Plea of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. or bar under Section 140 of Delhi Police Act cannot be a ground to refuse registration of FIR. Whether protection is available to public servant is a matter to be considered at later stage, not at FIR stage.

Criminal Law – Registration of FIR – Cognizable Offence – Duty of Police – Preliminary Enquiry – Scope –
Where complaints by private citizens disclosed prima facie commission of cognizable offences (illegal seizure of documents without seizure memo, abuse of authority, intimidation, derogation of bail orders) against CBI officers on deputation, the High Court was justified in directing registration of FIR and investigation. Held, under Section 154 Cr.P.C., registration of FIR is mandatory if information discloses cognizable offence; police is not required to test genuineness or credibility of information at that stage. Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2006) 2 SCC 677; Lalita Kumari v. State of U.P., (2014) 2 SCC 1 – relied on.

Criminal Procedure – Section 482 Cr.P.C. – Writ under Article 226 – Alternative Remedy – Maintainability –
Availability of alternative remedy (approaching Magistrate under Sections 156(3) or 200 Cr.P.C.) not an absolute bar. High Court, in exercise of its constitutional jurisdiction, can direct registration of FIR where serious allegations of abuse of power by public servants are made out.

Preliminary Inquiry – CBI Report – Effect –
Report of CBI Joint Director holding that no cognizable offence was made out, is at best a preliminary inquiry report prior to registration of FIR. Such a report is not conclusive and does not bind the Court; I.O. may look into it during investigation but must independently investigate without being influenced by such findings.

Public Servant – Protection – Section 197 Cr.P.C. – Sanction – Stage of Consideration –
Plea of sanction under Section 197 Cr.P.C. or bar under Section 140 of Delhi Police Act cannot be a ground to refuse registration of FIR. Whether protection is available to public servant is a matter to be considered at later stage, not at FIR stage.

Investigation – Forum –
Direction of High Court to have matter investigated by Special Cell (meant for terrorism-related cases) modified by Supreme Court. Investigation to be carried out by Delhi Police, by an officer not below the rank of Assistant Commissioner of Police.

Delay – Challenge to High Court Order – Condonation –
Though appeals were filed after 12 years, delay condoned as appellants had bona fide pursued LPAs which were later dismissed as not maintainable.

Practice and Procedure – Appeals – Scope of Interference – Article 136 –
Supreme Court declined to interfere with High Court’s discretionary order directing registration of FIR, as same was based on material showing prima facie commission of cognizable offences.

Directions –

1. FIR to be registered and investigated by Delhi Police (ACP rank or above).

2. Preliminary inquiry report of CBI may be considered by I.O., but not treated as conclusive.

3. Investigation to conclude preferably within 3 months.

4. Appellants to cooperate with I.O. and appear as directed; no arrest or coercive steps unless custodial interrogation found necessary.

2025 INSC 1095

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7900 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025)

(D.No. 10495 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

SHEESH RAM SAINI & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 7897 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)

AND

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. of 2025)

(D. No. 10508 of 2019)

VINOD KUMAR PANDEY & ANR. APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

VIJAY AGGARWAL & ANR. RESPONDENT(S)

2

J U D G M E N T

PANKAJ MITHAL, J.

1. Delay condoned.

2. Leave granted.

3. Heard Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel,

Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General

and Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel for

the parties.

4. The cases are quite simple but have a chequered

history, involving the appellants, who are two

officers of the Central Bureau of Investigation1. One

is Vinod Kumar Pandey, the then Inspector of CBI,

and the other is Neeraj Kumar, the then Joint

Director of CBI.

5. The two petitions being Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 675

of 2001 and Writ Petition (Crl.) No.738 of 2001

under Article 226 of the Constitution of India read

with Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure2, 1973 came to be filed by one Vijay

Aggarwal and other by one Sheesh Ram Saini

1 Hereinafter referred to as ‘CBI’

2 Hereinafter referred to as’Cr.P.C.’

3

respectively, seeking directions for registration of

First Information Report3 against the above two

officers on deputation to the CBI, namely, Vinod

Kumar Pandey and Neeraj Kumar for committing

offences under Sections 506, 341, 342 and 166,

and Sections 218, 463, 465, 469, 166 and 120-B of

the Indian Penal Code4, 1860, as alleged in the writ

petitions respectively.

6. The aforesaid two writ petitions were decided by the

Single Judge of the High Court on 26.06.2006 but

by separate order(s) passed in identical terms. Both

the petitions were partly allowed and directions

were issued to the Delhi Police to register a case on

the basis of the allegations contained in the

complaint dated 05.07.2001 lodged by Sheesh Ram

Saini with PS Lodhi Colony and complaint dated

23.02.2004 addressed to Commissioner of Police,

Delhi by Vijay Aggarwal respectively, and to get the

matter investigated by the Special Cell of the Delhi

Police by an Officer not below the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police, uninfluenced by the

3

In short ‘FIR’

4

In short ‘IPC’

4

findings and the observations contained in the

Inquiry Report dated 26.04.2005 conducted by the

Joint Director, CBI.

7. In short, the writ petitions were partly allowed with

the direction to register the FIR with the finding

that prima facie cognizable offences are made out

for investigation against the appellant-officers.

8. Aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment(s) and order(s)

of the High Court dated 26.06.2006, both the

officers of the CBI preferred separate Letters Patent

Appeal(s)5 before the Division Bench of the High

Court. The said LPAs were dismissed on 13.03.2019

on the ground of maintainability.

9. Out of the present four appeals, two appeals

[D.No.10495 of 2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are

against the order(s) of the learned Single Judge

dated 26.06.2006 partly allowing the petitions, and

other two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and

S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] are against the order of

the Division Bench of the High Court dated

13.03.2019 dismissing the LPAs as not

maintainable.

5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘LPA’

5

10. We had made it clear to the parties in the very

beginning that we would not enter into the question

of maintainability of the LPAs so as to adjudicate

the appeals arising out of their dismissal for the

reason that we would consider the correctness of

the judgment and order(s) dated 26.06.2006 on

merits as would have been done in the LPAs by the

Division Bench. The counsel for the parties agreed

and proceeded to advance arguments accordingly

on merits.

11. A preliminary objection was raised with regard to

delay of more than 12 years in challenging the

judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge dated

26.06.2006.

12. The said delay has been explained taking the

ground that the appellants were bona fide pursuing

their LPAs before the Division Bench of the High

Court and once they realized that the LPAs are not

maintainable and they have been dismissed as not

maintainable, they decided to challenge the

judgment and order(s) passed by the learned Single

Judge before the Supreme Court.

6

13. In view of the above explanation, though

technically, pursuing the LPAs and the time spent

thereon may not be a very good cause to condone

the delay but since there is no willful or deliberate

delay or any default on part of the appellants in

assailing the judgment and order(s) of the Single

Judge dated 26.06.2006 rather they were all

thoroughly vigilant of their rights, we have ignored

the delay and have heard the parties on merits,

more particularly, on the correctness of the

judgment and order(s) of the Single Judge.

14. Mr. Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, argued that the information/complaint

submitted by Sheesh Ram Saini and by Vijay

Kumar Aggarwal does not make out a cognizable

offence for enabling the Court to direct for the

registration of the FIR. The High Court could not

have directed for the registration of the FIR as the

procedure laid down by the various decisions of this

Court was not followed before approaching the High

Court. Secondly, the High Court could not have

recorded a finding of commission of a cognizable 

7

offence which leaves nothing for the Investigating

Officer6 to opine on after the completion of the

investigation, except to submit a chargesheet. He

further argued that in the so-called preliminary

inquiry conducted by the Joint Director, CBI, it has

been reported that no cognizable offence is made

out for the purpose of investigation, therefore, it

was not open for the High Court to have substituted

its own finding and to direct for the registration of

the FIR.

15. He emphasized that even if for the sake of argument

it is accepted that a case for investigation is made

out against Vinod Kumar Pandey, there is no

averment or iota of material to rope in Neeraj

Kumar, the other officer.

16. A further submission has been made by Mr. Ranjit

Kumar, learned senior counsel for the appellants,

that the High Court manifestly erred in directing the

investigation to be conducted by the Special Cell of

the Delhi Police, which ordinarily investigates the

matters relating to terrorism. The High Court also

committed an error in directing the exclusion of

6

In short ‘I.O.’

8

preliminary inquiry report dated 26.04.2005 of the

Joint Director, CBI from consideration during the

investigation.

17. Mr. S. V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General

for the respondents, pressed an application for the

impleadment of the CBI contending that as the

preliminary inquiry was conducted by an officer of

the CBI and the case involves allegations against

the officers of the CBI, therefore, the CBI is a proper

party so as to defend the inquiry report and its

officers.

18. On merits, he submitted that the complaints do not

make out any cognizable offence and are barred by

Section 197 Cr.P.C., as whatever acts have been

performed by the officers, they were in discharge of

their official duties. The complaints are also hit by

Section 140 of the Delhi Police Act, 1978 and are

barred by limitation.

19. Admittedly, the CBI was a party in the writ petitions

before the High Court and had not chosen to assail

the impugned order(s), meaning thereby that the

CBI never felt aggrieved by the said order(s). The 

9

CBI, even if impleaded, would be added as the

respondent or a proforma respondent. It is well

recognized in law that a respondent or a proforma

respondent may support the judgment impugned

but cannot assail the same in his capacity as a

respondent. The CBI has not independently

challenged the aforesaid order(s) of the High Court.

20. Moreover, the CBI is not the party actually

aggrieved by the direction given by the High Court

for the registration of the FIR against the two

officers. It is the officers who are aggrieved in their

personal capacity and not the institution to which

they are on deputation. It is, therefore, for the

officers to defend themselves by taking appropriate

legal remedies and the CBI has nothing to do with

it. This apart, the report of the CBI is not under

challenge, therefore, the contention that CBI has to

support the report of its officer is not appreciable.

Accordingly, we do not deem it necessary to permit

impleadment of the CBI and to consider any

objections as raised by the learned Additional

Solicitor General.

10

21. The plain reading of the impugned judgment and

order(s) of the Single Judge of the High Court dated

26.06.2006 reveals that the officers of the CBI in

the dock have committed irregularities, if not

illegality in discharge of their official duties and are

prima facie guilty of the commission of the offences

as alleged. This is clearly reflected from the

averments contained in the complaints and the

petitions. Both the officers have acted in

connivance, and it is alleged that one of the officers,

Vinod Kumar Pandey, had acted at the behest of the

Senior Officer, Neeraj Kumar. The question whether

Vinod Kumar Pandey acted on the advice or behest

of Neeraj Kumar or whether they were in

connivance, is a matter of fact which has to be

investigated.

22. The Single Judge of the High Court in Writ Petition

(Crl.) No. 738 of 2001, upon consideration of the

material on record including the inquiry report

dated 26.04.2005 of the Joint Director of CBI,

found that cognizable offences were prima facie

made out against the officers of the CBI i.e. the 

11

appellants. The allegation that the documents were

seized on 26.04.2000 without preparation of the

seizure memo stood substantiated even in the

inquiry report, which recorded that the memo of

seizure was prepared only on 27.04.2000 and not at

the time of seizure on 26.04.2000. The Court

disagreed with the explanation that the documents

were taken for scrutiny on 26.04.2000 noting that

such a version was contrary both to the records and

the findings of the inquiry itself. The Single Judge

also refused to accept that it was a procedural

irregularity and held that the preparation of seizure

memo in the facts and circumstances of the case

was not in accordance with the CBI Crime Manual

and attracted penal provisions of Sections 218, 463,

465, 469, 166 and 120-B IPC.

23. The High Court in Writ Petition (Crl.) No.675 of

2001, preferred by Vijay Aggarwal, observed that

V.K. Pandey had summoned Vijay Aggarwal on

07.06.2001 and 11.06.2001 in clear derogation of a

bail order dated 27.11.2000 passed by the Special

Judge, which prima facie indicated a mala fide and 

12

malicious exercise of authority.

24. The Court held that the allegations of abuse,

intimidation, and threats, including use of vulgar

language to coerce Vijay Aggarwal to ensure

withdrawal of his brother’s complaint against Neeraj

Kumar, were serious and not unfounded. The Court

observed that such conduct was grave in nature

and prima facie disclosed the commission of

cognizable offences under IPC.

25. The High Court rejected the conclusion reached by

the CBI’s enquiry officer that no offence was made

out and that the allegations of abuse and coercion

were unsubstantiated. It was observed that the

correctness or veracity of the allegations could not

have been gone into at the stage of a preliminary

enquiry and that such allegations, being serious in

nature, could not be brushed aside lightly. The

Court clarified that Vijay Aggarwal’s failure to file

objections to the enquiry report could not amount

to acceptance of its findings.

26. The Writ Court emphasized that CBI officers, being

public servants, cannot claim immunity if they 

13

knowingly prepare false or incorrect records during

the course of seizure or abuse their official position.

Such acts on their part are serious acts and are not

capable of being ignored and therefore, investigation

in the matter is necessary.

27. In Pradeep Nirankarnath Sharma v. State of

Gujarat,7 this Court, in a very recent judgment

held, that where the allegations pertain to the abuse

of official position and corrupt practices while

holding public office, such actions fall squarely

within category of cognizable offences and therefore,

they are to be inquired into, and holding of any

preliminary inquiry before the registration of the

FIR is not necessary. If the information provided to

the police or the preliminary report discloses a

commission of a cognizable offence, the police is

duty bound under Section 154 Cr.P.C. to register

an FIR without any delay.

28. The report of the CBI at best is a preliminary

enquiry report submitted before the registration of

the FIR. However, such an enquiry is not ordinarily

contemplated in law before registration of FIR, and

7

(2025) 4 SCC 818

14

hence is not a conclusive report to be relied upon to

oust the power of the Constitutional Court to record

its own conclusion about commission of a

cognizable offence, if any, on the material or the

allegations in the complaints.

29. Undoubtedly, the High Court(s) should discourage

writ petitions or petitions under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

where alternative remedies are available.

Nonetheless, as observed even in Sakiri Vasu v.

State of U.P.,8 it is equally true that alternative

remedy is not an absolute bar for invoking the

extraordinary jurisdiction or the inherent

jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of

the Constitution or Section 482 Cr.P.C.

30. In Ramesh Kumari v. State (NCT of Delhi)9, the

Court denounced the dismissal of the petition

seeking registration of the FIR, solely on the ground

of alternative remedy, and held that ground of

alternative remedy would not be a substitute in law

for refusing to register a case when the complaint of

the citizen makes it a cognizable offence.

8

(2008) 2 SCC 409

9

(2006) 2 SCC 677

15

31. In a recent landmark decision, Anurag Bhatnagar

& Anr. v. State (NCT of Delhi) & Anr.10, this

Court held that although the complainant

approached the Court, in that case the Magistrate,

without exhausting the alternative remedies

available, it was a mere procedural irregularity and

not illegality, as the Court was competent to order

registration of the FIR. It was further observed that

when information disclosing commission of

cognizable offence is conveyed to the police, they

cannot refuse to register the FIR.

32. Since, it is the duty of the police to register an FIR if

a prima facie cognizable offence is made out, the

police is not required to go into the genuineness

and credibility of the said information. It has been

so laid down very clearly in Ramesh Kumari

(Supra) that the genuineness or credibility of the

information is not the condition precedent for

registration of an FIR.

33. The complainants Sheesh Ram Saini and Vijay

Kumar Aggarwal have approached the police

authorities by means of complaints dated

10 2025 INSC 895

16

05.07.2001 and 23.02.2004 to get the matter

investigated, but as no action was purportedly

taken thereof rather it is alleged that the police

authorities expressed reluctance to entertain the

complaints as it would not be proper on part of the

police to investigate against the officers of the CBI,

the complainants approached the Constitutional

Court for necessary action.

34. Therefore, if the Constitutional Court has exercised

its discretion in entertaining the petitions and

directing for the registration of the FIR against the

two officers, on being satisfied that the commission

of a cognizable offence is prima facie made out

against them, we see no good reason to interfere

with such discretion. At best, as argued by Mr.

Ranjit Kumar, learned senior counsel for the

appellants, we can say that the opinion expressed

by the High Court in regard to commission of the

cognizable offences is only a prima facie opinion and

has to be treated as such, so as not to affect the

discretion of the I.O., subsequent to the

investigation.

17

35. The registration of the FIR against the two officers is

not likely to cause any prejudice to them. They will

have the right to participate in the investigation to

establish that they have not committed any offence,

as alleged. Thereupon, the I.O. on consideration of

the material collected during investigation, may

submit a closure report or file the chargesheet. In

the event, a closure report is filed and accepted by

the Magistrate, the appellants will have no

grievance. On the other hand, in the event, a charge

sheet is submitted, the appellants will have an

opportunity to assail the same before the

appropriate forum.

36. It would however, not be a prudent exercise at this

stage to scuttle the registration of the FIR or the

investigation, when the High Court in exercise of its

constitutional powers had opined that prima facie, a

cognizable offence is made out against the two

officers, that too upon elaborate consideration of

the preliminary inquiry report of the Joint Director

of CBI.

37. It is trite to point out that the offence is alleged to 

18

have been committed in the year 2000 and till date

the matter had not been allowed to be investigated.

It would be dichotomy of justice if such an offence

is allowed to go uninvestigated particularly when

there is involvement of the officers on deputation to

CBI. It is cardinal in law that justice must not only

be done, but must also be seen to be done. It is

high time that sometimes those who investigate

must also be investigated to keep alive the faith of

the public at large in the system.

38. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances, we

do not consider it appropriate to interfere with the

impugned judgment and order(s) of the High Court

in exercise of our discretionary jurisdiction under

Article 136 of the Constitution of India.

39. However, we make it clear that since the Special

Cell of the Delhi Police is supposed to investigate

the matters concerning terrorism, upon registration

of the FIR in the case at hand, the investigation

would be conducted by the Delhi Police itself but by

an officer not below the rank of Assistant

Commissioner of Police.

19

40. Secondly, in view of the law laid down in Lalita

Kumari vs. Government of Uttar Pradesh and

Ors.

11, and reiterated thereafter to the effect that

registration of FIR is mandatory under Section 154

Cr.P.C. if the information discloses commission of a

cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry before

FIR is permissible in such a situation; however, if

the information received does not disclose a

cognizable offence but indicates necessity of an

inquiry being conducted, a preliminary inquiry may

be conducted only to ascertain facts disclosing

cognizable offence, if any. Thus, treating the inquiry

conducted by the Joint Director, CBI as a

preliminary inquiry, we permit the same to be

looked into, if necessary, by the I.O. during the

investigation by him, but not to treat it as

conclusive. The I.O. would conduct the investigation

strictly in accordance with law without being

influenced by any finding or observation made by

the High Court in the impugned order(s) or by this

Court hereinabove and shall conclude the same as

expeditiously as possible, preferably within three

11 (2014) 2 SCC 1

20

months as the matter is quite old.

41. The appellants are directed to join the investigation

and to cooperate with the I.O. by appearing before

him, as and when called upon. In the event they

join the investigation and appear before the I.O.

regularly, no coercive steps shall be taken against

them, including that of arrest, until and unless the

I.O. records satisfaction that custodial interrogation

at any stage is necessary.

42. The two appeals [S.L.P.(C) No. 7900 of 2019 and

S.L.P.(C) No. 7897 of 2019] stand disposed of in the

above terms and the two appeals [D.No.10495 of

2019 and D.No.10508 of 2019] are partly allowed by

modifying the judgment and orders of the High

Court dated 26.06.2006 as indicated above.

43. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

…………………………………...J.

 [PANKAJ MITHAL]

…………………………………...J.

 [PRASANNA B. VARALE]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 10, 2025.

Counter-claim must necessarily be directed against the plaintiff; though incidental relief against a co-defendant may be permissible, a counter-claim solely against co-defendant is not maintainable. Specific performance of an agreement sought by defendant against a co-defendant (represented through Nazir) is impermissible.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VIII Rule 6A — Counter-claim

• Counter-claim must necessarily be directed against the plaintiff; though incidental relief against a co-defendant may be permissible, a counter-claim solely against co-defendant is not maintainable.

• Specific performance of an agreement sought by defendant against a co-defendant (represented through Nazir) is impermissible.

• Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar, (2006) 12 SCC 734 and Damodhar Narayan Sawale v. Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske, (2023) 19 SCC 175, reaffirmed.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order VIII Rule 6A; Limitation Act, 1963 — Article 54

• Counter-claim, though treated as a plaint, is subject to limitation law.

• Agreement to sell dated 21.10.2011 — specific performance sought in 2021 — hopelessly barred by limitation.

• Cause of action arose at least when plaintiff instituted suit in 2012; counter-claim filed nine years thereafter cannot be entertained.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Counter-claim — Stage for filing

• No absolute right to file counter-claim after written statement; outer limit is till framing of issues.

• Counter-claim filed after issues framed (12.02.2019) and after substantial progress in trial, cannot be entertained.

• Ashok Kumar Kalra v. Wing CDR. Surendra Agnihotri, (2020) 2 SCC 394, applied.

Civil Procedure Code, 1908 — Order XXII Rule 4A

• Appointment of Nazir to represent deceased defendant does not extend or revive right to file counter-claim.

• Cause of action for counter-claim cannot be said to arise only upon such substitution

Constitution of India — Article 227 — Supervisory Jurisdiction of High Court

• Interference with Trial Court’s order rejecting counter-claim unjustified when no jurisdictional error is shown.

• High Court erred in reversing Trial Court’s well-reasoned order.

Held

• High Court’s order permitting defendant no.2 to file counter-claim set aside.

• Trial Court’s rejection of counter-claim restored.

• Appeal allowed; no costs.

2025 INSC 1109

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NO. 5635 OF 2023

RAJUL MANOJ SHAH ALIAS RAJESHWARI

RASIKLAL SHETH ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

KIRANBHAI SHAKRABHAI PATEL & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Present appeal is against the judgment and order of the High

Court of Gujarat1 against the order passed by the City Civil Court,

Ahmedabad dismissing the interlocutory application2 filed by

respondent no.1/defendant no.2 for amending the written

statement and for filing a counter claim in a suit for declaration

and injunction filed by the appellant.

1 In Special Civil Application No. 12701 of 2021 dated 16.01.2023. 2 Exhibit-107/108 dated 05.08.2021 in O.S. No.167 of 2012.

2

3. Facts: Short facts leading to the filing of the appeal are that

the appellant, in 2012, instituted an original suit alleging that the

property in question, a bungalow in a cooperative housing society

situated near Stadium Char Rasta in Ahmedabad, belongs to her

father and upon his demise, the said property came to be owned

by her and by her brother jointly. However, upon the demise of her

brother, the property was jointly owned by the appellant and her

sister-in-law/defendant no. 1. In January, 2012, when the

appellant came to know that her sister-in-law has agreed to sell a

portion of the undivided share of the joint family property in favour

of respondent no.1 /defendant No.2, the appellant filed the suit for

a declaration that her sister-in-law, defendant no.1 has no right to

transfer or deal with the property without her consent and to

declare the agreement to sell dated 21.10.2011 in favour of

defendant no.2, as null and void.

4. On 12.10.2013, the original defendant no. 1 passed away

pending disposal of the suit. Thereafter, on 23.07.2017, the

appellant filed an application before the Trial Court declaring the

factum of defendant no.1’s death and praying for her deletion from

array of parties. Trial Court vide order dated 24.10.2019 allowed

appellant’s application for deletion of defendant no.1. Meanwhile,

3

on 10.10.2019, defendant no. 2 moved an application before the

Trial Court praying for substitution of the original defendant no. 1

with a court appointed officer under Order XXII Rule 4A of Code of

Civil Procedure, 19083 which came to be dismissed vide order

dated 15.11.2019.

5. Aggrieved against the orders dated 24.10.2019 and

15.11.2019, defendant no. 2 moved a Special Civil Application

before the High Court. On 10.02.2020, the High Court passed an

order based on consent of both the parties, thereby quashing

orders dated 24.10.2019 and 15.11.2019. Consequently, High

Court substituted and appointed the court official – Nazir of the

City Civil Court – respondent no. 2 as defendant no.1. Thereafter,

the appellant also filed an amended plaint on 04.03.2020.

6. Proceedings leading to the filing of the present appeal

commenced when defendant no. 2, on 26.07.2021 moved an

application seeking to amend the written statement by adding a

counter-claim, praying for, a) to direct the Nazir/respondent no.2

to accept remaining consideration and execute a sale deed for the

undivided share in furtherance of the agreement to sell dated

3 Hereinafter, CPC.

4

21.10.2011, and b) to partition the suit property as per Partition

Act, 1893.

7. The Trial Court by its order dated 05.08.2021 dismissed the

application by holding that defendant no. 2 has filed the

application after a long time and that, it is abuse of the process to

file such application after issues were framed, way back on

12.02.2019. Trial Court also observed that the defendant cannot

seek specific performance of the agreement of sale dated

21.10.2011 against deceased defendant no. 1, as represented by a

court officer, that too in a suit filed by the plaintiff. Following the

decisions of this Court, the Trial Court held that a counter claim

is not maintainable against the co-defendant. Respondent No. 1,

defendant no. 2 challenged this order in Special Civil Application

under Articles 226/227 and the High Court, by the order

impugned before us allowed the petition.

8. The High Court allowed the application of defendant no. 2

and permitted him to file his counter-claim. The relevant portion

of the order impugned is as follows;

“13.13. In view of this Court, considering the aforesaid facts, the

prayers as prayed for by the petitioner herein are required to be

granted and the prayers as prayed for in application below Exh.

107 /108 could have been prayed for by the petitioner herein,

only after the Nazir of the City Civil Court as administrator of the

property in question would have been appointed. The Nazir came

to be appointed only by order dated 10.02.2020 by this Court in

Special Civil Application No. 21979 of 2019 and soon thereafter, 

5

the applications below Exh.107/108 came to be filed by the

petitioner herein. The cause of action can be said to have arisen

after the Issues came to be framed, and therefore, in the facts of

the present case, the petitioner could not have been non-suited

on the ground of delay.

13. 14. The trial Court has also come to the conclusion that the

petitioner herein has chosen to file counter-claim against the codefendant and the same is held to be not maintainable. It

appears that the reliefs have not been sought for by the

petitioner herein against the co-defendant, the same have been

sought for against the Nazir - court official of the City Civil Court,

as also against the respondent no.2 - original plaintiff. The

counter-claim is maintainable, in view of the fact that the same

is filed after the administrator- Nazir came to be appointed by

this Court vide order dated 10.02.2020, for the prayers as

referred above.

14. This Court by exercising supervisory jurisdiction under

Article 227 of the Constitution of India, is inclined to allow the

said applications below Exh. 107 /108 preferred by the

petitioner herein by quashing and setting aside the order dated

05.08.2021 passed below Exh.107/108 in Civil Suit No. 167 of

2012 by the City Civil Court, Ahmedabad.

15. In view of this Court, in the facts and circumstances of the

present case, the present petition are required to be allowed and

the same is allowed, accordingly, keeping it open for the

respondent herein to lead the evidence on the ground of

limitation and the same be decided by the Court below in

accordance with law. It is also kept open for the respective

parties to take all the contentions before the Court below, when

the matter is taken-up for hearing and other issues that may be

germane for adjudication of the dispute in question including the

issue of limitation.

The present petition stands allowed, accordingly.”

(emphasis supplied)

9. Aggrieved, the appellant approached this Court by filing the

present civil appeal. We have heard Mr. Ritin Rai, learned senior

counsel assisted by others, on behalf of the appellant. We have

also heard Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, learned counsel and others on

behalf of the respondent.

6

10. The two submissions made by Mr. Ritin Rai, learned senior

counsel are simple and straightforward. The first submission is

that a counter claim cannot be entertained after the issues are

formulated in the suit. For this purpose, he relied on the decision

of this Court in Ashok Kumar Kalra v. Wing CDR. Surendra

Agnihotri4. The second submission, as accepted by the Trial Court

as well, is that a counter claim cannot be made against a codefendant and for this purpose the decision of this Court in Rohit

Singh & Ors. v. State of Bihar5 is relied on.

11. Mr. Pradhuman Gohil, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of respondent no. 1/defendant no. 2, articulated his arguments

very well and interpreted Order VIII Rule 6A of CPC innovatively

and also relied on certain portions of the 27th Law Commission

Report.

12. Analysis: Before we take up the issue relating to legality and

propriety of entertaining an application for counter claim 9 years

after filing of the suit, particularly when issues were framed 3 years

before the said application and also the issue relating to the legality

of institution of a counter claim against a co-defendant, we will

touch upon the jurisdiction that the High Court was exercising.

4 (2020) 2 SCC 394.

5 (2006) 12 SCC 734. Hereinafter, “Rohit Singh”.

7

13. The appellant did in fact raise the plea of the High Court

entertaining a petition under Article 227 against the order passed

by the Trial Court but the same was rejected by supplying the

following reasoning after extracting the portion of the decision of

this Court in Kishore Kumar Khaitan & Anr. v. Praveen Kumar

Singh6 by observing that;

“13. 10. Considering the aforesaid ratio as laid down by the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, as referred above, while this Court is

conscious of the restriction while exercising the jurisdiction

under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, looking to the

facts of the present case, interference is called for, in view of

the fact that cause of action for seeking amendment and

counter-claim could be said to have arisen, after the issues

came to be framed by the trial Court on 12.02.2019.

Undisputedly, the aforesaid prayers as prayed for by the

petitioner herein, invoking Order-8 Rule-6(A) 1 and Order-6

Rule-17 of the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 seeking

amendment in plaint and for counter-claim by the present

petitioner, would normally be not granted, after the

commencement of trial and considering the fact that, it would

result in prolonging the suit proceedings, however, the same

depends upon facts and circumstances of the case. The

provisions of Order-6 Rule-17 and Order-8 Rule-6(A)1 of the

Code of Civil Procedure, also provide that same be allowed, if

the same are germane for determining the real controversy

between the parties. In facts of the present case, it cannot be

said that the petitioner· herein has placed on record the facts,

which are new to the suit proceedings, and therefore, prayers

as prayed for by the petitioner herein are required to be

considered and required to be granted.”

(emphasis supplied)

14. The above-referred para does not indicate how the

jurisdictional error has arisen for consideration. In any event of

6 AIR 2006 SC 1474

8

the matter, the relevant portion of facts, as found by the trial court

while rejecting the application for counter claim, which we are of

the opinion are correct in law as well as on fact, are extracted as

hereinbelow for ready reference;

“8. ………

Upon considering the aforesaid provision of C.P.C. Order-8,

Rules-6, when cause arises for counter claim for the

defendant, then counter-claim can be lodged by the defendant

against the plaintiff. In the present case, as per the details of

the counter-claim submitted by the defendant no.2, he has

demanded counter-claim against defendant no. 1 and he has

not prayed for any relief against the plaintiff. If the suit is filed

by the plaintiff, the defendant cannot file counter-claim

against the defendant in the said suit.

Further, upon conducting in depth study of the other details of

the counter-claim, it is proved that the relief of specific

performance sought by the defendant no.2 against the

defendant no.1 in this counter-claim, is the agreement to sale

which was executed by defendant no.1 in favor of defendant

no.2 and no dispute is raised by the defendant no. 1 in that

regard. However, the said agreement to sale was executed in

the year 2011 ie. 21/10/2011. The said counter-claim for

specific performance in that regard, was filed by the defendant

no.2 in this suit in the year 2021. In this regard, upon

considering provisions of Article-54 of the Limitation Act, the

relief of specific performance can be filed within three years

from the date of execution of agreement and if any condition is

fixed in the agreement, then three years from the date of the

condition and if any condition is not fixed, then the date from

which implementation of the agreement is denied or within

three years from the date cause arises. This is a legal

limitation. As per the provision of sub-rule-3 of Rule-6 of Order8 of C.P.C., the provisions applicable to claim are also

applicable to counter-claim. Accordingly, all the provisions of

Limitation Act can be applied to counter-claim. As per Article54 of the Limitation Act, the agreement to sale submitted in

this case and the representation made by Mr. Patel, Ld.

Advocate of the defendant no.2 by citing condition no.3 of the

agreement to sale and upon evaluating the same, duration of 

9

twelve months is fixed after receiving the title clear certificate

in condition. 3 of the agreement to sale. However, defendant

no.2 has stated that the said title clear certificate is not

received. The agreement to sale was executed in the year 2011

and the present plaintiff filed the suit to declare the said

agreement to sale as null and void, ie the plaintiff has

challenged the agreement to sale. Upon considering the said

circumstances and the fact that defendant no.2 is also a party

in this suit and the agreement to sale is challenged in the

knowledge of defendant no.2, then in such circumstances,

cause of the suit can be considered arisen as per provision of

Article-54 of the Limitation Act. Moreover, the responsibility to

prove the provision of ready and willingness as per section- 16

(c) of the Specific Relief Act, falls on defendant no.2. Since the

agreement to sale was executed in favor of defendant no.2 in

the year 2011, then it cannot be believed in general

circumstances that he would have waited for title clear

certificate even after suit was filed. Moreover, even after the

said suit was filed, defendant no.2 did not initiate proceeding

against defendant no. 1 for the implementation of the said

agreement while he was alive and no such pleading is made

in this revision application. The present counter-claim of

defendant no.2 is completely barred by the provision of

Limitation Act.

9. Moreover, considering the significant contention of this

case, the defendant no.2 has already filed his reply vide

Exhibit-35 against the plaint of the plaintiff. He has not

submitted any counter claim with the said reply and presently,

he has submitted application seeking permission to bring the

said counter claim on the record. Considering the case records

of the entire case as to whether such permission can be

allowed after such long period or not, this court has framed

issues vide Exhibit-83. Thereafter, the evidence affidavit has

also been submitted by the plaintiff and presently, the matter

is kept for the cross examination of the plaintiff witness by the

defendant. Regarding the counter claim of the defendant no.2

can be taken on the record or not after such long period, the

Hon’ble Supreme Court has recently laid down clearly in the

judgment of Ashok Kumar Kalra V/s. Wing CDR Surendra

Agnihotri reported on (2020) 2 - SCC - 394 that no time limit

has been prescribed in the Order-8, Rules-6 of CPC to submit

counter claim. However, it does not mean that counter claim

can be taken on record at any time after submitting the reply. 

10

It is laid down in the para-17 of the aforesaid judgment that

the court has to consider simultaneously the facts as to

whether the counter claim is within the time-limit or not and

whether it is barred by the Limitation Act or not. Whereas, it is

clearly laid down in para-18 that the counter claim cannot be

allowed to take on the record after framing of issues and it

may affect the principle of speedy trial if such permission is

granted.

Citing the aforesaid facts, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has

rejected the application seeking permission to take counter

claim on the record after framing of issues and the said

judgment can be made applicable to the case on hand in its

entirety……..

Thus, once it has been established by the Hon'ble Supreme

Court that the permission to take counter claim on the record

cannot be granted once the issues are framed and as

discussed in the case on the hand, the issues have been

framed vide Exhibit-83. Deposition of the plaintiff has also

been recorded vide Exhibit-84 and considering the same, the

counter claim of the defendant no.2 cannot be taken on the

records.

******

10. Thus, considering the entire facts, as discussed above, the

issues have been framed in the present case, the proceedings

of the suit have been initiated, the defendant no.2 has

preferred present application after very long period and it is

barred the provisions of the limitation. As per the judgment of

the Hon'ble Supreme Court, permission to take counter claim

on record cannot be granted once the issues have been framed

and according to the provision of Order-8, Rules-6(A) of the

CPC, the defendant is not entitled to seek counter claim

against the defendant in the suit of the plaintiff, as the present

application of the defendant no.2 cannot be granted, I pass

following order rejecting this application.”

(emphasis supplied)

15. The only justification supplied by the High Court can be seen

in para 13.13 where the High Court has come to the conclusion

that the cause of action for defendant no. 2 has arisen only after 

11

the High Court directed the appointment of a Nazir to represent

the interest of defendant no. 1. There is no other reasoning in the

decision of the High Court.

16. Now, we must consider the two issues raised by the

appellant.

17. Re: Defendant no. 2’s claim of specific relief not

maintainable against appellant: Ld. Sr. Counsel for the

appellant has argued that in terms of Order VIII Rule 6A of CPC, a

counter-claim must be filed seeking relief against the plaintiff and

cannot be filed against a co-defendant, for a counter-claim must

necessarily deal with the defendant's cause of action against the

plaintiff. On the other hand, Ld. Counsel for the respondent

submits that the counter-claim seeks two substantive reliefs,

namely, partition and specific performance. Consequently, it is

contended that the counter-claim is not directed solely against a

co-defendant, for, in an independent suit seeking the very same

reliefs, the appellant would necessarily have to be impleaded as a

party. The ultimate relief sought by defendant no. 2 is a declaration

of co-ownership of the deceased sister-in-law of plaintiff and a

consequent decree of specific performance as against that

ownership on the basis of the agreement of sale.

12

18. Order VIII, Rule 6A, CPC enables a defendant to set up a

counter-claim. Said provision is extracted as below;

6A. Counter-claim by defendant.—(1) A defendant in a suit

may, in addition to his right of pleading a set-off under rule 6,

set up, by way of counter-claim against the claim of the plaintiff,

any right or claim in respect of a cause of action accruing to the

defendant against the plaintiff either before or after the filing of

the suit but before the defendant has delivered his defence or

before the time limited for delivering his defence has expired,

whether such counter-claim is in the nature of a claim for

damages or not:

Provided that such counter-claim shall not exceed the pecuniary

limits of the jurisdiction of the court.

(2) Such counter-claim shall have the same effect as a cross-suit

so as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in the

same suit, both on the original claim and on the counter-claim.

(3) The plaintiff shall be at liberty to file a written statement in

answer to the counter-claim of the defendant within such period

as may be fixed by the court.

(4) The counter-claim shall be treated as a plaint and governed

by the rules applicable to plaints.

(emphasis supplied)

19. As per Rule 6-A(1), a defendant may assert any right or claim

against the plaintiff before the filing of the written statement, even

if such cause of action is unrelated to the plaintiff’s suit. The only

limitation is that the counter-claim must lie within the pecuniary

jurisdiction of the court. Such a counter-claim is treated as a

cross-suit and is governed by the rules applicable to plaints,

including the obligation to disclose the cause of action and pay

requisite court fees. The legislative intent is to avoid multiplicity of

proceedings by allowing both the original suit and the counterclaim to be tried and disposed of in a single trial, thereby avoiding 

13

prolonged and protracted litigation as held in Jag Mohan Chawla

v. Dera Radha Swami Satsang.7

20. Rule 6A provides that counter-claim shall be against the

claim of the plaintiff and such right or claim shall be in respect of

cause of action accruing to defendant against the plaintiff. This

Court in Rohit Singh (supra) held;

“21. Normally, a counterclaim, though based on a different

cause of action than the one put in suit by the plaintiff could be

made. But, it appears to us that a counterclaim has necessarily

to be directed against the plaintiff in the suit, though incidentally

or along with it, it may also claim relief against the codefendants in the suit. But a counterclaim directed solely

against the co-defendants cannot be maintained. By filing a

counterclaim the litigation cannot be converted into some sort of

an interpleader suit…..”

21. The above observations have been reiterated with approval in

subsequent pronouncement in Damodhar Narayan Sawale v.

Tejrao Bajirao Mhaske8, by observing as under;

“39. The decision of this Court in Rohit Singh v. State of Bihar

also assumes relevance in the above context. This Court held

that a defendant could not be permitted to raise counterclaim

against co-defendant because by virtue of Order 8 Rule 6-A CPC,

it could be raised by the defendant against the claim of the

plaintiff.”

22. In the present case, defendant no. 2 sought to raise a

counter-claim primarily for the relief of specific performance of

agreement dated 21.10.2011 executed in his favour by deceased

7 (1996) 4 SCC 699.

8 (2023) 19 SCC 175; also see Satyender v. Saroj, (2022) 17 SCC 154.

14

original defendant no. 1 with respect to her undivided share in the

suit property, by a direction to the Nazir, the substituted

representative of defendant no. 1, to execute a sale deed in

pursuance of the agreement to sell. The relief of specific

performance as sought to be raised by defendant no. 2 cannot be

set up by way of a counter-claim since the same is not directed

against the appellant/plaintiff, but is instead directed solely

against the co-defendant. In view of this, defendant no. 2 is held

to be disentitled to raise prayer of specific performance by way of

counter-claim. This is simply not permissible, and this position is

no more res-integra in view of the decision of this Court in Rohit

Singh (supra).

23. Defendant no. 2 however submits that he has not only

claimed the relief of specific performance, but has also sought

partition of suit property to separate the share he is entitled to

under the agreement. Defendant must first establish a right of

claim over the property, which is absent9 till he succeeds against

the estate of defendant no. 1 and only thereafter that the question

of setting up a counter claim against plaintiff may arise. Thus, the

9 Munishamappa v. M. Rama Reddy, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1701.

15

submission that there is also a claim for partition must fail for the

same reason.

24. Re: Defendant no. 2 filed the counter-claim after issues

were framed: It is true that issues were framed on 12.02.2019

and the application for counter claim was filed almost two years

thereafter i.e., on 26.07.2021. For our purpose, it is sufficient to

refer to the guiding principle for determining the time-frame for

filing a counter claim, succinctly articulated in the judgment of

this Court in Ashok Kumar Kalra (supra). The relevant portion of

the decision is as under10;

“17. The time limitation for filing of the counterclaim, is not

explicitly provided by the legislature, rather only limitation as to

the accrual of the cause of action is provided. As noted in the

above precedents, further complications stem from the fact that

there is a possibility of amending the written statement.

However, we can state that the right to file a counterclaim in a

suit is explicitly limited by the embargo provided for the accrual

of the cause of action under Order 8 Rule 6-A. Having said so,

this does not mean that counterclaim can be filed at any time

after filing of the written statement. As counterclaim is treated to

be plaint, generally it needs to first of all be compliant with the

limitation provided under the Limitation Act, 1963 as the timebarred suits cannot be entertained under the guise of the

counterclaim just because of the fact that the cause of action

arose as per the parameters of Order 8 Rule 6-A.

18. As discussed by us in the preceding paragraphs, the whole

purpose of the procedural law is to ensure that the legal process

is made more effective in the process of delivering substantial

justice. Particularly, the purpose of introducing Rule 6-A in Order

8 CPC is to avoid multiplicity of proceedings by driving the

parties to file separate suit and see that the dispute between the

parties is decided finally. If the provision is interpreted in such

a way, to allow delayed filing of the counterclaim, the provision

itself becomes redundant and the purpose for which the

10 Ashok Kumar Kalra v. Wing CDR Surendra Agnihotri, (2020) 2 SCC 394.

16

amendment is made will be defeated and ultimately it leads to

flagrant miscarriage of justice. At the same time, there cannot be

a rigid and hyper-technical approach that the provision

stipulates that the counterclaim has to be filed along with the

written statement and beyond that, the court has no power. The

courts, taking into consideration the reasons stated in support of

the counterclaim, should adopt a balanced approach keeping in

mind the object behind the amendment and to subserve the ends

of justice. There cannot be any hard and fast rule to say that in

a particular time the counterclaim has to be filed, by curtailing

the discretion conferred on the courts. The trial court has to

exercise the discretion judiciously and come to a definite

conclusion that by allowing the counterclaim, no prejudice is

caused to the opposite party, process is not unduly delayed and

the same is in the best interest of justice and as per the objects

sought to be achieved through the amendment. But however, we

are of the considered opinion that the defendant cannot be

permitted to file counterclaim after the issues are framed and

after the suit has proceeded substantially. It would defeat the

cause of justice and be detrimental to the principle of speedy

justice as enshrined in the objects and reasons for the particular

amendment to CPC.

19. In this regard having clarified the law, we may note

that Mahendra Kumar case [Mahendra Kumar v. State of M.P.,

(1987) 3 SCC 265] needs to be understood and restricted to the

facts of that case. We may note that even if a counterclaim is

filed within the limitation period, the trial court has to exercise

its discretion to balance between the right to speedy trial and

right to file counterclaim, so that the substantive justice is not

defeated. The discretion vested with the trial court to ascertain

the maintainability of the counterclaim is limited by various

considerations based on facts and circumstances of each case.

We may point out that there cannot be a straitjacket formula,

rather there are numerous factors which needs to be taken into

consideration before admitting a counterclaim.

20. We may note that any contrary interpretation would lead to

unnecessary curtailment of the right of a defendant to file

counterclaim. This Court needs to recognise the practical

difficulties faced by the litigants across the country. Attaining

the laudable goal of speedy justice itself cannot be the only end,

rather effective justice wherein adequate opportunity is provided

to all the parties, need to be recognised as well (refer to Salem

Advocate Bar Assn. case [Salem Advocate Bar Assn. (2) v. Union

of India, (2005) 6 SCC 344 : AIR 2005 SC 3353] ).

21. We sum up our findings, that Order 8 Rule 6-A CPC does not

put an embargo on filing the counterclaim after filing the written

statement, rather the restriction is only with respect to the 

17

accrual of the cause of action. Having said so, this does not give

absolute right to the defendant to file the counterclaim with

substantive delay, even if the limitation period prescribed has

not elapsed. The court has to take into consideration the outer

limit for filing the counterclaim, which is pegged till the issues

are framed. The court in such cases have the discretion to

entertain filing of the counterclaim, after taking into

consideration and evaluating inclusive factors provided below

which are only illustrative, though not exhaustive:

(i) Period of delay.

(ii)Prescribed limitation period for the cause of action pleaded.

(iii) Reason for the delay.

(iv) Defendant's assertion of his right.

(v) Similarity of cause of action between the main suit and the

counterclaim.

(vi) Cost of fresh litigation.

(vii) Injustice and abuse of process.

(viii) Prejudice to the opposite party.

(ix) And facts and circumstances of each case.

(x) In any case, not after framing of the issues.”

25. It is also important to note that defendant no. 2 is seeking

specific performance of an agreement dated 21.10.2011, which

provided execution of the sale deed within twelve months.

Defendant no. 2 did not take any action. In any event, the next

course of action to seek execution of the sale deed arose

immediately after January 2012 when the appellant/plaintiff

instituted a suit seeking annulment of so-called agreement to sell.

The defendant no. 2 did nothing. Only after the death of his vendor

in October 2013 and after framing of the issues in February 2019

that the defendant no. 2 decided to file the application- only after

nine years of the filing of the suit, which is again two years after

framing of the issues. 

18

26. Enquiry and trial arising out of a claim to enforce an

agreement to sell is qualitatively different from the claim of a

plaintiff seeking a declaratory decree against a defendant. The civil

remedy that the appellant seeks, i.e., a declaration that his sisterin-law has no manner of right to alienate the property and

therefore to annul the sale is very different from the attempted civil

remedy through counter-claim for specific performance against a

co-defendant.

27. In view of the above, we are of the opinion that the High Court

committed an error in reversing the judgment of the Trial Court by

permitting defendant no. 2 to file a counter-claim against

defendant no.1 and not against the plaintiff. We, therefore, allow

the appeal arising out of SLP (C) No. 5635 of 2023 and set aside

the order and judgment passed by the High Court in SCA No.

12701 of 2021 dated 16.01.2023.

28. There shall be no order as to costs.

………………………………....J.

[PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA]

………………………………....J.

[JOYMALYA BAGCHI]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 12, 2025

Whether the seized ₹50 lakhs (muddamal) can be released in favour of Respondent No. 2 before conclusion of trial.

 2025 INSC 1129 (Rajput Vijaysinh Natwarsinh v. State of Gujarat & Ors.) decided on 18 September 2025 by the Supreme Court of India:

Court & Bench

• Supreme Court of India

• Bench: Sanjay Karol J. & Prashant Kumar Mishra J.

Case Citation

• 2025 INSC 1129

• Crl. A @ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025

Facts

1. A complaint (FIR No. 11206078220159/2022) was lodged against the appellant (accused) alleging cheating and breach of trust in castor seed trading worth ₹44.53 lakhs (complainant) and other firms amounting to ₹3.49 crores in total.

2. Police seized ₹50 lakhs cash as muddamal (case property).

3. Respondent No. 2 (a trader) sought release of the ₹50 lakhs claiming it was due to him from the accused, relying on bills, ledger and audit reports.

4. Trial Court & Sessions Court: Rejected release, holding ownership disputed, amount being “proceeds of crime,” and could only be decided in trial.

5. High Court of Gujarat: Allowed release of cash to Respondent No. 2 upon furnishing personal bond and after panchnama, relying on Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat (2002).

6. The appellant challenged this HC order before the Supreme Court.

Issue

Whether the seized ₹50 lakhs (muddamal) can be released in favour of Respondent No. 2 before conclusion of trial.

Law Involved

• Section 451 CrPC – Custody and disposal of property pending trial.

• Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of Gujarat (2002) – Guidelines for release of seized property.

Held

• The High Court erred in directing release of cash to Respondent No. 2 at this stage.

• Ownership of the seized amount cannot be conclusively determined now since:

  • Multiple victims/claimants exist.

  • Matching the seized amount with respondent’s claim does not prove sole entitlement.

  • Only trial can determine proper ownership.

• Trial Court and Sessions Court orders restored.

• Since respondent had already withdrawn the amount pursuant to HC order:

  • Directed deposit of withdrawn amount (with interest) in Trial Court.

  • Original currency notes, if still available, to be deposited.

  • Only after cross-verification with panchnama, amount can be permitted to be withdrawn.

Decision

• Appeal Allowed.

• HC judgment set aside; Trial Court & Sessions Court orders restored.

• Pending applications disposed of

• ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------

2025 INSC 1129

• Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 1 of 9

  NON-REPORTABLE

  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

  CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

  CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

  (Arising out of SLP(Criminal)No.3179 of 2025)

  RAJPUT VIJAYSINH NATWARSINH …APPELLANT(S)

  Versus

  STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)

   J U D G M E N T

  SANJAY KAROL J,

  Leave granted

  2. The appellant-accused has challenged a judgment passed

  by the learned Single Judge of the High Court of Gujarat at

  Ahmedabad in R/Special Criminal Application (Quashing) No.

  1955 of 2024, dated 4th December 2024 whereby release of case

  property (cash)1

  in connection with First Information Report

  being CR No. 11206078220159 of 2022 was allowed by the

  1 Hereinafter ‘muddamal’

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 2 of 9

  Court. The said application before the High Court was preferred

  against orders dated 1st August 2023 and 30th December 2023

  passed by the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate of Unjha, in

  Criminal Case No. 366 of 2022 and by the Additional Sessions

  Judge, Mahesana Visnagar, respectively.

  3. The facts, leading up to the impugned judgment, as can be

  understood from the judgments of the Courts below are that one

  Chiragkumar Dilipbhai Natwarlal Modi, lodged a complaint

  before the PS Unava, District Mahesana on 9th April 2022

  alleging that the appellant-accused ran a proprietary firm by the

  name of Jay Gopal Trading Company and had conducted

  business with the complainant worth Rs. 44,53,714/- in castor

  seeds on different dates and various cheques given in respect of

  this amount were returned due to insufficient balance. It was also

  alleged that the said Company had done business with other

  concerns totalling Rs.3,49,07,073/- (including the payment of the

  complainant) and had similarly not paid the amounts due. The

  police completed its investigation and presented chargesheet on

  5 June 2022 under Sections 406, 420 and 120-B Indian Penal

  Code, 1860. Therein, in support of its case the State listed a total

  of 41 witnesses and respondent no. 2 herein / the petitioner before

  the High Court was listed at serial no. 4 in the said list.

  4. Respondent No. 2 filed an application before the

  Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate, Unjha in Criminal Case 

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 3 of 9

  No. 366 of 2022 seeking release of ‘muddamal’ i.e., cash amount

  of Rs. 50,00,000 was seized during the investigation, on the

  ground that the said amount pertained to him for the goods he had

  sold through his concern namely Bhadrakali Tobacco to the

  Company of the appellant-accused and in that regard he has

  produced a copy of the bill, the audit report and ledger account.

  The learned Trial Judge, however, refused such prayer observing

  as follows:

  “… on perusing the charge-sheet, it appears at the

  present stage that in allegation against the accused of

  this case is that of committing cheating and breach

  of trust with the complainant and the witnesses

  stated in the charge-sheet and in that when objection

  of all the witnesses are not obtained on behalf of the

  applicant, then in that case, when the case

  proceedings are pending and it has become a matter

  of evidence as to whom the muddamal be handed

  over at this stage and hence, it does not appear to be

  proper and just to take any decision regarding

  muddamal…”

  5. In an appeal filed under Section 397 of the Code of

  Criminal Procedure, the Additional Sessions Judge, Mahesana at

  Visnagar confirmed that the order of the court below observing:

  “… In this case, it has revealed during the

  investigation that the accused has committed

  cheating and breach of trust with so many merchants

  over and above the complainant. The investigating

  Officer has seized the above amount during the

  investigation as proceeds of crime money. 

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 4 of 9

  Moreover, no any supporting evidence is produced

  on behalf of the applicant/accused by which it can be

  believed prima facie that the amount seized by the

  Investigating Agency is the amount prior to

  occurrence of the offence. Moreover, the list of

  victims is very lengthy as stated by the complainant

  in the complaint. It is the subject matter of evidence

  as to who lost how much amount from amongst the

  victims. In this way, this amount of relating to the

  proceeds of crime and hence, question of returning

  the said amount to the accused at this stage does not

  arise… Hence, it cannot be said to be just to return

  this amount to anyone from amongst the accused or

  the witness Bhargav Patel…”

  6. The respondent no. 2 then preferred a petition before the

  High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

  India against these orders. Taking a view opposite from the one

  taken by the Courts below, the High Court reasoned as follows:

  “6. Considering the facts and circumstances of the

  present case and procedure laid down by the Apex

  Court in case of Sundarbhai Desai (Supra), this

  Court is of considered opinion that, the interim

  custody of the cash amount, if released in favour of

  the petitioner, no prejudice is likely to be caused to

  the prosecution. Thus, therefore, the currency notes

  seized by the police is required to be released in

  favour of the petitioner who is lawfully entitled to

  claim the amount.

  7. In the result, the petition is allowed. The

  impugned order dated 01.08.2023 passed below

  Exh.27 by the Ld. Principal Senior Civil Judge &

  JMFC, Unjha, Mehsana in Criminal Case No. 366 of

  2022, as well as order dated 30.12.2023 passed in

  Criminal Revision Application No.67 of 2023 by Ld.

  Addl. District & Sessions Judge, Mehsana at

  Visnagar, are hereby quashed and set aside. The

  authority concerned and/or court concerned, is 

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 5 of 9

  directed to release the muddamal cash amount of

  the petitioner on condition of furnishing personal

  bond of equal the equivalent amount. Before

  handing over the possession of the muddamal cash

  amount to the petitioner, detailed panchnama of the

  currency notes with their numbers and/or

  denomination if not already drawn, shall be drawn

  for the purpose of trial. The production of the

  currency notes during the course of trial should not

  be insisted to produce by the petitioner. The

  petitioner is permitted to use the currency notes.”

  7. Aggrieved by this order, the appellant-accused is before

  us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.

  8. At the outset, we may reproduce Section 451 of the Code

  of Criminal Procedure, 1973 which forms part of Chapter

  XXXIV titled ‘Disposal of Property’ for reference:

  “451. Order for custody and disposal of property

  pending trial in certain cases.—When any property

  is produced before any Criminal Court during any

  inquiry or trial, the Court may make such order as it

  thinks fit for the proper custody of such property

  pending the conclusion of the inquiry or trial, and, if

  the property is subject to speedy and natural decay,

  or if it is otherwise expedient so to do, the Court

  may, after recording such evidence as it thinks

  necessary, order it to be sold or otherwise disposed

  of.

  Explanation.— For the purposes of this section, “property”

  includes—

  (a) property of any kind or document which is

  produced before the Court or which is in its

  custody;

  (b) any property regarding which an offence appears

  to have been committed or which appears to have

  been used for the commission of any offence.

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 6 of 9

  9. This Court in Sunderbhai Ambalal Desai v. State of

  Gujarat2

  , while dealing with Section 451 of the Code held thus:

  “Valuable articles and currency notes

  11. With regard to valuable articles, such as, golden

  or silver ornaments or articles studded with precious

  stones, it is submitted that it is of no use to keep such

  articles in police custody for years till the trial is

  over. In our view, this submission requires to be

  accepted. In such cases, the Magistrate should pass

  appropriate orders as contemplated under Section

  451 CrPC at the earliest.

  This extract is taken from Sunderbhai Ambalal

  Desai v. State of Gujarat, (2002) 10 SCC 283 : 2003

  SCC (Cri) 1943 : 2002 SCC OnLine SC 934 at page

  288

  12. For this purpose, if material on record indicates

  that such articles belong to the complainant at whose

  house theft, robbery or dacoity has taken place, then

  seized articles be handed over to the complainant

  after:

  (1) preparing detailed proper panchnama of such

  articles;

  (2) taking photographs of such articles and a bond

  that such articles would be produced if required at

  the time of trial; and

  (3) after taking proper security.

  13. For this purpose, the court may follow the

  procedure of recording such evidence, as it thinks

  necessary, as provided under Section 451 CrPC. The

  bond and security should be taken so as to prevent

  the evidence being lost, altered or destroyed. The

  court should see that photographs of such articles are

  attested or countersigned by the complainant,

  accused as well as by the person to whom the

  custody is handed over. Still however, it would be

  the function of the court under Section 451 CrPC to

  impose any other appropriate condition.

  2

  (2002) 10 SCC 283

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 7 of 9

  14. In case, where such articles are not handed over

  either to the complainant or to the person from

  whom such articles are seized or to its claimant, then

  the court may direct that such articles be kept in bank

  lockers. Similarly, if articles are required to be kept

  in police custody, it would be open to the SHO after

  preparing proper panchnama to keep such articles in

  a bank locker. In any case, such articles should be

  produced before the Magistrate within a week of

  their seizure. If required, the court may direct that

  such articles be handed back to the investigating

  officer for further investigation and identification.

  However, in no set of circumstances, the

  investigating officer should keep such articles in

  custody for a longer period for the purposes of

  investigation and identification. For currency notes,

  similar procedure can be followed.”

  10. The High Court has correctly referred to this judgment,

  however, in our considered view failed to appreciate its holding

  in the attending facts and circumstances of the instant case. We

  say so for the reason that the money in question was recovered

  as part of an investigation in which the exchange of money is

  the subject matter of controversy. As we have already noted

  supra, the dispute pertains to money paid to the complainant and

  other like firms, in the course of business. It is undisputed that

  respondent no. 2 has produced before the High Court certain

  documents to show that the proprietary firm through the

  appellant-accused, owed him/his concern a sum of

  Rs.50,00,000/-. However, it is entirely possible that the said

  sum of money was part of some other transaction. Simply

  because the amount owed to him matches the amount recovered 

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 8 of 9

  does not establish that he is the only claimant to the said amount.

  As such, we hold that the Additional District and Sessions

  Judge, Mehsana correctly took the view that the direct

  ownership of the said Respondent cannot be conclusively

  established.

  11. The appropriate ownership of the sum of money can only

  be determined after consideration of all evidence and having

  taken into account the claims and views of all the other persons

  that the appellant-accused has allegedly played foul with, in

  business. The evidence presented by respondent no. 2 to

  establish his claim over the said amount will have to be

  considered by the Court seized of trial in the matter, and then

  only can a proper decision be arrived at. At this stage, therefore,

  releasing the muddamal would be unjustified and premature.

  12. In that view of the matter, the appeal is allowed. The

  judgment of the High Court with particulars as mentioned in

  paragraph 1 is set aside and the judgment and orders of the

  Courts below are restored.

  13. By our order dated 21st July 2025 it was recorded that

  pursuant to the directions of the High Court, private respondents

  had already withdrawn the amount. It was as such directed that

  the said amount be deposited with the Registry of this Court

  along with the interest accrued thereupon. The Registry is

  directed to transfer the said amount to the custody of the

  Crl. A@ SLP(Crl) 3179 of 2025 Page 9 of 9

  concerned Trial Court forthwith. We direct the private

  respondents to forthwith deposit before the Trial Court the

  original currency notes, should they still be available with him.

  Once that is done, the amount deposited by him in terms of our

  is permitted to be withdrawn. Such withdrawal will only be

  permitted once cross verification has taken place from the

  detailed panchnama that would have been drawn in accordance

  with the order of the High Court.

  Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

  ……………………………………J.

  (SANJAY KAROL)

  ……………………………………J.

  (PRASHANT KUMAR MISHRA)

  New Delhi;

  18th September 2025

America at a Crossroads: Building a Stronger Democratic Future

America at a Crossroads: Building a Stronger Democratic Future

by M.Murali Mohan,Advocate

The United States stands at a pivotal moment. Widely regarded as the world’s largest democracy, it is experiencing visible strains: political showmanship overshadowing practical governance, recurring fiscal standoffs, and increasing public distrust in institutions. These challenges can give the impression of decline, yet the situation is not irreversible. With thoughtful reforms and a renewed commitment to cooperation, the country has the opportunity to strengthen its foundations and ensure long-term stability.

Current Actions and Their Consequences

Immigration

Actions: State governments have launched unilateral initiatives, such as transporting migrants to other regions, while federal policies have shifted between restrictive and temporary protective measures.

Consequences: These inconsistent steps have created uncertainty, strained relations between state and federal authorities, and placed greater pressure on immigration courts and humanitarian systems.

Fiscal Policy

Actions: Repeated debates over raising the debt ceiling have been used as leverage in political negotiations.

Consequences: While resolved each time, these standoffs undermine confidence in the U.S. economy, increase borrowing costs, and raise concerns about global financial stability.

Information Environment

Actions: Disinformation has circulated widely on digital platforms, while counter-efforts remain limited.

Consequences: Trust in media and institutions continues to erode, polarization deepens, and public debate is often shaped by misinformation.

Institutional Investment

Actions: Essential systems such as asylum courts, election administration, and public health services remain underfunded or understaffed.

Consequences: Backlogs, inefficiencies, and gaps in service weaken public confidence and reduce the ability of institutions to manage challenges effectively.

Remedies for Renewal

1. Reform the Debt-Ceiling Process

Adopting automatic adjustments or ending the use of the debt ceiling as a political tool would provide immediate fiscal stability and remove recurring risks of government shutdowns and economic disruption.

2. Strengthen Core Institutions

Increasing support for asylum courts, election systems, and public health infrastructure would reduce delays, improve reliability, and reinforce trust in the fairness of democratic processes.

3. Promote Civic-Healing Initiatives

Local-level initiatives, such as bipartisan forums, community dialogues, and civic academies, can encourage cooperation and reduce polarization by bringing citizens together to solve shared challenges.

4. Support Economic Stabilization

Targeted workforce training, regional investment, and expanded social supports can address economic pressures that fuel frustration. By linking programs to measurable outcomes, resources can be used effectively.

5. Address Disinformation Thoughtfully

Policies that encourage platform transparency, independent oversight, and digital literacy education can reduce the impact of harmful misinformation while preserving open debate.

6. Advance Balanced Immigration Reform

A comprehensive approach that combines efficient asylum processing, legal work opportunities, and enforceable border measures can create greater stability, fairness, and order in the immigration system.

7. Encourage Political Incentive Reforms

Over time, reforms such as ranked-choice voting, transparent campaign advertising, and updated primary processes can reward moderation, discourage extremism, and strengthen the democratic process.

Anticipated Positive Outcomes

Economic Stability: 

Removing fiscal brinkmanship strengthens financial markets and U.S. credibility.

Efficient Institutions: 

Stronger systems deliver fairer outcomes and reduce public frustration.

Community Trust: 

Civic initiatives help bridge divides and encourage collaboration.

Healthier Information Environment: Responsible safeguards limit manipulation while preserving free expression.

Orderly Immigration: 

Balanced reform reduces uncertainty, protects human dignity, and supports economic needs.

Resilient Democracy: 

Political reforms create conditions for constructive governance rather than partisanship.

Conclusion: 

A Path Toward Renewal

The challenges facing the United States are serious, but they are not insurmountable. What is required is the will to move beyond political performance and focus on sustainable solutions. Debt-ceiling reform, stronger institutions, and civic-healing programs are achievable steps that can stabilize the present. Over the longer term, immigration reform and adjustments to political incentives can build resilience.

Democracy’s greatest test lies not in external threats, but in the choices made within. By embracing cooperation, prioritizing substance over spectacle, and investing in its democratic foundations, America can chart a path toward a stronger and more stable future.

Importantly, renewal also requires a recognition that America’s greatest test lies within. Avoiding the impulse to grind its teeth against other countries, the nation must turn inward with self-realization and focus on strengthening its democratic foundations. By choosing cooperation, prioritizing substance over spectacle, and fostering constructive global engagement, America can chart a path toward a stronger and more stable future.