facilities and does not supply electricity to consumers against consideration. Activities of Railways therefore do not satisfy statutory requirements of a distribution licensee or deemed distribution licensee. Railways remains consumer under Electricity Act and is liable to pay Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge when availing open access. (Paras 16 to 37, 51 to 58)

Electricity Law — Distribution licensee — Essential requirements — Supply to consumers mandatory — Mere internal conveyance of electricity insufficient.

Indian Railways argued that conveyance of electricity from traction substations through its electrical network constituted “distribution” of electricity and that “supply” was not licensed activity under Electricity Act.

Held, conjoint reading of Sections 2(17), 2(19) and 42(1) of Electricity Act establishes that distribution licensee must fulfil twin requirements: (i) operate and maintain distribution system, and (ii) supply electricity to consumers within area of supply. Mere internal transmission or conveyance of electricity for self-consumption does not amount to “distribution” under Electricity Act. Distribution necessarily contemplates last-mile connectivity to consumers and supply of electricity against consideration. Railways’ internal operational network for traction, locomotives, signals and stations is only captive self-consumption infrastructure and not a statutory distribution system. (Paras 16 to 25, 28 to 33)

Railways Act, 1989 — Section 11 — Non-obstante clause — Scope and extent — Does not override Electricity Act licensing framework.

Railways contended that non-obstante clause in Section 11 of Railways Act conferred unfettered authority to distribute electricity independent of Electricity Act and exempted Railways from regulatory framework under Electricity Act.

Held, Section 11 of Railways Act cannot be read so expansively as to dispense with mandatory licensing framework under Sections 12 and 14 of Electricity Act. Non-obstante clause operates only in event of direct and irreconcilable inconsistency and cannot function as blanket exemption from applicability of subsequent regulatory statute. No inconsistency exists between Railways Act and Electricity Act since Railways can exercise operational powers under Section 11 while simultaneously complying with Electricity Act. Judicial endeavour must be to harmoniously construe both enactments. (Paras 26, 27, 29)

Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 2(5) — “Appropriate Government” — Railways falls within control of Central Government — Yet not entitled to deemed distribution licensee status.

Question arose whether Indian Railways, being instrumentality of Union Government, falls within ambit of “Appropriate Government” under Section 2(5)(a) of Electricity Act.

Held, Railways operates under pervasive fiscal, administrative and operational control of Central Government and for limited purpose falls within ambit of “Appropriate Government”. However, mere status as Government entity does not automatically confer deemed distribution licensee status. Such status depends upon actual performance of statutory functions of distribution licensee, namely supply of electricity to consumers. Railways’ electrical infrastructure exists exclusively for self-consumption and not for supply to consumers. Hence, despite satisfying limited governmental test, Railways cannot claim benefits of deemed distribution licensee under third proviso to Section 14. (Paras 38 to 50)

Electricity Act, 2003 — Section 42 — Open access — Cross-Subsidy Surcharge (CSS) and Additional Surcharge — Object and rationale.

Railways claimed exemption from payment of Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge while procuring electricity through open access.

Held, Cross-Subsidy Surcharge under Section 42(2) compensates distribution licensees for loss of revenue required to subsidise weaker consumer categories, while Additional Surcharge under Section 42(4) offsets stranded costs arising from existing supply obligations. Open-access consumers procuring electricity from alternate sources remain liable to bear such statutory charges. Even deemed distribution licensee procuring electricity exclusively for its own consumption is liable to pay CSS and Additional Surcharge. Since Railways procures electricity solely for captive consumption, it remains liable for payment of such charges. (Paras 51 to 58)

Statutory Interpretation — Executive clarifications — Ministry letters — No binding statutory force.

Railways relied upon Ministry of Power letters dated 06.05.2014 and 03.04.2023 declaring Railways to be deemed distribution licensee under Electricity Act.

Held, executive communications or administrative clarifications issued by Ministry of Power neither amend nor override statutory provisions of Electricity Act and carry no binding legal force. Jurisdictional status and statutory rights must flow from legislation and not from executive correspondence. Such letters therefore cannot confer status of deemed distribution licensee upon Railways. (Para 49)

Electricity Law — Functional test — Consumer vis-à-vis distribution licensee — Self-consumption decisive.

Railways asserted that it was not merely consumer but distribution entity because of its extensive nationwide electricity network.

Held, functionality test determines whether entity actually supplies electricity to consumers or merely consumes electricity for itself. Railways operates closed and self-contained electrical network only for traction, signalling and operational purposes and supplies electricity to no independent consumers. Railways therefore functions as consumer and not distribution licensee. Claim to deemed distribution licensee status was merely attempt to avoid liability towards Cross-Subsidy Surcharge and Additional Surcharge without assuming corresponding statutory obligations. (Paras 31 to 37, 57, 58)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Service Law — Departmental enquiry — Police consta...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Service Law — Departmental enquiry — Police consta...: advocatemmmohan APEX COURT HELD THAT Service Law — Departmental enquiry — Police constable — Fraudulent dual employment — Impersonation and...

Service Law — Departmental enquiry — Police constable — Fraudulent dual employment — Impersonation and forged credentials — Scope of judicial review — Dismissal from service restored.

Respondent was appointed as Constable in Jharkhand Police on 18.05.2005 under name “Ranjan Kumar”, son of Kamta Singh. While serving as Reserve Guard at Dhurki Police Station, he proceeded on compensatory leave from 20.12.2007 but failed to rejoin duty thereafter. During period of unauthorised absence, he allegedly secured another appointment as Constable in Bihar Police on 26.12.2007 under different identity namely “Santosh Kumar”, son of Kamta Sharma, by using forged certificates and fabricated credentials. Departmental enquiry was initiated on basis of reports received from Bihar authorities and contemporaneous official communications indicating that both identities belonged to same individual. Disciplinary authority dismissed respondent from service. Appellate and revisional authorities affirmed punishment. Learned Single Judge upheld dismissal, but Division Bench in Letters Patent Appeal interfered on ground that there was no legal evidence to prove misconduct.

Held, findings recorded by disciplinary authority, appellate authority and revisional authority were concurrent findings of fact based on relevant materials including appointment forms, photographs, certificates, enquiry reports and official communications from Bihar Police authorities. Departmental proceedings are governed by principle of preponderance of probabilities and strict rules of evidence under Evidence Act are inapplicable. Division Bench exceeded limits of judicial review by reappreciating evidence and substituting its own conclusions in place of findings recorded in disciplinary enquiry. Since charges of impersonation, fraud, dual employment and forgery stood reasonably established, punishment of dismissal was justified and proportionate. Judgment of Division Bench was therefore set aside and dismissal order restored. (Paras 3 to 5.10, 11 to 22, 27)

Service Jurisprudence — Departmental proceedings — Standard of proof — Preponderance of probabilities — Strict rules of Evidence Act inapplicable.

Department relied upon documentary material including photocopies of application forms, certificates, photographs and official reports from Bihar authorities to establish that respondent had secured dual employment under different identities. Respondent contended that authors of documents were not examined and documents were not formally proved.

Held, departmental enquiries are not criminal trials and strict technical rules of evidence do not apply. So long as delinquent employee is afforded fair opportunity and findings are based on relevant material having probative value, disciplinary findings cannot be interfered with. Standard applicable in departmental proceedings is that of preponderance of probabilities and not proof beyond reasonable doubt. Mere non-examination of some witnesses or formal proof of documents would not vitiate enquiry when overall material reasonably supports conclusion of guilt. (Paras 18, 19)

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Judicial review in disciplinary matters — High Court cannot act as appellate authority.

Division Bench interfered with concurrent findings recorded in departmental proceedings by reassessing evidentiary material and holding that charges were not proved.

Held, scope of judicial review in disciplinary matters is confined to examining whether enquiry was conducted by competent authority, whether principles of natural justice were complied with, and whether findings are based on some evidence. High Court cannot reappreciate evidence, examine adequacy or reliability of evidence, or substitute its own conclusions merely because another view is possible. Interference is permissible only where findings are perverse, arbitrary, mala fide, or based on no evidence. Division Bench transgressed settled parameters governing judicial review under Article 226. (Paras 19, 20)

Police Service — Integrity and discipline — Fraud at entry level — Serious misconduct warranting dismissal.

Respondent allegedly obtained simultaneous appointments in Jharkhand and Bihar Police under different names and parentage particulars by use of fabricated documents and thereafter remained unauthorisedly absent from duty.

Held, member of police force is expected to maintain highest degree of integrity, honesty and discipline. Fraud at threshold of entry into public service strikes at root of institutional integrity and public confidence. Misconduct involving impersonation, cheating, forged credentials and fraudulent public employment cannot be treated lightly and continuance of such employee in disciplined police force would be detrimental to administration and rule of law. Punishment of dismissal was therefore proportionate and justified. (Paras 13, 17, 22, 24)

Evidence in departmental proceedings — Forensic comparison — Fingerprints and biometric records — Identity established.

During pendency of appeal before Supreme Court, Bihar Police was directed to conduct independent enquiry regarding identity of “Ranjan Kumar” and “Santosh Kumar”. Enquiry report based on fingerprint examination, biometric records and photographic comparison concluded that both identities belonged to same person.

Held, forensic comparison of fingerprints, biometric records and photographs constituted objective scientific material clearly establishing that “Ranjan Kumar” and “Santosh Kumar” were one and same person. Genealogical records and electoral rolls further indicated manipulated identity trail rather than existence of separate persons. Such scientific evidence substantially dislodged defence of mistaken identity raised by respondent. (Paras 8.2 to 8.4, 15, 16)

Constitution of India — Article 142 — Complete justice — Fraudulent appointment in Bihar Police quashed.

Supreme Court found that respondent had secured appointment in Bihar Police as “Santosh Kumar” under fabricated identity while already serving in Jharkhand Police.

Held, to do complete justice under Article 142 of Constitution, Patna District Order No.10524 of 2007 dated 26.12.2007 appointing “Santosh Kumar” as Constable in Bihar Police was liable to be quashed and consequences in law were directed to follow. (Para 27.1)

Criminal Law — Departmental misconduct disclosing cognizable offences — Direction for criminal proceedings.

Supreme Court found that allegations against respondent involving impersonation, forgery, use of forged documents, cheating and false representation disclosed prima facie commission of cognizable offences.

Held, misconduct established in departmental proceedings also disclosed criminal offences under Indian Penal Code/Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita. Director General of Police, Bihar and Director General of Police, Jharkhand were therefore directed to ensure examination of matter by competent police authority and initiation of appropriate criminal proceedings in accordance with law. (Paras 23 to 25)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Power to rescind contract and power to extend time — Nature and scope. Supreme Court examined scope of Section 28 of Specific Relief Act in context of decree for specific performance where decree-holder had deposited amount after expiry of period fixed in decree. Held, Section 28 confers discretionary power on Court both to rescind contract and to extend time for payment or deposit of purchase money. Court passing decree retains control over decree till sale deed is executed and does not become functus officio. Prayer for extension of time may be made even after expiry of stipulated period and no particular form is prescribed for such request. Delay in deposit is not to be examined like application under Section 5 of Limitation Act requiring explanation of every day’s delay. Real test is whether conduct of decree-holder demonstrates wilful negligence or intention to abandon contract. (Paras 24 to 33)

APEX COURT HELD THAT

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Specific performance — Delay in deposit of balance sale consideration — Rescission of contract — Extension of time — Equitable jurisdiction of Court.

Plaintiff obtained decree for specific performance directing him to pay balance sale consideration of Rs.57,50,000 within one month or deposit same in Court, whereupon defendant was directed to execute sale deed. Though plaintiff issued notice to judgment-debtor calling upon him to execute sale deed and thereafter filed execution petition, balance amount was not deposited within stipulated period. Execution Court repeatedly adjourned matter and at different stages directed decree-holder to pay or deposit amount. Ultimately, on 26.11.2020, pursuant to Court order, decree-holder deposited entire balance amount. Thereafter, judgment-debtor sought rescission of contract under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act on ground of non-deposit within time stipulated in decree. Execution Court dismissed execution petition and rescinded decree holding that conditional decree had not been complied with in time. High Court affirmed same.

Held, decree for specific performance is in nature of preliminary decree and Court passing decree does not become functus officio after passing decree. Under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act, Court retains jurisdiction either to rescind contract for non-compliance or extend time for deposit. There is no automatic rescission merely because amount was not deposited within stipulated period unless decree itself specifically provides such consequence. While exercising power under Section 28, Court must adopt justice-oriented and equitable approach by considering conduct of parties, surrounding circumstances, bona fides of decree-holder, pendency of appeal, and whether judgment-debtor could be compensated for delay by imposing appropriate terms. Execution Court and High Court erred in adopting hyper-technical approach without considering relevant equities and circumstances surrounding delay in deposit. Orders were therefore set aside and matter remanded for fresh consideration. (Paras 3 to 14, 24 to 41)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Power to rescind contract and power to extend time — Nature and scope.

Supreme Court examined scope of Section 28 of Specific Relief Act in context of decree for specific performance where decree-holder had deposited amount after expiry of period fixed in decree.

Held, Section 28 confers discretionary power on Court both to rescind contract and to extend time for payment or deposit of purchase money. Court passing decree retains control over decree till sale deed is executed and does not become functus officio. Prayer for extension of time may be made even after expiry of stipulated period and no particular form is prescribed for such request. Delay in deposit is not to be examined like application under Section 5 of Limitation Act requiring explanation of every day’s delay. Real test is whether conduct of decree-holder demonstrates wilful negligence or intention to abandon contract. (Paras 24 to 33)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Equitable relief — Conduct of parties — Compensation to judgment-debtor.

Decree-holder contended that even if delay in deposit existed, decree could be saved by compensating judgment-debtor. Supreme Court considered equitable principles governing extension of time.

Held, since specific performance is equitable relief, Court while considering extension of time must balance equities between parties. Court may impose additional terms or compensation to adequately compensate judgment-debtor for delay in deposit. Relevant considerations include bona fides of decree-holder, cause for delay, conduct of parties, length of delay and equities created during intervening period. (Paras 17, 24 to 33, 40)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Doctrine of merger — Appeal dismissed for non-prosecution — Effect.

Judgment-debtor’s first appeal against decree for specific performance was dismissed for non-prosecution. Decree-holder contended that trial court decree merged with appellate court decree and therefore stipulation regarding deposit in trial court decree ceased to operate.

Held, doctrine of merger applies only where superior Court entertains appeal and passes adjudicatory order on merits whether by reversal, modification or confirmation. Dismissal of appeal for non-prosecution does not result in merger of trial court decree with appellate order because dismissal for default is not decree within meaning of Section 2(2) CPC. Consequently, trial court decree continued to operate. (Paras 19 to 22)

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Deposit permitted by Court — Whether judgment-debtor loses right to seek rescission.

Execution Court permitted decree-holder to deposit balance sale consideration on 26.11.2020 and amount was accordingly deposited. Decree-holder contended that once Court permitted deposit, right of judgment-debtor to seek rescission stood extinguished.

Held, permission granted by Court to deposit amount merely to test bona fides of decree-holder did not amount to final extension of time nor did it extinguish right of judgment-debtor to seek rescission under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act. Deposit pursuant to Court order was relevant factor while considering readiness and willingness of decree-holder, but application seeking rescission remained maintainable. (Paras 23 and 24)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XX Rule 12A CPC — Duty of Appellate Court in decree for specific performance.

Supreme Court reiterated obligation of appellate courts while disposing appeals arising out of decrees for specific performance.

Held, where appellate court disposes appeal concerning decree for specific performance, it should specifically fix time for deposit of balance sale consideration in terms of Order XX Rule 12A CPC. If appellate decree does not prescribe time, deposit must be made within reasonable period depending upon facts and circumstances of case. (Paras 32 and 33(vii))

Specific Relief Act, 1963 — Section 28 — Principles summarized by Supreme Court.

Supreme Court summarized principles governing exercise of jurisdiction under Section 28 of Specific Relief Act including nature of decree for specific performance, discretionary power to rescind or extend time, maintainability of application before Court of first instance, equitable considerations and absence of automatic rescission. (Para 33)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) — Rejection of plaint — Meaningful reading of plaint — Benami transaction — Suit based on alleged Will — Whether plaint liable to be rejected at threshold. Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaration of ownership over suit schedule properties on basis of alleged Will dated 20.04.2018 said to have been executed by deceased K. Raghunath in his favour, contending that though properties stood in name of deceased, consideration for purchase had flown from plaintiff because statutory restrictions under Karnataka Land Reforms Act prevented him from purchasing agricultural lands in his own name. Defendants filed application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC contending that plaint itself disclosed benami transaction barred under Sections 4 and 6 of Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. Trial Court rejected plaint holding that suit was barred by Benami Act, but High Court restored suit. Held, while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Court must undertake meaningful and substantive reading of plaint along with documents relied upon therein and not merely formal reading of pleadings. If clever drafting creates illusion of cause of action or conceals statutory bar, Court is duty-bound to reject plaint at threshold. Court can examine real substance of claim to determine whether transaction pleaded is benami in nature, even if plaint does not expressly use word “benami”. (Paras 4 to 5.4, 8 to 8.9)

APEX COURT HELD THAT

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) — Rejection of plaint — Meaningful reading of plaint — Benami transaction — Suit based on alleged Will — Whether plaint liable to be rejected at threshold.

Plaintiff filed suit seeking declaration of ownership over suit schedule properties on basis of alleged Will dated 20.04.2018 said to have been executed by deceased K. Raghunath in his favour, contending that though properties stood in name of deceased, consideration for purchase had flown from plaintiff because statutory restrictions under Karnataka Land Reforms Act prevented him from purchasing agricultural lands in his own name. Defendants filed application under Order VII Rule 11(a) & (d) CPC contending that plaint itself disclosed benami transaction barred under Sections 4 and 6 of Prohibition of Benami Property Transactions Act, 1988. Trial Court rejected plaint holding that suit was barred by Benami Act, but High Court restored suit.

Held, while deciding application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Court must undertake meaningful and substantive reading of plaint along with documents relied upon therein and not merely formal reading of pleadings. If clever drafting creates illusion of cause of action or conceals statutory bar, Court is duty-bound to reject plaint at threshold. Court can examine real substance of claim to determine whether transaction pleaded is benami in nature, even if plaint does not expressly use word “benami”. (Paras 4 to 5.4, 8 to 8.9)

Benami Transactions (Prohibition) Act, 1988 — Sections 2(9), 4 & 6 — Fiduciary relationship — Employer and employee — Exception to benami transaction — Pleading requirement.

Plaintiff contended that properties purchased in name of deceased K. Raghunath were protected under fiduciary exception contained in Section 2(9)(A)(ii) of Benami Act on ground that relationship between plaintiff and deceased was one of trust and confidence akin to employer and employee relationship. Defendants contended that plaint contained no foundational pleadings regarding fiduciary relationship and that ordinary employer-employee relationship could not automatically be treated as fiduciary relationship.

Held, for invoking statutory exception under Section 2(9)(A)(ii) of Benami Act, foundational pleadings regarding fiduciary relationship are necessary. Mere assertion of trust or employer-employee relationship is insufficient unless pleadings disclose legally recognized fiduciary obligations involving entrustment, confidence and duty of loyalty. (Paras 5.5 to 5.8, 6.4 to 6.5)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Scope of consideration — Defence in written statement irrelevant — Court confined to plaint averments and documents filed with plaint.

Defendants relied upon pending criminal proceedings alleging fabrication of Will and forgery of stamp papers. Plaintiff contended that while considering rejection of plaint, Court cannot examine defence or disputed questions relating to genuineness of Will.

Held, while adjudicating application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, Court is confined to averments contained in plaint and documents relied upon therein. Defence raised in written statement, disputed questions of fact, or pending criminal proceedings cannot be considered at threshold stage. Genuineness of Will and rival factual contentions are matters for trial. (Paras 6.1, 6.2, 6.7 and 8.4)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Duty of Court at stage of institution of suit — Mechanical registration of plaint impermissible — Frivolous or legally barred suits liable to be rejected suo motu.

Supreme Court examined scheme of Sections 26, 27 and 35A CPC and Orders IV, V, VI, VII and XIV CPC relating to institution of suits, pleadings and rejection of plaint.

Held, Trial Court has obligation to scrutinize plaint before admitting suit and cannot mechanically register plaint merely because it is presented. If plaint on meaningful reading appears frivolous, vexatious, barred by law, suppresses material facts or creates illusory cause of action through clever drafting, Court must reject plaint even without waiting for defendant to seek such relief. (Paras 9 to 9.4)

Pleadings — Suppression of material facts — Fraud on Court — Effect.

Supreme Court reiterated principles governing pleadings and disclosure obligations while considering maintainability of plaint.

Held, material facts are those facts which constitute complete cause of action and directly affect maintainability of suit. Suppression of material facts resulting in creation of illusory cause of action amounts to fraud upon Court and disentitles litigant from equitable relief. Court must firmly deal with plaints concealing relevant facts to circumvent statutory bars. (Paras 9.5 and 9.6)

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XIII Rule 1 CPC...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XIII Rule 1 CPC...:

AP HIGH COURT HELD THAT

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XIII Rule 1 CPC — Production of documents — Petition to direct plaintiff to produce original Will — Dismissal upheld — Suspicious circumstances surrounding alleged Will — No reference to Will in original written statements — Mention made only in additional written statements — Earlier litigation and advocate’s letter also did not refer to alleged Will — Court held plea regarding execution of Will appeared to be an afterthought introduced only to mark photocopy of Will — Trial Court justified in refusing relief.
Held, defendant No.1 did not mention the alleged Will dated 25.12.1995 in her original written statement and the same was introduced only in additional written statement with an explanation that previous counsel omitted to mention it by mistake. Further, even in earlier partition litigation and correspondence of counsel there was no reference to such Will. Hence, the plea regarding existence of the Will was surrounded by suspicious circumstances and appeared to be an afterthought innovation intended to introduce a photocopy of the document. Therefore, dismissal of petition under Order XIII Rule 1 CPC was proper. (Paras 13 to 20)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC — Recall of witness — Scope — Recall permissible only for clarification and not for filling lacunae — Recall sought regarding suspicious Will already disbelieved — Dismissal proper.
Held, power under Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC is discretionary and exceptional, intended only for clarification of evidence and not to permit parties to fill omissions or lacunae. Since the petition under Order XIII Rule 1 CPC relating to alleged Will dated 25.12.1995 was already dismissed on account of suspicious circumstances, recalling P.W.1 to confront her with photocopy of the same Will and to elicit evidence regarding its alleged suppression would become redundant. Trial Court rightly dismissed petition seeking recall of P.W.1. (Paras 21 to 23)

Civil Procedure Code — Consolidation / clubbing of suits — Partition suits involving different properties and distinct issues — Joint trial impermissible where it causes confusion — Simultaneous trial directed instead of consolidation.
Held, though both suits were partition suits and parties relied upon rival Wills, the subject matter, schedule properties and issues involved were distinct and different. One suit related to alleged joint family properties, while the other concerned properties standing in the name of son. Consolidation of such suits would lead to unnecessary confusion. Hence, instead of clubbing the suits together, proper course would be simultaneous trial. Order directing clubbing of suits was therefore set aside. (Paras 24 to 28, 31)

Article 227 of Constitution of India — Scope of interference — Revisional jurisdiction — Interference declined where trial Court orders did not suffer from perversity or procedural illegality — Interference exercised where consolidation order found improper.
Held, orders dismissing applications under Order XIII Rule 1 CPC and Order XVIII Rule 17 CPC did not warrant interference under Article 227 of Constitution of India, as Trial Court had properly appreciated suspicious circumstances surrounding alleged Will and necessity for recall of witness. However, order clubbing two distinct partition suits was found erroneous and liable to be set aside. Consequently, CRP Nos.1455 and 1642 of 2025 were dismissed, while CRP No.1705 of 2025 was allowed. (Paras 20, 23, 28 to 31)