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Scope of appeal — Section 125, Electricity Act, 2003. — An appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 lies only on substantial questions of law as envisaged by Section 100 CPC; concurrent findings of fact by expert regulatory bodies (CERC/APTEL) will not be disturbed unless shown to be perverse, arbitrary, in violation of statute or based on extraneous considerations.


  • Scope of appeal — Section 125, Electricity Act, 2003. — An appeal under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003 lies only on substantial questions of law as envisaged by Section 100 CPC; concurrent findings of fact by expert regulatory bodies (CERC/APTEL) will not be disturbed unless shown to be perverse, arbitrary, in violation of statute or based on extraneous considerations.

  • Coal linkage and FSAs — project-wide allocation. — Where Standing Linkage Committee minutes, LOAs and Fuel Supply Agreements indicate allocation of firm and tapering linkage and captive coal for the generating station/project as a whole, such allocation is not PPA-specific and must be understood as for the station in aggregate.

  • FSA interpretation — ACQ tied to aggregate PPA capacity. — Clause 4.1.1 of the FSA making Annual Contracted Quantity (ACQ) “in proportion to the percentage of generation covered under long-term PPAs” means coal supplied under the FSA is to be released against total PPA capacity; ACQ is operationalised in relation to PPAs but the entitlement under the FSA is station-wide.

  • Apportionment of linkage and alternate coal costs — pro rata. — Shortfall in firm/tapering linkage met through imported or open-market coal and resultant additional cost must be apportioned pro rata among all beneficiaries (DISCOMs) in proportion to scheduled/ supplied energy; the CERC’s methodology for computing such adjustment is validly applied.

  • Impleading of parties — necessity of GRIDCO. — A cost-plus PPA under Section 62 need not be impleaded as a necessary party to petitions commenced under Section 63 (competitive-bidding PPAs) where the relief sought relates to Section 63 PPAs; absence of GRIDCO (a Section 62 procurer) in GKEL’s Petitions Nos. 79 and 105 did not vitiate the proceedings.

  • Doctrine of approbation and reprobation — estoppel by conduct. — A procurer (Haryana Utilities) which accepted a methodology or position before the regulatory forum cannot later adopt a contrary stance after adverse orders; approbation and reprobation will bar inconsistent litigation posture.

  • Avoidance of anomalous cross-subsidy and equal treatment. — Treating linkage coal as PPA-specific in the facts of the case would lead to anomalous cross-subsidisation among states and unequal treatment of beneficiaries; pro rata apportionment safeguards equity and prevents discriminatory allocations.

  • Judicial restraint in regulatory matters. — Courts should be slow to disturb reasoned decisions of expert regulatory bodies (CERC/APTEL) on technical and factual matters related to tariff, fuel allocation and computation of compensation unless the decision is shown to be legally unsustainable.

  • Conclusion / Order. — Appeals dismissed; the APTEL judgment of 20.12.2019 upholding the CERC order of 20.3.2018 (which directed pro rata payment of supplementary bills raised by GKEL for July 2016–March 2017 and late payment surcharge) is affirmed.

  • 2025 INSC 1079

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 1 of 57

    REPORTABLE

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1929 OF 2020

    HARYANA POWER PURCHASE

    CENTRE (HPPC) AND OTHERS … APPELLANTS


    versus

    GMR KAMALANGA ENERGY

    LIMITED AND OTHERS … RESPONDENTS

    with

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3429 OF 2020

    J U D G M E N T

    B.R.GAVAI, CJI.

    FACTUAL ASPECTS

    1. These appeals take exception to the judgment and final order

    dated 20th December 2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for

    Electricity, New Delhi1 in Appeal No. 135 of 2018 along with

    Appeal No. 54 of 2019, whereby the learned APTEL dismissed the

    said appeals and upheld the order dated 20th March 2018 passed

    by the Central Electricity Regulatory Commission, New Delhi2 in

    Petition No. 105/MP/20173.

    1 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘APTEL’

    2 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘CERC’

    33 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Petition No. 105’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 2 of 57

    2. We have two appeals before us, both of which challenge the

    same judgment and final order of the learned APTEL. The first

    appeal being Civil Appeal No. 1929 of 2020 has been filed by

    Haryana Power Purchase Centre and two others4 whereas the

    second appeal being Civil Appeal No. 3429 of 2020 has been filed

    by one GRID Corporation of Orissa Limited5. For the sake of clarity

    and to avoid any confusion, the parties will be referred to

    according to their positions in the first of the two civil appeals.

    3. Before we proceed with the facts of the case, it would be

    apposite to give a brief overview of the parties before us.

    3.1 HPCC (Appellant No.1) is the nodal agency for the

    procurement of power on behalf of the distribution licensees in

    the State of Haryana, being Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam

    Limited (Appellant No.2) and Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam

    Limited (Appellant No.3). Haryana Power Generation Corporation

    Limited (Proforma Respondent No.6) is the body corporate that

    was responsible for the initiation of the competitive bid process on

    behalf of Appellant Nos. 2 and 3 for procurement of power in the

    4 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘HPCC’

    5 Hereinafter referred to as ‘GRIDCO’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 3 of 57

    State of Haryana. Together, the said parties may be referred to as

    the “Haryana Utilities”.

    3.2 GMR Kamalanga Energy Limited6 (Respondent No.1) is a

    generating company within the meaning of the Electricity Act,

    20037. Notably, GKEL is a special purpose vehicle of GMR Energy

    Limited8 which was the predecessor-in-interest of the Respondent

    No.1.

    3.3 PTC India Limited9 (Respondent No.2) is a trading licensee

    within the meaning of the 2003 Act. Respondent No. 2 had an

    arrangement with GKEL for the procurement of power.

    3.4 CERC (Respondent No.3) is the regulatory commission under

    the 2003 Act.

    3.5 GRIDCO (Respondent No.4) is a licensee under the 2003 Act

    which is responsible for procuring power for supply within the

    State of Odisha.

    3.6 Similarly, Bihar State Power (Holding) Company10

    (Respondent No.5) is a licensee under the 2003 Act which is

    6 Hereinafter referred to as ‘GKEL’

    7 Hereinafter referred to as the ‘2003 Act’

    8 Hereinafter referred to as ‘GEL’

    9 Hereinafter referred to as ‘PTC’

    10 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Bihar Utilities’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 4 of 57

    responsible for procuring power for supply within the State of

    Bihar.

    4. Having given a brief overview of the parties in the civil

    appeals, we may now proceed to examine the facts which lead to

    the present appeals. The facts are as follows:-

    4.1 With the intention to set up a thermal power plant of about

    1,000 MW comprising of two units of about 500 MW each at village

    Kamalanga, Dhenkanal in the State of Odisha, GEL entered into

    a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Government of

    Odisha on 9th June 2006. Per the terms of the MoU, the power

    project as envisaged was to operate with coal as the primary fuel,

    for which purpose the State of Odisha was to either allot coal

    blocks upon receipt of sanction from the Government of India or

    allot long-term coal linkage of such quality and quantity as

    required for the project. The MoU further necessitated that a

    nominated agency authorized by the Government of Odisha would

    have the right to purchase up to 25% of power sent out from the

    thermal power plants. While initially, the MoU envisaged the

    setting up of thermal plants with an aggregate capacity of 1,000

    MW (500 x 2), by way of alteration carried out subsequently, it

    was decided that GKEL would develop four power plants each 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 5 of 57

    having a capacity of 350 MW. Three out of the four said units have

    been installed, however, the fourth unit of 350 MW is yet to be

    installed. Subsequently, this project was accorded the Mega

    Power Project status by the Ministry of Power, Government of

    India vide its letter dated 1st February 2012.

    4.2 In terms of the MoU, on 28th September 2006, GKEL

    executed a Power Purchase Agreement with GRIDCO (Respondent

    No.4) being the nominated agency of the State of Odisha for the

    sale of 25% of the gross power generated by GKEL to GRIDCO,

    which came to 262.5 MW, upon the installed capacity reaching

    1050 MW (350 MW x 3).

    4.3 Thereafter, on 5th January 2007, GKEL addressed a letter to

    the Government of Odisha requesting the State Government for a

    recommendation to the Ministry of Coal, Government of India for

    the allotment of long-term coal linkage in favour of GKEL.

    Accordingly, the Department of Energy, Government of Odisha

    vide letters dated 19th December 2005 and 12th January 2007

    pursued the matter with the Government of India.

    4.4 While this was underway, on 1st March 2007, the Haryana

    Power Generation Corporation (Respondent No.6) issued a 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 6 of 57

    Request for Proposal11 on behalf of the Haryana Utilities for

    procurement of 2,000 MW power on a long-term basis. The said

    RfP envisaged the procurement of power by way of a tariff-based

    bidding process as provided for under Section 63 of the 2003 Act.

    In order to qualify for the bid, all the bidders were required to

    submit proof of fuel arrangements in terms of Clauses 2.1.5 and

    2.1.5 A of the RfP which read thus: -

    “2.1.5 All Bidders are required to submit copies of

    one or more of the following :-

    (a)Linkage letter from the fuel supplier; or

    (b)Fuel Supply Agreement between the Bidder and

    Fuel Supplier; or

    (c) Coal Block Allocation letter/In principle

    approval for allocation of captive block from

    Ministry of Coal; or

    (d)Other details submitted by Bidders subject to

    acceptance by the Procurer as sufficient proof for

    demonstration of ability,

    The above proof of fuel arrangement is not

    required in case the fuel to be used by the Bidder

    is imported fuel.

    2.1.5 A The Successful Bidder is required to show

    a firm fuel supply agreement/linkage by the time

    limit specified for fulfilment of Conditions

    Subsequent as mentioned in the PPA”

    11 Hereinafter referred to as ‘RfP’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 7 of 57

    4.5 Subsequently, the Standing Linkage Committee (Long

    Term)12 of the Government of India in a meeting dated 2nd August

    2007 approved a firm coal linkage of 2.14 MTPA13 for a 500 MW

    power plant as had been originally envisaged under the 1,000 MW

    (500 MW x 2) configuration.

    4.6 In addition to the said approval, the Ministry of Coal,

    Government of India intimated its decision to allocate Rampia and

    Dip Side Rampia coal blocks in Odisha to a consortium of six

    generating companies including GEL. GEL’s share was 4.6 MTPA

    which corresponded to the project capacity of 1,000 MW. The

    approval came to pass when the Ministry of Coal, Government of

    India confirmed the allotment of the said coal blocks to the

    aforementioned consortium vide letter dated 17th January 2008.

    4.7 In the meanwhile, on 31st October 2007, GEL entered into

    an agreement with PTC in order to enable the latter to participate

    in the bidding process initiated by Haryana Power Generation

    Corporation (Respondent No. 6) by way of the RfP. In pursuit of

    the same, PTC submitted its bid for sale of 300 MW of power to

    the Haryana Utilities and the bid was accepted. Thereafter, vide

    12 Hereinafter referred to as ‘SLC-LT’

    13 Short for ‘million tonnes per annum’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 8 of 57

    an order dated 31st July 2008, the Haryana Electricity Regulatory

    Commission (HERC) adopted the tariff successful bidders

    including PTC under Section 63 of the 2003 Act.

    4.8 Subsequently, upon the allocation of the Rampia and Dip

    Side Rampia coal blocks to GEL and the remaining allottees of the

    consortium, Mahanadi Coalfields Limited14 issued a Letter of

    Assurance15 dated 25th July 2008 in favour of GEL for providing

    firm linkage of 2.14 MPTA coal, being the normative requirement

    of one of the power plants having capacity of 500 MW.

    4.9 Thereafter, on 7th August 2008, PTC executed two separate

    Power Purchase Agreements16 with the Dakshin Haryana Bijli

    Vitran Nigam Limited (Appellant No.2) and Uttar Haryana Bijli

    Vitran Nigam Limited (Appellant No.3) for supply of 150 MW of

    power to each, aggregating to 300 MW with the Haryana STU-Inter

    Connection Point being the delivery point. Notably, the fuel type

    proposed to be utilized was Coal India Limited (CIL) coal linkage

    and it was proposed to be sourced from the MCL.

    4.10 As the captive coal from Rampia and Dip Side Rampia had

    not become available, on 12th November 2008, the SLC-LT

    14 Hereinafter referred to as ‘MCL’

    15 Hereinafter referred to as ‘LoA’

    16 Hereinafter referred to as ‘PPA’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 9 of 57

    approved the tapering coal linkage of 2.384 MTPA for 550 MW of

    the power project, against the coal block allocation to the

    concerned project. In view of the same, on 8th July 2009, MCL

    issued a LoA to GEL providing tapering linkage as aforementioned

    till captive coal blocks became available.

    4.11 Subsequently, as aforementioned, GKEL and GRIDCO

    executed an amended and restated PPA on 4th January 2011

    which altered the configuration of the thermal power plants and

    their output capacity, while keeping intact the entitlement of

    GRIDCO to 25% gross power generated by GKEL.

    4.12 On 9th November 2011, GKEL entered into a PPA with Bihar

    State Electricity Board, being the predecessor to Bihar Utilities

    for supply of 260 MW of net power/282 MW of gross power. Per

    the said PPA, the fuel source proposed to be utilized was Coal

    India Limited (CIL) coal linkage and the coal was proposed to be

    sourced from MCL and the Rampia and Dip Side Rampia coal

    blocks allocated to GKEL.

    4.13 Thereafter, on 26th March 2013, MCL signed a Fuel Supply

    Agreement17 with GKEL for supply of coal to the power plants (3 x

    17 Hereinafter referred to as ‘FSA’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 10 of 57

    350 MW) being 500 MW under normal linkage and 425 MW

    generation capacity covered under long term PPA i.e., an

    aggregate of 1.819 MTPA/18.19 lakh tonnes. The FSA was

    amended from time to time, initially to increase the quantum of

    coal supplied from 1.819 MTPA to 2.0009 MTPA for the same

    capacity of 425 MW and thereafter, the FSA was further amended

    on 18th September 2014 to increase the quantum of coal supplied

    to 2.14 MTPA on account of operationalization of the PPA with

    Bihar Utilities.

    4.14 Subsequently, on 28th August 2013, GKEL entered into

    another independent FSA with MCL for tapering linkage.

    4.15 In the meanwhile, on 23rd April 2013, GKEL preferred

    Petition No. 79/MP/201318 before the CERC against Haryana

    Utilities, being a petition under Section 79 of the 2003 Act read

    with the statutory framework governing the procurement of power

    through the competitive bidding process and Articles 12, 13 and

    17 of the PPA dated 7th August 2008 executed between PTC and

    the Haryana Utilities and the back-to-back PPA dated 12th March

    2009 executed between GEL and PTC for compensation due to

    18 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Petition No. 79’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 11 of 57

    force majeure events and Change in Law during the operation

    period. In the said petition, the GKEL sought adjustment of tariff

    on account of events of Change in Law which affected the power

    project during the operation period in order to restore GKEL to the

    same economic position that it would have been in if the

    concerned events had never occurred. It is notable that GRIDCO

    was not made a party to this petition.

    4.16 Soon thereafter, Unit I of the power project achieved

    commercial operation and GKEL began supplying power to

    GRIDCO w.e.f. 30th April 2013. Within a few months, Unit II of the

    power project achieved commercial operation and GKEL

    commenced the supply of power to Haryana Utilities w.e.f. 7th

    February 2014. Subsequently, Unit III of the power project

    achieved commercial operation on 25th March 2014 and thereafter

    GKEL began supplying power to Bihar Utilities w.e.f. 1st

    September 2014.

    4.17 At this stage, it would be apposite to run through the

    quantum of power that was contracted to be delivered under each

    of the long-term PPAs, which are as follows:-

    (a) Supply of 350 MW of gross power (Stage 1: 262.5 MW and

    Stage 2: 87.5 MW) to GRIDCO in terms of PPA dated 28th

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 12 of 57

    September 2006 (as amended on 4th January 2011, with

    delivery point as Odisha STU Interconnection point).

    (b) Supply of 350 MW of gross power (300 MW net of

    transmission losses and auxiliary consumption) to Haryana

    Utilities based on PPA dated 7th August 2008 and back-toback PPA dated 12th March 2009 executed between GEL and

    PTC.

    (c) Supply of 282 MW of gross power (260 MW net of auxiliary

    consumption) to Bihar State Electricity Board in term of PPA

    dated 9th November 2011, with delivery point as the Bihar

    STU Interconnection point.

    4.18 The CERC vide order dated 3rd February 2016 disposed of

    the Petition No. 79 filed by GKEL in the following terms:-

    (i) At the time of bid submission, the notified rate of royalty on

    coal was Rs. 55+5% of ROM price per tonne. This was

    subsequently increased to an ad-valorem rate of 14% on

    price of coal. The CERC held that GKEL would be entitled to

    compensation for the same from Haryana Utilities.

    (ii) At the time of bid submission, there was no clean energy cess

    on coal. However, this was subsequently introduced by way

    of the Finance Act 2010 whereby statutory cess of Rs. 100 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 13 of 57

    per tonne had been levied on coal. This was subsequently

    reduced to Rs. 50 per tonne. The CERC held that GKEL

    would be entitled to recover clean energy cess from Haryana

    Utilities in proportion to the coal consumed for generation

    and supply of electricity to the appellants.

    (iii) At the time of bid submission, there was no excise duty on

    coal. Excise duty @ 6% on the determined sale price of coal

    was introduced by the Finance Act 2012. The CERC held

    that GKEL would be entitled to compensation through

    adjustment in tariff on account of the freshly applicable

    excise duty on coal.

    (iv) Owing to shortfall in the linkage coal and also due to transfer

    of certain quantum of tapering linkage from MCL to Eastern

    Coalfields Limited, GKEL had to import coal and also source

    open market coal. This had led to an additional cost of Rs.

    46.10 crores in the generation of power for the Haryana

    Utilities during the months of February and May to July

    2014. The CERC held that GKEL would be entitled to

    compensation for the same and accordingly set out a

    mechanism for computing the actual additional cost

    incurred in a month to mitigate the shortfall in linkage coal. 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 14 of 57

    The actual compensation payable was to be calculated and

    certified by the auditor in terms of the method laid down by

    the CERC.

    (v) At the time of submission of the bid, the pricing of coal was

    based on the UHV19 method which was Rs. 400 per tonne for

    F-grade, run-of-mine coal. Thereafter, the Government of

    India directed a switchover from UHV-based pricing system

    to GCV20-based pricing system. This led to a significant

    increase in price. The resultant impact of the change was an

    increase in cost of Rs. 10.76 crores for a full year. The CERC

    disallowed this claim, holding that any decision affecting the

    price of inputs for generating electricity including coal could

    not be covered under Change in Law.

    (vi) GKEL had also raised claims for increase in rail freight

    charges owing to busy season surcharge and development

    surcharge. CERC disallowed this claim.

    (vii) GKEL also raised claims towards compensation/payment for

    increase in MAT21 rate from 11.33% to 20.01% as brought in

    by the Finance Act, 2012. This claim was also disallowed.

    19 Short for ‘Useful Heat Value’

    20 Short for ‘Gross Calorific Value’

    21 Short for ‘Minimum alternate tax’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 15 of 57

    (viii) A claim was raised by GKEL for payment towards the

    increase in VAT22 from 4% to 5%. This claim was disallowed.

    (ix) A claim was also raised for payment/compensation owing to

    increase in water charges, which was disallowed.

    4.19 It is notable that GKEL had preferred a similar petition

    being Petition No. 112/MP/201523 against the Bihar Utilities with

    regard to the PPA executed between the said parties for

    compensation due to Change in Law which impacted revenues

    and costs during the operating period. Vide order dated 7th April

    2017, the CERC disposed of the petition by allowing all such

    claims which fell within the parameters of Change in Law events.

    4.20 Subsequently, in terms of the order dated 3rd February

    2016 passed in Petition No. 79, GKEL raised supplementary bills

    towards compensation for ‘Change in Law’ events as approved by

    the CERC, by pro-rating coal received from various sources for the

    period commencing from February 2014 onwards. The bills were

    accompanied by Form 15, detailed annexures and calculations

    which clearly showed apportionment of firm linkage coal

    corresponding to respective PPA capacities.

    22 Short for ‘Value added tax’

    23 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Petition No. 112’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 16 of 57

    4.21 Disputing the supplementary bills raised by GKEL, Haryana

    Utilities wrote to PTC on 22nd September 2016 seeking certain

    clarifications as to whether the bills were as per the order of the

    CERC dated 3rd February 2016. GKEL responded to the letter on

    6th October 2016 wherein it contended that as per CERC’s order,

    it was entitled to claim additional cost incurred during a month

    in respect of imported coal, open market coal and tapering coal or

    any other coal purchased to make up the shortfall in the firm

    linkage coal supplied by MCL.

    4.22 Being dissatisfied with the response, Haryana Utilities

    refused to make payments. To resolve the issue, a meeting was

    held on 25th January 2017, however, the matter could not be

    resolved. In light of the same, it was decided by PTC that the

    supplementary bills raised by GKEL for the period between July

    2016 to November 2016 would be considered to be disputed bills.

    4.23 In order to resolve the issue, another meeting was convened

    between the parties on 24th April 2017 wherein it was jointly

    agreed that a clarificatory petition/review petition would be filed

    before the CERC.

    4.24 Thereafter, GKEL preferred Petition No. 105 before the

    CERC under Section 79(1)(b) and (f) of the 2003 Act read with 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 17 of 57

    Articles 11.6 and 17 of the PPA dated 7th August 2008 for the

    recovery of the outstanding amount from the Haryana Utilities

    raised vide supplementary bills.

    4.25 The CERC vide order dated 20th March 2018 disposed of the

    said petition by directing the Haryana Utilities to pay the

    supplementary bills raised by GKEL for the period from July 2016

    to March 2017 along with late payment surcharge as per the

    provisions of the PPA executed between the parties within one

    month. The CERC held, in terms of the previous order dated 3rd

    February 2017 as well as the decision of this Court in Energy

    Watchdog v. Central Electricity Regulatory Commission and

    Others24, GKEL would be eligible for relief for any shortfall in the

    firm linkage and tapering linkage met through import and open

    market coal. To avoid putting GRIDCO and Bihar Utilities at a

    disadvantage, the CERC further directed that the firm and

    tapering linkage coal supplied to GKEL would have to be

    apportioned on a pro rata basis to all the beneficiaries of the

    project and the cost of procurement of coal from alternate sources

    24 (2017) 14 SCC 80

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 18 of 57

    to meet the shortfall would also be apportioned pro rata based on

    power supplied to beneficiaries.

    4.26 Aggrieved thereby, Haryana Utilities preferred Appeal No.

    135 of 2018 before the learned APTEL. Subsequently, GRIDCO

    preferred Appeal No. 54 of 2019 before the learned APTEL.

    4.27 The learned APTEL vide the common judgment and final

    order dated 20th December 2019 dismissed both the appeals and

    upheld the order of the CERC.

    4.28 Hence, these civil appeals under Section 125 of the 2003

    Act.

    SUBMISSIONS

    5. We have heard Shri M.G. Ramachandran, learned Senior

    Counsel appearing for the appellants, Dr. Abhishek Manu

    Singhvi, learned Senior Counsel and Shri Vishrov Mukherjee,

    learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.1, Ms. Prerna

    Singh, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No.2, Shri Raj

    Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing for Respondent No. 4

    and Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Counsel appearing for

    Respondent No.5.

    6. Shri Ramchandran, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

    behalf of the Haryana Utilities submitted that from the perusal of 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 19 of 57

    the RfP issued by Haryana Utilities in March, 2007 and the bid

    submitted by GKEL on 23rd November 2007 through PTC, it is

    clear that the bidders were required to submit the details with

    regard to fuel arrangement, source of fuel among other

    particulars. It is equally clear that while submitting the bid, GKEL

    had shown the source of fuel to be firm linkage granted by way of

    SLC-LT meeting held on 2nd August 2007. It is further submitted

    that the perusal of PPA dated 7th August 2008 between Haryana

    Utilities and PTC would also show that the PPA was based on firm

    linkage coal from MCL. It is submitted that as against this, the

    PPA dated 9th November 2011, entered into by GKEL with Bihar

    Utilities clearly indicated the sources of fuel as firm linkage as well

    as Rampia and Dip Side of Rampia coal block allotment (tapering

    linkage).

    7. Shri Ramchandran further submitted that FSA as well as the

    LoA in favour of GKEL for the first phase was unit specific. It is

    submitted that FSA becomes operational in proportion to the

    generation covered under long term PPAs. It is submitted that at

    the time when the FSA dated 26th March 2013 was signed, even

    though the linkage was for 500 MW, only 425 MW was considered

    as generation capacity. This was so since the PPAs with Haryana 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 20 of 57

    Utilities for 300 MW as well as with GRIDCO for 125 MW were the

    only long term PPAs at that time. Shri Ramchandran further

    submitted that subsequently, when the Bihar PPA became

    operational, the capacity under the FSA vis-à-vis firm linkage was

    modified by specific additional 29.55 MW (out of a total Bihar PPA

    capacity of 260 MW).

    8. Shri Ramchandran contended that the Haryana Utilities

    would be entitled to supply of 300 MW of energy from the firm

    linkage whereas GRIDCO would be entitled to supply of 125 MW

    energy produced using the coal available from the firm linkage. It

    is, therefore, submitted that the Haryana Utilities cannot be

    burdened with the additional cost incurred on account of

    production of coal from the MCL tapering linkage. Shri

    Ramchandran submitted that the difference on account of the use

    of fuel from tapering linkage will have to be borne only by the

    GRIDCO and Bihar Utilities inasmuch as the said coal was used

    for production of power for Unit II of 200 MW and Unit III of 350

    MW. It is, therefore, submitted that both the CERC as well as the

    learned APTEL erred in putting the burden on the Haryana

    Utilities whereas the same should have been apportioned to Bihar

    Utilities and GRIDCO.

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 21 of 57

    9. Shri Raj Kumar Mehta, learned counsel appearing on behalf

    of GRIDCO submitted that it was the PPA with GRIDCO which

    came to be operationalized first in April 2013. It is submitted that

    even though GRIDCO’s share in the installed capacity of the

    thermal station of GKEL was 25%, the order dated 3rd February

    2016 in Petition No. 79 and order dated 20th March, 2018 in

    Petition No. 105 were passed without impleading GRIDCO. It is

    submitted that GRIDCO was a necessary and proper party as its

    rights were adversely affected. It is submitted that GRIDCO was

    also not impleaded in the appeal being Appeal No. 135 of 2018

    filed by the Haryana Utilities before the learned APTEL. It is

    submitted that on account of the order dated 28th November 2018

    of the learned APTEL, GRIDCO came to be impleaded in the said

    appeal.

    10. Shri Mehta further submitted that the reasoning given by the

    learned APTEL that since GRIDCO’s PPA was Cost Plus Tariff PPA

    under Section 62 of the 2003 Act whereas the proceedings before

    the CERC and the learned APTEL were initiated seeking

    compensation on the grounds of Change in Law with regard to

    Haryana Utilities and Bihar Utilities which fell under Section 63

    of the 2003 Act and therefore, GRIDCO was not necessary party,

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 22 of 57

    is wholly unsustainable. It is submitted that GKEL had

    specifically prayed for pro rating of linkage coal amongst all the

    three utilities namely GRIDCO, Haryana Utilities and Bihar

    Utilities and as such GRIDCO was a necessary party.

    11. It is submitted that the project sought to be installed by

    GKEL was at the instance of the Government of Odisha. It is

    submitted that the State of Odisha had provided all the necessary

    facilities to GKEL to install the project. It is therefore submitted

    that it is the GRIDCO which had the first right to the power

    generated from the coal made available from the firm linkage.

    12. Dr. Abhishek Manu Singhvi appearing on behalf of the

    respondent No. 1 submitted that the appeals are liable to be

    dismissed on the short ground that they do not raise any

    substantial question of law as is required under Section 125 of

    the 2003 Act. It is further submitted that the order dated 20th

    March 2018 in Petition No. 105 is passed by the CERC on the

    basis of its earlier order dated 3rd February, 2016 in Petition No.

    79. It is submitted that the CERC in Petition No. 79 had clearly

    held that coal supplied to GKEL under linkage by Government of

    India is to be apportioned on pro rata basis to all the three 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 23 of 57

    Distribution Companies25 i.e. Haryana Utilities, GRIDCO and

    Bihar Utilities. It is submitted that since the Haryana Utilities had

    not challenged the said order, it was not permissible for them to

    challenge the order passed in Petition No. 105. It is further

    submitted that supply of coal from all the modes of procurement

    has to be considered for the power project inasmuch as allocation

    by Government of India was for the whole project and not specific

    to any particular DISCOM.

    13. Dr. Singhvi further submitted that the concurrent orders

    passed by the CERC and the learned APTEL are equitable orders

    inasmuch as it has been held that coal supplied under the linkage

    is to be apportioned on pro rata basis to all the DISCOMS.

    However, if the contentions of the Haryana Utilities are accepted,

    it will amount to burdening the consumers in the State of Odisha

    and Bihar. It is further submitted that if the contentions of both

    Haryana Utilities and GRIDCO are accepted, it will amount to

    putting the total burden on the consumers in the State of Bihar.

    14. Dr. Singhvi further contended that the attitude of Haryana

    Utilities is of approbation and reprobation. It is submitted that in

    25 Hereinafter referred to as ‘DISCOMS’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 24 of 57

    the case of Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. & Another

    v. Adani Power (Mundra) Limited and Others26, this Court

    noted that after accepting before the CERC that they would adopt

    the methodology as given in the case of GMR-Kamalanga Energy

    Limited v. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd.27,

    Haryana Utilities changed their stand subsequently.

    15. In the totality, Dr. Singhvi submitted that the appeals

    deserve to be dismissed.

    16. Shri S.B. Upadhyay, learned Senior Counsel appearing on

    behalf of respondent No. 5 has supported the concurrent orders

    of the CERC and the learned APTEL.

    DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

    17. At the outset, it can be noticed that all three DISCOMS agree

    that GKEL is entitled to compensation on account of Change in

    Law event. However, the Haryana Utilities and GRIDCO argued

    that the said liability should not come to them but should instead

    be passed on to the other two. It is only the Bihar Utilities which

    agrees that the liability has to be equally shared by all three

    26 (2023) 14 SCC 736;

    27 (2016) SCC OnLine CERC 43

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 25 of 57

    DISCOMS in proportion to the energy supplied to them. We find

    it appropriate to deal with both the appeals separately.

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1929 OF 2020

    18. Undisputedly, the present appeal filed by Haryana Utilities

    challenges the impugned judgment and final order passed by

    learned APTEL whereby the learned APTEL has upheld the order

    of the CERC. The appeal to this Court has been filed under Section

    125 of the 2003 Act. The perusal of Section 125 shows that the

    appeal is tenable only on the grounds as available under Section

    100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190828, as such, it could be

    seen that appeal would be tenable only on a substantial question

    of law.

    19. One of us (B.R. Gavai, J, as he then was) had an occasion to

    deal with a large batch of electricity appeals pertaining to Change

    in Law event. This Court first decided the common issues involved

    in the said batch of appeals in Maharashtra State Electricity

    Distribution Company Limited v. Adani Power Maharashtra

    28 Hereinafter referred to as “CPC”

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 26 of 57

    Limited and Others29. It would be apposite to refer to following

    paragraphs of the said judgment:

    “118. It could thus be seen that two expert bodies i.e.

    CERC and the learned APTEL have concurrently

    held, after examining the material on record, that the

    factors of SHR and GCV should be considered as per

    the Regulations or actuals, whichever is lower. CERC

    as well as the State Regulatory bodies, after extensive

    consultation with the stakeholders, had specified

    SHR norms in the respective Tariff Regulations. In

    addition, insofar as GCV is concerned, the CEA has

    opined that the margin of 85-100 kcal/kg for a nonpit head station may be considered as a loss of GCV

    measured at wagon top till the point of firing of coal

    in boiler.

    119. In this respect, we may refer to the following

    observations of this Court in Reliance Infrastructure

    Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra [Reliance Infrastructure

    Ltd. v. State of Maharashtra, (2019) 3 SCC 352] :

    (SCC pp. 376-77, paras 38-39)

    “38. MERC is an expert body which is

    entrusted with the duty and function to frame

    regulations, including the terms and

    conditions for the determination of tariff. The

    Court, while exercising its power of judicial

    review, can step in where a case of manifest

    unreasonableness or arbitrariness is made

    out. Similarly, where the delegate of the

    legislature has failed to follow statutory

    procedures or to take into account factors

    which it is mandated by the statute to consider

    or has founded its determination of tariffs on

    29 (2023) 7 SCC 401, hereafter referred to as MSEDCL

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 27 of 57

    extraneous considerations, the Court in the

    exercise of its power of judicial review will

    ensure that the statute is not breached.

    However, it is no part of the function of the

    Court to substitute its own determination for

    a determination which was made by an expert

    body after due consideration of material

    circumstances.

    39. In Assn. of Industrial Electricity

    Users v. State of A.P. [Assn. of Industrial

    Electricity Users v. State of A.P., (2002) 3 SCC

    711] a three-Judge Bench of this Court dealt

    with the fixation of tariffs and held thus : (SCC

    p. 717, para 11)

    ‘11. We also agree with the High Court [S.

    Bharat Kumar v. State of A.P., 2000 SCC

    OnLine AP 565 : (2000) 6 ALD 217] that

    the judicial review in a matter with

    regard to fixation of tariff has not to be as

    that of an appellate authority in exercise

    of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the

    Constitution. All that the High Court has

    to be satisfied with is that the

    Commission has followed the proper

    procedure and unless it can be

    demonstrated that its decision is on the

    face of it arbitrary or illegal or contrary to

    the Act, the court will not interfere.

    Fixing a tariff and providing for crosssubsidy is essentially a matter of policy

    and normally a court would refrain from

    interfering with a policy decision unless

    the power exercised is arbitrary or ex

    facie bad in law.’ ”

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 28 of 57

    **** **** ****

    121. Recently, the Constitution Bench of this Court

    in Vivek Narayan Sharma (Demonetisation Case-5

    J.) v. Union of India [Vivek Narayan Sharma

    (Demonetisation Case-5 J.) v. Union of India, (2023) 3 SCC

    1] has held that the Courts should be slow in interfering

    with the decisions taken by the experts in the field and

    unless it is found that the expert bodies have failed to take

    into consideration the mandatory statutory provisions or

    the decisions taken are based on extraneous

    considerations or they are ex facie arbitrary and illegal, it

    will not be appropriate for this Court to substitute its

    views with that of the expert bodies.”

    20. It can thus be seen that this Court has held that when

    various expert bodies like the CERC, the APTEL and the Central

    Electricity Authority after considering the relevant material on

    record have taken a particular view, the Court should be slow in

    interfering with the decisions taken by them. It has been held that

    unless the Court finds that the expert bodies have failed to take

    into consideration the mandatory statutory provisions or if their

    decisions are based on extraneous considerations or they are ex

    facie arbitrary and illegal, it will not be appropriate for this Court

    to substitute its views with that of the expert bodies.

    21. After deciding the common issues involved in the batch of

    electricity appeals in the case of MSEDCL (supra), this Court

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 29 of 57

    considered various additional issues involved in individual

    matters pertaining to the question of Change in Law event. One

    such case was GMR Warora Energy Limited v. Central

    Electricity Regulatory Commission (CERC) and Others30. This

    Court in the said case observed thus:

    “VI. Epilogue

    171. Before we part with the judgment, we must note

    that we have come across several appeals in the

    present batch which arise out of concurrent findings

    of fact arrived at by two statutory bodies having

    expertise in the field. We have also found that in

    some of the matters, the appeals have been filed only

    for the sake of filing the same. We also find that

    several rounds of litigation have taken place in some

    of the proceedings.

    172. Recently, this Court in Maharashtra State

    Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Adani Power

    Maharashtra Ltd. [Maharashtra State Electricity

    Distribution Co. Ltd. v. Adani Power Maharashtra

    Ltd., (2023) 7 SCC 401] has noted that one of the

    reasons for enacting the Electricity Act, 2003 was

    that the performance of the Electricity Boards had

    deteriorated on account of various factors. The

    Statement of Objects and Reasons of the Electricity

    Act, 2003 would reveal that one of the main features

    for enactment of the Electricity Act was delicensing

    of generation and freely permitting captive

    generation. In the said judgment, we have recorded

    the statement of the learned Attorney General made

    in Energy Watchdog [Energy Watchdog v. CERC,

    30 (2023) 10 SCC 401

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 30 of 57

    (2017) 14 SCC 80 : (2018) 1 SCC (Civ) 133] that the

    electricity sector, having been privatised, had largely

    fulfilled the object sought to be achieved by the

    Electricity Act. He had stated that delicensed

    electricity generation resulted in production of far

    greater electricity than was earlier produced. The

    learned Attorney General had further urged the

    Court not to disturb the delicate balance sought to

    be achieved by the Electricity Act i.e. that the

    producers or generators of electricity, in order that

    they set up power plants, be entitled to a reasonable

    margin of profit and a reasonable return on their

    capital, so that they are induced to set up more and

    more power plants. At the same time, the interests of

    the end-consumers also need to be protected.

    173. However, we find that, in spite of this position,

    litigations after litigations are pursued. Though the

    concurrent orders of statutory expert bodies cannot

    be said to be perverse, arbitrary or in violation of the

    statutory provisions, the same are challenged.”

    22. It will also be appropriate to refer to the following

    observations made by this Court in paragraph 181 of the said

    judgment:

    181. It is further to be noted that the appeal to this

    Court under Section 125 of the Electricity Act, 2003

    is only permissible on any of the grounds as specified

    in Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

    As such, the appeal to this Court would be

    permissible only on substantial questions of law.

    However, as already observed herein, even in cases

    where well-reasoned concurrent orders are passed by

    the Electricity Regulatory Commissions and the

    learned APTEL, the same are challenged by 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 31 of 57

    the DISCOMS as well as the generators. On account of

    pendency of litigation, which in some of the cases in

    this batch has been more than 5 years, non-payment

    of dues would entail paying of heavy carrying cost to

    the generators by the DISCOMS, which, in turn, will be

    passed over to the end-consumer. As a result, it will

    be the end-consumer who would be at sufferance. We

    are of the opinion that such unnecessary and

    unwarranted litigation needs to be curbed.

    23. This Court in clear terms noted that the appeal under

    Section 125 of the 2003 Act is only permissible on any of the

    grounds as specified in Section 100 of the CPC. As such, it is

    permissible only on substantial questions of law. This Court

    observed that even in cases where well-reasoned concurrent

    orders are passed by the Electricity Regulatory Commissions and

    the learned APTEL, the same are challenged by DISCOMS as well

    as the generators. It has been observed that on account of

    pendency of litigation which in some of the cases in the said batch

    had been for more than 5 years, non-payment of dues would

    result in paying of heavy carrying cost to the generators by the

    DISCOMS. It was observed that, in turn, this heavy cost is passed

    over to the end-consumers who are the ultimate sufferers. The

    Court had in unequivocal terms observed that such unnecessary

    and unwarranted litigations need to be curbed. In spite of the 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 32 of 57

    aforesaid observations, this Court is flooded with such kind of

    litigations.

    24. In the present matter, there are concurrent findings of facts

    not only in the impugned judgment passed by the learned APTEL

    and the order passed by the CERC in Petition No. 105, but also in

    the order dated 3rd February 2016 passed by the CERC in Petition

    No. 79 during the first round of litigation. The Court will,

    therefore, have to be very slow in interfering with the said findings

    of fact. Unless it is found that the findings are perverse, arbitrary

    or in violation of the statutory provisions, it will not be permissible

    for this Court to interfere with the same.

    25. Though, it was sought to be argued on behalf of the

    appellants that in the present case question of interpretation of

    the documents arises and the same question would fall in the

    category of substantial question of law, we do not find that any

    substantial question of law arises for consideration in the present

    appeal.

    26. Be that as it may, since the present appeal is pending since

    2020 having been admitted on 3rd June 2020, we propose to deal

    with the merits of the matter.

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 33 of 57

    27. It will be relevant to refer to the Petition No. 79 filed by GKEL

    before the CERC. GKEL contended in the said petition that it had

    entered into three long term PPAs as under:

    a) Supply of 350 MW gross power (Stage 1: 262.5 MW and Stage

    2: 87.5 MW) to Grid Corporation of Odisha Limited (GRIDCO)

    in terms of PPA dated 28th September 2006 (as amended on 4th

    January 2011 with delivery point as Odisha STU

    interconnection point).

    b) Supply of 282 MW gross power (260 MW net of auxiliary

    consumption) to Bihar State Electricity Board in terms of PPA

    dated 9th November 2011, with delivery point as the Bihar STU

    interconnection point.

    c) Supply of 350 MW gross power (300 MW net of transmission

    losses and auxiliary consumption) to Haryana Discoms based

    on the competitive bidding through back-to-back

    arrangements:

    (i) The PPAs dated 7th August, 2008 entered into between

    PTC India Limited and Haryana Discoms with delivery

    point as Haryana STU bus bar;

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 34 of 57

    (ii) Back-to-back PPA dated 12th March, 2009 between GMR

    Energy Limited (holding company of GKEL) and PTC India

    Limited.

    28. The petition was filed by GKEL seeking relief on account of

    Change in Law on various grounds. One of the grounds was with

    regard to deviations from the New Coal Distribution Policy, 2007

    (the NCDP) and changes in coal distribution policy of the

    Government of India and Coal India Limited.

    29. The issue with regard to firm linkage and tapering linkage in

    favour of GKEL and allocation of captive coal mines in favour of a

    consortium of six companies including GKEL also fell for

    consideration in the said petition. It will also be relevant to refer

    to the following submissions of GKEL recorded by the CERC:

    “6…..

    (a) As regards the firm linkage, the Standing

    Linkage Committee (Long Term) (SLC-LT)

    approved a coal linkage for the project on 2.8.2007

    which was communicated to the petitioner on

    24.9.2007. Letter of Assurance (LOA) was issued

    in favour of GEL on 25.7.2008 for 2.14 MTPA of

    coal for 500 MW capacity of the Power Project.

    LOA was transferred in the name of GEKL by

    Ministry of Coal on 17.2.2011.

    (b) On 6.11.2007, Ministry of Coal conveyed its

    decision to allocate Rampia and Dip Side Rampia 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 35 of 57

    coal blocks in Odisha to a consortium comprising

    of GEL and five other companies (M/s Sterlite

    Energy Ltd, M/s Mittal Steel India Limited, M/s

    Lanco Group Limited, M/s Navbharat Power

    Private Ltd, and M/s Reliance Energy Ltd).

    Ministry of Coal vide its letter dated 17.1.2008

    made the allocation under Section 3(3)(a) (iii) of

    the Coal Mines (Nationalisation) Act, 1973 for

    captive use in the specified end use projects by the

    allocatees. A joint venture company in the name

    of Rampia Coal Mine and Energy Private Limited

    was formed by the allocattees to carry out coal

    mining in early 2008.

    (c) On 12.11.2008, SLC-LT approved tapering coal

    linkage for the power project based on the

    recommendation of CEA that development of coal

    block allocated to GEL alongwith others was likely

    to take time. On 8.7.2009, LOA was issued for

    tapering coal linkage of 2.384 MTPA for 550 MW

    capacity in favour of GEL till coal from Rampia

    coal block was available. LOA was transferred in

    the name of GEKL by Ministry of Coal on

    17.2.2011.

    (d) On 26.3.2013, Mahanadi Coalfield Limited

    (MCL) signed the Fuel Supply Agreement with

    GEKL for supply of 1.819 MTPA of coal per

    annum.

    7. According to the petitioners, the financial

    closure of the power project was achieved on

    29.5.2009 and the petitioners went ahead with

    execution of the project with the expected COD of

    Unit 1 as 25.4.2013 as on the date of filing the

    present petition.

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 36 of 57

    30. In the said petition, the Haryana Utilities had raised a

    preliminary objection on the ground that impact of Change in Law

    can be ascertained only during the operation period, i.e. after the

    power project has been declared under commercial operation.

    The CERC with following observations rejected the said

    preliminary objection:

    “17. According to the Haryana Discoms, the

    present petition is premature since the impact of

    "Change in Law" can be ascertained only during

    the operation period, that is, after the power

    project has been declared under commercial

    operation. In this regard, it is noted that 1st Unit

    of the power project was commissioned on

    30.4.2013 and has been taken note of by the

    Haryana Power Purchase Centre (which is

    responsible for purchase of power on behalf of

    the Haryana Discoms) in its letter dated

    20.5.2013. Subsequently, in its letter dated

    8.8.2013, HPCC in response to the petitioner's

    offer contained in the letter dated 4.7.2013,

    consented for scheduling of power from the

    Project. The 2nd Unit achieved COD on

    12.11.2013 and supply to the Haryana Discoms

    commenced on 7.2.2014. 3rd Unit achieved COD

    on 25.3.2014. Since all units of the power project

    have achieved COD, the operating period has

    already commenced, making the petitioners

    eligible for compensation under Change in Law

    during the operating period. The objections of

    Haryana Discoms on this count are disposed of

    accordingly.”

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 37 of 57

    31. The perusal of paragraphs 54, 55 and 73 of the order passed

    by the CERC dated 3rd February 2016 would reveal that it devised

    a formula for computing the Energy Charge Rate31 which required

    pro rata allocation of coal among all three DISCOMS. It is

    pertinent to note that the Haryana Utilities did not challenge the

    said order and paid the amounts due in terms of the said order

    till June 2016. The Haryana Utilities had accepted the bills which

    were submitted in pursuance to the order passed in Petition No.

    79 and a total of about Rs. 140 crores were paid till June, 2016.

    However, in September 2016, the Haryana Utilities raised the

    issue of pro rata allocation of coal. After due deliberations,

    Haryana Utilities and GKEL agreed that the latter would approach

    the CERC for clarification in this regard. As such, GKEL filed

    Petition No. 105. The argument of Haryana Utilities in the said

    petition was that coal received under FSA dated 26th March 2013

    should be considered for Haryana Utilities only and shortfall in

    supply thereof should be met through imported, open market or

    tapering coal. However, it was submitted on behalf of GKEL that

    the allocation of coal was made for the entire plant of GKEL and

    31 Hereinafter referred to as ‘ECR’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 38 of 57

    therefore, coal shall be used proportionately for generation and

    supply of power to all beneficiaries namely GRIDCO, Haryana

    Utilities and Bihar Utilities.

    32. The CERC vide order dated 20th March 2018 passed in

    Petition No. 105 considered the rival submissions as under:

    “31. On perusal of the documents on record, it

    emerges that the Petitioner was granted firm

    linkage of 500 MW and linkage from captive coal

    mine for 550 MW for its plant which was envisaged

    to have capacity of 1050 MW(3x350 MW),

    Subsequently, LOA dated 25.7.2008 was issued

    for firm linkage of 2.14 MTPA for 500 MW and LOA

    dated 8.7.2009 was issued for tapering linkage of

    2.384 MTPA for 550 MW by Ministry of Coal.

    Perusal of the Standing Linkage Committee (SLC)

    Minutes of Meeting dated 14.2.2012 reveals that

    the tapering linkage of 2.384 MTPA was allocated

    to the Petitioner for all three beneficiaries i.e.

    GRIDCO, Bihar Discoms and Haryana Discoms.

    The Committee noted that in some cases like GMR

    Kamalanga Energy Ltd., two separate LoAs were

    recommended by the SLC (LT) in different

    meetings, due to change in the

    configuration/capacity of the unit. The 2nd LoA

    was recommended by the SLC (LT) for the

    remaining capacity arising out of the changed

    configuration. On the recommendation of SLC

    (LT), the LoAs dated 25.7.2008 and 8.7.2009 were

    issued to the Petitioner for 500 MW and 550 MW

    respectively to meet the coal requirement for the

    entire capacity of 1050 MW.

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 39 of 57

    32. FSA dated 26.3.2013 was entered into by the

    Petitioner with Mahanadi Coalfield Limited for 500

    MW of firm linkage coal. The Tapering Linkage

    FSA with MCL was signed on 20.5.2014 and

    Tapering linkage FSA with ECL was signed on

    29.5.2014. Paras 4.1.1 and 4.2 of the FSA dated

    26.3.2013 provide as under:

    "4.1.1 The Annual Contracted Quantity of

    Coal agreed to be supplied by the Seller and

    undertaken to be purchased by the

    Purchaser, shall be 18.19 lakh Tes. Per Year

    from the Seller's mines and/or from import,

    as per Schedule I. For part of Year, the ACQ

    shall be prorated accordingly. The ACQ shall

    be in proportion of the percentage of

    Generation covered under long term Power

    Purchase Agreements executed by the

    Purchaser with the DISCOMs either directly

    or through PTC(s) who has/have signed the

    back to back long term PPA(s) with

    DISCOMs. Whenever, there is any change in

    the percentage of PPA(s), corresponding

    change in ACQ shall be effected through a

    side agreement. Such changes shall be

    allowed to be made only once in a year and

    shall be made effective only from the

    beginning of the next quarter. However, in no

    case ACQ should exceed the LOA quantity as

    mentioned in Schedule I.

    4.2. The total quantity of coal supplied

    pursuant to this Agreement is meant for use

    at Power Plant (3X350 MW), 500 MW under

    Normal Linkage (425 MW generation

    capacity covered under long term PPA).

    Located at Village-Kamalanga, Dt. 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 40 of 57

    Dhenkanal, Odhisha as listed in Schedule I.

    The Purchaser shall not sell/divert and/or

    transfer the Coal to any third party for any

    purpose whatsoever and the same shall be

    treated as material breach of Agreement, for

    which the Purchaser, shall be fully

    responsible and each act shall warrant

    suspension of coal supplies by the Seller in

    terms of Clause 14.1 (b)."

    It is evident from the above provisions of the FSA

    that the total quantum of coal supplied pursuant

    to the FSA is meant for use at the power plant

    (3x350 MW) of the Petitioner. Further, ACQ would

    be in proportion to the percentage of generation

    covered under long term PPAs either with the

    DISCOMs directly or through PTC which have

    been signed by the Petitioner. Therefore, the FSA

    cannot be for a particular PPA as contended by

    HPPC. As on the date of the FSA, only 425 MW

    were to be operationalised under long term PPAs

    with PTC/Haryana DISCOMs and GRIDCO and

    accordingly, only 425 MW covered under the long

    term PPAs was mentioned in the FSA. The FSA

    further provides that whenever there is any

    change in the percentage of PPAs, corresponding

    changes in the ACQ shall be effected through side

    agreements. The FSAs for the tapering linkage

    were signed with MCL on 20.5.2014 and with ECL

    on 29.5.2014. These FSAs were signed before the

    commencement of supply under Bihar PPA. The

    Petitioner was receiving 2.58 MTPA of coal from

    both firm and tapering linkage to meet the

    requirement for 618 MW and after

    operationalization of Bihar PPA, the Petitioner

    received 3.63 MTPA of coal to meet the

    requirement of 905 MW. Therefore, any shortfall 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 41 of 57

    in the firm linkage as well as tapering linkage met

    through import and open market coal shall be

    eligible for relief under the Change in law in the

    light of the order dated 3.2.2016 and the Hon'ble

    Supreme Court's judgment in Energy Watchdog

    case.

    33. In the light of the above discussion, it cannot

    be inferred from the language of para 48 of the

    order dated 3.2.2016 that the requirement of

    Haryana PPA shall be met from the firm linkage

    under the FSA dated 26.3.2013 and shortfall

    thereof shall be met through import and open

    market coal. Such an interpretation goes against

    the coal allocation by Ministry of Coal to power

    plant of the Petitioner as a whole and will put the

    GRIDCO PPA and Bihar PPA at a disadvantage visa-vis Haryana PPA. In fact, the Commission in

    para 73 (b) of the order dated 3.2.2016 in Petition

    No. 79/MP/2013 had observed as under:

    “73……

    (b) The additional cost incurred in a

    month due to shortage of linkage coal

    shall be computed on ex-bus scheduled

    energy and shall be pro-rated

    corresponding to the scheduled

    generation for Haryana Discoms as per

    methodology given in para 56 above."

    Therefore, in light of the allocation of firm as well

    as tapering linkage for all three beneficiaries and

    our order dated 3.2.2016 in Petition No.

    79/MP/2013, the firm and tapering linkage coal

    supplied to the Petitioner has to be apportioned on 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 42 of 57

    pro rata basis to all beneficiaries of the project and

    the cost of procurement of coal from alternate

    sources to meet the shortfall of firm and tapering

    linkage coal has also to be apportioned pro rata

    based on power supplied to these beneficiaries.

    Accordingly, the contention of Haryana Discoms

    to appropriate the coal supplied under firm

    linkage towards the capacity being supplied to

    them instead of pro-rata apportionment to all the

    beneficiaries is not correct. The order dated

    3.2.2016 has to be read in its entirety and HPPC

    is not correct to pick up an observation in para 48

    of the said order to claim that Its liability is limited

    to imported/open market coal for the shortage in

    firm linkage coal only. In our view, the Petitioner

    has correctly apportioned the linkage coal to

    Haryana Discoms proportionate to the capacity

    being supplied to them and has issued

    Supplementary Bills in accordance with the

    formula devised in order dated 3.2.2016 in

    Petition No. 79/MP/2013. Accordingly, we direct

    the respondents to pay the supplementary bills

    raised by the Petitioner for the period from July,

    2016 to March, 2017 along with late payment

    surcharge as per the provisions of the PPA within

    one month from the date of issue of the order.”

    33. The said order came to be challenged by the Haryana

    Utilities. However, at the instance of the learned APTEL, GRIDCO

    came to be impleaded as party respondent in the appeal filed by

    the Haryana Utilities. Subsequently, GRIDCO also filed its own

    appeal before the learned APTEL. It was sought to be contended 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 43 of 57

    on behalf of the Haryana Utilities that the order passed in Petition

    No. 105 was beyond the order dated 3rd February 2016. Rejecting

    the said contention, the learned APTEL by a well-reasoned

    judgment and order observed thus:

    “8.16 The Appellants contention that the Impugned

    Order has gone beyond Order dated 03.02.2016 is

    incorrect. It is evident from Paragraph 33 of the

    Impugned Order that CERC has merely reiterated its

    earlier Order and upheld the bills raised by GKEL in

    terms of Order dated 03.02.2016 in Petition No.

    79/MP/2013.

    Coal supply to Plant as whole and not Procurer

    Specific

    8.17 GKEL had quoted tariff for Haryana PPAs

    considering coal availability for the Project from

    linkage coal and its own Captive Coal blocks based

    on

    (a) SLC-LT approval dated 02.08.2007 for 500 MW;

    and

    (b) Ministry of Coal decision dated 06.11.2007 to

    allocate Rampia and Dip side Rampia coal blocks to

    GKEL.

    8.18 At the time of bid submission for Haryana, the

    SBD did not permit inclusion of different sources of

    coal - linkage, captive etc. Therefore, GKEL had cited

    linkage from CIL/MCL. Use of coal from the Captive

    Coal block was envisaged for the entire Plant as

    evident from the allocation letter dated 17.01.2008

    wherein GKEL share of coal reserves is 138 MT @ 4.6 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 44 of 57

    MT for 30 years to meet coal requirement of the

    Project as a whole.

    8.19 Coal supply was to the Project as a whole and

    not Procurer Specific is supported by:-

    (a) The SLC minutes dated 14.02.2012 clearly state

    that the tapering linkage coal of 2.384 MTPA is to be

    utilized for all three PPAs with GRIDCO, Haryana and

    Bihar Discoms.

    (b) Clause 4.2 of the FSA dated 26.03.2013 signed

    with MCL clearly states that:-

    "the total quantity of coal supplied pursuant

    to this Agreement is meant for use at Power

    Plant (3x350 MW), 500 MW under Normal

    Linkage (425 MW generation capacity

    covered under long term PPA)."

    8.20 It is submitted that LoA and FSA are for the

    station and never for a particular PPA as contended

    by the Appellants. Further, the Appellant's

    contention that the apportionment of coal (from firm

    linkage) is to be done proportionally between the

    Appellants (300 MW), GRIDCO (150 MW) and Bihar

    (29.55 MW) is erroneous. It is submitted that the enduse stated in these documents is for the Station/

    Plant. This was confirmed by MCL in terms of letter

    dated 02.05.2018 which stated that the Coal is

    released for the total PPA capacity and not bifurcated

    on the basis of individual PPAs.

    8.21 In terms of Clause 4.1 of the FSA, the ACQ shall

    be in proportion of the percentage generation covered

    under long term PPAs with Discoms. The relevant

    portion of Clause 4.1 is reproduced below:-

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 45 of 57

    "4.1.1... The ACQ shall be in proportion of the

    percentage of Generation covered under long

    term Power Purchase Agreements executed by

    the Purchaser with the DISCOMs either

    directly or through PTC(s) who has/ have

    signed the back to back long term PPA(s) with

    DISCOMS."

    It is only commencement of supply of coal which is

    linked to commencement of supply under the PPA.

    For example, if supply of power to Bihar commenced

    before Haryana, the ACQ would have been

    allocated/operationalized similarly.

    8.22 In view of the above, contention of Haryana that

    the tapering linkage granted in relation to coal block

    cannot be linked to 300 MW is wrong. In fact, the

    linkage coal/ coal block or tapering linkage are

    allocated for the station and to be utilized for all three

    PPAs. In fact, allocating coal under the FSA to

    Haryana Discoms to the exclusion of Bihar and

    GRIDCO will be contrary to the provisions of the FSA.

    8.23 As brought out above, the allocation of coal was

    for the Project as a whole and not Procurer/PPA wise.

    This is evident from the following:-

    (a) LOAs dated 25.07.2008 and 08.07.2009 were for

    the plant as a whole.

    (b) Allocation letter dated 17.01.2008 for the Captive

    Coal mine is for 4.6 MT which is sufficient for 1050

    MW, being the installed capacity of the Project.

    (c) Minutes of the SLC-LT dated 14.02.2012 note that

    the entire linkage (firm and tapering) is for all the 3

    PPAs.

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 46 of 57

    (d) Letter dated 02.05.2018 issued by Mahanadi

    Coalfields Limited ("MCL") states that CIL and its

    subsidiaries had allocated coal to the Project on prorata basis vis-à-vis the operational capacities and not

    on basis of procurers. The letter specifically states

    that "in case of multiple PPAs, coal is released to the

    IPPs considering the total PPA capacity and not

    bifurcated on the basis of individual PPAs". The

    aforesaid only confirms the provision of clause 4.1.1

    of the FSAs which also talks of allocation of coal on

    pro-rata basis to long term PPAs executed by the

    Discoms directly through PTC.

    8.24 If the Appellant's contention is upheld, it will

    lead to an anomalous situation wherein GRIDCO and

    Bihar Discoms will end up cross-subsidizing supply

    of power to Haryana Discoms. It is submitted that the

    Ld. Central Commission has rightly allowed pro-rata

    allocation of linkage and alternate coal so as to

    ensure that the impact is equally apportioned.

    8.25 Since the allocation is not PPA specific,

    allocation of coal to one procurer to the exclusion of

    others will be contrary to the terms of such allocation.

    8.26 Further, such action will also be contrary to

    Article 14 of the Constitution of India since it will

    result in equals being treated unequally.”

    34. It could thus be seen that the present appeal challenges the

    concurrent findings arrived at by the CERC on two different

    occasions and the learned APTEL in the impugned judgment. The

    perusal of the aforesaid judgment and orders would reveal that

    they are based upon interpretation of various documents and 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 47 of 57

    considering the following factual aspects with respect to fuel

    arrangements for the Project:

    (i) The original SLC-LT allocation dated 2nd August 2007

    for firm linkage was made prior to the Haryana PPA;

    (ii) Letter dated 6th November 2007 issued by Ministry of

    Coal intimating its decision to allocate Rampia and Dip

    Side Rampia coal blocks in Odisha to a consortium

    comprising of GKEL and five other allotees;

    (iii) Allocation letter dated 17th January 2008 for the captive

    coal mine is for 4.6 MT which is sufficient for 1050 MW,

    being the installed capacity of the Project; and

    (iv) SLC-LT minutes dated 14th February 2012 noted that

    the firm linkage capacity was intended for Odisha,

    Bihar and Haryana.

    35. It will also be relevant to refer to letter dated 7th February

    2022 issued by MCL in response to the clarification sought by

    GKEL on the letters dated 2nd May 2018 and 22nd June 2021 of

    MCL with regard to supply of coal to GKEL under FSA dated 26th

    February 2013. The relevant extracts of the said letter are as

    under:

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 48 of 57

    “As per the provision of FSA dated 26/03/2013, Annual

    Contracted Quantity (ACQ) under FSA is in proportion

    to the percentage of Generation covered under long

    term Power Purchase Agreement(s) executed by the

    Purchaser (IPP) with DISCOMs against the total LOA

    quantity. In case of multiple PPAs, coal is allocated/

    released as per the ACQ against the total PPA capacity

    and not segregated on the basis of any specific PPA. The

    same was clarified vide MCL's letter dated 02.05.2018.

    It is pertinent to mention that letter dated of

    22/06/2021 of MCL was issued to all concerned

    DISCOMs, with whom M/s GKEL has signed PPA, for

    the purpose of intimating the DISCOMs the quantum

    of coal procured by M/s GKEL under FSA from the

    sources of MCL to ensure proper utilization of coal. The

    said letter indicates the overall, quantity of coal

    supplied for all the PPAs.”

    36. As mentioned earlier, after deciding the common issues

    involved in a batch of electricity appeals in the case of MSEDCL

    (supra), this Court decided various individual matters involving

    additional issues. Another such matter was Uttar Haryana Bijli

    Vitran (supra). It would be pertinent to note that the Haryana

    Utilities had approached this Court challenging the concurrent

    judgment and order passed by learned APTEL dated 3rd November

    202032 and CERC dated 31st May 201833.

    32 2020 SCC OnLine APTEL 92

    33 2018 SCC OnLine CERC 411

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 49 of 57

    37. In the said proceedings Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd.34 had

    filed Petition No. 97/MP/201735 before the CERC pursuant to the

    orders passed by this court in Energy Watchdog (supra). The

    CERC vide order dated 31st May 2018 had allowed the said

    petition and directed the working out of the relief. It will be

    relevant to refer to the following paragraphs of the Uttar Haryana

    Bijli Vitran (supra):

    48. The grievance of Haryana Utilities is that the

    methodology for granting benefit on account of the

    change in law adopted by CERC and affirmed by the

    learned APTEL is contrary to the one which was

    previously arrived at in the earlier cases of GMR, DB

    Power, etc.

    49. Perusal of the order passed by the

    learned APTEL would reveal that AP(M)L had

    proposed a methodology based on the methodology

    approved by CERC in the GMR-Kamalanga Energy

    Ltd. v. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam

    Ltd. [GMR-Kamalanga Energy Ltd. v. Dakshin

    Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine

    CERC 43] considering the quoted tariff under the

    PPAs as the base.

    50. The learned APTEL had referred to the record of

    proceedings of CERC dated 10-8-2017, which read

    thus : (Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam case [Uttar

    Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power

    (Mundra) Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine APTEL 92] , SCC

    OnLine APTEL para 7.3)

    34 Hereinafter referred to as AP(M)L

    35 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Petition No. 97’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 50 of 57

    “7.3. … (a) … ‘3. In response to the

    Commission's query as to whether the

    methodology adopted by the petitioner in the

    light of the methodology given in GMR

    case [GMR-Kamalanga Energy

    Ltd. v. Dakshin Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam

    Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine CERC 43] is

    acceptable to Haryana Utilities, learned

    counsel replied in the positive.’ ”

    (emphasis in original)

    51. The learned APTEL had also referred to the order

    of CERC dated 28-9-2017 [Adani Power Ltd. v. Uttar

    Haryana Bijli Vitaran Nigam Ltd., 2017 SCC OnLine

    CERC 305] in IA No. 57 of 2017 in Petition No.

    97/MP/2017, which reads thus : (Uttar Haryana

    Bijli Vitran Nigam case [Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran

    Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd., 2020 SCC

    OnLine APTEL 92] , SCC OnLine APTEL para 7.3)

    “7.3. … (b) … ‘7. … Haryana Utilities who is

    the only respondent has not objected to the

    calculation made by the applicant.’ ”

     (emphasis in original)

    52. The learned APTEL had also referred to the order

    dated 3-12-2018 [Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam

    Ltd. v. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine

    CERC 237] passed by CERC in review petition

    bearing No. 24/RP/2018, which reads thus : (Uttar

    Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam case [Uttar Haryana Bijli

    Vitran Nigam Ltd. v. Adani Power (Mundra) Ltd.,

    2020 SCC OnLine APTEL 92] , SCC OnLine APTEL

    para 7.4)

    “7.4. … ‘25. … It is apparent from the above

    that the Commission, after due

    consideration of the submissions of the

    Adani Power and Prayas had consciously 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 51 of 57

    decided on the methodology for

    computation of relief due to shortage of

    domestic coal under change in law for the

    period from 1-4-2013 to 31-3-2017 in para

    46 of the impugned order [Adani Power

    (Mundra) Ltd. v. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran

    Nigam Ltd., 2018 SCC OnLine CERC 411]

    . The review petitioners had not suggested

    any methodology of calculation of the relief

    due to shortage of domestic coal. On the

    other hand, the review petitioners in their

    reply dated 28-7-2017 in Petition No.

    97/MP/2017 had stated that “the reliance

    to the decision of GMR is wholly

    inappropriate”. The review petitioners are

    now suggesting an alternative formula for

    computation of the relief under change in

    law. As already reiterated in the earlier part

    of the order, the review cannot be used for

    substitution of a view already taken with a

    new view. Therefore, the review on the

    ground is not maintainable.’ ”

    53. We find that Haryana Utilities are indulging into

    approbation and reprobation. They cannot be

    permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time.

    After accepting before CERC that they would adopt

    the methodology as given in GMR-Kamalanga

    Energy [GMR-Kamalanga Energy Ltd. v. Dakshin

    Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigam Ltd., 2016 SCC OnLine

    CERC 43] , it would not be appropriate, in our view,

    on the part of the appellants, which are, after all,

    instrumentalities of the State, to change its stand

    after final orders are passed by CERC.”

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 52 of 57

    38. It could thus clearly be seen that the learned APTEL had

    referred to the record of proceedings of the CERC dated 10th

    August 2017 wherein to the Commission’s query as to whether the

    methodology adopted by the petitioner in the light of the

    methodology given in GMR Kamalanga (supra) was acceptable to

    Haryana Utilities, learned counsel replied in the positive. The

    learned APTEL also referred to the order of the CERC dated 28th

    September 201736 in IA No. 57 of 2017 in Petition No. 97 wherein

    Haryana Utilities had not objected to the calculation made by the

    applicant. It could further be seen that the learned APTEL had also

    referred to the order dated 3rd December 201837 passed by the

    CERC in Review Petition No. 24/RP/2018 filed by the Haryana

    Utilities against the order dated 31st May 2018 of the CERC. The

    CERC in the said review petition referred to the affidavit filed by

    the Haryana Utilities stating that ‘the reliance to the decision of

    GMR is wholly inappropriate”. The learned APTEL, observing that

    the Review Petitioners are now suggesting an alternative formula

    for computation of the relief under change in law, rejected the

    review petition.

    36 (2017) SCC OnLine CERC 305

    37 (2018) SCC OnLine CERC 237

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 53 of 57

    39. This Court in Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran (supra) had

    observed that the Haryana Utilities are indulging in approbation

    and reprobation. It has been observed that they cannot be

    permitted to blow hot and cold at the same time. It has further

    been observed that after accepting before the CERC that they

    would adopt the methodology as given in GMR Kamalanga

    (supra), it would not be appropriate on the part of Haryana Utilities

    to change its stand after final orders were passed by the CERC.

    This Court had therefore dismissed the appeal of the Haryana

    Utilities observing that the interference would be warranted only if

    the concurrent findings have failed to take into consideration the

    mandatory statutory provisions or if the decision had been taken

    by them on extraneous consideration or that they were ex facie

    arbitrary and illegal. As a matter of fact, this Court in the said case

    had approved the methodology applied by the CERC and affirmed

    by the learned APTEL which was based on the decision of the

    CERC in the case of GMR Kamalanga (supra).

    40. In that view of the matter and considering the concurrent

    findings of fact by the CERC on two different occasions and the

    learned APTEL in impugned order and also taking into note of the

    communication dated 2nd February 2022 issued by MCL, we see 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 54 of 57

    no merit in the appeal of Haryana Utilities and the same is liable

    to be dismissed.

    Civil Appeal No. 3429 of 2020

    41. Insofar as the appeal by GRIDCO is concerned, the main

    contention of GRIDCO is that the order dated 3rd February 2016

    in Petition No. 79 and order dated 20th March 2018 in Petition No.

    105 were passed without impleading GRIDCO. It will be relevant

    to note that the PPA with GRIDCO is under Section 62 of the 2003

    Act whereas the PPAs with the Haryana Utilities and Bihar

    Utilities are under Section 63 of the 2003 Act. As such there was

    no occasion for GKEL to implead GRIDCO as a party to the said

    petitions.

    42. It is further to be noted that the petitions filed by GKEL

    before the CERC were filed seeking compensation on account of

    Change in Law events affecting Haryana and Bihar PPAs which

    were concluded by following provisions prescribed under Section

    63 of the 2003 Act. Section 63 of the 2003 Act provides for the

    determination of tariff by bidding process whereas under Section

    62, the tariff is determined on Cost Plus basis. It can thus be seen

    that proceedings under Sections 62 and 63 of the 2003 Act are

    entirely different. 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 55 of 57

    43. It is also relevant to note that GKEL had filed a petition being

    Petition No. 77/GT/201338 for approval of the tariff for supply of

    electricity to the GRIDCO. The CERC vide order dated 12th

    November 2015 had determined the tariff payable by the GRIDCO

    to GKEL for the period of 1st April 2013 to 1st March 2014. Being

    aggrieved by the said order, GRIDCO filed Appeal No. 45 of 2016

    before the learned APTEL. The learned APTEL vide judgment and

    order dated 1st August 2017 did not find any merit in the

    methodology adopted by CERC for determining the tariff. The

    learned APTEL found that the CERC had calculated ECR in

    accordance with the CERC (Terms and Conditions of Tariff)

    Regulations, 2009. The methodology adopted by the CERC for

    determining the tariff payable by GRIDCO to GKEL has been duly

    approved by the learned APTEL. In that view of the matter, we find

    that GRIDCO was neither a necessary nor a proper party to the

    proceedings initiated by GKEL by way of Petition Nos. 79 and 105.

    44. On merits, it is the contention of the GRIDCO that it was its

    PPA which was executed first on 28th September 2006 and was

    operationalized in April 2013. It is therefore contended that

    38 Hereinafter referred to as ‘Petition No. 77’

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 56 of 57

    GRIDCO has the first right over the firm linkage FSA dated 26th

    March 2013. GRIDCO further contended that allocation under

    SLC-LT meeting dated 2nd August 2007 and LOA dated 25th July

    2008 was against long term PPAs and the only PPA at that time

    was with GRIDCO, therefore, the firm linkage was for GRIDCO.

    While considering GRIDCO’s appeal, the learned APTEL found

    that the supply of coal from all modes of procurement has to be

    considered for the power plant as a whole and not for specific PPAs

    as prayed by the appellants.

    45. In the foregoing paragraphs, while considering the appeal of

    Haryana Utilities, we have already upheld the concurrent findings

    of the CERC and the learned APTEL that the coal supply from all

    the sources has to be apportioned amongst all the three DISCOMS

    in proportion to the energy supplied to them. None of the

    DISCOMS can claim a priority for supply of power based either on

    the prior date of agreement or the recital as to the source of coal.

    In view of the findings given by us while discussing the appeal of

    the Haryana DISCOMS, we find no merit in the present appeal as

    well. The same is therefore liable to be dismissed. 

     Civil Appeal No.1929 of 2020 etc. Page 57 of 57

    CONCLUSION

    46. In the result, we pass the following orders:

    I. Civil Appeal No. 1929 of 2020 filed by Haryana Utilities and

    Civil Appeal No. 3429 of 2020 filed by GRIDCO are dismissed

    sans merit; and

    II. The impugned judgment and order dated 20th December

    2019 passed by the Appellate Tribunal for Electricity, New

    Delhi in Appeal No. 135 of 2018 along with Appeal No. 54 of

    2019 is upheld.

    47. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

    ..…………..……………...CJI.

    (B.R.GAVAI)

    …….........…………………...J.

     (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

    NEW DELHI;

    SEPTEMBER 8, 2025

    Mere mention of “Tata Magic” in inquest panchnama or FIR was not sufficient without proof of its identity and insurance connection.


    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation – Burden of Proof – Involvement of offending vehicle – Delay in FIR – Evidence insufficient.

    The widow and children of the deceased (Dhanji Ram Marekar) sought compensation alleging that the deceased died in an accident involving a Tata Magic (MH-13-B-2719). The Tribunal awarded compensation of ₹15,77,000/- with 9% interest. The High Court set aside the award, holding that the involvement of the Tata Magic was not proved.

    On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the High Court’s decision.

    Held:

    1. In a motor accident claim, the initial burden lies on the claimants to prove the accident and involvement/identity of the offending vehicle, even if on a prima facie basis.

    2. A 26-day delay in lodging the FIR, absence of examination of crucial witnesses, inconsistencies in evidence, and lack of clear identification of the vehicle registration number created strong doubts.

    3. Mere mention of “Tata Magic” in inquest panchnama or FIR was not sufficient without proof of its identity and insurance connection.

    4. Claimants failed to discharge the burden; hence, the insurer’s liability could not be fastened.

    Result: Appeal dismissed. Tribunal’s award rightly set aside.2025 INSC 1077

    1

    Non-Reportable

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO.6794 of 2025

    VANITA & ORS. …APPELLANT(S)

    Versus

    M/S SHRIRAM INSURANCE COMPANY LTD.

    & ANR. …RESPONDENT(S)

    J U D G M E N T

    N.V. ANJARIA, J.

    Heard Mr. Dilip Annasaheb Taur, learned counsel

    appeared on behalf of the appellant and Ms. Meenakshi

    Midha, learned counsel appeared on behalf of the

    respondent-Insurance Company.

    2. The present appeal is directed against judgment of

    the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, Bench at

    Aurangabad dated 24.09.2019, whereby the High Court

    allowed the appeal of the respondent-insurance company

    holding that in the accident in question, the involvement

    of the offending vehicle-Tata Magic with registration 

    2

    number MH-13-B-2719 was not proved, therefore, the

    liability to compensate the claimants could not have been

    fastened on the insurance company. The appellantsherein are the original claimants.

    3. The claimants are the widow and children of

    deceased named Dhanji Ram Marekar who had

    approached the Motor Accident Claims Tribunal,

    Osmanabad (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Tribunal’)

    seeking compensation of Rs.10,00,000/- in respect of the

    accident, which took place on 27.05.2012 at about 6:00

    p.m. at Sholapur to Naldurg National Highway, when

    Dhanaji Ram Marekar was going to village Lohagaon on

    his motorcycle bearing registration number MH-13-U9013.

    3.1 The case of the claimant was that when the said

    deceased had reached near village Lohagaon, he was

    dashed, according to the claimant, by one Tata Magic

    bearing registration number MH-13-B-2719 which came

    with excessive speed from the opposite direction.

    Negligent driving was alleged against the driver of the

    said Tata Magic. 

    3

    3.2 The said Dhanji Ram Marekar sustained serious

    injuries and succumbed to death in the hospital. After

    applying relevant parameters to assess the

    compensation, the Tribunal, allowed M.A.C.P No.112 of

    2012 of the claimants as per its judgment and award dated

    06.01.2017, directed the insurance company to pay

    compensation of Rs.15,77,000/- with 9% interest.

    3.3 The insurance-company approached the High

    Court calling in question the Tribunal’s judgment and

    award and also questioning the liability to pay the

    compensation. In the written statement filed by

    respondent No.2-insurance company, the factum of

    accident was specifically denied. It was denied that Tata

    Magic bearing registration number MH-13-B-2719 was

    involved or that it is owned by respondent No.1 or that the

    same was insured with the insurer. The date, time and

    place of the accident were also denied.

    3.4 It was the case of the defence that a false offence

    was registered against the driver in collusion with the

    police. In view of the specific pleading and the defence of 

    4

    the insurance-company, one of the issues framed by the

    High Court was whether the claimants had proved the

    involvement of Tata Magic bearing registration number

    MH-13-B-2719 in the accident. The outcome of other

    issues raised as to whether there was breach of the

    insurance policy by respondent No.1 or whether the

    claimants were entitled to get the compensation from the

    respondents, were to depend upon the finding on the

    aspect of involvement of the offending vehicle Tata

    Magic.

    4. The claimants sought to contend that the finding

    of the High Court that the involvement of the Tata Magic

    was not proved, was a perverse finding. It was submitted

    that the factum of occurrence of the accident ought to

    have been accepted on the basis of the say of the

    witnesses including the witness Deepak Shendge.

    According to the learned counsel for the appellant, nonexamination of the witnesses named Mahesh Deshmukh

    and Laxman Kamble was not of much importance to

    conclude about the non-involvement of the offending

    vehicle. It was submitted that the High Court ought to 

    5

    have considered the issue about involvement of the

    vehicle on the footing of preponderance of probabilities.

    4.1 On the other hand, learned counsel for the

    respondents highlighted various circumstances set out

    by the High Court in its judgment to arrive at a conclusion

    that involvement of the offending vehicle in the accident

    was not proved and canvassed the correctness of the

    impugned judgment of the High Court.

    5. This Court considered the submissions asserted

    on behalf of the respective parties and carefully went

    through the findings recorded by the High Court in light

    of the evidence on record in relation to involvement of the

    vehicle Tata Magic with registration number MH-13-B2719.

    5.1 The High Court has inter alia rested on the

    following facts and circumstances to hold that the

    appellants-claimants were unable to prove the accident

    and death of Dhanji Ram Marekar by involvement of Tata

    Magic jeep. 

    6

    (i) The accident took place on 27.05.2011. The

    lodgement of the First Information Report (FIR) was only

    on 21.06.2011. In other words, there was a gap of 26 days

    between the date of the accident and lodging of the FIR.

    (ii) The FIR was lodged by brother of the deceased

    named Balaji. His explanation was least inspiring when he

    stated that since he was in a state of grief and his mental

    condition was not proper, he could not immediately

    lodge the FIR.

    (iii) Admittedly, the said informant Balaji was not

    examined by the claimants to elicit his evidence, for the

    reasons best known to the claimants.

    (iv) According to said Balaji, upon knowing about

    the occurrence of accident, he rushed to the hospital and

    knew that one Mahesh Deshmukh and one Laxman

    Kamble from his village had brought the deceased to the

    hospital.

    (v) Nor it is the case that the vehicle number of Tata

    Magic was provided to the informant Balaji at any specific

    point of time by either the deceased victim or the persons

    who brought the victim to the hospital. 

    7

    (vi) The said Mahesh Deshmukh was also kept out of

    witness box. Nor Laxman Kamble was examined. The said

    Mahesh Deshmukh was one of the Panchas to the inquest

    Panchnama but did not inform anything to the police to

    incorporate the vehicle number of Tata Magic.

    (vii) Nothing was recorded about the identity of the

    Tata Magic in the inquest Panchnama which could have

    been done by the said Mahesh Deshmukh who claimed to

    be an eye-witness. Nor Mahesh Deshmukh was

    examined.

    (viii) CW2 suggested that Laxman Kamble

    intercepted the jeep Tata Magic and one Mahesh

    Deshmukh had come in a bus which was going from

    Sholapour to Naldurg and that they had taken Dhanji Ram

    Marekar to the hospital. While they gave the motorcycle

    number, the Tata Magic registration number was never

    provided.

    (ix) One Deepak Lokhande (CW2) was examined to

    be projected as eye-witness. In his evidence it was

    claimed by him that he knew the Tata Magic number, yet

    he did not provide the same at any point of time. 

    8

    He conceded that though he witnessed the accident and

    noted the registration number of the offending vehicle; he

    never informed the police or even gave a statement

    under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure,

    1973.

    (x) In the inquest Panchnama prepared on

    28.05.2011, it was stated that the deceased died when hit

    by the Tata Magic but did not mention the registration

    number of the Tata Magic.

    (xi) Mere indicating the offending vehicle to be ‘Tata

    Magic’ was not sufficient. The identity of the offending

    vehicle with particular registration number was required

    to be proved.

    5.2 Following further aspects deserves to be

    highlighted which go to show that there was a dearth of

    evidence to prove the involvement of the offending

    vehicle as alleged.

    (a) The appellant-Vanita (CW1), widow of the

    deceased was admittedly not with the deceased at the

    time of the accident, therefore, her evidence has nothing 

    9

    to contribute to suggest or establish the identity of the

    offending vehicle.

    (b) The accident took place on 27.05.2011 in the

    evening at about 6:00 p.m. It was summer season,

    therefore, the evening was sufficiently bright with

    daylight.

    (c) It was possible to sight the identity of the Tata

    Magic, claimed to have been involved in the accident and

    its registration number. However, none of the alleged

    eye-witnesses gave such number in their statements.

    (d) The Investigating Officer was not examined by

    the claimants. The inquest Panchnama was prepared only

    on 28.05.2011.

    (e) It is not comprehensible as to why the police

    waited for some relative to lodge the report of the

    incident and did not do anything for 25 days. Even eyewitnesses did not approach before 21.06.2011.

    5.3 All the above evidence, circumstances and

    considerations reinforce that the factum of involvement of

    the offending vehicle as claimed and asserted by the

    claimants was not proved. The claimants failed to 

    10

    discharge their obligation on this count which was to be

    the primary step. Given the above strong evidentiary

    considerations, even on the principle of the

    preponderance of probabilities, the involvement of Tata

    Magic vehicle with registration number MH-13-B-2719

    could not be concluded and was not established.

    5.4 It was correct on the part of the High Court to

    conclude that mere mentioning of Tata Magic by name in

    the inquest Panchnama or in the FIR would not be

    sufficient to hold that it was the same Tata Magic

    belonging to respondent No.1 and insured with

    respondent No.2 in absence of its clear identification.

    6. It is a settled position of law that in a motor- accident

    claim petition, the initial burden to prove the factum of

    accident and involvement of offending vehicle lie on the

    claimants. It is the claimants who have to discharge this

    primary burden by establishing the occurrence of the

    accident and the involvement as well as identity of the

    vehicle at least on prima facie basis. Only then the onus to

    disprove shifts to the other side. 

    11

    6.1 The High Court, thus, in holding that the

    claimant had failed to prove the involvement of the Tata

    Magic in the accident or that it was owned by respondent

    No.1 or that the same was insured with respondent No.2

    committed no error. It has to be held that the liability of

    payment of compensation could not be fastened on the

    respondent-insurance company. The setting aside of the

    judgment and award passed by the Tribunal was justified.

    7. The appeal stands dismissed.

    In view of dismissal of the main appeal as

    above, all pending interlocutory applications would not

    survive and are accordingly disposed of.

    ………………………………….., J.

    [ K. VINOD CHANDRAN ]

    ………………………………….., J.

    [ N.V. ANJARIA ]

    NEW DELHI;

    SEPTEMBER 04, 2025.

    (VK)

    Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation for Death – Proximate Cause – For a claim of death compensation, there must be clear evidence establishing a proximate causal link between the injuries sustained in the accident and the eventual death. Mere temporal proximity between accident and death is insufficient.


  • Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 – Compensation for Death – Proximate Cause – For a claim of death compensation, there must be clear evidence establishing a proximate causal link between the injuries sustained in the accident and the eventual death. Mere temporal proximity between accident and death is insufficient.

  • Medical Evidence – Importance of Post-Mortem – In absence of post-mortem, cause of death cannot be conclusively ascertained. Mere reliance on a treating doctor’s certificate, especially when the deceased had pre-existing conditions (diabetes, hypertension, high cholesterol, cardiac strain), cannot establish accident as direct cause of death.

  • Injuries Not Serious in Nature – Where the injuries suffered in the accident were comparatively minor and the death occurred months later during/after a surgical procedure for a non-healing ulcer, the nexus between accident injuries and death is not proved.

  • Bed Rest Argument – Rejected – Contention that long bed rest following accident could have caused pulmonary embolism/myocardial infarction was rejected, there being no clear medical advice or evidence of prolonged immobility.

  • Scope of Compensation – Tribunal’s award for death based on presumption set aside; High Court’s restriction of claim to injury compensation upheld.

  • Appeal Dismissed – Supreme Court refused to interfere with the High Court’s judgment; no compensation payable for death as accident not shown to be proximate cause.

  • 2025 INSC 1075

    Page 1 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    Non-Reportable

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    Haseena & Ors.

    ….Appellant(s)

    Versus

    The United India Insurance Co. Ltd. & Anr.

    .... Respondent(s)

    J U D G E M E N T

    K. VINOD CHANDRAN, J.

    1. The claimants before the Motor Accident Claims

    Tribunal1 were the wife, minor child and the mother of an

    Excise Guard, who died, allegedly as a result of a motor

    vehicle accident. The accident occurred on 29.04.2006 when

    the motorcycle driven by the deceased collided with

    another motorcycle, owned and driven by the fourth

    respondent. The accident occurred at about 9 am and the

    injured victim was taken to a nearby hospital for treatment.

    1

    for short, ‘the Tribunal’

    Page 2 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    The victim was treated as an inpatient from 29.04.2006 till

    03.05.2006 and discharged. The injuries suffered by him

    were compound fracture of second, third and fourth

    metatarsals of right foot and a simple fracture of the

    proximal phalanx of left little finger. He also sustained a

    wound at the fracture site.

    2. After getting discharged, the treatment continued as

    an outpatient till 12.08.2006, subsequent to which he was

    referred to a higher medical centre for plastic surgery

    consultation. On 18.09.2006, the victim was admitted to the

    higher medical centre with a non-healing ulcer on the right

    foot. The victim was advised to undergo a surgery after

    which he abruptly died. The cause of death was pulmonary

    embolism/acute myocardial infarction. The death occurred

    on 18.09.2006, almost five months after the date of the

    accident. The Tribunal found the death to be a direct

    consequence of the accident which finding was overturned

    by the High Court. The appeal is by the claimants against

    the judgment of the High Court. 

    Page 3 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    3. The factum of the accident and the death is

    undisputed. The controversy arose insofar as the death

    occurred after five months; whether the accident was a

    direct causation of the death. The High Court has

    elaborately considered the evidence of PW-1, the plastic

    surgeon who carried out the surgical procedure and found

    the death to be not a direct cause of the accident.

    4. We first looked at the order of the Tribunal which was

    specifically emphasised by Mr. Shaji P. Chaly, learned

    Senior Counsel appearing for the appellant. The Tribunal

    found merit in the submissions of the claimants that the nonhealing ulcer on the right foot was consequent to the injuries

    sustained by the victim in the motor accident. The Tribunal

    also observed that the injuries sustained by the deceased

    victim were not so serious and though the deceased had

    undergone grafting of skin in the local hospital on two

    occasions, the injuries did not heal which prompted the

    reference to a higher centre for plastic surgery consultation;

    the local hospital having found themselves unable to further 

    Page 4 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    manage the medical condition. The surgery was carried out

    at the higher medical centre and the patient was shifted to

    post operative ward at 12:50 pm on 21.09.2006 but at 04:45

    pm he developed sudden breathlessness and restlessness.

    Exhibit A-1, the certificate issued by the plastic surgeon,

    who was examined as PW-1 clearly reported the cause of

    death as pulmonary embolism/acute myocardial infarction.

    5. PW-1 affirmed Exhibit A-1 and the Tribunal found that

    the proximity of the accident in which the injuries were

    sustained, with the death, clearly showed the nexus

    between the accident and the death. It was also found that

    the cross-examination of PW-1 did not elicit any contra

    indication and there was neither any heart complaint nor

    hypertension or diabetics. It was hence the Tribunal found

    the death to be a direct result of the injuries sustained in the

    accident.

    6. The High Court by the impugned judgment

    elaborately considered the evidence of PW-1. PW-1 while

    affirming Exhibit A-1 certificate, deposed that the surgery 

    Page 5 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    was conducted by reason of the non-healing ulcer and the

    skin grafting was done on 21.09.2006 under spinal

    anaesthesia. The patient was shifted to the ward at 12:50 pm

    after which he becomes breathless and restless and

    eventually succumbed at 04:45 pm on the same day. The

    cause of death was stated to be as seen from Exhibit A-1.

    7. In chief examination, he also stated that due to the

    injuries sustained in the accident and continued treatment,

    pulmonary embolism/acute myocardial infarction can be

    caused if the patient continues bed rest for long. In cross

    examination, PW-1 deposed on the injuries caused by the

    accident, as has been mentioned above, which by itself are

    not serious in nature; even according to PW1. In cross

    examination, PW-1 admitted with reference to Exhibit A-9

    that the victim had a history of mild blood pressure and

    diabetics. Though, no cardiology check-up was held before

    surgery, and no heart complaint was detected, cholesterol

    was found at a high level in the preoperative tests.

    Hypertrophy with strain pattern as detected in the patient 

    Page 6 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    was deposed to be a symptom of cardiac complaint. It also

    came out in the deposition of PW-1 that postmortem was not

    conducted on the deceased since his family objected to it.

    PW1 also deposed that if postmortem had been done, the

    cause of death could have been ascertained. It was also

    clarified that in a patient, with the test results of the nature

    seen from Exhibit A-9, chances of a heart attack will be

    more. The mere response to the suggestions made, as to the

    injuries in the accident could have also resulted in

    myocardial infarction, cannot be taken as a conclusive proof

    of the death having been caused by reason of the injuries

    suffered in the accident.

    8. Even according to PW-2, the wife of the deceased, the

    victim had suffered three injuries on the right leg, a wound

    and a fracture on the ring finger which was followed by skin

    grafting at the local hospital and a surgical procedure by the

    plastic surgeon attached to the higher medical centre and

    then her husband succumbed to death. PW-2 asserted that

    there was no advise of a postmortem examination and that 

    Page 7 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    her husband had no ailments, but, the non-healing ulcer

    caused by the injuries in the accident. We cannot but

    observe that the statement of PW-2 regarding the health

    condition of her husband runs contrary to the expert opinion

    given by the Doctor who was examined by the claimants

    themselves as PW-1.

    9. The High Court has elaborately considered the

    arguments raised on behalf of the claimants regarding the

    cause of acute myocardial infarction. The contention that

    such a condition could occur due to a long bed rest, as

    deposed by the Doctor PW-1 also was negatived on the

    ground that there is no clear evidence as to such a bed rest

    having been advised for the patient. Admittedly, the

    inpatient treatment was only between 29.04.2006 and

    03.05.2006 and after that the victim was stated to have

    undergone outpatient treatment till 12.08.2006. Though, it

    has been contended that on discharge he was advised bed

    rest, there is no specific period of bed rest spoken of by the

    witness or substantiated by documentary evidence. 

    Page 8 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    Admittedly, there was a non-healing ulcer on the right foot

    which did not respond to the treatment at the local hospital

    which prompted the reference to a higher medical centre. It

    was at the higher medical centre that the death occurred

    after a successful skin grafting procedure. The death could

    very well have been the after effect of the surgery, given the

    medical parameters of the patient. It cannot have any direct

    nexus to the accident which was not conclusively

    established; the expert medical opinion being otherwise.

    10. The injuries suffered in the accident, as deposed by

    PW-1, the Doctor and found by the Tribunal were not very

    serious. The non-healing ulcer could have been for various

    causes, especially when the victim was known to be a

    diabetic, which necessitated the skin grafting procedure.

    The procedure also was carried out successfully but in the

    aftermath of the surgery, the patient succumbed to death.

    11. Merely by reason of the proximity of the accident and

    the death or the possibility of acute myocardial infarction

    occurring for reason of a long bed rest, it cannot be 

    Page 9 of 9

    Civil Appeal No. 6621 of 2025

    assumed, without clear evidence to substantiate the death

    having been caused as a result of the injuries sustained in

    the accident that the death occurred by reason of the

    accident. There cannot be found even a preponderance of

    probability, going by the Doctor’s evidence. We cannot

    interfere with the well-considered judgment of the High

    Court, which though rejected the claim for compensation for

    death, considered the claim for injuries sustained. We are

    unable to interfere with the findings of the High Court.

    12. The appeal stands dismissed.

    13. Pending application, if any, shall stand disposed of.

    ….………….……………………. J.

     (K. VINOD CHANDRAN)

    ...……….………………………..J.

     (N.V. ANJARIA)

    New Delhi;

    September 04, 2025.

    Tender — Bid Disqualification — Clause 5(D), NIT (Past Experience Criteria) — Whether non-furnishing of JV agreement warranted rejection of bid. Clause 5(D) allowed bidders to rely on past experience of a consortium/JV proportionate to their share, provided the share was defined in the JV agreement. Appellant submitted a work execution certificate from MSMC showing it had a 45% share in Hind Maha Mineral LLP and executed similar works. Tender Evaluation Committee rejected the bid for non-furnishing of the JV agreement. High Court upheld disqualification and further held that appellant would anyway be ineligible under Clause 5(B) (washery capacity committed to MSMC).


    Tender — Bid Disqualification — Clause 5(D), NIT (Past Experience Criteria) — Whether non-furnishing of JV agreement warranted rejection of bid.
    Clause 5(D) allowed bidders to rely on past experience of a consortium/JV proportionate to their share, provided the share was defined in the JV agreement. Appellant submitted a work execution certificate from MSMC showing it had a 45% share in Hind Maha Mineral LLP and executed similar works. Tender Evaluation Committee rejected the bid for non-furnishing of the JV agreement. High Court upheld disqualification and further held that appellant would anyway be ineligible under Clause 5(B) (washery capacity committed to MSMC).

    Held (Supreme Court):

    • Clause 5(D) did not expressly mandate submission of the JV agreement; submission of the MSMC certificate showing appellant’s share sufficed.

    • NIT conditions must be clear and unambiguous; if production of JV agreement was mandatory, it should have been explicitly provided.

    • Respondent authority could have verified or called for JV agreement under Clause 8.8 (power to seek additional information).

    • Appellant did not act with mala fide intention; suppression not established.

    • High Court erred in going beyond the Committee’s reasons by invoking Clause 5(B) on washery capacity; this was raised for the first time in written submissions of 2nd respondent.

    • Issue of washery capacity is contentious and must be reconsidered by High Court.

    Result:
    Impugned judgment set aside. Disqualification under Clause 5(D) quashed. Matter remanded to High Court to decide afresh on Clause 5(B) (spare washery capacity) and validity of work order awarded to 2nd respondent. Appeal partly allowed.

    2025 INSC 1085

    Page 1 of 19

    Reportable

    IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

    CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NO. of 2025

    (Arising out of SLP (C) No.1940/2025)

    Maha Mineral Mining & Benefication

    Pvt. Ltd. … Appellant (s)

    Versus

    Madhya Pradesh Power Generating

    Co. Ltd. & Anr. … Respondent(s)


    J U D G M E N T


    1. Leave granted.

    Factual Matrix

    2. In response to Notice Inviting Tender1 dated 17.05.2024, issued

    by the 1st respondent for the purpose of run-of-mine (ROM) coal

    beneficiation and managing logistics from Western Coalfields

    Ltd.2 (Nagpur area) sources for Shree Singaji Thermal Power

    Project, Khandwa (Madhya Pradesh), the appellant and two

    1 ID 2024_MPPGC_341576_1, hereinafter referred to as “NIT”.

    2 Hereinafter “WCL”.

    Page 2 of 19

    others, namely the 2nd respondent3 and one M/s NN Global

    Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. had submitted their bid.

    3. As NN Global Mercantile Pvt. Ltd. could not furnish earnest

    money deposit, only the appellant and the 2nd respondent

    remained in the fray. On 04.07.2024, the Tender Evaluation

    Committee4 while referring to Clause 5(D)5 of the NIT rejected

    the appellant’s technical bid holding as follows –

    “As per Clause No. 5(D) “Past experience criteria” of NIT,

    bidder is allowed to use past experience of their previous

    Consortium or JV (proportionate to its share in that

    consortium if defined in the Consortium Agreement,

    3 Rukhmai Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd.

    4 Hereinafter referred to as “The Committee”.

    5 Clause 5(D): “Past Experience: Copies of successfully executed orders (including part

    executed) in the name of bidder for same or similar work {similar work means coal lifting

    from mines of CIL subsidiaries or SCCL area, coal beneficiation (through wet process),

    movement of washed coal by road from washery to railway siding and movement of

    washed coal through Railways with experience in liaisoning with Railways/ CIL

    subsidiaries or SCCL area, i.e., arranging rakes, dispatches coal from own or leased

    Private siding or Goods shed Railways siding by loading of washed coal into railway

    wagons through own arrangement with monitoring the rake movement etc. up to the

    destination Power house}. Bidder is allowed to use past experience of their previous

    Consortium or JV (proportionate to its share in that consortium if defined in the

    Consortium Agreement, otherwise, lead partner if not defined in the Consortium)

    to meet out the past experience criteria of the tender. The order copies should

    indicate the above w/ork for 4 Lakh MT (4,00,000 MT) quantity or more in stale Owned

    Power Generating Companies or Other Captive Power Utilities of PSU or NTPC or Govt.

    Industries / Departments or Semi Govt. Industries / Departments or PSUs or Nodal

    Agency of any PSUs in India executed in last five years ending with initial date of opening

    of bid are to be uploaded. This order execution should be within a period of twelve (12)

    months. It may be through single or multiple orders (in parallel), but in case of multiple

    orders; these should be within a single span of time period of twelve (12) months.

    1. The work execution certificate by the customers along-with self-attested

    un-priced copies of aforesaid work order(s) should be submitted.

    2. For Past performance certificates - If worked with MPEB/ MPSEB/ MPPGCL in past

    for similar work, then it is mandatory to provide Satisfactory Performance Certificate for

    the same. Failing this, the offer shall not be considered.” (emphasis supplied)

    Page 3 of 19

    otherwise, lead partner if not defined in the Consortium)

    to meet out the past experience criteria of the tender.

    The firm has used the credentials of their consortium M/s

    Hind-Maha-Mineral LLP for meeting out the past

    experience criteria. However, Agreement of the

    Consortium/JV is not submitted to substantiate the share

    of the bidder in that consortium. Bidder is disqualified

    due to non-submission of credentials as per Clause No.

    (5)D of the NIT.”

    4. Appellant challenged the decision of the Committee before the

    High Court of Madhya Pradesh.

    6 Appellant contended neither

    Clause 5(D) nor any terms of the NIT expressly required a bidder

    who was relying on past-experience of a previous consortium or

    joint venture7 to produce the JV agreement itself to demonstrate

    its proportionate share in the consortium. In terms of Clause

    5(D) it had submitted a work execution certificate from

    Maharashtra State Mining Corporation8 which inter alia stated

    that the appellant was 45% Joint Venture/Consortium Partner

    of M/s. Hind Maha Mineral LLP vide the JV agreement dated

    02.12.2019 and had executed similar work in respect of WCL

    command for the period 05.03.2021 to 05.03.2024. It was

    6 Writ Petition No. 18286/2024.

    7 Hereinafter referred to as “JV”.

    8 Hereinafter referred to as “MSMC”.

    Page 4 of 19

    further clarified the JV agreement had been submitted before

    MSMC.

    5. In case of doubt, 1st respondent could have verified the

    correctness of the certificate from MSMC or called upon the

    appellant to furnish the JV agreement. On the contrary, the 1st

    respondent arbitrarily rejected the technical bid on the ground

    the JV agreement had not been furnished.

    6. 1st respondent contradicted such stance and contended in the

    event any bidder was seeking to rely on past-experience of a

    previous consortium/JV, submission of the JV agreement was

    implicit in Clause 5(D) of the NIT. Further, Clause 8.1 provided

    that if the bidder did not submit the desired documents as per

    NIT at the time of submission of the bid, he shall not be allowed

    to submit documents subsequently and its bid is liable to be

    rejected on account of incomplete documents. Clause 8.1 of the

    NIT unequivocally states that –

    “Instructions regarding shortfall documents:-

    (i) The bidders not submitting all the desired

    documents as per NIT/Tender Document at the

    time of submitting bids, shall not be allowed to

    submit documents subsequently and their bids

    shall be rejected on account of incomplete

    documents. Thus, no "shortfall window" for 

    Page 5 of 19

    submission of shortfall documents shall be

    created by MPPGCL in the e-tender.

    (ii) Accordingly, Clause No. 1.15 (VII) "Verification of

    credentials/PQR" of the Standard Bid Document (SBD)

    so far as it relates to "Shortfall of document" window

    shall not be applicable.

    (iii)Any condition elsewhere mentioned in the

    NIT/Tender Document for submission of Shortfall

    Document shall not be applicable.

    (iv) However, techno-commercial clarifications (if

    required) shall be obtained through e-mail/physical

    form from the bidders” (emphasis supplied)

    The said clause is further fortified by circular no. F3/25/2015/13/109 issued by the Government of Madhya

    Pradesh on 29.11.2023.

    7. Appellant was fully aware of the requirement to furnish the JV

    agreement to demonstrate its proportionate share in the

    consortium in order to rely on the past-experience of such

    previous consortium/JV. In fact after the closing date, by email

    dated 05.07.2024, the appellant purportedly submitted a JV

    9 Circular dated 29.11.2023: “It has come to the notice of the department that bidders are

    being allowed to participate in the bid process with incomplete documents. Bidders are

    allowed to submit the balance documents in due course of time and meanwhile some of

    the bidders back out of the bidding process, allowing a few number of bidders to

    participate in the bidding process and quote non-competitive rates which results in

    financial loss to the Power Companies. It has therefore been decided that bidders not

    submitting all the desired documents as per NIT/Tender document at the time of

    submitting bids, should not be allowed to submit documents subsequently and

    their bids should be rejected on account of incomplete documents. If required, even

    fresh bid can be called to get competitive rates.

    As directed, it is request to please ensure the bidding process to make it more transparent

    and fair.” (emphasis supplied)

    Page 6 of 19

    agreement dated 06.09.2019, which however did not

    correspond to the JV agreement dated 02.12.2019 referred to in

    the certificate issued by the MSMC. Be that as it may, such

    subsequent submission of document was impermissible as per

    Clause 8.1 of the NIT read with circular dated 29.11.2023 and

    the technical bid was rightly rejected for submission of

    incomplete document.

    8. During the pendency of the writ petition, 2nd respondent was

    declared as the successful bidder and was impleaded in the

    proceedings. During hearing, the JV agreement dated

    02.12.2019 was placed on record. Written submissions were

    also submitted on behalf of the parties.

    Findings of the High Court

    9. By the impugned judgement and order, the High Court upheld

    the decision of the Committee holding as follows:-

    “22. Due to non-filing of Joint Venture agreement by the

    Petitioner, the Impugned Order rejecting the bid of the

    petitioner has to be seen wherein at the outset it has been

    stated that your bid for the above tender has been

    rejected during Technical evaluation by the duly

    constituted committee for the reason Bidder is

    disqualified due to non submission of credentials as per

    Clause No. (5)D of the NIT.” It is evident that the Petitioner

    has not filed the Joint Venture agreement. The Petitioner

    is disqualified for the reason of non compliance with the 

    Page 7 of 19

    requirements in terms of Clause (5)D. The reason is also

    assigned by the Respondent No.1 in their reply as to why

    the petitioner was disqualified. If the petitioner is relying

    on the Joint Venture Agreement dated 02.12.2019 then it

    was the duty of Petitioner to file the same while

    submitting the bid. The NIT condition no. (8)1(i) and

    (8)(1)(iii), specifically prohibit the submission of the

    document/shortfall document at a later stage. As per the

    NIT conditions, a bidder is supposed to upload all the

    requisite documents at the time of submission of the bid.

    It is evident that the earlier practice of allowing bidders to

    fulfil the shortfall in documents left a scope for unfair

    practices in the bidding process and therefore, the said

    practice of allowing documents at a later stage has been

    discontinued in view of the past experience, as is evident

    from the letter 29.11.2023 of the GoMP, Energy

    Department. The Petitioner in the present case relied

    on the experience certificate issued by the

    Maharashtra State Mining Corporation dated

    14.06.2024 wherein date of the Joint Venture

    agreement is mentioned as 02.12.2019. However,

    surprisingly the Petitioner neither filed the said

    document of JV on record at the time of submission

    of bid nor at the time of filing of the petition. Even

    the document of JV agreement, which the Petitioner

    has filed along with the Email sent to Respondent

    No.1, is dated September, 2019 and not

    02.12.2019. The Petitioner has not filed the said JV

    Agreement from its own. It is apparent that there is

    a suppression of the JV Agreement dated

    02.12.2019 by the Petitioner and hence, on this

    count of concealment of JV agreement dated

    02.12.2019 the instant petition fails. The Petitioner

    has not given any satisfactory response in the petition or

    even otherwise for not submitting the document in

    alternate. Thus, the Petitioner cannot put forward its

    claim before demonstrating its bonafides that could have

    been done by duly submitting all the documents and by

    not engaging in active suppression and

    concealment…….” (emphasis supplied)

    Page 8 of 19

    10. Thereafter, referring to the written submissions made by the 2nd

    respondent in light of Clauses 3.12, 3.13 and 8.5 of the JV

    agreement, the Bench further held:-

    “24. The additional submissions of the Respondent No.2

    have force and it is evident that in any case, even if the

    above-mentioned documents were provided by the

    Petitioner would have been disqualified as its

    washeries had been committed to Maharashtra

    State Mining Corporation Ltd. alone in terms with

    the Joint Venture Agreement dated 02.12.2019.

    Even the experience Certificate issued by Maharashtra

    State Mining Corporation Ltd. to the Petitioner

    categorically mentions the Joint Venture Agreement dated

    02.12.2019.” (emphasis supplied)

    11. In view of the aforesaid findings, the Division Bench dismissed

    the writ petition, giving rise to the present appeal.

    12. Heard Mr. Narender Hooda, learned senior counsel for the

    appellant, Mr. Bijender Chahar, learned senior counsel for 1st

    respondent, and Mr. Shyam Divan and Mr. Balbir Singh,

    learned senior counsel for 2nd respondent.

    Analysis

    13. It appears the High Court had not only upheld the

    disqualification of the appellant by the Tender Evaluation

    Committee for non-compliance of Clause 5(D) of the NIT but also

    went a step further and held, even if the JV agreement had been 

    Page 9 of 19

    submitted, the appellant would have stood disqualified since its

    washeries had been exclusively committed to MSMC.

    (I) Appellant’s disqualification under Clause 5(D) of the NIT

    14. First, let us consider whether the decision of the High Court to

    uphold the appellant’s disqualification under Clause 5(D) for

    not furnishing JV agreement is justified or not?

    15. Clause 5(D) of the NIT required the bidders to furnish

    documents relating to past-experience in similar work. The

    clause further provided that “bidder is allowed to use past

    experience of their previous Consortium or JV (proportionate to its

    share in that consortium if defined in the Consortium Agreement,

    otherwise, lead partner if not defined in the Consortium) to meet

    out the past experience criteria of the tender.” Sub-clause 1 and

    2 of the said clause stated the following documents are to be

    submitted:-

    “1. The work execution certificate by the customers

    along-with self-attested un-priced copies of aforesaid

    work order(s) should be submitted.

    2. For Past performance certificates - If worked with

    MPEB/ MPSEB/ MPPGCL in past for similar work, then it

    is mandatory to provide Satisfactory Performance

    Certificate for the same. Failing this, the offer shall not be

    considered.” (emphasis supplied)

    Page 10 of 19

    Appellants had submitted a work execution certificate from

    MSMC along with its bid to support its past-experience as a 45%

    proportionate member of a consortium/JV for similar work

    executed at WCL in the last five years. The relevant portion of

    the certificate reads as follows:-

    “……this is to certify that as part of the aforementioned

    contract agreement, M/s Maha Mineral Mining &

    Beneficiation Private Limited being the 45% Joint

    Venture/Consortium Partner of M/s. Hind Maha

    Mineral LLP vide the JV agreement dated

    02.12.2019 (submitted to this office by M/s Hind Maha

    Mineral LLP) has executed the said work in respect of

    WCL command for the period 05.03.2021 to 05.03.2024.

    The details are as follows:

    a. Quantity of RoM Coal Lifted: 1,41,55,130.40 MT

    b. Quantity of RoM coal washed: 1,17,95,440.46 MT

    c. Quantity of washed coal supplied to Mahagenco

    TPSs: 1,17,47,501.99 MT

    d. Approximate value of the work executed: Rs. 465

    crores.” (emphasis supplied)

    16. The aforesaid certificate clearly demonstrates that the appellant

    had 45% share in a JV consortium namely M/s Hind Maha

    Mineral LLP and had successfully executed work of similar

    nature as required by Clause 5(D) of the NIT.

    17. The Committee refused to rely on such certificate holding as

    follows :-

    “(v) As per tender condition no documents other than

    Consortium/JV Agreement can be permitted to meet out 

    Page 11 of 19

    the above criteria as per the NIT. Thus, the certificate

    submitted by M/s Maha Mineral Mining and Benefication

    Private Limited cannot be considered as valid document

    for the same.”

    18. Though the submission of a JV agreement has not been

    expressly stated in the aforesaid clause, the respondents argue

    that the proportionate share of a bidder in a consortium/JV can

    only be established through production of the JV agreement

    itself and the words used in the contract/tender document

    must be read in a purposive manner so that no part of the

    document is rendered superfluous. Respondents further

    contend appellant had submitted its bid on the last day and it

    was open to the appellant during the previous calls to seek

    clarification whether submission of JV agreement was

    mandatory. Appellant did not do so and intentionally

    suppressed the JV agreement while submitting its bid to avoid

    disclosure of inconvenient clauses in the JV agreement. This is

    evident from the appellant’s conduct as it had after submission

    of bid, emailed a purported JV agreement dated 06.09.2019,

    whereas the JV agreement mentioned in the certificate was a

    different one. Be that as it may, the subsequent submission of 

    Page 12 of 19

    a JV agreement could not have been considered in light of

    Clause 8.1 read with circular dated 29.11.2023.

    19. We are unable to accept such arguments for the following

    reasons:-

    (i) Clause 5(D) merely states the appellant would be entitled

    to use the past-experience of a previous consortium/JV in

    the event its proportionate share is defined in the JV

    agreement failing which the past-experience shall be

    attributed to the lead partner. The clause does not

    mandate the submission of the JV agreement itself to

    satisfy such criteria. Appellant had relied on the work

    execution certificate issued by MSMC which in no

    uncertain terms states the appellant had 45% share in the

    JV consortium named M/s Hind Maha Mineral LLP and

    successfully executed similar work of a volume larger than

    required under the clause. The certificate also mentioned

    the JV agreement had been submitted and was in the

    custody of MSMC.

    (ii) It is nobody’s case that the 1st respondent had doubted the

    authenticity of the certificate but had disqualified the 

    Page 13 of 19

    appellant on the ground that Clause 5(D) mandated

    furnishing of the JV agreement alone and nothing else to

    prove proportionate share in a previous JV in order to use

    such experience.

    (iii) Conditions in a NIT must be clear and unambiguous. In

    the event the tendering authority insisted on furnishing of

    the JV agreement alone and no other document as proof of

    the proportionate share of the bidder to avail previous JV

    experience as prior qualification, it should have been spelt

    out clearly in the NIT. Having not done so, the 1st

    respondent cannot thrust the responsibility on the

    appellant to seek clarification and submit such document.

    As Clause 5(D) does not require submission of JV

    agreement itself to establish proportionate share in the JV

    whose past-experience the bidder is seeking to use, nonsubmission of such JV cannot be a ground to disqualify

    the bidder for submission of incomplete documents in

    terms of Clause 8.1 of NIT. Admittedly, the appellant had

    submitted the work execution certificate, as required

    under clause 5(D), which also unequivocally sets out its 

    Page 14 of 19

    proportionate share in the JV agreement whose prior

    experience it had relied on.

    (iv) Though it is argued Clause 8.1 as well as circular dated

    29.11.2023 put an embargo on 1st respondent to rely on

    documents furnished after submission of bid, nothing

    prevented 1st Respondent to seek clarification with regard

    to the proportionate share of the appellant in the previous

    JV as disclosed in the work execution certificate. It may be

    apposite to note Clause 8.810 of the NIT, couched in a nonobstante clause, reserved the right of the 1st respondent to

    seek additional information to satisfy itself with regard to

    the eligibility of any bidder. 1st respondent failed to

    exercise such discretion by fortifying itself through calling

    for the JV agreement, which, when placed before this

    Court, unequivocally endorsed the contents of the

    certificate submitted by the Appellant.

    10 Clause 8.8: “Notwithstanding anything stated above, MPPGCL reserves the right to

    assess the creditability, capability and capacity to perform the contract. Should the

    circumstances warrant such an assessment in its overall interest, bidder shall furnish

    additional documents to substantiate its claim. MPPGCL also reserves the right to seek

    such additional information as it may deem fit to satisfy itself of the eligibility

    of the bidder.” (emphasis supplied)

    Page 15 of 19

    (v) The other argument advanced by the respondents is that

    the appellant had acted with mala fide intention by

    suppressing the JV agreement and subsequently

    furnishing different versions of the said agreement at

    various stages i.e., before the 1st Respondent, in the

    Special Leave Petition and finally, by way of additional

    documents respectively. This argument is unacceptable as

    neither Clause 5(D) required submission of JV agreement

    to prove proportionate share nor was the appellant called

    upon to submit such document. Moreover, the

    proportionate share of the appellant in the consortium as

    reflected in all the documents, i.e., the JV agreement

    submitted before the 1st Respondent, annexed to the SLP

    and the agreement with additional documents, is the same

    and consistent with the work execution certificate

    submitted in the bid. For these reasons, we are not in

    agreement with the argument that the appellant had

    intentionally suppressed the JV agreement or had

    approached the Court with unclean hands.

    Page 16 of 19

    (vi) Finally, submission of the 2nd Respondent regarding a

    pending civil dispute between the consortium partners of

    M/s Hind Maha Mineral LLP is also of little consequence.

    Such dispute has no impact on the proportionate share of

    the appellant in the JV agreement and the work executed

    by the appellant as a part of the consortium for MSMC as

    disclosed in the work execution certificate.

    20. In these circumstances, we are inclined to hold the 1st respondent

    acted contrary to the terms of the NIT and unfairly rejected the

    appellant’s bid for non-production of JV agreement although

    Clause 5(D) did not prescribe production of such agreement as

    mandatory to rely on past-experience of such consortium in

    which the bidder had a defined proportionate share.

    21. Accordingly, decision of the Committee, upheld by the High

    Court as per Clause 5(D) is liable to be set aside.

    (II) Appellant’s disqualification under Clause 5(B) of the NIT

    22. However, the High Court went a step further, traversing beyond

    the reasons given by the Committee and held the Appellant 

    Page 17 of 19

    would otherwise be disqualified under Clause 5(B) of the NIT.

    Clause 5(B) reads as follows –

    “Details of Washery:

    Bidder should have its own Washery with wet

    beneficiation technology either of Heavy Media Cyclone or

    Heavy Media Bath or Wet Jig. The Bidder should have

    a minimum spare washing capacity using wet

    technology of 50% of annual tendered quantity, i.e.,

    5 Lakh Metric Tonnes (LMT), in area nearby to mines

    of WCL configured in the tender. Total distance from

    mine(s) to offered washery (ies) and offered washery (ies)

    to Railway siding shall not be more than 100 KM.”

    (emphasis supplied)

    23. To arrive at such a finding the High Court relied on written

    arguments submitted by the 2nd respondent and held as per

    Clauses 3.12, 3.13 and 8.5 of the JV agreement the appellant’s

    washeries were committed to MSMC and could not have been

    used for the present tender. Mr. Hooda rightly contends the

    issue was raised for the first time in the written submissions

    and his client did not get the opportunity to controvert the

    same. Referring to a chart placed before us,

    11 he vehemently

    argues the appellant’s Gondegaon washery had a spare capacity

    of 1.5 MMTPA12 which was much higher than the required spare

    11 Annexure P-34 in the Appellant’s Rejoinder to the Counter Affidavit filed by the 2nd

    Respondent.

    12 Million Metric Tonnes Per Annum.

    Page 18 of 19

    capacity under Clause 5(B) of the NIT. He further contends a

    request13 had been made to MSMC to shift their operation to

    other washeries in terms of Clause 614 of the contract agreement

    executed between MSMC and the consortium, and the

    Gondegaon Washery was available for execution of the work

    under the present NIT.

    24. We are of the considered view the aforesaid issue is a

    contentious one and ought not to have been decided by the High

    Court without giving opportunity to the appellant to controvert

    the same. High Court also lost sight of the fact that the

    Committee had not adverted to this issue and it was

    impermissible for it to travel beyond the reasons given by the

    Committee and disqualify the appellant. It is also relevant to

    note that allotment of work order to 2nd respondent has been

    made subject to the outcome of this proceeding.

    13 Letter dated 14.06.2024, annexed as P-36 in the Appellant’s Rejoinder to the Counter

    Affidavit filed by the 2nd Respondent.

    14 Clause 6: “ACCEPTED RATES:- Accepted Rates for beneficiation of raw coal as below

    (exclusive of GST). If any change in washery/railway siding is request by

    CONTRACTOR (LLP), then it should not put extra financial burden on MSMC……”

    (emphasis supplied).

    Page 19 of 19

    25. For these reasons, we remand the matter for a fresh

    consideration whether appellant had requisite spare washing

    capacity as per Clause 5(B) of the NIT and the validity of the

    work order in favour of the 2nd respondent in light of such

    decision. The High Court shall decide the matter as

    expeditiously as possible preferably within two months from the

    date of communication of this order.

    26. The impugned judgment and order of the High Court is set aside

    and the appeal is partly allowed.

    …………………………………………., J

    (SURYA KANT)

    …………………………………………, J

    (JOYMALYA BAGCHI)

    New Delhi,

    September 09, 2025.