Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — Sections 98, 156 — Execution of award — Property of judgment-debtor liable to attachment and sale — Challenge to validity of mortgage after award attained finality — Impermissible. (Paras 21–23) An ex parte award dated 04.04.1994 under Section 91 attained finality; application to set aside the award was rejected. The award operated as a money decree executable under Section 98 as a decree of a Civil Court. The predecessor-in-interest of respondents being a judgment-debtor, his property was amenable to attachment and sale for recovery of decretal dues. Objection regarding absence of prior Government permission for mortgage was held irrelevant at the stage of execution of a final award. Ratio Decidendi: Once an award under the 1960 Act attains finality and becomes executable as a civil decree under Section 98, property of the judgment-debtor can be attached and sold for realization of dues; validity of the underlying mortgage cannot be re-opened in execution.

Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — Sections 98, 156 — Execution of award — Property of judgment-debtor liable to attachment and sale — Challenge to validity of mortgage after award attained finality — Impermissible. (Paras 21–23)

An ex parte award dated 04.04.1994 under Section 91 attained finality; application to set aside the award was rejected. The award operated as a money decree executable under Section 98 as a decree of a Civil Court. The predecessor-in-interest of respondents being a judgment-debtor, his property was amenable to attachment and sale for recovery of decretal dues. Objection regarding absence of prior Government permission for mortgage was held irrelevant at the stage of execution of a final award.

Ratio Decidendi: Once an award under the 1960 Act attains finality and becomes executable as a civil decree under Section 98, property of the judgment-debtor can be attached and sold for realization of dues; validity of the underlying mortgage cannot be re-opened in execution.

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Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Act, 1960 — Section 154 — Revisional jurisdiction — Scope — Maintainability against confirmation of sale — Not curtailed by Rule 107 remedies — No pre-deposit required when revision not against recovery certificate. (Paras 24–42)

The legal representatives of the borrower filed revision under Section 154 challenging confirmation of auction sale. It was contended that remedy lay exclusively under Rule 107(13) or (14) of the 1961 Rules and that revision was not maintainable. The Court held that Section 154 confers wide revisional power to examine legality or propriety of any decision or order of a subordinate officer where no appeal lies. Remedies under Rule 107 are applications to set aside sale on specified grounds and do not eclipse statutory revisional power. Pre-deposit under Section 154(2-A) is attracted only when revision is against a recovery certificate; here revision was against confirmation of sale.

Ratio Decidendi: The revisional power under Section 154 of the 1960 Act is plenary and cannot be restricted by procedural remedies under Rule 107; revision is maintainable against confirmation of sale without pre-deposit where challenge is not to the recovery certificate.

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Maharashtra Co-operative Societies Rules, 1961 — Rule 107(11)(g) & (h) — Deposit of 15% at auction and balance within stipulated period — Mandatory requirement — Non-compliance renders sale a nullity — No discretion to extend time for balance payment. (Paras 45–48, 55)

Under Rule 107(11)(g), 15% of purchase price must be deposited at the time of sale; under Rule 107(11)(h), the remainder must be paid within 15 days (as applicable at the time). No provision authorises extension of time for payment of the balance purchase money. Consequences of default include forfeiture and resale after fresh proclamation under Rule 107(11)(i) & (j). Relying on Shilpa Shares & Securities v. National Co-operative Bank Ltd. and earlier precedents, the Court affirmed that non-deposit within prescribed time renders the sale void, not merely irregular.

Ratio Decidendi: Compliance with Rule 107(11)(g) and (h) is mandatory; failure to deposit the balance purchase money within the stipulated period vitiates the sale, rendering confirmation a nullity.

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Waiver — Applicability — Auction conditions under Rule 107 — Not confined to creditor’s benefit — Serve public purpose — No waiver by borrower. (Paras 50–55)

The auction purchaser relied on General Manager, Sri Siddheshwara Co-operative Bank Ltd. v. Ikbal to contend that time stipulation could be waived. The Court distinguished the decision, noting that Rule 9(4) of the SARFAESI Enforcement Rules expressly permitted extension by written agreement, whereas Rule 107 contains no such provision. Moreover, the stipulation under Rule 107 serves broader public interest in maintaining sanctity of public auctions and preventing manipulation. There was no material indicating waiver by the borrower or his heirs.

Ratio Decidendi: Time stipulation under Rule 107(11)(h) is not merely for the creditor’s benefit and cannot be waived in absence of statutory provision; absence of timely deposit invalidates the sale notwithstanding creditor’s acceptance.

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Relief — Consequence of void auction — Appropriate order — Fresh auction — Refund with interest — Protection of equities. (Paras 57–58)

While upholding that the sale and its confirmation were void, the Court modified the High Court’s directions. The property was directed to be put to fresh auction under Rule 107(11)(j). The auction purchaser, having deposited the entire amount as permitted by the Recovery Officer, was held entitled to refund with 6% interest per annum from date of deposit till repayment. Liberty was reserved to the Bank and judgment-debtors to arrive at settlement before the Recovery Officer.

Ratio Decidendi: Upon declaring an auction void for non-compliance with mandatory rules, the proper course is to direct resale in accordance with law and order refund of the purchase money with reasonable interest to the auction purchaser.

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Final Order

Auction sale dated 29.01.2005 and confirmation dated 18.03.2005 declared null and void. Property to be re-auctioned under Rule 107(11)(j). Bank to refund Rs.1,51,00,000 to M/s. Adishakti Developers with 6% interest from date of deposit till repayment. Liberty for settlement between decree-holder and judgment-debtors reserved. Appeals disposed of. No order as to costs.

Registration Act, 1908 and Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Unilateral cancellation of registered lease — Impermissible — Absence of forfeiture clause — Determination under Section 111 TPA not established. (Paras 10.2, 21) The lease deed contained no clause permitting unilateral cancellation by the lessor. There was no proof of determination in terms of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the unilateral deed of cancellation dated 03.12.2003 was illegal and non est. Ratio Decidendi: In absence of contractual stipulation or statutory ground under Section 111 TPA, a registered lease cannot be unilaterally cancelled by the lessor; such cancellation is void.

Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Section 105 — Lease v. Licence — Tests for determination — Intention of parties — Literal construction preferred — Exclusive possession of demised portion decisive unless contrary intention established. (Paras 14–16, 18–21)

The substantial question concerned whether Ext. 1 dated 23.03.1998 created a lease for 99 years or merely a licence. The High Court treated the document as a licence, relying inter alia on subsequent conduct and retention of first floor by the owner. The Supreme Court, applying the settled principles in Associated Hotels of India Ltd. v. R.N. Kapoor and M.N. Clubwala v. Fida Hussain Saheb, held that the decisive test is intention gathered from the substance of the document.

Ext. 1 expressly used the words “demise”, fixed a term of 99 years, stipulated yearly rent of Rs.1,000/-, permitted alterations by the lessee, and extended the benefit to heirs, successors and assigns. These clauses unequivocally created an interest in immovable property. Retention of occupation of the first floor by the lessor did not negate lease, as exclusive possession is assessed qua the demised portion.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the document, read as a whole, transfers an interest in immovable property for a definite term in consideration of rent and grants exclusive possession of the demised portion, it constitutes a lease under Section 105 TPA notwithstanding nomenclature or partial retention of occupation by the owner.

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Construction of Documents — Literal rule — Limited scope for purposive or ex-post facto interpretation — Subsequent conduct not primary guide when language is clear. (Paras 17–21)

The Court reiterated the principles governing interpretation of deeds, including literal, golden and purposive rules, referring to Annaya Kocha Shetty v. Laxmi Narayan Satose. When the language of the instrument is clear and unambiguous, courts must give effect to its plain meaning. Reliance on post-execution conduct to infer intention is unwarranted unless ambiguity exists.

The High Court erred in relying on cross-examination and subsequent conduct to construe Ext. 1 as a licence, despite clear covenants creating leasehold interest.

Ratio Decidendi: Where the terms of a written instrument are clear, intention must be gathered from the plain language of the document itself; recourse to subsequent conduct is impermissible in absence of ambiguity.

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Registration Act, 1908 and Transfer of Property Act, 1882 — Unilateral cancellation of registered lease — Impermissible — Absence of forfeiture clause — Determination under Section 111 TPA not established. (Paras 10.2, 21)

The lease deed contained no clause permitting unilateral cancellation by the lessor. There was no proof of determination in terms of Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hence, the unilateral deed of cancellation dated 03.12.2003 was illegal and non est.

Ratio Decidendi: In absence of contractual stipulation or statutory ground under Section 111 TPA, a registered lease cannot be unilaterally cancelled by the lessor; such cancellation is void.

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Doctrine of Lis Pendens — Purchasers during pendency of suit — Rights subject to outcome — Bona fide purchaser plea rejected on facts. (Paras 10.3, 22)

Defendant Nos. 3 and 4 purchased the property during pendency of the suit and with knowledge of the 99-year lease reflected in the encumbrance certificate. Their rights were subject to the leasehold interest and outcome of litigation.

Ratio Decidendi: A transferee pendente lite takes the property subject to subsisting rights and pending litigation; knowledge of prior encumbrance negates plea of bona fide purchase without notice.

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Final Order

The impugned judgment of the High Court in RSA No. 123 of 2021 set aside. Judgments and decrees of the Trial Court and First Appellate Court restored. Ext. 1 held to be a valid 99-year lease; unilateral cancellation illegal. Civil Appeal allowed. No order as to costs. (Paras 21–23)**

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — Section 30(1) — Search and seizure — Decision to authorize search must be of the ‘Appropriate Authority’ collectively — Search ordered by Chairperson alone — Illegal — Applicability of precedent. (Paras 41–45, 50) The communication/order dated 17.09.2015 directing raid was issued by the Civil Surgeon acting as Chairperson of the District Appropriate Authority without evidence of collective decision by all members. Applying the ratio in Ravindra Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Court held that authorization of search under Section 30(1) must be by the Appropriate Authority as a body; unilateral decision by Chairperson vitiates the search. Ratio Decidendi: Authorization of search under Section 30(1) of the PCPNDT Act must emanate from the Appropriate Authority collectively; a unilateral decision of the Chairperson renders the search illegal.

Pre-Conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Prohibition of Sex Selection) Act, 1994 — Section 30(1) — Search and seizure — Decision to authorize search must be of the ‘Appropriate Authority’ collectively — Search ordered by Chairperson alone — Illegal — Applicability of precedent. (Paras 41–45, 50)

The communication/order dated 17.09.2015 directing raid was issued by the Civil Surgeon acting as Chairperson of the District Appropriate Authority without evidence of collective decision by all members. Applying the ratio in Ravindra Kumar v. State of Haryana, the Court held that authorization of search under Section 30(1) must be by the Appropriate Authority as a body; unilateral decision by Chairperson vitiates the search.

Ratio Decidendi: Authorization of search under Section 30(1) of the PCPNDT Act must emanate from the Appropriate Authority collectively; a unilateral decision of the Chairperson renders the search illegal.

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Criminal Evidence — Effect of illegal search — Admissibility of evidence seized — Relevancy test — Evidence not automatically excluded — Subject to admissibility and fairness. (Paras 50–53)

Despite holding the search illegal, the Court held that materials seized cannot be discarded altogether. Relying on Radha Kishan v. State of Uttar Pradesh, R.M. Malkani v. State of Maharashtra and the Constitution Bench decision in Pooran Mal v. Director of Inspection, it was reiterated that illegality of search does not per se render seized material inadmissible; relevancy is the governing test, subject to judicial discretion to prevent unfairness.

Ratio Decidendi: Evidence obtained through an illegal search is not per se inadmissible; unless expressly barred by statute, relevant material may be relied upon subject to admissibility and fairness.

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PCPNDT Act — Sections 4(3), 5, 6, 23, 29 — Maintenance of Form F and records — Mandatory nature — Non-maintenance amounts to contravention — Burden on practitioner. (Paras 21, 39–40, 54, 56)

The Court reiterated that maintenance of complete record in Form F is mandatory and any deficiency constitutes contravention of Sections 5 or 6 unless proved otherwise by the practitioner. Reliance was placed on Federation of Obstetrics and Gynaecological Societies of India v. Union of India, holding that non-maintenance of record is not a clerical lapse but the “springboard” for commission of the offence.

Ratio Decidendi: Complete and accurate maintenance of Form F and statutory records is mandatory under the PCPNDT regime; deficiency therein prima facie constitutes contravention attracting penal consequences under Section 23.

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PCPNDT Act — Section 28 — Cognizance only on complaint by Appropriate Authority — Police discharge in FIR case — No bar to statutory complaint. (Paras 54)

The appellant had been discharged in a police case arising from FIR. The Court held that offences under the PCPNDT Act are cognizable only upon complaint by the Appropriate Authority under Section 28. Police discharge does not preclude initiation of independent complaint proceedings by the statutory authority.

Ratio Decidendi: Discharge in a police-registered FIR does not bar prosecution under the PCPNDT Act, which mandates cognizance only upon complaint by the Appropriate Authority.

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PCPNDT Rules — Rule 18A(2)(ii) — Membership of Advisory Committee — Alleged conflict of interest — Scope — Directory nature of code of conduct. (Paras 55)

The contention that a member of the raiding team was also part of the Advisory Committee was rejected. Rule 18A(2)(ii) applies only to persons forming part of the “investigating machinery”. The concerned individual was not part of such machinery. Moreover, the provisions under Rule 18A form part of a general code of conduct and are directory.

Ratio Decidendi: Rule 18A(2)(ii) prohibits inclusion in the Advisory Committee only of persons forming part of the investigating machinery; incidental participation in raid does not ipso facto attract disqualification.

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Exercise of inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC — Quashing of complaint — Scope — Social welfare legislation — Trial not to be stifled at threshold where prima facie contravention alleged. (Paras 56–57)

The Court emphasized the object of the PCPNDT Act in combating female foeticide and held that where prima facie non-maintenance of statutory records is alleged, the prosecution should not be quashed at inception. Issues of admissibility, reliability and defence are matters for trial.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions under the PCPNDT Act involving alleged statutory record violations, quashing at threshold is unwarranted where prima facie material exists; disputed factual issues must be adjudicated at trial.

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Final Order

The criminal complaint No. COMA/116/2018 pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Gurugram upheld. Appeal dismissed. Observations confined to adjudication of quashing; merits left open. No order as to costs. (Paras 57–58)**

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 — Sections 18(a)(i), 17(b), 17(c), 27(d), 32 — Cognizance — Complaint by Drugs Inspector — Limitation under Sections 468–469 CrPC — Commencement of limitation where identity of offender emerges during inquiry — Held, limitation commences under Section 469(1)(c) CrPC from the date when identity of offender becomes known during investigation — Complaint filed within three years thereof is within limitation. (Paras 31–36) The allegation related to misbranding of vaccine labels. Though the initial private complaint was dated 05.01.2006, the identity of all accused persons crystallised only upon completion of inquiry and document verification on 18.04.2006. Applying Section 469(1)(c) CrPC, the limitation period commenced from the date when identity of offenders became known to the competent authority. The complaint dated 20.01.2009 was therefore within the three-year limitation prescribed under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC for offences punishable up to three years. Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, where identity of the offender is ascertained during investigation, the period of limitation commences from such date under Section 469(1)(c), not from the date of initial information.

Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 — Sections 18(a)(i), 17(b), 17(c), 27(d), 32 — Cognizance — Complaint by Drugs Inspector — Limitation under Sections 468–469 CrPC — Commencement of limitation where identity of offender emerges during inquiry — Held, limitation commences under Section 469(1)(c) CrPC from the date when identity of offender becomes known during investigation — Complaint filed within three years thereof is within limitation. (Paras 31–36)

The allegation related to misbranding of vaccine labels. Though the initial private complaint was dated 05.01.2006, the identity of all accused persons crystallised only upon completion of inquiry and document verification on 18.04.2006. Applying Section 469(1)(c) CrPC, the limitation period commenced from the date when identity of offenders became known to the competent authority. The complaint dated 20.01.2009 was therefore within the three-year limitation prescribed under Section 468(2)(c) CrPC for offences punishable up to three years.

Ratio Decidendi: For purposes of limitation under Section 468 CrPC, where identity of the offender is ascertained during investigation, the period of limitation commences from such date under Section 469(1)(c), not from the date of initial information.

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Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 — Section 202(1) — Mandatory inquiry where accused resides beyond territorial jurisdiction — Complaint by public servant — Harmonious construction with Section 200 proviso — Held, where complaint is filed by a public servant in discharge of official duties, the legislative scheme places such complainant on a distinct footing; non-holding of separate Section 202 inquiry does not ipso facto vitiate summoning order. (Paras 37–41)

The High Court had quashed the complaint on the ground that the Magistrate failed to conduct a mandatory inquiry under Section 202(1) CrPC since the accused resided beyond jurisdiction. The Supreme Court held that Section 202 must be construed harmoniously with the proviso to Section 200 CrPC, which exempts examination of a public servant complainant. Relying on precedent, the Court held that complaints by public servants stand on a different pedestal and strict insistence on Section 202 inquiry in such cases is unwarranted.

Ratio Decidendi: In prosecutions initiated by authorised public servants in discharge of official duties, failure to conduct a separate Section 202 CrPC inquiry does not automatically invalidate cognizance and summoning.

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Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940 — Section 34 — Vicarious liability of Directors — Whether Director was ‘in charge of’ and ‘responsible to the company’ — Question of fact — Premature quashing impermissible. (Paras 56–59)

In the connected appeal relating to prosecution for ‘not of standard quality’ syringes, the High Court had quashed proceedings against Directors for insufficient averments under Section 34 of the Act. The Supreme Court held that whether Directors were in charge of and responsible for conduct of business is a matter for trial based on evidence. At the threshold, proceedings ought not to be quashed on such factual issues.

Ratio Decidendi: Determination of vicarious liability under Section 34 of the Drugs and Cosmetics Act involves factual inquiry and cannot ordinarily be decided at the stage of quashing.

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Limitation — Section 473 CrPC — Power to extend limitation — Observations of High Court regarding computation — Clarified. (Paras 32–36)

The Court clarified that the High Court erred in computing limitation from an earlier date under Section 469(1)(b) CrPC; rather, Section 469(1)(c) applied in the facts. However, subsequent developments rendered that issue academic.

Ratio Decidendi: Correct identification of the applicable limb of Section 469(1) CrPC is essential for computing limitation; where identity of offender is initially unknown, clause (c) governs.

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Result — First Appeal (Panacea Biotec matter): Impugned High Court order quashing complaint set aside; summoning order restored; substitution permitted in view of death of Managing Director; fresh summons to issue. (Paras 43–44)**

Connected Appeal (Diary No. 18999 of 2023): Dismissed, for reasons recorded in principal appeal. (Paras 45–48)**

Connected Appeal (SLP (Crl.) No. 8867 of 2023): Impugned High Court judgment quashing proceedings on Section 202 and Section 34 grounds set aside; complaint restored; fresh summons to issue. (Paras 57–59)**

Clarification: Observations confined to issues decided; merits left open for trial; no order as to costs. (Para 60)**

Customs Act, 1962 — Section 135(1)(b)(i) — Dealing with smuggled goods — Conviction based on statements under Section 108 — Admissibility and evidentiary value — Held, statements recorded under Section 108 by authorized Customs Officers are admissible and can form substantive evidence if voluntary — Not hit by Sections 24, 30 or 34 of the Evidence Act — Conviction upheld where corroborative material exists. (Paras 20–23) The appellants contended that conviction was founded solely on confessional statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The Court affirmed the High Court’s reasoning that statements under Section 108, if voluntary, are admissible and constitute substantive evidence. The High Court had found that the statements were not shown to be obtained by coercion and that they led to recovery of incriminating articles and money documented by panchnamas, thereby providing corroboration. No perversity was found in concurrent findings of the courts below. Ratio Decidendi: A voluntary statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is admissible and may sustain conviction, particularly when corroborated by recoveries and other circumstantial evidence.

Customs Act, 1962 — Section 135(1)(b)(i) — Dealing with smuggled goods — Conviction based on statements under Section 108 — Admissibility and evidentiary value — Held, statements recorded under Section 108 by authorized Customs Officers are admissible and can form substantive evidence if voluntary — Not hit by Sections 24, 30 or 34 of the Evidence Act — Conviction upheld where corroborative material exists. (Paras 20–23)

The appellants contended that conviction was founded solely on confessional statements recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act. The Court affirmed the High Court’s reasoning that statements under Section 108, if voluntary, are admissible and constitute substantive evidence. The High Court had found that the statements were not shown to be obtained by coercion and that they led to recovery of incriminating articles and money documented by panchnamas, thereby providing corroboration. No perversity was found in concurrent findings of the courts below.

Ratio Decidendi: A voluntary statement recorded under Section 108 of the Customs Act is admissible and may sustain conviction, particularly when corroborated by recoveries and other circumstantial evidence.

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Criminal Jurisprudence — Article 136 of the Constitution — Interference with concurrent findings — Scope — Held, where trial Court, appellate Court and High Court have concurrently affirmed conviction and no perversity or manifest illegality is shown, Supreme Court will not interfere with findings of guilt. (Paras 23–24)

The Court declined to reappreciate evidence under Article 136, noting that findings of guilt were based on proper evaluation of statutory provisions and evidence on record. The concurrent conclusions did not suffer from manifest error.

Ratio Decidendi: In exercise of jurisdiction under Article 136, the Supreme Court does not ordinarily interfere with concurrent findings of fact unless demonstrated to be perverse or legally unsustainable.

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Customs Offences — Sentencing — Section 135(1)(b)(i) proviso — Reduction of sentence — Long lapse of time — Advanced age — Period already undergone exceeding statutory minimum — Ends of justice. (Paras 24–28)

Though conviction was affirmed, the Court considered mitigating circumstances. The incident dated back to 1985; the recovery was from abandoned pits; several co-accused were acquitted; some appellants had passed away; surviving appellants were of advanced age; and approximately one year of incarceration had already been undergone, exceeding the statutory minimum of six months under the proviso to Section 135(1)(b)(i) as it then stood. In the totality of circumstances, further imprisonment was held unnecessary.

Ratio Decidendi: In exceptional circumstances involving protracted litigation, advanced age of accused, substantial incarceration already undergone, and passage of decades since offence, sentence under Section 135 of the Customs Act may be reduced to the period already undergone while maintaining conviction.

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Final Order: Conviction under Section 135(1)(b)(i) of the Customs Act, 1962 affirmed. Sentence reduced to period already undergone. Appellants on bail; bail bonds discharged. Appeals partly allowed. (Paras 28–30)**