Debt Recovery Tribunal Proceedings — Parallel proceedings — Effect on invocation of IBC. The Supreme Court observed that proceedings were already pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the dispute regarding recovery and security interests was actively under adjudication and substantial deposit had already been made pursuant to orders of the DRT. Such circumstances reinforced the conclusion that the matter belonged appropriately to recovery proceedings rather than insolvency jurisdiction under the Code. (Paras 2(xiii), 2(xiv), 12)

APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Section 7 — Preconditions for initiation of CIRP — Existence of financial debt and default mandatory.
The Supreme Court reiterated that the sine qua non for invocation of Section 7 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 is the existence of a “financial debt” coupled with “default” in repayment thereof. The Code is intended to trigger a collective insolvency resolution process upon genuine financial distress and not for adjudication of isolated contractual disputes or recovery claims. (Para 8)

IBC — Insolvency proceedings cannot be used as debt recovery mechanism or coercive recovery tool.
The Court reaffirmed that the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code cannot be invoked with the dominant object of compelling payment or recovering money from a debtor. Use of insolvency proceedings as a coercive mechanism for recovery by individual creditors constitutes abuse of process. (Paras 8, 12)

IBC — Financial creditor — Loan disbursed directly to builder under quadripartite agreement — Nature of transaction examined.
The Supreme Court held that where the loan amount was directly disbursed by the Bank to the Builder under a quadripartite agreement and the transaction was inseparably connected with obligations concerning construction, transfer and delivery of immovable property, the arrangement could not be viewed as a simple bilateral financial lending transaction between the Bank and the Corporate Debtor. (Paras 9, 10)

Contractual Disputes — Predominantly contractual and property-related disputes — Invocation of IBC impermissible.
The Court held that disputes arising from competing contractual obligations involving transfer of immovable property, obligations of the builder, refund arrangements, liens, and associated rights under a quadripartite agreement are predominantly contractual in character and do not constitute a straightforward insolvency default warranting commencement of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (CIRP). (Paras 10, 11, 12)

Debt Recovery Tribunal Proceedings — Parallel proceedings — Effect on invocation of IBC.
The Supreme Court observed that proceedings were already pending before the Debt Recovery Tribunal where the dispute regarding recovery and security interests was actively under adjudication and substantial deposit had already been made pursuant to orders of the DRT. Such circumstances reinforced the conclusion that the matter belonged appropriately to recovery proceedings rather than insolvency jurisdiction under the Code. (Paras 2(xiii), 2(xiv), 12)

Forum Shopping — Simultaneous recourse to different statutory remedies — Scope.
While the appellant-bank contended that taking recourse to multiple statutory remedies did not amount to forum shopping, the Supreme Court ultimately upheld the NCLAT’s conclusion refusing CIRP initiation because the dispute was essentially contractual and recovery-oriented rather than insolvency-centric. (Paras 4, 5, 12, 13)

Quadripartite Agreement — Obligations of builder — Significance in determining nature of transaction.
The Court extensively relied upon clauses of the quadripartite agreement demonstrating that the Builder bore substantial obligations relating to construction, execution of sale deed, refund obligations upon cancellation, maintenance of clear title, creation of mortgage security, and restrictions against transfer or encumbrance of the property. These obligations established that the transaction was not merely a financial debt arrangement simpliciter. (Para 9)

Result — Appeal dismissed — NCLAT order setting aside CIRP upheld.
The Supreme Court declined to interfere with the judgment of the NCLAT and upheld the setting aside of the NCLT order admitting the Section 7 application and initiating CIRP against the Corporate Debtor. (Paras 12, 13, 14) 

SC/ST Granted Lands — Transfer after expiry of non-alienation period — Proceedings initiated by persons who themselves participated in alienation — Effect. The Supreme Court distinguished earlier precedents and held that proceedings under the Act could not be sustained where the very persons who later sought annulment of the sale had themselves participated in the original alienation transaction. In the present case, the sons of the original grantee, who initiated restoration proceedings, were parties to the first sale deed executed in 1997 after expiry of the 15-year non-alienation period. Such conduct disentitled them from seeking relief under the Act after substantial delay. (Paras 5, 7)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978 — Section 4 — Annulment of transfer of granted land — Delay and laches — Applicability of doctrine of reasonable time.
The Supreme Court reiterated that even where no limitation period is prescribed under the Karnataka Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prohibition of Transfer of Certain Lands) Act, 1978, proceedings for annulment of transfers must nevertheless be initiated within a reasonable time. Relief may be denied where proceedings are instituted after inordinate delay depending upon the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. (Paras 6, 7)

SC/ST Land Grant — Beneficial legislation — Protection of granted lands — Scope and object.
The Court observed that the 1978 Act is a beneficial legislation intended to preserve lands granted to members of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes who may otherwise be induced or compelled to part with such lands. The statute seeks to protect vulnerable grantees from exploitation and unlawful alienation of granted lands. (Para 7)

SC/ST Granted Lands — Transfer after expiry of non-alienation period — Proceedings initiated by persons who themselves participated in alienation — Effect.
The Supreme Court distinguished earlier precedents and held that proceedings under the Act could not be sustained where the very persons who later sought annulment of the sale had themselves participated in the original alienation transaction. In the present case, the sons of the original grantee, who initiated restoration proceedings, were parties to the first sale deed executed in 1997 after expiry of the 15-year non-alienation period. Such conduct disentitled them from seeking relief under the Act after substantial delay. (Paras 5, 7)

Karnataka Land Revenue Rules — Grant certificate under Schedule-E — Non-alienation period of 15 years — Transfer after expiry thereof.
The Court noted that the grant certificate issued under Schedule-E of the Karnataka Land Revenue framework prohibited alienation only for a period of fifteen years. Since the original grant was made in 1977 and grant certificate issued in 1981, the first transfer effected in 1997 occurred after expiry of the non-alienation period. (Para 5)

Delay and Laches — Distinction between proceedings initiated by unaware legal representatives/community members and proceedings initiated by participating transferors.
The Supreme Court drew a distinction between cases where legal representatives, unaware of prior grants or transfers, initiate proceedings after delay, or where villagers challenge illegal alienations in public interest, and cases where the applicants themselves were parties to the impugned transaction. In the latter category, equitable relief under the beneficial legislation may justifiably be denied. (Para 7)

Precedents — Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner distinguished on facts.
The Court distinguished Satyan v. Deputy Commissioner wherein delay of eight years in initiating proceedings was not treated as fatal because of the protective object of the legislation. In the present case, however, proceedings were initiated by persons who had themselves participated in the earlier alienation, thereby materially altering the equities involved. (Paras 4, 6, 7)

Result — Appeal allowed — Orders annulling sale set aside.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and set aside the orders of the authorities and the High Court which had declared the sale transaction void under the Act of 1978. (Paras 7, 8)

Medical Council of India (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 — Disciplinary proceedings against doctor — Punishment on charge different from original show cause notice — Violation of principles of natural justice. The Supreme Court held that once a doctor had successfully explained and defended the original charge levelled in the show cause notice, the Ethics Committee and Executive Committee could not proceed to punish him on a different or altered charge without issuing a fresh show cause notice and without granting an opportunity to respond to the new allegation. Imposition of punishment on a charge not originally framed amounted to denial of fair hearing and violation of principles of natural justice. (Paras 11, 12)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT

Medical Council of India (Professional Conduct, Etiquette and Ethics) Regulations, 2002 — Disciplinary proceedings against doctor — Punishment on charge different from original show cause notice — Violation of principles of natural justice.
The Supreme Court held that once a doctor had successfully explained and defended the original charge levelled in the show cause notice, the Ethics Committee and Executive Committee could not proceed to punish him on a different or altered charge without issuing a fresh show cause notice and without granting an opportunity to respond to the new allegation. Imposition of punishment on a charge not originally framed amounted to denial of fair hearing and violation of principles of natural justice. (Paras 11, 12)

Disciplinary Proceedings — Distinction between original charge and altered charge — Delinquent cannot be punished on variance of charge.
The Court held that the original allegation against the appellant-doctor concerned submission of fake faculty declaration forms and simultaneous appearance in inspections of two medical colleges. However, after the doctor successfully demonstrated that he was abroad during one of the inspections, the Ethics Committee shifted the basis of liability to non-disclosure of prior service in another medical college in the declaration form. Such punishment on an altered charge, without notice, was impermissible in law. (Paras 10, 11, 12)

Principles of Natural Justice — Fresh show cause notice mandatory where disciplinary authority proposes to proceed on new charge.
Relying upon Ravi Oraon v. State of Jharkhand, the Supreme Court reiterated that once a delinquent employee or professional successfully rebuts the original charge, the disciplinary authority cannot punish the delinquent on a completely different allegation without issuance of a fresh show cause notice and affording reasonable opportunity of hearing. (Para 12)

Medical Ethics — Mis-declaration in faculty declaration form — Professional misconduct.
The Supreme Court observed that the appellant-doctor failed to satisfactorily explain the incorrect declaration stating that he had not presented himself before any other institution as faculty during the same academic year for purposes of MCI assessment. Such mis-declaration, by itself, constituted misconduct and could not be condoned by the regulatory body. (Paras 13, 16)

Medical Education — MCI/NMC inspections — Importance of faculty declaration forms.
The Court recognised the importance of surprise inspections conducted by the Medical Council of India/National Medical Commission to ensure maintenance of standards in medical education and observed that declarations submitted by faculty members play a crucial role in the approval process undertaken by the regulatory authority. (Paras 6.1, 6.3)

Constitution of India — Article 142 — Modification of punishment to do complete justice.
Though the Court found substance in the allegation of mis-declaration, it exercised powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to modify the punishment considering the peculiar facts and circumstances, including the doctor’s advanced age, lapse of nearly a decade since initiation of proceedings, and prolonged pendency of litigation. The punishment of removal of the doctor’s name from the Indian Medical Register for three months was reduced to issuance of censure/warning. (Paras 14, 15, 16)

Administrative Law — Judicial review — Court may interfere with quantum of punishment in exceptional circumstances.
The Supreme Court held that although the process undertaken by the Medical Council of India was not entirely faulted and misconduct was established, interference with the quantum of punishment was warranted in exercise of extraordinary powers to ensure complete justice between the parties. (Para 16)

Result — Civil Appeal allowed partly — Penalty modified from removal from Indian Medical Register for three months to censure/warning.
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal in part and requested the National Medical Commission to substitute the punishment of removal of the doctor’s name from the Indian Medical Register for three months with a lesser penalty of censure/warning. (Paras 16, 17) 

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Select List — Inclusion in select list does not confer indefeasible right to appointment. The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that a candidate whose name appears in a select list does not acquire any indefeasible or vested right to appointment unless the governing rules specifically confer such entitlement. Recruitment by the State or its instrumentalities must conform to comparative merit and equality principles under Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 13)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Service Law — Recruitment Process — Select List — Inclusion in select list does not confer indefeasible right to appointment.
The Supreme Court reiterated the settled principle that a candidate whose name appears in a select list does not acquire any indefeasible or vested right to appointment unless the governing rules specifically confer such entitlement. Recruitment by the State or its instrumentalities must conform to comparative merit and equality principles under Article 14 of the Constitution. (Para 13)

Service Law — Recruitment — Non-disclosure of marks of all candidates — Whether vitiates selection process — Held, no, in absence of statutory or advertisement requirement.
The Court held that where neither the recruitment rules nor the recruitment advertisement required publication or disclosure of marks obtained by all candidates appearing in the written examination, non-disclosure of such marks could not by itself invalidate the recruitment process. The respondents failed to establish that they had qualified in the written examination and mere non-disclosure of marks was insufficient to infer arbitrariness. (Paras 14, 15)

Evidence — Adverse inference — Non-production/destruction of recruitment records — Whether presumption can be drawn that candidates had qualified — Held, no.
The Supreme Court held that mere non-production or destruction of recruitment records does not automatically justify drawing an adverse inference that unsuccessful candidates had cleared the examination. Since the recruitment process had been conducted through an independent agency and no rule prescribed the duration for preservation of records, the explanation offered for non-availability of records was accepted as bona fide. (Para 15)

Service Law — Recruitment — Burden to establish successful qualification — Candidate cannot rely merely on absence of declaration of failure.
The Court held that the respondents had not pleaded or proved that they had passed the written examination. Merely because the authorities had not specifically declared them unsuccessful, no legal inference could be drawn that they had qualified in the recruitment process. (Para 14)

Constitution of India — Article 14 — Recruitment process — Transparency in selection — Scope.
The Supreme Court observed that the State and its instrumentalities are obligated to ensure fairness and adherence to comparative merit while making appointments. However, absence of disclosure of cut-off marks or evaluation criteria does not automatically render the recruitment process unconstitutional where no such requirement exists under the governing rules or advertisement. (Paras 10, 13, 14)

Service Law — Relief beyond pleadings — Appointment cannot be granted where no such relief originally sought.
The Court noted that in the original writ petitions the respondents had merely sought disclosure of results and records relating to selected candidates and had not sought appointment to the post for themselves. Consequently, the Tribunal exceeded its jurisdiction in directing appointments to the respondents. (Para 16)

Service Law — Change in qualification criteria during intervening period — Effect on grant of relief.
The Supreme Court held that since the qualifications prescribed for the post of Plant Attendant had been revised in the year 2008, it was not feasible to direct appointment of the respondents at a later stage pursuant to litigation arising from the earlier recruitment process. (Paras 9, 16)

Administrative Law — Equitable compensation despite denial of appointment — Litigation pursued for prolonged period.
Though setting aside the directions for appointment, the Supreme Court, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances and the fact that Respondent No.1 alone had continued to pursue litigation since 2008, directed payment of compensation of Rs.5,00,000/- to Respondent No.1 within two months. (Para 17)

Result — Appeals partly allowed — Directions for appointment set aside — Compensation awarded to one respondent.
The Supreme Court set aside the orders of the Tribunal and High Court directing appointment of the respondents to the post of Plant Attendant, while directing payment of Rs.5 lakhs compensation to Respondent No.1. (Paras 17, 18, 19)

Revenue Records — Evidentiary value — Whether revenue entries confer title — Held, no — Revenue records serve only fiscal purpose and do not create or extinguish title. The Supreme Court reiterated that entries in Revenue Records, Jamabandi, Faisal Patti, Vasool Baqi, Pahanies and mutation entries are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes to facilitate collection of land revenue and do not constitute documents of title. Mutation entries neither create nor extinguish ownership rights and carry no presumptive value regarding title. Revenue records may, at best, raise a presumption regarding possession but cannot independently establish ownership in the absence of foundational title documents such as pattas or grants. (Paras 16, 16.1 to 16.4, 17)

 APEX COURT HELD THAT 

Land Law — Revenue Records — Evidentiary value — Whether revenue entries confer title — Held, no — Revenue records serve only fiscal purpose and do not create or extinguish title.
The Supreme Court reiterated that entries in Revenue Records, Jamabandi, Faisal Patti, Vasool Baqi, Pahanies and mutation entries are maintained primarily for fiscal purposes to facilitate collection of land revenue and do not constitute documents of title. Mutation entries neither create nor extinguish ownership rights and carry no presumptive value regarding title. Revenue records may, at best, raise a presumption regarding possession but cannot independently establish ownership in the absence of foundational title documents such as pattas or grants. (Paras 16, 16.1 to 16.4, 17)

Land Law — Forest Land — Claim for exclusion of land from proposed reserve forest — Failure to produce primary title document — Effect.
The Supreme Court upheld rejection of the claim seeking exclusion of Ac. 600.00 in Survey No. 81, Kalvalanagaram Village, from proposed reserve forest notification, holding that the claimants failed to produce the foundational title document, namely the patta allegedly granted in favour of their predecessors-in-interest. Mere reliance on revenue entries, unsupported by lawful orders of mutation or grant, was held insufficient to establish proprietary rights over the land. (Paras 8, 10, 15, 17, 18)

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Scope of judicial review — Writ Court cannot adjudicate disputed questions of title.
The Court held that proceedings under Article 226 are not the proper forum for adjudicating serious disputes relating to title and ownership of immovable property involving disputed questions of fact. Such matters require adjudication through a properly constituted civil suit before a competent civil court. The learned Single Judge exceeded the permissible limits of judicial review by effectively declaring title of the appellants in writ proceedings. (Paras 17, 19, 20)

Constitution of India — Article 226 — Writ of Certiorari — Limited grounds for interference.
The Supreme Court reiterated that a writ of certiorari lies only on limited grounds, namely: (i) lack of jurisdiction, (ii) excess of jurisdiction, (iii) violation of principles of natural justice, and (iv) error apparent on the face of the record. The learned Single Judge improperly expanded the scope of judicial review by entering into adjudication of title and granting substantive declaratory relief. (Paras 19, 20)

Land Law — Revenue entries showing “Jungle”/forest land — Unsupported private entries — No sanctity attached.
The Court noted that the Pahanie records for Faslis 1346–1356 described Survey No. 81 as “Jungle” (forest land), while names of private individuals appeared in certain columns without any supporting patta, grant order, or lawful mutation proceedings. Such unauthorised or contradictory entries lacking foundational documentary support were held insufficient to establish private ownership rights against the Government. (Para 17)

Forest Law — Notification under repealed enactment — Whether invalid solely for citing wrong statute — Held, no.
Affirming the Division Bench, the Supreme Court held that a notification is not rendered invalid merely because it refers to a repealed enactment, provided the action is otherwise traceable to the corresponding provisions of the existing law and is not inconsistent therewith. The contention that the 1950 notification was ultra vires solely because it referred to Hyderabad Forest Act, 1326 Fasli instead of Hyderabad Forest Act, 1355 Fasli was rejected. (Paras 10, 13)

Land Law — Presumption from revenue records — Stray entries — No proof of ownership.
The Court reiterated that stray or isolated revenue entries recorded for a limited period cannot prevail over consistent records or establish title. Revenue entries unsupported by authentic foundational records may even be fabricated or manipulated and do not bind the Government in absence of proof of lawful title. (Paras 16.5, 16.6, 17)

Result — Civil Appeal dismissed — Judgment of Division Bench upheld.
The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to establish any legal claim or title over the subject land and upheld the Division Bench judgment reversing the learned Single Judge’s order. Consequently, the Civil Appeal was dismissed. (Paras 20, 21)