Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

Criminal Law — Homicide — IPC, S.300 Exceptions 1, 2 & 4 — Whether conviction for murder (S.302 IPC) could be reduced to culpable homicide not amounting to murder — facts: four knife-blows to vital parts (common carotid & subclavian arteries cut) — no defence evidence, accused’s s.313 denial only — whether plea of self-defence / sudden fight / grave provocation available — held: no mitigating exception available; substantial injuries on vital parts, absence of evidence of exchange of blows or deceased being armed, lack of plea or proof of sudden loss of self-control; accused rightly convicted under s.302; appeal dismissed.

RATIO / KEY POINTS

1. Standard for applicability of Exceptions to S.300 IPC (Exceptions 1, 2, 4):
   — Exception 2 (exceeding right of private defence) requires a foundation that the accused or his property was being attacked; mere allegation of quarrel or shouts is insufficient. Where there is no evidence that the deceased attacked or threatened the accused, Exception 2 is inapplicable.
   — Exception 4 (sudden fight) postulates a bilateral exchange of blows — a “fight” — not merely a quarrel or verbal duel. If the assailant is armed and the deceased unarmed, Exception 4 will not ordinarily apply. (Bhagwan Munjaji Pawade v. State of Maharashtra followed; Awadhesh Kumar affirmed.)

2. Nature and gravity of injuries decisive:
   — Infliction of multiple knife-blows on vital parts (here four blows cutting common carotid and subclavian arteries) ordinarily establishes that the act would in the ordinary course cause death; such injuries are indicative of lethal intent and/or cruel manner of attack, militating against classification as culpable homicide in sudden fight or mere excess of private defence.

3. Requirement of contemporaneous or proximate provocation for Exception 1:
   — Exception 1 (grave and sudden provocation) requires that provocation be so grave and sudden as to deprive the accused of self-control. Mere antecedent quarrel or shouting (or general allegation of addiction and shouts) without evidence that provocation was immediate and of such quality is insufficient to attract Exception 1.

4. Procedural and evidentiary posture:
   — Where no defence evidence is led and the accused’s statement under s.313 CrPC contains only denial (no plea of self-defence or that deceased attacked), court cannot conjure missing factual substratum necessary to draw Exceptions to S.300 in favour of accused.

5. Conclusion on sentencing/conviction:
   — In absence of (i) evidence of deceased attacking accused, (ii) bilateral exchange of force, or (iii) grave and sudden provocation, and on the presence of multiple lethal blows to vital parts, benefit of Exceptions 1, 2 or 4 cannot be extended. Conviction under S.302 IPC stands; appeal to reduce offence is rightly dismissed.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.

Criminal Law – Evidence Act, 1872 – Sections 3, 11 – Omission of accused’s name in FIR based on eyewitness account – effect – subsequent improvements and embellishments – Test Identification Parade held despite eyewitness knowing accused – evidentiary value – recovery of blood-stained articles where blood group not established – conviction based solely on untrustworthy and materially improved testimony liable to be set aside.
Wife of deceased claimed to be an eyewitness; however, the earliest version (merg and FIR) narrated by her to informant-father-in-law did not contain the name of the accused; assailants described only as unknown masked persons. Later statements under Sections 161/164 CrPC introduced new facts: mask allegedly fell; identification by voice; three assailants instead of two. These constituted material improvements. FIR omission held fatal, particularly where the witness had narrated every other minute detail. No medical evidence supported prosecution theory that witness was too ill to disclose identity. TIP of accused, admittedly known to eyewitness, held meaningless. Recoveries of blood-stained articles inconclusive, blood group not proved; link evidence not established. Held, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt; conviction set aside; accused acquitted. (Ram Kumar Pandey v. State of M.P., applied.)

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A material omission in the FIR regarding identity of assailants, when the FIR is based on the eyewitness’s own narration, is a circumstance directly relevant under Section 11 of the Evidence Act and fundamentally undermines the credibility of later identifications.
   – Where the eyewitness provided detailed particulars (time, appearance, sequence, actions) but omitted the accused’s name, later assertions of identification are inherently doubtful.

2. Subsequent improvements in police statements—such as new assertions that mask fell off or identification by voice—are material embellishments and cannot form the basis of conviction.
   – Improvements introduced after a delay, without plausible medical or factual justification, are unreliable.

3. Test Identification Parade is meaningless where the witness already knew the accused; holding a TIP after naming the accused in a Section 161 statement casts further doubt on the genuineness of that statement.

4. Recoveries under Section 27 IPC lose probative value when blood detected on the seized weapons/clothes is only identified as “human blood” and not correlated with the deceased, and when link evidence remains unproved.

5. In cases resting solely on eyewitness testimony, courts must subject such testimony to rigorous scrutiny when prior enmity exists; if the foundational version is untrustworthy, the entire prosecution case collapses.

6. Conviction cannot rest on conjectures or cumulative suspicion; failure to prove identity of assailant beyond reasonable doubt mandates acquittal.

Arbitration — Section 11(4), Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — joinder of non-signatory / “veritable party” test — prima facie satisfaction required — referral refused.

Arbitration — Section 11(4), Arbitration & Conciliation Act, 1996 — joinder of non-signatory / “veritable party” test — prima facie satisfaction required — referral refused.
Where party BCL (non-signatory to HPCL–AGC purchase order) contended it was entitled to invoke arbitration clause in HPCL tender based on a back-to-back contract with AGC and a later settlement-cum-assignment, High Court allowed Section 11 petition and directed constitution of arbitral tribunal to decide arbitrability as preliminary issue. Supreme Court held that referral court must be prima facie satisfied that an arbitration agreement exists and that the non-signatory is a veritable party before directing arbitration; on the facts there was no prima facie material to show privity, consent to assignment or any intention to bind BCL to HPCL–AGC contract (clauses in tender expressly prohibit subcontract/assignment without written owner consent), and the Section 11 petition was dismissed. Referral court cannot abdicate its limited duty to examine existence of arbitration agreement; competence-competence does not relieve referral court from requiring a prima facie showing of a real connection.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. A Section 11 referral court must examine, prima facie, whether an arbitration agreement exists and whether a non-signatory is a “veritable” party to that agreement; this is a limited inspection — not a full contested inquiry — but it must go beyond mere assertion. (Cox & Kings; Interplay; SBI General; Ajay Madhusudan Patel.)

2. Mere commercial or legal connection between signatory and non-signatory, or production of post-hoc assignment/settlement, is insufficient absent prima facie evidence of intent/consent to bind the non-signatory or of a valid assignment in accordance with contractual prohibitions on subletting/assignment.

3. Where the prima facie threshold is not met, the referral court should refuse to refer the non-signatory to arbitration; competence-competence and the remit of the arbitral tribunal do not justify devolving the prima facie screening function entirely to the tribunal.

ISSUE → HOLDING → REASONS

ISSUE
Whether the High Court (referral court) was correct in directing arbitration by appointing an arbitrator under Section 11(4) where the claimant (BCL) was a non-signatory to the HPCL–AGC contract and relied upon a back-to-back agreement, escrow/communications and a later Settlement-cum-Assignment to claim rights “through or under” AGC.

HOLDING
No. The Supreme Court held that the High Court erred. On prima facie examination the respondent (BCL) failed to establish that it was a veritable party to the HPCL–AGC arbitration agreement and hence was not entitled to a mandatory Section 11 referral. The Section 11 petition was dismissed.

REASONS (condensed)
• Statutory and precedential frame: Section 11(6-A)/11(4) requires the referral court to examine existence of an arbitration agreement (Interplay; SBI General). Cox & Kings and subsequent decisions recognise that complex joinder questions often better suit the tribunal, but that does not remove the referral court’s prima facie duty to satisfy itself that a non-signatory is a veritable party.
• Prima facie test applied: BCL failed the prima facie test. There was no contractual privity between HPCL and BCL; the back-to-back contract expressly restricted BCL’s direct dealings with HPCL (Project Manager not to communicate with HPCL without AGC’s prior written approval); the tender expressly prohibited subletting/assignment without HPCL’s prior written consent (clauses 3.17 / 5.c.1).
• Settlement/assignment insufficient: The Settlement-cum-Assignment (31.10.2023) transferring receivables from AGC to BCL did not, by itself, create a pre-existing arbitration agreement between HPCL and BCL, nor did it show consent to bind BCL at the time of contract formation. Clause 2.2 of settlement did not, prima facie, convert BCL into a veritable party to the HPCL–AGC arbitration clause.
• Policy / limits: Allowing mere commercial linkages, emails or escrow arrangements to suffice would abrogate privity and party autonomy; referral court must refuse referrals where there is no prima facie showing of veritable party status.
• Conclusion: On the facts, referral was improper; the CAA is dismissed (no need to decide time-bar point).

SC/ST Act (Section 3(1)(s)) — “place within public view” — summoning order quashed in part. Complainant alleged caste-based abuse, assault and related acts occurring partly inside her house and partly outside; Trial Court summoned accused for offences under Sections 323, 504 IPC and s.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act; High Court upheld summons. Supreme Court held that an essential ingredient of s.3(1)(s) — that abuse be made “in any place within public view” — was not made out on the face of the complaint where averments indicated the caste-based abuse occurred within the four corners of the complainant’s premises (not in public view). The Court quashed proceedings under s.3(1)(s) but declined to interfere with summoning on ordinary IPC counts; appellate interference confined to absence of prima facie case as to the statutory ingredient.

SC/ST Act (Section 3(1)(s)) — “place within public view” — summoning order quashed in part.
Complainant alleged caste-based abuse, assault and related acts occurring partly inside her house and partly outside; Trial Court summoned accused for offences under Sections 323, 504 IPC and s.3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act; High Court upheld summons. Supreme Court held that an essential ingredient of s.3(1)(s) — that abuse be made “in any place within public view” — was not made out on the face of the complaint where averments indicated the caste-based abuse occurred within the four corners of the complainant’s premises (not in public view). The Court quashed proceedings under s.3(1)(s) but declined to interfere with summoning on ordinary IPC counts; appellate interference confined to absence of prima facie case as to the statutory ingredient.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act requires that caste-based abuse be uttered “in any place within public view”; where complaint and material on file do not aver that the abuse occurred in a location where members of public could witness/ hear it, the statutory ingredient of “public view” is not satisfied.

2. At summoning stage the court must examine the complaint prima facie; if an essential ingredient of the statutory offence is absent on the face of the complaint, the appellate court may quash the summoning order insofar as that statutory count is concerned without reopening factual credibility.

3. Appellate power to interfere with summoning orders must be exercised sparingly but will be used where, on a prima facie reading, the requisite ingredient of an offence is missing.

ISSUE → HOLDING → REASONS

ISSUE
Whether the offence under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC/ST (PoA) Act was made out on a prima facie basis where the complaint averred caste-based abuse primarily within the complainant’s house (and related incidents), and whether the High Court erred in refusing to quash the summoning order on that count.

HOLDING
Yes. The Supreme Court held that, on the face of the complaint, the element “in any place within public view” under s.3(1)(s) is not satisfied; accordingly, the summoning order is set aside insofar as proceedings under Section 3(1)(s) are concerned. Proceedings on the IPC counts (Sections 323 and 504) continue.

REASONS (condensed)
• Statutory meaning: “place within public view” requires the utterance to be in a location open to public observation/hearing; an occurrence confined within the four walls of a private residence ordinarily is not within public view (relying on prior decisions including Karuppudayar and Hitesh Verma).
• Factual matrix: the complaint and Section 156(3) material alleged that caste-based abuses were uttered inside the complainant’s premises; there was no specific averment that the abuse was made in a public place or exposed to public view.
• Summoning-stage standard: appellate courts should not probe credibility but must ensure essential elements of charged offences are prima facie pleaded; absent such elements, summoning for that statutory offence is unsustainable.
• Limited interference: Court exercised appellate power narrowly — quashing only the SC/ST Act count while permitting trial to proceed on remaining IPC charges.

NDPS Act — Seizure, sampling and chain of custody — Section 52-A — Representative samples drawn at spot; absence of independent witnesses; minor variation in sample weight — convictions sustained.

NDPS Act — Seizure, sampling and chain of custody — Section 52-A — Representative samples drawn at spot; absence of independent witnesses; minor variation in sample weight — convictions sustained.
Where official raiding party intercepted a vehicle and seized 23.500 kg ganja, drew two representative samples at the spot, sealed them, produced seized material and samples before the Magistrate and forwarded one sealed sample for chemical analysis with the other kept in judicial custody, the prosecution established chain of custody and identity of samples notwithstanding absence of independent lay witnesses at the seizure site and a minor reduction in sample weight. Procedural lapses or delayed compliance with Section 52-A of the NDPS Act are not ipso facto fatal; conviction may be sustained where the irregularity does not affect the integrity/identity of the material and the remaining evidence inspires confidence. Minimum sentence for commercial quantity under s.20(b)(ii)(C) is mandatory and cannot be reduced on mercy grounds by the court.

RATIO DECIDENDI

1. Non-examination of independent witnesses: The non-presence or non-examination of independent witnesses at a seizure site is not automatically fatal where official witnesses give coherent, consistent and corroborative testimony and no material contradictions are elicited in cross-examination.

2. Scope of Section 52-A (sampling): Strict or ideal compliance with Section 52-A is desirable; however, mere procedural deviation or delayed compliance does not vitiate prosecution unless it causes discrepancies that undermine identity, integrity or chain of custody. Courts must assess whether irregularity casts reasonable doubt on the core evidence.

3. Minor variance in sample weight: Small reduction in sample weight between seizure and laboratory receipt, explained by drying/loss of moisture, does not, by itself, destroy the evidentiary value of the sample.

4. Sentencing in commercial quantity: Where statutory minimum punishment is prescribed for commercial quantity possession under the NDPS Act, the court lacks power to reduce below the mandatory minimum on humanitarian grounds (remission is executive).

ISSUE — HOLDING — REASONS (concise)

ISSUE
Whether convictions under Sections 8(c) r/w 20(b)(ii)(C) and 8(c) r/w 29(1) of the NDPS Act can be sustained where (i) representative samples were drawn at the spot (alleged non-compliance with Section 52-A), (ii) no independent lay witnesses attested the seizure mahazar, and (iii) there was a minor variation in sample weight between seizure and laboratory analysis.

HOLDING
Yes. The Supreme Court upheld conviction and sentence. Procedural irregularities were minor and did not impair identity, integrity or chain of custody of the seized ganja or the samples; scientific report and official witness testimony collectively proved guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Court cannot reduce mandatory minimum sentence for commercial quantity.

REASONS (summary)
• Official witnesses (raiding team) gave consistent, corroborative evidence; no material contradictions were brought out in cross-examination. Non-examination of independent witnesses, where none were available at site, is not fatal.
• Following precedents (including recent authority clarifying Section 52-A), mere non-compliance or delayed compliance with sampling formalities is not fatal unless it creates discrepancies affecting the integrity/identity of the substance. Here the Magistrate recorded samples, one sample was forwarded to FSL sealed and intact, the other retained judicially; the laboratory confirmed cannabinoids and certified intact seals.
• The marginal weight reduction (about 50g → 40.6g) was satisfactorily explained by drying and loss of moisture in the interregnum — a normal physical effect — and did not undermine identity.
• There was no evidence of tampering, substitution or broken seals; chain of custody remained intact.
• Sentencing: statutory minimum for commercial quantity under s.20(b)(ii)(C) is mandatory; court cannot temper it on humanitarian or social grounds — executive remission remains the proper channel.