Section 151 — Police aid — Enforcement of ad interim injunction Held, where an ad interim injunction is in force and the plaintiff seeks police aid for its enforcement, the Civil Court is competent, in appropriate cases, to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to direct police authorities to render aid for due and proper implementation of the injunction order. (Para 3)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 151 — Police aid — Enforcement of ad interim injunction

Held, where an ad interim injunction is in force and the plaintiff seeks police aid for its enforcement, the Civil Court is competent, in appropriate cases, to invoke its inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to direct police authorities to render aid for due and proper implementation of the injunction order.
(Para 3)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Inherent powers — Implementation of injunction orders

Held, though the Code provides for grant of injunction and punishment for disobedience, there is no specific provision dealing with implementation of injunction orders; in such circumstances, Section 151 CPC can be invoked to render complete justice and undo the wrong caused by disobedience of court orders.
(Para 3)

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Civil Revision — Article 227 of the Constitution — Non-disposal of interlocutory application — Urgency

Held, where an application seeking police aid for enforcement of injunction is pending before the trial Court and the relief is time-sensitive, the High Court, in exercise of supervisory jurisdiction under Article 227, may direct the trial Court to expeditiously dispose of the application within a fixed time.
(Paras 2, 4–5)

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Interlocutory Applications — Ad interim injunction — Agricultural crop — Time-bound relief

Held, when delay in deciding an application may render the relief ineffective, particularly where agricultural crops are ripe for harvesting, the trial Court is required to decide the application without further delay.
(Paras 2, 4–5)

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II. ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The revision petitioner is the plaintiff in O.S.No.117 of 2025 on the file of the Additional Civil Judge (Senior Division), Anantapuramu.

2. An ad interim injunction was granted in favour of the petitioner on 13.08.2025.

3. Alleging obstruction in harvesting the red gram crop despite the injunction, the petitioner filed I.A.No.438 of 2025 in I.A.No.241 of 2025 seeking police aid for enforcement of the injunction.

4. The grievance before the High Court was that no order was passed on the said application and the matter was adjourned to 23.01.2026, by which time the relief would become ineffective as the crop was ripe for harvesting.

5. Aggrieved by inaction of the trial Court, the petitioner approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by filing the present Civil Revision Petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India.

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III. ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The learned Judge took note of the legal position laid down by the Madras High Court in S. Kalimuthu v. S. Arumugam, which in turn relied upon Division Bench authority recognising the power of civil courts to grant police aid under Section 151 CPC.

2. The judgment extracted in extenso explains:

   • the three stages of injunction proceedings, namely grant, implementation, and punishment for disobedience;

   • absence of a specific provision in the Code for implementation of injunction orders; and

   • availability of inherent powers under Section 151 CPC to ensure enforcement.

3. The Court, however, refrained from granting police aid directly, observing that:

   • the interlocutory application was still pending before the trial Court;

   • the trial Court has the advantage of hearing both parties; and

   • a decision on merits was yet to be taken.

4. Considering the urgency pleaded and the fact that delay would defeat the relief, the Court exercised supervisory jurisdiction to ensure expeditious disposal by the trial Court.

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IV. RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Civil Courts have inherent power under Section 151 CPC to direct police aid for enforcement of injunction orders where no specific procedural provision exists for implementation.

2. When an application seeking police aid for enforcement of an ad interim injunction is pending and the relief is time-sensitive, the High Court, under Article 227 of the Constitution, can direct the trial Court to decide the application expeditiously.

3. Delay in deciding such interlocutory applications, where agricultural crops are ripe for harvesting, may render the relief ineffective and must be avoided.

Return of plaint — Requirement of reasons — Judicial duty Held, when a plaint is returned after hearing the plaintiff and after representation complying with objections, the Court is bound to assign reasons for rejecting the explanation; a mere endorsement such as “Heard. Returned.” without reasons is unsustainable in law. (Paras 9–11)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Plaint — Return of plaint — Requirement of reasons — Judicial duty

Held, when a plaint is returned after hearing the plaintiff and after representation complying with objections, the Court is bound to assign reasons for rejecting the explanation; a mere endorsement such as “Heard. Returned.” without reasons is unsustainable in law.
(Paras 9–11)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII — Return of plaint — Endorsement — Validity

Held, where no separate order is passed and the endorsement on the plaint does not indicate that reasons are contained in a separate speaking order, the return of plaint is vitiated for want of reasons.
(Paras 10–11)

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Judicial Orders — Reasoned order — Necessity

Held, judicial discipline requires that reasons must be assigned, at least briefly, while returning a plaint, especially after hearing the plaintiff on maintainability; absence of reasons renders the order arbitrary and liable to be set aside.
(Paras 9–12)

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Civil Revision — Scope — Procedural illegality

Held, a Civil Revision Petition is maintainable where the grievance is confined to procedural illegality in returning the plaint without a reasoned order, without entering into the merits of the suit.
(Paras 6, 11–12)

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II. ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The petitioner presented a plaint on 28.11.2025 before the Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Tirupati, seeking declaratory and other reliefs against the respondent.

2. On 28.11.2025, the plaint was returned with the endorsement:

   “How the suit is maintainable should be explained for the declaration.”

3. The petitioner represented the plaint on 01.12.2025, furnishing an explanation justifying the maintainability of the suit.

4. Despite such representation, the plaint was again returned on 01.12.2025, and thereafter represented on 02.12.2025 with a request to hear the matter on Bench.

5. The learned Principal Civil Judge (Junior Division), Tirupati, heard the matter, but on 18.12.2025, returned the plaint with a cryptic endorsement:

   “Heard. Returned.”

6. No separate speaking order was passed, nor was the endorsement indicative of reasons being recorded elsewhere.

7. Aggrieved by the said endorsement, the petitioner approached the High Court of Andhra Pradesh by way of the present Civil Revision Petition.

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III. ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The High Court confined its examination strictly to the procedural legality of the return of the plaint and consciously refrained from entering into the merits of the suit or the question of maintainability.

2. The Court noted from the record that:

   • the petitioner had complied with the objections,

   • explanation regarding maintainability was submitted, and

   • the matter was heard on Bench at the request of the petitioner.

3. Despite the above, the impugned endorsement dated 18.12.2025 did not disclose:

   • why the explanation offered by the petitioner was unacceptable, or

   • whether any reasons were recorded in a separate order.

4. The Court emphasised that assignment of reasons is an essential attribute of a judicial order, particularly when the Court exercises discretion to return a plaint after hearing the party.

5. The absence of reasons rendered the endorsement bereft of reasoning and legally unsustainable, warranting interference in revision.

6. Consequently, the endorsement was set aside and the Trial Court was directed to pass a reasoned order within a stipulated time.

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IV. RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A plaint, once represented with an explanation and heard by the Court, cannot be returned by a cryptic endorsement without assigning reasons; such return is unsustainable in law.

2. When no separate speaking order exists, and the endorsement on the plaint does not disclose reasons, the return of the plaint is vitiated for arbitrariness.

3. Failure to assign reasons while returning a plaint constitutes procedural illegality justifying interference under the revisional jurisdiction.

A plea of non-service of summons cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay when the record shows appearance through counsel, filing of vakalat, grant of time to file written statement, and setting of defendants ex parte for non-appearance. Suppression of material facts and filing of a false affidavit with intent to mislead the Court amounts to abuse of the process of Court and disentitles the litigant to discretionary relief. Inordinate delay unsupported by bona fide explanation must result in rejection of condonation application and dismissal of appeal as barred by limitation. Courts are justified in imposing exemplary costs where judicial process is abused through misstatements and suppression of facts.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Section 5, Limitation Act — Condonation of delay — False plea of non-service — Suppression of material facts

Held, where defendants had entered appearance through counsel, filed vakalat, were granted statutory time to file written statement, and were set ex parte for non-appearance, a plea in appeal affidavit that no summons were served and that the defendants had no knowledge of the suit proceedings is false and contrary to record and does not constitute “sufficient cause” for condonation of inordinate delay.
(Paras 8–11)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Appeal barred by limitation — Delay of 950 days — Dismissal

Held, in the absence of sufficient cause and in view of incorrect and misleading averments made in the affidavit filed in support of condonation of delay, the application for condonation of delay of 950 days and the appeal itself are liable to be dismissed as barred by limitation.
(Paras 11–12)

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Practice and Procedure — Affidavit — Duty of candour — Suppression of material facts

Held, a litigant approaching the Court is under a solemn obligation to candidly disclose all material facts; suppression of facts or misstatement with intent to mislead the Court amounts to abuse of process and disentitles such party to any discretionary relief.
(Paras 5–7, 9)

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Judicial Process — Abuse of process — Filing false affidavit — Consequences

Held, filing an affidavit containing incorrect facts, suppressing material circumstances, and setting up a false plea of non-service of summons constitutes abuse of the process of Court, warranting imposition of exemplary costs.
(Paras 5–10)

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Costs — Exemplary costs — Imposition

Held, in view of abuse of process and attempt to mislead the Court, costs of ₹50,000/- were imposed on the appellants, payable to the Andhra Pradesh State High Court Legal Services Committee.
(Paras 10, 16)

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Advocates — Duty of care — Verification of instructions

Observed, though no action was taken against counsel, an advocate is expected to exercise due care, diligence, and verification of facts, particularly where the trial court record itself reflects service of summons and appearance of defendants.
(Paras 11–13)

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II. ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The respondent filed O.S.No.11 of 2018 for recovery of money, which was decreed ex parte on 11.04.2022.

2. The appellants/defendants filed A.S.No.223 of 2025 with a delay of 950 days, accompanied by I.A.No.1 of 2025 seeking condonation of delay.

3. In the affidavit supporting condonation, the appellants pleaded that:

   • no summons were served,

   • they had no knowledge of the suit,

   • they came to know of the decree only through execution proceedings in Kerala.

4. The High Court called for a factual report from the trial court regarding service of summons.

5. The report of the V Additional District Judge, Rajamahendravaram revealed that:

   • summons were issued,

   • vakalat was filed by advocates on behalf of defendants,

   • statutory time was granted for filing written statement,

   • defendants failed to file written statement and were set ex parte on 16.04.2019.

6. The Court found that the affidavit filed in support of condonation contained incorrect statements and suppressed material facts.

7. Even after opportunity, the explanation offered by the appellants through a subsequent affidavit was found unsatisfactory and an afterthought.

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III. ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Court reaffirmed that condonation of delay is a discretionary relief, dependent on bona fides and sufficiency of cause.

2. A plea of non-service of summons, when directly contradicted by the trial court record showing appearance and vakalat, is factually false and legally untenable.

3. Relying on authoritative pronouncements, the Court reiterated that:

   • litigants must approach the Court with clean hands,

   • suppression of material facts pollutes the stream of justice,

   • courts have not only the power but the duty to deny relief in such cases.

4. The Court further emphasised the ethical standards expected of advocates, observing that while the counsel was not proceeded against, verification of facts was expected in light of the trial court record.

5. In order to preserve the sanctity of judicial proceedings and deter abuse, the Court imposed exemplary costs.

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IV. RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A plea of non-service of summons cannot constitute sufficient cause for condonation of delay when the record shows appearance through counsel, filing of vakalat, grant of time to file written statement, and setting of defendants ex parte for non-appearance.

2. Suppression of material facts and filing of a false affidavit with intent to mislead the Court amounts to abuse of the process of Court and disentitles the litigant to discretionary relief.

3. Inordinate delay unsupported by bona fide explanation must result in rejection of condonation application and dismissal of appeal as barred by limitation.

4. Courts are justified in imposing exemplary costs where judicial process is abused through misstatements and suppression of facts.

Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Stage of registration — Limitation — Scope Held, rejection of a plaint at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation is impermissible where the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, and where limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence. (Paras 25, 31–33, 46) Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 58 and 65 — Suit for declaration and recovery of possession — Governing article Held, where a suit seeks declaration of title with the further relief of recovery of possession based on title, the relief of declaration is ancillary and limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, i.e., 12 years from the date when possession becomes adverse, and not Article 58 alone. (Paras 18–19, 46)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Rejection of plaint — Stage of registration — Limitation — Scope

Held, rejection of a plaint at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground that the suit is barred by limitation is impermissible where the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, and where limitation is a mixed question of law and fact requiring evidence.
(Paras 25, 31–33, 46)

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Limitation Act, 1963 — Articles 58 and 65 — Suit for declaration and recovery of possession — Governing article

Held, where a suit seeks declaration of title with the further relief of recovery of possession based on title, the relief of declaration is ancillary and limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Schedule to the Limitation Act, i.e., 12 years from the date when possession becomes adverse, and not Article 58 alone.
(Paras 18–19, 46)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VII Rule 11 — Meaningful reading of plaint — Defence irrelevant

Held, while considering rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC, the court must confine itself to the averments in the plaint alone, read the plaint as a whole, and cannot rely on defence material, previous judgments, or inferences of knowledge merely from registration of documents.
(Paras 20–21, 33)

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Registration Act, 1908 — Effect of registration — Knowledge — Presumption

Held, registration of a document may amount to notice to the world, but such presumption is rebuttable; where the plaint specifically pleads a later date of knowledge, such plea cannot be rejected at the threshold without trial.
(Paras 26, 31–32)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order II Rule 2 — Bar of subsequent suit — Stage of consideration

Held, whether a subsequent suit is barred under Order II Rule 2 CPC, or by res judicata, or for want of cause of action, involves mixed questions of law and fact and cannot be decided at the stage of registration or under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
(Paras 37–38)

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Andhra Pradesh Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 — Sections 63 & 64 — Refund of court fee

Held, where rejection of plaint is set aside and the plaint is directed to be received and registered, the appellants are entitled to refund of the entire court fee paid on the memorandum of appeal under Section 64 of the Act, 1956.
(Paras 39–45, 46)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The appellants instituted a comprehensive civil suit seeking:

   • declaration of title,

   • declaration that multiple registered sale deeds and GPA transactions are null and void and not binding, and

   • consequential recovery of possession and permanent injunctions.

2. At the stage of registration, the office of the II Additional District Judge, Vijayawada, raised an objection as to limitation.

3. The plaintiffs explained in their representation that:

   • limitation is a mixed question of law and fact,

   • the suit is one for declaration with recovery of possession, and

   • the cause of action and date of knowledge were specifically pleaded.

4. By order dated 06.05.2025, the trial court rejected the plaint, holding that:

   • registration of documents amounts to notice to the world,

   • the plaintiffs had knowledge long prior, and

   • the suit was barred by limitation and without cause of action, also relying on dismissal of an earlier suit O.S.No.372 of 2015.

5. The plaintiffs preferred A.S.No.409 of 2025 before the High Court of Andhra Pradesh, challenging the rejection of plaint.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench examined the scope of Order VII Rule 11 CPC, reiterating that:

   • only the plaint averments are relevant,

   • defence material, previous judgments, or presumptions cannot be imported, and

   • the plaint must be read as a whole with a meaningful reading.
     (Paras 20, 33)

2. Relying on N. Thajudeen v. Tamil Nadu Khadi and Village Industries Board, the Court held that:

   • suits for declaration with recovery of possession are governed by Article 65,

   • limitation runs from the date possession becomes adverse, and

   • such determination necessarily requires evidence.
     (Paras 18–19)

3. The Court distinguished cases where limitation could be inferred on the face of the plaint (e.g., long-concluded partitions with admitted knowledge), holding that those facts were absent here.
   (Paras 27–28)

4. The Court categorically held that:

   • mere registration does not conclusively establish knowledge, and

   • where the plaint pleads a specific later date of knowledge, limitation cannot be decided at the threshold.
     (Paras 31–32)

5. On the issue of the earlier suit O.S.No.372 of 2015, the Court held that:

   • questions of Order II Rule 2 CPC, res judicata, omission of reliefs, or intentional relinquishment require trial, and

   • cannot form the basis for rejection of plaint under Order VII Rule 11 CPC.
     (Paras 35–38)

6. On refund of court fee, applying Sections 63 and 64 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956, the Court directed full refund, as the rejection of plaint was set aside.
   (Paras 39–46)

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A plaint seeking declaration of title with consequential recovery of possession cannot be rejected at the stage of registration under Order VII Rule 11 CPC on the ground of limitation when the plaint contains specific averments regarding cause of action and date of knowledge, making limitation a mixed question of law and fact.

2. In suits combining declaration and recovery of possession based on title, limitation is governed by Article 65 of the Limitation Act, and not solely by Article 58.

3. Presumption of knowledge arising from registration of documents is rebuttable and cannot, by itself, justify rejection of plaint without trial.

4. Bars under Order II Rule 2 CPC or res judicata involve factual determination and cannot be decided at the stage of plaint registration.

5. When rejection of plaint is set aside and the plaint is directed to be received, full refund of court fee paid in appeal is mandatory under Section 64 of the A.P. Court Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956.

O.21 R.58 — Execution — Claim petition — Unregistered non-possessory agreement — Agreement subsequent to decree — Right to resist execution Held, an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of the decree, even coupled with alleged part-payments, does not confer any right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property so as to enable the claim petitioner to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC. (Paras 10–14)

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.21 R.58 — Execution — Claim petition — Unregistered non-possessory agreement — Agreement subsequent to decree — Right to resist execution

Held, an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of the decree, even coupled with alleged part-payments, does not confer any right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property so as to enable the claim petitioner to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.
(Paras 10–14)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — O.21 R.58 — Claim petition — Prima facie right, title or interest — Requirement

Held, in the absence of any prima facie right, title or interest in the subject matter, a claim petition under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC is not maintainable, and such an application can be rejected at the threshold without numbering.
(Paras 12–13)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Execution proceedings — Plea of collusive decree — Who can raise

Held, a third party, claiming under an unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the decree, has no locus to allege collusion between the decree holder and the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.
(Paras 8, 11–14)

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Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Appeal under S.96 — Interference with order in execution

Held, where the Execution Court has rightly rejected a claim petition founded on an unregistered agreement of sale subsequent to the decree, no illegality or infirmity is made out warranting interference in appeal under Section 96 CPC.
(Paras 13–16)

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ANALYSIS OF FACTS

1. The 1st respondent was the plaintiff and decree holder in O.S.No.42 of 2021, instituted on 12.03.2021 for recovery of money based on two promissory notes. The suit was decreed on 23.07.2022.

2. The decree holder initiated execution by filing E.P.No.44 of 2023.

3. The present appellant, as a claim petitioner, filed an unnumbered E.A. under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC, contending that he had entered into an unregistered non-possessory agreement dated 03.10.2022 with the judgment debtor for the E.P. schedule property, and had allegedly paid amounts after the decree.

4. The appellant further alleged that the decree was collusive between the decree holder and the judgment debtor.

5. The Execution Court rejected the claim petition by order dated 14.08.2025, holding that:

   • the agreement relied upon was unregistered,

   • it was subsequent to the decree, and

   • no right could be claimed on such basis to obstruct execution.

6. Aggrieved thereby, the claim petitioner preferred A.S.No.500 of 2025 under Section 96 CPC.

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ANALYSIS OF LAW

1. The Division Bench of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh framed the central point for determination as to whether the appellant had any prima facie right, title or interest in the E.P. schedule property to resist execution, based on an unregistered non-possessory agreement dated 03.10.2022, executed after the decree.
   (Para 8)

2. The Court noted the chronology of events, emphasizing that:

   • the suit was instituted on 12.03.2021,

   • the decree was passed on 23.07.2022, and

   • the agreement relied upon by the appellant was executed on 03.10.2022, i.e., after the decree, and even the alleged payments were subsequent thereto.
     (Para 10)

3. The Court held that such an unregistered non-possessory agreement does not confer any right, title or interest in the property, even prima facie, so as to resist execution proceedings.
   (Paras 11–12)

4. The Court rejected the contention that the Execution Court ought to have registered the claim petition, holding that no numbering was required when, on the face of it, the claim was untenable.
   (Para 13)

5. The plea of collusive decree was also held to be unsustainable at the instance of a third party whose claim itself was founded on a post-decree, unregistered agreement.
   (Paras 8, 11–14)

6. Finding no illegality or perversity in the order of the Execution Court, the Division Bench dismissed the appeal.

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RATIO DECIDENDI

1. An unregistered non-possessory agreement of sale executed after the passing of a decree does not confer any right, title or interest in the property so as to enable a third party to resist execution under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC.

2. A claim petition under Order XXI Rule 58 CPC, lacking any prima facie right or interest in the subject property, can be rejected at the threshold without being numbered.

3. A third party claiming under a post-decree unregistered agreement has no locus to allege collusion between the decree holder and the judgment debtor in execution proceedings.

4. Orders of the Execution Court rejecting such untenable claims do not warrant interference in appeal under Section 96 CPC.