Assault / outraging modesty / offences under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — Convictions under Sections 354, 323, 294, 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) SC/ST Act by trial court; appeal dismissed by High Court — Whether prosecution proved offences beyond reasonable doubt — Material contradictions in FIR, depositions and medical evidence; lack of independent / post-occurrence witnesses though many said to be present; hostile witness gave statements favourable to accused which had been ignored by High Court — Medical evidence showed only simple injuries consistent with fall or dragging; no evidence that accused targeted victim because she belonged to Scheduled Caste — Held: Prosecution case suffers from major contradictions and improbabilities; the appellate court should have weighed hostile witness evidence and the inconsistencies; convictions are unsafe and set aside. Appeal allowed; appellants acquitted and discharged.

Criminal law — Trial / Appeal — Assault / outraging modesty / offences under SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities) Act — Convictions under Sections 354, 323, 294, 34 IPC and Section 3(1)(xi) SC/ST Act by trial court; appeal dismissed by High Court — Whether prosecution proved offences beyond reasonable doubt — Material contradictions in FIR, depositions and medical evidence; lack of independent / post-occurrence witnesses though many said to be present; hostile witness gave statements favourable to accused which had been ignored by High Court — Medical evidence showed only simple injuries consistent with fall or dragging; no evidence that accused targeted victim because she belonged to Scheduled Caste — Held: Prosecution case suffers from major contradictions and improbabilities; the appellate court should have weighed hostile witness evidence and the inconsistencies; convictions are unsafe and set aside. Appeal allowed; appellants acquitted and discharged.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Standard of proof and appellate scrutiny: Conviction must rest on evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellate courts must test prosecution testimony for internal consistency, corroboration and probability; they must not ignore material inconsistencies or favourable portions of testimony of hostile witnesses.

2. Material contradictions in versions (FIR v. court deposition): The FIR alleged that both accused were present and that the male accused teased and abused the victim knowing her caste. At trial the victim’s version differed as to whether the second accused accompanied the first or was called by phone. Discrepancies as to how PW-2 (the brother) came to know of the incident (he said he was informed; victim said he ran after hearing her scream) were material and undermined credibility.

3. Absence of independent witnesses despite claimed public presence: PW-2 asserted that many locality persons had seen the incident (Ganesh Puja pandal nearby), yet no independent public witness was produced. The non-production of other witnesses when many were allegedly present is a circumstance militating against prosecution story and weakens reliance on oral testimony of interested witnesses.

4. Medical evidence did not support prosecution’s embellished narrative: Medical officer (PW-5) recorded only simple injuries (scratch marks) on the victim and PW-2; these injuries were consistent with falling or dragging and were simple in nature. The prosecution’s claims of nail-marks, bleeding from nose and mouth, and serious assault were not borne out by the medical report; such divergence is fatal to the prosecution case.

5. Hostile witness whose portions favour defence must be considered: PW-4 turned hostile and deposed to a scuffle at the pandal and that defendants may merely have stepped on feet, provoking an altercation. The High Court erred in disregarding this evidence entirely: portions of a hostile witness’s testimony that are consistent with defence or prosecution deserve close scrutiny and may be accepted in whole or part.

6. Lack of proof of motive under SC/ST Act / statutory ingredients not established: There was no testimony in court that the assault/teasing was committed because the victim belonged to Scheduled Caste; the High Court’s conclusion that offence under SC/ST Act was committed for that reason was perverse and unsupported by the record.

7. Appellate conclusion — acquittal justified: Given the cumulative contradictions, omissions, absence of independent corroboration and medical findings consistent with an alternative hypothesis (scuffle / fall), the convictions were unsafe. The Supreme Court set aside the convictions and sentences of both appellants, ordered their release and discharged them from bail.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Liquidation — Private sale under Regulation 33(2) of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 — Distinction between Reg. 33(2)(c) (private sale at price higher than reserve of failed auction) and Reg. 33(2)(d) (private sale with prior NCLT approval) — Whether sale to appellant constituted a contractual arrangement attracting Section 74, Contract Act — Forfeiture of deposit / payments upon failure to adhere to extended timelines — Power of NCLT under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to impose conditions including forfeiture when extending time — Appellant’s conduct including suppression before High Court — Applicability of approbate–reprobate principle — Held: Sale was under Reg. 33(2)(d), not Reg. 33(2)(c); transaction not a private commercial contract but one supervised by NCLT; forfeiture clause validly imposed under Rule 15; appellant accepted benefits of extension but defaulted; no relief available; Section 74 Contract Act inapplicable. NCLAT majority correctly upheld forfeiture and dismissal of appeals. Appeals under Section 62 IBC dismissed.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 — Liquidation — Private sale under Regulation 33(2) of the Liquidation Process Regulations, 2016 — Distinction between Reg. 33(2)(c) (private sale at price higher than reserve of failed auction) and Reg. 33(2)(d) (private sale with prior NCLT approval) — Whether sale to appellant constituted a contractual arrangement attracting Section 74, Contract Act — Forfeiture of deposit / payments upon failure to adhere to extended timelines — Power of NCLT under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, 2016 to impose conditions including forfeiture when extending time — Appellant’s conduct including suppression before High Court — Applicability of approbate–reprobate principle — Held: Sale was under Reg. 33(2)(d), not Reg. 33(2)(c); transaction not a private commercial contract but one supervised by NCLT; forfeiture clause validly imposed under Rule 15; appellant accepted benefits of extension but defaulted; no relief available; Section 74 Contract Act inapplicable. NCLAT majority correctly upheld forfeiture and dismissal of appeals. Appeals under Section 62 IBC dismissed.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Nature of sale — Regulation 33(2)(d), not 33(2)(c):
   The auction process for Raichur assets had fully failed by July 2021; SCC had shifted to scrap-sale valuation. Therefore, the appellant’s offer of 09.09.2021 was not an offer higher than a reserve price in a failed auction under Reg. 33(2)(c) but a private sale requiring prior NCLT approval under Reg. 33(2)(d). The liquidator correctly approached NCLT, and the approval order dated 22.03.2022 governed the transaction.

2. Sale not a ‘contract’ under the Contract Act:
   When sale occurs under NCLT supervision, pursuant to IBC and Liquidation Regulations, terms of sale emanate from the Adjudicating Authority, not from consensual contractual stipulations. Thus, Section 74 of the Contract Act (liquidated damages/penalty) does not apply. The forfeiture clause was an NCLT-imposed condition, not a term of a commercial bargain.

3. NCLT’s power to impose terms when granting extension:
   Under Rule 15 of the NCLT Rules, NCLT may extend time “upon such terms as justice may require.” Extension granted on 29.06.2022 was accompanied by an explicit forfeiture clause—failure to meet the new deadlines would result in forfeiture of the entire amount paid. NCLT had jurisdiction to impose such condition, especially given the delays and IBC’s time-bound liquidation mandate.

4. Appellant’s own commitments and failure to honour them:
   The appellant’s offer expressly promised to pay the entire balance within 15 days from NCLT approval (i.e., from 22.03.2022). It failed. SCC showed leniency by granting extension till 30.05.2022; NCLT later extended time further but subject to forfeiture. Appellant paid only part amounts (₹1.50 crore thereafter) and failed to comply with extended deadlines. Its default triggered the forfeiture as per the NCLT order.

5. Approbate and reprobate — conduct disentitles relief:
   The appellant accepted the benefit of the extension by making further payments after 29.06.2022, but simultaneously attempted to challenge the very order and its forfeiture condition. A party cannot take advantage of an order and later repudiate the conditions attached to it.

6. Suppression and abuse of process before High Court:
   The appellant filed a writ petition on 05.09.2022 suppressing the fact that an appeal against the 29.06.2022 order had already been filed before NCLAT (on 13.08.2022). This conduct demonstrated lack of bona fides and justified refusal of equitable relief.

7. Stakeholders’ interest and IBC time-sensitivity:
   Delay in liquidation erodes asset value and defeats IBC’s objectives. The Court reiterated Kridhan Infrastructure v. Venkatesan Sankaranarayan (2021): time is essential in IBC proceedings. The forfeiture clause and rejection of further indulgence were justified to ensure timely conclusion of liquidation.

8. Subsequent resale irrelevant to forfeiture question:
   Even though Raichur assets ultimately sold for ₹145.38 crore (higher than appellant’s ₹105.21 crore offer), the financial creditors still suffered haircuts. Forfeiture is assessed vis-à-vis breach of NCLT’s stipulated timelines, not subsequent market appreciation.

9. Final holding:
   NCLAT’s majority correctly dismissed the appellant’s appeals. No jurisdictional or legal error exists in upholding forfeiture. Appeals under Section 62 IBC lie only on questions of law; none were made out. Supreme Court dismissed the appeals.

Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”) vis-à-vis State Rent Control enactments — Whether PP Act (a central statute) overrides State rent control laws in respect of premises which fall within definition of “public premises” under s.2(e) — Whether two-Judge decision in Suhas H. Pophale (2014) drawing a prospective-only application and exempting tenants in occupation prior to 16-9-1958 (or prior to date premises became ‘public premises’) was correct — Held: Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench, 1990) and subsequent three-Judge authority(s) correctly decide law; PP Act is a special enactment whose object and policy demonstrate overriding operation over State Rent Control Acts to the extent premises fall within s.2(e); Suhas H. Pophale is overruled to the extent inconsistent. The PP Act applies to tenancies created either before or after coming into force of PP Act provided (i) the premises fall within s.2(e) and (ii) occupation is unauthorised (including where tenancy is terminated under s.106 T.P. Act). “Occupation” (continuous concept) and not merely “possession” is the relevant test.

Constitutional / Statutory Interpretation — Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (“PP Act”) vis-à-vis State Rent Control enactments — Whether PP Act (a central statute) overrides State rent control laws in respect of premises which fall within definition of “public premises” under s.2(e) — Whether two-Judge decision in Suhas H. Pophale (2014) drawing a prospective-only application and exempting tenants in occupation prior to 16-9-1958 (or prior to date premises became ‘public premises’) was correct — Held: Ashoka Marketing (Constitution Bench, 1990) and subsequent three-Judge authority(s) correctly decide law; PP Act is a special enactment whose object and policy demonstrate overriding operation over State Rent Control Acts to the extent premises fall within s.2(e); Suhas H. Pophale is overruled to the extent inconsistent. The PP Act applies to tenancies created either before or after coming into force of PP Act provided (i) the premises fall within s.2(e) and (ii) occupation is unauthorised (including where tenancy is terminated under s.106 T.P. Act). “Occupation” (continuous concept) and not merely “possession” is the relevant test.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Primary holding: Where premises fall within the definition of “public premises” under Section 2(e) of the PP Act, and occupation of such premises is “unauthorised” within the meaning of Section 2(g) (for example, after termination of tenancy under Section 106, T.P. Act), the statutory machinery of the PP Act applies and will, by reason of its object, policy and later legislative will, override inconsistent provisions of State Rent Control legislation.

2. Status of Suhas H. Pophale (2014): The two-Judge Bench decision in Suhas H. Pophale, insofar as it held that PP Act applies only prospectively (i.e., excluding occupants in possession prior to 16-9-1958 or prior to date premises became public premises), stands in conflict with the Constitution-Bench decision in Ashoka Marketing (1990) and the three-Judge precedent in M/s. Jain Ink. The court holds Suhas H. Pophale incorrect and overrules it to the extent inconsistent.

3. Precedential hierarchy & stare decisis: A Bench of lesser strength cannot override or depart from law laid down by a larger Bench. Where the two-Judge view conflicts with earlier Constitution-Bench / three-Judge authorities on materially similar facts, the larger-Bench jurisprudence prevails.

4. Principles of statutory interpretation applied: Both PP Act and State Rent Control Acts are “special” enactments. When two special statutes overlap, conflict must be resolved by reference to (i) legislative purpose, (ii) policy and object, and (iii) clear intendment of the statutory language. The PP Act — designed to provide a special, speedy regime for eviction from public premises — must be given overriding effect to carry out its purpose.

5. Occupation vs. possession; continuity of occupation: The material inquiry for applicability of PP Act is whether the person was in “occupation” of the public premises when the PP Act was enacted and, later, whether occupation became “unauthorised.” The term “occupation” is continuous in nature and not limited to a discrete moment of entry or “possession.”

6. Two conditions for PP Act to apply: (i) the tenanted premises must fall within the scope of s.2(e) (i.e., belong to or be taken on lease by a Central Government entity or specified companies/corporations), and (ii) the occupation must have become unauthorised (e.g., upon expiry/termination of tenancy, including after issuance of a s.106 T.P. Act notice).

7. Termination of tenancy as a mode of rendering occupation “unauthorised”: Determination of tenancy (e.g., by notice under Section 106 T.P. Act) is one statutory mode which can render continued occupation “unauthorised” and thus attract PP Act eviction procedure.

8. Non-dependence on mere physical possession: Invocation of PP Act does not depend exclusively on the moment of taking physical possession; rather, the test is whether occupation is unauthorised within the statutory definition and the premises are public premises as defined.

9. Practical consequence: Where both statutes arguably cover the same premises, occupants in unauthorised occupation of public premises cannot successfully invoke protections of State Rent Control Acts against eviction under the PP Act; the Estate Officer’s summary machinery under PP Act is available to central/public entities for recovery of possession.

10. Scope preserved: The judgment preserves that the PP Act operates only when both statutory conditions are met and leaves open other remedies where PP Act is inapplicable (e.g., proceedings under Rent Control Act or Small Causes Court where appropriate).

Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Standard for applicability of Exceptions to S.300 IPC (Exceptions 1, 2, 4):
   — Exception 2 (exceeding right of private defence) requires a foundation that the accused or his property was being attacked; mere allegation of quarrel or shouts is insufficient. Where there is no evidence that the deceased attacked or threatened the accused, Exception 2 is inapplicable.
   — Exception 4 (sudden fight) postulates a bilateral exchange of blows — a “fight” — not merely a quarrel or verbal duel. If the assailant is armed and the deceased unarmed, Exception 4 will not ordinarily apply. (Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra followed; Awadhesh Kumar affirmed.)

2. Nature and gravity of injuries decisive:
   — Infliction of multiple knife-blows on vital parts (here four blows cutting common carotid and subclavian arteries) ordinarily establishes that the act would in the ordinary course cause death; such injuries are indicative of lethal intent and/or cruel manner of attack, militating against classification as culpable homicide in sudden fight or mere excess of private defence.

3. Requirement of contemporaneous or proximate provocation for Exception 1:
   — Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) requires that provocation be so grave and sudden as to deprive the accused of self-control. Mere antecedent quarrel or shouting (or general allegation of addiction and shouts) without evidence that provocation was immediate and of such quality is insufficient to attract Exception 1.

4. Procedural and evidentiary posture:
   — Where no defence evidence is led and the accused’s statement under s.313 CrPC contains only denial (no plea of self-defence or that deceased attacked), court cannot conjure missing factual substratum necessary to draw Exceptions to S.300 in favour of accused.

5. Conclusion on sentencing/conviction:
   — In absence of (i) evidence of deceased attacking accused, (ii) bilateral exchange of force, or (iii) grave and sudden provocation, and on the presence of multiple lethal blows to vital parts, benefit of Exceptions 1, 2 or 4 cannot be extended. Conviction under S.302 IPC stands; appeal to reduce offence is rightly dismissed.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.
Wife of deceased claimed to be an eyewitness; however, the earliest version (merg and FIR) narrated by her to informant-father-in-law did not contain the name of the accused; assailants described only as unknown masked persons. Later statements under Sections 161/164 CrPC introduced new facts: mask allegedly fell; identification by voice; three assailants instead of two. These constituted material improvements. FIR omission held fatal, particularly where the witness had narrated every other minute detail. No medical evidence supported prosecution theory that witness was too ill to disclose identity. TIP of accused, admittedly known to eyewitness, held meaningless. Recoveries of blood-stained articles inconclusive, blood group not proved; link evidence not established. Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction set aside; accused acquitted. (Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., applied.)

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A material omission in the FIR regarding identity of assailants, when the FIR is based on the eyewitness’s own narration, is a circumstance directly relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act and fundamentally undermines the credibility of later identifications.
   – Where the eyewitness provided detailed particulars (time, appearance, sequence, actions) but omitted the accused’s name, later assertions of identification are inherently doubtful.

2. Subsequent improvements in police statements—such as new assertions that mask fell off or identification by voice—are material embellishments and cannot form the basis of conviction.
   – Improvements introduced after a delay, without plausible medical or factual justification, are unreliable.

3. Test Identification Parade is meaningless where the witness already knew the accused; holding a TIP after naming the accused in a Section 161 statement casts further doubt on the genuineness of that statement.

4. Recoveries under Section 27 IPC lose probative value when blood detected on the seized weapons/clothes is only identified as “human blood” and not correlated with the deceased, and when link evidence remains unproved.

5. In cases resting solely on eyewitness testimony, courts must subject such testimony to rigorous scrutiny when prior enmity exists; if the foundational version is untrustworthy, the entire prosecution case collapses.

6. Conviction cannot rest on conjectures or cumulative suspicion; failure to prove identity of assailant beyond reasonable doubt mandates acquittal.