An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period and even after an award has been rendered beyond the mandate. Such an award is unenforceable, but the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 29A remains intact. The termination under Section 29A(4) is not absolute and is subject to judicial extension upon sufficient cause.

Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 — Section 29A — Extension of mandate after award

(Paras 1–2, 14–23)

An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period of twelve months (extendable by six months by consent) and even where an award has been rendered after expiry of the mandate.

An award rendered after expiry of the mandate is unenforceable under Section 36 and does not attain the status of a decree; however, such unilateral act of the arbitrator does not denude the Court of its jurisdiction under Section 29A(4) and (5) to extend the mandate upon sufficient cause being shown.

---

Nature of termination under Section 29A(4) — Not absolute or irretrievable

(Paras 16–18)

The termination of the arbitrator’s mandate under Section 29A(4) upon expiry of time is not final or irreversible. The expression “terminate” in the context of Section 29A is transitory and subject to judicial intervention. The legislative scheme, including continuation of proceedings pending extension application and power of substitution under Section 29A(6), demonstrates the intention to preserve and not abort arbitral proceedings.

---

Court’s powers under Section 29A — Toolkit for ensuring efficiency and integrity

(Paras 20–23)

While considering extension under Section 29A, the Court may reduce arbitral fees, impose costs, substitute arbitrators, and impose appropriate terms and conditions. The power of substitution is discretionary and fact-dependent. The statutory scheme reflects a balance between expeditious resolution and procedural integrity.

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS

The dispute arose out of three agreements to sell between the parties. A sole arbitrator was appointed by the High Court under Section 11 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Pleadings were completed on 20.08.2022, triggering the twelve-month period under Section 29A(1). By consent under Section 29A(3), the mandate was extended by six months till 20.02.2024.

Though arguments were concluded and the matter reserved for award, settlement negotiations intervened. Ultimately, the arbitrator passed the award on 11.05.2024, i.e., after expiry of the extended mandate on 20.02.2024.

The respondent challenged the award under Section 34 on the ground that it was rendered after expiry of mandate. The appellant filed an application under Section 29A seeking extension of mandate. The High Court dismissed the Section 29A application as not maintainable and allowed the Section 34 petition, holding that an award passed after expiry of mandate is a nullity and mandate cannot be extended post-award.

The Supreme Court was thus called upon to decide whether extension under Section 29A can be granted even after an award has been rendered beyond the statutory timeline.

---

ANALYSIS OF LAW

The Court undertook a structural and purposive interpretation of Section 29A.

Under the Arbitration Act, 1940, Section 28 expressly empowered the Court to enlarge time whether or not the award had been made. The 1996 Act initially did not prescribe timelines, which led to delay. The Law Commission’s 176th Report recommended structured timelines but emphasized continuation of arbitral proceedings even where delay occurred.

Section 29A, introduced by amendment, prescribes:

twelve months from completion of pleadings;
six months’ consensual extension;
further extension only by Court upon sufficient cause;
continuation of mandate pending extension application;
power of substitution;
power to reduce fees and impose costs.

The Court held that Section 29A does not expressly bar post-award extension. The phrase “if an award is not made” in Section 29A(4) merely identifies the contingency for termination; it does not prohibit extension after an award is rendered.

The Court clarified that:

An award passed after expiry of mandate is unenforceable under Section 36 and need not necessarily be challenged under Section 34 merely for that reason.

The unilateral act of the arbitrator in rendering such an award cannot curtail the Court’s statutory power.

Termination under Section 29A(4) is conditional and subject to judicial revival.

The power to extend exists both prior to and after expiry of mandate.

International jurisprudence was referred to, including developments under English law, to demonstrate that courts retain retrospective power to enlarge time in appropriate cases.

The Court approved earlier observations in Rohan Builders (India) Pvt. Ltd. v. Berger Paints India Ltd., 2024 SCC Online SC 2494, and clarified that Parliament intended Section 29A to safeguard arbitration from technical collapse due to delay, not to render proceedings futile.

The Court emphasized that extension is not automatic. The Court must examine sufficient cause and may impose costs, reduce fees, or substitute arbitrators where warranted.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

An application under Section 29A(5) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for extension of the mandate of the arbitral tribunal is maintainable even after expiry of the statutory period and even after an award has been rendered beyond the mandate. Such an award is unenforceable, but the Court’s jurisdiction under Section 29A remains intact. The termination under Section 29A(4) is not absolute and is subject to judicial extension upon sufficient cause.

---

RESULT

The judgment of the High Court dismissing the Section 29A application was set aside. The application was restored for fresh consideration in accordance with the principles laid down by the Supreme Court.

The appeal was allowed.

Transgender Rights — Institutional Representation in Advisory Mechanism (Paras 3–4) In matters concerning transgender rights and allied constitutional protections, representation of institutional scholarship and domain expertise in advisory bodies constituted by the Court is essential for informed policy and rights-based deliberation.

Advisory Committee — Continuity of Member Despite Change in Institutional Affiliation

(Paras 2–3)

Where a member of an Advisory Committee constituted by judicial order ceases to be affiliated with the institution she was originally nominated to represent, such cessation does not automatically disqualify her from continuing as a member, particularly when her expertise and prior contribution to the subject matter are substantial and relevant to the functioning of the Committee.

---

Power of Court in Original Jurisdiction — Modification/Clarification of Earlier Order

(Paras 1, 4)

In exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, the Court may clarify, supplement, or modify earlier directions to ensure effective functioning of a Committee constituted by it, including appointment of additional members representing institutional expertise.

---

Transgender Rights — Institutional Representation in Advisory Mechanism

(Paras 3–4)

In matters concerning transgender rights and allied constitutional protections, representation of institutional scholarship and domain expertise in advisory bodies constituted by the Court is essential for informed policy and rights-based deliberation.

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

By judgment dated 17.10.2025 in Writ Petition (Civil) No. 1405 of 2023, the Supreme Court had constituted an Advisory Committee and appointed Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar as a member representing the Centre for Law and Policy Research.

Subsequently, a Miscellaneous Application was moved by the learned Amicus Curiae seeking inclusion of Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Senior Associate at the Centre for Law and Policy Research, as a member of the Advisory Committee.

The factual premise was that Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar was no longer associated with the Centre. However, the Court took note of her extensive and substantive work in the field of transgender rights. The Court thus held that institutional dissociation did not dilute her expertise or suitability as a member of the Advisory Committee.

At the same time, to ensure continued institutional representation of the Centre’s scholarship and research in transgender rights, the Court appointed Ms. Aparna Mehrotra as an additional member of the Advisory Committee.

The order reflects two doctrinal aspects:

First, the Court retains continuing supervisory jurisdiction in matters where it has issued structural or institutional directions, especially in public law and rights-based adjudication.

Second, the Court recognizes that advisory bodies constituted under judicial directions must function effectively, and composition may be modified to preserve expertise, continuity, and institutional depth.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

Cessation of institutional affiliation does not ipso facto disqualify a member of a judicially constituted Advisory Committee where the appointment was premised on subject-matter expertise. The Court, in exercise of its original civil jurisdiction, may appoint additional members to ensure effective functioning and institutional representation.

---

RESULT

Ms. Nithya Rajshekhar shall continue as a member of the Advisory Committee.

Ms. Aparna Mehrotra, Senior Associate, Centre for Law and Policy Research, is appointed as an additional member of the Advisory Committee to represent the Centre and its scholarship in transgender rights.

The Miscellaneous Application stands disposed of accordingly.

Anticipatory bail once granted cannot ordinarily be restricted till filing of the charge-sheet. Filing of charge-sheet, taking cognizance, or issuance of summons does not extinguish protection under Section 438 CrPC. Duration of anticipatory bail is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot be curtailed by arbitrary time limits unless special reasons are recorded. Arrest at the stage of filing of charge-sheet is not mandatory where the accused has cooperated.

Anticipatory Bail — Impermissibility of Time-Bound Protection Till Filing of Charge-Sheet

(Paras 10–15, 25–27)

Once anticipatory bail is granted upon judicial consideration of the nature of allegations, role of the accused, and surrounding circumstances, the protection cannot ordinarily be restricted till filing of the charge-sheet. Imposition of expiry clauses tied to procedural milestones such as completion of investigation or filing of charge-sheet is contrary to settled constitutional principles governing Section 438 CrPC.

---

Section 438 CrPC — Grant of Anticipatory Bail After Filing of Charge-Sheet — Maintainability

(Paras 16–17)

There is no restriction in Section 438 CrPC preventing grant of anticipatory bail even after filing of charge-sheet or taking of cognizance. Filing of charge-sheet by itself does not extinguish the jurisdiction of the Court to grant pre-arrest bail in appropriate cases.

---

Constitution Bench — Duration of Anticipatory Bail

(Paras 18–20, 25)

Anticipatory bail need not invariably be limited to a fixed period. Protection ordinarily continues till conclusion of trial unless special reasons exist warranting limitation. Filing of charge-sheet, summoning of accused, or framing of charge does not automatically terminate anticipatory bail.

---

Personal Liberty — Arrest Not Mandatory Upon Filing of Charge-Sheet

(Paras 21–23)

Section 170 CrPC does not mandate arrest of the accused at the time of filing of charge-sheet. Arrest is justified only where custodial interrogation is necessary, there exists risk of absconding, tampering of evidence, or other compelling reasons. Mere filing of charge-sheet cannot compel surrender if the accused has cooperated during investigation.

---

Addition of Graver Offences After Grant of Bail — Legal Consequences

(Paras 30–34)

Where after grant of bail additional cognizable and non-bailable offences of a graver nature are added, the Court must apply its mind afresh. The investigating agency cannot unilaterally arrest the accused; it must seek appropriate orders under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC for cancellation or modification of bail.

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellant, brother-in-law (devar) of the deceased, was implicated in FIR No. 560/2024 registered at Akbarpur Police Station, Kanpur Dehat, for offences under Section 80(2)/85 of the Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita (dowry death framework) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

The High Court initially granted anticipatory bail but limited its operation “till filing of the charge-sheet.” Upon filing of the charge-sheet, the protection automatically lapsed. The appellant filed a fresh anticipatory bail application, which was rejected by the High Court without indicating any change in circumstances.

The Supreme Court found the approach of the High Court fundamentally flawed. If the Court had, in the earlier order, found the allegations, role, and circumstances sufficient to grant anticipatory bail, it was incumbent upon it to record specific reasons for declining continuation of protection.

The Court relied upon binding precedents:

The principle that anticipatory bail can be granted even after filing of charge-sheet was reiterated from Bharat Chaudhary v. State of Bihar and Ravindra Saxena v. State of Rajasthan.

The Constitution Bench in Sushila Aggarwal v. State (NCT of Delhi) clarified that anticipatory bail ordinarily does not expire at filing of charge-sheet or summoning of accused, and duration cannot be arbitrarily curtailed.

Further, Siddharth v. State of Uttar Pradesh held that arrest at the stage of filing of charge-sheet is not mandatory and custody is not synonymous with arrest.

The Court also relied upon Md. Asfak Alam v. State of Jharkhand, where rejection of anticipatory bail merely because charge-sheet was filed was disapproved.

The Supreme Court emphasized that anticipatory bail jurisprudence is anchored in Article 21 — personal liberty cannot be made dependent on procedural milestones unless compelling reasons are demonstrated.

Risk management can be addressed through conditions ensuring cooperation, attendance, and non-interference with evidence, rather than by imposing automatic expiry clauses.

---

ADDITION OF GRAVER OFFENCES — CLARIFICATION

The Court further addressed a practical scenario: where after grant of bail additional serious non-bailable offences are added.

Relying on Pradeep Ram v. State of Jharkhand and Prahlad Singh Bhati v. NCT of Delhi, the Court clarified:

If graver offences are added, the accused does not automatically lose liberty. However, the Court must reconsider entitlement to bail in changed circumstances. The investigating agency must seek cancellation under Sections 437(5) or 439(2) CrPC. It cannot arrest the accused without judicial order where bail subsists.

The Court summarised four principles:

The accused may surrender and seek bail for newly added offences.

The investigating agency may apply for cancellation.

The Court may order custody upon cancellation.

Where bail exists, arrest for added offences requires judicial authorization.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

Anticipatory bail once granted cannot ordinarily be restricted till filing of the charge-sheet. Filing of charge-sheet, taking cognizance, or issuance of summons does not extinguish protection under Section 438 CrPC. Duration of anticipatory bail is a matter of judicial discretion and cannot be curtailed by arbitrary time limits unless special reasons are recorded. Arrest at the stage of filing of charge-sheet is not mandatory where the accused has cooperated.

---

RESULT

The impugned High Court order rejecting anticipatory bail was set aside.

The appellant was directed to be released on anticipatory bail in the event of arrest, subject to appropriate conditions imposed by the Investigating Officer.

After release, the appellant shall appear before the Trial Court and furnish fresh bail bond.

The Registry was directed to forward a copy of the order to the Registrar General of the Allahabad High Court.

Pending applications stood disposed of.

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: After submission and judicial acceptance of a fina...

ADVOCATEMMMOHAN: After submission and judicial acceptance of a fina...: advocatemmmohan Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 173(8) — Further Investigation — Leave of Court Mandatory (Paras 27–33) Though Secti...

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 — Section 173(8) — Further Investigation — Leave of Court Mandatory

(Paras 27–33)

Though Section 173(8) CrPC does not expressly mandate prior leave of the Magistrate for conducting further investigation after submission of final report under Section 173(2), the settled legal position requires the investigating agency to seek permission of the Magistrate before undertaking further investigation. The requirement of judicial permission is implicit, flowing from long-standing practice and doctrine of contemporanea expositio, and stands affirmed in authoritative precedents.

---

Power to Direct Further Investigation — Vested in Magistrate / Constitutional Courts — Not in Executive Authorities

(Paras 32–36)

The power to order further investigation rests with the Magistrate concerned or superior constitutional courts. Executive authorities, including Superintendent of Police or State Government officials, cannot direct further investigation on their own once a final report has been filed and accepted. Any such direction without judicial sanction is without jurisdiction and liable to be quashed.

---

Acceptance of Closure Report — Effect — Further Investigation Only Through Judicial Route

(Paras 6–8, 34–36)

Where a final report under Section 173(2) CrPC is filed and accepted by the Magistrate after notice to the informant, the matter attains judicial closure subject to statutory remedies. Any further investigation thereafter must necessarily be preceded by an order of the competent court. Administrative directions for reopening investigation undermine judicial authority and are impermissible.

---

Distinction — Further Investigation vs Fresh / De Novo Investigation

(Paras 29–31, 37)

“Further investigation” under Section 173(8) CrPC is a continuation of earlier investigation and does not amount to fresh or de novo investigation. While constitutional courts may order fresh or de novo investigation in appropriate cases, the investigating agency cannot unilaterally initiate further investigation after filing and acceptance of final report without court’s leave.

---

NHRC Directions — No Override of Criminal Court’s Jurisdiction

(Paras 9–13, 34–36)

Directions issued pursuant to recommendations of the National Human Rights Commission cannot supplant or bypass the statutory scheme under the CrPC. Even if administrative authorities decide that further investigation is required, such decision must be placed before the Magistrate for judicial consideration under Section 173(8).

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appeal arose from FIR No. 70/2013 registered for offences under Sections 376D, 352, 504 and 506 IPC at Mahila Police Station, Firozabad.

After investigation by Crime Branch, Mathura, a final report dated 30.05.2014 was submitted stating that no offence was made out due to contradictions in statements and lack of corroborative evidence. The Judicial Magistrate, Firozabad, after issuing notices to the informant and finding no protest petition, accepted the closure report on 14.09.2015.

Subsequently, after approximately three years, a complaint was filed before the NHRC alleging lapses in investigation. The NHRC directed fact-finding inquiry and compensation. Acting upon this, the Under Secretary, Government of Uttar Pradesh, issued communication dated 06.06.2019 directing investigation by CBCID and recommended further investigation under Section 173(8) CrPC.

An Inspector of CBCID sought permission from the Magistrate on 22.04.2021 to conduct further investigation. However, no judicial order granting such permission was passed. Despite this, the Superintendent of Police, vide communication dated 26.04.2021, directed expeditious completion of further investigation. DNA samples were collected and investigation proceeded.

The High Court declined to quash these communications. The Supreme Court examined whether further investigation could be ordered without judicial leave.

The Court analysed Section 173(8) CrPC and relied upon the binding precedent in Vinay Tyagi v. Irshad Ali, where it was held that although Section 173(8) does not expressly require permission, it is a settled practice and legal necessity that investigating agencies seek leave of the court before conducting further investigation.

The Court further referred to Vinubhai Haribhai Malaviya v. State of Gujarat and Peethambaran v. State of Kerala, which reaffirmed that the power to direct further investigation lies with the Magistrate or higher courts and not with executive police authorities.

The doctrine of contemporanea expositio was invoked to emphasize that long-standing judicial understanding requiring leave of court must be respected. The investigating agency cannot assume unfettered authority merely because Section 173(8) preserves its power to conduct further investigation.

The reliance placed by the State on Dharam Pal v. State of Haryana was distinguished. That case concerned exercise of constitutional powers to order de novo investigation and did not dilute the requirement of judicial oversight in ordinary further investigation under Section 173(8).

On facts, the Superintendent of Police proceeded to direct further investigation without any judicial order granting permission. The Magistrate had neither ordered nor sanctioned such further investigation. This amounted to executive overreach and encroachment upon judicial domain.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court set aside the High Court’s judgment and quashed the communications dated 06.06.2019 and 26.04.2021.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

After submission and judicial acceptance of a final report under Section 173(2) CrPC, further investigation under Section 173(8) can be undertaken only with the leave of the Magistrate concerned. Executive authorities or police officers cannot unilaterally direct or commence further investigation without judicial sanction. The power to order further investigation rests with the Magistrate or constitutional courts, and compliance with judicial oversight is mandatory.

---

RESULT

The appeal was allowed.
The impugned High Court judgment was set aside.
Communications dated 06.06.2019 and 26.04.2021 directing further investigation were quashed.
Observations made shall not prejudice pending criminal revision or related proceedings.
Pending applications stood disposed of.

In a suit for injunction and recovery of possession relating to immovable property, the plaintiff must establish through specific pleadings and proof (i) possession on the date of suit for injunction, and (ii) entitlement, date and mode of dispossession, and illegality of defendant’s possession for recovery. In absence of such foundational pleadings, the suit is liable to be dismissed irrespective of perceived weaknesses in the defendant’s case.

Perpetual Injunction — Requirement of Possession on Date of Suit

(Paras 11–12)

In a suit for perpetual injunction relating to immovable property, proof of actual possession on the date of institution of the suit is an essential prerequisite. Absence of pleading and proof of such possession is fatal to the relief of injunction.

---

Recovery of Possession — Mandatory Pleadings — Specifics of Dispossession

(Paras 11–12)

In a suit seeking recovery of possession, the plaintiff must specifically plead and prove entitlement, manner of acquisition of title, date and mode of dispossession, and the illegality of the defendant’s possession. Absence of material particulars in the plaint renders the claim legally unsustainable.

---

Burden of Proof — Plaintiff Must Stand on Own Pleadings

(Paras 11–13)

The plaintiff must succeed on the strength of his own case. The burden cannot be shifted onto the defendant merely because the defendant’s plea is disbelieved. An appellate court errs if it reverses findings without examining whether the plaintiff discharged the foundational burden in accordance with the nature of the relief sought.

---

Maintenance — Section 14(1), Hindu Succession Act, 1956

(Para 7.1 – Context)

Where property is granted to a female Hindu in lieu of maintenance, such right, being a pre-existing right under Shastric Hindu Law, may ripen into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956. However, such determination must arise within the proper framework of pleadings and relief claimed.

---

ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appeal arose from proceedings concerning agricultural land measuring 8 Kanals 05 Marlas in District Una, Himachal Pradesh.

The original plaintiff filed a suit in 1990 for perpetual injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with possession. The plaint was later amended to include a prayer for recovery of possession.

The plaintiff claimed ownership and asserted that the defendant’s possession, if any, was only Hisadari possession on his behalf. The first defendant, however, claimed possession in her own right, asserting that after the death of her husband Roshan Lal, her father-in-law, as Karta of the Joint Hindu Family, granted the suit property to her in lieu of maintenance. She contended that this right matured into absolute ownership under Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

The Trial Court dismissed the suit. The First Appellate Court reversed the decree. The High Court, in Second Appeal, allowed the appeal and restored dismissal of the suit.

Before the Supreme Court, the principal contention of the appellants (plaintiff’s LRs) was that the plaintiff had a 1/6th share and that possession of the first defendant was not adverse but only on behalf of the plaintiff.

The Supreme Court examined the nature of the reliefs claimed:

First, as to perpetual injunction, the Court reiterated the settled principle that possession on the date of filing of the suit is indispensable. The concurrent findings showed that the plaintiff was not in possession. Hence, the injunction could not be granted.

Second, as to recovery of possession, the Court emphasised that the plaint must contain material particulars regarding entitlement, date and manner of dispossession, and the illegality of defendant’s possession. The plaint was found to be completely deficient in such foundational pleadings.

The Court relied upon Maria Margarida Sequeira Fernandes v. Erasmo Jack de Sequeira to reiterate that pleadings in possession suits must be detailed and specific. Mere fragments of evidence cannot cure absence of pleadings.

The Supreme Court also observed that the First Appellate Court had erred by improperly shifting the burden onto the defendant and drawing adverse inferences, without first examining whether the plaintiff had established the essential ingredients of the relief claimed.

Given the fundamental pleading deficiencies, the suit was held to be rightly dismissed.

---

RATIO DECIDENDI

In a suit for injunction and recovery of possession relating to immovable property, the plaintiff must establish through specific pleadings and proof (i) possession on the date of suit for injunction, and (ii) entitlement, date and mode of dispossession, and illegality of defendant’s possession for recovery. In absence of such foundational pleadings, the suit is liable to be dismissed irrespective of perceived weaknesses in the defendant’s case.

---

RESULT

The Civil Appeal was dismissed. No order as to costs. Pending applications stood disposed of.