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Saturday, September 27, 2025

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 34, 109 — Murder trial — Conviction on circumstantial evidence — Acquittal. Case resting entirely on circumstantial evidence. Deceased, a police constable, alleged to have been murdered by wife, brother and brother-in-law of another constable (A1), at his instigation, for non-repayment of ₹1 lakh loan. A2 (wife of A1) allegedly lured deceased to house, where he was hacked with choppers; A2 allegedly confessed at police station. Trial Court acquitted A1 (instigation charge — alibi proved), but convicted A2–A4 under S. 302 r/w S. 34. High Court affirmed. Held, conviction unsustainable. — Motive not established: Testimonies of PWs contradictory; wife of deceased (PW-18) denied loan transaction; other relatives (PWs 11 & 12) unreliable. — Presence of dead body at A2’s house doubtful: Contradictory evidence; some witnesses said first seen at hospital; inquest report unreliable. Even if proved, mere presence of body in accused’s premises not conclusive of guilt (Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 19 SCC 321). — Extra-judicial confessions inadmissible: All made inside police station, to police officers or in their presence — hit by Ss. 25–26, Evidence Act, 1872 (State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8). — Recovery of chopper (A4) unreliable: Based on joint/simultaneous disclosure of A3 and A4, witnesses to recovery hostile, no forensic link to crime (Navjot Sandhu, (2005) 11 SCC 600; Kishore Bhadke, (2017) 3 SCC 760). — Eyewitnesses turned hostile; no reliable ocular evidence. — Section 106 Evidence Act: Burden does not shift unless prosecution establishes prima facie case; not discharged here (Shivaji Chintappa Patil, (2021) 5 SCC 626). — Circumstances do not form complete chain. Prosecution failed to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appeal allowed. Conviction and sentence of A2–A4 under S. 302/34 IPC set aside. Accused acquitted. Evidence Act, 1872 — Ss. 25, 26 & 27 — Confessions and discovery. — Confessions made inside police station to police officers or in their presence inadmissible (Ss. 25, 26). — Recovery under S. 27 must be supported by cogent evidence; joint or simultaneous disclosures inherently weak; recovery by one accused after such disclosure, absent corroboration, cannot by itself sustain conviction. Precedents relied on / distinguished: State of W.B. v. Vindu Lachmandas Sakhrani, AIR 1994 SC 772 — distinguished. Suraj Pal v. State of U.P., AIR 1995 SC 419 — distinguished. Babu v. State of Kerala, (2010) 9 SCC 189 — motive not essential if chain otherwise complete. Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2023) 19 SCC 321 — applied. Shivaji Chintappa Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (2021) 5 SCC 626 — applied. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu @ Afsan Guru, (2005) 11 SCC 600 — referred. Kishore Bhadke v. State of Maharashtra, (2017) 3 SCC 760 — referred. Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra, (1976) 1 SCC 828 — followed. Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P., 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984 — referred. State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8 — applied. ⚖️ Ratio Decidendi: In a case based purely on circumstantial evidence, conviction under S. 302 IPC cannot be sustained unless the chain of circumstances is complete, cogent, and points only to guilt of accused. Mere presence of dead body in accused’s premises, inadmissible confessions within police station, or weak recovery under S. 27 cannot substitute for such a chain.

2025 INSC 1135

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

Nagamma @ Nagarathna & Ors.

…Appellants

Versus

The State of Karnataka

…Respondent

J U D G E M E N T

K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

1. The default in repayment of a loan led to a crime, most

foul, of murder, is the prosecution case. The allegation was

that a police man, the 1st accused, took a loan from another

police man, the deceased, who was killed by the wife,

brother and brother-in-law of the former; at his instigation.

The deceased, the driver of a Superintendent of Police made

persistent demands for repayment of the loan. This led to

A2, the wife of A1, calling the deceased to her home on the

pretext of repaying the debt, on the night of 10.03.2006. At 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

around 2am on the next day the victim was made immobile

by throwing chili powder on his face and hacked to death

with two choppers wielded by the accused. A2 then, after

sunrise, went directly to the police station and confessed to

the SHO about the crime and apprised him of the presence

of the dead body in her house. The SHO deputed a police

constable to make enquiries and later an inquest was done

by PW-24 at the house of A2, after which the body was taken

to the hospital.

2. Before the trial court, the prosecution examined 24

witnesses and marked 33 documents as also 16 material

objects. The first accused examined himself and during the

examination of the prosecution witnesses marked Exs.D1 to

D8. The trial court found, from the evidence of the

prosecution witnesses, that the presence of the dead body

in the house of A2 was proved, and the crime itself was

confessed to by A2, who also pointed out the dead body

which was lying in her house. A2 is said to have made extra 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

judicial confessions to other persons, including the wife of

the deceased.

3. A recovery was made of a chopper, and one chopper

(sickle) was seized from the scene of occurrence itself. A1,

who was arrayed for instigation, had a perfect alibi insofar

as the night duty undertaken in another police station,

deposed to by PW-14, who was also on duty. There was

nothing to indicate an instigation, which led to the acquittal

of A1. A2 to A4 were convicted under Section 302 read with

Section 34 and was sentenced to life. The High Court

affirmed the findings of the Trial Court in an appeal by A2 to

A4, finding established; the motive and the culpability of the

accused based on other circumstances, like extra judicial

confessions, recovery of a chopper under Section 27, the

crime scene being the house of A1&2 and the absence of

explanation for the dead body being at the house of the

accused, under Section 106.

4. Mr.C.B. Gururaj, learned counsel for the appellants

would argue that since Section 302 is charged against four 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

accused read with Section 34, when one of the accused is

acquitted, it should inure to the benefit of the others also.

Reliance was placed on State of West Bengal v. Vindu

Lachmandas Sakhrani alias Deru1 and Suraj Pal v. State of

Uttar Pradesh2. The depositions were read over to us and it

was argued that the eye witnesses had turned hostile and

there was no circumstance bringing out the culpability of the

accused.

5. Mr.Nishanth Patil, learned AAG, however, sought to

uphold the conviction on the ground that the dead body was

found in the house of A2, which was pointed out by her and

there was no explanation even under Section 313

questioning. The motive was proved, and the extra judicial

confessions further established the crime. The recovery as

against A4 also provided a link in the chain of

circumstances, which chain is complete.

1 AIR 1994 SC 772

2 AIR 1995 SC 419

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6. Undisputedly, this is a case of circumstantial evidence,

especially since the eyewitnesses who were projected as

tenants in the building in which the crime occurred, turned

hostile. It is also pertinent that as per the allegation of the

prosecution, a police man was killed by the wife of another

police man, with the aid of her brother and brother-in-law.

Upon the sad news being conveyed to the wife of the

deceased, she allegedly went to the premises with her

relatives and friends; the latter of whom were either police

men or their spouses.

7. On the question of whether the death was a homicide,

there can be no dispute raised, unequivocally established

by the evidence of PW-23, the Doctor who conducted the

post-mortem. Almost 13 wounds were noticed which were

lacerated and chop wounds. According to the Doctor, death

was caused due to the injuries sustained to the head; all the

internal and external injuries being ante-mortem in nature.

The chop wounds were found on the right side & middle of

the forehead as also over the left parietal prominence and

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

the eye, the nose and the lip on the left side. There were

wounds on the right cheek, over the right ear lobe, incised

wound extending from the occipital area to the left ear, with

comminuted fracture on the occipital area, at the right

temporal bone extending to lower of left temporal bone,

with brain tissue exposed. There were other lacerated and

chop wounds on the left leg exposing the libia and fibula and

on the left wrist a joint fracture in the second metacarpal

bone. The injuries bring forth a case of a brutal frontal

attack, which is opined, by PW-23, to be possible by the

chopper recovered from the scene of occurrence and that

recovered at the instance of A4.

8. The death, no doubt is homicidal in nature and now we

turn to the culpability of the accused. The first argument of

the learned counsel for the appellants, that, the appellants

too have to be acquitted, considering their parity with A-1,

cannot at all be countenanced. In Vindu Lachmandas

Sakhrani alias Deru1 (supra), a husband and his wife were

charged with the kidnapping and murder of a six-year-old

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child. While the husband was acquitted, the trial court

convicted the wife, which conviction was overturned in

appeal on the ground of parity. In that case, dependent

solely on circumstantial evidence, it was held that the

charge under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC, based

on the common intention of both, falls flat with the acquittal

of the husband, especially when there was no simpliciter

charge under Section 302 against the wife.

9. In Suraj Pal2 (supra), the charges were under Sections

147, 323, 307 and 302 read with Section 149 of the IPC. There

was no independent charge against the sole accused

convicted for the offence under Sections 307 and 302 IPC. In

that circumstance when all the others were acquitted, one of

the accused who was arrested for shooting the deceased,

could not have been convicted under Sections 307 and 302

IPC, was the finding. In the present case, the charge against

A1 was under Section 109, instigation, leading to a charge

under Section 302 read with Section 34. The charge against

the other accused was under Section 302 read with Section 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

34 IPC; quite distinguishable. There was no evidence to

substantiate instigation and an independent charge under

Section 302 would not stand against A2 by reason of the airtight alibi.

10. The motive alleged is of a loan of Rs.1 lakh taken from

the deceased having not been repaid giving rise to

persistent demands, resulting in ill will between the

deceased and the accused, leading to frequent quarrels.

The trial court and the High Court placed reliance on the

evidence of PW-18, 11 &12, the wife, mother and brother of

the accused and PW-7, to find motive.

11. In chief examination, PW-18 deposed that it was A2

who revealed to her that she owed a sum of Rs.1 lakh to the

deceased which A2 had obtained at the time of construction

of the house. The chief examination of PW-18 does not at all

support the motive set up by the prosecution. In cross

examination, it was categorically stated by PW-18 that in the

domestic inquiry against A-1, she had appeared before the

inquiry officer; Dy. S.P. Arasikare, and deposed that her 

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husband and accused were in cordial terms and there were

no transactions between them. Very strangely, after the

cross examination by the accused, the Special Public

Prosecutor sought to treat the witness as hostile and

attempted a cross examination. She categorically asserted

that the statement made before the inquiry officer was not

under coercion.

12. Yet another witness proffered by the prosecution to

prove the motive was PW-7, a police constable and a

neighbour of the deceased. In his chief examination, it was

deposed that while occupying the police quarters, the

deceased and the accused were on friendly terms. He also

deposed that he had no information regarding any loan

taken by A-1 from the deceased. The witness was treated

hostile and cross examined by the prosecution, when it was

brought out that in the statement under Section 161, Cr. PC,

the witness had spoken about the loan of Rs.1 lakh taken by

A-1 from the deceased, which alone would not prove the

motive since it was not deposed in his chief examination.

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13. PW-11 and PW-12, the mother and brother of the

deceased, however spoke of a loan having been taken by

A-1 from the deceased. The reliability of the said witnesses

has to be tested on the totality of the circumstances as

deposed to by the witnesses. PW-18 deposed that PWs11&12 were not on cordial terms with her husband; belying

their knowledge of the loan availed, which even the wife of

the deceased was not aware of. PW-18 asserted that she or

her husband were not in the habit of discussing their

problems with PWs-11&12 nor was there even exchange of

pleasantries. There are further reasons to disbelieve the

testimony of PWs-11&12, which we shall deal with a little

later.

14. Absence of motive is not an imperative circumstance

to arrive at a conviction, in a case where there is ocular

evidence. The role of motive is not very significant even

when circumstances otherwise form an unbreakable chain.

Motive only provides another link, and the absence of

motive is a factor that weighs in favour of the accused as held 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

in Babu v. State of Kerala3. We cannot find a motive in this

case; of the financial transaction having led to the crime.

Further, the prosecution case is that the deceased was

summoned over telephone, to the house of A2, on the

pretext of repaying the loan. But even PW-18 has no case

that the deceased left the house on such a mission, after a

telephone call. There is also no clear evidence as to whether

the deceased returned to his home in the evening of that

day.

15. Even according to the prosecution, the police came to

know about the death from A2 who surrendered before the

Police Station and made a voluntary statement before PW15, the Station House Officer (SHO) in the presence of PW17, a Sentry on duty at the Police Station. PW-15,

immediately called PW-21, a constable and directed him to

proceed to the house of A2 to verify the information given

by A2. PW-22, with another constable, visited the house of

3

(2010) 9 SCC 189

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

A2 and having seen the dead body, intimated it to PW-15.

PW-15 informed PW-18, who in turn informed her

neighbours and her relatives.

16. The prosecution in addition to the official witnesses,

sought to establish the presence of the dead body at the

house of A1& A2, through the other witnesses including the

wife, mother and brother of the deceased who were alleged

to have come to the crime scene and witnessed the presence

of the dead body thereat. PW-18, the wife of the deceased

more than once deposed in her chief examination and cross

examination, that she came to know of the death of her

husband at ‘7 O’clock’ on the morning of 11.03.2006 when

the police came to her house with the information of the

crime. Though, she stated in her chief examination that she

went to the house of A2 and saw the dead body, before the

inquiry officer, Dy. S.P. Arasikare, she had stated that she

saw the dead body first at the hospital; admitted in her

testimony before Court. In cross examination by the

Prosecutor, after she was declared hostile, it was 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

categorically stated by PW-18 that she did not see the dead

body of her husband at the house of A-1&2.

17. PW-6 and PW-8, the wives of two police constables

who resided near to the house of the deceased stated before

police that they saw the dead body at the house of A-1&2,

but resiled from their statement before Court and both of

them were declared hostile. PW-7, in his chief examination

stated that he too saw the dead body first at the hospital but,

in cross examination by the prosecution, sought to assert

that he had seen the body of the deceased at the house of A1&2; which statement he had not made before the police.

18. The inquest report was drawn up by PW-24, allegedly

at the house of A-1&2. PWs-1&4, the witnesses to the inquest

report, did not corroborate and deposed that the report was

drawn up and signed at the hospital. PW-11 and PW-12, the

mother and brother of the deceased spoke of having seen

the dead body at the alleged crime scene, the house of A1&2. It is pertinent that according to PW-18, the relatives

including her mother-in-law and brother-in-law came to the 

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hospital. The presence of the said witnesses in the alleged

scene of crime, after the crime proper, is suspect.

19. PW-11, the mother of the deceased stated in her cross

examination that PW-18 called her over phone at 4 am to

inform her about the crime committed. It is also stated that

she was informed by PW-18 through the phone of one

Shankarappa, who was not examined before Court. PW-12,

the brother of the accused stated in his cross examination

that having been informed of the murder of his brother, by

PW18, he came to Hassan at about 05:30 am in the morning.

PW18 at the risk of repetition, asserted before Court more

than once, that she was first informed about the death of her

husband at 7 am when the police came to her house with the

said information.

20. Useful reference can be made to the decision of this

Court in Santosh v. State (NCT of Delhi)4

, wherein the dead

body was recovered from an apartment occupied by the

4

(2023) 19 SCC 321

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appellant/accused as a tenant. The Court categorically

found that there was no serious dispute to the tenancy

arrangement but even then, that was insufficient by itself, to

hold the accused guilty. It was held:

“… there is no general presumption against the

owner/tenant of a property with regard to his/her

guilt if a dead body with homicidal injuries is

found in his/her property. No doubt if the

prosecution succeeds in proving a chain of

circumstances from which a reasonable inference

can be drawn regarding one’s guilt then, in

absence of proper explanation, the court can

always draw an appropriate conclusion with

respect to his/her guilt with the aid of Section 106

of Evidence Act, 1872. But, if the chain of

circumstances is not established, mere failure of

the accused to offer an explanation is not sufficient

to hold him guilty.”

21. This Court also relied on Shivaji Chintappa Patil v.

State of Maharashtra5

in which it was observed that Section

106 of Evidence Act 1872 does not directly operate against

either the husband or the wife, staying under the same roof,

even if he/she is the last person seen with the deceased. It

does not absolve the prosecution of discharging its primary

5

(2021) 5 SCC 626

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burden of proving a case beyond reasonable doubt. Unless

there is evidence led to sustain a conviction or which makes

out a prima facie case, the question does not arise of a

burden of proof placed upon the accused to offer an

explanation.

22. As we found, there is no cogent, credible evidence

that the body was at the house of A-1&2. But, for the moment

we will accept the said circumstance to have been proved

on two grounds. One, PW-15, the SHO to whom A2 spoke of

the crime, even if eschewed as a confession, recorded the

statement, marked as Ext.P10(a) in the Station Diary

produced as Ext.P10. PW-17 corroborated the statement,

leading to the discovery of the body at the house of A2 by

PW-21, the Constable deputed to verify. Even if these

circumstances are accepted, going by the decisions cited,

that alone cannot be conclusive proof to find A2 guilty,

without other corroborating evidence.

23. One another circumstance, heavily relied upon by the

trial court and the High Court are the extra judicial 

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confessions made by A2 to various persons, but all inside

the police station. The First Information Report was on the

complaint made by PW-18, the wife of the deceased, though

the information first supplied was by A2 in the morning, to

PW-15, the SHO and PW-17, the Sentry. Both these extra

judicial confessions have been made in the police station

before the police officers, even according to the

prosecution, on which no reliance can be placed. PW-18, the

wife of the deceased deposed that it was A2 who revealed

to her the murder of her husband, at the police station, which

was the testimony of PW-7 also. The extra judicial

confessions and the context in which they were made, within

the police station cannot at all be relied upon.

24. Section 25 of the Evidence Act mandates that no

confession made to a police officer shall be proved as

against a person accused of any offence and Section 26 also

restricts any confession by a person in the custody of a

police officer from being proved against him unless it is

made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate. In State of 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya6

, this Court had considered the

impact of Section 25 and 26, in paragraph 7, from which the

relevant portion is extracted herein below:

“… The expression, “accused person” in

Section 24 and the expression “a person

accused of any offence” have the same

connotation, and describe the person against

whom evidence is sought to be led in a criminal

proceeding. As observed in Pakala Narayan

Swami v. Emperor by the Judicial Committee of

the Privy Council, “Section 25 covers a

confession made to a police officer before any

investigation has begun or otherwise not in the

course of an investigation”. The adjectival

clause “accused of any offence” “is therefore

descriptive of the person against whom a

confessional statement made by him is declared

not provable, and does not predicate a

condition of that person at the time of making

the statement for the applicability of the ban.

Section 26 of the Indian Evidence Act by its first

paragraph provides. “No confession made by

any person whilst he is in the custody of a police

officer, unless it be made in the immediate

presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as

against a person accused of any offence”. By this

section, a confession made by a person who is

in custody is declared not provable unless it is

made in the immediate presence of a

Magistrate. …”

6 1960 SCC OnLine SC 8

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

25. The extra judicial confessions, said to have been made

by A2 in the present case, were all within the police station,

where she is said to have voluntarily come, to confess about

the murder. The confession made to the SHO, PW-15,

overheard by PW-17, the Sentry of the police station, hence

has to be completely eschewed under Section 25. The

confession made to PW-18, the wife of the deceased and

PW-7, though a police constable; who arrived at the police

station in the status of the neighbour of the deceased, also

has to be eschewed under Section 26. The other witnesses

to whom the extra judicial confession was made, that too

inside the police station, in any case turned hostile.

26. Yet another circumstance relied upon by the

prosecution is the recovery of a chopper, MO-16 on the

confession statement of A4 under Section 27. In this context,

we have to look at the evidence of PW-24, the investigating

officer (I.O) who deposed that A3 and A4 were taken into

police custody on 15.03.2006 after their voluntary surrender

before Court on 13.03.2006. It is the categoric statement of 

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

the I.O that both A3 and A4 confessed in their voluntary

statements that they would point out the chopper used for

commission of offence by leading the police to the spot

where they concealed it. A4 alone was taken to the spot,

leading to the recovery of MO-16, is the case of the

prosecution.

27. Disclosure statements taken from one or more persons

in police custody do not go out of the purview of Section 27

altogether, as held in State (NCT of Delhi) v. Navjot Sandhu

@ Afsan Guru7 and reiterated in Kishore Bhadke v. State of

Maharashtra8. While asserting that a joint or simultaneous

disclosure would per se be not inadmissible under Section

27, it was observed that it is very difficult to place reliance

on such an utterance in chorus; which was also held to be, in

fact, a myth. Recognising that there would be practical

difficulty in placing reliance on such evidence, it was

declared that it is for the Courts to decide, on a proper

7

(2005) 11 SCC 600

8

(2017) 3 SCC 760

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Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

evaluation of evidence, whether and to what extent such a

simultaneous disclosure could be relied upon. In Kishor

Bhadke7, while affirming the above principles in Navjot

Sandhu6, the facts revealed were noticed, wherein the

information given by one, after the other, was without any

break, almost simultaneously and such information was

followed up by pointing out the material thing by both the

accused, in which circumstance it was held that there is no

reason to eschew such evidence.

28. With the above principles in mind when we look at the

facts of the present case, the I.O though has stated about the

disclosure statement of both A3 and A4, he does not specify

whether it is simultaneous or one after the other. It is also not

clear; if the disclosure is at different points of time, in which

event, who made the first disclosure. Deposition of PW-24

though does not speak of the exact location as stated by the

accused in the confession statement; PW-24 speaks of

having taken A4 to the bush of Rose Trees at the Helipad

near Udayagiri Layout from where the chopper was 

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produced. PW-2 and PW-3, the witnesses of recovery of MO16 turned hostile and they deposed that they affixed their

signatures to the recovery mahazar at the police station.

Further, it also has to be noticed that but for the recovery

there is nothing to indicate the culpability of A3 and A4

through forensic evidence to link the recovered weapon to

the crime proper.

29. Insofar as the recovery under Section 27, as has been

reiterated in Mohd. Inayatullah v. State of Maharashtra9

,

the expression ‘fact discovered’ includes not only the

physical object produced, but also the place from which it is

produced and the knowledge of the accused about the

concealment. In the cited decision, which considered the

offence of theft, the accused had made a statement of the

place where the stolen drums were kept by him. Finding the

admissible portion of the statement to be only the location

of the three drums, it was held that the information taken in

9

(1976) 1 SCC 828

Page 23 of 28

Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

conjunction with the facts discovered, was insufficient to

draw the presumption that the accused was the thief or the

receiver of the stolen property, with the knowledge that it

was stolen. The drums in question were found in the

compound or yard of a musafirkhana (rest place for

travellers) and it was neither lying concealed nor was the

compound under the lock and key of the accused. In the

present case, the I.O, PW-24, categorically deposed before

Court that after A3 and A4 were taken into custody on

15.03.2006, pursuant to their surrender before Court on

13.03.2006, confessions were made by both the accused

regarding the concealment of the chopper allegedly used

for commission of offence; which statement of ‘use in the

commission of offence’ has to be totally eschewed. The exact

spot in which the concealment was made as stated in the

disclosure statement has also not been deposed to by the

I.O.

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30. Manoj Kumar Soni v. State of M.P.10 was a case in

which all the accused persons made disclosure statements

to the IO whereupon recovery of various articles were

effected. It was held that even when disclosure statements

hold significance as a contributing factor in a case, it is not

so strong a piece of evidence sufficient on its own and

without anything more to bring home the charges beyond

reasonable doubt (sic, para 22).

31. The fact that confessions were made by both the

accused and the recovery was made from one of the

accused, A4, leading the police to the spot would restrain us

from treating the recovery as an inculpating circumstance

against A3 or A4, especially when the confession is taken

simultaneously from both the accused. We are of the opinion

that in the present case there can be no reliance placed on

the recovery based on the sketchy evidence adduced.

10 2023 SCC OnLine SC 984

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32. Now, looking at the witness who supported the

prosecution case, we find them to be totally unreliable.

PW-7, whose evidence was relied upon for the purpose of

motive and also the presence of the dead body at the house

of A-1&2, we have already found, did not speak of either of

these circumstances before the police under Section 161 or

in the chief examination. As far as PW-11 and PW-12 are

concerned, their presence at the scene of occurrence itself

is doubtful. The motive sought to be proved through PW11&12 as also the presence of the dead body in the house of

A-1&2, hence stands totally discredited. It is also relevant

that PW-16, the brother-in-law of the deceased,

categorically stated that he saw the dead body at the

hospital and not at the house of A-1&2.

33. As we noticed at the outset, PW-20 and PW-22

eyewitnesses turned completely hostile. We are at a loss to

understand how the High Court and the trial court made an

observation that though they were declared hostile, there

was credible material in their evidence pointing to the 

Page 26 of 28

Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

culpability of the accused, which could be relied upon. We

find no such material in the chief examination or the cross

examination. PW-20 and PW-22, who as per the prosecution

were brothers staying in the house of A1 and A2 on rent. The

witnesses admitted that they were bothers but they denied

that they were tenants of A1 and A2. After PW-20 was

declared hostile, the prosecutor had put forth P-12 to P-20

contradictions in the alleged statements under Section 161

recorded by the police, which were all denied by the said

witness. Likewise, PW-22 also did not subscribe to the

prosecution case and there was nothing in his evidence to

find culpability of the accused.

34. The prosecution case itself was that the deceased was

summoned to the house of A-1&2, for which there is no

evidence adduced nor does PW-18, the wife speaks of the

deceased having left the house on receiving such a call.

Further it is the case of the prosecution that the deceased

reached the house of the accused at around 10 pm while the

death was confirmed as having occurred at 2 pm. What 

Page 27 of 28

Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

happened in the interregnum is not clear and together with

what we noticed above, there is a suspicion as to the genesis

and origin of the crime which compounds the reasonable

doubt regarding the prosecution case.

35. Undisputably, the case is one of circumstantial

evidence which is treated as proved only when there is a

complete chain of circumstances, comprising cogent and

reliable material, providing an unbreakable link, leading

only to the culpability of the accused and bringing forth the

hypothesis only of guilt and not leading to any reasonable

doubt as to the guilt or otherwise of the accused. The motive

projected and the crime itself has not at all been proved and

there is no circumstance leading to the culpability of the

accused. The presence of the dead body in the house of the

accused is also under a cloud and in any event, that, with the

absence of a proper explanation cannot by itself bring home

a conviction.

36. Considering the totality of the circumstances and the

evidence led in the trial, we are of the considered opinion 

Page 28 of 28

Criminal Appeal No.425 of 2014

that the conviction cannot be sustained; which we set aside

and acquit the accused. If the accused are in custody, they

shall be released forthwith, if they are not wanted in any

other case. However, if they are on bail, their bail bonds

shall stand cancelled and revoked.

37. The criminal appeal stands allowed.

38. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

……….…………………….….. J.

 (K. V. VISWANATHAN)

……….…………………….….. J.

 (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 22, 2025.

Criminal Law – Penal Code, 1860 – Ss. 376, 376(2)(n) – Rape on pretext of marriage – FIR and chargesheet quashing – When warranted – Delay, conduct of parties, and mala fides. The complainant (Computer Operator) and the appellant (Assistant Revenue Inspector, colleague) developed a friendship that became intimate. The complainant, who was married with a child, alleged that the appellant had sexual relations with her on the assurance of marriage (15-03-2023 to 10-04-2023), later refused marriage, and asked her to wed someone else. FIR registered under Ss. 376 & 376(2)(n) IPC (07-08-2023), followed by chargesheet (20-10-2023). Counter-complaints by appellant: Prior to FIR, appellant had filed police complaint (24-04-2023) alleging harassment, suicide threats, and an incident of the complainant consuming poison; also lodged representations with Municipal Commissioner and Divisional Officer (July 2023), leading to issuance of show cause notice (06-07-2023) to complainant, threatening termination if misconduct continued. Representation also made to Superintendent of Police. Held: FIR filed four months after alleged incident, only after issuance of show cause notice and appellant’s complaints/representations, raises strong inference of mala fides and afterthought. Allegations of promise to marry, even if assumed true, were not promptly pursued. Circumstances suggest FIR lodged to counter consequences of complainant’s workplace misconduct proceedings and to wreak vengeance. Relying on State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335; M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana, (2019) 10 SCC 373; Balaji Traders v. State of U.P., 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1314; and Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P., (2023) 20 SCC 219 – Court reiterated: inherent jurisdiction under S. 528 BNSS (corresponding to S. 482 CrPC) to be exercised to prevent abuse of process where criminal proceedings are manifestly attended with mala fides/ulterior motives. Result: FIR and chargesheet quashed. High Court’s refusal to quash set aside. Appeal allowed. ⚖️ Ratio: A belated FIR filed only after the accused initiates prior legal/administrative action against the complainant, coupled with circumstances suggesting vengeance, can be quashed as an abuse of process under S. 528 BNSS (S. 482 CrPC). Courts must look beyond the FIR’s text and consider surrounding circumstances to determine mala fides.

2025 INSC 1143

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 1 of 8

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(@Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No. 3361 OF 2025)

SURENDRA KHAWSE …APPELLANT(S)

Versus

STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH

& ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

 J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KAROL J,

Leave Granted.

2. Under challenge in this appeal is a judgment and order

dated 27th January 2025 passed in Misc. Criminal Case No.48079

of 2023 by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur, titled

analogously where the High Court has refused to exercise its

powers under Section 528 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 2 of 8

20231

seeking quashing of the First Information Report2

and the

chargesheet3

.

3. The brief facts leading to the impugned judgment are that

the complainant, Respondent No.2 herein was a Computer

Operator employed at Suhagi Municipal Corporation where the

appellant-accused was working as Assistant Revenue Inspector

and in the course of regular interactions they became friendly

with one another and such friendship eventually progressed

further. It is important to note here that the complainant at an

earlier point in time was married and had also begotten a son

from the wedlock. This friendship and eventual physical

intimacy turned sour which led to the instant proceedings.

4. The allegation levelled by the complainant against the

Appellant-accused is that when the latter proposed the possibility

of taking their friendship further, she had clearly stated that she

was married and had a son to which he agreed or in other words,

the implications of which he understood and also said that they

would, at one point in future, be joined in matrimony. It is then

alleged that on 15th March 2023 the Appellant-accused called the

complainant to his residence after office hours and forced

intimate relations with her. When she resisted/refused he assured

1 For short ‘BNSS 2023’

2. For short ‘FIR’

3 Dated 07th August 2023, P.S. Adhartaal bearing no.0934/2023 under Sections 376 and

376 (2)(n)IPC

4 Dated 20th October 2023

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 3 of 8

her of marriage and asked her not to worry. This situation

continued till 10th April 2023. A few days thereafter, upon being

asked as to why they are yet to get married, the complainant

alleges that the Appellant-accused refused and asked her to marry

someone else. Terming this to be rape on pretext of marriage, the

complainant filed the subject FIR.

5. Certain other facts are also required to be taken note of.

The relationship having soured, the Appellant-accused filed a

complaint under Section 155 Cr.PC4 on 24th April 2023 before

P.S. Adhartaal District-Jabalpur alleging that the complainant

with whom he does not want any relationship or dealing,

repeatedly threatened him saying that she would kill herself and

even on the day of filing of the said complaint, she came to his

residence asking him to speak with her, hurled abuses and also

consumed rat poison. Subsequently, the Appellant-accused also

lodged a complaint with the Municipal Commissioner, Jabalpur

dated 05th July 2023 detailing the alleged harassment by the

complainant to the effect of false implication in cases and stating

that if the harassment continues, he will be forced to commit

suicide. A similar complaint was also submitted to the Divisional

Officer, Nagar Nigam.

6. As a consequence of the said representation, the

complainant was issued a show cause notice dated 6th July 2023

4 Code of Criminal Procedure 1973

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 4 of 8

where she was asked to rectify her behaviour and submit a

clarification against the allegations within a period of 24 hours.

It was stated therein that should she not furnish such a

clarification, she would be relieved of employment. The

Appellant-accused also submitted a representation to the

Superintendent of Police, Jabalpur, in similar terms as the

representations referred to in the preceding paragraph.

7. It is to be noted that the FIR and chargesheet which are the

subject matter of the instant proceedings, are developments

subsequent to the representations made by the Appellantaccused.

8. The Appellant-accused filed a petition under Section 482,

Cr.PC for quashing of the FIR on 13th October 2023. The police

completed its investigation and presented chargesheet for trial, as

already noted supra.

9. In terms of the impugned judgement dated 27th January

2025, the High Court refused to quash the FIR and charge sheet

observing:

“5. At this stage, it cannot be said that there was false

promise or not. It will be matter of evidence before

the trial Court to decide the same. It will be too early

to quash FIR on the said pretext.

6. Petition is dismissed.”

10. It is in this background that the present case has travelled

up to this Court. We have heard the learned senior counsel,

Mr. Mrigendra Singh, assisted by Ms. Niti Richhariya, learned 

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 5 of 8

Advocate-on-Record for the Appellant-accused and Mr.

Bhupendra Pratap Singh, learned Deputy Advocate General for

the State, assisted by Ms. Mrinal Gopal Elker, learned Advocate

on Record.

11. Section 528 of the BNSS, 2023 reads:-

“528. Saving of inherent powers of High Court.—Nothing in

this Sanhita shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent

powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be

necessary to give effect to any order under this Sanhita, or to

prevent abuse of the process of any Court or otherwise to

secure the ends of justice.”

12. The exercise of the powers under Section 482, Cr.PC

which corresponds to Section 528, BNSS have been repeatedly

detailed in various judgments. We need not do so once more.

Suffice it to refer to what is arguably the most famous judgment

i.e., State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal5

and its recent reiteration in

M. Srikanth v. State of Telangana6

, and Balaji Traders v. State

of U.P.7

.

13. As apparent from the record, the Appellant-accused and

the complainant had been colleagues for the past 5 years and it is

somewhere during this time that their relationship progressed.

We notice once again that the Appellant-accused had initiated

legal processes/administrative processes against the complainant

much prior to the subject FIR being lodged. These included a

5 1992 Supp (1) 335

6

(2019) 10 SCC 373

7 2025 SCC OnLine SC 1314

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 6 of 8

show-cause notice issued by the employer regarding her

continued acrimonious behaviour against the Appellant- accused,

with the ultimatum that should she not respond to the notice with

the requisite clarification, she would be relieved of her

employment. It is only thereafter that the subject FIR was lodged.

Further, the same was lodged four months after the alleged

incident of forced sexual intercourse with the complainant. If the

description of the offence is taken at face value, right at the first

instance, the complainant was not willing and was persuaded to

engage in relations on the assurance of eventual marriage

between the parties. When she enquired as to when the same

would take place, a few days later, allegedly the Appellantaccused refused and asked her to marry someone else. That

would be the first occasion when, having realized that she had

been taken advantage of the complainant should have taken the

requisite action. Even if that was not done so, the fact that the

subject FIR was only lodged after the issuance of show-cause

notice, which obviously has large real-world implications insofar

as the complainant is concerned, leaves open a gaping possibility

that the same was lodged as an afterthought and was a vehicle for

vengeance for the impending consequences described above.

14. One of the factors mentioned in Bhajan Lal (supra)

justifying the quashing of criminal proceedings is when the same

is initiated in pursuance of ulterior motives. It reads as under:

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 7 of 8

“(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with

mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted

with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused

and with a view to spite him due to private and personal

grudge.”

Reference to Mohd. Wajid v. State of U.P.

8

, would also be

appropriate. It was held:

“36. At this stage, we would like to observe something important.

Whenever an accused comes before the Court invoking either the

inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure (CrPC) or extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226

of the Constitution to get the FIR or the criminal proceedings

quashed essentially on the ground that such proceedings are

manifestly frivolous or vexatious or instituted with the ulterior

motive for wreaking vengeance, then in such circumstances the

Court owes a duty to look into the FIR with care and a little more

closely.

37. We say so because once the complainant decides to proceed

against the accused with an ulterior motive for wreaking personal

vengeance, etc. then he would ensure that the FIR/complaint is

very well drafted with all the necessary pleadings. The

complainant would ensure that the averments made in the

FIR/complaint are such that they disclose the necessary

ingredients to constitute the alleged offence. Therefore, it will not

be just enough for the Court to look into the averments made in

the FIR/complaint alone for the purpose of ascertaining whether

the necessary ingredients to constitute the alleged offence are

disclosed or not.

38. In frivolous or vexatious proceedings, the Court owes a duty

to look into many other attending circumstances emerging from

the record of the case over and above the averments and, if need

be, with due care and circumspection try to read in between the

lines. The Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Section

482CrPC or Article 226 of the Constitution need not restrict itself

only to the stage of a case but is empowered to take into account

the overall circumstances leading to the initiation/registration of

the case as well as the materials collected in the course of

investigation…”

(emphasis supplied)

8

(2023) 20 SCC 219

Crl. App. No…../2025@SLP(Crl)No.3361/2025 Page 8 of 8

15. In view of the above discussion, we are of the view that

the FIR and the chargesheet against the Appellant-accused

ought to be quashed. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid

terms. The judgment and order passed by the High Court of

Madhya Pradesh with particulars as mentioned in paragraph 2,

is set aside.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand closed.

……………………………………………..J.

(SANJAY KAROL)

………………………………………………J.

(NONGMEIKAPAM KOTISWAR SINGH)

New Delhi;

September 22, 2025

Cryptic and Unreasoned Judgment of the High Court The High Court allowed the appeals and acquitted the accused without discussing or marshalling the facts and evidence on record. Findings in para 3 of the High Court judgment were de hors any basis, lacking proper reasoning or analysis. The judgment even failed to mention the case number and trial court details from which the appeals had arisen. Failure of Appellate Duty under Section 374(2) CrPC As the first appellate court, the High Court is bound to independently evaluate the entire evidence (oral, medical, witness statements, defence case). The appellate court is akin to a trial court and must be satisfied that the prosecution proved the case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court did not exercise this jurisdiction properly. Requirement of Independent Application of Mind While a judgment need not be lengthy, it must reflect due application of mind to crucial evidence. The High Court did not assess whether the Sessions Court was justified in convicting the accused. Principle from Precedents Ignored Supreme Court cited State of U.P. v. Ambarish (2021) 16 SCC 371, Shakuntala Shukla v. State of U.P. (2021) 20 SCC 818, and SBI v. Ajay Kumar Sood (2023) 7 SCC 282 – holding that appellate courts must apply mind to the entire record while deciding criminal appeals. High Court’s failure to do so vitiated its judgment. Preservation of Fair Trial Rights and Liberty Since a person’s liberty was at stake, the High Court had a duty to carefully reappraise the evidence. The absence of reasoning amounted to miscarriage of justice, warranting remand.

2025 INSC 1170 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.736-738/2015

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND Appellant(s)

VERSUS

ANIL & ORS. Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

There is no representation on behalf of respondent Nos.1

and 2. On perusal of the Office Report, it is noted that

learned counsel, Mustaq Ahmed for respondent No.1 has since

passed away. There is no alternative arrangement made. As far

as respondent No.2 - Mohd. Imaran is concerned, there is no

representation on his behalf. In the circumstances, we request

learned counsel, Smt. Sangeeta Kumar and Smt. Manjeet Chawla

to serve as Amicis Curiae for respondent Nos.1 and 2

respectively in these appeals since they are appearing on

behalf of the Supreme Court Legal Services Committee presently

representing respondent Nos.3 and 4 respectively.

2. The State of Uttarakhand has filed these appeals assailing

the Common Judgment dated 02.05.2013 passed by the Division

Bench of the High Court of Uttarakhand in Criminal Appeal

No.95/2009, Criminal Appeal No.97/2009 and Criminal Appeal

1

No.98/2009. Those appeals were preferred by the respondentaccused(s), Anil, Imran, Wasif and Pappu. Vide the impugned

judgment, the High Court has allowed the criminal appeals and

acquitted Anil and Imran who were in jail, and ordered them to

be released. The accused Wasim and Pappu who are on bail were

discharged from their bail bonds and sureties. By the

impugned judgment, the High Court has set aside the judgment

of conviction and sentence of life imprisonment in the case of

accused Nos.1 and 2 and sentence of one year imprisonment plus

fine in the case of accused Nos.3 and 4 imposed by judgment

dated 04.06.2009 in ST No.50/2003.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellant-State of

Uttarakhand and learned senior counsel and learned counsel for

the respondent-accused(s).

4. Learned counsel for the appellant-State made a two-fold

submission: firstly, she contended that even without going into

the merits of the case, the manner and tenor of the judgment

may be considered; that this is a judgment of a High Court

which was considering a first appeal against a judgment and

order of conviction against which appeals were filed by

respondents - accused; that in a cryptic manner, the judgment

has been delivered by the High Court acquitting the respondents

– accused. That this Court in a catena of cases has observed

that even if a judgment confirming the judgment of a Sessions

2

Court is to be rendered by the High Court, thereby dismissing

the first appeal which has been preferred under Section 374 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, “CrPC”), the

appeal would have to be considered based on the evidence on

record and thereafter possibly the High Court could dismiss

such an appeal. But here is a case where the High Court has

reversed the judgment of the Sessions Court inasmuch as the

judgment and sentence of life imprisonment has been set aside

and a complete acquittal given to the respondents - accused

without there being any reasons and marshalling of the facts

and the evidence on record. In this regard, she drew our

attention to paragraphs 2 and 3 of the impugned judgment and

submitted that the findings in paragraph 3 of the impugned

judgment are de hors any basis in the absence of there being a

discussion of the facts and evidence on record. In the

circumstances, she submitted that if this Court is so inclined,

may consider remanding of the matter without going into the

merits of the case.

5. The second submission of learned counsel for the appellant

is, in the event this Court is not inclined to accept the first

submission, then the appeal can be taken up on merits. Learned

counsel submitted that even on merits, the High Court could not

have given a judgment of acquittal by reversing the judgment of

the Sessions Court. She therefore submitted that the impugned

3

judgment may be set aside and the judgment of the Sessions

Court may be restored.

6. Per contra, learned senior counsel and learned counsel

appearing for the respondents-accused who have been acquitted,

vehemently contended that there is no merit in the submissions

made by the appellant’s counsel. They drew our attention to the

fact that the High Court may have given the judgment pithily

but it is not without substance. Merely because the impugned

judgment is short and not a lengthy one cannot make it an

erroneous judgment as the reasoning is evident and there is a

basis for the findings arrived at. In the circumstances, this

Court may not accept the first contention of the appellant and

hence, they contended that they are ready to argue the matter

on merits so that this Court could confirm the judgment of

acquittal passed by the High Court.

7. In view of the nature of grievances expressed by the

appellant-State and the tenor of the submissions advanced, it

is not necessary to narrate the facts of the case giving rise

to these appeals in detail.

8. We observe that while hearing appeals under Section 374(2)

of the CrPC, the High Court is exercising its appellate

jurisdiction. There has to be an independent application of

mind in deciding the criminal appeal against conviction. It is

4

the duty of an appellate court to independently evaluate the

evidence presented and determine whether such evidence is

credible. Even if the evidence is deemed reliable, the High

Court must further assess whether the prosecution has

established its case beyond reasonable doubt. The High Court,

though being an appellate Court, is akin to a Trial Court and

must be convinced beyond all reasonable doubt that the

prosecution's case is substantially true and that the guilt of

the accused has been conclusively proven while considering an

appeal against conviction.

9. As the first appellate court, the High Court is expected

to evaluate the evidence including the medical evidence,

statement of the victim, statements of the witnesses and the

defence version with due care. While the judgment need not be

excessively lengthy, it must reflect a proper application of

mind to crucial evidence. Albeit the High Court does not have

the advantage to examine the witnesses directly, the High

Court should, as an appellate Court, re-assess the facts,

evidence on record and findings to arrive at a just conclusion

in deciding whether the Trial Court was justified in

convicting the accused or not. We are also cognizant of the

large pendency of cases bombarding our courts. However, the

same cannot come in the way of the Court’s solemn duty,

particularly, when a person's liberty is at stake.

5

10. This Court, in State of Uttar Pradesh vs. Ambarish,

(2021) 16 SCC 371 held that while deciding a criminal appeal

on merits, the High Court is required to apply its mind to the

entirety of the case, including the evidence on the record

before arriving at its conclusion. In this regard, we may also

refer to the orders passed by this Court in Shakuntala Shukla

vs. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2021) 20 SCC 818 and State Bank

 of India vs. Ajay Kumar Sood, (2023) 7 SCC 282.

11. We find that the High Court ought to have considered the

evidence on record in light of the arguments advanced at the

bar and thereafter ascertained whether the Sessions Court was

justified in passing the judgment of conviction and imposing

the sentence. The same being absent in the impugned judgment,

for that sole reason, we set aside the same. In fact, the High

Court has not even referred to the case number and the trial

court from which the appeals had arisen.

12. We therefore find that the first contention advanced by

the learned counsel for the appellant-State has to be accepted

for the reason that the respondents-accused in these appeals

respectively would also have another opportunity in the appeals

that they had filed before the High Court. In the

circumstances, while holding that the impugned judgment of the

High Court is cryptic and de hors any reasoning in coming to

the findings in paragraph 3 of the said judgment, we set aside

6

the said judgment without expressing anything on the merits of

the case.

13. We allow the appeals filed on the aforesaid limited

ground.

14. The matters are remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand

at Nainital.

15. The High Court is requested to rehear the appeals filed by

the respondents/accused respectively in these appeals by also

giving an opportunity to the appellant-State herein to make its

submission in the said appeals as well as the accused to make

this submission in the matter.

16. We once again clarify that we have not made any

observations on the merits of the matter.

17. All contentions on both sides are left open to be

advanced before the High Court.

18. Since the incident is of the year 2002 and the impugned

judgment is dated 02.05.2013 and we are remanding the matter to

the High Court, we request the High Court to dispose of the

appeal as expeditiously as possible.

19. Since we have set aside the judgment dated 02.05.2013

passed by the High Court of Uttarakhand at Nainital in Criminal

Appeal Nos.95 of 1997; 97 of 1997 and 98 of 1997, the

7

accused Anil and Imran shall remain on bail. However, the said

accused shall appear before the concerned Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Haldwani and execute fresh bonds for a sum

of Rs.15,000/- each with two like sureties each and subject to

other conditions imposed by the concerned Principal District

and Sessions Judge, Haldwani.

20. In view of the above, the judgment dated 02.05.2013 passed

in Criminal Appeal No.95/2009, Criminal Appeal No.97/2009 and

Criminal Appeal No.98/2009 are set aside, the matters are

remanded to the High Court of Uttarakhand by restoring the

aforesaid appeals on the file of the said High Court. The High

Court is requested to rehear these appeals in order to decide

upon the correctness or otherwise of the judgment and sentence

imposed by the Sessions Court and to dispose of the appeals in

accordance with law.

21. The appeals are allowed and disposed of in the aforesaid

terms.

22. It is needless to observe that the High Court shall issue

notice to all the parties and thereafter shall rehear the

appeals upon service of notice to the respondents.

8

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

………………………………………………………,J.

 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

………………………………………………………,J.

 (R. MAHADEVAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 18, 2025.

9

ITEM NO.124 COURT NO.5 SECTION II-B

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 736-738/2015

THE STATE OF UTTARAKHAND Appellant(s)

 VERSUS

ANIL & ORS. Respondent(s)

Date : 18-09-2025 These appeals were called on for hearing

today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE B.V. NAGARATHNA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R. MAHADEVAN

For Appellant(s) Mr. Sudarshan Singh Rawat, AOR

 Ms. Saakshi Singh Rawat, Adv.


For Respondent(s) Ms. Mridula Ray Bharadwaj, AOR


 Ms. Sangeeta Kumar, AOR

 Mrs. Vithika Garg, Adv.

 Ms. Vidushi Garg, Adv.


 Mr. A. Shirajudeen, Sr. Adv.

 Ms. Manjeet Chawla, AOR

 Ms. Kiran Bala Agarwal, Adv.

 Ms. Shaik Soni Ahamed, Adv.


 UPON hearing the counsel, the Court made the following

 O R D E R

The appeals are allowed and disposed of in terms of the

signed non-reportable judgment which is placed on the file.

Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

(RADHA SHARMA) (DIVYA BABBAR)

ASTT. REGISTRAR-cum-PS COURT MASTER (NSH)

10

Indian Penal Code, 1860 — Sections 302, 304 Part I, 34 — Murder or culpable homicide — Intention vs. Knowledge: Where the accused, armed with sharp-edged weapons (pike, spear), used only their blunt sides in an assault arising out of a dispute over land measurement, causing death of three persons — Held, though the accused had knowledge that the injuries inflicted could likely cause death, there was no material to establish an intention to kill. Held: Conviction under Section 302 IPC not sustainable. Conviction altered to Section 304 Part I IPC. Evidence — Related witness testimony — Reliance: Testimony of PW-1 (son/nephew of deceased persons), though related, found trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence. Hostility of PW-2 does not affect prosecution case. Sentence — Modification: Accused had already undergone imprisonment for more than 12 years. Sentence reduced to period already undergone. Ordered to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Disposition Appeal partly allowed. Conviction under Section 302 IPC set aside. Conviction modified to Section 304 Part I IPC. Sentence reduced to period already undergone.

2025 INSC 1172

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 1 of 9

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

RAGHAV PRASHAD AND OTHERS … APPELLANTS


versus

STATE OF U.P. … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

B.R.GAVAI, CJI.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

1. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and order

dated 4th July 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad1 in Criminal Appeal u/s 374

Cr.P.C. No. 2259 of 1989 filed by the accused appellants

whereby, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the

judgment and order dated 8th November 1989 passed by the

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karvi (Banda)2 in

Sessions Case No. 88 of 1986 convicting the accused appellants

under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”.

2 Hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”.

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

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18603. The High Court also upheld the order of sentence dated

15th November, 1989 vide which the Trial Court had sentenced

the accused appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life

along with a fine of Rs.6,000/-.

2. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are

as under:

2.1. It is the prosecution case that on the morning of

6th August 1986 at 8 o’clock, complainant – Ram Gopal

(PW-1) along with his father Ram Avtar, uncles Namo

Shankar and Girija Shankar and two other persons had

arrived at Baruahaar Ghat for measuring some agricultural

fields for partition where they met the accused appellants –

Raghav Prashad (Accused No.1/owner of adjacent land),

Prem Shankar (Accused No.2/brother of Accused No.1),

Dayanidhi (Accused No.3/Cousin brother of Accused No.1

and Accused No.2) and Late Ram Naresh

(Accused No. 4/Father-in-law of Accused No. 2).

2.2. It is the prosecution case that the accused persons who

were hiding in the Baruahaar Ghat suddenly came out. They

3 Hereinafter referred to as “IPC”.

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had an altercation with complainant’s father and his uncles

over the measurement of agricultural fields and later

started hitting them with pike, sticks, and spear.

2.3. Thereafter, complainant along with his injured father and

uncles went to the Raipura police station in a bullock cart

driven by one Kandhai Lal and an FIR No. 53/1986 came to

be registered at 9:30 AM initially under Sections 307 and

308 read with Section 34 IPC. Subsequently, the injured

persons were sent to the Karvi Hospital in a truck from the

police station.

2.4. Injured Ram Avtar and Namo Shankar succumbed to their

injuries on the same day at Karvi Hospital whereas injured

Girija Shankar also died on same day while being shifted to

another hospital in Allahabad. Hence, charge under Section

302 IPC was added.

2.5. The post-mortem report dated 7th August 1986 noted

various ante-mortem injuries and fractures on the body of

the deceased persons.

2.6. The accused appellants were arrested on 12th August 1986.

The chargesheet was filed and the case being exclusively 

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triable by the Sessions Court was committed for Trial to the

court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karvi

(Banda) by an order dated 13th November 1986 passed by

the Munsiff Court, Karvi. Thereafter, the accused appellants

were released on bail on 7th January 1987.

2.7. Vide judgment and order dated 8th November 1989, the Trial

Court convicted the accused appellants for the offence

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC

and vide order dated 15th November, 1989 they were

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life alongwith a fine

of Rs. 6,000/-.

2.8. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Appeal being

Criminal Appeal u/s 374 Cr.P.C. No. 2259 of 1989 before

the High Court which was dismissed vide impugned

judgment and order dated 4th July 2013. The High Court

upheld the judgment and order of the Trial Court and

directed the Trial Court to take necessary steps to ensure

that the accused appellants who were out on bail are

arrested and committed to custody to undergo their

sentence. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

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2.9. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by way of special

leave.

SUBMISSIONS

3. We have heard Shri Raj Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for

the appellants and Shri Akshay Amritanshu, learned counsel for

the respondent-State.

4. Shri Raj Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the accused

appellants submitted that the prosecution’s case is solely based

on the evidence of PW-1. It is submitted that PW-1 is a related

witness and as such, the conviction cannot rest solely on the

basis of his evidence. In addition, it is submitted that the offence

committed by the accused appellants would not fall under

Section 302 IPC and at the most, the accused appellants could

be convicted for a lesser offence.

5. Per contra, Shri Akshay Amritanshu, the learned counsel

appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal. He

submitted that the appellants have committed the brutal murder

of three persons. It is further submitted that the testimony of

PW-1 is supported by medical evidence and as such, no

interference by this Court would be warranted. 

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DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material placed on record.

7. The prosecution case basically rests on the testimony of

PW-1, who is the son of deceased Ram Avtar and nephew of

deceased Namo Shankar and deceased Girija Shankar. PW-1 in

his statement has deposed that there was a dispute over the

measurement of agricultural fields between deceased Ram Avtar

and accused No. 1 - Raghav Prashad. PW-1 stated that when he

along with all three deceased and two other persons went to the

agricultural field in Baruahaar Ghat, they saw that the four

accused persons were hiding there and on seeing them, they

came out. It is further stated that the accused persons Raghav

Prashad and Dayanidhi were carrying sticks whereas Prem

Shankar had a pike and his father-in-law had a spear.

8. The perusal of the evidence of PW-1 would reveal that even

though the accused appellants were having sharp weapons

(pike, spear, etc.), they had only used the blunt side of the said

weapons. 

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9. It is further to be noted that PW-2 – Chandrika Prasad who

is the son of deceased Namo Shankar had turned hostile.

10. Moreover, the medical evidence would also show that all the

three deceased persons had lacerated and contused wounds only

and there were no incised wounds.

11. As already seen above, a perusal of the evidence of PW-1

would itself reveal that the accused persons Raghav Prashad and

Dayanidhi were carrying sticks whereas the other accused

persons Prem Shankar and Late Ram Naresh who were carrying

the sharp weapons, had only used the blunt side of the weapons.

12. In view of the evidence of PW-1, we do not find any reason

to disagree with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the

Trial Court and the High Court that it was the accused

appellants who caused the death of Ram Shankar, Namo

Shankar and Girija Shankar.

13. However, the question that arises for our consideration is

as to whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC would be

tenable or whether the accused are liable to be convicted for a

lesser offence. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

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14. We find that though the accused persons could be said to

have the knowledge that the injuries would cause death of the

deceased, there is no material on record to show that they had

the intention to kill them. It is further to be noted that PW-1 had

himself deposed that there was prior enmity between the

Appellant No. 1- Raghav Prashad and deceased Ram Avtar over

the measurement of agricultural fields.

15. We, therefore, find that in the facts of the present case, the

conviction under Section 302 IPC would not be tenable and is

liable to be converted to one under Section 304 Part I of IPC. We

are, therefore, inclined to partly allow the appeal.

CONCLUSION

16. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is partly allowed;

(ii) The conviction of the accused appellants under Section

302 of IPC is converted to one under Section 304 Part 1

of IPC; and

(iii) Accused appellants have already undergone sentence of

more than 12 years. We, therefore, find that the sentence

already undergone by them would subserve the interest 

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of justice. The accused appellants are, therefore,

directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any

other case.

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..…………..……………...CJI.

(B.R.GAVAI)

…….........…………………...J.

 (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 26, 2025

2025 INSC 1158 — Sanjabij Tari v. Kishore S. Borcar & Anr., Criminal Appeal No. 1755 of 2010. Decided: 25th September, 2025. Bench: Manmohan, J. & N.V. Anjaria, J. Nature of case — Appeal against High Court’s ex-parte order of acquittal in revision reversing concurrent convictions under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (NI Act). Trial Court and Sessions Court had convicted the accused for dishonour of cheque; Supreme Court set aside High Court order and restored convictions. Facts (short) — Complainant alleged delivery of cash loan(s) totalling ₹6,00,000 to accused; accused issued cheque which was dishonoured. Complainant produced evidence (PW-1) of loan and means of raising funds (father, borrowings); accused admitted signature but pleaded lack of enforceable debt and alleged cheque was blank security to enable complainant to obtain bank loan. Accused failed to file independent evidence to show complainant’s financial incapacity; statutory demand notice not replied. Presumptions under Sections 118 & 139 NI Act — Once execution (signature) of cheque is admitted, the statutory presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 arise that the cheque was drawn for consideration and in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability. These presumptions are rebuttable, but the initial burden to exhibit a probable defence lies on the accused/drawer; if rebutted, the onus shifts back to the complainant to prove financial capacity. Concurrent factual findings accepting complainant’s case should not be upset in revision unless perverse. Proof of financial capacity — Mere bald pleas as to complainant’s impecuniosity are insufficient. Where defence questions complainant’s capacity (especially in cash loan cases), accused must adduce independent materials or examine appropriate witnesses (e.g., bank officials, Income-tax Officer) to discharge the burden of raising a probable defence. In absence of such material, trial courts are justified in upholding presumption under Section 139. Effect of failure to reply to statutory notice — Non-reply to the statutory demand notice under Section 138 gives rise to an adverse inference and strengthens the complainant’s case; accused is expected to set up his defence in reply to the notice. Blank/ security cheque defence — Allegation that a signed blank cheque was handed over merely as a security to enable complainant to obtain bank finance is a defence which must be supported by credible material. Unsupported and inherently improbable assertions cannot successfully rebut statutory presumptions. Interaction with Income-tax Act, 1961 (s.269SS) — A transaction in cash exceeding ₹20,000 in breach of Section 269SS, IT Act, 1961, may attract penalty under tax law (s.271D) but does not, by itself, render the antecedent debt unenforceable for the purposes of Section 138 NI Act or automatically rebut the presumption under Section 139. A contravention of s.269SS does not make the debt void; therefore Kerala HC decision holding such cash transactions ipso facto non-enforceable is not tenable. Revisional jurisdiction — A High Court in revisional jurisdiction must not re-appreciate and re-weigh evidence and upset concurrent findings of Trial and Sessions Courts in absence of perversity or jurisdictional error. Remedy/relief in this case — High Court’s acquittal dated 16.04.2009 set aside; Trial Court and Sessions Court judgments restored. Accused directed to pay ₹7,50,000 in 15 equal monthly instalments of ₹50,000 each. Policy/administrative directions — In view of massive pendency of Section 138 cases and for ensuring expeditious disposal, the Court issues comprehensive procedural directions (to be implemented not later than 1st November, 2025) for all NI Act complaints, including (inter alia): complainant to effect dasti service in addition to usual modes and provide electronic contact particulars under affidavit; courts to resort to electronic service where permissible; affidavit of service to be filed; penal consequences for false affidavits; operationalise dedicated online payment facilities (QR/UPI) at district level and make this option explicit in summons; facilitate compounding/closure upon receipt; prescribe a standard synopsis to be filed at the top of every Section 138 complaint stating parties, cheque particulars, presentation/dishonour details, statutory notice particulars, cause of action and reliefs sought; no requirement to issue summons prior to cognizance (in view of BNSS, 2023 and NI Act being a special enactment); courts may use limited preliminary questioning (admissions/denials under S.251 Cr.P.C. / S.274 BNSS) to decide suitability for summary trial; encourage interim deposit under Section 143A NI Act where appropriate; physical listing post-service of summons; realistic pecuniary limits for evening courts; dashboards and monthly reviews in high-pendency registries (Delhi, Mumbai, Calcutta); administrative committees to monitor NI Act cases; promotion of mediation/Lok Adalats/ADR; record and preserve cogent reasons when converting summary trial to summons trial. Compounding guidelines (modified) — Damodar S. Prabhu guidelines revisited and refined to discourage delay: payment of cheque amount before defence evidence — compounding may be allowed without costs; payment after defence evidence but before pronouncement of judgment — compounding on payment of additional 5% of cheque amount to Legal Services Authority (or as court directs); payment before Sessions Court / High Court in revision/appeal — compounding on payment of 7.5% costs; payment before Supreme Court — compounding on payment of 10% costs; alternative: where complainant/financial institutions demand amounts beyond cheque value, courts may require accused to plead guilty and pass orders under s.255 Cr.P.C./278 BNSS or grant benefits under Probation of Offenders Act, 1958. Ratio / Law laid down — (i) statutory presumptions under ss.118 & 139 NI Act apply once signature/execution of cheque is admitted; (ii) such presumptions are rebuttable but initial burden to raise a probable defence lies on accused and, if discharged, the complainant must then prove the antecedent debt and financial capacity; (iii) contravention of s.269SS, IT Act, 1961, attracts tax/penalty but does not render the debt unenforceable under s.138 NI Act; (iv) revisional interference with concurrent findings is impermissible absent perversity; (v) wide administrative directions to expedite Section 138 cases and revised compounding scale are appropriate and justified. Cases referred to / considered — (inter alia) Rangappa v. Sri Mohan (2010) 11 SCC 441; APS Forex Services Pvt. Ltd. v. Shakti International Fashion Linkers (2020) 12 SCC 724; Damodar S. Prabhu v. Sayed Babalal H. (2010) 5 SCC 663; MMTC Ltd. v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234; P. Mohanraj v. Shah Brothers Ispat Pvt. Ltd. (2021) 6 SCC 258; Tedhi Singh v. Narayan Dass Mahant (2022) 6 SCC 735; Rajaram S/o Sriramulu Naidu v. Maruthachalam (2023) 16 SCC 125; plus relevant High Court decisions noted and considered. Disposition — Appeal allowed; High Court order of acquittal quashed; convictions and orders of Trial Court and Sessions Court restored; directions/guidelines issued as above — implementation to commence by 1st November, 2025.

2025 INSC 1158

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 1 of 19

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1755 OF 2010

SANJABIJ TARI .…. APPELLANT

VERSUS

KISHORE S. BORCAR & ANR. ..…RESPONDENTS

J U D G M E N T

MANMOHAN, J.

1. The present Appeal has been filed challenging the ex-parte judgment and

order dated 16th April 2009 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Goa

acquitting the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of the Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881 (for short ‘NI Act’) and reversing the concurrent judgments

of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF APPELLANT-COMPLAINANT

2. Mr. Amarjit Singh Bedi, learned counsel for the Appellant-Complainant

submitted that the High Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction erred in

upsetting the conviction of the Respondent No.1-Accused under Section 138 of

the NI Act based on categorical findings of facts rendered by both the Courts

below that the dishonoured cheque had been issued in favour of the AppellantComplainant in discharge of a legally enforceable debt.

3. He contended that there was no evidence on record to establish that the

Appellant-Complainant did not have the financial means to advance a friendly

loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) to the Respondent No.1-Accused . He

emphasised that the Appellant-Complainant in his statement under oath had stated 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 2 of 19

that in order to oblige his friend/Respondent No.1-Accused , the AppellantComplainant had arranged money from his father, who was a cloth merchant

having two shops and even went to the extent of parting with a portion of the loan

amount which he himself had borrowed from a financial institution.

4. He pointed out that the Respondent No.1-Accused during the course of

arguments on sentencing before the Trial Court had prayed for leniency on the

ground that he was ready to pay the cheque amount to the Appellant-Complainant

within a reasonable time.

5. He further stated that though the Appellant-Complainant filed an

application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (‘Cr.P.C.’) for

recall of the impugned judgment by substantiating sufficient cause for the absence

of his advocate on 16th April 2009, yet the learned Single Judge had been pleased

to dismiss the said application holding that the Court had become functus officio

and it had no jurisdiction under criminal law to recall the impugned order. He

submitted that the High Court erred in not exercising its inherent powers to set

aside the impugned judgment which, for all legal purposes, was an ex-parte order.

6. He lastly stated that if this Court were to set aside the impugned judgment

of the High Court and restore the concurrent judgments of the Trial Court and

Sessions Court, the Appellant-Complainant would accept the payment of

outstanding amount in instalments as directed by the Trial Court.

ARGUMENTS ON BEHALF OF RESPONDENT NO.1-ACCUSED

7. Per contra, Mr. Ankit Yadav, learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-

Accused stated that the Appellant-Complainant was being paid a salary of only

Rs.2,300/- (Rupees Two Thousand and Three Hundred) per month at the relevant

point of time, which was not even adequate to take care of his family, leave alone

sufficient to advance a loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs). He contended

that the Appellant-Complainant was a highly indebted person who did not have

any source of income other than his meagre salary and therefore, he did not have 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 3 of 19

the wherewithal to advance such a huge loan and that too without issuance of any

kind of receipt.

8. He submitted that the accused can always rely on material and/or evidence

filed by the complainant in order to raise a probable defence which creates doubts

about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. In support of his

submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court in Rangappa vs. Sri

Mohan, (2010) 11 SCC 441.

9. He further submitted that whenever the accused questions the financial

capacity of the complainant in support of his probable defence, despite the

presumption of a legally enforceable debt under Section 139 of the NI Act, the

onus shifts back to the complainant to prove his financial capacity, more

particularly, when it is a case of giving loan by cash and thereafter issuance of a

cheque. In support of his submission, he relied upon the judgment of this Court

in APS Forex Services Private Limited vs. Shakti International Fashion

Linkers and Ors., (2020) 12 SCC 724.

10. He emphasised that the defence of the Respondent No.1-Accused that a

blank cheque had been given to the Appellant-Complainant to enable him to

obtain a loan from the bank was more than a probable defence to rebut the

presumption under the NI Act, particularly, in view of the fact that the parties

were known to each other.

REASONING

SCOPE AND INTENT OF CHAPTER XVII OF NI ACT

11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties, this Court is of the view that

it is essential to first outline the scope and intent of Chapter XVII (Sections 138

to 148) of NI Act which has been inserted by Act 66 of 1988 w.e.f. 1st April 1989.

12. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of Act 66 of 1988 states, “….to

enhance the acceptability of cheques in settlement of liabilities by making the

drawer liable for penalties in case of bouncing of cheques due to insufficiency of 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 4 of 19

funds in the accounts or for the reason that it exceeds the arrangements made by

the drawer, with adequate safeguards to prevent harassment of honest drawers.”

13. The provisions contained in Chapter XVII provide that where any cheque

drawn by a person for the discharge of any liability is returned by the bank unpaid

for the reason of the insufficiency of the amount of money standing to the credit

of the account on which the cheque was drawn or for the reason that it exceeds

the arrangements made by the drawer of the cheque with the banker for that

account, the drawer of such cheque shall be deemed to have committed an

offence. In that case, the drawer, without prejudice to the other provisions of the

said Act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to

two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or

with both.

14. Consequently, this Court is of the view that the intent behind introducing

Chapter XVII is to restore the credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute

for cash payment and to promote a culture of using cheques. Further, by

criminalizing the act of issuing cheques without sufficient funds or for other

specified reasons, the law promotes financial discipline, discourages

irresponsible practices and allows for a more efficient and timely resolution of

disputes compared to the previous pure civil remedy which was found to involve

the payee in a long-drawn out process of litigation.

ONCE EXECUTION OF CHEQUE IS ADMITTED, PRESUMPTIONS UNDER

SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF THE NI ACT ARISE

15. In the present case, the cheque in question has admittedly been signed by

the Respondent No.1-Accused . This Court is of the view that once the execution

of the cheque is admitted, the presumption under Section 118 of the NI Act that

the cheque in question was drawn for consideration and the presumption under

Section 139 of the NI Act that the holder of the cheque received the said cheque

in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or liability arises against the accused. It

is pertinent to mention that observations to the contrary by a two Judges Bench 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 5 of 19

in Krishna Janardhan Bhat vs. Dattatraya G. Hegde, (2008) 4 SCC 54 have

been set aside by a three Judges Bench in Rangappa (supra).

16. This Court is further of the view that by creating this presumption, the law

reinforces the reliability of cheques as a mode of payment in commercial

transactions.

17. Needless to mention that the presumption contemplated under Section 139

of the NI Act, is a rebuttable presumption. However, the initial onus of proving

that the cheque is not in discharge of any debt or other liability is on the

accused/drawer of the cheque [See: Bir Singh vs. Mukesh Kumar, (2019) 4 SCC

197].

18. The judgment of this Court in APS Forex Services Private Limited (supra)

relied upon by learned counsel for the Respondent No.1-Accused only says that

presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act is rebuttable and when the same is

rebutted, the onus would shift back to the complainant to prove his financial

capacity, more particularly, when it is a case of giving loan by cash. This judgment

nowhere states, as was sought to be contended by learned counsel for the

Respondent No.1-Accused, that in cases of dishonour of cheques, in lieu of cash

loans, the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act does not arise.

APPROACH OF SOME COURTS BELOW TO NOT GIVE EFFECT TO THE

PRESUMTIONS UNDER SECTIONS 118 AND 139 OF NI ACT IS CONTRARY

TO MANDATE OF PARLIAMENT

19. Recently, the Kerala High Court in P.C. Hari vs. Shine Varghese & Anr.,

2025 SCC OnLine Ker 5535 has taken the view that a debt created by a cash

transaction above Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty Thousand) in violation of the

provisions of Section 269SS of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short ‘IT Act,

1961’) is not a ‘legally enforceable debt’ unless there is a valid explanation for

the same, meaning thereby that the presumption under Section 139 of the Act will

not be attracted in cash transactions above Rs. 20,000/- (Rupees Twenty

Thousand). 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 6 of 19

20. However, this Court is of the view that any breach of Section 269SS of the

IT Act, 1961 is subject to a penalty only under Section 271D of the IT Act, 1961.

Further neither Section 269SS nor 271D of the IT Act, 1961 state that any

transaction in breach thereof will be illegal, invalid or statutorily void. Therefore,

any violation of Section 269SS would not render the transaction unenforceable

under Section 138 of the NI Act or rebut the presumptions under Sections 118

and 139 of the NI Act because such a person, assuming him/her to be the

payee/holder in due course, is liable to be visited by a penalty only as prescribed.

Consequently, the view that any transaction above Rs.20,000/- (Rupees Twenty

Thousand) is illegal and void and therefore does not fall within the definition of

‘legally enforceable debt’ cannot be countenanced. Accordingly, the conclusion

of law in P.C. Hari (supra) is set aside.

21. This Court also takes judicial notice of the fact that some District Courts

and some High Courts are not giving effect to the presumptions incorporated in

Sections 118 and 139 of NI Act and are treating the proceedings under the NI Act

as another civil recovery proceedings and are directing the complainant to prove

the antecedent debt or liability. This Court is of the view that such an approach

is not only prolonging the trial but is also contrary to the mandate of Parliament,

namely, that the drawer and the bank must honour the cheque, otherwise, trust in

cheques would be irreparably damaged.

NO DOCUMENTS AND/OR EVIDENCE LED WITH REGARD TO THE

FINANCIAL INCAPACITY OF THE APPELLANT

22. It is pertinent to mention that in the present case, the Respondent No.1-

Accused has filed no documents and/or examined any independent witness or

led any evidence with regard to the financial incapacity of the AppellantComplainant to advance the loans in question. For instance, this Court in

Rajaram S/o Sriramulu Naidu (Since Deceased) Through LRs. vs.

Maruthachalam (Since Deceased) Through LRs., (2023) 16 SCC 125 has held

that presumptions under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act can be rebutted by 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 7 of 19

the accused examining the Income Tax Officer and bank officials of the

complainant/drawee.

WHEN THE EVIDENCE OF PW-1 IS READ IN ITS ENTIRETY, IT CANNOT BE

SAID THAT THE APPELLANT-COMPLAINANT HAD NO WHEREWITHAL TO

ADVANCE LOAN

23. Most certainly, the accused can rely upon the evidence adduced by the

complainant to rebut the presumption with regard to the existence of a legally

enforceable debt or liability, yet in the present case, when the evidence of

Appellant-Complainant (PW-1) is read in its entirety, like it should be, it cannot

be said that the Appellant-Complainant had no wherewithal to advance any loan

to the Respondent No.1-Accused .

24. In fact, the Appellant-Complainant, in his statement, has stated that as the

Respondent No.1-Accused was his friend, he had advanced part of the loan

received by him and had also taken loan from his father to advance money to the

Respondent No.1-Accused .

25. The Trial Court in its order and judgment dated 30th April 2007 has held

that the Respondent No.1-Accused has failed to rebut the presumption under

Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act and that the Appellant-Complainant has

proved the legally enforceable debt. The relevant portion of the Trial Court’s

order and judgment dated 30th April 2007 is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“11…Accused had not disputed his signature on the cheque.

Complainant stated that he had advanced to accused amount of

cheque in two different installments on two different occasions cannot

be believed has no merit. Accused himself admitted his signature on

the cheque and accused had failed to rebut the presumption in favour

of the complainant as available under Negotiable Instruments Act,

1881.

12.As regard the contention of the Ld. Advocate for the accused that

the complainant failed to show legally enforceable liability due to him

by the accused has also no merit as there is cogent evidence of the

complainant supported with documentary evidence as regard the 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 8 of 19

cheque and its dishonour and its non payment by the accused inspite

of the receipt of the notice to pay the same….”

26. The Sessions Court too specifically rejected the contention of the

Respondent No.1-Accused that the Appellant-Complainant had no means to

advance the loan of Rs.6,00,000/- (Rupees Six Lakhs) to the Respondent No.1-

Accused. The relevant portion of the Sessions Court’s judgment dated 17th

September 2008 is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“15…The contention of the accused, now in appeal, that the

complainant had no means to sustain himself and was in debt to

various institutions is not borne out from the records. No doubt, no

documentary evidence is produced by the complainant nor any

witness is there to prove that he gave Rs.6,00,000/- to the accused.

But the circumstances, discussed above are such that the testimony of

PW1 is sufficient to prove the said friendly loan transaction…”

IN REVISIONAL JURISDICTION, HIGH COURT DOES NOT, IN THE

ABSENCE OF PERVERSITY, UPSET CONCURRENT FACTUAL FINDINGS

27. It is well settled that in exercise of revisional jurisdiction, the High Court

does not, in the absence of perversity, upset concurrent factual findings [See: Bir

Singh (supra)]. This Court is of the view that it is not for the Revisional Court to

re-analyse and re-interpret the evidence on record. As held by this Court in

Southern Sales & Services and Others vs. Sauermilch Design and Handels

GMBH, (2008) 14 SCC 457, it is a well-established principle of law that the

Revisional Court will not interfere, even if a wrong order is passed by a Court

having jurisdiction, in the absence of a jurisdictional error.

28. Consequently, this Court is of the view that in the absence of perversity, it

was not open to the High Court in the present case, in revisional jurisdiction, to

upset the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Sessions Court.

FAILURE OF ACCUSED TO REPLY TO NOTICE LEADS TO AN INFERENCE

29. Furthermore, the fact that the accused has failed to reply to the statutory

notice under Section 138 of the NI Act leads to an inference that there is merit in 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 9 of 19

the Appellant-Complainant’s version. This Court in Tedhi Singh vs. Narayan

Dass Mahant, (2022) 6 SCC 735 has held that the accused has the initial burden

to set up the defence in his reply to the demand notice that the complainant did

not have the financial capacity to advance the loan. The relevant portion of the

said judgment is reproduced hereinbelow:-

“10. … The proceedings under Section 138 of the NI Act is not a civil

suit. At the time, when the complainant gives his evidence, unless a

case is set up in the reply notice to the statutory notice sent, that the

complainant did not have the wherewithal, it cannot be expected of

the complainant to initially lead evidence to show that he had the

financial capacity. To that extent, the courts in our view were right in

holding on those lines. However, the accused has the right to

demonstrate that the complainant in a particular case did not have

the capacity and therefore, the case of the accused is acceptable

which he can do by producing independent materials, namely, by

examining his witnesses and producing documents. It is also open to

him to establish the very same aspect by pointing to the materials

produced by the complainant himself. He can further, more

importantly, achieve this result through the cross-examination of the

witnesses of the complainant. Ultimately, it becomes the duty of the

courts to consider carefully and appreciate the totality of the evidence

and then come to a conclusion whether in the given case, the accused

has shown that the case of the complainant is in peril for the reason

that the accused has established a probable defence.”

 (emphasis supplied)

30. This Court in MMTC Ltd. and Another vs. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma

(P) Ltd. and Another, (2002) 1 SCC 234 has specifically held that when a

statutory notice is not replied, it has to be presumed that the cheque was issued

towards the discharge of liability.

31. Also, after receipt of the legal notice, wherein the Appellant-Complainant

alleged that the Respondent No.1-Accused’s cheque had bounced, no complaint

or legal proceeding was initiated by the Respondent No.1-Accused alleging that

the cheque was not to be encashed. Consequently, the defence of financial 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 10 of 19

incapacity of Appellant-Complainant advanced by the Respondent No.1-Accused

is an afterthought.

RESPONDENT NO.1-ACCUSED’S DEFENCE THAT A SIGNED BLANK

CHEQUE WAS ISSUED TO ENABLE COMPLAINANT TO OBTAIN A LOAN IS

UNBELIEVABLE

32. The High Court’s finding that the Respondent No.1-Accused ’s defence

that a signed blank cheque was issued by him so as to enable his friend/AppellantComplainant to obtain a loan from a bank was sufficient to rebut the presumptions

under Sections 118 and 139 of the NI Act is unbelievable and absurd. This Court

agrees with the Sessions Court’s finding in the present case that, “It is funny to

say that for obtaining loan from the bank, one can show a cheque which is issued

on an account in which there are not sufficient funds. The case of the accused is

unbelievable”.

KEEPING IN VIEW THE MASSIVE BACKLOG OF CHEQUE BOUNCING

CASES, THE FOLLOWING GUIDELINES ARE ISSUED

33. Before parting with this matter, this Court takes judicial notice of the fact

that despite repeated directions by this Court in various judgments including

Indian Bank Association and Others vs. Union of India and Others, (2014) 5

SCC 590, Damodar S. Prabhu vs. Sayed Babalal H., (2010) 5 SCC 663 and In

Re: Expeditious Trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act 1881, (2021) 16 SCC

116, pendency of cheque bouncing cases under the NI Act in District Courts in

major metropolitan cities of India continues to be staggeringly high. For instance,

the pendency of Section 138 cases as on 01st September 2025 in Delhi District

Courts is 6,50,283 (Six Lakhs Fifty Thousand Two Hundred Eighty Three),

Mumbai District Courts is 1,17,190 (One Lakh Seventeen Thousand One

Hundred Ninety) and Calcutta District Courts is 2,65,985 (Two Lakhs Sixty Five

Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty Five) [Source: National Judicial Data Grid].

This pendency is putting an unprecedented strain on the judicial system as in

some States, cases under Section 138 of the NI Act constitute nearly fifty per cent 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 11 of 19

(50%) of the pendency in Trial Court (in Delhi Section 138 NI Act cases

constitute 49.45% of total Trial Court pendency).

34. In P. Mohanraj and Others v. Shah Brothers Ispat Private Limited, (2021)

6 SCC 258, this Court while re-iterating the position of law with regard to the

nature of offence under Section 138 of the NI Act, has held as under:

“53. A perusal of the judgment in Ishwarlal Bhagwandas [S.A.L.

Narayan Row v. Ishwarlal Bhagwandas, (1966) 1 SCR 190 : AIR 1965

SC 1818] would show that a civil proceeding is not necessarily a

proceeding which begins with the filing of a suit and culminates in

execution of a decree. It would include a revenue proceeding as well

as a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution, if the

reliefs therein are to enforce rights of a civil nature. Interestingly,

criminal proceedings are stated to be proceedings in which the larger

interest of the State is concerned. Given these tests, it is clear that a

Section 138 proceeding can be said to be a “civil sheep” in a

“criminal wolf's” clothing, as it is the interest of the victim that is

sought to be protected, the larger interest of the State being

subsumed in the victim alone moving a court in cheque bouncing

cases, as has been seen by us in the analysis made hereinabove of

Chapter XVII of the Negotiable Instruments Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

35. Admittedly, the offence under Section 138 of the NI Act is quasi-criminal

in character and is compoundable [See: Damodar S. Prabhu (supra)]. Recently,

in Gian Chand Garg v. Harpal Singh & Anr. (Criminal Appeal No. 3789 of

2025 dated 11th August 2025), a co-ordinate Bench of this Court has set aside

concurrent convictions rendered by the Courts below on the ground that the

proceeding under Section 138 of the NI Act is essentially a civil proceeding and

it is open to the parties to enter into a voluntary compromise. Consequently, this

Court is of the view that not only a voluntary compromise can bring the

proceedings under Section 138 NI Act to an end, but the accused under the said

offence are entitled to benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 [See:

Chellammal & Another vs. State Represented by the Inspector of Police, 2025

SCC OnLine SC 870]. Observations to the contrary by Kerala HC in M.V. 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 12 of 19

Nalinakshan vs. M. Rameshan & Anr. 2009 All MR (Cri) Journal 273 are set

aside.

36. Keeping in view the massive backlog of cheque bouncing cases and the

fact that service of summons on the accused in a complaint filed under Section

138 of the NI Act continues to be one of the main reasons for the delay in disposal

of the complaints as well as the fact that punishment under the NI Act is not a

means of seeking retribution but is more a means to ensure payment of money

and to promote credibility of cheques as a trustworthy substitute for cash

payment, this Court issues the following directions:-

A. In all cases filed under Section 138 of the NI Act, service of

summons shall not be confined through prescribed usual modes but shall

also be issued dasti i.e. summons shall be served upon the accused by the

complainant in addition. This direction is necessary as a large number of

Section 138 cases under the NI Act are filed in the metropolitan cities by

financial institutions, by virtue of Section 142(2) of the NI Act, against

accused who may not be necessarily residing within the territorial

jurisdiction of the Court where the complaint has been filed. The Trial

Courts shall further resort to service of summons by electronic means in

terms of the applicable Notifications/Rules, if any, framed under subSections 1 and 2 of Section 64 and under Clause (i) of Section 530 and

other provisions of the Bhartiya Nagarik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023 (for short

‘BNSS, 2023’) like Delhi BNSS (Service of Summons and Warrants)

Rules, 2025. For this purpose, the complainant shall, at the time of filing

the complaint, provide the requisite particulars including e-mail address,

mobile number and/or WhatsApp number/messaging application details of

the accused, duly supported by an affidavit verifying that the said

particulars pertain to the accused/respondent.

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 13 of 19

B. The complainant shall file an affidavit of service before the Court.

In the event such affidavit is found to be false, the Court shall be at liberty

to take appropriate action against the complainant in accordance with law.

C. In order to facilitate expeditious settlement of cases under Section

138 of the NI Act, the Principal District and Sessions Judge of each District

Court shall create and operationalise dedicated online payment facilities

through secure QR codes or UPI links. The summons shall expressly

mention that the Respondent/Accused has the option to make payment of

the cheque amount at the initial stage itself, directly through the said online

link. The complainant shall also be informed of such payment and upon

confirmation of receipt, appropriate orders regarding release of such money

and compounding/closure of proceedings under Section 147 of the NI Act

and/or Section 255 of Cr.P.C./278 BNSS, 2023 may be passed by the Court

in accordance with law. This measure shall promote settlement at the

threshold stage and/or ensure speedy disposal of cases.

D. Each and every complaint under Section 138 of the NI Act shall

contain a synopsis in the following format which shall be filed immediately

after the index (at the top of the file) i.e. prior to the formal complaint:-

Complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881

I. Particulars of the Parties

(i) Complainant: ____________

(ii) Accused: ____________

(In case where the accused is a company or a firm then Registered

Address, Name of the Managing Director/Partner, Name of the

signatory, Name of the persons vicariously liable)

II. Cheque Details

(i) Cheque No. ____________

(ii) Date: ____________

(iii) Amount: ____________

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 14 of 19

(iv) Drawn on Bank/Branch: ____________

(v) Account No.: ____________

III. Dishonour

(i) Date of Presentation: ____________

(ii) Date of Return/Dishonour Memo: ____________

(iii) Branch where cheque was dishonoured:_________

(iv) Reason for Dishonour: ____________

IV. Statutory Notice

(i) Date of Notice: ____________

(ii) Mode of Service: ____________

(iii) Date of Dispatch & Tracking No.: ____________

(iv) Proof of Delivery & date of delivery: ____________

(v) Whether served:____________________

(vi) If Not, reasons thereof:________________

(vii) Reply to the Legal Demand Notice, if any_______________

V. Cause of Action

(i) Date of accrual: ____________

(ii) Jurisdiction invoked under Section 142(2): ____________

(iii) Whether any other complaint under section 138 NI Act is pending

between the same parties, If Yes, in which court and the date and year

of the institution.

VI. Relief Sought

(i) Summoning of accused and trial under Section 138 NI

Act__________

(ii) Whether Award of Interim compensation under Section 143A of NI

Act sought _____

VII. Filed through:

Complainant/Authorized Representative”

E. Recently, the High Court of Karnataka in Ashok Vs. Fayaz Aahmad,

2025 SCC OnLine Kar 490 has taken the view that since NI Act is a special

enactment, there is no need for the Magistrate to issue summons to the

accused before taking cognizance (under Section 223 of BNSS) of

complaints filed under Section 138 of NI Act. This Court is in agreement 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 15 of 19

with the view taken by the High Court of Karnataka. Consequently, this

Court directs that there shall be no requirement to issue summons to the

accused in terms of Section 223 of BNSS i.e., at the pre-cognizance stage.

F. Since the object of Section 143 of the NI Act is quick disposal of the

complaints under Section 138 by following the procedure prescribed for

summary trial under the Code, this Court reiterates the direction of this

Court in In Re: Expeditious Trial of cases under Section 138 of NI Act

(supra) that the Trial Courts shall record cogent and sufficient reasons

before converting a summary trial to summons trial. To facilitate this

process, this Court clarifies that in view of the judgment of the Delhi High

Court in Rajesh Agarwal vs. State and Anr., 2010 SCC OnLine Del 2511,

the Trial Court shall be at liberty (at the initial post cognizance stage) to

ask questions, it deems appropriate, under Section 251 Cr.P.C. / Section

274 BNSS, 2023 including the following questions:-

(i) Do you admit that the cheque belongs to your account? Yes/No

(ii) Do you admit that the signature on the cheque is yours? Yes/No

(iii) Did you issue/deliver this cheque to the complainant? Yes/No

(iv) Do you admit that you owed liability to the complainant at the

time of issuance? Yes/No

(v) If you deny liability, state clearly the defence:

(a) Security cheque only;

(b)Loan repaid already;

(c) Cheque altered/misused;

(d)Other (specify).

(vi) Do you wish to compound the case at this stage? Yes/No

G. The Court shall record the responses to the questions in the ordersheet in the presence of the accused and his/her counsel and thereafter

determine whether the case is fit to be tried summarily under Chapter XXI

of the Cr.P.C. / Chapter XXII of the BNSS, 2023.

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 16 of 19

H. Wherever, the Trial Court deems it appropriate, it shall use its power

to order payment of interim deposit as early as possible under Section 143A

of the NI Act.

I. Since physical courtrooms create a conducive environment for direct

and informal interactions encouraging early resolution, the High Courts

shall ensure that after service of summons, the matters are placed before

the physical Courts. Exemptions from personal appearances should be

granted only when facts so warrant. It is clarified that prior to the service

of summons the matters may be listed before the digital Courts.

J. Wherever cases under Section 138 of the NI Act are permitted to be

heard and disposed of by evening courts, the High Courts should ensure

that pecuniary limit of the cheque amount is realistic. For instance, in

Delhi, the jurisdiction of the evening courts to hear and decide cases of

cheque amount is not exceeding Rs.25,000/-. In the opinion of this Court,

the said limit is too low. The High Courts should forthwith issue practice

directions and set up realistic pecuniary benchmarks for evening Courts.

K. Each District and Sessions Judge in Delhi, Mumbai and Calcutta

shall maintain a dedicated dashboard reflecting the pendency and progress

of cases under Section 138 of the NI Act. The dashboard shall include, inter

alia, details regarding total pendency, monthly disposal rates, percentage of

cases settled/compounded, average number of adjournments per case and

the stage-wise breakup of pending matters. The District and Sessions

Judges in aforesaid jurisdictions shall conduct monthly reviews of the

functioning of Magistrates handling NI Act matters. A consolidated

quarterly report shall be forwarded to the High Court.

L. The Chief Justices of Delhi, Bombay and Calcutta are requested to

form Committee on the Administrative side to monitor pendency and to

ensure expeditious disposal of Section 138 of the NI Act cases. These

Committees should meet at least once a month and explore the option of 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 17 of 19

appointing experienced Magistrates to deal with Section 138 of the NI Act

cases as well as promoting mediation, holding of Lok Adalats and other

alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in Section 138 NI Act cases.

37. It is pertinent to mention that this Court framed guidelines for

compounding offences under the NI Act nearly fifteen years back in Damodar S.

Prabhu (supra). The relevant portion of the said Judgment is reproduced

hereinbelow:-

“THE GUIDELINES

(i) In the circumstances, it is proposed as follows:

(a) That directions can be given that the writ of summons

be suitably modified making it clear to the accused that he could

make an application for compounding of the offences at the first

or second hearing of the case and that if such an application is

made, compounding may be allowed by the court without

imposing any costs on the accused.

(b) If the accused does not make an application for

compounding as aforesaid, then if an application for

compounding is made before the Magistrate at a subsequent

stage, compounding can be allowed subject to the condition that

the accused will be required to pay 10% of the cheque amount to

be deposited as a condition for compounding with the Legal

Services Authority, or such authority as the court deems fit.

(c) Similarly, if the application for compounding is made

before the Sessions Court or a High Court in revision or appeal,

such compounding may be allowed on the condition that the

accused pays 15% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the application for compounding is made

before the Supreme Court, the figure would increase to 20% of

the cheque amount.

 xxx xxx xxx

24. We are also conscious of the view that the judicial

endorsement of the abovequoted Guidelines could be seen as an

act of judicial law-making and therefore an intrusion into the

legislative domain. It must be kept in mind that Section 147 of the

Act does not carry any guidance on how to proceed with the

compounding of offences under the Act. We have already

explained that the scheme contemplated under Section 320 CrPC 

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 18 of 19

cannot be followed in the strict sense. In view of the legislative

vacuum, we see no hurdle to the endorsement of some suggestions

which have been designed to discourage litigants from unduly

delaying the composition of the offence in cases involving Section

138 of the Act.

25. The graded scheme for imposing costs is a means to

encourage compounding at an early stage of litigation. In the

status quo, valuable time of the court is spent on the trial of these

cases and the parties are not liable to pay any court fee since the

proceedings are governed by the Code of Criminal Procedure,

even though the impact of the offence is largely confined to the

private parties. Even though the imposition of costs by the

competent court is a matter of discretion, the scale of costs has

been suggested in the interest of uniformity. The competent court

can of course reduce the costs with regard to the specific facts

and circumstances of a case, while recording reasons in writing

for such variance. Bona fide litigants should of course contest the

proceedings to their logical end.

26. Even in the past, this Court has used its power to do complete

justice under Article 142 of the Constitution to frame guidelines

in relation to the subject-matter where there was a legislative

vacuum.”

38. Since a very large number of cheque bouncing cases are still pending and

interest rates have fallen in the last few years, this Court is of the view that it is

time to ‘revisit and tweak the guidelines’. Accordingly, the aforesaid guidelines

of compounding are modified as under:-

(a) If the accused pays the cheque amount before recording of his

evidence (namely defence evidence), then the Trial Court may

allow compounding of the offence without imposing any cost or

penalty on the accused.

(b) If the accused makes the payment of the cheque amount post the

recording of his evidence but prior to the pronouncement of

judgment by the Trial Court, the Magistrate may allow

compounding of the offence on payment of additional 5% of the

cheque amount with the Legal Services Authority or such other

Authority as the Court deems fit.

Criminal Appeal No.1755/2010 Page 19 of 19

(c) Similarly, if the payment of cheque amount is made before the

Sessions Court or a High Court in Revision or Appeal, such

Court may compound the offence on the condition that the

accused pays 7.5% of the cheque amount by way of costs.

(d) Finally, if the cheque amount is tendered before this Court, the

figure would increase to 10% of the cheque amount.

39. This Court is of the view that if the Accused is willing to pay in accordance

with the aforesaid guidelines, the Court may suggest to the parties to go for

compounding. If for any reason, the financial institutions/complainant asks for

payment other than the cheque amount or settlement of entire loan or other

outstanding dues, then the Magistrate may suggest to the Accused to plead guilty

and exercise the power under Section 255(2) and/or 255(3) of the Cr.P.C. or 278

of the BNSS, 2023 and/or give the benefit under the Probation of Offenders Act,

1958 to the Accused.

CONCLUSION

40. Keeping in view the aforesaid findings, the appeal is allowed. The

impugned order passed by the High Court dated 16th April, 2009 is set aside and

the judgment as well as the orders of Trial Court and Sessions Court are restored

with a direction to the Respondent No.1-Accused to pay Rs.7,50,000/- (Rupees

Seven Lakhs Fifty Thousand) in 15 (fifteen) equated monthly instalment of

Rs.50,000/- (Rupees Fifty Thousand) each. The High Courts and District Courts

shall implement the aforesaid guidelines not later than 01st November, 2025.

……………….J.

[MANMOHAN]

.……………….J.

[N.V. ANJARIA]

New Delhi;

September 25, 2025