Civil Procedure — Suit based on promissory note — Denial of execution by defendant — Application seeking comparison of signatures — Registered documents of earlier years treated as contemporaneous — Legality of reference to expert upheld. Where the disputed promissory note is of the year 2020 and the admitted signatures relied upon are contained in registered cancellation deeds of 2016 and 2019, such documents are sufficiently proximate in time and may be regarded as contemporaneous for the purpose of comparison of signatures. The Trial Court committed no illegality in allowing the application. Paras 7 and 9.

 Constitution of India — Article 227 — Scope of supervisory jurisdiction — Interference with interlocutory orders — Order directing comparison of disputed signature with admitted signatures — No jurisdictional error, perversity, or illegality established — Interference declined.

Held, the supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 is confined to cases of jurisdictional error, patent illegality, or perversity. Where the Trial Court, upon consideration of the pleadings and admitted signatures, directs comparison of disputed signatures with admitted signatures for expert opinion, and no prejudice or legal infirmity is demonstrated, such discretionary order does not warrant interference. Paras 7 to 10.

Civil Procedure — Suit based on promissory note — Denial of execution by defendant — Application seeking comparison of signatures — Registered documents of earlier years treated as contemporaneous — Legality of reference to expert upheld.

Where the disputed promissory note is of the year 2020 and the admitted signatures relied upon are contained in registered cancellation deeds of 2016 and 2019, such documents are sufficiently proximate in time and may be regarded as contemporaneous for the purpose of comparison of signatures. The Trial Court committed no illegality in allowing the application. Paras 7 and 9.

Evidence — Comparison of disputed signature with admitted signature — Documents executed in favour of third parties — Relevance — Admitted signatures therein sufficient for expert comparison.

The contention that the cancellation deeds were not inter se between the parties is immaterial once it is not disputed that the documents contain the admitted signatures of the defendant. For the purpose of comparison of signatures, the existence of admitted signatures is the relevant consideration. Para 8.

Civil Procedure — Expert opinion — Procedural stage — No prejudice caused by sending document for comparison — Right to object to expert report preserved.

Sending the disputed promissory note for expert comparison does not cause prejudice at the interlocutory stage, as the party retains the right to raise objections to the expert’s report and to cross-examine the expert during trial. Para 10.

Result — Civil Revision Petition dismissed — No order as to costs. Para 11.

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RATIO DECIDENDI
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The ratio of the decision is that an order permitting comparison of disputed signatures with admitted signatures through expert opinion is a procedural and discretionary step taken in aid of adjudication of the suit and does not determine substantive rights of the parties. When execution of a promissory note is denied, the Trial Court is justified in directing comparison with admitted signatures appearing on registered documents of reasonably proximate years, which may be treated as contemporaneous. The fact that such documents were executed in favour of third parties does not affect their utility for comparison once the signatures therein are admitted.

Further, supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 cannot be invoked to reappreciate or interfere with such discretionary interlocutory orders in the absence of patent illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error. Since no prejudice is caused and the party retains the right to challenge the expert evidence at trial, interference is unwarranted.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) & (4) — Defamation of public servant — Complaint by Public Prosecutor — Maintainability — “Person aggrieved” — Government as complainant — Held, Government not a “person” within meaning of Section 199(2) CrPC — State cannot maintain criminal defamation unless specific constitutional authority/public servant covered under Section 199(2) is defamed — Complaints filed by “State Public Prosecutor” without statutory authority — Not maintainable — Cognizance set aside.

 Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) & (4) — Defamation of public servant — Complaint by Public Prosecutor — Maintainability — “Person aggrieved” — Government as complainant — Held, Government not a “person” within meaning of Section 199(2) CrPC — State cannot maintain criminal defamation unless specific constitutional authority/public servant covered under Section 199(2) is defamed — Complaints filed by “State Public Prosecutor” without statutory authority — Not maintainable — Cognizance set aside.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Sections 200 and 202 — Mandatory compliance — Accused residing beyond territorial jurisdiction — Post-2005 amendment — Inquiry under Section 202 mandatory before issuance of process — Failure to conduct inquiry — Vitiates cognizance — Proceedings void ab initio.

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 199(2) — Special procedure — Role of Public Prosecutor — Must act independently — Cannot act as “post office” of Government — Absence of independent scrutiny — Sanction mechanically granted — Prosecution unsustainable.

Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 499, 500, 501, 502 — Criminal defamation — Essential ingredient — Mens rea — Intention to harm reputation — Generalised criticism of Government — Not defamation — Government as abstract entity not defamable — Unless specific official targeted.

Constitution of India — Articles 19(1)(a), 19(2), 21 — Freedom of press — Criminal defamation — Balance between reputation and free speech — Legitimate criticism of governance protected — Prosecution to silence dissent impermissible.

Criminal Revision — Order taking cognizance — Nature — Intermediate order — Revisable — Maintainability affirmed following Girish Kumar Suneja and Madhu Limaye.

Sanction for prosecution — Mechanical sanction — Non-application of mind — Vitiates entire proceedings.

Result — Criminal Revision Cases allowed — Cognizance and consequential proceedings quashed.

Hindu Joint Family Property — Suit for Partition — Burden of Proof — Proof of Nucleus — Admissions — Scope. In a suit for partition, there is no presumption that property is joint family property merely because a joint Hindu family exists. The initial burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish that the property is joint family property or that there existed sufficient nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made. Upon proof of nucleus, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition. Admission of a party in pleadings or evidence is not conclusive proof but is a substantive piece of evidence and must be weighed with other material on record. Relied on: D. S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chandgade Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam Held, the trial Court failed to consider material admissions of DW-1 and did not properly determine existence of joint family nucleus or apply settled burden-shifting principles. Findings on Issue Nos.2 to 5 held unsustainable.

 

Hindu Joint Family Property — Suit for Partition — Burden of Proof — Proof of Nucleus — Admissions — Scope.

In a suit for partition, there is no presumption that property is joint family property merely because a joint Hindu family exists. The initial burden lies upon the plaintiff to establish that the property is joint family property or that there existed sufficient nucleus from which acquisitions could have been made. Upon proof of nucleus, the burden shifts to the person asserting self-acquisition.

Admission of a party in pleadings or evidence is not conclusive proof but is a substantive piece of evidence and must be weighed with other material on record.

Relied on:
D. S. Lakshmaiah v. L. Balasubramanyam
Appasaheb Peerappa Chandgade v. Devendra Peerappa Chandgade
Angadi Chandranna v. Shankar
Bhagwat Sharan v. Purushottam

Held, the trial Court failed to consider material admissions of DW-1 and did not properly determine existence of joint family nucleus or apply settled burden-shifting principles. Findings on Issue Nos.2 to 5 held unsustainable.

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Co-ownership — Joint Possession — Ouster — Court Fee.

In law, possession of one co-owner is possession of all, unless clear ouster is pleaded and proved. Mere non-residence or separate employment does not amount to exclusion from joint possession. Absence of actual physical possession does not disentitle a coparcener from seeking partition nor justify adverse inference regarding court fee.

Relied on:
Annasaheb Bapusaheb Patil v. Balwant
Neelavathi v. N. Natarajan

Held, finding of trial Court that plaintiff was not in joint possession solely because he was residing elsewhere was contrary to settled law.

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Hindu Succession — Property standing in name of father/mother — Intestate death — Right of legal heirs.

Where property stands in the name of the father and/or mother and death is intestate, legal heirs succeed in accordance with statutory succession. Trial Court erred in holding that property recorded in individual name could not be subject matter of partition without applying principles under succession law.

Held, non-consideration of statutory rights under succession amounted to error of law.

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Will — Proof — Suspicious Circumstances — Amendment to plead Will.

A Will must be proved in accordance with Section 63 of the Succession Act and Section 68 of the Evidence Act. Execution after institution of suit is not per se a ground to refuse amendment seeking to plead such Will. Amendment cannot be rejected merely because document is subsequent to filing of suit.

Relied on:
Meena Pradhan v. Kamla Pradhan
Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa

Held, rejection of amendment relating to Will was unsustainable.

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Amendment of Pleadings — Order VI Rule 17 CPC — Scope — Due Diligence — Court not to decide merits at amendment stage.

At the stage of considering amendment, the Court must examine whether amendment is necessary for effective adjudication of real controversy. Merits or correctness of proposed plea are not to be adjudicated at that stage. Delay alone is not a ground for rejection. Even after commencement of trial, amendment may be allowed if due diligence is shown.

Relied on:
Rajesh Kumar Aggarwal v. K. K. Modi
Andhra Bank v. ABN Amro Bank N. V.
J. Samuel v. Gattu Mahesh
Chander Kanta Bansal v. Rajinder Singh Anand
Basavaraj v. Indiara

Held, trial Court conducted a mini-trial at amendment stage and rejected applications on unsustainable grounds; Orders set aside.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

The trial Court failed to apply fundamental principles governing partition of joint Hindu family property, burden of proof regarding nucleus, evidentiary value of admissions, co-ownership possession, proof of Will, and scope of amendment under Order VI Rule 17 CPC. Material evidence, including admissions of DW-1, was not properly appreciated. Findings (except on Issue No.1) suffered from legal infirmity and perversity.

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FINAL ORDER

Appeal allowed. Judgment and decree dated 22-11-2017 in O.S. No.94 of 2010 set aside except finding on Issue No.1. Matter remanded for fresh decision in accordance with law.

C.R.P. No.3813 of 2017 and C.R.P. No.5818 of 2017 allowed; impugned orders in I.A. Nos.492 of 2014 and 986 of 2017 set aside and applications restored for fresh consideration.

C.R.P. No.5836 of 2017 dismissed as infructuous.

No order as to costs. Trial Court directed to dispose of suit expeditiously within one year.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 110 — Presumption as to ownership from possession — Scope and limitations. Section 110 embodies the principle that possession furnishes prima facie proof of ownership, but the presumption is rebuttable and applies only when possession is prima facie lawful and the contesting party has no title. It cannot substitute proof of title in a declaratory suit. Reliance was placed on Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector, State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co., Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (Paras 38–47) Where revenue records stood in the name of the Endowment/Mutt and plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral title, presumption under Section 110 could not be invoked. (D) Pleadings — Alleged admission — Plea of ignorance not admission of title. Pleadings must be read as a whole. A statement by the defendant that he was “not aware” regarding issuance of pattadar passbooks did not amount to admission of ownership. There was clear and categorical denial of plaintiffs’ title. (Paras 34–36) Held, burden of proof was not discharged by relying on alleged admissions.

 

(A) Suit for Declaration of Title — Burden of Proof — Plaintiff must succeed on strength of own title — Weakness of defence immaterial.

In a suit for declaration of title, the burden always lies on the plaintiff to establish a clear and cogent title. The plaintiff cannot succeed merely because the defendant’s case is weak or defective. The plaintiff must prove his own title independently by legally admissible evidence. Reliance was placed on Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. and Jagdish Prasad Patel v. Shivnath. (Paras 21–25, 54)

Held, the plaintiffs failed to prove title of their ancestors and therefore the suit was rightly dismissed.

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(B) Revenue Records — Mutation Entries — Pattadar Passbooks — Cist Receipts — Not proof of title.

Revenue entries, pattadar passbooks, adangals and mutation records are maintained for fiscal purposes and do not confer ownership. They may at best raise a presumption regarding possession but cannot form the foundation for declaration of title. Reliance was placed on Nagar Palika v. Jagat Singh, Suraj Bhan v. Financial Commissioner and Union of India v. Vasavi Cooperative Housing Society Ltd.. (Paras 48–53)

Held, Exs.A1 to A32 were insufficient to establish ownership.

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(C) Evidence Act, 1872 — Section 110 — Presumption as to ownership from possession — Scope and limitations.

Section 110 embodies the principle that possession furnishes prima facie proof of ownership, but the presumption is rebuttable and applies only when possession is prima facie lawful and the contesting party has no title. It cannot substitute proof of title in a declaratory suit. Reliance was placed on Chief Conservator of Forests v. Collector, State of A.P. v. Star Bone Mill & Fertiliser Co., Nazir Mohamed v. J. Kamala and Yerikala Sunkalamma v. State of Andhra Pradesh. (Paras 38–47)

Where revenue records stood in the name of the Endowment/Mutt and plaintiffs failed to prove ancestral title, presumption under Section 110 could not be invoked.

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(D) Pleadings — Alleged admission — Plea of ignorance not admission of title.

Pleadings must be read as a whole. A statement by the defendant that he was “not aware” regarding issuance of pattadar passbooks did not amount to admission of ownership. There was clear and categorical denial of plaintiffs’ title. (Paras 34–36)

Held, burden of proof was not discharged by relying on alleged admissions.

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(E) Endowment Property — Similarity of surname — No proof of ancestral title.

Mere similarity between the plaintiffs’ surname “Matam” and the property recorded in the name of the Mutt does not establish ancestral ownership. Title must be proved by documentary evidence tracing succession. (Paras 30–33, 54)

Held, plaintiffs failed to establish linkage between alleged ancestor and suit property.

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(F) Appellate Jurisdiction — No perversity in trial court findings — Appeal dismissed.

The trial court properly appreciated oral and documentary evidence. No error of fact or law was demonstrated warranting interference. The appellate court affirmed the dismissal of the suit. (Paras 54–56)

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FINAL ORDER

The First Appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs. The judgment and decree dated 28-07-2011 were affirmed.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainabil...Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability — Locus standi — Competing project proponent — Challenge to issuance of Terms of Reference (ToR) at Scoping stage under EIA Notification, 2006 — Petitioner’s application for CBMWTF pending — Objections rejected — Held, petitioner is “person aggrieved” — Writ petition maintainable. Paras 24, 45 Where the petitioner had already obtained Environmental Clearance and its application for establishment of a Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facility was pending consideration, and the relocation of the 5th respondent’s facility was within 2.8 km affecting petitioner’s proposed site and coverage area, the petitioner could not be treated as a stranger. Rejection of petitioner’s representation conferred locus to challenge the recommendations. Held, petitioner has locus standi and writ petition is maintainable.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainabil...: advocatemmmohan (A) Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability — Locus standi — Competing project proponent — Challenge to issuan...

(A) Constitution of India — Article 226 — Maintainability — Locus standi — Competing project proponent — Challenge to issuance of Terms of Reference (ToR) at Scoping stage under EIA Notification, 2006 — Petitioner’s application for CBMWTF pending — Objections rejected — Held, petitioner is “person aggrieved” — Writ petition maintainable.

Paras 24, 45

Where the petitioner had already obtained Environmental Clearance and its application for establishment of a Common Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facility was pending consideration, and the relocation of the 5th respondent’s facility was within 2.8 km affecting petitioner’s proposed site and coverage area, the petitioner could not be treated as a stranger. Rejection of petitioner’s representation conferred locus to challenge the recommendations.

Held, petitioner has locus standi and writ petition is maintainable.

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(B) Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 — EIA Notification, 2006 — Stage of “Scoping” — Issuance of Terms of Reference (ToR) — Nature of ToR — Whether final decision — Held, ToR is not environmental clearance — Merely procedural stage — Final decision yet to be taken.

Paras 18, 30, 43

Issuance of ToR under Stage-II (Scoping) is part of four-stage process (Screening, Scoping, Public Consultation, Appraisal). It is only a determination of scope of EIA study and not grant of environmental clearance.

Held, recommendations for ToR do not amount to final decision.

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(C) National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 — Sections 14, 16, 22 — Alternative remedy — Whether bars writ jurisdiction — Held, jurisdiction of High Court under Article 226 not ousted — But Court may decline interference at pre-decisional stage.

Relied on:
• Municipal Corpn. of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha
• Mantri Techzone (P) Ltd. v. Forward Foundation
• Madhya Pradesh High Court Advocates Bar Association v. Union of India

Paras 26–30

Though NGT has wide environmental jurisdiction and appellate powers, High Court’s power under Article 226 forms part of basic structure and is not ousted. However, where statutory process is incomplete and final decision is pending, High Court may decline to interfere.

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(D) Bio-Medical Waste Treatment Facilities — Revised Guidelines, 2016 — Relocation of existing CBMWTF — Compliance requirement — Whether permissible — Held, relocation requires compliance with EIA Notification and relevant provisions of Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

Paras 33–35

Guideline 5.3(c) specifically provides that relocation of existing CBMWTF requires compliance with relevant provisions notified under Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

Relocation not per se barred, but subject to statutory compliance.

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(E) Natural Justice — Consideration of objections — Stage of Appraisal — Duty of regulatory authority — Reasoned order mandatory.

Paras 41, 46

Where petitioner alleged non-consideration of objections at Scoping stage, Court held that objections may be raised again at Stage-IV (Appraisal). Regulatory authority must:

• Provide due opportunity of hearing to both parties
• Consider applicability of Public Consultation stage
• Decide whether proposal is “relocation” or “new project”
• Pass reasoned order in accordance with Guidelines, 2016

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(F) Public Consultation — Exemption — Industrial estate projects — Requirement of recording reasons.

Para 42

Even if exemption under Stage-III (Public Consultation) is claimed, regulatory authority must examine applicability and record cogent reasons for exemption.

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(G) Environmental Jurisprudence — Precautionary Principle — Sustainable Development — Regulatory authority must apply balancing approach.

Relied on:
• Vellore Citizens' Welfare Forum v. Union of India

Para 44

Precautionary principle and sustainable development are integral to environmental decision-making. Regulatory authority must balance industrial development with environmental protection while passing final order.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Issuance of ToR at Scoping stage is not final environmental clearance.

2. Competing project proponent affected by relocation within prohibited radius has locus standi.

3. Writ jurisdiction not barred by availability of NGT remedy, but interference at pre-decisional stage is unwarranted.

4. Regulatory authority must independently decide at Appraisal stage after hearing parties and passing reasoned order.

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FINAL ORDER

Writ petition disposed of.

Regulatory authority directed to:

• Take final decision under Stage-IV (Appraisal)
• Consider objections of petitioner and 5th respondent
• Examine applicability of Public Consultation stage
• Determine whether proposal is relocation or new project
• Pass reasoned order in accordance with Bio-Medical Waste Guidelines, 2016
• Complete exercise within six months

No costs.