Civil Rules of Practice (A.P.) — Rule 55 — Multiple interim reliefs in a single I.A. — Duty of court — Rule 55 mandates separate applications for each distinct relief; if several reliefs are combined, the court shall direct the applicant to confine to one unless the others are consequential, and to file separate applications for the rest. Where the trial court granted an omnibus interim injunction both (i) restraining alienation, and (ii) restraining dispossession/interference, in a single I.A., Held, appellate court relegated parties to trial court to apply Rule 55 and proceed; merits left open. Interim injunction — Maintainability vs. Merits — Appellate restraint — When maintainability turns on procedural non-compliance (Rule 55) and respondents are absent, appellate court may decline to pick which relief subsists and permit correction before the trial court; liberty reserved to assail the 07-02-2025 order on merits as well.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY, THE TWENTY-FIRST DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO
AND
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 93 of 2025

Between
Mallidi Sathireddy & Anr. … Appellants/Respondents/Defendants

And
Mallidi Srinivasa Reddy & Ors. … Respondents/Petitioners/Plaintiffs

Counsel: For Appellants — C. Subodh · For Respondents — —

HEADNOTES

Civil Rules of Practice (A.P.) — Rule 55 — Multiple interim reliefs in a single I.A. — Duty of court —
Rule 55 mandates separate applications for each distinct relief; if several reliefs are combined, the court shall direct the applicant to confine to one unless the others are consequential, and to file separate applications for the rest. Where the trial court granted an omnibus interim injunction both (i) restraining alienation, and (ii) restraining dispossession/interference, in a single I.A., Held, appellate court relegated parties to trial court to apply Rule 55 and proceed; merits left open.

Interim injunction — Maintainability vs. Merits — Appellate restraint —
When maintainability turns on procedural non-compliance (Rule 55) and respondents are absent, appellate court may decline to pick which relief subsists and permit correction before the trial court; liberty reserved to assail the 07-02-2025 order on merits as well.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 3 of 2025 (II Addl. District Judge, Amalapuram) for declaration of title and injunction against interference and alienation.

2. By I.A. No. 156 of 2025, they sought two interim injunctions in one application: (a) against alienation, and (b) against dispossession/interference (with an endorsement later reflecting the dispossession limb).

3. The trial court, by order 07.02.2025, granted both interim restraints.

4. Defendants filed the present CMA, invoking Rule 55 of the Civil Rules of Practice and disputing merits.

COURT’S REASONING

• Rule 55 text & effect: When distinct reliefs are clubbed, the court should confine the applicant to one (unless consequential) and require separate I.As. for others.

• Application here: Injunctions against alienation and dispossession are separate and not necessarily consequential to each other; thus, the Rule 55 issue squarely arises.

• Appropriate course: In the absence of respondents and given the procedural posture, the appellate court will not unilaterally choose which injunction survives. Parties are relegated to the trial court to apply Rule 55, with liberty to both sides to advance their cases; appellants may also assail merits of the 07-02-2025 order there.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Appeal disposed of by relegating parties to the trial court to address Rule 55 compliance (separate I.As. or confinement to one relief) and to consider the merits of the interlocutory reliefs.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.

— R. RAGHUNANDAN RAO, J.
— MAHESWARA RAO KUNCHEAM, J.

Date: 21.02.2025

CPC, 1908 — Sections 115, 151; Order XXI Rules 90 & 106 — Allegation of fraud in execution sale — Failure to plead particulars — Dismissal upheld — When a judgment debtor sought to set aside an ex parte order and execution sale alleging fraud and undervaluation, but failed to particularize or prove fraud as required by Order VI Rule 4 CPC, and offered no satisfactory explanation for delay, Held, dismissal of his applications by the executing court cannot be faulted. — Mere assertions of fraud, unsupported by evidence, do not justify interference under Section 115 CPC or sustain an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(j). Fraud — Burden of proof — Pleadings — Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved by cogent evidence; vague averments or conjectures are insufficient to invoke equitable relief.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

FRIDAY, THE EIGHTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE RAVI CHEEMALAPATI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No. 588 of 2025

AND

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 110 of 2025

(Common Order)

Between:
Boddula Siva Surya Venkateswara Rao,
S/o. Late Appala Narasayya … Petitioner / Judgment Debtor / Appellant

And

1. Koppisetti Veerababu, S/o. Venkateswarlu

2. Vasamsetty Sri Siva Kumar, S/o. Venkateswarlu
   … Respondents / Decree Holders / Respondents

Counsel for Petitioner: Sri Shaik Mohammed Ismail
Counsel for Respondents: Sri V.V.N. Narayana Rao

HEADNOTES

CPC, 1908 — Sections 115, 151; Order XXI Rules 90 & 106 — Allegation of fraud in execution sale — Failure to plead particulars — Dismissal upheld —
When a judgment debtor sought to set aside an ex parte order and execution sale alleging fraud and undervaluation, but failed to particularize or prove fraud as required by Order VI Rule 4 CPC, and offered no satisfactory explanation for delay, Held, dismissal of his applications by the executing court cannot be faulted.
— Mere assertions of fraud, unsupported by evidence, do not justify interference under Section 115 CPC or sustain an appeal under Order 43 Rule 1(j).

Fraud — Burden of proof — Pleadings —
Fraud must be specifically pleaded and proved by cogent evidence; vague averments or conjectures are insufficient to invoke equitable relief.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The respondents/decree holders filed O.S. No. 370 of 2015 on the file of the I Additional Senior Civil Judge, Kakinada, for recovery of money, which was decreed on 23.10.2017.

2. To enforce the decree, they filed E.P. No. 32 of 2019 before the Senior Civil Judge, Vizianagaram (as the attached property lay within that jurisdiction).

3. The petitioner/judgment debtor was set ex parte on 28.01.2020, and his property was auctioned on 06.02.2024.

4. He thereafter filed E.A. Nos. 38 & 39 of 2024 seeking to set aside the ex parte order and cancel the sale, alleging that he was unaware of the proceedings, that his counsel had died during the COVID period, and that the property worth ₹2 crores was sold for ₹21,30,000/- through fraudulent undervaluation.

5. The executing court dismissed both applications on 31.12.2024, finding no proof of fraud or bona fide explanation for delay. Hence, the present Civil Revision Petition (No. 588/2025) and CMA (No. 110/2025).

COURT’S ANALYSIS

• Fraud allegation: The petitioner alleged fraud and undervaluation but did not file any documentary proof such as market value certificates or conversion documents.

• Order VI Rule 4 CPC mandates that cases involving fraud, misrepresentation, or undue influence must contain specific particulars — dates, acts, and items. The petitioner’s affidavit was vague and bereft of details.

• No substantial injury proved: Even assuming irregularity, the petitioner failed to prove that substantial injury resulted from the sale, as required under Order XXI Rule 90 CPC.

• Delay and laches: No satisfactory reason was offered for not filing the applications within limitation. The plea that his counsel died and he fell ill was unsupported by any evidence.

• Findings of lower court: The executing court rightly held that the allegations were unsubstantiated and the sale was conducted per procedure.

• Scope of revision under Section 115 CPC: The High Court will not interfere unless there is jurisdictional error or manifest illegality, neither of which was demonstrated here.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

Held:
The petitioner failed to plead or prove fraud with requisite particulars or to justify the delay.
The executing court’s orders are reasoned and proper.
No illegality, perversity, or jurisdictional error is found warranting interference.

• Accordingly, C.R.P. No. 588 of 2025 and C.M.A. No. 110 of 2025 are dismissed.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions, if any, shall stand closed.

— RAVI CHEEMALAPATI, J.
Date: 18.07.2025

Ratio Capsule for Digest:

“Execution sale — Allegation of fraud — Pleadings must satisfy Order VI Rule 4 CPC — Mere assertion without proof insufficient — Applications rightly dismissed; no interference under Section 115 CPC.”

Indian Divorce Act, 1869 — Section 55 — Appeal — Non-joinder of alleged second wife — Divorce petition dismissed — Liberty to refile — Where a petition for divorce was dismissed solely on the ground that the alleged second wife of the respondent was not impleaded as a party, Held, such defect is curable, and dismissal of the petition does not preclude a fresh filing with proper parties. Appellate Court therefore disposed of the appeal granting liberty to the wife to institute a fresh petition impleading necessary parties. Practice — Matrimonial proceedings — Joinder of parties — Where the cause of action involves allegations of bigamy, the alleged second spouse is a necessary party, and non-impleadment renders the proceedings defective; however, the defect is not fatal to the right to re-agitate the claim properly.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE TWENTY-FOURTH DAY OF APRIL, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN
AND
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA

---

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 143 of 2025

Between:
J. Shantha Kumari, W/o. T. Pullaiah @ Chinna Pullaiah … Appellant / Petitioner

And
T. Pullaiah @ Chinna Pullaiah @ Chinna, S/o. T. Pedda Pullaiah … Respondent / Respondent

Counsel for Appellant: Sri Papudippu Sashidar Reddy
Counsel for Respondent: None appeared

HEADNOTES

Indian Divorce Act, 1869 — Section 55 — Appeal — Non-joinder of alleged second wife — Divorce petition dismissed — Liberty to refile —
Where a petition for divorce was dismissed solely on the ground that the alleged second wife of the respondent was not impleaded as a party, Held, such defect is curable, and dismissal of the petition does not preclude a fresh filing with proper parties. Appellate Court therefore disposed of the appeal granting liberty to the wife to institute a fresh petition impleading necessary parties.

Practice — Matrimonial proceedings — Joinder of parties —
Where the cause of action involves allegations of bigamy, the alleged second spouse is a necessary party, and non-impleadment renders the proceedings defective; however, the defect is not fatal to the right to re-agitate the claim properly.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. The appellant-wife filed D.O.P. No. 8 of 2021 before the II Additional District Judge, Proddatur, seeking dissolution of marriage dated 14.08.2008 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, alleging cruelty and desertion.

2. The petitioner averred that the respondent-husband contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of the first marriage.

3. The Trial Court dismissed the petition on 25.02.2022, observing that the alleged second wife was not made a party, relying on Radhika @ M. Lavanya v. M. Lokender, 2014 (5) ALD 340.

4. Aggrieved, the wife preferred the present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal under Section 55 of the Act.

COURT’S REASONING

• The Trial Court was correct in observing that, in a case alleging a second marriage, the alleged second wife is a necessary and proper party for effective adjudication.

• However, dismissal on this technical ground does not extinguish the appellant’s right to pursue dissolution of marriage after curing the procedural defect.

• The appellant expressed readiness to implead the alleged second wife in a fresh petition.

• Accordingly, the appellate court considered it just to grant liberty rather than interfere substantively.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Civil Miscellaneous Appeal disposed of granting liberty to the appellant to file a fresh divorce petition before the competent court, impleading all necessary parties.

• No order as to costs.

• All pending interlocutory applications — Closed.

— B. KRISHNA MOHAN, J.
— A. HARI HARANADHA SARMA, J.

Date: 24.04.2025

Order 39 Rules 1 & 2; Order 43 Rule 1 — Ad-interim injunction pending first appeal — Duty of appellate court — Where the lower appellate court declined injunction solely because the trial court record was not yet received, without recording findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, Held, such refusal is unsustainable. An application under O.39 Rr.1&2 must be examined on merits even on available materials; the court can call for records, receive copies, or take affidavits, but cannot reject on technicalities. Order set aside; matter remanded for fresh consideration within a time-frame.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

THURSDAY, THE SEVENTEENTH DAY OF JULY, 2025

PRESENT
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE CHALLA GUNARANJAN

CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 318 of 2025

Between
Kammela Sambasiva Rao & Anr. … Appellants / Plaintiffs

And
Velivela Subba Rao … Respondent / Defendant

Counsel: For Appellants — P. Durga Prasad · For Respondent — Venkata Subbaiah Pogula

HEADNOTES

CPC, 1908 — Order 39 Rules 1 & 2; Order 43 Rule 1 — Ad-interim injunction pending first appeal — Duty of appellate court —
Where the lower appellate court declined injunction solely because the trial court record was not yet received, without recording findings on prima facie case, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury, Held, such refusal is unsustainable. An application under O.39 Rr.1&2 must be examined on merits even on available materials; the court can call for records, receive copies, or take affidavits, but cannot reject on technicalities. Order set aside; matter remanded for fresh consideration within a time-frame.

Practice & Procedure — Interim relief in appeal —
Appellate courts must avoid mechanical rejection; they are required to render reasoned findings on the three injunction tests, even where records are awaited, adopting pragmatic case-management.

SUMMARY OF FACTS

1. Plaintiffs filed O.S. No. 707 of 2021 seeking permanent injunction to protect a 6-ft access way for ingress/egress to their residence.

2. The suit was dismissed on 19.11.2024. Plaintiffs preferred A.S. No. 5 of 2025 and, therein, I.A. No. 16 of 2025 under O.39 Rr.1&2 for ad-interim injunction against interference with the pathway.

3. By order 15.04.2025, the XI Addl. District Judge, Tenali, rejected the I.A., stating that trial court record had not been received and, on the rival affidavits alone, merits could not be decided.

4. Hence, the present CMA under O.43 R.1.

COURT’S REASONING

• The impugned order shows the appellate court did not address the three settled tests for interim injunction.

• Non-receipt of records is not a legal ground to refuse interim relief; courts must assess prima facie right, balance of convenience, and irreparable injury on the material available (pleadings, affidavits, documents annexed), and may call for records or direct filing of copies where necessary.

• The approach adopted reflects a procedural infirmity warranting interference.

OPERATIVE CONCLUSION

• Impugned order dated 15.04.2025 in I.A. No. 16 of 2025 in A.S. No. 5 of 2025 — Set aside.

• Remand: I.A. No. 16 of 2025 to be considered afresh on merits (prima facie case, balance of convenience, irreparable injury) after hearing both sides; to be disposed within three (03) months from receipt of this order.

• CMA disposed of; no order as to costs.

• All pending miscellaneous petitions — Closed.

— CHALLA GUNARANJAN, J.
Date: 17.07.2025

A. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court qua payment of additional amount of $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ by the plaintiff-appellant? If receipt of additional payment by D-1 and D-2 is proved, as found by the first appellate court, whether it could be held that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract?The Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the First Appellate Court's finding on this issue, and that the finding conclusively proved the Appellant's readiness and willingness.Interference in Second Appeal: The High Court erred in law by setting aside the First Appellate Court's finding that the vendors (D-1 and D-2) received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. This was a finding of fact based on the appreciation of evidence (admitted signatures on the endorsement, Exb. A-2), and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning it without establishing perversity.Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ after the expiry of the six-month deadline stipulated in the agreement, the vendors waived their right to insist on the time limit for the balance $\text{Rs. 10,000}$. This action confirmed the contract was subsisting. As the Appellant had paid over 90% of the original consideration plus the additional demanded amount, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract were unequivocally established.B. Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable without seeking a declaration that termination of the agreement was invalid in law?The Supreme Court found that the suit was maintainable without the declaratory relief.Termination as a Void Act: The vendors' subsequent termination notice (20.08.2010) was deemed a void act because they had already waived their right to terminate by accepting the additional payment post-deadline (09.06.2010), and had committed a prior breach (selling to D-3 on 17.08.2010).Declaration Not Essential: A declaratory relief is only essential where a cloud exists on the plaintiff's right, typically when termination is executed under an express contractual right. Since the termination here was a repudiation following a breach, the plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract as subsisting and sue directly for specific performance.C. Whether in the facts of the case the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance?The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance, and the High Court erred in denying it.Rejection of Grounds to Deny Relief: The Court rejected the High Court's grounds for denying relief:The claim of additional payment was upheld, negating the finding of "false claim/unclean hands."The unproven claim of possession was held to be immaterial, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a deliberately false statement, and the Appellant would be entitled to possession upon receiving the decree anyway.Vendors' Mala Fide Conduct: The grant of relief was mandated because the vendors acted in bad faith by demanding extra money and then selling the property to D-3 (Vasanthi), who, as D-1's daughter, was not a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the prior agreement.Conclusion: Given the Appellant's substantial performance (payment of over 90%) and the vendors' clear mala fides, this was a case where denying the equitable relief of specific performance would be arbitrary.

Annamalai v. Vasanthi and Others (Revised)

1. Cause Title

Element	Detail
Case Name	ANNAMALAI v. VASANTHI AND OTHERS
Citation	2025 INSC 1267
Court	Supreme Court of India
Appeal No.	Civil Appeal No. of 2025 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 26848-26849/2018)

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2. Head Notes (Legal Principles Applied)

• Jurisdiction in Second Appeal (Section 100 CPC): The High Court commits an error of law if it interferes with a finding of fact made by the First Appellate Court, as no substantial question of law arises.

• Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting additional money ($\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$) after the stipulated deadline, the vendors waive the time condition, confirming the purchaser's readiness and willingness.

• Bona Fide Purchaser Status: The subsequent purchaser (Vasanthi, D-3) was held not to be a bona fide purchaser due to the close family relationship (D-3 being the daughter of vendor D-1) and presumed knowledge of the prior, subsisting agreement for sale.

• Possession Claim: The High Court erred in using the unproven claim of possession by the purchaser as a ground to deny specific performance, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a false claim made in bad faith.

• Discretionary Relief (Section 20, Specific Relief Act): Specific performance must be granted where the vendor's conduct is mala fide (selling property to a relative after receiving over 90% of consideration) and the denial of relief would be arbitrary.

3. Facts of the Case

The appellant, Annamalai, entered into an agreement for sale with Saraswathi (D-1) and Dharmalingam (D-2) on 08.01.2010 for $\text{Rs. 4,80,000}$, paying $\text{Rs. 4,70,000}$ in advance.

1. Waiver: Annamalai paid an additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ to the vendors on 09.06.2010, which was endorsed on the agreement.

2. Breach and Subsequent Sale: The vendors sold a part of the property to Vasanthi (D-3) (D-1's daughter) on 17.08.2010. They issued a termination notice on 20.08.2010.

3. Litigation History: The High Court ultimately set aside the specific performance decree by finding Annamalai lacked readiness and willingness and by disbelieving the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ payment.

4. Findings of the Apex Court

The Supreme Court overruled the High Court's judgment, confirming the First Appellate Court's findings:

• Payment and Readiness: The Court restored the finding that the vendors received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. It ruled that the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning this finding of fact. This payment confirmed Annamalai's readiness and willingness and established the vendors' waiver of the time clause.

• Status of Vasanthi (D-3) - Bona Fide Purchaser: Vasanthi, being the daughter of vendor D-1, was deemed not a bona fide purchaser. The family connection implied presumed knowledge of the prior sale agreement, making the subsequent sale in her favour non-protected. The vendors committed a breach of contract by selling the property to D-3 before terminating the agreement with Annamalai.

• Possession Claim: The Court held that the High Court was wrong to use the unproven claim of possession as a ground to deny relief. It reasoned that an unproven claim is not necessarily a false claim that demonstrates unclean hands, and Annamalai's substantial performance (paying over 90% plus the additional amount) far outweighed this technicality. Furthermore, a decree for specific performance would, in any event, entitle him to possession.

• Discretionary Relief: The denial of specific performance was found to be arbitrary and not guided by sound judicial principles, given the overwhelming evidence of the vendor's mala fide conduct and the purchaser's substantial performance.

• findings of issues : 

A. Whether the High Court was justified in interfering with the finding of the first appellate court qua payment of additional amount of $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ by the plaintiff-appellant? If receipt of additional payment by D-1 and D-2 is proved, as found by the first appellate court, whether it could be held that plaintiff was not ready and willing to perform its part under the contract?

The Supreme Court found that the High Court was not justified in interfering with the First Appellate Court's finding on this issue, and that the finding conclusively proved the Appellant's readiness and willingness.

• Interference in Second Appeal: The High Court erred in law by setting aside the First Appellate Court's finding that the vendors (D-1 and D-2) received the additional $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$. This was a finding of fact based on the appreciation of evidence (admitted signatures on the endorsement, Exb. A-2), and the High Court exceeded its jurisdiction under Section 100 CPC by overturning it without establishing perversity.

• Waiver and Readiness/Willingness: By accepting the $\text{Rs. 1,95,000}$ after the expiry of the six-month deadline stipulated in the agreement, the vendors waived their right to insist on the time limit for the balance $\text{Rs. 10,000}$. This action confirmed the contract was subsisting. As the Appellant had paid over 90% of the original consideration plus the additional demanded amount, his readiness and willingness to perform his part of the contract were unequivocally established.

B. Whether the suit for specific performance was maintainable without seeking a declaration that termination of the agreement was invalid in law?

The Supreme Court found that the suit was maintainable without the declaratory relief.

• Termination as a Void Act: The vendors' subsequent termination notice (20.08.2010) was deemed a void act because they had already waived their right to terminate by accepting the additional payment post-deadline (09.06.2010), and had committed a prior breach (selling to D-3 on 17.08.2010).

• Declaration Not Essential: A declaratory relief is only essential where a cloud exists on the plaintiff's right, typically when termination is executed under an express contractual right. Since the termination here was a repudiation following a breach, the plaintiff was entitled to treat the contract as subsisting and sue directly for specific performance.

C. Whether in the facts of the case the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance?

The Supreme Court found that the plaintiff was entitled to the discretionary relief of specific performance, and the High Court erred in denying it.

• Rejection of Grounds to Deny Relief: The Court rejected the High Court's grounds for denying relief:

  • The claim of additional payment was upheld, negating the finding of "false claim/unclean hands."

  • The unproven claim of possession was held to be immaterial, as an unproven claim is not equivalent to a deliberately false statement, and the Appellant would be entitled to possession upon receiving the decree anyway.

• Vendors' Mala Fide Conduct: The grant of relief was mandated because the vendors acted in bad faith by demanding extra money and then selling the property to D-3 (Vasanthi), who, as D-1's daughter, was not a bona fide purchaser without knowledge of the prior agreement.

• Conclusion: Given the Appellant's substantial performance (payment of over 90%) and the vendors' clear mala fides, this was a case where denying the equitable relief of specific performance would be arbitrary.

5. Relief Granted

The Supreme Court ALLOWED the appeals by Annamalai and issued the following order:

• The Judgment and Decree of the High Court was SET ASIDE.

• The Judgment and Decree of the First Appellate Court (granting specific performance) was RESTORED.

• The Appellant, Annamalai, was directed to deposit the remaining balance amount of Rs. 10,000 in the execution court within a period of one month.

• The parties were directed to bear their own costs.