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Friday, September 26, 2025

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court Interference with acquittal can be made only where judgment suffers from patent perversity, misreading/omission of material evidence, or when no two reasonable views are possible and only conclusion consistent with guilt arises. If two views are possible, appellate court should not disturb acquittal. (Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, relied on). Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Ss. 302, 120-B, 143, 201 – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence Motive: Alleged strained relations between deceased and Hemlata/Narpat, and land dispute with Bhanwar Singh, not proved by substantive evidence. Testimonies of PW-15 (son) and PW-24 (wife) negated prosecution’s case of motive. PW-12’s version found to be exaggerated and inconsistent with police statement. Last Seen Theory: Testimonies of PW-8 and PW-20 unreliable due to inordinate delay (over a month) in disclosure and unnatural conduct. Recoveries: Chunni allegedly stained with blood recovered from Hemlata’s house — FSL report did not establish blood group; house was accessible, recovery considered concocted and inconsequential. Maruti van allegedly used to transport body — blood stains inconclusive, no witness saw body being carried in vehicle. Hotel registers — failed to establish link between accused and alleged contract killers. Evidence Act, 1872 – S. 27 – Disclosure and Recovery Disclosure statement (Exh. P-70) of accused Hemlata could not be used to prove motive. Section 27 permits only discovery of fact, not use of inculpatory narrative to establish motive. Evidence Act, 1872 – S. 65-B – Electronic Records – Call Detail Records Call detail records produced without mandatory S. 65-B certificate – inadmissible. Reliance on handwritten note (Ex. P-53) without examining scribe impermissible. Hence, telephonic conversation evidence linking accused to conspiracy was unproved in law. Principle – Circumstantial Evidence – Standard of Proof Prosecution must establish chain of circumstances by admissible and reliable evidence. In absence of proved motive, credible “last seen” evidence, or valid recoveries, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. High Court’s acquittal was based on proper appreciation of evidence; no ground for Supreme Court interference. Held Appeals by State of Rajasthan dismissed. Acquittal of respondents (Hemlata, Narpat Choudhary and Bhanwar Singh) confirmed. Pending applications also dismissed.

Criminal Law – Appeal against Acquittal – Scope of Interference by Appellate Court

  • Interference with acquittal can be made only where judgment suffers from patent perversity, misreading/omission of material evidence, or when no two reasonable views are possible and only conclusion consistent with guilt arises.

  • If two views are possible, appellate court should not disturb acquittal.
    (Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka, (2024) 8 SCC 149, relied on).


Indian Penal Code, 1860 – Ss. 302, 120-B, 143, 201 – Murder – Circumstantial Evidence

  • Motive: Alleged strained relations between deceased and Hemlata/Narpat, and land dispute with Bhanwar Singh, not proved by substantive evidence. Testimonies of PW-15 (son) and PW-24 (wife) negated prosecution’s case of motive. PW-12’s version found to be exaggerated and inconsistent with police statement.

  • Last Seen Theory: Testimonies of PW-8 and PW-20 unreliable due to inordinate delay (over a month) in disclosure and unnatural conduct.

  • Recoveries:

    • Chunni allegedly stained with blood recovered from Hemlata’s house — FSL report did not establish blood group; house was accessible, recovery considered concocted and inconsequential.

    • Maruti van allegedly used to transport body — blood stains inconclusive, no witness saw body being carried in vehicle.

    • Hotel registers — failed to establish link between accused and alleged contract killers.


Evidence Act, 1872 – S. 27 – Disclosure and Recovery

  • Disclosure statement (Exh. P-70) of accused Hemlata could not be used to prove motive. Section 27 permits only discovery of fact, not use of inculpatory narrative to establish motive.


Evidence Act, 1872 – S. 65-B – Electronic Records – Call Detail Records

  • Call detail records produced without mandatory S. 65-B certificate – inadmissible.

  • Reliance on handwritten note (Ex. P-53) without examining scribe impermissible.

  • Hence, telephonic conversation evidence linking accused to conspiracy was unproved in law.


Principle – Circumstantial Evidence – Standard of Proof

  • Prosecution must establish chain of circumstances by admissible and reliable evidence.

  • In absence of proved motive, credible “last seen” evidence, or valid recoveries, prosecution failed to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

  • High Court’s acquittal was based on proper appreciation of evidence; no ground for Supreme Court interference.


Held

  • Appeals by State of Rajasthan dismissed.

  • Acquittal of respondents (Hemlata, Narpat Choudhary and Bhanwar Singh) confirmed.

  • Pending applications also dismissed

2025 INSC 1166

  • 1

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CRIMINAL APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    STATE OF RAJASTHAN .….APPELLANT(S)

    VERSUS

    BHANWAR SINGH ETC. ETC. ….RESPONDENT(S)

    J U D G M E N T

    Mehta, J.

    1. Heard.

    2. The appellant-State of Rajasthan has filed

    these appeals assailing the common final judgment

    and order dated 14th December, 2011, passed by the

    Division Bench of Rajasthan High Court at

    Jodhpur1 in D.B. Criminal Appeal Nos. 95 of 2008,

    122 of 2008, and 166 of 2008 filed under Section

    374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 by

    the accused-respondents herein against the

    judgment and order dated 10th January, 2008,

    1 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘High Court’.

    2 Hereinafter, being referred to as, ‘CrPC’.

    2

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge

    (Fast Track) No.2, Jodhpur3 in Sessions Case No.3

    of 2006, whereby the accused-respondents had

    been convicted for offences punishable under

    Sections 302 read with Section 120-B, 143 and 201

    of the Indian Penal Code, 18604 and were sentenced

    as below: -

    a. Section 302 read with Section 120-B IPC:

    Imprisonment for life along with fine of Rs.

    1,000/- each and in default of payment of

    fine, to further undergo imprisonment for

    three months.

    b. Section 143 IPC: Simple imprisonment for

    a period of three months.

    c. Section 201 IPC: Rigorous imprisonment

    for a period of three years along with fine of

    Rs. 500/- each and in default of payment of

    fine, to further undergo imprisonment for

    one month.

    3. The Division Bench of the High Court, vide the

    common impugned judgment and order dated 14th

    December, 2011, allowed the individual criminal

    3 Hereinafter, being referred to as ‘trial Court’.

    4 Hereinafter, being referred to as the ‘IPC’.

    3

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    appeals preferred by each of the accusedrespondents and set aside their conviction and

    sentences imposed by the trial Court and acquitted

    them of the charges by extending them the benefit of

    doubt on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and

    patent infirmities in the prosecution case.

    4. We have heard and considered the

    submissions advanced by the learned counsel

    representing the appellant-State of Rajasthan and

    the learned counsel representing the respondents

    (acquitted accused) and have gone through the

    impugned judgment and have minutely reappreciated the evidence available on record.

    5. Succinctly stated, the case of the prosecution

    is that on 23rd January, 2006, Navneet Sharma (PW15)5 lodged a missing report at Police Station

    Mahamandir, Jodhpur at 12:40 P.M. alleging that

    his father Shri Suresh Sharma had gone missing. It

    was stated in the missing person report that Shri

    Suresh Sharma had some ongoing disputes with

    Vijay Punia and Gokalram pertaining to the lands

    situated in the village Nandri District, Jodhpur. On

    21st January, 2006, a telephone call made by a

    5 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘complainant-Navneet (PW-15)’.

    4

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    property dealer was received on the landline number

    at the complainant’s residence at Luhar Colony,

    Paota, and the same was attended by Shri Suresh

    Sharma who conveyed to the caller that he would be

    visiting the subject site on the next day. On the

    following day, Shri Suresh Sharma left his house at

    about 6:00 P.M. to visit the agricultural fields

    located at the Village Banad, however, he did not

    return, and no information was forthcoming

    regarding his whereabouts. On the morning of 23rd

    January, 2006, the complainant-Navneet (PW-15)

    was informed by Dhanna Ram (PW-11) that while he

    was sitting at the shop of Ratanlal, he had seen Shri

    Suresh Sharma proceeding towards Banad. A

    missing person case was registered, and inquiry was

    assigned to Assistant Sub Inspector of Police.

    6. While the action upon the missing person

    report was being contemplated, a message was

    received at the Police Station Mahamandir, Jodhpur

    at about 12:50 P.M. regarding the discovery of a

    human dead body lying between villages Jajiwal

    Gahlotan and Jajiwal Bhatiyan.

    7. Upon receiving this information, the

    complainant-Navneet (PW-15) immediately rushed 

    5

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    to the spot along with the police personnel and

    found the dead body of his father Shri Suresh

    Sharma6 lying on the ground. The police personnel

    from the Police Station Dangiawas were present at

    the spot in advance. The complainant-Navneet (PW15) noticed that the hands of the deceased-Shri

    Suresh had been tied behind his back with an iron

    wire, and his legs had been fastened with help of a

    piece of cloth. One shoe was missing and there were

    visible signs of efforts made to efface the identity by

    crushing the face. The neck was inflamed with red

    marks.

    8. Pursuant to recovery of the dead body, FIR No.

    7 of 2006 came to be registered at the Police Station

    Dangiyawas at the instance of the complainantNavneet (PW-15) for the offences punishable under

    Sections 302 and 201 IPC. The usual course of

    investigation was undertaken. The dead body was

    subjected to inquest proceedings and subsequently

    forwarded to the hospital for postmortem

    examination.

    9. The Medical Board, comprising Dr. V.K.

    Malhotra (PW-23), Dr. Yogiraj and Dr. Rajesh Vyas,

    6 Hereinafter, referred to as ‘deceased- Shri Suresh’.

    6

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    conducted autopsy on the body of the deceased-Shri

    Suresh and issued the postmortem report (Exh. P35) taking note of about 20 injuries on the dead

    body, and the cause of death was opined to be

    antemortem strangulation.

    10. The accused-respondents were arrested, and

    upon conclusion of investigation, a chargesheet

    came to be submitted against them under Section

    173 (2) CrPC for offences punishable under Section

    302, 201 and 120-B IPC.

    11. Since the offence punishable under Section

    302 IPC was triable exclusively by the Court of

    Sessions, the case was committed for trial to the

    Court of Sessions, and charges were framed against

    the accused-respondents in the following terms: -

    “Firstly - it is alleged against you that with

    intent to commit murder of Shri Suresh

    Sharma, you hatched conspiracy with contract

    killers from U.P. for murdering Suresh Sharma

    and committed murder of Suresh Sharma. Your

    aforesaid act is punishable under Section 120-

    B read with Section 302 of the Indian Penal

    Code, which is in my cognizance.

    Secondly - it is alleged against you that with

    intent to commit murder of Suresh Sharma,

    you formed unlawful assembly within 5 or more

    than 5 persons by having meeting or by having

    conversation over telephone and in furtherance

    of your common intention, you shared your

    7

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    roles, which is an offence punishable under

    Section 143 of the Indian Penal Code and the

    same is in my cognizance.

    Thirdly - it is alleged against you that during

    any time between on 22.01.2006 and

    23.01.2006, you committed murder of Suresh

    Sharma, Hemlata and Narpat Seervi in house

    plot No.111, Tirupati Nagar, Banad Road,

    Jodhpur and having committed this act in

    criminal conspiracy along with the members of

    unlawful assembly and your silence in this

    regard, is an offence punishable under Section

    302 read with Section 149 or 150 of the Indian

    Penal Code, which is in my knowledge.

    Fourth - it is alleged against you that after

    committing the murder of Suresh Sharma at

    the time, date and place mentioned in aforesaid

    charge No.3, you carried the dead body of

    deceased Suresh Sharma in van of accused

    Narpat Seervi and put the dead body near the

    road at Jajiwala Gehlotan in order to escape

    from the crime, and which is punishable under

    Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code and the

    same is in my cognizance.”

    12. The accused-respondents denied the charges

    and claimed trial. The prosecution examined 37

    witnesses (PW-1 to PW-37) and exhibited 102

    documents (Ex. P-1 to Ex. P-102) along with 29

    articles (Ex. A-1 to Ex. A-29) to prove its case.

    13. Upon being examined under Section 313 CrPC,

    and when asked to explain the circumstances

    appearing against them in the prosecution case, the 

    8

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    accused-respondents claimed to be innocent and

    alleged to have been falsely implicated. However,

    they did not lead any evidence in defence.

    14. Upon hearing the arguments of both sides and

    appreciating the evidence on record, the trial Court

    found the accused-respondents guilty of charges

    and proceeded to convict and sentence them as

    mentioned above7 vide judgment and order dated

    10th January, 2008.

    15. The trial Court attributed different theories of

    motive to the accused-respondents, Hemlata and

    Narpat Choudhary on the one hand, and Bhanwar

    Singh on the other hand. One of the alleged motives

    was that the deceased-Shri Suresh used to visit the

    house of respondent-Hemlata frequently, and

    because of that she and her husband, Narpat

    Choudhary, were perturbed and intended to get rid

    of him. As regards respondent-Bhanwar Singh, it

    was held that he had some ongoing land dispute

    with one Sayri Devi (PW-12). The deceased-Shri

    Suresh took sides of Sayri Devi (PW-12) and

    threatened respondent-Bhanwar Singh with dire

    consequences and hence Bhanwar Singh bore a

    7 Supra para 2.

    9

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    grudge against the deceased-Shri Suresh. Fuelled

    by the aforesaid motives, the accused-respondents

    allegedly knitted a criminal conspiracy to kill the

    deceased-Shri Suresh. To execute the nefarious

    plan, they hired professional killers from Uttar

    Pradesh with the connivance of Dhanesh, who is

    said to be the brother of respondent-Hemlata.

    16. As per the prosecution, the professional killers

    hired by the accused-respondents visited Jodhpur

    on two occasions and stayed at two different hotels

    which were facilitated by respondent-Narpat

    Choudhary. On the fateful evening, the deceasedShri Suresh was lured to the residence of

    respondent-Hemlata where he was strangled to

    death. Thereafter, the dead body was placed in a

    Maruti van owned by respondent-Narpat Choudhary

    and was abandoned on the roadside after making

    efforts to efface the identity in order to escape

    detection. The trial Court arrived at the following

    conclusions qua respondent-Hemlata:-

    “(i) the accused with the aid of her brother

    Dhanesh called deceased Suresh Sharma at her

    residence with a pretext to visit a land site for

    some interested party;

    10

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    (ii) all the accused committed murder of Shri

    Suresh Sharma by strangulation after beating

    him;

    (iii) no evidence is available on record to

    disclose that the deceased went to any other

    place or was seen alive after parking his scooter

    in front of accused Hemlata’s house; and

    (iv) the stole (chunni) recovered from the house

    of this accused was stained with human blood

    and no explanation is given to satisfy

    availability of that.”

    17. For drawing an inference pertaining to motive,

    the trial Court relied upon the document (Exh. P-70)

    which was a disclosure made by respondentHemlata about the situs of the crime. Manifestly,

    the use of the said document was limited to the

    extent permitted under Section 27 of the Indian

    Evidence Act, 18728, and inculpatory narrative

    recited therein could not have been used to draw

    any inference regarding motive, which was required

    to be established from substantive evidence.

    18. Be that as it may, we may note that the

    complainant-Navneet (PW-15), in unequivocal terms

    stated that the deceased-Shri Suresh and

    respondent-Hemlata were maintaining good

    relations and there was no dispute or tension

    8 For short, ‘Evidence Act’.

    11

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    between them. The witness (PW-15) denied having

    knowledge about any kind of exploitation or

    victimisation of respondent-Hemlata by his father.

    19. Meena Sharma (PW-24) wife of the deceasedShri Suresh also did not state anything which could

    give rise to an inference of motive against

    respondent-Hemlata. Rather she stated that

    respondents-Hemlata and Narpat Choudhary used

    to visit the deceased-Shri Suresh in the capacity of

    his clients and there was no other relation between

    them.

    20. Nevertheless, the trial Court held that the

    accused-respondents called the deceased-Shri

    Suresh to the house of respondent-Hemlata, acting

    in furtherance of their prior plan to eliminate him.

    The prosecution attempted to establish that

    Dhanesh, stated to be the brother of respondentHemlata, made a telephonic call on 22nd January,

    2006, at around 5:00 P.M. on the landline number

    of the deceased-Shri Suresh and invited him to the

    residence of respondent-Hemlata. The aforesaid call

    was attended by Meenkashi (PW-27), being the

    sister-in-law of Meena Sharma (PW-24).

    12

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    21. It may be noted that neither Meena Sharma

    (PW-24) nor Meenkashi (PW-27) had any idea about

    the identity of the person who made this call who

    was admittedly a stranger to them. These ladies did

    not claim to have ever met the caller before. Rather,

    we find that there is no substantive evidence

    whatsoever on record to prove that any person by

    the name Dhanesh, alleged to be the brother of

    respondent-Hemlata, had actually called on the

    landline number operational in the house of the

    deceased-Shri Suresh. If at all, the prosecution was

    desirous to prove this fact, the relevant call detail

    records supported by the certificate under Section

    65-B of the Evidence Act had to be brought on

    record and proved as per law. However, this

    evidence is totally lacking from the side of the

    prosecution.

    22. Heavy reliance was placed by the trial Court on

    the prosecution theory that the deceased-Shri

    Suresh parked his scooter and was seen moving

    towards the house of respondent-Hemlata after

    having left his home in the evening of 22nd January,

    2006. The said evidence was given by Hukum Singh

    (PW-8) and Dharmender Singh (PW-20).

    13

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    23. Hukum Singh (PW-8) was employed with

    Dharmender Singh (PW-20) and was also an

    attesting witness to the inquest memo (Exh. P-9)

    that was drawn on 23rd January, 2006, after

    discovery of the dead body of Shri Suresh Sharma.

    Dharmender Singh (PW-20), an electrician by

    occupation, deposed on oath that on 22nd January,

    2006, at about 06:30 P.M. to 07:00 P.M., he and his

    assistant Hukum Singh (PW-8) saw the deceasedShri Suresh parking his scooter in front of

    respondent-Hemlata’s house. However, neither of

    the witnesses stated that they had actually seen the

    deceased-Shri Suresh entering the house of

    respondent-Hemlata. In addition, it is a matter of

    record that Hukum Singh (PW-8) divulged this

    information to the police on 28th February, 2006,

    i.e., after one month and six days from the date of

    occurrence. The fact regarding the presence of the

    deceased-Shri Suresh near the house of respondentHemlata just before his death was far too important

    so as to have escaped the memory of the said

    witness. If at all, Hukum Singh (PW-8) had seen any

    such event, he would not be expected to remain

    silent and, in natural course, he would have 

    14

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    promptly disclosed about this important

    circumstance to the police officials when he signed

    the inquest memo (Exh. P-9) on 23rd January, 2006.

    24. The failure of the witness (PW-8) in not

    disclosing this important fact to the police for

    almost one month and six days of the incident

    assumes great importance because he was amongst

    the first few to have seen the dead body of the

    deceased-Shri Suresh immediately after its

    discovery. The High Court held that the fact

    pertaining to the movement of the deceased-Shri

    Suresh near the house of respondents-Hemlata and

    Narpat Choudhary few hours prior to his death was

    very significant and in normal course of events, any

    person of ordinary prudence would have disclosed

    this to the relatives of the deceased-Shri Suresh and

    the police as an immediate reaction after seeing the

    body of the deceased-Shri Suresh. Thus, the High

    Court found the conduct of Hukum Singh (PW-8) in

    keeping silent for more than a month to be highly

    suspicious and rightly so, in our opinion.

    25. Dharmender Singh (PW-20) stated that he

    came to know about the murder of the deceasedShri Suresh after a gap of 20-25 days and that his 

    15

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    Assistant Hukum Singh (PW-8) never told him about

    the said incident. The witness (PW-20) visited the

    residence of the deceased-Shri Suresh to offer

    condolences after 20-25 days. On that day, for the

    first time, he disclosed to the complainant-Navneet

    (PW-15), about seeing the deceased-Shri Suresh

    near the house of respondent-Hemlata on the

    evening of 22nd January, 2006. The complainantNavneet (PW-15), in turn, asked the witness (PW-20)

    to convey this information to the investigating

    agency and pursuant thereto, the statement of the

    witness (PW-20) came to be recorded as late as 28th

    February, 2006. Notably, neither Hukum Singh

    (PW-8) nor Dharmender Singh (PW-20) bothered to

    convey this material fact to the police officials and

    chose to remain silent for a long time which is a

    clear indicator of their unnatural conduct. Thus, it

    is our firm opinion that the High Court was perfectly

    justified in discarding the testimony of Hukum

    Singh (PW-8) and Dharmender Singh (PW-20),

    finding their conduct to be doubtful.

    26. The next circumstance relied upon by the

    prosecution was that of recovery of a chunni (stole)

    having blood stains of human origin at the instance 

    16

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    of respondent-Hemlata in presence of panch

    witnesses Rameshwar (PW-16), Ramniwas (PW-9)

    and Babulal (PW-10). It is noteworthy to mention

    that Ramniwas (PW-9) and Rameshwar (PW-16)

    were not the residents of the vicinity, while Babulal

    (PW-10) was a police constable. Suffice it to say that

    otherwise also, the said recovery is insignificant and

    does not connect respondent-Hemlata with the

    murder of the deceased-Shri Suresh in any manner.

    This is primarily so because no opinion was

    obtained from the Forensic Science Laboratory

    regarding the group of blood found on the chunni.

    Unless the chunni was shown to be having the same

    blood group as that of the deceased-Shri Suresh,

    the recovery thereof even with blood stains of

    human origin would be inconsequential and cannot

    link respondent-Hemlata to the crime. Moreover, the

    High Court, observed that the chunni was recovered

    on 27th January, 2006, i.e., 5 days after the

    incident, during which period the house was under

    the occupation of respondents-Hemlata and Narpat

    Choudhary. The High Court found it strange that

    the accused-respondents despite having full control

    over the house, did not make any effort to remove or 

    17

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    destroy the evidence pertaining to the crime

    allegedly committed by them. As per the High Court,

    fact that the chunni was recovered from the house

    which remained unlocked till the police brought

    back respondents-Hemlata and Narpat Choudhary

    for inspection rendered the recovery under Section

    27 of the Evidence Act irrelevant, as it was

    effectively recovered from a place accessible to all

    and sundry.

    27. The prosecution also relied upon some

    additional circumstances in its effort to connect

    respondent-Narpat Choudhary with the crime.

    These circumstances were regarding the recovery of

    the visitors entry register from Hotel Taj and Hotel

    Raneja, Jodhpur based on the disclosures made by

    respondent-Narpat Choudhary; call details records

    purportedly proving the telephonic conversations

    between respondents-Bhanwar Singh and Narpat

    Choudhary just before and after the commission of

    the crime; recovery of the Maruti van in which the

    dead body of the deceased-Shri Suresh was

    allegedly transported and the presence of blood

    stains on the seat cover and the mats of the said

    vehicle.

    18

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    28. The hotel registers were seized on the premise

    that the accommodation for hired killers from Uttar

    Pradesh was arranged in these hotels by

    respondent-Narpat Chaudhary. The High Court,

    after threadbare discussion of evidence held that the

    entries made in the registers, in no manner,

    connected respondent-Narpat Choudhary with the

    persons (hired killers) who allegedly stayed at these

    two hotels. The prosecution failed to lead any

    evidence to establish the fact that respondentNarpat Choudhary had facilitated the stay of the socalled hired killers in the aforesaid hotels. We find

    the said finding of the High Court to be

    unimpeachable.

    29. So far as the recovery of the Maruti van is

    concerned, the same also did not provide any

    succour to the prosecution’s case. No witness saw

    the dead body of Shri Suresh Sharma being moved

    in the said vehicle. The blood stains allegedly found

    at various places in the vehicle did not give any

    positive conclusion for blood grouping during

    serological examination. Hence, the said recovery

    also becomes inconsequential. 

    19

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    30. Regarding the call details records, the

    prosecution did not lead any evidence whatsoever to

    prove the ownership/subscription of the mobile

    numbers which were allegedly used to hatch the

    conspiracy. Furthermore, no certificate under

    Section 65-B of the Evidence Act was produced on

    record to prove these so-called incriminating call

    detail records as per the mandate of law. The High

    Court also found that the cell numbers, which were

    sought to be connected to the accused-respondents

    on the basis of the information provided by the

    Customer Care Executive, Reliance Web World,

    Jodhpur vide document (Ex. P-53), were not derived

    from an electronic record but were present in form

    of a handwritten note. The scribe of the said

    document, namely, Ms. Ragini Vyas was not

    examined by the prosecution and hence, the recitals

    contained therein were not proved in accordance

    with law.

    31. We are of the firm opinion that the said finding

    of the High Court is unassailable. Taken together,

    both the circumstances, i.e., non-production of the

    certificate under Section 65-B of the Evidence Act,

    and the call detail records being presented through 

    20

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    a handwritten note without examining the scribe

    thereof would lead to an inescapable conclusion

    that the call details were not proved as per law.

    32. We give our full imprimatur to the conclusion

    drawn by the High Court in the impugned judgment

    that the recovery of chunni was concocted and

    planted. The other recoveries effected by the

    investigating officer were insignificant. The theory

    of motive and last seen was nothing but a

    conjectural story. Thus, there is no evidence worth

    the name on the record of the case so as to connect

    respondents-Hemlata and Narpat Choudhary with

    the murder of the deceased-Shri Suresh. None of

    the three alleged incriminating circumstances i.e.,

    motive, last seen theory and recoveries were proved

    by leading an admissible or reliable evidence.

    33. Thus, the High Court was fully justified in

    holding that no satisfactory evidence was led by the

    prosecution so as to establish complicity of

    respondents-Hemlata and Narpat Choudhary for the

    alleged murder of the deceased-Shri Suresh.

    34. Qua respondent-Bhanwar Singh, the

    prosecution had projected the theory of conspiracy

    through the evidence of Sayri Devi (PW-12). The trial 

    21

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    Court held that respondent-Bhanwar Singh was in

    unauthorised possession of certain plots of land

    owned by Sayri Devi (PW-12) and the deceased-Shri

    Suresh extended a helping hand to the said lady

    and that is why, respondent-Bhanwar Singh was

    bearing a grudge against the deceased-Shri Suresh.

    The prosecution also sought to connect the

    respondent-Narpat Choudhary through the call

    detail records but the said evidence again suffers

    from the same infirmity regarding the

    inadmissibility of the call detail records as

    concluded above.

    9

    35. We have perused the statement of Sayri Devi

    (PW-12) closely. Although, in her examination-inchief, the witness (PW-12) stated that respondentBhanwar Singh had extended a threat to kill the

    deceased-Shri Suresh but on a perusal of her crossexamination, we find that she admitted that the

    land which had fallen to her share had been sold to

    respondent-Bhanwar Singh. However, she corrected

    herself saying that respondent-Bhanwar Singh to

    whom the land was sold, was another Bhanwar

    Singh who resided in BJS. Total 18 bighas of land

    9 Supra paras 30-31.

    22

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    were sold to said Bhanwar Singh of BJS and on this

    land, houses had been constructed. Thus, from the

    tenor of evidence of Sayri Devi (PW-12), all that can

    be inferred is that she was involved in some land

    disputes with respondent-Bhanwar Singh. The

    witness was confronted with her police statement

    (Exh. D-6) wherein the following glaring omissions

    were elicited: -

    i. The deceased-Shri Suresh had extended help

    to her in order to resolve the disputes with

    respondent-Bhanwar Singh.

    ii. The alleged threat given by the deceasedShri Suresh to respondent-Bhanwar Singh for

    letting go of the disputed land.

    iii. The respondent-Bhanwar Singh had

    threatened the said witness (PW-12) that if her

    Advocate, i.e., deceased-Shri Suresh got the

    house vacated then, first her Advocate would

    be killed and thereafter the witness (PW-12)

    herself would be eliminated.

    Manifestly, the theory of motive and threat

    attributed to respondent-Bhanwar Singh by the

    witness (PW-12) in her examination-in-chief are in

    form of gross exaggerations and improvements from 

    23

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    her previous statement (Exh.-D6) and hence, the

    evidence of this witness (PW-12) was rightly

    discarded and disbelieved by the High Court.

    36. Other than the evidence of the so-called threat

    given by respondent-Bhanwar Singh in presence of

    Sayri Devi (PW-12), which the High Court found to

    be highly doubtful and exaggerated, no other

    evidence was led by the prosecution to link

    respondent-Bhanwar Singh with the alleged murder

    of the deceased-Shri Suresh.

    37. Suffice it to say that mere threat to inflict harm

    may constitute an incriminating circumstance but

    in isolation, the said circumstance would fall

    woefully short of proof of conspiracy to commit

    murder.

    38. Having threadbare examined the entire

    evidence on record, we are of the firm opinion that

    the view taken by the High Court in acquitting the

    accused-respondents is based on apropos

    appreciation and evaluation of evidence and hence,

    does not warrant inference in this appeal against

    acquittal.

    24

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    39. This Court in Babu Sahebagouda

    Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka10, reiterated

    following principles governing interference by the

    appellate Court with a judgment of acquittal:-

    “41. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope

    of interference by an appellate court for reversing the

    judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial court in

    favour of the accused has to be exercised within the

    four corners of the following principles:

    41.1. That the judgment of acquittal suffers from

    patent perversity;

    41.2. That the same is based on a

    misreading/omission to consider material evidence on

    record; and

    41.3. That no two reasonable views are possible and

    only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is

    possible from the evidence available on record.

    42. The appellate court, in order to interfere with the

    judgment of acquittal would have to record pertinent

    findings on the above factors if it is inclined to reverse

    the judgment of acquittal rendered by the trial court.”

    40. Applying the above-mentioned principles, we

    are of the firm view that there exist no valid grounds

    that would justify upsetting and reversing the

    acquittal of the respondents. On a careful

    consideration of the evidence and materials

    available on record, we find no infirmity or

    10 (2024) 8 SCC 149.

    25

    CRL. APPEAL NO(S). 1954-1956 OF 2013

    perversity in the impugned judgment and order

    dated 14th December, 2011 warranting interference.

    41. As a consequence of the above discussion, we

    do not find any merit in these appeals which are

    dismissed as such.

    42. In view of dismissal of the appeals, no orders

    are required to be passed in the application for

    impleadment and is accordingly dismissed as such.

    43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand

    disposed of.

    ...….……………………J.

     (SANDEEP MEHTA)

    …...…………………….J.

     (JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

    NEW DELHI;

    SEPTEMBER 26, 2025.

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Pt. I, 34 — Murder or Culpable Homicide — Intention to kill vs. Knowledge of likelihood of death — Distinction drawn — Accused armed with pike, spear and sticks attacked complainant’s father and uncles during land dispute. Evidence (PW-1) showed that though sharp-edged weapons were carried, only blunt side used; medical evidence revealed only lacerated and contused wounds, no incised wounds. Three persons died from injuries. Held, death caused attributable to acts of accused proved beyond doubt. However, absence of intention to kill established; mere knowledge that injuries inflicted were likely to cause death is inferable. Conviction under S.302 IPC not sustainable; altered to S.304 Pt. I IPC. Evidence Act, 1872 — Credibility of related witness — Sole testimony — Conviction can be based on sole testimony of related witness if trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence. PW-1 (son/nephew of deceased) found reliable. PW-2 turning hostile immaterial. Sentence — Accused had undergone 12+ years imprisonment. In facts, sentence already undergone deemed sufficient. Accused directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case. Held (i) Conviction under S.302 IPC altered to S.304 Pt. I IPC. (ii) Sentence modified to period already undergone (12+ years). (iii) Appellants to be released forthwith. (B.R. Gavai, CJI and K. Vinod Chandran, J.) Citation: 2025 INSC 1172 : Criminal Appeal No. 596 of 2014, decided on 26-9-2025 (SC)

Penal Code, 1860 — Ss. 302, 304 Pt. I, 34 — Murder or Culpable Homicide — Intention to kill vs. Knowledge of likelihood of death — Distinction drawn — Accused armed with pike, spear and sticks attacked complainant’s father and uncles during land dispute. Evidence (PW-1) showed that though sharp-edged weapons were carried, only blunt side used; medical evidence revealed only lacerated and contused wounds, no incised wounds. Three persons died from injuries. Held, death caused attributable to acts of accused proved beyond doubt. However, absence of intention to kill established; mere knowledge that injuries inflicted were likely to cause death is inferable. Conviction under S.302 IPC not sustainable; altered to S.304 Pt. I IPC.

Evidence Act, 1872 — Credibility of related witness — Sole testimony — Conviction can be based on sole testimony of related witness if trustworthy and corroborated by medical evidence. PW-1 (son/nephew of deceased) found reliable. PW-2 turning hostile immaterial.

Sentence — Accused had undergone 12+ years imprisonment. In facts, sentence already undergone deemed sufficient. Accused directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any other case.


Held

  • (i) Conviction under S.302 IPC altered to S.304 Pt. I IPC.

  • (ii) Sentence modified to period already undergone (12+ years).

  • (iii) Appellants to be released forthwith.

(B.R. Gavai, CJI and K. Vinod Chandran, J.)

Citation: 2025 INSC 1172 : Criminal Appeal No. 596 of 2014, decided on 26-9-2025 (SC)


2025 INSC 1172

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 1 of 9

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

RAGHAV PRASHAD AND OTHERS … APPELLANTS


versus

STATE OF U.P. … RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

B.R.GAVAI, CJI.

FACTUAL ASPECTS

1. The present appeal challenges the final judgment and order

dated 4th July 2013 passed by the Division Bench of the High

Court of Judicature at Allahabad1 in Criminal Appeal u/s 374

Cr.P.C. No. 2259 of 1989 filed by the accused appellants

whereby, the High Court dismissed the appeal and upheld the

judgment and order dated 8th November 1989 passed by the

Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karvi (Banda)2 in

Sessions Case No. 88 of 1986 convicting the accused appellants

under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code,

1 Hereinafter referred to as “the High Court”.

2 Hereinafter referred to as “the Trial Court”.

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 2 of 9

18603. The High Court also upheld the order of sentence dated

15th November, 1989 vide which the Trial Court had sentenced

the accused appellants to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life

along with a fine of Rs.6,000/-.

2. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeal are

as under:

2.1. It is the prosecution case that on the morning of

6th August 1986 at 8 o’clock, complainant – Ram Gopal

(PW-1) along with his father Ram Avtar, uncles Namo

Shankar and Girija Shankar and two other persons had

arrived at Baruahaar Ghat for measuring some agricultural

fields for partition where they met the accused appellants –

Raghav Prashad (Accused No.1/owner of adjacent land),

Prem Shankar (Accused No.2/brother of Accused No.1),

Dayanidhi (Accused No.3/Cousin brother of Accused No.1

and Accused No.2) and Late Ram Naresh

(Accused No. 4/Father-in-law of Accused No. 2).

2.2. It is the prosecution case that the accused persons who

were hiding in the Baruahaar Ghat suddenly came out. They

3 Hereinafter referred to as “IPC”.

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 3 of 9

had an altercation with complainant’s father and his uncles

over the measurement of agricultural fields and later

started hitting them with pike, sticks, and spear.

2.3. Thereafter, complainant along with his injured father and

uncles went to the Raipura police station in a bullock cart

driven by one Kandhai Lal and an FIR No. 53/1986 came to

be registered at 9:30 AM initially under Sections 307 and

308 read with Section 34 IPC. Subsequently, the injured

persons were sent to the Karvi Hospital in a truck from the

police station.

2.4. Injured Ram Avtar and Namo Shankar succumbed to their

injuries on the same day at Karvi Hospital whereas injured

Girija Shankar also died on same day while being shifted to

another hospital in Allahabad. Hence, charge under Section

302 IPC was added.

2.5. The post-mortem report dated 7th August 1986 noted

various ante-mortem injuries and fractures on the body of

the deceased persons.

2.6. The accused appellants were arrested on 12th August 1986.

The chargesheet was filed and the case being exclusively 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 4 of 9

triable by the Sessions Court was committed for Trial to the

court of Additional District and Sessions Judge, Karvi

(Banda) by an order dated 13th November 1986 passed by

the Munsiff Court, Karvi. Thereafter, the accused appellants

were released on bail on 7th January 1987.

2.7. Vide judgment and order dated 8th November 1989, the Trial

Court convicted the accused appellants for the offence

punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of IPC

and vide order dated 15th November, 1989 they were

sentenced to rigorous imprisonment for life alongwith a fine

of Rs. 6,000/-.

2.8. Aggrieved thereby, the appellants filed Appeal being

Criminal Appeal u/s 374 Cr.P.C. No. 2259 of 1989 before

the High Court which was dismissed vide impugned

judgment and order dated 4th July 2013. The High Court

upheld the judgment and order of the Trial Court and

directed the Trial Court to take necessary steps to ensure

that the accused appellants who were out on bail are

arrested and committed to custody to undergo their

sentence. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 5 of 9

2.9. Aggrieved thereby, the present appeal by way of special

leave.

SUBMISSIONS

3. We have heard Shri Raj Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for

the appellants and Shri Akshay Amritanshu, learned counsel for

the respondent-State.

4. Shri Raj Kumar Yadav, learned counsel for the accused

appellants submitted that the prosecution’s case is solely based

on the evidence of PW-1. It is submitted that PW-1 is a related

witness and as such, the conviction cannot rest solely on the

basis of his evidence. In addition, it is submitted that the offence

committed by the accused appellants would not fall under

Section 302 IPC and at the most, the accused appellants could

be convicted for a lesser offence.

5. Per contra, Shri Akshay Amritanshu, the learned counsel

appearing for the State has vehemently opposed the appeal. He

submitted that the appellants have committed the brutal murder

of three persons. It is further submitted that the testimony of

PW-1 is supported by medical evidence and as such, no

interference by this Court would be warranted. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 6 of 9

DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

6. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material placed on record.

7. The prosecution case basically rests on the testimony of

PW-1, who is the son of deceased Ram Avtar and nephew of

deceased Namo Shankar and deceased Girija Shankar. PW-1 in

his statement has deposed that there was a dispute over the

measurement of agricultural fields between deceased Ram Avtar

and accused No. 1 - Raghav Prashad. PW-1 stated that when he

along with all three deceased and two other persons went to the

agricultural field in Baruahaar Ghat, they saw that the four

accused persons were hiding there and on seeing them, they

came out. It is further stated that the accused persons Raghav

Prashad and Dayanidhi were carrying sticks whereas Prem

Shankar had a pike and his father-in-law had a spear.

8. The perusal of the evidence of PW-1 would reveal that even

though the accused appellants were having sharp weapons

(pike, spear, etc.), they had only used the blunt side of the said

weapons. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 7 of 9

9. It is further to be noted that PW-2 – Chandrika Prasad who

is the son of deceased Namo Shankar had turned hostile.

10. Moreover, the medical evidence would also show that all the

three deceased persons had lacerated and contused wounds only

and there were no incised wounds.

11. As already seen above, a perusal of the evidence of PW-1

would itself reveal that the accused persons Raghav Prashad and

Dayanidhi were carrying sticks whereas the other accused

persons Prem Shankar and Late Ram Naresh who were carrying

the sharp weapons, had only used the blunt side of the weapons.

12. In view of the evidence of PW-1, we do not find any reason

to disagree with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the

Trial Court and the High Court that it was the accused

appellants who caused the death of Ram Shankar, Namo

Shankar and Girija Shankar.

13. However, the question that arises for our consideration is

as to whether the conviction under Section 302 IPC would be

tenable or whether the accused are liable to be convicted for a

lesser offence. 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 8 of 9

14. We find that though the accused persons could be said to

have the knowledge that the injuries would cause death of the

deceased, there is no material on record to show that they had

the intention to kill them. It is further to be noted that PW-1 had

himself deposed that there was prior enmity between the

Appellant No. 1- Raghav Prashad and deceased Ram Avtar over

the measurement of agricultural fields.

15. We, therefore, find that in the facts of the present case, the

conviction under Section 302 IPC would not be tenable and is

liable to be converted to one under Section 304 Part I of IPC. We

are, therefore, inclined to partly allow the appeal.

CONCLUSION

16. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) The appeal is partly allowed;

(ii) The conviction of the accused appellants under Section

302 of IPC is converted to one under Section 304 Part 1

of IPC; and

(iii) Accused appellants have already undergone sentence of

more than 12 years. We, therefore, find that the sentence

already undergone by them would subserve the interest 

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 596 OF 2014

. Page 9 of 9

of justice. The accused appellants are, therefore,

directed to be released forthwith, if not required in any

other case.

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

..…………..……………...CJI.

(B.R.GAVAI)

…….........…………………...J.

 (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 26, 2025

Service Law – Appointment of Lecturer – Applicability of Rules – Assam Govt. Aided Junior College Management Rules, 2001 vis-à-vis Assam Secondary Education (Provincialisation) Service Rules, 2003 – Age limit – Condone of overage. Advertisement dated 28.02.2006 for post of Lecturer in History in Respondent No.3 – an aided institution – issued under the 2001 Rules which did not prescribe any upper age limit. Appellant stood first in merit; Governing Body recommended her name and Government, by communication dated 13.10.2006, condoned overage of 2 years 7 months and approved appointment (22.03.2007). Appellant continuously served as Lecturer for 18 years. Respondent No.5 (unsuccessful candidate) challenged condonation and appointment on ground of violation of Rule 19(iv), 2003 Rules prescribing maximum age of 36 years. Single Judge of Gauhati High Court (30.03.2010) dismissed writ petition holding 2003 Rules inapplicable to aided junior colleges; selection governed by 2001 Rules. Division Bench (24.02.2012) allowed appeal relying on Rule 19(iv), 2003 Rules and Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, holding Appellant overaged and ineligible; condonation could not retrospectively validate candidature. Supreme Court (per S.V.N. Bhatti, J.) held: Advertisement was under 2001 Rules; Appellant validly selected and appointed. Application of 2003 Rules to aided institution at pre-provincialisation stage was illegal and without jurisdiction. Condonation of age by Government was valid; Appellant cannot be denied benefit after 18 years of service. Orders of Division Bench (24.02.2012) and Review (24.05.2023) set aside. Appellant to be reinstated within 4 weeks; continuity of service to be granted for all purposes but no back wages. Services of Respondent No.5, already working as Lecturer, not to be disturbed. Held: Appointment of Appellant governed by 2001 Rules, not 2003 Rules. High Court erred in applying Rule 19(iv) of 2003 Rules. Appellant entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service (but without back wages).

Service Law – Appointment of Lecturer – Applicability of Rules – Assam Govt. Aided Junior College Management Rules, 2001 vis-à-vis Assam Secondary Education (Provincialisation) Service Rules, 2003 – Age limit – Condone of overage.

  1. Advertisement dated 28.02.2006 for post of Lecturer in History in Respondent No.3 – an aided institution – issued under the 2001 Rules which did not prescribe any upper age limit.

  2. Appellant stood first in merit; Governing Body recommended her name and Government, by communication dated 13.10.2006, condoned overage of 2 years 7 months and approved appointment (22.03.2007). Appellant continuously served as Lecturer for 18 years.

  3. Respondent No.5 (unsuccessful candidate) challenged condonation and appointment on ground of violation of Rule 19(iv), 2003 Rules prescribing maximum age of 36 years.

  4. Single Judge of Gauhati High Court (30.03.2010) dismissed writ petition holding 2003 Rules inapplicable to aided junior colleges; selection governed by 2001 Rules.

  5. Division Bench (24.02.2012) allowed appeal relying on Rule 19(iv), 2003 Rules and Shankar K. Mandal v. State of Bihar, holding Appellant overaged and ineligible; condonation could not retrospectively validate candidature.

  6. Supreme Court (per S.V.N. Bhatti, J.) held:

    • Advertisement was under 2001 Rules; Appellant validly selected and appointed.

    • Application of 2003 Rules to aided institution at pre-provincialisation stage was illegal and without jurisdiction.

    • Condonation of age by Government was valid; Appellant cannot be denied benefit after 18 years of service.

  7. Orders of Division Bench (24.02.2012) and Review (24.05.2023) set aside.

    • Appellant to be reinstated within 4 weeks; continuity of service to be granted for all purposes but no back wages.

    • Services of Respondent No.5, already working as Lecturer, not to be disturbed.


Held: Appointment of Appellant governed by 2001 Rules, not 2003 Rules. High Court erred in applying Rule 19(iv) of 2003 Rules. Appellant entitled to reinstatement with continuity of service (but without back wages).


2025 INSC 1156

1

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 011777 - 011778 OF 2025

[@ SLP (C) NOS. 13145 -13146 OF 2025]

JYOTSNA DEVI … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF ASSAM & ORS. … RESPONDENT(S)


J U D G M E N T

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. We have heard learned counsel, Mr. Rituraj Biswas and Mr. Chinmoy

Pradip Sharma, Sr. AAG. Respondent No.5, despite the service of notice of the

pending proceedings, is not represented.

2. The Appellant assails the order dated 24.05.2023, in Review Petition

No. 175 of 2017, and the order dated 24.02.2012 in Writ Appeal No. 262 of

2011 in the Gauhati High Court at Gauhati. The journey of the litigation dates

back to the advertisement dated 28.02.2006, issued by Respondent No. 3 to

fill a vacant post of Lecturer in History. The Appellant and Respondent No. 5

have participated in the selection process, and by the resolution dated

24.07.2006, the Governing Body of Respondent No. 3 - College, having noticed

the relatively better merit and suitability of the Appellant, resolved to select

the Appellant. On the even date, the Governing Body forwarded the resolution

to Respondent No.1/Government for approval. At this juncture, we notice the

undisputed facts that the Respondent No. 3 is an aided institution as on the

date of selection process. Therefore, the selection process was set in motion

by referring to the Assam Government Aided Junior College Management

Rules, 2001 (for short “2001 Rules”). The advertisement does not stipulate an 

2

upper or lower age limit as a qualification or disqualification, as the case may

be, for applying for the post of Lecturer in History. The Respondent No. 1, on

the request of Respondent No. 3, vide communication dated 13.10.2006,

exercising its jurisdiction/discretion, communicated to Respondent No. 3,

condoning the alleged overage of 2 years 7 months of the Appellant. On

22.03.2007, the Respondent No. 2 approved the appointment of the Appellant

as a Lecturer. The Appellant entered service of Lecturer in Respondent No. 3-

College. Respondents Nos. 1 and 2 admit that the Appellant has put in a

continuous service of 18 years as Lecturer in History in Respondent No. 3 -

College. Respondent No. 5 filed a Writ Petition No. 1707 of 2007 challenging

the order of approval dated 13.10.2006, condoning the over-age of 2 years 7

months and the order dated 22.03.2007 approving the Appellant’s

appointment. The case of Respondent No. 5, briefly stated, is that the

Appellant was aged 39 years at the time of advertisement or during

appointment to the post of Lecturer. The advertisement is issued referring to

the 2001 Rules. However, according to the Assam Secondary Education

(Provincialisation) Service Rules, 2003 (for short “2003 Rules”), the prescribed

age limit for a candidate being recruited is between twenty-one to thirty-six

years. The order condoning the over-age is illegal and contrary to the 2003

Rules. The case of Respondent Nos. 1 to 3 was that the 2003 Rules, at the

time of issuance of the advertisement, had no application to College of

Respondent No.3, and that the advertisement was issued referring to the 2001

Rules. There is a difference between an appointment in an aided institution

and in a Government College. In the absence of a provision stipulating which

one of the enactments is applicable, viz., Assam Higher Secondary Education

Act, 1984 or The Assam Secondary Education (Provincialisation) Act, 1977, 

3

the discretion exercised by the Respondent No. 1 in abundant caution does

not give a cause to a candidate at serial no. 2 to challenge the appointment of

Appellant who stood at serial no.1. The Learned Single Judge on 30.03.2010

dismissed the Writ Petition. A few of the findings recorded by the order dated

30.03.2010 are very apt for understanding the fact in issue, and read as

follows:

“13. As could be gathered from the affidavits filed by the

respondents, the respondent No.5 was appointed under the

provisions of the Assam Govt. Aided Junior College Management

Rules, 2001. Apparently, it is not clear whether 2001 Rules have

been framed either under the 1984 Act or under 1977 Act. Be that

as it may, 2001 Rules have been framed especially for governing

the management and control of colleges, imparting education in

plus two stage. Hence, it has to be inferred that selection of

respondent no.5 is governed by these Rules.

14. It is true that Repeal and Savings provision under Rule 32 in

2003 Rules it has been clarified that all Rules, corresponding to

these Rules in force immediately before commencement of these

Rules shall stand repealed. However, the Rules are applicable only

for Provincialisation Act, 1977 and not for 1984 Act. In my

considered, opinion, both 1977 Act and 1984 Act operate in

different fields. The basic object to enact the 1977 Act is for

Provincialisation of secondary education, whereas, 1984 Act has

been enacted to regulate, supervise and develop the higher

secondary education in the State of Assam. Hence, I am of the

considered opinion that conditions incorporated in 2003 Rules,

with regard to appointment and service conditions of persons

appointed in Higher Secondary Schools cannot be made

applicable to the staff appointed by the Governing Bodies of

Junior Colleges. Even otherwise, the admitted position is that the 

4

respondent No.5 has been appointed adhering to the provisions of

Govt Aided Junior College Rules, 2001 and not 2003 Rules.”

3. The Respondent No. 5 filed Writ Appeal No. 262 of 2011. The Division

Bench, vide impugned order dated 24.02.2012, allowed the Writ Appeal. The

order dated 24.02.2012 notices that the 2001 Rules do not provide for any

age limit, but Rule 19(iv) of the 2003 Rules has to be applied together with

the decision in Shankar K Mandal & Ors. v. State of Bihar & Ors.1. The

following finding has been recorded:

“Judged by the parameters as above, It is apparent that both on

the date of the advertisement as well as on the last date for

submission of applications by the willing candidates, the

respondent No.5 was beyond the age of 37 years prescribed for

entry into Government service. In the teeth of Rule 19(iv) of the

Rules, in our estimate, she was over aged at all relevant times

and, thus, was not eligible to participate in the selection process.

As admittedly the condonation of her overage was much

subsequent to the completion of the selection process, the same

could not have legalised her candidature with retrospective effect.

We are in respectful agreement with the view taken in Mahesh

Gogoi (supra).”

4. The Appellant challenged the order dated 24.02.2012 in S.L.P. No.

16230 of 2012 before this Court, and on 28.08.2017, while granting liberty to

the Appellant to file a review, the SLP was dismissed. This resulted in the

filing of Review Petition No. 175 of 2017 before the High Court. The review

order was passed without appreciating which one of the enactments is

applicable. Again, by relying on Rule 19 (iv) of the 2003 Rules, the review was

1 (2003) 9 SCC 519.

5

dismissed. The order of this Court dated 28.08.2017, since granted liberty to

assail the orders, the present Civil Appeal is maintained.

5. Mr Rituraj Biswas argues that the impugned orders are entirely silent

on the applicability of the Rule to the subject selection by an aided institution.

Respondent No. 3 was provincialised subsequently in point of time, and the

advertisement was issued before provincialization. Applying the 2001 Rules

for the subject selection would be proper and legal. The Appellant participated

in the selection process with reference to the 2001 Rules. The Appellant is the

meritorious candidate, and the step taken in abundant caution should not be

put against the Appellant. The Respondent No. 5 is accommodated as Lecturer

subsequent in point of time, and the continuation of the appellant in the post

already she has been working, is neither illegal nor arbitrary. Lastly, it is

argued that applying Rules made under Article 309 of the Constitution of

India to an aided post in the absence of applicable Rules amounts to an illegal

exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court. Mr. Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Sr.

AAG appearing for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, does not dispute the

appointment of Respondent No. 5 and continuing as on date as well as the

subsequent provincialisation of Respondent No. 3–College to the

advertisement issued for an aided post in the institution. The learned counsel

for Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, however, would argue that the appellant has

rendered service for a considerable time, and the appointment may be

confirmed without laying down the principle applicable on the method and

mode of recruitment in aided colleges.

6. We appreciate the circumstances which are undisputed and express

our view on the issue at hand. The advertisement is clear that the selection

process is set in motion as per the 2001 Rules. The Appellant stood at serial 

6

no. 1 in the merit list. The Governing Body resolved the appellant’s case for

approval and appointment. The Government, referring to the extant Rules,

condoned the overage for applying to an aided post in an aided institution. In

the absence of the advertisement or the spelling out of applicable Rules,

applying Rule 19(iv) of the 2003 Rules, to set aside the approval and

appointment of the appellant, in the circumstances of this case, is illegal.

Consequently, the orders dated 24.02.2012 and 24.05.2023 are set aside, and

we are in agreement with the view expressed by the learned Single Judge.

7. The Respondent No. 5, since is admittedly working as a Lecturer under

the administrative control of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, it is made clear that

the services of the Respondent No. 5 shall not be interfered with,

notwithstanding the view taken by us in this order. The Appellant has

discontinued after dismissal of the Review Petition, and therefore, we direct

Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 to reinstate the Appellant within 4 weeks from today,

and the respondents shall not treat the break in service between the date of

termination and reinstatement pursuant to this order. The appellant shall be

given continuity of services for all purposes, without any back wages. For the

reasons stated above, in the peculiar facts of the case, the civil appeals are

allowed.

8. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

………..……….…………………J.

 [AHSANUDDIN AMANULLAH]

.………..…………………………J.

 [S.V.N. BHATTI]

New Delhi;

September 25, 2025.