Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection. [Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

 

Comparative Advertising — Disparagement — Generic disparagement

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Calling an entire class of rival products “dhoka / deception” amounts to generic disparagement — Even without naming a specific competitor, denigration of a product category is impermissible — Market leader within the disparaged class is entitled to protection.
[Paras 24.9–24.16, 28–29, 35–39]

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Commercial Speech — Limits of Article 19(1)(a)

Commercial advertising is protected speech, but protection does not extend to false, misleading, unfair or deceptive representations — Freedom of speech does not include the right to disparage or defame competitors.
[Paras 25.2–25.5, 30–33]

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Puffery vs Disparagement — Legal distinction

Exaggeration of one’s own product is permissible — Attributing inferiority, deception, fraud or lack of efficacy to rival products crosses from puffery into disparagement — The distinction between “my product is better” and “others are bad/deceptive” must be maintained.
[Paras 24.13–24.17, 29–33]

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Generic Disparagement — Identification not necessary

Disparagement of a class or genre of products, without specifically identifying a competitor, is actionable — Clever advertising cannot escape liability merely by avoiding brand names.
[Paras 24.14–24.16, 39]

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Medicinal / Ayurvedic Products — Statutory compliance

Where a product is manufactured in accordance with authoritative texts recognised under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act, 1940, it cannot be portrayed as deceptive — Calling such products “dhoka” is ex-facie false and misleading.
[Paras 24.2, 24.9–24.12, 34–37]

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Endorsements — Influence of spokesperson

Impact of an advertisement must be assessed considering the stature and influence of the endorser — Statements made by a person projected as an expert are likely to be taken as statements of fact by consumers.
[Paras 38, 35–36]

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Interim Injunction — Balance of convenience — Irreparable harm

Where a prima facie case of disparagement is made out, balance of convenience lies in restraining the offending advertisement — Continuing broadcast would cause irreparable harm to goodwill and reputation.
[Paras 40–41]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Generic Disparagement as an Independent Wrong

The Court reiterates settled law that generic disparagement is as actionable as specific disparagement. Denigrating an entire category of goods necessarily harms competitors within that category, especially the market leader. The absence of brand reference is not decisive (Paras 24.14–24.16, 39).

B. Commercial Speech and Constitutional Limits

While acknowledging that advertising is protected under Article 19(1)(a), the Court emphasises that:

• Falsehoods, deception and denigration fall outside constitutional protection.

• Article 19(2) permits reasonable restrictions where public interest and fair competition are affected (Paras 25.2–25.5, 30).

C. Puffery Distinguished from Disparagement

The judgment carefully delineates the boundary:

• Permissible: claiming superiority, highlighting additional features.

• Impermissible: stating or implying that rival products deceive consumers or lack efficacy.
  The use of the word “dhoka” is held to cross this boundary (Paras 24.13, 29–33).

D. Statutory Context — Ayurvedic Medicines

A crucial legal finding is that all Chyawanprash manufactured as per recognised Ayurvedic texts and licensed under the Drugs and Cosmetics Act are statutorily valid medicines. Branding such products as deceptive undermines the statutory framework itself (Paras 34–37).

E. Role of the Average Consumer

The test applied is that of an ordinary reasonable consumer with imperfect recollection. From such a perspective, the impugned advertisement conveys that all non-defendant Chyawanprash are fake or ineffective, which is misleading (Paras 35–36).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Dabur India Limited is the market leader in Chyawanprash with over 61% market share (Paras 24.1–24.4).

• Defendants Patanjali Ayurved Limited and Patanjali Foods Limited released the impugned advertisement in October 2025 (Paras 24.5–24.7).

• Advertisement repeatedly used the word “dhoka” to describe Chyawanprash other than defendants’ product (Paras 24.6–24.13).

• Prior Division Bench order had permitted comparison with “ordinary Chyawanprash” provided it did not deride or refer to the plaintiff’s product (Para 24.8).

• Court found the impugned advertisement contrary to that liberty and prima facie disparaging (Paras 28–39).

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IV. OPERATIVE DIRECTIONS / RESULT

• Ad-interim injunction granted.

• Defendants restrained from issuing, broadcasting or disseminating the impugned advertisement or any advertisement referring to Chyawanprash as “dhoka / deceptive”.

• Defendants directed to take down / disable the advertisement from all media platforms within 72 hours.

• Replies and rejoinders directed; matter listed for further hearing.
  [Paras 42–44]

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Ratio (Concise)

Generic denigration of an entire class of products as deceptive, even without naming a competitor, constitutes actionable disparagement; commercial speech does not protect false or misleading attacks on rival goods, particularly in the case of medicinal products.

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts. [Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

 

Defamation — Internet publication — Hyperlinking

Whether hyperlinking amounts to republication

Hyperlinking to an allegedly defamatory article does not ipso facto amount to republication — Hyperlink is content-neutral and only provides a reference unless the manner of hyperlinking itself conveys, endorses, or adopts the defamatory content — Each case must be examined on facts.
[Paras 2, 35–36, 66–70]

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Defamation — Republication — Fresh cause of action

Article 75, Limitation Act, 1963

Every republication of a libel constitutes a fresh libel and gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Limitation of one year runs from the date of each republication — However, mere continued online availability is not republication.
[Paras 49–58]

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Hyperlinking — Distinction between reference and publication

A hyperlink by itself does not communicate the defamatory content — It requires an independent act of the reader to access the content — Hyperlinking is akin to a reference or footnote, unless accompanied by contextual endorsement.
[Paras 69–70]

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Order VII Rule 11 CPC — Rejection of plaint

Cause of action — Limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC

Plaint cannot be rejected under Order VII Rule 11 CPC when hyperlinking and repeated references give rise to a triable issue on republication and limitation — Order II Rule 2 CPC does not apply to continuing or recurring causes of action.
[Paras 36–41, 59–65]

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Defamation — Online publication — Continuing tort

Defamation through repeated acts of publication or republication constitutes a continuing tort — Each fresh act gives rise to a fresh cause of action under Section 22 of the Limitation Act.
[Paras 52–55, 58, 63]

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Interim injunction — Defamation — Media reporting

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Pre-trial injunction in defamation suits must be granted sparingly — Where defence of truth, fair comment, and public interest is raised and requires evidence, injunction cannot be granted mechanically.
[Paras 25–33, 34]

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Freedom of speech vs right to reputation

Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21

Right to reputation is an intrinsic facet of Article 21 — At the same time, investigative journalism and source protection are integral to Article 19(1)(a) — Courts must balance both at the interim stage.
[Paras 3, 30–33]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Concept of Publication in Defamation

The Court reiterates that publication is the sine qua non of defamation. Publication means communication of the defamatory matter to at least one person other than the plaintiff. Mere existence of content on the internet is insufficient unless there is an act of communication or republication (Paras 44–48).

B. Republication and Limitation

Relying on common-law principles and Indian precedent, the Court holds:

• Every republication is a fresh libel.

• Limitation under Article 75 runs from the date of such republication.

• Section 22 of the Limitation Act applies to continuing torts (Paras 49–58).

However, the Court draws a clear distinction between:

• Republication, and

• Passive continued availability of content online.

C. Hyperlinking — Jurisprudential Clarification

This judgment is a landmark exposition on hyperlinking in Indian defamation law. The Court holds:

• A hyperlink does not reproduce content.

• It merely points to where content exists.

• Hyperlinking becomes actionable only if it conveys endorsement, adoption, or contextual defamatory meaning (Paras 66–70).

The Court draws persuasive guidance from comparative jurisprudence (including Canadian law) while grounding its conclusion in Indian constitutional principles.

D. Order II Rule 2 CPC and Continuing Cause

The Court exhaustively analyses Order II Rule 2 CPC and reiterates that:

• It applies only when the cause of action is identical.

• In cases of continuous or recurring causes of action, the bar does not operate.

• Hyperlink-based republication, if established, creates distinct causes of action (Paras 59–65).

E. Interim Injunction in Defamation

Applying the principles of Bonnard v. Perryman and Indian precedent, the Court holds that:

• Pre-trial injunctions in defamation are exceptional.

• Where defendants raise plausible defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest, the matter must ordinarily proceed to trial (Paras 25–33).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• Plaintiffs are founders and entities associated with OFB Tech Private Limited and Oxyzo Financial Services Ltd., claiming high reputation and valuation (Paras 4–5).

• Defendant Slowform Media Pvt. Ltd. publishes The Morning Context (Para 6).

• Allegedly defamatory article was first published on 17-05-2023 and later hyperlinked in articles dated 08-11-2023, 29-12-2023, and 07-10-2024 (Paras 7–8, 14).

• Earlier suit concerning a different article dated 07-10-2024 was pending (Paras 9–14).

• Defendants raised objections of limitation and Order II Rule 2 CPC (Paras 16–17).

• Plaintiffs asserted fresh cause of action due to hyperlinking (Paras 18–22).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC dismissed — plaint discloses triable issues on republication and limitation.

• Hyperlinking does not automatically amount to republication; issue requires factual examination.

• Interim injunction declined at this stage — defences of truth, fair comment, and public interest require trial.

• Both applications directed to proceed in accordance with law.
  [Paras 64–65 and concluding directions]

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Ratio (Succinct)

Hyperlinking to allegedly defamatory content does not per se constitute republication; only when hyperlinking conveys endorsement or defamatory meaning can it give rise to a fresh cause of action, and such determination is fact-dependent.

Defamation — Television broadcast — Continuing tort Repeated telecast of allegedly defamatory programmes constitutes a continuing wrong — Each subsequent broadcast gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Subsequent suit maintainable notwithstanding earlier proceedings on distinct broadcasts. [Paras 26, 28, 30, 31]

 

Defamation — Television broadcast — Continuing tort

Repeated telecast of allegedly defamatory programmes constitutes a continuing wrong — Each subsequent broadcast gives rise to a fresh cause of action — Subsequent suit maintainable notwithstanding earlier proceedings on distinct broadcasts.
[Paras 26, 28, 30, 31]

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Civil Procedure — Suppression of facts — Clean hands doctrine

Litigant approaching Court for discretionary relief is required to disclose all relevant facts — Non-disclosure of prior proceedings, criminal complaints, or interim orders is improper — However, where no interim benefit has accrued, opportunity to amend plaint may be granted in the interest of justice.
[Paras 3–11, 32–33]

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Multiple Suits — Same relief — Distinct cause of action

Reliefs claimed may appear similar, but maintainability depends on sameness of cause of action — Different programmes, different dates, and different factual foundations constitute distinct causes of action — Bar does not operate merely because relief clauses overlap.
[Paras 17–21, 27–30]

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Defamation — Media trial — Presumption of guilt

Broadcasts giving impression that a person has been sentenced or adjudged guilty, when trial is pending, are in bad taste and prima facie defamatory — Failure to obtain version of the affected person aggravates the issue.
[Para 31]

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Election-related broadcasts — Public interest vs reputation

Even under the guise of public interest or political reporting, media cannot pronounce guilt or prejudice pending judicial proceedings — Balance between freedom of speech and right to reputation must be maintained.
[Paras 22, 31]

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Pleadings — Amendment — Opportunity

Where plaint suffers from omission of relevant background facts, Court may permit amendment or fresh filing instead of outright rejection, particularly at pre-summons stage.
[Paras 32–34]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Continuing Tort in Defamation

The Court reiterates the settled principle that defamation by repeated publication is a continuing tort. Each telecast constitutes an independent wrong, giving rise to a fresh cause of action and a fresh period of limitation (Paras 26, 30).

B. Distinction Between Cause of Action and Relief

The judgment draws a clear distinction between:

• Cause of action (facts giving rise to the right to sue), and

• Relief claimed (consequence sought).

Similarity in relief clauses does not bar a subsequent suit if factual substratum differs (Paras 17–21, 28).

C. Suppression of Facts — Not an Automatic Dismissal

While reaffirming the doctrine that a litigant must approach the Court with clean hands, the Court adopts a balanced approach:

• Acknowledges non-disclosure of earlier proceedings and criminal complaint;

• Holds that such facts ought to have been disclosed;

• However, since no interim relief had been granted, dismissal was not automatic.
  Opportunity to amend plaint was considered appropriate (Paras 32–33).

D. Media Trial and Defamation

The Court expresses disapproval of broadcasts which:

• Convey a finding of guilt before trial concludes;

• Fail to obtain the version of the affected person;

• Create prejudice in the public mind.

Such conduct is prima facie defamatory and legally unsustainable (Para 31).

E. Judicial Restraint at Threshold Stage

The Court consciously refrains from deciding merits of defamation allegations at the admission stage, limiting itself to procedural propriety and maintainability (Paras 16, 26).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiffs Subhash Chandra and Zee Media Corporation Limited alleged repeated defamatory broadcasts by defendant TV channels (Paras 1–2).

• Defendants objected on ground of suppression of:

  • Bombay High Court suit,

  • Criminal complaint,

  • Interim stay order (Paras 3–11, 32).

• Court found Bombay suit related to a different press conference and programme (Paras 27–28).

• Present suit concerned different broadcasts on different dates, some occurring even after the Bombay suit (Paras 28–31).

• No interim injunction had been granted till date (Para 33).

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IV. FINAL DIRECTIONS / RESULT

• Court declined to dismiss the suit at threshold.

• Plaintiffs granted liberty:

  • to amend plaint, or

  • to file a fresh suit incorporating all relevant facts.

• Objections of defendants kept open to be decided on merits.

• Matter directed to be listed before Roster Bench.
  [Paras 33–34]

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Ratio (Concise)

Repeated defamatory broadcasts constitute a continuing tort giving rise to fresh causes of action; non-disclosure of prior proceedings is improper but, absent accrued advantage, may be cured by amendment rather than outright dismissal.

Defamation — Commercial Reputation — Interim Protection Circulation of communications suggesting subsisting injunctions, infringement or legal disability against a business entity, when such issues are sub judice or disputed, may prima facie affect goodwill and reputation and justify interim directions to prevent further damage. [Paras 10–16, 22]

 

Tortious Interference — Business Relations — Injunction

Order XXXIX Rules 1 & 2 CPC

Unlawful interference with contractual and business relations by communicating misleading or incorrect information to clients and potential clients of a competitor can constitute tortious interference warranting interim restraint.
[Paras 2, 10–18, 22]

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Defamation — Commercial Reputation — Interim Protection

Circulation of communications suggesting subsisting injunctions, infringement or legal disability against a business entity, when such issues are sub judice or disputed, may prima facie affect goodwill and reputation and justify interim directions to prevent further damage.
[Paras 10–16, 22]

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Competing Businesses — Limits of Legitimate Competition

While parties are entitled to protect and promote their business interests, they cannot indulge in negative marketing, false propaganda or communications calculated to dislodge an established competitor by inducing fear or uncertainty among its clients.
[Paras 10–18, 21–22]

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Pending Intellectual Property Litigation — Misuse of Court Orders

Court orders passed in one proceeding cannot be selectively or misleadingly projected to third parties to suggest final adjudication or automatic application against entities not expressly bound by such orders.
[Paras 9–14, 20–22]

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Interim Relief — Balancing of Equities

At the interlocutory stage, the Court may mould relief to maintain commercial fairness by restraining parties from conveying personal views and limiting communications strictly to reproduction of court orders.
[Para 22]

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Damages — Proof at Trial

Claim for damages arising out of tortious interference and defamation must be established by evidence during trial; interim stage is confined to preventing further prejudice.
[Para 23]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Tortious Interference in Commercial Context

The Court recognises that direct communications to a rival’s clients, particularly suggesting illegality, injunctions, or infringement, can cross the line from legitimate competition into tortious interference if such communications are misleading or designed to disrupt existing business relationships (Paras 10–18).

B. Defamation of Business Reputation

The order treats commercial goodwill and reputation as protectable interests. Statements implying subsisting court restraints or legal risk, if not accurately stated, are capable of causing reputational harm even without final adjudication on merits (Paras 10–16).

C. Use and Misuse of Pending Litigation

A key legal concern addressed is the misrepresentation of pending court proceedings. The Court cautions against portraying interim or disputed orders as conclusive findings, especially when the scope of such orders vis-à-vis a party is itself contested (Paras 9–14, 20–22).

D. Controlled Interim Remedy

Instead of granting a blanket injunction, the Court adopts a balanced and proportionate approach:

• restraining parties from expressing personal or subjective views;

• permitting only factual communication of court orders;

• directing corrective communication to recipients of earlier letters.

This approach preserves fairness without prejudging merits (Para 22).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS FOUND)

• Plaintiff Perpetuuiti Technosoft Service Pvt. Ltd. alleged loss of business and reputation due to defendants’ communications to its clients (Paras 2–5, 10–18).

• Defendants Sanovi Technologies (India) Pvt. Ltd. relied upon a pending copyright suit and interim orders therein (Paras 7–9, 20).

• Communications to clients such as IBM suggested that injunction orders operated against the plaintiff (Paras 12–14).

• Plaintiff disputed such portrayal and alleged loss of contracts and goodwill (Paras 15–18).

• Issues relating to infringement and impleadment were still pending adjudication (Paras 20–22).

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IV. FINAL DIRECTIONS / OPERATIVE PART

• Parties restrained from communicating personal views to clients or third parties.

• Defendants directed to circulate only copies of court orders to recipients of earlier communications.

• Compliance affidavit directed.

• Claim for damages left open to be proved at trial.

• Application disposed of with protective interim directions.
  [Paras 22–23]

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Ratio (Concise)

In commercial rivalry, dissemination of disputed or misleading legal positions to a competitor’s clients may amount to tortious interference and reputational harm; courts may impose calibrated interim restraints limiting communications strictly to factual court orders pending trial.

Defamation — Slander and Libel — Pleadings Order VI Rules 2 & 4 CPC; Order VII Rule 11 CPC In a suit for defamation, the plaint must specifically plead the exact slanderous or libellous words, the persons to whom they were published, and the time and place of publication — Absence of such pleadings renders the plaint vague and liable to rejection for want of cause of action. [Paras 4, 9–12]

 

Defamation — Slander and Libel — Pleadings

Order VI Rules 2 & 4 CPC; Order VII Rule 11 CPC

In a suit for defamation, the plaint must specifically plead the exact slanderous or libellous words, the persons to whom they were published, and the time and place of publication — Absence of such pleadings renders the plaint vague and liable to rejection for want of cause of action.
[Paras 4, 9–12]

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Defamation — Evidence cannot substitute pleadings

Cause of action for defamation must be disclosed in the plaint itself — Plaint cannot be saved by proposing to disclose defamatory statements later through evidence or witnesses.
[Paras 12, 29]

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Defamation — Corporate plaintiff — Separate legal personality

A company, being a juristic person distinct from its director, cannot claim defamation merely because allegations are made against its director — No cause of action arises to the company unless specific defamatory statements concerning it are pleaded.
[Para 13]

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Employer–Employee Relationship — Disclosure of reasons for termination

Qualified privilege

Communication by an employer to co-employees or prospective employers regarding reasons for termination of an employee, when made bona fide and in discharge of duty, is protected by qualified privilege and does not constitute defamation.
[Paras 18–24, 26–29]

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Defamation — Reference checks by former employer

Honest disclosure by a former employer to a prospective employer regarding the antecedents and reasons for termination of an employee is permissible and in public interest — Such communication is privileged unless actuated by malice.
[Paras 19–27]

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Defamation — Termination for misconduct — Finality

Where termination for misconduct has attained finality and has not been challenged, communication of such fact cannot be treated as defamatory.
[Paras 20–21, 26]

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Limitation — Defamation and breach of contract

Articles 75, 76, 55 & 58, Limitation Act, 1963

Suit for compensation for libel or slander must be filed within one year from publication — Claims for breach of contract and declaration must be filed within three years — Suit filed beyond limitation is barred and not maintainable.
[Paras 30–31]

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Interrogatories — Fishing enquiry

Order XI CPC

Interrogatories cannot be used to conduct a roving or fishing enquiry to discover a cause of action not pleaded in the plaint.
[Paras 4–8]

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II. ANALYSIS OF LAW

A. Mandatory Pleadings in Defamation Suits

The Court reiterates settled law that defamation actions demand strict pleadings. The defamatory words themselves are material facts and must be pleaded with specificity. Without such pleading, the defendant has no opportunity to answer the case, and no issue can arise for trial (Paras 4–12).

B. Evidence vs. Pleadings

The judgment strongly affirms that evidence cannot cure defective pleadings. A plaintiff cannot omit defamatory words from the plaint and attempt to introduce them through witness testimony or documents later (Paras 12, 29).

C. Qualified Privilege in Employment Context

A substantial portion of the judgment is devoted to the doctrine of qualified privilege. The Court holds that:

• Employers owe a duty to other employees and to prospective employers to disclose reasons for termination.

• Such disclosure, if honest and bona fide, is privileged.

• Privilege is defeated only by proof of malice (Paras 18–24).

D. Public Policy Considerations

The Court recognises that reference checks and internal disclosures are essential for professional and commercial integrity. Treating such communications as defamatory would be contrary to public interest and freedom of speech (Paras 19–21).

E. Corporate Plaintiff and Individual Defamation

The Court draws a clear line between an individual and a company. Even if a director is allegedly defamed, the company does not automatically acquire a cause of action (Para 13).

F. Limitation as an Independent Bar

Apart from lack of cause of action, the Court independently holds the suit to be time-barred, both for defamation (one year) and for breach of contract / declaration (three years) (Paras 30–31).

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III. ANALYSIS OF FACTS (AS PER RECORD)

• Plaintiff No.2 was a senior employee terminated for misconduct after disciplinary proceedings (Paras 1, 16).

• Termination order was not challenged and attained finality (Para 20).

• Alleged defamation was based on vague assertions that defendants made negative statements in the industry (Paras 1(xi), 9).

• No defamatory words, publication details, or named recipients were pleaded (Paras 9–12).

• Suit was instituted in January 2013, long after the alleged publications in 2009–2011 (Paras 30–31).

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IV. FINAL HOLDING / RESULT

• Plaint, insofar as it related to defamation, did not disclose any cause of action.

• Claims were barred by limitation.

• Employer communications were held to be privileged.

• Suit and counter-claim both dismissed.

• Defendants bound by prior statement not to defame.
  [Paras 29–34]

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Ratio (Concise)

In defamation suits arising from employment termination, absence of specific pleadings of defamatory words is fatal; bona fide disclosures by an employer to co-employees or prospective employers are protected by qualified privilege, and stale claims are barred by limitation.