Criminal Law – Appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC – Duty of High Court While deciding a criminal appeal against conviction, the High Court, as the first appellate court, is duty-bound to re-appreciate the entire evidence, including medical evidence, witness testimonies, and the defence version. Merely giving a short judgment without discussion of facts, evidence, or reasoning is not sufficient when liberty of the accused is at stake. A cryptic order of acquittal reversing the trial court’s judgment of conviction is unsustainable in law. Principles Reiterated High Court, as an appellate court in criminal matters, stands in a position akin to a trial court and must independently assess whether the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. Pendency of cases and workload cannot justify abdication of judicial duty where liberty is concerned. Reliance placed on State of U.P. v. Ambarish (2021) 16 SCC 371; Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P. (2021) 20 SCC 818; and State Bank of India v. Ajay Kumar Sood (2023) 7 SCC 282. Result Supreme Court held that the impugned High Court judgment (02.05.2013) acquitting the accused was cryptic and de hors reasoning. Without going into merits, SC set aside the acquittal judgment and remanded the matter to the Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital, for fresh consideration. Accused Anil and Imran to remain on bail subject to fresh bonds of ₹15,000 each with sureties before the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Haldwani. High Court requested to rehear the appeals expeditiously. Disposition: Appeals allowed; High Court judgment dated 02.05.2013 set aside; matter remanded for rehearing.

Criminal Law – Appeal under Section 374(2) CrPC – Duty of High Court

While deciding a criminal appeal against conviction, the High Court, as the first appellate court, is duty-bound to re-appreciate the entire evidence, including medical evidence, witness testimonies, and the defence version.

Merely giving a short judgment without discussion of facts, evidence, or reasoning is not sufficient when liberty of the accused is at stake.

A cryptic order of acquittal reversing the trial court’s judgment of conviction is unsustainable in law.

Principles Reiterated

High Court, as an appellate court in criminal matters, stands in a position akin to a trial court and must independently assess whether the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt.

Pendency of cases and workload cannot justify abdication of judicial duty where liberty is concerned.

Reliance placed on State of U.P. v. Ambarish (2021) 16 SCC 371; Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P. (2021) 20 SCC 818; and State Bank of India v. Ajay Kumar Sood (2023) 7 SCC 282.

Result

Supreme Court held that the impugned High Court judgment (02.05.2013) acquitting the accused was cryptic and de hors reasoning.

Without going into merits, SC set aside the acquittal judgment and remanded the matter to the Uttarakhand High Court, Nainital, for fresh consideration.

Accused Anil and Imran to remain on bail subject to fresh bonds of ₹15,000 each with sureties before the Principal District & Sessions Judge, Haldwani.

High Court requested to rehear the appeals expeditiously.

Disposition: Appeals allowed; High Court judgment dated 02.05.2013 set aside; matter remanded for rehearing.

2025 INSC 1170 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.736-738/2015

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND Appellant(s)

VERSUS

ANIL & ORS. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

There is no representation on behalf of respondent Nos.1

and 2. On perusal of the Office Report, it is noted that

learned counsel, Mustaq Ahmed for respondent No.1 has since

passed away. There is no alternative arrangement made. As far

as respondent No.2 - Mohd. Imaran is concerned, there is no

representation on his behalf. In the circumstances, we request

learned counsel, Smt. Sangeeta Kumar and Smt. Manjeet Chawla

to serve as Amicis Curiae for respondent Nos.1 and 2

respectively in these appeals since they are appearing on

behalf of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee presently

representing respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively.

2. The State of Uttarakhand has filed these appeals assailing

the Common Judgment dated 02.05.2013 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand in Criminal Appeal

No.95/2009, Criminal Appeal No.97/2009 and Criminal Appeal

1

No.98/2009. Those appeals were preferred by the respondentaccused(s), Anil, Imran, Wasif and Pappu. Vide the impugned

judgment, the High Court has allowed the criminal appeals and

acquitted Anil and Imran who were in jail, and ordered them to

be released. The accused Wasim and Pappu who are on bail were

discharged from their bail bonds and sureties. By the

impugned judgment, the High Court has set aside the judgment

of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment in the case of

accused Nos.1 and 2 and sentence of one year imprisonment plus

fine in the case of accused Nos.3 and 4 imposed by judgment

dated 04.06.2009 in ST No.50/2003.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant-State of

Uttarakhand and learned senior counsel and learned counsel for

the respondent-accused(s).

4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State made a two-fold

submission: firstly, she contended that even without going into

the merits of the case, the manner and tenor of the judgment

may be considered; that this is a judgment of a High Court

which was considering a first appeal against a judgment and

order of conviction against which appeals were filed by

respondents - accused; that in a cryptic manner, the judgment

has been delivered by the High Court acquitting the respondents

– accused. That this Court in a catena of cases has observed

that even if a judgment confirming the judgment of a Sessions

2

Court is to be rendered by the High Court, thereby dismissing

the first appeal which has been preferred under Section 374 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”), the

appeal would have to be considered based on the evidence on

record and thereafter possibly the High Court could dismiss

such an appeal. But here is a case where the High Court has

reversed the judgment of the Sessions Court inasmuch as the

judgment and sentence of life imprisonment has been set aside

and a complete acquittal given to the respondents - accused

without there being any reasons and marshalling of the facts

and the evidence on record. In this regard, she drew our

attention to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the impugned judgment and

submitted that the findings in paragraph 3 of the impugned

judgment are de hors any basis in the absence of there being a

discussion of the facts and evidence on record. In the

circumstances, she submitted that if this Court is so inclined,

may consider remanding of the matter without going into the

merits of the case.

5. The second submission of learned counsel for the appellant

is, in the event this Court is not inclined to accept the first

submission, then the appeal can be taken up on merits. Learned

counsel submitted that even on merits, the High Court could not

have given a judgment of acquittal by reversing the judgment of

the Sessions Court. She therefore submitted that the impugned

3

judgment may be set aside and the judgment of the Sessions

Court may be restored.

6. Per contra, learned senior counsel and learned counsel

appearing for the respondents-accused who have been acquitted,

vehemently contended that there is no merit in the submissions

made by the appellant’s counsel. They drew our attention to the

fact that the High Court may have given the judgment pithily

but it is not without substance. Merely because the impugned

judgment is short and not a lengthy one cannot make it an

erroneous judgment as the reasoning is evident and there is a

basis for the findings arrived at. In the circumstances, this

Court may not accept the first contention of the appellant and

hence, they contended that they are ready to argue the matter

on merits so that this Court could confirm the judgment of

acquittal passed by the High Court.

7. In view of the nature of grievances expressed by the

appellant-State and the tenor of the submissions advanced, it

is not necessary to narrate the facts of the case giving rise

to these appeals in detail.

8. We observe that while hearing appeals under Section 374(2)

of the CrPC, the High Court is exercising its appellate

jurisdiction. There has to be an independent application of

mind in deciding the criminal appeal against conviction. It is

4

the duty of an appellate court to independently evaluate the

evidence presented and determine whether such evidence is

credible. Even if the evidence is deemed reliable, the High

Court must further assess whether the prosecution has

established its case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court,

though being an appellate Court, is akin to a Trial Court and

must be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the

prosecution's case is substantially true and that the guilt of

the accused has been conclusively proven while considering an

appeal against conviction.

9. As the first appellate court, the High Court is expected

to evaluate the evidence including the medical evidence,

statement of the victim, statements of the witnesses and the

defence version with due care. While the judgment need not be

excessively lengthy, it must reflect a proper application of

mind to crucial evidence. Albeit the High Court does not have

the advantage to examine the witnesses directly, the High

Court should, as an appellate Court, re-assess the facts,

evidence on record and findings to arrive at a just conclusion

in deciding whether the Trial Court was justified in

convicting the accused or not. We are also cognizant of the

large pendency of cases bombarding our courts. However, the

same cannot come in the way of the Court’s solemn duty,

particularly, when a person's liberty is at stake.

5

10. This Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ambarish,

(2021) 16 SCC 371 held that while deciding a criminal appeal

on merits, the High Court is required to apply its mind to the

entirety of the case, including the evidence on the record

before arriving at its conclusion. In this regard, we may also

refer to the orders passed by this Court in Shakuntala Shukla

vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 20 SCC 818 and State Bank

 of India vs. Ajay Kumar Sood, (2023) 7 SCC 282.

11. We find that the High Court ought to have considered the

evidence on record in light of the arguments advanced at the

bar and thereafter ascertained whether the Sessions Court was

justified in passing the judgment of conviction and imposing

the sentence. The same being absent in the impugned judgment,

for that sole reason, we set aside the same. In fact, the High

Court has not even referred to the case number and the trial

court from which the appeals had arisen.

12. We therefore find that the first contention advanced by

the learned counsel for the appellant-State has to be accepted

for the reason that the respondents-accused in these appeals

respectively would also have another opportunity in the appeals

that they had filed before the High Court. In the

circumstances, while holding that the impugned judgment of the

High Court is cryptic and de hors any reasoning in coming to

the findings in paragraph 3 of the said judgment, we set aside

6

the said judgment without expressing anything on the merits of

the case.

13. We allow the appeals filed on the aforesaid limited

ground.

14. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand

at Nainital.

15. The High Court is requested to rehear the appeals filed by

the respondents/accused respectively in these appeals by also

giving an opportunity to the appellant-State herein to make its

submission in the said appeals as well as the accused to make

this submission in the matter.

16. We once again clarify that we have not made any

observations on the merits of the matter.

17. All contentions on both sides are left open to be

advanced before the High Court.

18. Since the incident is of the year 2002 and the impugned

judgment is dated 02.05.2013 and we are remanding the matter to

the High Court, we request the High Court to dispose of the

appeal as expeditiously as possible.

19. Since we have set aside the judgment dated 02.05.2013

passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal

Appeal Nos.95 of 1997; 97 of 1997 and 98 of 1997, the

7

accused Anil and Imran shall remain on bail. However, the said

accused shall appear before the concerned Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Haldwani and execute fresh bonds for a sum

of Rs.15,000/- each with two like sureties each and subject to

other conditions imposed by the concerned Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Haldwani.

20. In view of the above, the judgment dated 02.05.2013 passed

in Criminal Appeal No.95/2009, Criminal Appeal No.97/2009 and

Criminal Appeal No.98/2009 are set aside, the matters are

remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand by restoring the

aforesaid appeals on the file of the said High Court. The High

Court is requested to rehear these appeals in order to decide

upon the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and sentence

imposed by the Sessions Court and to dispose of the appeals in

accordance with law.

21. The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid

terms.

22. It is needless to observe that the High Court shall issue

notice to all the parties and thereafter shall rehear the

appeals upon service of notice to the respondents.

8

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………………………………………………,J.

 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

………………………………………………………,J.

 (R. MAHADEVAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 18, 2025.

9

ITEM NO.124 COURT NO.5 SECTION II-B

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 736-738/2015

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND Appellant(s)

 VERSUS

ANIL & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 18-09-2025 These appeals were called on for hearing

today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN

For Appellant(s) Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat, AOR

 Ms. Saakshi Singh Rawat, Adv.

For Respondent(s) Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, AOR

 Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, AOR

 Mrs. Vithika Garg, Adv.

 Ms. Vidushi Garg, Adv.

 Mr. A. Shirajudeen, Sr. Adv.

 Ms. Manjeet Chawla, AOR

 Ms. Kiran Bala Agarwal, Adv.

 Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Adv.

 UPON hearing the counsel, the Court made the following

 O R D E R

The appeals are allowed and disposed of in terms of the

signed non-reportable judgment which is placed on the file.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(RADHA SHARMA) (DIVYA BABBAR)

ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)

10

Constitution of India – Article 136 – Special Leave Petition – Withdrawal – Second SLP – Maintainability – Where a special leave petition challenging a High Court order is withdrawn unconditionally, without seeking or being granted liberty to re-approach the Supreme Court, a second SLP against the same order is not maintainable. Principle of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC (withdrawal without liberty precludes fresh proceeding) applies to SLPs as a matter of public policy – Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P., (1999) 1 SCC 81, applied. S. Narahari v. S.R. Kumar, (2023) 7 SCC 740, distinguished. Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XLVII Rule 7(1) – Review – Appealability – An appeal does not lie against an order rejecting a petition for review. Rejection of review does not result in merger; it only affirms the original decree/order. Remedy lies, if at all, against the parent order, not against the review dismissal. SARFAESI Act, 2002 – Section 13(4) – Borrower default – Loan classified as NPA – High Court directing repayment schedule – Challenge before Supreme Court by second SLP not maintainable once earlier SLP was withdrawn unconditionally. Doctrine of Merger / Res judicata – Public policy – Entertaining a second SLP in such circumstances would amount to sitting in appeal over earlier SC order and is barred by principles of public policy; litigation must attain finality (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium). Held – Appeals dismissed as not maintainable. Connected applications closed. Liberty reserved to appellant to pursue remedy before appropriate forum in accordance with law.

Constitution of India – Article 136 – Special Leave Petition – Withdrawal – Second SLP – Maintainability –

Where a special leave petition challenging a High Court order is withdrawn unconditionally, without seeking or being granted liberty to re-approach the Supreme Court, a second SLP against the same order is not maintainable. Principle of Order XXIII Rule 1 CPC (withdrawal without liberty precludes fresh proceeding) applies to SLPs as a matter of public policy – Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P., (1999) 1 SCC 81, applied. S. Narahari v. S.R. Kumar, (2023) 7 SCC 740, distinguished.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 – Order XLVII Rule 7(1) – Review – Appealability –

An appeal does not lie against an order rejecting a petition for review. Rejection of review does not result in merger; it only affirms the original decree/order. Remedy lies, if at all, against the parent order, not against the review dismissal.

SARFAESI Act, 2002 – Section 13(4) –

Borrower default – Loan classified as NPA – High Court directing repayment schedule – Challenge before Supreme Court by second SLP not maintainable once earlier SLP was withdrawn unconditionally.

Doctrine of Merger / Res judicata – Public policy –

Entertaining a second SLP in such circumstances would amount to sitting in appeal over earlier SC order and is barred by principles of public policy; litigation must attain finality (interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium).

Held – Appeals dismissed as not maintainable. Connected applications closed. Liberty reserved to appellant to pursue remedy before appropriate forum in accordance with law.

2025 INSC 1140

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.11752-11753/2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NOS.30056-30057/2024]

SATHEESH V.K. … APPELLANT

VERSUS

THE FEDERAL BANK LTD. … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Appellant, Satheesh V.K., is a borrower within the meaning of section

2(f) of the Securitisation and Reconstruction of Financial Assets and

Enforcement of Security Interest Act, 20021

. Undisputedly, the

appellant obtained financial assistance from the respondent-Federal

Bank, a secured creditor within the meaning of section 2(zd) of the

SARFAESI Act, by creating equitable mortgage over properties

situated in Kozhikode. However, the appellant having defaulted in his

obligation to repay the loan, the respondent classified the loan

account as ‘Non-Performing Asset’ (NPA) and initiated measures

under section 13(4) of the SARFAESI Act.

1

 SARFAESI Act

2

2. Aggrieved by the action taken by the respondent, the appellant

invoked the jurisdiction of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam

under Article 226 of the Constitution by presenting a writ petition2

.

According to the respondent, the total outstanding amount was

Rs.7,77,41,321/-. The order dated 1st October, 2024 passed by the

High Court disposing of the writ petition required the appellant to pay

Rs.2,00,00,000/- on or before 30th October, 2024 and the remaining

amount along with future interest in 12 (twelve) equal monthly

instalments. The first instalment was to be paid on or before 15th

November, 2024 and the remaining eleven (11) instalments were to

be paid on or before 15th day of each succeeding month. The

impugned order further directed that in case of failure to make

payment of Rs.2,00,00,000/- or any of the subsequent instalments,

as directed, the respondent would be free to proceed against the

appellant under the SARFAESI Act for realisation of the dues in

accordance with law. Appellant was also granted liberty to approach

the respondent for one time settlement after making payment of the

initial sum of Rs.2,00,00,000/- on or before 30th October, 2024.

3. The order dated 1st October, 2024 was challenged by the appellant in

a special leave petition3 before this Court. Order dated 28th

November, 2024 recorded on the said special leave petition by a coordinate Bench reads as follows:

2 Writ Petition (C) No.33280 of 2024

3 Special Leave Petition (C) No.28259/2024

3

 ORDER

1. After arguing for some time and on our expressing reservation in

entertaining the present petition, the learned senior counsel for the

petitioner seeks permission to withdraw the present petition.

2. Permission to withdraw is granted.

3. The Special Leave Petition is dismissed as withdrawn.

4. Having been permitted to withdraw the special leave petition, the

appellant next approached the High Court with a petition4 seeking

review of the order dated 1st October, 2024. Such petition came to be

dismissed vide order dated 5th December, 2024.

5. Consequent upon such dismissal, these two civil appeals were

presented by the appellant before this Court on 12th December, 2024.

The appeal5

registered prior in point of time is directed against the

order dated 1st October, 2024 of disposal of the appellant’s writ

petition, whereas the one6 subsequently registered is directed against

the dismissal of the review petition.

6. The alacrity with which the appellant moved from court to court

between 1st October, 2024 (date of disposal of his writ petition) and

12th December, 2024 (date of presenting the special leave petitions

before this Court giving rise to these appeals) without showing

semblance of an inclination to repay the dues of the respondent and

to buy time by resorting to technicalities are certainly factors which

we propose to bear in mind while deciding these appeals.

4 RP No.1294 of 2024

5 Civil Appeal No.11752/2025

6

 Civil Appeal No.11753/2025

4

7. Mr. Aljo K. Joseph, learned counsel appearing for the respondent, has

vehemently objected to maintainability of the appeals. He has

referred to the aforesaid order dated 28th November, 2024 passed on

the appellant’s previous special leave petition and contended that no

liberty having been sought and/or granted by this Court to present a

fresh special leave petition to lay a challenge to the order dated 1st

October, 2024, the appellant has no right in law to approach this

Court once again after withdrawing the initial challenge. Also, in view

of Order XLVII Rule 7 (1) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19087

, there

can be no appeal against an order refusing review.

8. The objection to the maintainability of the appeal against the order

dated 1st October, 2024 was sought to be countered by Mr. Menon,

learned counsel for the appellant, by citing the decision of a coordinate Bench of this Court in S. Narahari and Others v. S.R.

Kumar and Others8

. It was pointed out that a reference was made

for constitution of a larger Bench to deliberate and adjudicate the

issue as to whether a second special leave petition would be

maintainable against an order which was previously challenged in a

special leave petition but the challenge had either been withdrawn or

spurned. Our attention was further drawn by Mr. Menon to orders

dated 29th July, 2024 and 13th August, 2024 passed by another coordinate Bench of this Court [of which one of us (Dipankar Datta) was

7 CPC

8

(2023) 7 SCC 740

5

a member] in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors

Association Lumding Division vs. Union of India & Ors.9 where,

noticing S. Narahari (supra), the special leave petitions were

adjourned till such time the reference is decided.

9. Apart from referring to the aforesaid decisions, Mr. Menon relied on a

compilation of precedents starting from Dhakeswari Cotton Mills

Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax, West Bengal10

. Reliance

was placed on paragraph 8 of Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd. (supra)

on the extent of powers conferred by Article 136 of the Constitution,

reading as follows:

“8. … It is not possible to define with any precision the limitations on

the exercise of the discretionary jurisdiction vested in this Court by

the constitutional provision made in Article 136. The limitations,

whatever they be, are implicit in the nature and character of the

power itself. It being an exceptional and overriding power, naturally

it has to be exercised sparingly and with caution and only in special

and extraordinary situations. Beyond that it is not possible to fetter

the exercise of this power by any set formula or rule. All that can be

said is that the Constitution having trusted the wisdom and good

sense of the Judges of this Court in this matter, that itself is a

sufficient safeguard and guarantee that that power will only be used

to advance the cause of justice, and that its exercise will be governed

by well-established principles which govern the exercise of overriding

constitutional powers. It is, however, plain that when the Court

reaches the conclusion that a person has been dealt with arbitrarily

or that a court or tribunal within the territory of India has not given

a fair deal to a litigant, then no technical hurdles of any kind like the

finality of finding of facts or otherwise can stand in the way of the

exercise of this power because the whole intent and purpose of this

Article is that it is the duty of this Court to see that injustice is not

perpetuated or perpetrated by decisions of courts and tribunals

because certain laws have made the decisions of these courts or

tribunals final and conclusive. …”

9 Special Leave Petition (C) Nos.17501-17502/2024

10

 AIR 1955 SC 65

6

10. According to Mr. Menon, the power conferred by Article 136 of the

Constitution of India is an extra-ordinary power and such power must

be exercised to advance the cause of justice and not to thwart it.

11. Other decisions relied on by Mr. Menon are Patel Narshi Thakershi

and Ors. v. Shri Pradyumansinghji Arjunsinghji11

, S. Nagaraj

and Others v. State of Karnataka and Another12

, Lily Thomas

and Others v. Union of India & Ors.13

, Kunhayammed and

Others v. State of Kerala & Another14

, Ramnik Vallabhdas

Madhvani and Others v. Taraben Pravinlal Madhvani15

, Union

of India v. Amrit Lal Manchanda and Another16, and Khoday

Distilleries Limited (Now Known as Khoday India Limited) and

Others v. Sri Mahadeshwara Sahakara Sakkare Karkhane

Limited, Kollegal (Under Liquidation) Represented by the

Liquidator17

.

12. Of these decisions, Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday

Distilleries Limited (supra) have relevance and, therefore, we

propose to consider the same in some detail for deciding the question

arising before us at a later part of this judgment. The other decisions

not being directly related to the point under consideration are not

separately considered. Suffice to record, these decisions lay down

11 (1971) 3 SCC 844

12 1993 Supp (4) SCC 595

13 (2000) 6 SCC 224

14 (2000) 6 SCC 359

15 (2004) 1 SCC 497

16 (2004) 3 SCC 75

17 (2019) 4 SCC 376

7

general principles of law, inter alia, of what is a review, that power to

review is not an inherent power and has to be statutorily conferred,

whether res judicata is applicable in a case where there is inherent

lack of jurisdiction, how to read precedents, and that law has to bend

before justice in given circumstances.

13. On merits, Mr. Menon referred to the decision in M/s Pro Knits v.

The Board of Directors of Canara Bank & Ors.18 and Shri Shri

Swami Samarth Construction & Finance Solution and Another

v. Board of Directors of NKGST Co-op. Bank Ltd and Others19

to contend that the appellant’s company being an unit which is an

MSME, it is entitled to the benefits flowing from Notification dated

29th May, 2015 issued by the Central Government in terms of Section

9 of the Micro Small and Medium Enterprises Development Act, 2006

and that the respondent had acted illegally in not extending the

benefit of such notification to the appellant.

14. Since the question of examining the merits of the appellant’s claim

would arise if the objection to the maintainability were overcome, we

proceed to examine the maintainability aspect first.

15. In course of hearing, we had invited Mr. Menon’s attention to the

order of recent origin dated 1st September, 2025 of another coordinate Bench in Vasantalata Kom Vimalanand Mirjankar Rep.

by G.P.A. Holder vs. Deepa Mavinkurve & Ors.20

. Mr. Menon

18 (2024) 10 SCC 292

19 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1566

20 Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No.36933/2025

8

sought to distinguish Vasantalata (supra) by referring to the

opening sentence of paragraph 7. It was submitted that this Court in

Vasantalata (supra) had dealt with a case where a special leave

petition was dismissed and not withdrawn, as in the present case;

therefore, Vasantalata (supra) has no application here.

16. The question we are tasked to decide, though of frequent occurrence

now-a-days, is not res integra. It is, whether a special leave petition

(second in the series) would be maintainable against a judgment and

order which was earlier challenged before this Court but such

challenge turned out to be abortive because the special leave petition

before this Court is either (i) withdrawn unconditionally, or (ii)

dismissed on merits by a brief order not containing reasons, or (iii)

withdrawn with liberty to apply for review but without the liberty to

approach this Court once again, should the review too fail.

17. No doubt, the co-ordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) has referred

the issue to a larger Bench for consideration. The facts therein may

be noted now. The coordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra) was

seized of the question as to whether, upon dismissal of a special leave

petition against the parent order as withdrawn with liberty to file a

review before the high court but without liberty to approach this Court

again against the parent order should the review fail, a fresh special

leave petition filed against both the parent order and the review

rejection order would be maintainable. The Bench pondered whether

liberty granted by this Court to approach the high court in review 

9

automatically places the said matter in the “escalation matrix”, and

makes the remedy of a special leave petition available again. The

Bench traced the first line of cases, Vinod Kapoor v. State of Goa21

and Sandhya Educational Society v. Union of India22 which ruled

that when no liberty has been granted to approach the Supreme

Court once again, a subsequent special leave petition is not

maintainable. This was contrasted with the decision rendered in

Khoday Distilleries (supra) wherein after placing reliance on

Kunhayammed (supra), a three-Judge Bench came to the

conclusion that even after dismissal of a special leave petition, a

review before the high court is maintainable.

18. The Bench in S. Narahari (supra) while acknowledging that the

question in the matter before it was different, was of the view that

the logic employed by the larger Bench in Khoday Distilleries

(supra) caused a crack in the reasoning of the first line of cases and

came to the conclusion that Khoday Distilleries (supra) essentially

ruled that the doctrine of merger does not apply when a special leave

petition is dismissed by way of a non-speaking order. If indeed that

be so, the Bench in S. Narahari (supra) was concerned that such

dismissal by way of a non-speaking order is not to be considered as

law declared under Article 141 of the Constitution and then the same

cannot be considered res judicata; therefore, in every such dismissal,

21 (2012) 12 SCC 383

22 (2014) 7 SCC 701

10

the remedy of filing a special leave petition would still persist. Further,

if a review is allowed to be filed after a special leave petition is

dismissed, then a fresh special leave petition cannot be barred

arbitrarily. Hence, the matter was referred to a larger Bench to put a

quietus to the issue.

19. Having noticed S. Narahari (supra), a stark dissimilarity in facts is

discernible. There, the unsuccessful petitioner at the time of dismissal

of the special leave petition as withdrawn had prayed for and was

granted leave to apply for a review. Upon the review being dismissed,

the parent order was challenged once again. Before us, there is

something very adverse to the appellant. He having sensed that the

co-ordinate Bench was not inclined to entertain the special leave

petition, did not invite an order of dismissal thereof on merits but

went away content with permission to withdraw. Neither permission

was sought to apply for review nor was any window kept open by this

Court to permit the appellant to approach it once again mounting a

challenge to the same order. This is a plain and simple case where

the law laid down in the previous century by a co-ordinate Bench in

its decision in Upadhyay & Co. v. State of U.P. and Others23 would

squarely apply.

20. As noted by the co-ordinate Bench in its order dated 13th August,

2024 in N.F. Railway Vending and Catering Contractors

Association (supra), relied on by Mr. Menon, the decision in

23 (1999) 1 SCC 81

11

Upadhyay & Co. (supra) was not placed for consideration of the coordinate Bench in S. Narahari (supra).

21. In Upadhyay & Co. (supra), it was held thus:

“9. In the meanwhile, the petitioner challenged the order of the

Allahabad High Court dated 3-5-1996 by filing SLP (C) No. 12673 of

1996 in this Court. But for reasons better known to the petitioner he

withdrew the SLP on 9-7-1996. Thereafter, he filed an application

before the High Court for clarification of the order dated 3-5-1996,

but the Division Bench did not find anything to be clarified about that

order and hence dismissed the petition on 10-10-1997.

10. The present special leave petitions are filed against the two

orders of the High Court, one dated 3-5-1996 and the other dated

10-9-1997.

11. We made a recapitulation of the events as above for the purpose

of showing that the petitioner has absolutely no case in the present

SLPs. He cannot, at any rate, now challenge the order of the High

Court dated 3-5-1996 over again having withdrawn the SLP which he

filed in challenge of the same order. It is not a permissible practice

to challenge the same order over again after withdrawing the special

leave petition without obtaining permission of the court for

withdrawing it with liberty to move for special leave again

subsequently.

12. The above principle has been incorporated as a rule in the realm

of suits. Order 23 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure deals with

withdrawal of suit or abandonment of part of the claim. Sub-rule (3)

says that the court may in certain contingencies grant permission to

withdraw from a suit with liberty to institute a fresh suit in respect of

the subject-matter of such suit. Sub-rule (4) reads thus:

‘1. (4) Where the plaintiff—

(a) abandons any suit or part of a claim under sub-rule (1),

or

(b) withdraws from a suit or part of a claim without the

permission referred to in sub-rule (3),

he shall be liable for such costs as the court may award and

shall be precluded from instituting any fresh suit in respect of

such subject-matter or such part of the claim.’

13. The aforesaid ban for filing a fresh suit is based on public policy.

This Court has made the said rule of public policy applicable to

jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution [Sarguja Transport

Service v. STAT : (1987) 1 SCC 5]. The reasoning for adopting it in

writ jurisdiction is that very often it happens, when the petitioner or

his counsel finds that the court is not likely to pass an order admitting

the writ petition after it is heard for some time, that a request is

made by the petitioner or his counsel to permit him to withdraw it

without seeking permission to institute a fresh writ petition. A court

which is unwilling to admit the petition would not ordinarily grant

liberty to file a fresh petition while it may just agree to permit

withdrawal of the petition. When once a writ petition filed in a High 

12

Court is withdrawn by the party concerned, he is precluded from filing

an appeal against the order passed in the writ petition because he

cannot be considered as a party aggrieved by the order passed by

the High Court. If so, he cannot file a fresh petition for the same

cause once again. The following observations of E.S. Venkataramiah,

J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) are to be quoted here:

‘[W]e are of the view that the principle underlying Rule 1 of

Order 23 of the Code should be extended in the interests of

administration of justice to cases of withdrawal of writ petition

also, not on the ground of res judicata but on the ground of

public policy as explained above. It would also discourage the

litigant from indulging in bench-hunting tactics. In any event

there is no justifiable reason in such a case to permit a

petitioner to invoke the extraordinary jurisdiction of the High

Court under Article 226 of the Constitution once again. While

the withdrawal of a writ petition filed in the High Court without

permission to file a fresh writ petition may not bar other

remedies like a suit or a petition under Article 32 of the

Constitution of India since such withdrawal does not amount

to res judicata, the remedy under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India should be deemed to have been

abandoned by the petitioner in respect of the cause of action

relied on in the writ petition when he withdraws it without such

permission.’

14. ***

15. We have no doubt that the above rule of public policy, for the

very same reasoning, should apply to special leave petitions filed

under Article 136 of the Constitution also. Even otherwise, the order

passed by the Division Bench of the High Court on 3-5-1998 does not

warrant interference on merits as the learned Judges of the High

Court have taken into account all the relevant facts and come to the

correct conclusion.”

(emphasis ours)

22. Upadhyay & Co. (supra), which precedes Kunhayammed (supra)

in point of time, is still the law holding the field declaring in no certain

terms that the principle flowing from Order XXIII Rule 1 of the CPC is

also applicable to special leave petitions presented before this Court.

Reading Upadhyay & Co. (supra) together with Sarguja Transport

Service (supra), which had the occasion to deal with a subsequently

filed writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India after

unconditional withdrawal of the first writ petition under the same 

13

article, the position in law seems to be this - a second special leave

petition would not be maintainable at the instance of a party, who

elects not to proceed with the challenge laid by him in an earlier

special leave petition and withdraws such petition without obtaining

leave to file a fresh special leave petition; if such party applies for a

review before the court from whose order the special leave petition

was initially carried and the review fails, then he can neither challenge

the order rejecting the review nor the order of which review was

sought.

23. That no appeal lies from an order rejecting a petition for review is

clear from the plain language of Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC. We need

not burden this judgment by referring to any authority on this point.

24. However, the principle underlying Order XLVII Rule 7(1), CPC may be

understood. Whenever a party aggrieved by a decree or order seeks

a review thereof based on parameters indicated in Section 114 read

with Order XLVII, CPC and the application ultimately fails, the decree

or order under review does not suffer any change. It remains intact.

In such an eventuality, there is no merger of the decree or order

under review in the order of rejection of the review because such

rejection does not bring about any alteration or modification of the

decree or order; rather, it results in an affirmance of the decree or

order. Since there is no question of any merger, the party aggrieved

by the rejection of the review petition has to challenge the decree or

order, as the case may be, and not the order of rejection of the review 

14

petition. On the contrary, if the petition for review is allowed and the

suit or proceedings is placed for rehearing, Rule 7(1) permits the

party aggrieved to immediately object to the order allowing the

review or in an appeal from the decree or order finally passed or

made in the suit, i.e., after rehearing of the matter in dispute.

25. It is now time to consider the decisions relied upon by Mr. Menon.

26. The passage from the decision in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills Ltd.

(supra) referred to by Mr. Menon has no application on facts and in

the circumstances of the present case. We are inclined to the view

that the nature of power exercisable by this Court under Article 136,

as elaborately laid down there, would apply in the first round when a

judgment and order is challenged and not when the challenge to the

same judgment and order is withdrawn in the first round and a second

bite at the cherry is attempted without having obtained the

permission of the Court to re-approach it.

27. Reliance placed by Mr. Menon on the decisions in Kunhayammed

(supra) and Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra) also do not aid the

appellant’s cause for the reasons that follow.

28. In Kunhayammed (supra), the facts were these. After the special

leave petition of the State of Kerala which was directed against an

appellate judgment and order of the High Court dated 17th December,

1982 was dismissed on 18th July, 1983 by a single line order24, the

State had invoked the review jurisdiction of the High Court in January,

24 “Special Leave Petition is dismissed on merits.”

15

1982 seeking review of the said judgment and order dated 17th

December, 1982. A preliminary objection to the maintainability of the

review petition was raised before the High Court, which came to be

overruled by an order dated 14th December, 1995. The said order also

directed the review petition to be posted for hearing on merits. The

order dated 14th December, 1995 overruling the preliminary objection

was carried to this Court in a special leave petition, on which leave

was granted on 16th September, 1996. By an order dated 14th March,

2000, the matter was referred to a three-Judge Bench for decision.

29. Kunhayammed (supra) is considered an authority on the doctrine

of merger. However, on the facts before the three-Judge Bench, it was

held that since the judgment and order of the High Court dated 17th

December, 1982 did not merge in the single line unreasoned order of

dismissal of the special leave petition (dated 18th July, 1983), the

petition for review was maintainable.

30. Turning to Khoday Distilleries (supra), two appeals were under

consideration. It is found that in the lead appeal, a petition for review

of the judgment and order dated 12th November, 2008 was not

entertained by the High Court of Karnataka by its order dated 9th

September, 2011 on the ground that a special leave petition against

the said judgment and order dated 12th November, 2008 stood

dismissed by a single line order25 of this Court dated 4th December,

25

“Delay condoned. Special leave petition is dismissed.”

16

2009. The question of law arising for decision was noted in paragraph

8, reading as follows:

“8. The question of law which needs to be determined in the aforesaid

circumstances is as to whether the review petition is maintainable

before the High Court seeking review of a judgment against which

the special leave petition has already been dismissed by this Court.”

31. After extensively referring to and/or relying on Kunhayammed

(supra), the three-Judge Bench summed up the legal position in

paragraph 26 as under:

“26. From a cumulative reading of the various judgments, we sum

up the legal position as under:

26.1. The conclusions rendered by the three-Judge Bench of this

Court in Kunhayammed and summed up in para 44 are affirmed and

reiterated.

26.2. We reiterate the conclusions relevant for these cases as under

: (Kunhayammed case, SCC p. 384)

‘(iv) An order refusing special leave to appeal may be a nonspeaking order or a speaking one. In either case it does not

attract the doctrine of merger. An order refusing special leave

to appeal does not stand substituted in place of the order

under challenge. All that it means is that the Court was not

inclined to exercise its discretion so as to allow the appeal

being filed.

(v) If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order

i.e. gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the

order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law

contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme

Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution.

Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated

in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court

which would bind the parties thereto and also the court,

tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by

way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex

Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that

the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood

merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special

leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the

only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings

between the parties.

(vi) Once leave to appeal has been granted and appellate

jurisdiction of the Supreme Court has been invoked the order

passed in appeal would attract the doctrine of merger; the

order may be of reversal, modification or merely affirmation.

17

(vii) On an appeal having been preferred or a petition seeking

leave to appeal having been converted into an appeal before

the Supreme Court the jurisdiction of the High Court to

entertain a review petition is lost thereafter as provided by

sub-rule (1) of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.’

26.3. Once we hold that the law laid down in Kunhayammed is to be

followed, it will not make any difference whether the review petition

was filed before the filing of special leave petition or was filed after

the dismissal of special leave petition. Such a situation is covered in

para 37 of Kunhayammed case6.

27. Applying the aforesaid principles, the outcome of these appeals

would be as under.

Civil appeal arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.

490 of 2012

28. In the instant case, since special leave petition was dismissed in

limine without giving any reasons, the review petition filed by the

appellant in the High Court would be maintainable and should have

been decided on merits. Order dated 12-11-2008 passed by the High

Court is accordingly set aside and matter is remanded back to the

High Court for deciding the review petition on merits. The civil appeal

is disposed of accordingly.”

32. In Khoday Distilleries Limited (supra), the order under appeal was

clearly in the teeth of the ratio laid down in Kunhayammed (supra)

and it was only a matter of time for such erroneous order to be set

aside.

33. Since the facts in Kunhayammed (supra) and Khoday Distilleries

Limited (supra) were different, there is evidently no consideration of

the decision in Upadhyay & Co. (supra) which clinches the issue and

assists us in drawing the conclusion we do hereunder.

34. Insofar as the order dated 13th August, 2024 passed in N.F. Railway

Vending and Catering Contractors Association Lumding

Division (supra) is concerned, the order records developments

having taken place subsequent to the order dated 29th July, 2024 

18

which, in the opinion of the Bench, required a further consideration.

The order dated 13th August, 2024, for such reason, recalled the

earlier order dated 29th July, 2024 and issued notice on the special

leave petition as well as on the application for stay together with

interim protection. The order dated 13th August, 2024 recalled the

order dated 29th July, 2024 whereby hearing was adjourned sine die

awaiting the reference made in S. Narahari (supra). No assistance

can, thus, be drawn by the appellant from such order.

35. We have no doubt that entertaining a special leave petition in a case

of the present nature would be contrary to public policy and can even

tantamount to sitting in appeal over the previous order of this Court

which has attained finality. The maxim interest reipublicae ut sit finis

litium (it is for the public good that there be an end to litigation)

would apply in all fours when it is found that proceedings challenging

an order were not carried forward by withdrawing the special leave

petition and the litigant has returned to the same court after some

time mounting a challenge to the self-same order which was earlier

under challenge and such challenge had not been pursued. This is a

course of action which cannot be justified either in principle or

precept.

36. For the foregoing reasons, the preliminary objections to the

maintainability of the appeals raised by the respondent succeed.

37. The civil appeals are, consequently, dismissed. Connected

applications, if any, stand closed.

19

38. If so advised, the appellant may pursue his remedy before the

appropriate forum in accordance with law.

……………………..………J.

[DIPANKAR DATTA]

…………..…………………J.

[K.V. VISWANATHAN]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 23, 2025. 

Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 – Ss. 439(2), 401, 482 – Cancellation/Revocation of Bail – Held: Distinction reaffirmed. Cancellation of bail applies where accused misuses liberty, tampers with evidence, threatens witnesses, commits similar offences, absconds, etc. Revocation of grant of bail applies where order granting bail is perverse, illegal, or passed on irrelevant considerations – superior courts may set aside such orders. [(P v. State of M.P., (2022) 15 SCC 211; Abdul Basit, (2014) 10 SCC 754, followed)]. Bail – Delay in filing application for cancellation – Delay alone not fatal. However, long lapse of time coupled with good conduct of accused on bail weighs in favour of continuation of liberty. Bail – Factors for grant/refusal – While antecedents relevant, they cannot by themselves constitute a ground to deny bail. Period of incarceration and conduct during bail period may tilt balance towards liberty. [(Ayub Khan v. State of Rajasthan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763, relied on)]. Bail – High Court’s power – Once Sessions Court grants bail mechanically without considering relevant factors, High Court may either (i) remit matter for fresh consideration by Sessions Court, or (ii) itself assess and revoke, depending on circumstances. Bail Jurisprudence – Balancing liberty and fair trial – Supreme Court reiterates principle: “Bail is the rule, jail is the exception” (Krishna Iyer, J.). Court must balance individual liberty with victim’s rights and societal interests. Strict conditions can ensure trial integrity without unnecessary curtailment of liberty. Bail – Post-bail misconduct allegation – Affidavit by alleged victim (Abhiram) disowning FIR against appellant Vishnu undermined allegation of fresh offence. FIR in such circumstances did not warrant cancellation of bail. Practice & Procedure – Conditions imposed by Supreme Court – Bail restored subject to stringent conditions: Accused barred from entering Alappuzha district (except for trial). Mandatory police station attendance every alternate day. No tampering with evidence or influencing witnesses. No deferment of cross-examination of eye-witnesses. Liberty to seek modification of restrictions post recording of all eye-witness evidence. Bail bonds to satisfaction of trial court. State directed to ensure witness protection and presence; trial court to expedite trial. Result – Impugned judgment revoking bail set aside. Appeals allowed. Accused to remain on bail subject to stringent conditions.

2025 INSC 1136 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.4197-4199 OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS.5814-5816 OF 2025]

ABHIMANUE ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS

VS.

STATE OF KERALA … RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 4200-4201 OF 2025

[ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRIMINAL) NOS.7641-7642 OF 2025]

VISHNU ETC. … APPELLANTS

VS.

STATE OF KERALA & ANR. … RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

DIPANKAR DATTA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Assailed in the present set of appeals is the judgment and order

dated 11th December, 20241

 of the Kerala High Court, passed on a

batch of petitions2

 filed by the State of Kerala praying for setting

aside of grant of bail (through separate orders) to a total of 10

(ten) accused. Vide the impugned order, the High Court set aside

1 impugned order

2 Crl. M Nos. 4707, 4713, 4716, 4739, 4749, 4752, 4762, 4767 & 4798 of 2024

1

the orders granting bail to 5 (five) of the 10 (ten) accused, who

are the appellants before us.

3. A First Information Report3

 under Sections 143, 147, 148, 149,

324 and 302, Indian Penal Code, 18604

, was registered on 19th

December, 2021, against unknown persons. It was alleged

therein that such unknown persons committed the said offences

under the leadership of one political activist of a particular

political organization (not a party to these proceedings). Soon

thereafter, the appellants were arrested. As per the narrative in

the police report (charge-sheet) filed under Section 173(2), Code

of Criminal Procedure, 19735

 dated 15th March, 2022, the accused

are activists of a particular political organization who, allegedly,

due to political enmity murdered the victim on 18th December,

2021. Accused 2-6 formed an unlawful assembly, followed the

victim in a vehicle and collided with his scooter at 5:50 pm. The

victim fell down whereupon he was brutally attacked; ultimately,

he succumbed to his injuries at 11:30 pm. The accused were

consequently charged with having committed offences under

Sections 120-B, 109, 115, 143, 147, 148, 149, 324 and 302, IPC

and Section 27(1) of the Arms Act, 1959. We note that the

appellants Abhimanue, Athul, Sanand, Vishnu and Dhaneesh

figure as A-3, A-5, A-4, A-2 and A-6, respectively, in the chargesheet.

3 FIR No. 621/2021, PS Mannanchery, District Alappuzha, Kerala

4 IPC

5 Cr. PC

2

4. In December 2022, vide separate orders of various dates, after

being in custody for nearly a year, the appellants and the coaccused were granted bail by the trial court. The State applied for

cancellation of bail before the Additional Sessions Judge, who

rejected the application on 5th April, 2024.

5. Next, the State approached the High Court in May 2024 praying

for setting aside of the orders granting bail to the accused

persons.

6. The High Court divided the accused into two categories – (i)

conspirators and (ii) persons against whom the specific overt act

of murder was alleged. The appellants belong to the second

category. The High Court noted that bail was granted to the

appellants by the Sessions Court in a mechanical manner,

without referring to any “circumstance that should have been

borne in mind while granting bail in a heinous crime as murder”.

The High Court further noted that the Sessions Court granted bail,

based on two factors. First, the accused had been in custody for

more than a year, and secondly, there was no opposition from the

Public Prosecutor. The possibility of influencing the witnesses or

tampering with evidence was not borne in mind by the Sessions

Court, whereas only a few weeks prior, their bail applications

were rejected finding that they may influence the witnesses and

tamper with evidence. The High Court found that there was no

change of circumstances, and hence bail should not have been

granted. The High Court also rejected the argument that bail

3

should not be cancelled, as the applications praying for

cancellation were filed more than a year and a half after the grant

of bail. Accordingly, the bail granted in favour of the appellants

stood set aside by the High Court.

7. Aggrieved by the impugned order revoking grant of bail, the

appellants have now carried it to this Court in appeal.

8. Mr. Soumya Chakraborty, learned senior counsel, submitted on

behalf of the appellants that setting aside orders granting bail, on

an application filed more than 18 (eighteen) months after such

grant, was unjustified. Further, the appellants did not tamper

evidence or influence witnesses, did not abscond, and did not

violate any other bail condition while on bail; as such, setting

aside of the orders granting bail was uncalled for and without

justifiable reasons. He further submitted that the application for

cancellation of bail, preferred by the State before the High Court,

was not maintainable. Since an earlier application for cancellation

had already been rejected by the Sessions Judge, the proper

remedy of the State was to approach the High Court under

Sections 401 and 482, Cr. PC, rather than by way of a fresh

application for cancellation before the High Court. Lastly, as the

State did not challenge the order of the Sessions Judge refusing

to cancel the bail, the said order has attained finality and is now

unassailable.

9. The State filed a status report pursuant to an order of this Court.

Upon perusal of the report, apart from the antecedents of the

4

accused, it is seen that the accused were identified based on

CCTV footage of the crime, which was recovered from a nearby

house. Relying thereon, learned senior counsel Mr. Dinesh,

representing the State, urged that the impugned order suffers

from no infirmity and, thus, deserves to be upheld.

10. It was also stated in the status report that Vishnu (A-2) had

violated a condition of interim bail (granted by this Court vide

order dated 28th May, 2025) by entering the district of Alappuzha

on 30th July, 2025. Vishnu (A-2), along with Rajendra Prasad (A-1),

allegedly assaulted and threatened (by knife) a person named

Abhiram on the same day which led to registration of FIR No.

1006/2025.

11. Opposing the petitions, Mr. R. Basant, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the respondent no. 2 (widow of the

victim), submitted that the Sessions Court failed to consider the

severity of the allegations against the appellants and granted bail

by a non-speaking order. On the other hand, the order impugned

in these appeals is well-reasoned and this Court ought to be loath

to interfere therewith. Out of the total 10 (ten) accused, the High

Court set aside the orders granting bail of only 5 (five) accused,

after considering all relevant factors. Distinguishing them from

the conspirators, the appellants herein were classified in the

category of the actual assailants in the gruesome murder.

Specific overt acts attributable to each accused were discussed in

detail by the High Court. Our attention was also drawn to the

5

several criminal antecedents of the appellants. A-2, along with a

co-accused, allegedly committed offences even after the grant of

interim protection by this Court on 30th July, 2025. Moreover, it

was submitted that the Sessions Court granted bail to the several

accused upon hearing only the Public Prosecutor and not the

Special Public Prosecutor, who was appointed for the case. Lastly,

the High Court rightly held that delay in filing an application for

revocation of bail is no ground for rejecting such an application.

12. Mr. Chakraborty responded by stating that Vishnu entered into

the district as he was required to attend the ongoing trial of the

case on that date. As regards the commission of an offence by

Vishnu, it was submitted that the purported victim (Abhiram) had

denied the involvement of the accused persons in the offence by

way of an affidavit filed before the High Court in proceedings

instituted by Vishnu under Section 482, Cr. PC.

13. Heard learned senior counsel appearing for the parties and

perused the record.

14. Before proceeding further, we consider it appropriate to begin our

analysis by addressing one of the arguments raised by Mr.

Chakraborty. He has challenged the very maintainability of the

application filed before the High Court. According to him, once an

application under Section 439(2), Cr. PC seeking cancellation of

bail has been rejected by the Sessions Judge, a second

application under the same provision cannot be filed directly

before the High Court. Instead, the proper course would be either

6

to challenge the Sessions Judge’s order in a petition for revision,

or to invoke the inherent powers of the High Court under Section

482, Cr. PC.

15. We are unable to agree with this argument. We note that, in the

present case, the application before the High Court was filed

under “Section 482 r/w 439 (2) of Code of Criminal Procedure”.

That being the case, nothing prevented the High Court from

exercising its inherent powers.

16. We now propose to proceed with our discussion on the other

aspects of the case.

17. Law is well settled that cancellation of bail is distinct from

revocation of an order granting bail. Bail may be cancelled when

the accused violates any of the conditions imposed. On the other

hand, an order granting bail can be revoked if such an order is

found to be perverse or illegal. In P v. State of Madhya

Pradesh6

, a three-judge Bench of this Court, after analyzing

various previous decisions, discussed the distinction between the

two. Relevant paragraphs of the decision are reproduced below:

21. Echoing the above principle, in Ranjit Singh v. State of

M.P. [Ranjit Singh v. State of M.P., (2013) 16 SCC 797 : (2014) 6 SCC

(Cri) 405], it has been held thus:

“19. … There is also a distinction between the concept of setting

aside an unjustified, illegal or perverse order and cancellation of

an order of bail on the ground that the accused has

misconducted himself or certain supervening circumstances

warrant such cancellation. If the order granting bail is a perverse

one or passed on irrelevant materials, it can be annulled by the

superior court.”

6 (2022) 15 SCC 211

7

22. In Abdul Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary [Abdul

Basit v. Mohd. Abdul Kadir Chaudhary, (2014) 10 SCC 754 : (2015) 1

SCC (Cri) 257], this Court has opined that: (SCC p. 763, para 19)

“19. Therefore, the concept of setting aside an unjustified, illegal

or perverse order is different from the concept of cancellation of

a bail on the ground of accused's misconduct or new adverse

facts having surfaced after the grant of bail which require such

cancellation and a perusal of the aforesaid decisions would

present before us that an order granting bail can only be set

aside on grounds of being illegal or contrary to law by the court

superior to the court which granted the bail and not by the same

court.”

***

24. As can be discerned from the above decisions, for cancelling

bail once granted, the court must consider whether any supervening

circumstances have arisen or the conduct of the accused post grant

of bail demonstrates that it is no longer conducive to a fair trial to

permit him to retain his freedom by enjoying the concession of bail

during trial [Dolat Ram v. State of Haryana, (1995) 1 SCC 349 : 1995

SCC (Cri) 237] . To put it differently, in ordinary circumstances, this

Court would be loathe to interfere with an order passed by the court

below granting bail but if such an order is found to be illegal or

perverse or premised on material that is irrelevant, then such an

order is susceptible to scrutiny and interference by the appellate

court.

25. Some of the circumstances where bail granted to the accused

under Section 439(1) CrPC can be cancelled are enumerated below:

(a) If he misuses his liberty by indulging in similar/other

criminal activity;

(b) If he interferes with the course of investigation;

(c) If he attempts to tamper with the evidence;

(d) If he attempts to influence/threaten the witnesses;

(e) If he evades or attempts to evade court proceedings;

(f) If he indulges in activities which would hamper smooth

investigation;

(g) If he is likely to flee from the country;

(h) If he attempts to make himself scarce by going

underground and/or becoming unavailable to the

investigating agency;

(i) If he attempts to place himself beyond the reach of his

surety.

(j) If any facts may emerge after the grant of bail which are

considered unconducive to a fair trial.

We may clarify that the aforesaid list is only illustrative in nature

and not exhaustive.

(emphasis ours)

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18. In the present case, the High Court revoked the orders granting

bail after noting that the Sessions Court kept only two

considerations in mind: period of custody and ‘no opposition from

the prosecution’, without a discussion of the other factors in

detail. However, the Sessions Court having primarily proceeded

on the premise of there being no objection from the side of the

prosecution for grant of bail, it would have been just and proper

for the High Court to direct the Sessions Court to consider all the

relevant factors and decide afresh the application of the

appellants for bail. Evidently, in the absence of the Sessions

Court looking into all relevant factors for grant of bail, the High

Court took upon itself such a responsibility. Looking at the gravity

of the crime and the apprehension of evidence being tampered

and witnesses being susceptible to influence and intimidation,

the High Court proceeded to revoke the bail.

19. What weighs with us now, in the facts and circumstances of the

present case, is whether the High Court ought to have revoked

the bail for the reasons that it assigned or should the High Court

have directed the Sessions Court to decide the application for bail

afresh.

20. Directing the Sessions Court to decide the application for grant of

bail is an available option to us given the circumstances noted

above but having regard to the lapse of time and the submissions

advanced, we propose to decide the appeals on merits.

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21. Apart from the fact that it has not been shown to our satisfaction

that the appellants violated any of the conditions of bail except in

one case, which we propose to consider a little later, we are of

the considered opinion that notwithstanding the gravity of the

offences alleged against the appellants, the conflicting interests

of individual liberty on the one hand and the victim’s rights as

well as concerns for community safety on the other could have

been better balanced bearing in mind that the appellants had

suffered incarceration for nearly a year and thereafter had been

on bail for almost 2 (two) years before the orders granting bail

were revoked vide the impugned order. The likelihood of the

accused influencing the witnesses or tampering with the

evidence and ensuring smooth progress of the trial could have

been taken care of by imposing stringent conditions over and

above those which were imposed while granting bail.

22. Reverting to the sole instance of violation of bail condition, we

note that after the grant of interim bail by this Court, Vishnu and

A-1 had allegedly assaulted and threatened Abhiram with a knife,

which led to Abhiram lodging an FIR under Sections 115 (2),

118(1), 351(2) and 25 of the Bhartiya Nyaya Sanhita, 2023.

Seeking quashing of the said FIR, Vishnu approached the High

Court. The records indicate that Abhiram filed an affidavit before

the High Court denying Vishnu’s involvement in the crime stating

that “(T)he police may have for reasons best known to them

implicated him in the offence. After preparing the statement, I

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merely affixed by signature at the paper as shown by them

without reading the statement. I was never aware that the

Petitioner’s name was included … .”. Abhiram also denied having

settled the dispute and clarified that “upon conciliation talks only

the misunderstanding was mitigated”. Suffice it to record on

perusal of the above statement that there is much more than

what meets the eyes. We are not prepared to accept the

contention that the FIR lodged by Abhiram affords ground for

cancellation of bail granted to Vishnu.

23. Our attention was also invited to the status report filed by the

State, to indicate the various criminal antecedents of the

appellants. Suffice it to say, however, that such antecedents by

themselves cannot constitute a ground for denial of bail. In this

context, a useful reference may be made to the decision of a

coordinate Bench of this Court in Ayub Khan v. State of

Rajasthan7 of which one of us (Augustine George Masih, J.) was

a member. The relevant paragraph therefrom is extracted below:

10. The presence of the antecedents of the accused is only one of

the several considerations for deciding the prayer for bail made by

him. In a given case, if the accused makes out a strong prima

facie case, depending upon the fact situation and period of

incarceration, the presence of antecedents may not be a ground to

deny bail. There may be a case where a Court can grant bail only on

the grounds of long incarceration. The presence of antecedents may

not be relevant in such a case. In a given case, the Court may grant

default bail. Again, the antecedents of the accused are irrelevant in

such a case. Thus, depending upon the peculiar facts, the Court can

grant bail notwithstanding the existence of the antecedents. ……… .

24. Cancellation/revocation of bail, no doubt, seeks to uphold trial

integrity. The dominant purpose thereof is to ensure a fair trial

7 2024 SCC OnLine SC 3763

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and protect societal interests by preventing persons accused of a

heinous or grave crime and having tendencies to influence or

intimidate witnesses or to tamper evidence from being released.

Indeed, if such accused are likely to interfere with witness

testimony, the courts could be justified in ordering the accused to

be taken back into custody. However, at the same time, the

golden rule of bail jurisprudence propounded by Hon’ble V.R.

Krishna Iyer, J. of ‘bail being the rule and jail an exception’ cannot

be ignored. Taking back the appellants in custody for no better

reason than that the Sessions Court should not have been

swayed by omission of the Public Prosecutor to raise any

objection to grant of bail should not operate to the appellants’

prejudice, more so when two years have passed in the

interregnum.

25. Upon perusing the status report filed by the State, we find that

the case was posted for “schedule trial” on 30th May, 2025 and

thereafter the case has been listed on various dates. As per the

chargesheet, a total of 141 (one hundred forty-one) witnesses are

to be examined. Of them, there are at least five witnesses who

allegedly witnessed the crime. The trial will obviously take time to

conclude. Bearing in mind that the appellants since grant of bail

have not been involved in any similar or other offence, we prefer

to lean in favour of liberty rather than its curtailment.

Accordingly, while setting aside the impugned order, the

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appellants’ liberty is not curtailed subject to imposition of certain

stringent conditions.

26. To obviate any possibility of tampering with evidence and

intimidation and/or influencing of the witnesses by the appellants,

we impose the following conditions for grant of bail to the

appellants:

a. The appellants shall not enter the limits of district Alappuzha,

save when their presence is required for the purposes of trial.

b. The appellants shall inform the trial court of their respective

address where they propose to stay during such time condition

(a) remains in force.

c. On every alternative day, the appellants shall mark their

presence at the police station having jurisdiction in respect of

their proposed places of stay. Such attendance need not be

marked, if on any particular day, they are required to remain

present before the trial court.

d. The appellants shall not procrastinate the trial and fully

cooperate with the trial court to take the trial to its logical

conclusion without any delay.

e. The appellants shall not tamper with prosecution evidence and

influence/intimidate the witnesses.

f. The appellants shall not pray for deferment of crossexamination of any eye-witness.

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g. After the evidence of all the alleged eye-witnesses is recorded,

the appellants shall be at liberty to seek modification of

condition (a) supra before the trial court.

h. The appellants shall be required to furnish bail bonds to the

satisfaction of the trial court.

27. The trial court, in addition to the aforesaid conditions, may

impose any other conditions as it may deem fit and proper.

28. The police administration of the State may appoint the

investigating officer of the case or any other police officer to

ensure that not only do the appellants not influence/intimidate

the witnesses but also that protection to the witnesses, as and

when the occasion so demands, is provided.

29. We direct the State too to cooperate with the trial court by

ensuring the presence of all the private and official witnesses on

the dates fixed by the trial court for recording evidence.

30. The trial court is encouraged to expedite the trial by scheduling

dates in such a manner that witness testimony is recorded

without undue delay.

31. The appellants shall continue to remain on bail, pending trial,

subject to adherence to the terms and conditions for such grant

as imposed by the trial court, in addition to the conditions

imposed by us. Should there be any breach of the terms and

conditions and the same is brought to the notice of the trial court,

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appropriate orders may be passed including cancellation of the

bail granted by this Court.

32. The impugned judgment and order revoking the orders granting

bail stands set aside. The appeals are, accordingly, allowed.

33. Pending application (s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………..…………….………………J.

 (DIPANKAR DATTA)

…………..……………..……………J.

 (AUGUSTINE GEORGE MASIH)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 22, 2025.

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