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Saturday, September 20, 2025

Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a re-trial because the video (CD) was not played before each witness and not transcribed into witness’ words. Whether non-examination of Chemical Examiner/Analyst (CA) warranted a re-trial. Whether non-production/opening of representative/remnant samples or non-production of bulk contraband required a re-trial or acquittal. Whether a re-trial should be ordered in the facts, applying principles in Ukha Kolhe and Nasib Singh.


The Supreme Court set aside a High Court order directing a re-trial in NDPS prosecution where the High Court had held that video evidence and certain procedural steps were not properly converted into admissible evidence. The Court held (1) that where Section 65B(4) certificate is produced the electronic record (video/CD) is admissible as a document and need not invariably be played during each witness’s deposition or reduced to a witness transcript; (2) a Chemical Examiner’s report is admissible under CrPC §293 and there is no absolute rule mandating production of the CA in every NDPS trial; (3) non-production of the bulk contraband or representative samples may not be fatal where inventory, sample-sealing, chain of custody and FSL report are on record; and (4) a direction for re-trial is an exceptional remedy — here inappropriate — so the appeals were restored to the High Court for fresh consideration (preferred to ordering acquittal or a re-trial). Appeal allowed; High Court order of re-trial set aside; appeals restored to High Court for fresh decision.


Facts (very short)

Police raid of a hut and later a house recovered ganja (39 kg from hut; 107.90 kg from house). Video of raid recorded by a photographer (SW-2) with a 65B(4) certificate; inventory and samples were made and sent to FSL (reports on record). Trial Court convicted accused nos.1 & 2; High Court set aside conviction and ordered re-trial on grounds that (a) video evidence was not properly converted into evidence (not played during each witness’s testimony), (b) Chemical Analyst (CA) not examined, (c) representative/remnant samples not produced/opened in Court. Supreme Court heard appeal against the direction for re-trial.


Issues considered

  1. Whether the High Court was justified in ordering a re-trial because the video (CD) was not played before each witness and not transcribed into witness’ words.

  2. Whether non-examination of Chemical Examiner/Analyst (CA) warranted a re-trial.

  3. Whether non-production/opening of representative/remnant samples or non-production of bulk contraband required a re-trial or acquittal.

  4. Whether a re-trial should be ordered in the facts, applying principles in Ukha Kolhe and Nasib Singh.


Holdings / Ratio (by issue)

  1. Admissibility of video / playing during evidence — Once Section 65B requirements are satisfied (there is a certificate under §65B(4) from the maker/creator), the electronic record is admissible like any document. It is not legally required as a rule that the CD/video be played while each witness is being examined or that the contents be reduced to a transcript in the witness’s words. Whether explanatory testimony is needed depends on facts; absence of playing the CD during testimony does not automatically render it inadmissible. (Paras 19–21, 22)

  2. Chemical Examiner (CA) non-production — CrPC §293 makes CA reports admissible; the court may summon/examine CA but there is no mandatory rule that CA be produced in every NDPS trial where report is otherwise admissible. The High Court’s insistence that CA must be examined for every NDPS trial is unsustainable. (Paras 21, 31)

  3. Non-production of contraband / samples — While omission to produce bulk contraband may create doubt, case law shows non-production is not automatically fatal if the seizure, inventory, representative sample procedure, chain of custody, and FSL report are otherwise proved (citing Jitendra, Ashok, Noor Aga, Jaroopram, Vijay Pandey, Sahi Ram). Section 52-A safeguards inventory, photographs and certified list of samples as primary evidence. Where inventory, sealing and samples are on record and seals remained intact on reaching FSL, non-production of entire bulk may not justify re-trial. (Paras 23–33)

  4. Re-trial principles — Retrial is exceptional (per Ukha Kolhe). Appellate court should order retrial only where trial was vitiated by serious illegalities, jurisdictional defects, denial of opportunity to lead material evidence for reasons beyond parties’ control, or where trial was a sham. Mere procedural lapses or failure to lead evidence by prosecution ordinarily do not justify retrial. Here, the High Court’s conclusion that re-trial was required was unsustainable. (Paras 16–18, 34–36)

  5. Relief granted — Supreme Court set aside the High Court order directing re-trial and restored the appeals to the High Court for fresh consideration in accordance with law (preferably within six months). The appellant’s bail to continue. (Paras 35–37)

2025 INSC 1117

Page 1 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No.4646 of 2025)

KAILAS S/O BAJIRAO PAWAR … APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF MAHARASHTRA … RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

MANOJ MISRA, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises from a judgment and order of the

High Court1, dated 25.10.2024, in Criminal Appeal Nos.

449 of 2023 and 457 of 2024, whereby the appeals filed by

the appellant and another, against the order of conviction

and sentence dated 29.04.2023 of the Trial Court2 in

Special Sessions Trial No. 34 of 2020, were partly allowed,

the order of conviction was set aside and the case was

1 The High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur

2 Additional Sessions Judge Akot, District Akola

Page 2 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

remanded to the Trial Court for a re-trial coupled with a

direction that the accused shall stand remanded to

judicial custody.

Facts

3. Appellant and three others were tried for offences

punishable under Section 8(c) read with Section

20(b)(ii)(C) of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances

Act, 19853. Prosecution case is based on a search and

seizure operation leading to recovery of contraband (i.e.,

Ganja). It is alleged that on receipt of information that

accused No. 1 - Kailas (the appellant) and accused No. 2 –

Raju Motiram Solanke have stocked Ganja for sale in a

hut, after entering the information in the Diary, sending

information to senior officer vide written letter (Exh. No.69)

and seeking permission (Exh. No.70), a raid was organized

after arranging two panch witnesses, a photographer, a

gazetted officer and a weighing scale. The hut was located.

Two persons, namely, accused nos.1 and 2, were found

sitting there. After necessary formalities, the hut was

searched. Upon search, in the presence of panchas, 18

3 NDPS Act

Page 3 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

plastic packets, kept in a sack, containing Ganja, weighing

39 kilograms, were recovered; from which samples were

drawn and sealed. On disclosure by the aforesaid two

accused, complicity of accused No.3 came to light.

Thereafter, raid was conducted at the residence of accused

No. 3, who was not found present. However, during house

search, five sacks with packets containing Ganja, weighing

107.90 kilogram, were recovered. When accused No. 3 was

arrested, complicity of accused No. 4 came to light as the

person who transported the contraband.

4. After investigation all four were charge-sheeted and

tried. During trial, prosecution examined seven witnesses,

namely, S.W. No. 1 – Vinayak Rajabhau Shinde i.e.,

witness of spot and seizure panchnama; S.W. No. 2 –

Santosh Ashok Solanke i.e., photographer who took video

as well as photographs of the raid proceedings; S.W. No. 3

– Sajid Khan Rajulla Khan i.e., person who weighed the

contraband; S.W. No. 4 – Gopal Ukhardu Patil i.e., one of

the members of the raiding party; S.W. No. 5 – Mohammed

Umar Anisoddin i.e., panch witness of seizure panchnama

of accused no.4’s vehicle, who was declared hostile; S.W. 

Page 4 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

No. 6 – Gopalsingh Narsingh Daberao i.e., driver-cumPolice Constable, who took Ganja samples to forensic

laboratory, Amravati for chemical analysis; and S.W. No.

7 – Sagar Ashokrao Hatwar i.e., Chief of the raiding party.

5. Trial Court convicted accused Nos.1 and 2 and

acquitted the other two accused.

6. In its judgment, the Trial Court, inter alia, relied on

the video recording of the raid to corroborate the

substantive evidence led during trial. Relevant

observations qua appreciation of evidence including the

video recording are found in paragraphs 40 to 48 of the

judgment, which are reproduced below:

“40. Santosh (SW No.2) has stated in his

examination in chief that, he himself videographed

the entire procedure and he himself made the

compact disc of the said video film. He also

personally gave the necessary certificate to the

police in that behalf. He has included all the

technical details in the said certificate. It is the same

certificate as Exh. No.32.

41. The certificate on Exh. No.32 is given by Santosh

(SW No.2). That is, of course as per section 65 B (4)

of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872. In the said

certificate Santosh (SW No.2) has mentioned the

entire details such as the business of photography

the witness is involved in, the camera he uses for

that purpose, its particulars such as Sony company

camera model number 450 H.D. camera etc and he

has proven the certificate that he has issued 

Page 5 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

personally (Exh. 32) on all the legal and technical

criteria.

42. The video film of the proceedings of the raid

conducted by the police and its compact disc made

by Santosh (S.W. No. 2) is produced in the court and

it was seen in the court on the laptop by the court

(myself), the concerned clerk, the learned counsels

for the accused, the learned counsels for the

prosecution and all the accused. The said compact

disc is assigned property No.27. There is no dispute

regarding the video film in the said compact disc

raised by the defense. This important fact is to be

taken into consideration and kept in our collective

conscious (sic).

43. All of us saw when the said CD was played in

this court that the panch witnesses, police officers,

staff members, the weighing scale operator, subdivisional officer, both the accused No.1, Kailas, No.

2 Raju could be seen in the video film (i.e., in the

video shooting in the CD) in the compact disc

marked as property No.27.

44. There is no reason whatsoever to take any doubt

regarding the veracity of the video film in the said

property No.27. There is no place whatsoever to

raise any doubt regarding the reliability of Santosh

No.2 doing the video shooting. There is also no

reason whatsoever to raise any doubts regarding

this certificate exhibit No.32 issued as per section

65-B (4) of the Indian Evidence Act 1872. No one has

raised any dispute whatsoever in the recognition or

identification of the panch witnesses, police officials,

staff members, accused seen in the said video hence

all these facts stand proven.

45. In this way the originally reliable contentions

made in the oral statements and examination in

chief by all the witnesses such as Vinayak (SW

No.1), Santosh (SW No.2), Sajid Khan (SW No.3),

Gopal (SW No.4) and Shri Hatkar (SW No.7) that, on

the date, time and place of occurrence the accused 

Page 6 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

No.1, Kailas, and accused No.2, Raju, were found in

possession of Ganja weighing 39 kilograms are

strongly and undisputedly supported by the video

film and photographs in the compact disc of

property No.27 on record of the court. There is no

reason whatsoever to refute the said proofs. As

mentioned earlier the said video film in the said CD

has also not been contested on behalf of the accused

No.1 and 2.

46. In the said video film and in some still

photographs (i.e., in the photographs in exhibit

No.36, 37, 38 on record of this court) an unknown

person in yellow T-shirt and who has dyed his color

can be seen. The learned counsel Shri Sharma for

the accused No.1 and 2 attempted to create a big

controversy during the cross examination of the

witnesses in that behalf.

47. All the witnesses have clearly dismissed the

suggestions made by the learned counsel for the

accused number 1 and 2 to the witnesses in their

cross examination that the Hut behind the Mari

Mata temple at Adgaon is owned by the unknown

person in those photographs and the Ganja also

belongs to him. Shri Hatwar (S.W. No.7) has clearly

stated in his cross examination (Exh. No.61), page

No.14, Para No.67) that the person wearing the

yellow T-shirt is the associate of the weighing scale

operator Sajid Khan (SW No.3).

48. It is quite possible that some bystanders,

overzealous persons then enter as intruders while

any such proceedings are in progress. Just because

he was seen in one of such photographs and in some

part of the video film, the cogent, reliable and

undisputed proof of all the remaining witnesses,

public prosecution does not and should not get

nullified. The identification of the unknown person

seen in the said photograph and the video film is not

the point of contention in this case. It is

unnecessary and irrelevant, and it is not sufficient 

Page 7 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

at all to nullify all the other reliable evidence

produced by the prosecution.”

(Emphasis supplied)

7. Aggrieved by Trial Court’s judgment and order, the

two convicts filed criminal appeals before the High Court.

Criminal Appeal No. 449 of 2023 was by the appellant

whereas the other i.e., Criminal Appeal No. 457 of 2024,

was by Raju Motiram Solanke.

8. The High Court partly allowed the appeals, set aside

the conviction and sentence, however, remanded the

matter for a re-trial with a direction that the accused shall

stand remanded to judicial custody. Aggrieved by the

direction for a re-trial with judicial remand, this appeal

has been filed.

High Court’s observations

9. The reasons for which High Court directed a re-trial

can be found in paragraphs 12 to 19 of its judgment,

reproduced below:

“12. It is to be noted that the entire process of raid

at the hut as well as at the house of Shatrughna was

video recorded with the help of the photographer.

The photographer has been examined. Panch

witness has supported the case of the prosecution.

PW-1 Vinayak Shinde, the panch witness, has

deposed in great detail about the raid, search,

seizure and sampling. He has stated that, in his 

Page 8 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

presence, the entire process was video recorded by

the photographer. PW-2 Santosh Solanke is the

photographer. He has deposed about the video

recording of the entire process of search, seizure,

sampling and apprehension of the appellant. PW-7

Sagar Hatwar, the investigating officer, has deposed

in his evidence that the entire process of the raid

was video-graphed. The CD of the video recording is

at Exh. 27. In this context, it would be necessary to

consider the evidence of the photographer (PW-2). At

Para No. 7, he has stated that on last date the CD

was played on the computer of the Court by the

clerk. The APP and the Advocates for the appellants

had seen the recording. Perusal of the evidence of all

the witnesses does not show that the learned Judge,

while recording their evidence, had played the CD in

the Court and personally saw it.”

13. In this background, it is necessary to consider

the observations made by the learned Judge in his

judgment. Para No. 42 would be relevant. Learned

Judge has noted that he had personally seen the

video recording. Similarly, it was seen by the

concerned clerk, APP and the advocates for the

appellants. Learned Judge has noted that the

advocates for the appellants had no dispute about

the contents of the CD. In my view, this observation

is against the appellants. It is to be noted that the

CD has been admitted in the evidence. It is marked

as Exh. 27. The question is whether the evidence

adduced before the Court is sufficient to prove the

contents of the CD or not. If the Court comes to the

conclusion that this evidence is not sufficient to

prove the contents, then the question is as to how

the same could be used against the appellant.”

14. It is to be noted that we are in the era of

technology. The technology is now being used for the

purpose of investigation. This is a good sign for the

criminal justice administration. Electronic evidence

collected with the assistance of the technology,

which may be audio recording, video recording,

photography or the data from the memory card, 

Page 9 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

cannot be admitted in the evidence as it is. Before

such material is admitted as an evidence, proper

care and procedure is required to be followed. Such

material has to be converted into a legally

admissible evidence. The law prescribes the

procedure. The prosecutor, the presiding officer and

the advocates must be well versed with the

procedure, while recording the evidence of the

witness with regard to the contents of the video

recording or CCTV footage. If there is a lack of

procedural knowledge to convert such material into

legally admissible evidence collected during the

course of investigation, then the very purpose of the

video recording or collection of the CCTV footage

capturing the incident will be frustrated. The video

recording or CCTV footage without proper evidence

to prove the contents of the video recording cannot

be made use of against the accused. It needs to be

stated that with the advent of technology and use of

the technology during the investigation, all

concerned are required to keep themselves abreast

with the law and procedure. A great care is required

to be taken while recording the evidence when such

electronic evidence is produced before the court. It

is the duty of the court and other stakeholders to

see that it is converted into legally admissible

evidence. If there is a failure on the part of the

prosecutor and the presiding officer, on account of

some misconception related to the subject, then it

can cause miscarriage of justice. It needs to be

stated that in this case on account of procedural

error, apparent lacuna has crept in, and which has

resulted in miscarriage of justice. It has caused

prejudice not only to the appellant but to the

prosecution as well. It needs to be mentioned that in

this case, on this count, there is an imminent flaw,

which has caused prejudice not only to the

appellants but to the prosecution as well.

15. It is to be noted that the video recording of the

entire process was the best evidence in the

possession of the prosecution. The question that

was required to be addressed by the learned Judge 

Page 10 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

while recording such evidence was as to how it has

to be converted into legally admissible evidence. The

learned Judge and the learned prosecutor have

committed a procedural error. The proper procedure

has not been followed. In this case, the main

witnesses are the panch witnesses, the

photographer, other members of the raiding party

and the investigating officer. If the evidence consists

of a video recording of the particular incident or part

of the incident, the recorded incident must be

proved through the concerned witness. As far as the

video recording or recorded CCTV footage is

concerned, the witness who is an eyewitness to the

incident or acted as a panch witness or in the other

capacity, must describe the incident on oath before

the Court. In such a case, at the time of recording

the evidence of the concerned witness, the video

recording, either recorded in the CD or pen drive or

any other electronic gadget, must be played on the

screen. The witness, after playing the CD, must

describe or translate the video recording or the

contents of the recording in his own words on oath

before the Court. If it is an audio recording, then the

part of the audible conversation must be transcribed

and placed on record under the signature of the

investigating officer. Unless and until the recorded

video or CCTV footage is played at the stage of

evidence of the witness, the witness would not be

able to describe or narrate the incident in his or her

own words on oath before the Court. In this way, at

the stage of recording of evidence, each and every

witness concerned with the video recording of the

incident or any part of the incident must describe or

narrate the incident in his or her own words on oath

before the Court. If it is not so done, then it would

be very difficult to understand or read that video

recording by the presiding officer, prosecutor or

Advocate. This procedure has to be scrupulously

followed. This has not happened in this case. The

CD was not played while recording the evidence of

the panch witnesses, the photographer, the other

members of the raiding party and the investigating

officer. It is therefore apparent that the legally 

Page 11 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

admissible evidence as to the contents of the

recording/CD has not at all been recorded.

16. The CD is a part of the record. At the stage of

the arguments in these appeals, the CD was played

in the Court. It is evident that the video recording

commenced with the apprehension of the appellant.

The CD contains the recording of the inspection of

hut, recovery of the substance, the description of the

substance and further part of the proceedings. The

CD further contains the recording of the raid and

recovery at the house of Shatrughna. The learned

Judge was required to play the CD at the time of

recording evidence of each witness and record the

contents appearing on the screen with the help of

the concerned witness. If this procedure had been

followed, then the contents of the CD would have

become legally admissible evidence. This procedure

had not been followed. This has caused prejudice to

the appellants as well as to the prosecution. The

important evidence collected in the form of the video

recording has not been converted into legally

admissible evidence. In order to verify the correct

factual position, at the stage of the argument of the

appeals, the video recording was played. It was very

difficult to understand the contents of the CD. If the

evidence of the witnesses had been recorded on

playing the video recording at the time of the

evidence, then the oral testimony of the witnesses

on oath, as to the contents of the CD would have

been part of the record.

17. It is evident that in this case the detailed

description of the Ganja has not been recorded in

the panchnama. Similarly, the detailed description

of the Ganja has not been stated by the witnesses.

The substance seized from the possession of the

appellant can be seen from the video recording. It

was necessary to show this part of the recording to

the witnesses and record the description of the

substance in detail through each and every witness.

In my view, this is a fundamental flaw in this case.

The appellants could not be held responsible for this 

Page 12 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

mistake or rather a mess. It was the responsibility

of the learned prosecutor to insist before the learned

Judge to play the CD when the witnesses were in the

witness box. It was not done by the learned

Prosecutor/In-charge of the case. Similarly, the

learned Judge did not follow this procedure

scrupulously. It seems that the learned Judge did

not act diligently while recording the evidence of the

witnesses with regard to the incident or a part of the

incident video-graphed by the investigating officer.

Learned Judge has observed in his judgment that

there was no objection as such on the part of the

appellants to this CD. In my view, this observation

is totally perverse. This observation is not only

against the appellants, but it is also against the

prosecution. In this case, the required evidence as

to the contents of the video recording or CD has not

been properly recorded. There is a procedural error.

It was the duty of the Court to give justice to the

hard work put in by the police officer, while

conducting the raid and ensuring the video

recording of the entire proceedings. The video

recording is the most important and vital evidence

in this case. It can reflect upon the credibility and

authenticity of the raid. Similarly, the description of

the substance, which can be seen from the video

recording, would be of immense importance. It

cannot be excluded from consideration, if it is

proved properly. This is one flaw in this case. It has

caused prejudice to the appellants as well as to the

prosecution.

18. The next important flaw which can be seen is

the failure of the prosecution to examine the CA. It

is noticed that in the Vidarbha region, in the trials

under the NDPS Act, the CA is not examined. In my

view, this is a serious mistake on the part of the

prosecution. It needs to be placed on record that in

Greater Mumbai, in every case under the NDPS Act,

the CA is examined. In Vidarbha region, while

deciding the appeals against the conviction and

sentence in NDPS cases, it is noticed that this aspect

is taken for granted by the prosecution. It needs to 

Page 13 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

be stated that in Vidarbha region, the majority of the

cases under the NDPS Act are with regard to the

seizure of the Ganja. The examination of the CA, in

the case of the analysis of Ganja, is very important

because, in the report of the CA the description of

the substance in detail is recorded invariably. The

description of the substance, seized as Ganja, is

required to be proved to bring it within the ambit of

the definition of Ganja under Section 2(iii)(b) of the

NDPS Act. In this case, the prosecution has failed to

examine the CA. In this case, the learned prosecutor

did not produce remnant samples received from the

office of CA. Similarly, the prosecutor did not

produce the representative samples drawn at the

time of the seizure on the spot as well as drawn in

presence of the learned Magistrate at the time of the

inventory. The remnant samples are required to be

shown to the CA to bring on record the nature of the

narcotic drug and the description of the drugs.

Similarly, the representative samples are required to

be opened before the Court at the time of the

evidence of the concerned witness. The presiding

officer is required to note down the description of the

narcotic drug/substance found in the sample

packets. It is further pertinent to mention that if the

seized drug is not destroyed, then the same shall

also be produced before the Court while recording

the evidence of the witness. The description of the

substance found in the packets/sacks shall also be

recorded. The learned presiding officer is required to

record this part of the evidence very meticulously

and note down the description of substance.

19. I am conscious of the fact that under Section

293 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the reports

of certain Government scientific experts may be

used as evidence in an inquiry, trial or other

proceedings. The record shows that no specific order

was passed by the learned Judge, while admitting

the CA report. It is to be noted that, in cases under

the NDPS Act, as and when a CA report is tendered,

the Court shall insist the prosecutor to examine the

CA. If the CA is available, then the learned Judge 

Page 14 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

shall not exhibit the report without examining the

CA. The trial of the offences under the NDPS Act

cannot be taken lightly. The trial for the offences

under the NDPS Act has to be conducted very

carefully. It needs to be mentioned that in such a

trial, the Court has to deal with so many technical

aspects and issues. The NDPS Act provides for

checks and balances while conducting the

investigation in the crime so as to avoid false

implication of innocent persons. The act provides for

stringent punishment for a proved offence.

Therefore, the Court has to be very careful while

recording the evidence. In this case, the required

care was not taken.”

10. After the above discussion, the High Court

proceeded to consider whether a re-trial of the case would

be necessary and, in Paragraph 26, the High Court opined

that re-trial is necessary. Paragraph 26 of the impugned

judgment is extracted below:

“26. It is to be noted that in this case, for the

purpose of proving the contents of the CD, the recall

of all the witnesses would be necessary. The

witnesses were the members of the raiding party.

Each and every witness would be required to

describe /translate the contents of the CD/video

recording. Similarly, the prosecution would be

required to examine the CA. Therefore, in this case,

the option of recording additional evidence may not

be appropriate. Even after recording the additional

evidence, the further procedure with regard to the

recording of 313 statement of the accused would be

required to be gone into. In this case, in my view, the

re-trial would be the best option in the interest of

the appellants as well as the prosecution. In the

facts and circumstances, in this case, I am opting to

order a re-trial.”

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SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

11. Having held that re-trial is necessary the High Court

set aside the Trial Court judgment and ordered re-trial of

accused nos.1 and 2. However, since there was no appeal

against acquittal of accused nos.3 and 4, the High Court

observed that accused nos. 3 and 4 shall not have to face

re-trial.

12. Aggrieved by the direction for holding a re-trial, one

of the accused, namely, Kailas, is in appeal before us.

Submissions on behalf of the Appellant

13. On behalf of the appellant, it is submitted that a retrial can be directed in exceptional circumstances as laid

down by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Ukha

Kolhe versus State of Maharashtra4

, which has been

consistently followed, and recently followed by a three

Judge Bench of this Court in Nasib Singh versus State

of Punjab and Another5. Relying on the aforesaid

decisions, it was urged that re-trial is not to be ordered

just to enable the prosecution to lead evidence which it

could but did not care to lead either on account of

insufficient appreciation of the nature of the case or for

4 AIR 1963 SC 1531

5

(2022) 2 SCC 89

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SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

other reasons. It was urged that if the High Court was not

satisfied with the prosecution’s evidence on record, the

appropriate course for the High Court was to order

acquittal of the appellant. Accordingly, it is urged that the

order of the High Court directing for a re-trial be set aside

and the appellant be acquitted.

Submissions on behalf of Respondent-State

14. Per contra, on behalf of the State, it was urged that

the High Court erred in holding that the video was not

admissible. The same was admissible as a document

under Section 65B of the Indian Evidence Act, 18726 in

view of there being a certificate under sub-section (4) of

Section 65B from its creator (SW No.2). Moreover, there

was substantive oral evidence of the members of the

raiding party who witnessed the recovery. Additionally,

there were documents in the form of seizure memo,

inventory of the consignment of Ganja prepared by

Magistrate, produced as Exh. No.84, evidencing the

recovery. Besides above, during trial, the video was played

in Court in the presence of the presiding officer of the

6 Evidence Act

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Court, the accused persons and their respective counsels.

No dispute as regards the identity of accused and

members of raiding party as seen in the video was raised

before the trial court. Therefore, the view of the High Court

that video was not admissible, because it was not played

while recording statement of each witness and its

transcript was not prepared, is misconceived. Moreover, it

was urged, transcript of a visual input cannot be prepared.

As regards non-examination of Chemical Examiner, it was

urged, it would not have a material bearing on the

admissibility of its report because, under Section 293 of

the Code of Criminal Procedure, 19737, Chemical

Examiner is a scientific expert, and its report is ipso facto

admissible. In such circumstances, it was urged, there

was no necessity to direct for a re-trial; and if the High

Court found it difficult to understand the video, it had

power to accept additional evidence on record under

Section 391 CrPC but in no case a re-trial was required. It

was thus prayed on behalf of the State that the order of

7 CrPC

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the High Court be set aside, and the appeal be restored on

the file of the High Court for fresh consideration.

Discussion

15. Having considered the rival submissions, the

principal question that falls for our consideration is

whether the High Court was justified in ordering a re-trial?

If not, then what would be the appropriate order that may

be passed in this appeal?

16. Before we proceed further, it would be useful to

survey the judicial precedents as to in what circumstances

a re-trial is to be directed and what are the consequences

of such a direction. In Ukha Kolhe Versus State of

Maharashtra (supra), this Court observed that:

“An order for the re-trial of a criminal case is

made in exceptional cases, and not unless the

appellate court is satisfied that the Court trying the

proceeding had no jurisdiction to try it or that the

trial was vitiated by serious illegalities or

irregularities or on account of misconception of the

nature of the proceedings and on that account in

substance there had been no real trial or that the

Prosecutor or an accused was, for reasons over

which he had no control, prevented from leading or

tendering evidence material to the charge, and in the

interest of justice the appellate court deems it

appropriate, having regard to the circumstances of

the case, that the accused should be put on his trial 

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again. An order of re-trial wipes out from the record

the earlier proceeding, and exposes the person

accused to another trial which affords the

prosecutor an opportunity to rectify the infirmities

disclosed in the earlier trial, and will not ordinarily

be countenanced when it is made merely to enable

the prosecutor to lead evidence which he could, but

has not cared to lead either on account of

insufficient appreciation of the nature of the case or

for other reasons.”

17. Following the aforesaid decision, in Nasib Singh

versus State of Punjab and Another (supra), this Court

summarized the principles governing re-trial as follows:

“33. The principles that emerge from the decisions

of this Court on re-trial can be formulated as under:

33.1 The appellate court may direct a re-trial only

in “exceptional” circumstances to avert a

miscarriage of justice.

33.2 Mere lapses in the investigation are not

sufficient to warrant a direction for retrial. Only if

the lapses are so grave so as to prejudice the rights

of the parties, can a re-trial be directed.

33.3 A determination of whether “shoddy”

investigation /trial has prejudiced the party, must

be based on the facts of each case pursuant to a

thorough reading of the evidence.

33.4 It is not sufficient if the accused/prosecution

makes a facial argument that there has been a

miscarriage of justice warranting a re-trial. It is

incumbent on the appellate court directing a re-trial

to provide a reasoned order on the nature of the

miscarriage of justice caused with reference to the

evidence and investigatory process.

33.5 If a matter is directed for re-trial, the evidence

and record of the previous trial is completely wiped

out.

33.6 The following are some instances, not

intended to be exhaustive, of when the Court could 

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order a re-trial on the ground of miscarriage of

justice:

(a) The trial court has proceeded with the trial in

the absence of jurisdiction;

(b) The trial has been vitiated by an illegality or

irregularity based on a misconception of the nature

of the proceedings; and

(c) The prosecutor has been disabled or

prevented from adducing evidence as regards the

nature of the charge, resulting in the trial being

rendered a farce, sham or charade.”

18. In the instant case, the High Court ordered a re-trial

citing following reasons:

(a) Video-recording of search and seizure

operation was the best evidence, but the same

was not converted into admissible evidence

inasmuch as, (i) video was not played while

recording statement of each witness so as to

enable the witness to explain the video in his

own words in his deposition; (ii) no transcript of

video was prepared; and (iii) when it was played

in Court, in absence of explanatory statement of

witnesses qua the video, its content could not

be understood.

(b) The Chemical Examiner / Analyst (for short CA)

was not produced as a witness.

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(c) The prosecutor did not produce remnant

samples received from the office of CA.

(d) The prosecutor did not produce the

representative samples drawn at the time of the

seizure from the spot as well as drawn in

presence of the learned Magistrate at the time

of making the inventory.

19. As far as admissibility of video recording i.e.,

Compact Disc (CD) is concerned, the author of the video i.e.,

SW No.2 not only deposed that he recorded the video, but

he also gave a certificate, as contemplated under subsection (4) of Section 65B of the Evidence Act, to make the

CD admissible in evidence. Interestingly, the High Court did

not dispute that the electronic record was duly exhibited as

there existed a certificate envisaged under sub-section (4) of

Section 65B. However, strangely, the High Court opined

that the video would become relevant only if it is played

during deposition of each witness so that the witness could

explain its contents in his own words resulting in a

transcript of the video. In our view, this is a strange and

unacceptable reasoning for the simple reason that the CD 

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is an electronic record and once the requirement of Section

65B is fulfilled it becomes an admissible piece of evidence,

like a document, and the video recorded therein is akin to

contents of a document which can be seen and heard to

enable the Court to draw appropriate inference(s). No

doubt, there may be an occasion where to appreciate

contents of a video an explanatory statement may be

needed, but that would depend on the facts of a case.

However, it is not the requirement of law that the contents

of the video would become admissible only if it is reduced to

a transcript in the words of a witness who created the video

or is noticed in the video. Besides that, in the instant case,

the search and seizure operation was sought to be proved

by oral evidence of witnesses. The video, therefore, was

perhaps to corroborate the oral testimony. Even the

judgment of the trial court makes it clear that the video was

played in court in the presence of all accused as well as both

sides counsels and the presiding officer, upon seeing the

video, could spot and confirm the presence of witnesses as

well as the accused at the time of search and seizure. In 

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such circumstances, in our view, a re-trial is not required

only to explain the video.

20. We are conscious of the law that while exercising

appellate power the record must be perused8 and, therefore,

if the High Court, as an appellate court, had difficulty in

understanding the contents of the video, which was part of

the record, it could have called for the presence of the

accused as well as the witnesses or their respective lawyers

to explain to the Court the significance of what appears in

that video. Besides, the power to take additional evidence is

there under Section 391 of CrPC. However, to merely

understand the video, in our view, there is no justification

to order a re-trial and fresh recording of evidence. For the

reasons above, reason (a) supra assigned by the High Court

for ordering a re-trial is totally misconceived and baseless.

21. As far as non-production of Chemical Examiner as

a witness is concerned, under Section 2939 of CrPC, report

8 See: Section 386 CrPC

9 Section 293. Reports of certain Government scientific experts. --- (1) Any document purporting

to be a report under the hand of a government scientific expert to whom this section applies, upon

any matter or thing duly submitted to him for examination or analysis and report in the course of any

proceeding under this Code, may be used as evidence in any inquiry, trial or other proceeding under

this Code.

(2). The court may, if it thinks fit, summon and examine any such expert as to the subject matter of

his report.

(3). Where any such expert is summoned by a court and he is unable to attend personally, he may,

unless the court has expressly directed him to appear personally, depute any responsible officer 

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of a Chemical Examiner is admissible even if he is not

produced as a witness though, the Court may summon and

examine him as to the subject matter of the report. Nothing

is there in High Court’s judgment to show that before the

trial court any application was moved to summon the

Chemical Examiner but the same was rejected. In

paragraph 19 of its judgment, the High Court records that

no specific order was passed by the trial judge while

admitting the CA (Chemical Analyst) report. The High Court

thereafter goes on to observe that in cases under NDPS Act

as and when a CA report is tendered, the Court must insist

the prosecutor to examine the CA. In our view, there is no

such requirement of law that Chemical Examiner would

have to be called in each NDPS case to prove the report

when it is otherwise admissible under sub-section (1) of

working with him to attend the court, if such officer is conversant with the facts of the case and can

satisfactorily depose in Court on his behalf.

(4). This section applies to the following Government scientific experts, namely:-

(a) any Chemical Examiner or Assistant Chemical Examiner to Government;

(b) the Chief Controller of Explosives;

(c) the Director of the Finger Print Bureau;

(d) the Director, Haffkeine Institute, Bombay;

(e) the Director, Deputy Director or Assistant Director of a Central Forensic Science Laboratory or a

State Forensic Science Laboratory;

(f) the Serologist to the Government.

(g) any other Government scientific experts specified, by notification, by the Central Government for

this purpose.

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Section 293 of CrPC. Moreover, from the judgment of the

trial court it appears that the Chemical Examiner’s report

was admitted in evidence as Exh Nos.81 and 82. Nothing is

there in High Court’s judgment that any objection was

raised in respect of exhibiting the Chemical Examiner’s

report. In such circumstances, reason (b) supra assigned

by the High Court for ordering re-trial is not sustainable.

22. As far as reasons (c) and (d) (supra) assigned for

ordering a re-trial are concerned, they are linked to each

other and shall, therefore, be discussed simultaneously.

Before we discuss the same, it would be useful to survey

judicial pronouncements as to why production of the seized

contraband may be important and in what manner recovery

of contraband may be proved.

23. In Jitendra and Another v. State of M. P.10 the

Charas and Ganja alleged to have been seized from the

possession of the accused were not produced before the trial

court to connect them with the sample sent to the forensic

science laboratory (FSL). The High Court noticed the lacuna

but brushed it aside by observing that non-production of

10 (2004) 10 SCC 562

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those articles before the court is not fatal to the prosecution

when the defense had not insisted during trial that those be

produced. While observing so, the High Court relied on

Section 465 CrPC to hold that non-production of the

material object was a mere procedural irregularity and did

not cause prejudice to the accused. Rejecting the aforesaid

reasoning, this Court held:

“6. In our view, the view taken by the High Court is

unsustainable. In the trial it was necessary for the

prosecution to establish by cogent evidence that the

alleged quantities of charas and ganja were seized

from the possession of the accused. The best

evidence would have been the seized materials

which ought to have been produced during the trial

when marked as material objects. There is no

explanation for this failure to produce them. Mere

oral evidence as to their features and production of

panchnama does not discharge the heavy burden

which lies on the prosecution, particularly where the

offense is punishable with a stringent sentence as

under the NDPS Act. …”

24. The aforesaid view was followed by this Court in

Ashok v. State of M.P.11

, wherein this Court, inter alia,

emphasized upon the necessity of maintaining proper

custody of the seized contraband from the date of its seizure

till obtaining of FSL report including production in Court

because for the prosecution to succeed it is imperative that

11 (2011) 5 SCC 123

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there must be evidence to connect the forensic report with

the substance that was seized from the possession of the

accused. Similar was the view taken by this Court in Vijay

Jain v. State of M.P.12

25. In Noor Aga v. State of Punjab13, the accused, an

Afghan national, was apprehended with 1.4 kg heroin

concealed in layered wall of a carton carrying grapes. The

contraband articles were produced before the Magistrate.

Evidence, however, was not clear regarding the purpose of

such production and there was no evidence that order was

passed in respect of its destruction. Moreover, no

application for destruction was filed. During trial, the seized

contraband was not produced. Submission, on behalf of

accused, inter alia, was that prosecution having not

produced the physical evidence of the seizure before the

court, particularly the sample of the purported contraband

material, no conviction could have been based thereupon.

On behalf of the prosecution, submission was that the

contraband was destroyed under orders of the Magistrate.

This Court found that there was no cogent evidence that

12 (2013) 14 SCC 527

13 (2008) 16 SCC 417

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guidelines in respect of destruction of contraband articles

were followed. Relevant observations are extracted below:

“96. Last but not the least, physical evidence

relating to three samples taken from the bulk

amount of heroin was also not produced. Even if it

is accepted for the sake of argument that the bulk

quantity was destroyed, the samples were essential

to be produced and proved as primary evidence for

the purpose of establishing the fact of recovery of

heroin as envisaged under Section 52-A of the Act.”

25.1. After observing as above, this Court proceeded to

notice several discrepancies in the evidence produced and

held:

“100. Physical evidence of a case of this nature being

the property of the court should have been treated

to be sacrosanct. Non-production thereof would

warrant drawing of a negative inference within the

meaning of section 114 (g) of the Evidence Act. While

there are such a large number of discrepancies, if a

cumulative effect thereto is taken into consideration

on the basis whereof the permissive inference would

be that serious doubts are created with respect to

the prosecution’s endeavor to prove the fact of

possession of contraband by the appellant.”

26. Following the decision in Noor Aga (supra), this

Court, in Union of India v. Jaroopram14, laid emphasis on

the production of the bulk quantity of seized contraband in

14 (2018) 4 SCC 334

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absence of there being evidence of its disposal. The relevant

observations are extracted below:

“10. Omission on the part of the prosecution to

produce the bulk quantity of seized opium would

create a doubt in the mind of the court on the

genuineness of the samples drawn and marked as

A, B, C, D, E, F from the allegedly seized contraband.

However, the simple argument that the same had

been destroyed, cannot be accepted as it is not clear

that on what authority it was done. Law requires

that such an authority must flow from an order

passed by the Magistrate. On a bare perusal of the

record, it is apparent that at no point of time any

prayer had been made by the prosecution for

destruction of the said opium or disposal thereof

otherwise. The only course of action the prosecution

should have resorted to is for its disposal is to obtain

an order from the competent court of Magistrate as

envisaged under section 52A of the Act. It is

explicitly made under the Act that as and when such

an application is made, the Magistrate may, as soon

as may be, allow the application.

11. There is no denial of the fact that the

prosecution has not filed any such application for

disposal /destruction of the allegedly seized bulk

quantity of contraband material nor was any such

order passed by the Magistrate. Even no notice has

been given to the accused before such alleged

destruction /disposal. It is also pertinent here to

mention that the trial court appears to have believed

the prosecution's story in a haste and awarded

conviction to the respondent without warranting the

production of bulk quantity of contraband. But, the

High Court committed no error in dealing with this

aspect of the case and disbelieving the prosecution

story by arriving at the conclusion that at the trial,

the bulk quantities of contraband were not exhibited

to the witnesses at the time of adducing evidence.”

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27. In Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana15, a threeJudge Bench of this Court, following the decisions in

Jitendra (supra), Vijay Jain (supra) Ashok (supra) and

Noor Aga (supra), allowed the appeal of a convict on the

ground that the seized contraband was not produced and

there was no satisfactory evidence regarding proper custody

of the contraband.

28. In Vijay Pandey v. State of U.P.16, this Court laid

emphasis on the existence of evidence to correlate the seized

sample with the one that was tested. The relevant

observations are reproduced below:

“8. The failure of the prosecution in the present case

to relate the seized sample with that seized from the

appellant makes the case no different from failure to

produce the seized sample itself. In the

circumstances the mere production of a laboratory

report that the sample tested was narcotics cannot

be conclusive proof by itself. The sample seized and

that tested have to be correlated.”

29. In State of Rajasthan v. Sahi Ram17, the High

Court acquitted the accused on the ground that muddamal

(i.e., case property or seized goods) were not produced. The

High Court held that in absence of production of seized

15 (2021) 18 SCC 523

16 (2019) 18 SCC 215

17 (2019) 10 SCC 649

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goods the prosecution failed to lead primary evidence of the

seizure and thus, the entire evidence of the prosecution

leading to recovery had to be discarded. This Court did not

accept the verdict of the High Court and, while allowing the

appeal and restoring conviction recorded by the trial court,

after discussing earlier decisions in Jitendra (supra), Noor

Aga (supra), Ashok (supra), Vijay Jain (supra) and Vijay

Pandey (supra), held that in none of the decisions of this

Court non-production of the contraband material before the

court has singularly been found to be sufficient to grant the

benefit of acquittal. After holding so, the law on the point

was summarized in the following terms:

“18. If the seizure of the material is otherwise proved

on record and is not even doubted or disputed, the

entire contraband material need not be placed

before the court. If the seizure is otherwise not in

doubt, there is no requirement that the entire

material ought to be produced before the court. At

times, material could be so bulky, for instance as in

the present material when those 7 bags weighed 223

Kg that it may not be possible and feasible to

produce the entire bulk before the Court. If the

seizure is otherwise proved, what is required to be

proved is the fact that the samples taken from and

out of the contraband material were kept intact, that

when the samples was submitted for forensic

examination the seals were intact, that the report of

the forensic experts shows the potency, nature and

quality of the contraband material and that based 

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on such material the essential ingredients

constituting an offense are made out.”

30. At this stage, we may refer to the provisions of

Section 52-A18 of NDPS Act. This section, inter alia, enables

preparation of inventory of seized contraband, drawing of

samples therefrom, taking of photographs, etc., as well as

its disposal. Sub-section (4) of Section 52-A is important. It

provides that every court shall treat the inventory, the

photographs of the contraband and any list of samples

18 Section 52-A. Disposal of seized narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances. – (1) The Central

Government may, having regard to the hazardous nature, vulnerability to theft, substitution,

constraint of proper storage space or any other relevant consideration, in respect of any narcotic

drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances, by notification in the

Official Gazette, specify such narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or

conveyance or class of narcotic drugs, class of psychotropic substances, class of controlled

substances or conveyances, which shall, as soon as may be after their seizure, be disposed of by

such officer and in such manner as that Government may, from time to time, determine after

following the procedure hereinafter specified.

(2) Where any narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances has

been seized and forwarded to the officer-in-charge of the nearest police station or to the officer

empowered under section 53, the officer referred to in sub-section (1) shall prepare an inventory of

such narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances containing

such details relating to their description, quality, quantity, mode of packing, marks, numbers or such

other identifying particulars of the narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances

or conveyances or the tracking in which they are packed, country of origin and other particulars as

the officer referred to in sub-section (1) may consider relevant to the identity of the narcotic drugs,

psychotropic substances, controlled substances or conveyances in any proceedings under this Act

and make an application, to any magistrate for the purpose of --

(a) certifying the correctness of the inventory so prepared; or

(b) taking in the presence of such Magistrate, photographs of such drugs, substances or

conveyances and certifying such photographs as true; or

(c) allowing to draw representative samples of such drugs or substances, in the presence of

such Magistrate and certifying the correctness of any list of samples so drawn

(3) Where an application is made under sub-section (2), the Magistrate shall, as soon as may be,

allow the application.

(4) Notwithstanding anything contained in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872) or the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974), every court trying an offense under this Act, shall treat the

inventory, the photographs of narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances, controlled substances or

conveyances and any list of samples drawn under sub-section (2) and certified by the Magistrate, as

primary evidence in respect of such offence.

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drawn under sub-section (2) and certified by the Magistrate,

as primary evidence in respect of such offence.

31. In the light of the discussion above, in our view,

mere non-production of the seized contraband during trial

may not be fatal if there is reliable evidence in respect of its

seizure, drawing of samples therefrom, and FSL report

relating to the sample drawn from the seized material.

However, to ensure that no adverse inference is drawn

against the prosecution for non-production of the seized

contraband, documents prepared in terms of the provisions

of Section 52-A, inter alia, evidencing preparation of

inventory of seized contraband and drawing of samples

therefrom, would have to be brought on record. Likewise,

evidence should be there that the sample drawn from the

inventory was sent to FSL in a sealed container/ envelop,

as per guidelines, and that the seal was found intact at the

end of FSL. This is to obviate any doubt regarding sample

being tampered in transit. Similarly, FSL’s report along with

the sample tested by it is to be placed on record so that there

remains no doubt regarding the sample tested. 

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32. In the instant case, trial court in its judgment has

observed as follows:

“55. Shri Hatwar (SW No.7) has also stated in his

examination in chief that, I sent a letter (Exh No.83)

to the First Class Judicial Magistrate, Akota for

getting the inventory of the consignment of Ganja

that was found in possession of the accused no.1

and 2 made and, accordingly, the said court

prepared the inventory as per Exh. No.84.

56. Going through the inventory at Exh. No.84, it

appears that, it was made by the First Class Judicial

Magistrate, Court No.2, Akot on dated 25.9.2020

i.e., immediately on the day following the date of

occurrence i.e., dated 23.9.2020. Basically, the

hearing proceedings appear to be going on till the

midnight of dated 23.9.2020 i.e., from 00.26 till 1.09

hours on dated 24.9.2020. Therefore, one day after

24th i.e., immediately on the following day i.e., on

dated 25.9.2020 the court appears to have made the

inventory of Exh. No.84.

57. Accordingly, the said court has mentioned in

Exh. No.84 that the entire consignment was found

properly sealed, samples were sealed and were

sealed again, its weight of 39.180 kilos was noted

correctly and in detail. It was also mentioned in it

that the entire consignment was properly sealed and

the seal was intact and it has been resealed. Later it

was also mentioned in it that the First Class Judicial

Magistrate of the said court and the panchas and

the witnesses have signed the said inventory.

58. The driver Gopal Singh (SW No.6) has stated in

his examination in chief that, he had taken such

properly sealed samples to the Forensic Laboratory,

Amravati for chemical analysis and for examination.

The chemical analysis report of the said substance

given by the said laboratory after examining it are

on record at Exh. No.81 and 82. It is clearly

mentioned in the said report that the sample of the 

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said substance is nothing but Ganja. It is mentioned

in the report that the said samples were brought to

the said laboratory through Gopal Singh (SW No.6)

the police constable, batch number 2140. The seal

of the wrapping on the samples were intact and it is

mentioned in Exh. No.81.

59. From the above it stands indisputably proven

beyond all possible doubts that, the accused no.1

Kailas and accused no.2 Raju were found in

possession of Ganja weighing 39 kilograms in the

hut that is located behind the Mari Mata Temple at

Adgaon on dated 23.9.2020. There is not even a

word of clarification except denial in the statement

recorded under section 313 of CrPC of the accused

in this behalf.”

33. From above, prima facie, there existed material to

indicate that the seized contraband was sent in a sealed

condition for preparation of inventory. Thereafter, inventory

was prepared, samples were drawn and sealed; and the

samples were sent to FSL in a sealed condition, which found

the seal intact. The High Court, however, observed that the

representative sample was not opened before the Court at

the time of recording of statement of the concerned witness.

Be that as it may, this was not a ground to direct for a retrial when the appellate court has power to take additional

evidence under Section 391 of CrPC, which, inter alia, can

be exercised to exhibit a document or material already on

the record of the Court. And if those defects are fatal to the 

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prosecution, the appellate court is free to take its decision

as may be warranted in the facts of the case. But, in any

event, it cannot be a ground to direct a re-trial.

34. We are therefore of the view that even for reasons (c)

and (d) (supra), direction for a re-trial cannot be

countenanced. We shall now consider as to what would be

the appropriate relief to the appellant, that is, should he be

acquitted or the appeals be restored for a fresh

consideration by the High Court in accordance with law.

35. In our view, a direction for restoration of appeals

before the High Court for a fresh decision would be more

appropriate, reasons being: (a) neither the High Court nor

the Trial Court has enlisted the entire evidence available on

record therefore it is difficult for us to take a decision with

precision as to whether the prosecution has been successful

in bringing home the charge against the accused; (b) the

High Court’s judgment does not address the entire evidence

on record, rather it is swayed by an erroneous view that the

video-record was the best evidence available which was not

converted into legally admissible evidence; and (c) the

parties would lose the right of appeal if we take a decision 

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on the merits more so when the High Court has not taken a

final call on merits. In our view, therefore, ends of justice

would be served if the appeal(s) are restored on the file of

the High Court for a fresh decision in accordance with law.

36. Consequently, the appeal is allowed. The impugned

order of the High Court is set aside. Both the appeals (i.e.,

one filed by the appellant, being Criminal Appeal No.449 of

2023, and the other by the co-accused Raju Motiram

Solanke, being Criminal Appeal No.457 of 2024), are

restored on the file of the High Court for a fresh decision in

accordance with law, preferably, within six months from the

date this order is communicated to the High Court.

37. We also direct that the appellant, who was released

on bail by an order of this Court dated 05.05.2025, shall

continue to remain on bail during the pendency of the

appeal subject to the condition that he shall cooperate in

the hearing of the appeal(s) by the High Court. The other

accused Raju Motiram Solanke who had not filed appeal

against the order of the High Court would be at liberty to

apply to the High Court for suspension of sentence and bail,

which shall be considered on its own merit. 

Page 38 of 38

SLP Criminal No. 4646 of 2025

38. At this stage, we would like to clarify that we have

not expressed opinion on the merit of the appeals filed by

the appellant and the other co-accused before the High

Court. Our discussion in this judgment was with a view to

assess whether in the facts and law a re-trial is necessitated

or not.

39. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed

of.

......................................J.

 (MANOJ MISRA)

......................................J.

 (UJJAL BHUYAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 15, 2025

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Disbursement – Apportionment – Challenge to. Where compensation awarded by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was disbursed upon a joint application signed by all claimants including the appellant (mother of deceased), and she voluntarily received ₹1,00,000/-, signed the order-sheet and encashed the cheque without protest, she cannot subsequently challenge the apportionment as unfair or contrary to succession law. – Held, appellant acted consciously and with open eyes; allegation of fraud rejected. – Doctrine of approbate and reprobate applied. – [Paras 6, 6.1, 6.2].


Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Disbursement – Apportionment – Challenge to.
Where compensation awarded by Motor Accident Claims Tribunal was disbursed upon a joint application signed by all claimants including the appellant (mother of deceased), and she voluntarily received ₹1,00,000/-, signed the order-sheet and encashed the cheque without protest, she cannot subsequently challenge the apportionment as unfair or contrary to succession law. – Held, appellant acted consciously and with open eyes; allegation of fraud rejected. – Doctrine of approbate and reprobate applied. – [Paras 6, 6.1, 6.2].


Limitation – Review application – Delay of 6 months 22 days – Cause shown: surgery and illness – Proof.
Review petition against Tribunal’s disbursement order filed with delay of over 6 months. – No medical records produced to substantiate claim of illness/surgery. – Held, delay not satisfactorily explained; Tribunal rightly dismissed review as barred by limitation. – [Paras 3.4, 6.4].


Civil Procedure – Conduct of parties – Effect of voluntary acceptance.
A party who participates in proceedings, signs joint petition, accepts disbursement and encashes cheque cannot later resile or allege fraud. Subsequent attempt to reopen settled disbursement treated as afterthought. – [Paras 5.4, 6.2].


Review – Scope.
Review not maintainable where no error apparent or fraud established. Allegations raised after voluntary acceptance of benefit cannot sustain a review petition. – [Paras 6.2, 6.3].


Result: Appeal dismissed.

2025 INSC 1072 NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1352 OF 2023

URMILA CHAND ….Appellant (s)

VERSUS

SONU CHAND AND OTHERS ….Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

N.V. ANJARIA, J.

The challenge in this appeal is directed against the

judgment and order of the Gauhati High Court dated 22nd

January, 2021. The High Court, refused to exercise its

supervisory jurisdiction dismissing the Civil Revision

Petition, in turn confirming order dated 12.01.2018

passed by the Motor Vehicle Claims Tribunal, Tinsukia in

Miscellaneous (J) Case No. 6 of 2015.

Page 1 of 13

2. By the said order, the Motor Vehicle Claims

Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Tribunal’) had

rejected the review petition against the order dated

21.04.2015 on the ground that it was barred by

limitation. As per the order brought under review, the

Tribunal had disbursed the amount of compensation. A

cheque of Rs. 1,00,000/- was given in favour of the

appellant herein who was the mother, whereas Rs.

6,26,000/- was given to the respondent No. 1, daughter

in law. Further, cheques for Rs. 3,00,000/- each was

directed to be deposited in fixed deposit in the name of

minor respondent Nos. 2 and 3 – Claimants No. 2 and 3.

3. In the origin, it was the proceedings of Motor

Accident Claim Case No. 125 of 2009 instituted by

appellant and respondent Nos. 2 and 3 who were mother,

daughter in law and minor children respectively, of one

Mr. Priyank Chand who died in vehicular accident.

3.1 The accident occurred on 27.02.2009. The said

deceased Mr. Prayank Chand was going in an Indica Car

Page 2 of 13

bearing AS-23F-0934 which belonged to his friend. Truck

bearing No. AMB-0551 dashed with the car which was on

way from Tinsukia to Makum side. Mr. Prayank who was

sitting in the front side suffered serious injury in the

accident and succumbed to death. In the aforesaid

petition filed by the claimants, the Tribunal awarded a

sum of Rs. 11,82,000/- as per its judgment and award

dated 11.11.2011.

3.2 The High Court by an interim order passed in

Civil Appeal No. 79 of 2012, in which the aforesaid

judgment and award was challenged, by the Insurance

Company, granted interim relief of payment of Rs.

1,00,000/- each to the four claimants. The appeal of the

Insurance Company was ultimately dismissed by the

High Court as per judgment and order dated 09.09.2014,

upholding the award passed by the Tribunal.

3.3 It was upon a joint application that the disbursal

order came to be passed by the Tribunal on 21.04.2015.

As stated above the Tribunal issued cheque of Rs.

Page 3 of 13

1,00,000/- in favour of the appellant herein, a cheque of

Rs. 6,26,000/- with interest to respondent No. 1-

claimants and directed cheques for Rs. 3,00,000/- each

to be kept in the fixed deposit in the name of the minor

claimants – respondent Nos. 1 and 2.

3.4 It appears that subsequently the appellant

harboured some grievances about the disbursement.

After filing an application under the Right to Information,

she filed a review petition against the said order dated

21.04.2015. The review petition came to be dismissed by

the Tribunal on the ground that it was delayed by 6

months and 22 days. The delay was sought to be

explained by the appellant stating that she had

undergone surgery between the period from 25.05.2015

to 9.12.2015. The Tribunal dismissed the review

application holding that the appellant was unable to

show any document to substantiate the ground of

medical illness or about having undergone the surgery.

Page 4 of 13

3.5 It further appears from the facts on record that

the appellant had certain differences with her Advocates.

She was dissatisfied with the advocate who appeared for

her from the District Legal Services Authority. It is

appellant’s own saying that she had taken legal

assistance from four different counsels be as it may.

3.6 Against the order of the Tribunal dismissing the

review application, the appellant approached the High

Court by filing Civil Revision Application. The same was

also dismissed as stated above, giving rise to the present

appeal before this Court, on various grounds. Learned

counsel for both the parties made submissions and also

filed written arguments. They were also considered.

4. Learned counsel for the appellant Mr. Pranav

Sachdeva submitted that the Tribunal as well as the

High Court erred in not condoning the delay of 6 months.

He submitted that the order of the Tribunal which was

sought to be reviewed by the appellant, was grossly

unfair, therefore was unsustainable. It was further

Page 5 of 13

submitted that the Tribunal paid only Rs. 1,00,000/- to

the appellant widow, whereas total amount awarded to

all the claimants was much higher. Learned counsel for

the petitioner submitted that the apportionment was

contrary to the principles of successions law in view that

mother is a class 1 legal heir. It was submitted that

injustice was done to her in disbursement.

4.1 Learned counsel for the appellant then

highlighted all the chronology of events submit that the

son of the appellant was tactically prevented from

entering the court room. It was submitted that when the

order for disbursement was passed by the Tribunal the

appellant and her son were entering the court room but

the Tribunal pronounced the order.

4.2 On the other hand, learned counsel for the

respondent Ms. Anshula Vijay Kumar Grover, submitted

that after the judgment and award came to be passed by

the Claims Tribunal awarding a total sum of Rs.

11,82,000/- by order dated 21.04.2015 for disbursement

Page 6 of 13

amongst the four claimants was passed. It was

emphasized that at the time of disbursement, the parties

including the appellant herein were present in the court

and also interacted with one another. It was submitted

that the appellant did accept Rs. 1,00,000/- and put her

signature on the order sheet, accepting the cheque

amount. It was submitted that filing of the review

petition was an afterthought. The appellant had

conducted herself voluntarily in accepting the amount

and putting her signature, submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellant.

4.3 Both the learned counsels, submitted their

respective written submission, which were also confirmed

by the Court.

5. While not entertaining the challenge to the

rejection of the review application and confirming the

order rejecting review application on the ground of delay,

the High Court also considered certain manifested

aspects of merits. It was observed that “it is seen not only

Page 7 of 13

that respondent Nos. 1 and 5 had taken significant stand

that petitioner was present and on acceptance of cheque,

had put her signature on the order sheet of the learned

Tribunal, but the said stand is affirmed by the

petitioner.”

5.1 In Para 8 of the order of the High Court

proceeded to observe,

“…...Therefore, it is apparent that at the

time of receiving the cheque for Rs.1.00

lakh on 21.04.2015, the petitioner did

not raise any · grievance. Assuming that

the petitioner did not understand the

implication of receiving cheque for

Rs.1.00 lakh, but there is no denying

that as on 2L05.2015, the final award

had already been deposited before the

learned Tribunal and that this Court

had already dismissed MAC Appeal no.

79/2012 by judgment dated 02.09.2014.

Therefore, the only conclusion that V can

be reached is that the petitioner having

consciously and voluntarily accepted the

cheque for Rs.1.00 lakh, having

successfully encashed it without any

demur, had made claim for more money

as her share of compensation.

5.1.1 It was further stated in the same

paragraph,

Page 8 of 13

The petitioner has not made any attempt

to explain why on 21.04.2015, when she

was present before the learned Tribunal

with her son, she did not apply for

certified copy of the order-sheet of

21.04.2015 despite putting her signature

on the order-sheet. Therefore, the

petitioner had personal knowledge of the

proceeding of 21.04.2015, as such, the

projection that she had spent time to call

for information under RTI Act appears to

be merely a ploy to create a story to cover

up for the laches and delay in applying

for review.

5.2 In Para 9 following findings were recorded,

“It is seen that in the present revision,

the petitioner had not disclosed that she

had put her signature in the order sheet

while receiving the cheque for Rs.1.00

lakh and it has also not been disclosed

that on the said date, she was

accompanied with her son, namely,

Shishir Chand. In fact, the disbursement

order passed by the learned Tribunal on

21.04.2015 has not been annexed to this

revision petition. However, the

respondent no.1 has annexed the copy of

the joint petition no.223/15 dated

21.04.2015 and a copy of the order dated

21.04.2015 alongwith her affidavit-inopposition. On a perusal of the same,

the petitioner and the respondent no.1

are found to have jointly signed the

verification, and the said petition

Page 9 of 13

contained a prayer to allow the claimants

to withdraw the amount of

compensation, without indicating the

share of the parties. The said petition

specifically contains averment in

paragraph-1 that the insurer had

deposited a sum of Rs.13,07,913 in the

Tribunal.”


5.3 The High Court noted that order dated

21.04.2015 disclosed the payments made and the

amount released to the claimants which include the

minor grandchildren for whom the amount was directed

to be deposited. It was noted that the amount

accumulated as interest on the deposited amount was to

be disbursed in favour of the claimants. A direction was

issued for issuance of cheque in their savings bank

account of the Central Bank of India which was identified

by the Court with Account No. 325513828.

5.4 The High Court pointedly observed about the

conduct of the appellant, in the same paragraph,

“Therefore, when the petitioner had

signed the order sheet dated 21.04.2015

and when she has received a cheque for

Page 10 of 13

Rs. 1.00 lakh, she is deemed to know of

the contents of the said order. Thus,

having accepted the order dated

21.04.2015 by which the award was

apportioned, the plea that the ·petitioner

was not aware of the proceedings or the

contents of order dated 21.04.2015, falls

through as unacceptable. The order

dated 21.04.2015 cannot be said to be

vitiated by fraud.”

6. Having gone through the facts and the order

passed by the High Court, it has to be observed that the

claimants approached the Tribunal for disbursement of

the amount by filing a joint petition No. 223 of 2015

which was filed on 21.04.2015. The order was passed on

the said joint application. The said joint application was

admittedly signed by the appellant herein as well as

daughter in law – respondent No. 1. It contained a prayer

to allow the claimants to withdraw the amount awarded

towards compensation. Nothing more was indicated much

less the share of the respective parties.

6.1 The appellant received the cheque for Rs.

1,00,000/- which she encashed also. She has accepted

Page 11 of 13

the cheque without any protest and demur. It was upon a

joint application and with open eyes. Not only that

appellant voluntarily received the said amount, but she

also put her signature on the order sheet confirming the

receipt of the amount. The High Court has rightly

observed that she knew the contents of the order. It was

only the subsequent change of mind on the delay of the

appeal.

6.2 The appellant could not be permitted to resile

from her own conduct. She cannot be accounted to

approbate and reprobate. The question of occurrence of

fraud against her does not arise in the facts of the case.

She acted with open eyes, overtly and consciously. The

appellant now cannot reopen or dispute the factums of

her own act by showing disagreement to the

disbursement raising all after-thought contentions.

6.3 Looking to the facts and the conduct of the

appellant in jointly applying and thereafter accepting the

compensation and encashing the cheque, no error could

Page 12 of 13

be booked in the order passed by the Tribunal as well as

by the High Court. The operative facts do not permit this

Court to take any different view.

6.4 The High Court while agreeing with the findings

of the Tribunal that there was no satisfactory explanation

of delay in filing and the facts to justify the delay, also

adverted the factual aspect on the merits regarding the

conduct of the appellant as highlighted above. The High

Court consequently rightly dismissed the review

application.

7. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

………………………………….. J.

 N.V. ANJARIA


…..…………………………….. J.

 ATUL S. CHANDURKAR

NEW DELHI;

September 3, 2025

Page 13 of 13

Criminal Law – Cheating under Section 420 IPC – Mens rea at inception of transaction mandatory – Breach of contract not per se cheating To constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC, the complainant must establish fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise or representation. Mere failure to keep a promise or deliver goods of desired quality, without proof of dishonest inducement at inception, does not amount to “cheating”. Allegations of supply of machinery with lesser weight/output and failure to replace the same, are at best breach of contract, not criminal cheating.


Criminal Law – Cheating under Section 420 IPC – Mens rea at inception of transaction mandatory – Breach of contract not per se cheating

  • To constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC, the complainant must establish fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise or representation.

  • Mere failure to keep a promise or deliver goods of desired quality, without proof of dishonest inducement at inception, does not amount to “cheating”.

  • Allegations of supply of machinery with lesser weight/output and failure to replace the same, are at best breach of contract, not criminal cheating.

Delay in lodging FIR – Mala fides inferred

  • FIR filed nearly 5 years after the transaction raises suspicion about complainant’s bona fides.

  • Delay, coupled with vague allegations, militates against continuation of prosecution.

Civil vs. Criminal Remedies

  • Where contractual obligations are allegedly breached, remedy lies in civil suit for damages, not in initiating criminal proceedings.

  • Criminal law cannot be used as a tool for settling civil disputes or for vendetta.

Abuse of process – Bhajan Lal principles applied

  • Case falls squarely within categories laid down in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal (1992 Supp (1) SCC 335), particularly clauses (1), (3), (5), and (7) of para 102.

  • Allegations do not disclose ingredients of cognizable offence; proceedings appear mala fide and intended to harass.

Misuse of Criminal Process

  • Courts must be vigilant against misuse of criminal justice system to settle personal scores (Inder Mohan Goswami v. State of Uttaranchal, (2007) 12 SCC 1; Vesa Holdings v. State of Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293; Vishal Noble Singh v. State of U.P., 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680).

Held: FIR No.11/2023 dated 14.02.2023, charge-sheet dated 27.07.2023 and all consequential proceedings quashed. High Court order refusing to quash proceedings set aside. Appeal and writ petition allowed.2025 INSC 1118

Page 1 of 15

NON-REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE/ORIGINAL JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2025

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.3415 of 2024)

PARAMJEET SINGH …APPELLANT

 VERSUS

STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH

& OTHERS …RESPONDENTS

WITH

WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 217/2025

J U D G M E N T

NAGARATHNA, J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal arises out of order dated 02.01.2024 passed by

the Himachal Pradesh High Court in Cr.MMO No.288/2023

dismissing the application filed under Section 482 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter ‘CrPC’ for short) preferred by 

Page 2 of 15

the accused-appellant, Paramjeet Singh and refusing to quash the

proceedings arising out of FIR No.11/2023 dated 14.02.2023 that

was filed by Kushal K. Rana, the complainant/respondent No.3-

proprietor of M/s Soma Stone Crusher.

3. Writ Petition (Criminal) No.217/2025 has been preferred by

accused-petitioner, Sarabjit Singh, being aggrieved by the

chargesheet submitted on 27.07.2023 arising out of the very same

FIR No.11/2023 before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Jaisinghpur, Kangra District, Himachal Pradesh wherein both

Paramjeet Singh and Sarabjit Singh were arraigned as accused and

charged under Section 420 read with Section 120B of the Indian

Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter, “IPC’ for short). In the said Writ

Petition, the petitioner has prayed for quashing of FIR No.11/2023

and all the subsequent proceedings emanating from it.

4. Since both the appeal and writ petition arise from the same

facts and circumstances, they have been heard together and are

being disposed of by this common judgment. The appellant and the

writ petitioner shall henceforth be referred to as the ‘appellants’. 

Page 3 of 15

5. Briefly stated, the facts of the case are that the appellants are

brothers running business firms dealing in stone crushing.

Appellant Paramjeet Singh runs a proprietorship M/s Sardara

Singh & Sons having GST No.:03AYQPS7151J3ZV. Petitioner

Sarabjit Singh runs a proprietorship M/s Saini Engineering Works

having GST No.:03BVHPS8462D1ZG.

6. On 12.12.2017, a sale and purchase agreement was entered

into by M/s Soma Stone Crusher with M/s Saini Engineering

Works for the purchase of a 20X40 ‘sand ruula machine’ and

conveyor and structures for a consideration of Rs.9,12,912/-. In

pursuance of the said agreement, a cheque bearing No.024210

dated 13.01.2018 for an amount of Rs.5,00,000/- was drawn by

M/s Soma Stone Crusher in favour of M/s Saini Engineering Works

at Punjab National Bank, Jalsinghpur, Kangra, Himachal Pradesh.

7. Upon presentation of the said cheque for encashment, the

same was returned by the bank with a remark: ‘Stop Payment’.

Aggrieved by the same, M/s Saini Engineering Works, through

Special Power of Attorney Paramjeet Singh (appellant herein), filed

a complaint in April, 2018 under Section 138 of Negotiable

Instruments Act, 1881, (“the Act”, for short) being NACT/306/2018 

Page 4 of 15

against M/s Soma Stone Crusher and the

complainant/respondent No.3.

8. Thereafter, after five years from the sale-purchase agreement

dated 12.12.2017, an FIR No.11 dated 14.02.2023 was lodged at

Police Station Lambagaon under Section 420 IPC at the instance of

the complainant/respondent No.3 against the appellant. The

allegations in the said FIR can be crystallized as under:

i. Upon assurances of the appellant-accused Paramjeet Singh, a

ruula body 20X40 of approximate 14 tons was purchased from

M/s Saini Engineering Works and consequently an advance

payment of Rs.5,00,000/- was made through cheque bearing

No.024210.

ii. It was assured by the appellant that in case the said ruula set

fitting was not found as per the above said specification, the

same shall be replaced by him.

iii. It was also agreed by him that the said cheque of Rs.5,00,000/-

shall be presented only after complete satisfaction of the

complainant/respondent No.3 that the said ruula set fitting

was as per the specifications as agreed upon.

Page 5 of 15

iv. It was found that the weight of the said ruula set fitting was

only 12 tons instead of the promised 14 tons and the output of

the same was only 500 feet per hour instead of 1000 ft. to 1200

ft. per hour.

v. Due to the delivery of a product with wrong specifications and

failure to replace the same by the appellant, the

complainant/respondent No.3 has suffered a loss of Rs. 50

lakhs and hence liable for the offence of breach of trust.

9. Upon completion of the investigation with respect to the FIR,

a final police report was submitted before the court of Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Jaisinghpur charging the appellants of

offences under Section 420 read with Section 120B IPC. Thereafter,

Paramjeet Singh preferred a petition before the High Court under

Section 482 of CrPC as Cr. MMO No.288/2013 praying for the relief

of quashing of all the proceedings arising out of FIR No. 11/2023.

The High Court by the impugned order dated 02.01.2024

dismissed the said application. 

Page 6 of 15

10. Hence, the present appeal and the writ petition.

11. Heard the learned counsel for the appellants and learned

counsel for the respondent-State as well as respondentcomplainants. We have perused the material on record.

12. We have given our thorough consideration to the arguments

advanced at the bar and the material on record.

13. The contents of the FIR as well as the chargesheet would have

to be read in light of the ingredients of Section 420 IPC and the law

settled by this Court through various judicial dicta. On perusal of

FIR No.11 dated 14.02.2023 and the subsequent proceedings

emanating from it, it is noted that the appellants are accused of

offences under Section 420 and Section 120B IPC. For ease of

reference, the aforesaid Sections are extracted as under:

“420. Cheating and dishonestly inducing delivery of

property.- Whoever cheats and thereby dishonestly

induces the person deceived to deliver any property to any

person, or to make, alter or destroy the whole or any part

of a valuable security, or anything which is signed or

sealed, and which is capable of being converted into a

valuable security, shall be punished with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to seven

years, and shall also be liable to fine.

xxx

Page 7 of 15

120B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy.- (1) Whoever

is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence

punishable with death, imprisonment for life or rigorous

imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,

where no express provision is made in this Code for the

punishment of such a conspiracy, be punished in the same

manner as if he had abetted such offence.

(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than

a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable as

aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term not exceeding six months, or with

fine or with both.”

14. In Inder Mohan Goswami vs. State of Uttaranchal, (2007)

12 SCC 1, (“Inder Mohan Goswami”) while dealing with Section

420 IPC, this Court observed thus:

“42. On a reading of the aforesaid section, it is manifest

that in the definition there are two separate classes of acts

which the person deceived may be induced to do. In the

first class of acts he may be induced fraudulently or

dishonestly to deliver property to any person. The second

class of acts is the doing or omitting to do anything which

the person deceived would not do or omit to do if he were

not so deceived. In the first class of cases, the inducement

must be fraudulent or dishonest. In the second class of

acts, the inducing must be intentional but need not be

fraudulent or dishonest. Therefore, it is the intention

which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of

cheating it is necessary to show that he had a fraudulent

or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise.

From his mere failure to subsequently keep a promise, one

cannot presume that he all along had a culpable intention

to break the promise from the beginning.”

Page 8 of 15

15. In light of facts and circumstances of the present case, we

find that the complainant/respondent No.3 has failed to make out

a case that satisfies the basic ingredients of the offence under

Section 420 IPC. We fail to understand as to how the allegations

against the appellants herein could be brought within the scope

and ambit of the aforesaid Section 420 IPC. On a bare perusal of

the FIR as well as the charge-sheet, we do not find that the offence

of cheating as defined under Section 420 IPC is made out at all and

we do not find that there is any cheating and dishonest inducement

to deliver any property of a valuable security involved in the instant

case.

16. It is settled law that for establishing the offence of cheating,

the complainant/respondent No.3 was required to show that the

appellants had a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of

making a promise or representation of buying the said ‘ruula set

fitting’. Such a culpable intention when the promise was made

cannot be presumed but has to be supported with cogent facts. In

the facts of the present case, there is a clear absence of dishonest

and fraudulent intention on the part of the appellants as regards

the sale and purchase agreement. We must hasten to add that 

Page 9 of 15

there is no allegation in the First Information Report or the

chargesheet indicating either expressly or impliedly any intentional

deception or fraudulent/dishonest intention on the part of the

appellants right from the time of making the promise or

misrepresentation. Nothing has been said on what the

misrepresentations were and how the appellants intentionally

deceived the complainant/ respondent No.3. Mere vague

allegations by the complainant/ respondent No.3 that the

appellants failed to provide a product of a particular specification

and failed to replace the faulty machines do not satisfy the test of

dishonest inducement to deliver a property or part with a valuable

security as enshrined under Section 420 IPC.

17. At this point, we must hasten to add that the impugned FIR

was filed after a delay of nearly five years. The learned counsel for

the complainant/respondent No.3 has not been able to state before

us the reason for the delay and this further raises suspicion about

the bona fides of the complainant. The delay in lodging of the FIR,

coupled with the vague allegations do not inspire the confidence of

this Court to allow the criminal proceedings to continue against

the appellants. The complainant had an alternative remedy of filing 

Page 10 of 15

a civil suit claiming damages for the alleged violation of his

contractual rights but a route through criminal proceedings, when

no ingredient of offence is made out, cannot be permitted. Criminal

law ought not become a platform for initiation of vindictive

proceedings to settle personal scores and vendettas. The

appellants, in our view, could not be attributed any mens rea and

therefore, the allegations levelled by the prosecution against the

appellants are unsustainable.

18. This Court, in the case of Vesa Holdings P. Ltd. vs. State of

Kerala, (2015) 8 SCC 293, had observed and held that every

breach of contract would not give rise to an offence of cheating but

the cases of breach of contract would amount to cheating only

where there was any deception played at the very inception. It was

further observed that for the purpose of constituting an offence of

cheating, the complainant is required to show that the accused had

a fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making a promise

or representation. It was further observed that even in a case where

allegations are made in regard to failure on the part of the accused

to keep his promise, in the absence of a culpable intention at the

time of making initial promise being absent, no offence under 

Page 11 of 15

Section 420 IPC can be said to have been made out and that the

real test is, whether, the allegations in the complaint disclose the

criminal offence of cheating.

19. Furthermore, in the case of Inder Mohan Goswami, it was

held by this Court that the Court must ensure that criminal

prosecution is not used as an instrument of harassment or for

seeking private vendetta or with an ulterior motive to pressurise

the accused. It was further held by this Court that it is neither

possible nor desirable to lay down an inflexible rule that would

govern the exercise of inherent jurisdiction. In view of the above

and for the reasons stated above, we are of the firm opinion that to

continue the criminal proceedings against the appellants herein

would cause undue harassment to them because, as observed

hereinabove, no prima facie case for the offence under Section 420

IPC is made out.

20. In this regard, it would be apposite to rely on the judgment in

the case of State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Suppl (1)

SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”) with particular reference to paragraph

102 therein, where this Court observed: 

Page 12 of 15

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various

relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of

the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series

of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power Under Article 226 or the inherent powers Under

Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and

reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases

by way of illustration wherein such power could be

exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any

court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it

may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly

defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible

guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list

of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the

Accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and

other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers Under Section 156(1) of the Code except

under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the

same do not disclose the commission of any offence and

make out a case against the Accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer

without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated Under

Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are

so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which 

Page 13 of 15

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that

there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the

Accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of

the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under

which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution

and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is

a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act,

providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the

aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance

on the Accused and with a view to spite him due to private

and personal grudge.”

21. On a careful consideration of the aforementioned judicial

dictum, we find that none of the offences alleged against the

appellants herein is made out. In fact, we find that the allegations

of criminal intent and other allegations against the appellants

herein have been made with a mala fide intent and therefore, the

judgment of this Court in the case of Bhajan Lal and particularly

sub-paragraphs 1, 3, 5 and 7 of paragraph 102, extracted above,

squarely apply to the facts of this case. It is neither expedient nor

in the interest of justice to permit the present prosecution to

continue. 

Page 14 of 15

22. At this juncture, we find it apposite to mention the

observations of this Court in Vishal Noble Singh vs. State of

Uttar Pradesh, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1680 wherein it was

observed that in recent years, the machinery of criminal justice is

being misused by certain persons for their vested interests and for

achieving their oblique motives and agenda. Courts have therefore

to be vigilant against such tendencies and ensure that acts of

omission and commission having an adverse impact on the fabric

of our society must be nipped in the bud. We say so for the reason

that while the complainant has made allegations against the

appellants herein and a charge-sheet has also been filed, he has

failed to justify the same before this Court. Such actions would

create significant divisions and distrust among people, while also

placing an unnecessary strain on the judicial system, particularly

the criminal courts.

23. In the aforementioned circumstances, the impugned order of

the High Court is set aside and consequently, the FIR No.11/2023

dated 14.02.2023 at Police Station Lambagaon, the chargesheet

dated 27.07.2023 and all consequent proceedings initiated

pursuant thereto stand quashed.

Page 15 of 15

24. The appeal and the writ petition are allowed in the aforesaid

terms.

…………………………………..J.

 (B.V. NAGARATHNA)

…………………………………..J.

 (R. MAHADEVAN)

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 15, 2025.