In proceedings where scientific or statistical evaluation is integral to adjudication or to the functioning of a court-constituted or court-monitored body, the Supreme Court may appoint a qualified technical expert and direct the concerned executive authority to provide necessary institutional support, infrastructure, and remuneration to give effect to such appointment.

Interlocutory Jurisdiction — Power to Appoint Technical Expert — Court-Monitored Process

(Paras 2–3)

In proceedings involving technical evaluation of survey data by a National Task Force, the Supreme Court, in exercise of its interlocutory jurisdiction, may appoint an independent expert as Technical Consultant to ensure comprehensive and scientific analysis. Such appointment is justified to preserve objectivity, credibility, and methodological rigour in court-monitored processes.

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Appointment of Technical Consultant — Former Chief Statistician — Institutional Support

(Paras 2–3)

Where the application seeks appointment of a qualified expert with domain expertise in statistics and data analysis, and the Court finds such appointment necessary for effective functioning of a National Task Force, it may direct the concerned Ministry to formally appoint the expert, extend administrative and infrastructural support, grant access to data, and provide remuneration in accordance with prevailing norms.

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Ministry’s Obligation — Compliance with Court Directions — Administrative Facilitation

(Para 3)

Upon judicial direction, the concerned Ministry is obligated to issue the order of appointment expeditiously and ensure full administrative cooperation, including infrastructure, data access, and honorarium, to facilitate execution of the mandate assigned by the Court.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The interlocutory application was filed in pending criminal appellate proceedings seeking the appointment of Dr. T.C.A. Anant, former Chief Statistician of India, as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force for comprehensive and scientific analysis of survey data. The application also sought directions to the Ministry of Education, Union of India, to provide administrative support, infrastructure, data access, and remuneration.

The matter was heard with assistance from learned Amicus Curiae and the learned Additional Solicitor General for the Union of India.

The Supreme Court considered the nature of the relief sought and found it appropriate to appoint Dr. T.C.A. Anant as Technical Consultant. The order reflects judicial recognition that analysis of survey data in complex matters requires specialised statistical expertise and independent oversight to maintain scientific integrity and credibility.

Accordingly, the Court directed:

First, appointment of Dr. T.C.A. Anant as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force.

Second, the Ministry of Education to formally issue the order of appointment at the earliest.

Third, the Ministry to extend all necessary administrative support, infrastructure, and data access, and to provide appropriate remuneration/honorarium as per prevailing norms.

The order demonstrates the Court’s supervisory role in ensuring that technical aspects of policy-linked or data-intensive matters are handled with professional competence and institutional backing.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

In proceedings where scientific or statistical evaluation is integral to adjudication or to the functioning of a court-constituted or court-monitored body, the Supreme Court may appoint a qualified technical expert and direct the concerned executive authority to provide necessary institutional support, infrastructure, and remuneration to give effect to such appointment.

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RESULT

The interlocutory application was allowed to the extent indicated. Dr. T.C.A. Anant was directed to be appointed as Technical Consultant to the National Task Force, and the Ministry of Education, Union of India, was directed to provide administrative support, data access, and remuneration. The application stood disposed of accordingly.

Where Article 243-O of the Constitution applies and the State Legislature has enacted a law providing for an election petition as the exclusive remedy to challenge election-related grievances, including improper rejection of nomination, the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process. The constitutional embargo mandates that election disputes be addressed only through the statutory mechanism, and judicial intervention during or after the process, outside that framework, is impermissible.

Constitution of India — Article 243-O — Bar to Judicial Interference in Panchayat Elections — Scope

(Paras 8.1, 9 to 9.4, 12)

Article 243-O(b) imposes an express constitutional embargo that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in the manner provided by State law. Where the State Legislature has enacted a law providing a complete and efficacious mechanism for challenging election-related grievances, the High Court is precluded from exercising jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process.

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Article 226 — Judicial Review in Electoral Matters — Self-Imposed Restraint — Non-Obstante Clause

(Paras 9.3, 12)

Though judicial review forms part of the basic structure, Article 243-O opens with a non-obstante clause and mandates that election disputes be channelled through the statutory mechanism. High Courts must exercise great circumspection and refrain from granting interim reliefs that disrupt an ongoing or concluded election process when an alternative statutory remedy exists.

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Election Law — Rejection of Nomination — Remedy — Election Petition Only

(Paras 10 to 10.5)

Where the grievance relates to improper rejection of nomination, the sole remedy lies by way of an election petition under the governing statute. Such grievance cannot be agitated in writ proceedings during the currency of the election process. The statutory scheme must be strictly adhered to.

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Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016 — Section 131H — Improper Rejection of Nomination — Prescribed Authority — Exclusive Jurisdiction

(Paras 10 to 10.4)

Section 131H provides a complete code for challenging elections, including cases where the result is materially affected by improper acceptance or rejection of nomination. The election petition must be presented before the prescribed authority, namely the Assistant Collector (First Class) or Pargana Magistrate, with further revision before the District Judge. Recourse to writ jurisdiction is impermissible when such statutory remedy is available.

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Electoral Process — Declaration of Candidate as Elected Unopposed — Judicial Interference — Impermissibility

(Paras 3.3, 11)

Once a candidate has been declared elected unopposed in accordance with the election process, the High Court cannot, in writ or intra-court appeal, direct reopening of the electoral process or permit participation of a disqualified candidate, particularly without impleading or hearing the elected candidate.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellant was declared elected unopposed as Zila Panchayat Member from Constituency No. 11 – Bharhgaon, District Pithoragarh, after the Returning Officer rejected the nomination of respondent No. 1 for non-disclosure.

Respondent No. 1 challenged the rejection of his nomination by filing a writ petition before the High Court of Uttarakhand. The learned Single Judge dismissed the writ petition on the ground that, once the election process had commenced, the writ court ought not to interfere in view of Article 243-O of the Constitution and the availability of an election petition under Section 131H of the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016.

In intra-court appeal, the Division Bench stayed the order of the Single Judge and directed the Returning Officer to allot a symbol to respondent No. 1 and permit him to contest the election. Notably, the present appellant, already declared elected unopposed, was not impleaded.

The Supreme Court examined the constitutional and statutory scheme governing Panchayat elections.

Article 243-O(b), inserted by the Constitution (73rd Amendment) Act, 1992, provides that no election to any Panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition presented in the manner provided by State law. The State of Uttarakhand has enacted the Uttarakhand Panchayati Raj Act, 2016, which under Section 131H provides a comprehensive mechanism to challenge election results, including improper rejection of nomination.

The Court relied upon established election jurisprudence including:

• Harnek Singh v. Charanjit Singh

• N.P. Ponnuswami v. Returning Officer, Namakkal Constituency

• Laxmibai v. Collector

These authorities reiterate that election disputes must be raised only through the statutorily prescribed election petition after completion of the election process. Even High Courts cannot entertain writ petitions during the pendency of the election process to challenge rejection of nomination.

The Supreme Court held that the Division Bench committed three manifest errors:

First, it acted in disregard of the constitutional embargo under Article 243-O.

Second, it interfered with a process that had already culminated in the appellant being declared elected unopposed.

Third, it granted relief adverse to the appellant without impleading or hearing him, thereby violating principles of natural justice.

The Court emphasised that the right to contest or question an election is purely statutory and must be exercised strictly in accordance with the statute. Liberal interim reliefs that disrupt the election process undermine public interest and constitutional design.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where Article 243-O of the Constitution applies and the State Legislature has enacted a law providing for an election petition as the exclusive remedy to challenge election-related grievances, including improper rejection of nomination, the High Court cannot exercise jurisdiction under Article 226 to interfere with the electoral process. The constitutional embargo mandates that election disputes be addressed only through the statutory mechanism, and judicial intervention during or after the process, outside that framework, is impermissible.

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RESULT

The Supreme Court set aside the interim order dated 18 July 2025 passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand in Special Appeal No. 192 of 2025. The writ appeal was dismissed, and the appellant’s election as Zila Panchayat Member remained undisturbed. The civil appeal was allowed. Pending applications stood disposed of.

Where the Code of Civil Procedure provides a specific remedy, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court cannot exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. Article 227 jurisdiction is exceptional, supervisory and not to be invoked to bypass or supplant statutory remedies. The existence of alternative remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to such exercise.

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction — Availability of Specific Remedy under CPC — Near Total Bar

(Paras 5 to 9)

Where a specific statutory remedy is available under the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court ought not to invoke its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. The availability of such remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to the exercise of supervisory jurisdiction, except in rare and exceptional cases involving grave miscarriage of justice.

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Article 227 — Scope and Limits — Not an Appellate or Corrective Jurisdiction

(Paras 5.1 to 5.7, 7)

The power of superintendence under Article 227 is supervisory and extraordinary, to be exercised sparingly and with judicial discipline. It is not meant to correct mere errors or to function as an appellate forum. It cannot be exercised as a cloak of appeal in disguise or to supplant statutory remedies expressly provided under the CPC.

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of Plaint — Statutory Grounds — Factual Inquiry Involved

(Paras 6.2 to 6.2.3)

Order VII Rule 11 CPC provides specific and enumerated grounds for rejection of plaint. Determination of such grounds ordinarily involves consideration of factual aspects. Where such statutory mechanism exists, the High Court cannot bypass it by exercising Article 227 jurisdiction to strike off the plaint.

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Order VI Rule 16 CPC — Striking Out Pleadings — Limited Scope — Cannot Be Used to Strike Entire Plaint

(Paras 6.1 to 6.4.1)

Order VI Rule 16 CPC permits striking out unnecessary, scandalous, frivolous, vexatious or abusive pleadings. It does not empower the court to strike down the entire plaint. Rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 is distinct from striking out pleadings under Order VI Rule 16. The latter cannot be invoked to justify striking off the plaint through Article 227.

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Civil Disputes Involving Title — Disputed Questions of Fact — Inappropriate for Article 227 Interference

(Paras 6.3 to 6.3.2)

Title disputes and civil controversies ordinarily involve disputed questions of fact requiring trial and evidence. The High Court ought not to entertain Article 227 petitions in routine civil matters such as property disputes, particularly where factual adjudication is necessary.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellant-plaintiff instituted a suit for permanent injunction before the District Munsif Court, Tambaram, claiming possession and enjoyment of the suit property based on inheritance from his mother, who had allegedly purchased the property through a registered sale deed of 1975.

The defendants disputed the sale transaction, alleging fabrication and fraud, and contended that the certified copy of the sale deed relied upon by the plaintiff pertained to another transaction. They claimed title and possession in themselves.

Instead of filing an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC before the trial court for rejection of plaint, the defendants approached the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution by filing a Civil Revision Petition. The High Court, upon examining the material, recorded findings that the sale deed was forged, that the suit was fraudulent, and that continuation of the suit was unnecessary. Consequently, it struck off the plaint in exercise of its supervisory jurisdiction.

The Supreme Court examined whether such invocation of Article 227 was legally permissible when a specific statutory remedy existed under the CPC.

The Court reiterated settled principles governing Article 227 jurisdiction, drawing support from precedents including:

• Shalini Shyam Shetty v. Rajendra Shankar Patil

• Virudhunagar Hindu Nadargal Dharma Paribalana Sabai v. Tuticorin Educational Society

• Radhey Shyam v. Chhabi Nath

• K. Valarmathi v. Kumaresan

The Court emphasized that Article 227 is not meant to substitute statutory remedies. Order VII Rule 11 CPC provides specific grounds for rejection of plaint, and the defendants ought to have invoked that provision before the trial court.

The Court further clarified that Order VI Rule 16 CPC, which permits striking out pleadings, cannot be stretched to justify striking down the entire plaint. Rejection of plaint and striking out pleadings are conceptually and legally distinct.

Since the dispute involved questions of title and allegations of fraud, factual adjudication through trial was necessary. The High Court, by recording findings of forgery and fraud under Article 227, effectively assumed a role akin to an appellate court, which is impermissible.

The Supreme Court held that availability of alternative remedy under the CPC must be treated as a near total bar against invocation of Article 227 in civil matters governed by the Code.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

Where the Code of Civil Procedure provides a specific remedy, particularly under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of plaint, the High Court cannot exercise its supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution to strike off the plaint. Article 227 jurisdiction is exceptional, supervisory and not to be invoked to bypass or supplant statutory remedies. The existence of alternative remedy under the CPC constitutes a near total bar to such exercise.

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RESULT

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set aside the judgment of the High Court of Madras dated 03.06.2025 striking off the plaint, restored the suit to the file of the trial court, and granted liberty to the defendants to file an application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC to be decided in accordance with law. There was no order as to costs.

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 — Section 3 read with Section 7 — Cement — Decontrol — Absence of Subsisting Control Order — Conviction Unsustainable (Paras 14 to 19, 25) Where statutory price and distribution control over cement stood withdrawn with effect from 01.03.1989 by amendment to the Cement Control Order, 1967, and further delegation of powers to State Governments for regulating retail distribution stood rescinded in 1990, no subsisting order under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 remained in force on 24.03.1994. In the absence of a valid and operative control order, contravention thereof cannot be alleged and penal consequences under Section 7 cannot be attracted. Conviction under Section 3 read with Section 7 without proof of a subsisting statutory order is legally impermissible.

Essential Commodities Act, 1955 — Section 3 read with Section 7 — Cement — Decontrol — Absence of Subsisting Control Order — Conviction Unsustainable

(Paras 14 to 19, 25)

Where statutory price and distribution control over cement stood withdrawn with effect from 01.03.1989 by amendment to the Cement Control Order, 1967, and further delegation of powers to State Governments for regulating retail distribution stood rescinded in 1990, no subsisting order under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955 remained in force on 24.03.1994. In the absence of a valid and operative control order, contravention thereof cannot be alleged and penal consequences under Section 7 cannot be attracted. Conviction under Section 3 read with Section 7 without proof of a subsisting statutory order is legally impermissible.

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Penal Liability under Section 7 — Foundational Requirement — Proof of Existence and Contravention of Statutory Order

(Paras 9, 16, 17, 25)

A conviction under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act necessarily requires proof of the existence of a valid order issued under Section 3 and its contravention. Where prosecution fails to produce or establish any operative control order governing cement on the date of alleged offence, the very foundation of criminal liability collapses.

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Effect of Omission/Deletion of Statutory Provision — Absence of Saving Clause — Pending and Future Proceedings

(Paras 18, 19)

Where a statutory provision is unconditionally omitted without a saving clause preserving pending or future proceedings, actions founded upon such provision cannot continue. Applying the principle laid down in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd. v. Union of India, once the Cement Control regime stood substantially deleted without saving prosecution for future acts, no proceedings could be initiated for acts committed after decontrol.

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Diversion of Government Property — Inapplicability of E.C. Act — Potential IPC Offences

(Paras 21 to 24)

Though regulatory control under the Essential Commodities Act stood rescinded, diversion or dishonest retention of Government-supplied cement may attract penal consequences under appropriate provisions of the Indian Penal Code, subject to proof of ingredients thereof. However, in absence of proper charge and prosecution under IPC, conviction cannot be substituted at the appellate stage.

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Section 222 CrPC — Conviction for Minor Offence — Limits of Appellate Power

(Paras 26, 27)

Though Section 222 of the Code of Criminal Procedure permits conviction for a minor offence where facts so justify, such power must be exercised at trial and cannot be invoked for the first time in appeal to substitute conviction under a distinct penal statute without proper charge or foundational findings.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellants were convicted by the Special Court for offences under Section 3 read with Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, 1955, on the allegation that they unauthorisedly purchased and stored Government quota cement intended for public works and attempted to black-market the same.

The prosecution case was that cement supplied to a contractor for construction of a public works project was diverted and found in premises allegedly connected to the appellants. Upon raid, cement bags were seized from trucks and from a shop. The trial Court convicted the appellants and the High Court affirmed the conviction.

Before the Supreme Court, the principal contention was that as on the date of alleged offence, namely 24.03.1994, cement had already been decontrolled. By notification dated 01.03.1989, the Central Government substantially removed price and distribution control over cement by omitting key provisions of the Cement Control Order, 1967. Further, by notification dated 07.08.1990, delegation of powers to State Governments for regulation of retail distribution through licensing was rescinded.

The Court examined the statutory scheme and found that on the relevant date no operative order under Section 3 of the Essential Commodities Act was in force regulating sale, storage or distribution of cement in a manner attracting penal consequences. The prosecution failed to produce any subsisting control order operative on 24.03.1994.

In criminal law, penal liability under Section 7 is contingent upon contravention of a valid order made under Section 3. In absence of such order, conviction is without statutory foundation.

The Court relied upon the principle laid down in Kolhapur Canesugar Works Ltd., that omission of a statutory provision without a saving clause obliterates the provision and pending or future actions founded thereon cannot survive unless expressly preserved.

While the Court noted that diversion of Government-supplied cement might potentially attract provisions of the Indian Penal Code, it held that such prosecution was neither undertaken nor could be substituted at the appellate stage in the absence of proper charge.

Accordingly, the conviction was set aside.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

For conviction under Section 7 of the Essential Commodities Act, there must exist a valid and operative order under Section 3 whose contravention is established. Where statutory control over a commodity stands withdrawn prior to the date of alleged occurrence, and no saving clause preserves penal liability, prosecution under the Act is legally unsustainable. Penal consequences cannot be imposed in vacuum without subsisting statutory prohibition.

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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court allowed the appeals and set aside the judgments of conviction and sentence passed by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court. Bail bonds were cancelled and fine amounts directed to be refunded. The Court clarified that while prosecution under the Essential Commodities Act was untenable, appropriate IPC provisions might have been attracted had they been properly invoked.

When daily-wage workers are similarly situated to others whose services have been regularized pursuant to judicial orders, denial of identical relief amounts to impermissible discrimination. The decision in Umadevi (3) cannot be mechanically invoked to defeat claims of long-serving employees engaged in posts of perennial nature, especially where their appointments are irregular but not illegal. Parity and equality require extension of the same benefit to all identically placed employees.

Service Law — Casual Workers in Income Tax Department — Regularization — Parity with Similarly Situated Employees — Discrimination Impermissible

(Paras 6 to 8, 10, 11)

Where daily-wage workers of the Income Tax Department, whose names figured in the same seniority list as other similarly situated employees, were denied regularization despite this Court having earlier directed regularization of co-workers from the very same list, such denial amounts to hostile discrimination. Once the benefit of regularization has been granted to identically placed employees pursuant to judicial orders, the employer cannot selectively refuse similar treatment to others similarly situated. The principle of parity and non-discrimination mandates extension of identical relief.

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Regularization — Applicability of Umadevi (3) — Distinction Between “Illegal” and “Irregular” Appointments

(Paras 2, 4, 9, 10)

The Constitution Bench decision in Secretary, State of Karnataka v. Umadevi (3) does not bar regularization in every case of non-permanent engagement. The judgment distinguishes between illegal appointments and irregular appointments. Where employees were engaged through employment exchange sponsorship, interviewed, and have rendered long years of service in posts of perennial nature, their engagement cannot be treated as illegal. Mechanical reliance on the ten-year cut-off in Umadevi (3), without examining factual parity and the nature of work performed, amounts to misapplication of the law.

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Service Jurisprudence — Perennial Nature of Work — Outsourcing — Indicator of Continuing Need

(Para 9)

Where duties performed by casual workers are subsequently outsourced, such outsourcing demonstrates that the work is perennial and essential to the functioning of the department. Replacement of one set of workers by contractual labour does not negate the existence of regular, continuing functions. Courts must examine the substance of employment rather than the nomenclature.

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Precedent — Binding Effect of Earlier Directions for Regularization — Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar

(Paras 6 to 8, 11)

In Ravi Verma v. Union of India, this Court directed regularization of daily-wage workers in the Income Tax Department whose names appeared in the same departmental list. Subsequently, in Raman Kumar v. Union of India, identical relief was granted on the ground of parity. Employees forming part of the same list and similarly situated cannot be denied relief once such judicial directions attain finality.

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Interpretation of Umadevi (3) — Clarification in Jaggo — Human and Equitable Approach

(Para 9)

The subsequent decision in Jaggo v. Union of India clarifies that Umadevi (3) cannot be weaponized to defeat legitimate claims of long-serving employees performing indispensable duties. Courts must adopt a humane and equitable approach where appointments are not illegal and the service rendered is continuous and unblemished.

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS AND LAW

The appellants were casual workers engaged in the Office of the Commissioner of Income Tax, Gwalior, from the early 1990s and late 1990s. Their names were sponsored through the Employment Exchange, and they were engaged after interview as daily-wage workers on posts such as Sweeper and Cook. They continued in service for considerable periods.

Their request for regularization was rejected by the Central Administrative Tribunal on the ground that they did not fulfil the requirement of ten years’ continuous service as on 10.04.2006, as contemplated in Umadevi (3). The High Court affirmed that decision.

Before the Supreme Court, the appellants demonstrated that their names appeared in the same departmental list dated 31.10.2005 (and subsequent lists) alongside other daily-wage workers whose services had already been regularized pursuant to the judgment in Ravi Verma. The Court noted that five workers from that very list had secured regularization from 01.07.2006 by virtue of judicial directions.

The Court further observed that in Raman Kumar, regularization was extended to similarly situated employees, and the principle of parity was applied to prevent discrimination.

In addition, reliance was placed on Jaggo, wherein this Court clarified that Umadevi (3) must not be misapplied to deny regularization where appointments are irregular rather than illegal and where the employees have rendered long years of indispensable service.

The Supreme Court held that the Tribunal had erred in mechanically applying Umadevi (3) without examining parity and the factual matrix. The High Court compounded the error by affirming that approach.

Since the appellants were similarly situated as those in Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar, and since the department could not discriminate between workers drawn from the same list, the denial of regularization was unsustainable.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

When daily-wage workers are similarly situated to others whose services have been regularized pursuant to judicial orders, denial of identical relief amounts to impermissible discrimination. The decision in Umadevi (3) cannot be mechanically invoked to defeat claims of long-serving employees engaged in posts of perennial nature, especially where their appointments are irregular but not illegal. Parity and equality require extension of the same benefit to all identically placed employees.

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CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court set aside the judgment of the High Court and directed regularization of the appellants’ services with effect from 01.07.2006 on the same terms as granted in Ravi Verma and Raman Kumar. Consequential benefits were directed to be released within three months. The appeal was allowed without costs.