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Monday, March 17, 2025

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to: Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40] Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]



[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 160


Geddam Jhansi & Anr. v. The State of Telangana & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025)


07 February 2025


[B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant(s) under Sections 498A, 506, Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ought to be quashed.


Headnotes


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to:


Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40]


Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]


Case Law Cited


State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) 1 Supp. SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 – referred to.


List of Acts


Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.


List of Keywords


Quashing; Cruelty; Demand for dowry; Physical and mental Harassment; Domestic violence; Harassment; Criminal intimidation; Panchayat witnesses; Identical statements of the witnesses; Generalised allegations; Matrimonial/domestic disputes; Criminal cases relating to domestic violence; Tendency to implicate family members/relatives; Institution of family; Abuse of the process of the law; Charge-sheet; Hearsay evidence.


Case Arising From


CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025


From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2022 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 3105 of 2022


With


Criminal Appeal No. 610 of 2025


Appearances for Parties


Nitin Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Shaik Mohammad Haneef, Abdul Mannan, Irshad Ahmad, Advs. for the Appellants.


Ms. Devina Sehgal, Vineet George, Beno Bencigar, Parijat Kishore, Advs. for the Respondents.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.


1.Leave granted in both the SLPs.


2.This common order disposes of both the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 as both these appeals relate to similar and connected incidents.


3.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 was filed against the judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 under Section 498A, 506 Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short “Dowry Act”) pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) by holding that, prima facie, there are certain allegations against both the appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali, and that these are triable issues for which the appellants have to face trial and prove their innocence.


4.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “DV Act”) in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of CrPC on similar ground by holding that, prima facie, there are specific allegations against the sole appellant, Geddam Jhansi, and the same have to be decided only after enquiry.


5.Being aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending before the concerned Magistrates, the present appeals have been preferred.


6.The gravamen of the plea of the appellants in both the appeals is that the allegations against them are vague and are of a generalised nature without any specific overt act attributed to them, thus, incapable of being fastened with criminal liability, which unfortunately, the High Court had failed to appreciate.


7.The relevant facts in brief as may be culled from the pleadings is that a written complaint was filed before the Mahila Police Station Bhuvanagiri on 17.09.2021 by one Premlata (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) in which it was mentioned that she was married to one Samuel Suresh, a doctor by profession and a resident of Chennai on 17.08.2016 and at the time of marriage her mother-in-law, Pathagadda, had demanded a sum of Rs.30 Lakhs and accordingly, the complainant’s mother had given Rs.10 Lakhs by way of cash and 15 tolas of gold as dowry to her mother-in-law. It was stated that for about five months after the marriage, the complainant’s husband had treated her well and took care of her properly. Unfortunately, later, her husband suspecting her character started harassing her mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10 Lakhs, for which her mother-in-law, the younger sister of her mother-in-law, namely, Geddam Jhansi (Appellant No.1), her brother-in-law, Sudheer, and the son of Geddam Jhansi, namely, Geddam Sathyakama Jabali (Appellant No.2) pressurized her to act according to her husband’s and mother in law’s wishes and also threatened to kill her if the demand for dowry was not met. It was also alleged that because of their behaviour, the complainant’s mother organised panchayat several times before the elders and other family members. It was alleged that in front of the elders, her husband had agreed to take care of her properly but as usual after sometime he started harassing her because of which she ultimately approached the police for counselling but there was no change in their behaviour leaving her no alternative but to file the aforesaid complaint.


8.On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 54 of 2021 was registered at Bhongir Women PS, Rahakonda District, under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the complainant’s husband, complainant’s mother-in-law, complainant’s brother in law and the present two appellants. On completion of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 46 of 2021 was filed before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the aforesaid accused including the present two appellants, which is now pending before the aforesaid court in C.C. No. 46 of 2022.


9.Apart from the aforesaid complaint filed before the Mahila Police Station, another complaint was filed by the complainant on 20.09.2021 before the Protection Officer, Bhuvanagari alleging cruelty and criminal intimidation under the DV Act, 2005 making similar allegations with the additional allegations that on one occasion, her husband asked her not to touch his clothes and to go away from the kitchen and that he tried to burn his socks because the complainant had washed them. It was also alleged that her husband had influenced his friends to talk ill of her, who in turn used to call the complainant and ask her to leave her husband, further telling her that her husband has a girlfriend who had taken divorce to marry him. It was also alleged that on 17.10.2020 at around 10:00 p.m, the complainant was beaten and pushed out of the matrimonial house by her husband.


10.The complainant accordingly, approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhongir where a case under DV Act, being DVC No. 25 of 2021 was registered and is now pending.


11.At this stage it may be apposite to mention herein that the allegations are not one way and the husband had made counter allegations against the complainant. Before the aforesaid complaints were filed by the complainant, the husband of the complainant instituted a divorce proceeding before the Court of the Principal District Judge at Kanchipuram, which was registered as I.D.O.P. No. 44 of 2021 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 alleging neglect, insensitivity to the needs of the husband, incompatibility, concealment of facts, showing hostile attitude towards the husband, refusal to consummate the marriage, causing mental and physical harassment and desertion since 10 April 2018.


12.As we proceed to examine the issues involved, we may briefly allude to the law relating to quashing of FIRs/criminal proceedings, which is well-settled and summarised by this Court in the State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in which this Court held as below:


“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.


(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.


(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.


(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.


(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.


(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.


(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party


(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”


13.In the present case, the charge-sheet has been filed before the Court of the Magistrate in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 after investigation was completed by the police on the basis of the complaint/FIR lodged by the complainant and another proceeding is also pending under the DV Act before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate. However, this will not preclude this Court from interfering with the criminal proceedings, if upon perusal of the complaints, the materials gathered during the investigation and in the charge-sheet, it is found that no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants and the criminal proceedings amount to abuse of the process of law. As mentioned above, the common plea of the appellants in both the proceedings is that allegations against them are of a generalized nature devoid of specific offending acts to constitute offences punishable under law.


14.In this regard, we may recall what this Court has held in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 as regards permissibility of quashing of proceeding once charge-sheet is filed as follows:


“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] , this Court while deciding the question whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)


“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”


15. Even otherwise also, it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 of the CrPC and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of the CrPC. Section 482 of the CrPC reads as follows:


“482. Saving of inherent powers of the High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”


16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of inherent powers by the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only up to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7, Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by the registration of the FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of any court.


15.Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, we will examine whether the facts/materials obtaining in the present case would warrant interference of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the said criminal proceedings pending before the concerned courts.


16.As far as the first complaint is concerned, out of which the criminal proceeding in “C.C. No.46 of 2022” has arisen, which is pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir, where the charge-sheet has been filed, the relevant portions of the said complaint read as follows: -


“xxxxxx


On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh. S/o. Late Janardhan Rao, aged 38 years, Caste: SC (Madiga). Occupation: Doctor, R/o Pondicherry in Chennai. At the time of marriage, my mother-in-law demanded Rs. 30,00,000/- and accordingly my mother has given Rs. 10.00.000/- by way of cash and 15 tulas gold as dowry to my mother-in-law. After the marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter my husband started suspecting my character and harassed mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10,00,000/-. I submit that my mother-in-law Pathagadda Bharathi and younger sister of my Mother-in-Law namely Geddam Jhansi, my brother-in-law Sudheer and son of younger sister of my Mother-in-law namely Geddam Satya Rama Jabili all the persons referred above used to pressurize to act according to my husband’s and Mother-in-law’s wish, otherwise they threatened to kill me. In this regard my mother organized Panchayathi several times, before the elders and family members. In front of the elders, my husband agreed to take care of me properly but as usual, after sometime, he started harassing me. Thereafter. I have approached Bhongiri Mahila Police Station and have given a complaint. Thereafter, Police personnel called them for counselling, but there was no change in the behaviour. In view of the above I request to take legal action, on all persons mentioned above.”


(emphasis added)


17.Charge-sheet is filed only on culmination of the investigation during which time the investigating agency collects all the relevant evidence in support of the complaint on the basis of which a clear prima facie case indicating commission of the offence must be made out against the accused warranting trial. The investigation may uncover/throw up more detailed and additional facts and evidence that would support the complaint/FIR. Accordingly, this Court will examine the charge-sheet filed and examine the evidence which has been gathered in the present case relating to “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” to see if any new facts or evidence had been disclosed.


18.In this regard we may refer to the charge-sheet filed in connection with the aforesaid case, relevant portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow: -


“As per the evidence collected, during the course of the investigation and as per detailed and discreet enquiries, prima-facie care is made out against the A-1 to A-5 for the offence punishable U/s 498-(A). 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act-1961.


During the further course of the Investigation, since the prima-facie offence is proved against the accused A-1. A-2 & A-4 on 23.09.2021 the LW-07 has Register post under sub-section (1) of Section 41 A of Criminal Procedure Code to them, but A-1, A-2 & A-4 was Rejected the Post, after that A-1 received anticipatory bail Hon’ble court of 5 additional district and sessions judge at Bhongir Cri.M.P.No.410/2021 on 27-11-2021 A-3 & A-5 on 02.11.2021 the LW-07 has served the notices them under sub-section (1) of Section 41.A of Criminal Procedure Code with directions to appear before me. Accordingly, on 03.12.2021, the accused A-3 & A-5 have complied with the instructions of LW-07 by appearing before her. As such, as per the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and since the offence is having the punishment of less than seven years Imprisonment, the LW. 07 has served notices under sub-section (3) of section 41 A of Criminal Procedure to the accused A-3 & A-5 directing them to appear before the Hon’ble trial court as when they received the summons.


Investigation done so far in this case it well established that LW-1 Panthagadda Premalatha is the complainant & victim legally wedded of the A-1 is resident of H No 1-11-14. Near By Meg Market. Jangaon (V&M&D), Present at Yadagirigutta (V&M). Yadadri-Bhongir (Dist), the LW-2 S Potta Chandralah, the Lw-3. Smt Potta Bharathamma are parents respectively of victim and circumstant witness to the incident, the LW.4, Sri Eppialapally Narendar, the LW-5 Sri Bollepally Janardhan are panchayath elders & circumstantial witness to the incident. Whereas the accused A-1 Panthagadda Shymul Suresh is the son of A-2, the A-2. Panthagadda Bharathi, are resident of Thiruvikanagar. Madhaliya Pet. Pondicherry, the A-3 /Geddam Jhand. Small Mother-in-law of A-1, the A-4 Panthagadda Sudheer, the AS Geddam Sathyakama Jabal @Amancherla Jabali are Brothers of A-1 are resident of Jawaharagar, Hyderabad.


The LW-1 marriage was performed on 17.08.2016 with the A-1 as per customs prevailing in their community and the presence of their relatives. At the time of LW-1 marriage. her in-laws.


Demand Rs. 30,00,000/-Cash for dowry, in which, LW-2 & 3 have gave Rs. 10,00,000/- cash, 15 Thule’s Gold to them as dowry, After marriage the couple had lead happy conjugal life of 5 Months. thereafter A-1 suspecting the Lw-1 character and also used to harassed mentally and physically to bring Additional Rs.10.00.000/- dowry from her parent’s house otherwise A-1 do the 2 marriage with other women, A-2 to A-5 are supported to A-1 Due to such harassment, the LWs 26 3 was placed the matter before the elders LW1-4 & 5 who are circumstantial witness & Panchayath elders. On request of the LWs 2 & 3, the elders held a panchayath 2018 May month 2 times at Chennai, 2018 July month one time at Hyderabad A-3 House, 2019 February Month one time. 2019 August Month one time convinced them, A-1 to A-5 says in front of panchayath elders take good care of Lw-1. but A-1 to A 5) are again harassed her. Later 2 years ago A1 to A-5 beaten the Lw-1 and necked out in the house to bring additional Rs. 10,00,000/ dowry if not bring the amount they would kill the LW-1. Later Lw-1 filed a complaint against them in Woman PS Bhongir. Police are given counselling them, but A1 to A 5 did not change their · attitude. Thus the A1 to A5 noted in Col. No 12 of this charge sheet committed an offence punishable U/s 498-A. 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 DP Act.”


19.Perusal of the charge-sheet would show that the investigating agency had relied on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two other witnesses who are Panchayat elders to substantiate the allegations. As far as the statement of the complainant is concerned, it is in the form of the complaint which has been already reproduced hereinabove. We will now examine whether any new or fresh evidence has been revealed in the course of the investigation from the examination of other witnesses, namely, the complainant’s parents and the two panchayat witnesses.


20.The statements of the parents are carbon copy of each other and as such we may refer to the statement of the father only, relevant portions of which read as follows: -


“I am resident of Yadadri Bhuvangiri district, Bibinagar, Brahmanapalli road. We married our daughter Premalatha in 2016 to Panthagadda SamuelSuresh, s/o Janardhan Rao, resident of Pondicherry. Our son-in-law works as a Doctor. At the time of marriage, the Mother-in-law of my daughter demanded Rs.30,00,000 cash as dowry and we gave Rs. 10,00,000/ cash and 15 sovereigns of gold as per her wish. Five months after marriage, my daughter came to our house and told me: that her husband-was suspecting her with every person she spoke further he told her that he doesn’t like her as she did not get the dowry as demanded by them and asked her to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/ for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that, he can marry again. He was harassing my daughter mentally and physically. My daughter’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, my daughter’s mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, my daughter’s husband’s brother Sudhir, Jabali, all of them supported my daughter’s husband and told that as she brought less dowry they warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used to abuse her and beat her. In this regard we held panchayat with elders. When the elders convinced them, they used to say they will look after her well and taken her with them, but used to harass her again. These type of panchayats took place 4 times in Chennai and 5 times in Hyderabad. Approximately about 2 years ago my daughter came to our house and told me that when she questioned why they were doing like this, they said, how dare you to raise your voice against us and all of them together abused her and beat her and pushed her out of house. They threatened her saying that, if she comes home without getting money of Rs.10,00,000/- they will kill her. After that, my daughter has given a complaint against them in Bhuvanagiri Mahila Police Station and the police called them and counselled them, but there was no change in them is what he stated.”


(emphasis added)


21.The other evidence is in the form of the statements of the two panchayat witnesses, namely, Sri Eppala Pally Narendar and Sri Bollepally Janardhan. It is also noticed that their statements too are reproduction of the other and as such examination of only one of the statements will suffice, for which we may examine the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narendar, relevant portions of which read as follows: -


“I am a resident of Yadadri-Bhuvanagiri district…….After 5 months of their marriage Chandraiah came to me and told me that his daughter came home and told him that her husband is suspecting her with every person she spoke Further he told he doesn’t like her, as she did not get the dowry that they asked for he asked her to get additional dowry of Rs 10,00,000 for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that he can marry again. He used to harass mentally and physically. Premalatha’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, her Mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, Jabali, her husband’s brother Subir, all of them together supported her husband and told her that she brought less dowry and warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used abuse her and beat her Premalatha’s father told me that in this regard, they were holding a panchayat with elders and asked me to come an panchayat elder. Then I along with a few other elders went to the panchayat. We told them to be good and they said we will look after Premalatha well and has taken her with them, but again harassed her in the same way. In May 2018, one time in July 2018, one time in February 2019, one time in 2019 August, in panchayats were held in Chennai and Hyderabad (Jhansi’s house). In the panchayat all the above persons, collectively told that, if they give the dowry they asked for only, they will take Premalatha or else we will get their boy married again. 1 came to know that at about 2 years ago all of them together abused and beat Premalatha and pushed her out of house and threatened her to get Rs.5,00,000 and then only they will allow her enter the house or else they will kill her-is the statement given by him”


22.When we minutely examine the statements of the father and the mother of the complainant, what can be seen is that as far as the demand for dowry of Rs. 30 Lakhs and giving of Rs. 10 lakhs and 15 sovereigns of gold at the time of marriage of the complainant is concerned, it can be said that it was within their direct knowledge. Being the father and mother, the complainant daughter would naturally convey to them what had transpired with her in relation to her husband and family. Thus, as regards other allegations of harassment, the same were informed to them by their daughter but they were not witness to the same.


It may also be noted that as regards the alleged act of beating of the complainant by her husband and other relatives mentioned by the parents, the complainant herself does not mention so in her complaints. Therefore, this allegation of beating of the complainant is something which has been added by the father and the mother of the complainant though they did not themselves witness the same.


23.As regards the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narender, the Panchayat elder, regarding the incidents of harassment which are the subject matter of the complaint, the same has been stated by him after he was informed by the father of the complainant. Thus, his evidence is nothing but hearsay evidence. As far as the statement regarding holding of panchayat at Hyderabad and Chennai is concerned, where the family members of the husband had allegedly stated that if the dowry is not given as demanded, the complainant would not be taken back and they would get the husband married again, the said statement is of a very generalised nature and vague in the sense that it does not mention exactly when and in which Panchayat the aforesaid incident took place and what roles the appellants played. Further, it is noticed that this witness as well as the other Panchayat witness are residents of Bhongir which is in Telangana. It is not stated how they were also present in the Panchayat meetings held in Chennai.


The aforesaid Panchayat witness mentioned about the alleged demand of dowry and threat meted out to the complainant of being killed if the demand for dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs was not met, and about the threat of the complainant being thrown out of the matrimonial house, but the said statement is based on the information provided to him by the father of the complainant and is not based on personal knowledge of the witness.


24.When the aforesaid statements are examined, it is evident that there certainly are specific allegations made against the husband of the complainant, his mother (mother-in-law of the complainant) about demand of dowry and harassment meted out to the complainant. However, as regards the present appellants, the allegation against them is that they along with the other accused family members used to pressurize the complainant to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes. Apart from this generalised allegation, there are no specific or overt acts attributed to the appellants which would tantamount to acts of cruelty or physical or mental harassment or being active participants in the demands for dowry.


25.From the above what is clearly evident is that the statements of the witnesses though support the case of the complainant, do not disclose any new fact or provide better particulars beyond what had already been stated by the complainant. As far as the present appellants are concerned, these witnesses including the complainant merely make generalised allegations without any specific evidence against them.


26.Thus, if the evidence of the complainant as well as the witnesses are taken at their face value, what can be said to have been made out against the appellants is that the appellants and other members of the family used to pressurize the complainant to act according to the wishes of her husband and mother-in-law which is a very generalised allegation devoid of specific particulars.


27.As mentioned above, the statements of the mother and the father of the complainant as annexed in the charge-sheet are carbon copies. Similarly, the same is in respect of the statements of the other two independent witnesses, Epalla Pally Narender and Bollepally Janardhan. Under these circumstances, discussed above, we have no hesitation to say that the identical statements of the witnesses do not inspire confidence of this Court for continuation of the criminal proceedings with regard to the present appellants.


28.Coming to the other case relating to domestic violence pending before the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir in DVC No. 25 of 2021, the same is based on the second complaint dated 20.09.2021 filed by the complainant, relevant portions of which read as follows:-


“xxxxxx


On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh….


After the, marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter 1. My husband Samuel Suresh, 2. My mother-in-law Bharati Janardhan. 3. Younger sister of my mother-in law Jhansi Geddam 4. My brother-in-law Pathagadda Sudheer 5. Son of my mother-in-law’s sister Geddam Sathyakama Jabill, all the above referred persons, with a plan, started harassing me physically and mentally and demanded to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/-. When I informed the same thing to my parents, my parents organized a panchayat before my family members and elders. My husband agreed to take care of me properly, before the elders, but as usual after some days he started harassing me along with his family members. They made me to pay the house rent. At times my husband stayed away from the house during nights. My husband used to tell each and everything to my mother-in-law and he used to act as per her directions. Further my mother-in-law used to pressurize me to purchase a new house and a car. They also tried to get a false report from the psychiatrist, by taking an appointment with the doctor. Thereafter they forced me to address a letter stating that, I was responsible for all the mistakes happened in our marital life. They have taken money from me and have spent for their personal uses.


I submit that when meeting was held at the residence of younger sister of my mother-in-law, my husband promised before my parents that he will take care of me properly. After that when I holded his hand, he pushed me down and used to scold me for every small issue. Further he asked not to touch his clothes and go away from the kitchen. Once he tried to burn his socks. because I washed them. My husband has not supported me, even when requested him, that there is a problem in my job and finally lost the job. My parents have invited my husband for my brother’s marriage, but he refused to attend the marriage and used to pressurize me to sign the letter. He used to tell bad about me to his friends and they used to call me and asked me to leave my husband. One day, a girl called me and said that my husband is having a girlfriend earlier and now she has taken divorce from her husband and therefore he is planning to marry her. They have tortured me in many ways, but I patiently tolerated their ill-treatment for a smooth marriage, but he has not understood me. He tortured me mentally by scolding me and he used to go out with his friends and used to come at 3 or 4 in the early morning. On 17.10.20 at around 10:00 pm he necked me out of the house, therefore I request you to take legal action on my husband Samuel Suresh and other family members for torturing me physically and mentally. Further I request you to take action as per Domestic Violence and see that protection order and residence order is provided in my favor. Further, see that every month Rs.30,000/- is given to me, for my maintenance.”


(emphasis added)


The said second complaint is more or less the reiteration of the allegations made in her first complaint with some additional incidents. Perusal of the second complaint shows that no specific allegations about harassment have been made against the appellants.


29.As far as the allegation of the complainant of being thrown out of her matrimonial house on 17.10.2020 is concerned, she made the specific allegation only against her husband and she did not attribute any role of the appellants except for making a general allegation of harassing her physically and mentally without specifying the actual role of the appellants.


30.It may be also noted that in the second complaint, the complainant had specifically stated that when a meeting was held at the residence of the younger sister of her mother-in-law (Appellant No.1), her husband promised before her parents that he would take care of her properly. This statement shows that the Appellant No. 1 was trying to mediate and broker peace between the complainant, her husband and her mother-in-law, which is inconsistent with the allegation that the appellants were pressurising the complainant in support of the mother-in-law and the husband.


31.Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the penal code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, preservation of family relationship has always been emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.


32.We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.


33.It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since, violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.


34.For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner to hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turns, otherwise an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.


35.We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who are accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.


36.Our observations, however, should not be generalised to mean that relatives cannot be brought under the purview of the aforesaid penal provisions when they have actively participated in inflicting cruelty on the daughter-in-law/victim. What needs to be assessed is whether such allegations are genuine with specific criminal role assigned to such members of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person. Each and every case of domestic violence will thus depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in each case.


37.In the present case, the charges against the accused including the appellants are sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders.


As discussed above, the statements of the two elders are based on the information provided by the father of the complainant. These two witnesses did not witness any of the incidents of physical harassment by the appellants. Though they were present in the panchayat to resolve the dispute between the parties, their account of harassment of the complainant is based on what they had learnt from the father of the complainant. As regards their knowledge of demand of dowry by the appellants, the same is quite vague and without specific details.


Similarly, the statements of the parents of the complainant are based on the information provided by the complainant/daughter. There is also nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants.


Thus, the evidence against the appellants in these proceedings boils down to the evidence of the complainant. The complainant in her complaints as mentioned above, did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details. The evidence of the complainant is the foundation for the criminal proceedings against the appellants. As discussed above, the evidence of the other witnesses do not disclose anything new as far as the appellants are concerned.


In our considered view, the aforesaid materials do not constitute a prima facie case against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial.


38.We have also noted that the appellants do not live with the principal accused. While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad. As the appellants do not stay together with the complainant and her husband and mother-in-law, to make the appellants as co-accused for alleged offences committed in the matrimonial house of the complainant on the basis of very generalised allegations does not appear to be tenable.


39.Under these circumstances, for the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the appellants have been able to make out a case for interference in these proceedings qua the present appellants as in our opinion no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants to continue with the criminal proceedings against them and allowing these to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the law.


40.Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:


(i)The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.


(ii)The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.


41.However, it is made clear that the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court are in the respect of the allegations made against the present appellants and the same will have no bearing on the criminal proceedings against the other accused persons and the trial courts will not be swayed by the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court and the trial courts are expected to proceed with the criminal proceedings pending against the other accused persons after proper appreciation of evidence and in accordance with law.


Result of the case: Appeals allowed.



Friday, March 14, 2025

"Section 39 in Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023 39. Opinions of experts. (1)When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign law or of science or art, or any other field, or as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or any other field, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger impressions are relevant facts and such persons are called experts."

APHC010533112024

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3330]

WEDNESDAY, THE TWELFTH DAY OF MARCH

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FIVE

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No: 2973/2024

Between:

Manduva Hanumantha Rao ...PETITIONER

AND

Manduva Srinivasa Rao and Others ...RESPONDENT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner:

1.N SASIKALA

Counsel for the Respondent(S):

1.MADHAVA RAO NALLURI

The Court made the following:

2025:APHC:9343

2

ORDER:

The petitioner herein, who is the plaintiff in O.S.No.374 of 2014

on the file of the Family-cum-VIII Additional District Judge, Prakasam at

Ongole, filed suit for partition against the respondents/defendants. The

petitioner/plaintiff and the 1

st respondent/ 1st defendant are the sons of

Manduva Seshaiah, born in wedlock with Venkata Subbamma.

2. The said suit was defended by the 1st respondent-1

st defendant

on the ground that there is already a partition has taken place, vide

registered partition deed vide document No.1076/1997 dated

26.03.1997 and also has taken another stand that the father of the

petitioner has executed a Will dated 15.10.1998 in favour of the 1st

respondent/defendant.

3. In the said suit, the petitioner-plaintiff filed I.A.No.1542 of 2024

under Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, to send

the unregistered Will Ex.B5 which is said to have been executed by

M.Seshaiah for expert opinion to compare the signatures of M.Seshaiah

with the admitted signatures in the registered partition deed dated

26.03.1997, to disprove the said Will as fabricated.

2025:APHC:9343

3

4. The said I.A.No.1542 of 2024 was dismissed vide order dated

29.10.2024 on the ground that Ex.B1 is not contemporaneous document

with that of Ex.B5 and, in the absence of any such contemporaneous

document, sending the document to expert is nothing but futile exercise

and, accordingly, I.A.No.1542 of 2024 filed under Section 39 of the

Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023, was dismissed.

5. Assailing the said order dated 29.10.2024, the present

C.R.P.No.2973 of 2024 is filed on the ground that the observation of the

learned trial Court Judge is contrary to law and Ex.B.1 is dated

26.03.1997 and Ex.B.5-Will is dated 15.10.1998 and both are

contemporaneous documents and the dismissing of application in

I.A.No.1542 of 2024 filed to send for the expert opinion is erroneous.

6. Learned counsel appearing for the petitioner has relied on the

judgment of the erstwhile common High Court in the case titled as

Bande Siva Shankara Srinivasa Prasad Vs. Ravi Surya Prakash Babu

and others1

and also the judgment in the case of M/s. Janachaitanya

Housing Ltd., Ameerpet Vs. M/s. Divya Financiers2

for the proposition

that what is the meaning of contemporaneous and what is the measure


1 AIR 2016 Hyderabad 118 Full Bench

2 AIR 2008 A.P. 163

2025:APHC:9343

4

of contemporaneity and contended that the gap between two

documents is very less and the second judgment relied for the

proposition that the delay cannot be a ground to reject the application to

send for expert opinion, hence prayed to set aside the order and

consequently prayed to direct the trial Court to send the document for

expert opinion for doing substantial justice.

7. Learned counsel appearing for the 1st respondent-1

st defendant in

the suit has filed memo dated 12.12.2024 and filed Ex.B.1-registered

partition deed and the deposition of P.W.1, i.e., the petitioner-plaintiff.

8. For facility, Section 39 of the Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam,

2023, is extracted hereunder:

"Section 39 in Bharatiya Sakshya Adhiniyam, 2023

39. Opinions of experts.

(1)When the Court has to form an opinion upon a point of foreign

law or of science or art, or any other field, or as to identity of

handwriting or finger impressions, the opinions upon that point of

persons specially skilled in such foreign law, science or art, or any

other field, or in questions as to identity of handwriting or finger

impressions are relevant facts and such persons are called

experts."

2025:APHC:9343

5

9. The case of the petitioner herein is that the 1

st respondent-1

st

defendant filed I.A.No.1184 of 2024 to receive the document Ex.B.5-Will

at a belated stage and the same was allowed by the Court and it is the

case of the petitioner-plaintiff that his father has never executed any Will

and the same was forged by the 1st respondent-1

st defendant in the suit

and in order to disprove the signature on the Ex.B5-Will, it is necessary

to file the present application to send for expert opinion, which would

meet the ends of justice and there is no such delay on the part of the

petitioner herein in filing the application, as the 1st respondent-1

st

defendant filed the said document in 2024 under Order 8 Rule 1(A)(3) of

C.P.C. and the same was allowed by the trial Court.

10. As seen from Ex.B.1 registered partition deed dated 26.03.1997

and Ex.B.5-Will dated 15.10.1998, the said documents can be

considered as contemporaneous documents and there is element of

contemporaneity. The judgment of the Full Bench of the common High

Court in Bande Siva Shankara Srinivas Prasad’s case (1 supra), the

common High Court by framing an issue “What is the meaning of

contemporaneous; and what is the measure of contemporaneity”, held

as hereunder:

2025:APHC:9343

6

"b) What is the meaning of contemporaneous; and what is

the measure of contemporaneity.

Comment: Contemporaneous means occurrence at same

period of time. No specific measure could be assigned to the

element of contemporaneity. One of the famous authors in

the field of examination of documents, Ordway Hilton, in his

famous book Scientific Examination of Questioned

Documents, states that material written two or three years

before or after the disputed writing serve as satisfactory

standards and the same is enunciated in page 11 of

Annexure enclosed."

11. The Division Bench of the common High Court has also held in

M/s. Janachaitanya Housing Ltd., Ameerpet Vs. M/s. Divya Financiers’s

(2 supra) that “No time could be fixed for filing applications under

Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act for sending the disputed signature

or writings to the handwriting expert for comparison and opinion and

same shall be left open to the discretion of the Court, for exercising

such discretion when exigencies so demand, depending upon the facts

and circumstances of the each case.”

12. As seen from the two judgments stated supra, the trial Court has

erroneously dismissed the present application filed for sending the

document to expert opinion on the ground that the said document is not

2025:APHC:9343

7

contemporaneous document. As seen from both the documents, there

is a time gap of 1½ years and the object of sending the document for

expert opinion is to compare the disputed signatures with the admitted

signatures which are in contemporaneous and there should not be any

chance of changing the signature intentionally. In the present case, the

said two documents are contemporaneous and there is no such huge

gap of 2 to 3 years and the said two documents are old documents and

there is no question of any intentionally changing the signatures that it

would arise.

13. The petitioner herein has also filed I.A. to receive the original

registered partition deed in the place of Ex.B.1 filed by the petitioner

herein, which is a certified copy.

14. In view of the aforesaid discussion, the Civil Revision Petition is

allowed setting aside the order dated 29.10.2024 in I.A.No.1542 of 2024

in O.S.No.374 of 2014 on the file of the Family-cum-VIII Additional

District Judge, Prakasam at Ongole, and consequently, the said

I.A.No.1542 of 2024 is allowed and the trial Court is hereby directed to

send the document for expert opinion. There shall be no order as to

costs.

2025:APHC:9343

8

As a sequel, interlocutory applications pending, if any, in this

case, shall stand closed.


__________________________________

 JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

Date:12.03.2025

siva

2025:APHC:9343

9

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE TARLADA RAJASEKHAR RAO

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.2973 OF 2024

Date: 12.03.2025

siva

2025:APHC:9343

Having knowledge that wife took divorce in police station from her first husband - married the petitioner second time and gave a birth to the second petitioner, the respondent is not permitted to take U turn and can not throw the wife and children to the street as the very purpose of Sec.125 would be defeated

Having knowledge that wife took divorce in police station from her first husband - married the petitioner second time and gave a birth to the second petitioner, the respondent is not permitted to take U turn and can not throw the wife and children to the street as the very purpose of Sec.125 would be defeated

In the present case, the Petitioner has obtained divorce not before the Court of law, but before the Police. 

Taking advantage of the same, the husband has taken a plea that she is not entitled for maintenance, since the marriage between them is not a valid marriage. 

This Court does not find any force in the said contention, since it may give scope to the husband to leave the wife to her fate, under the guise of the void marriage. Such being the case, the purpose and object of introducing Section 125 of Cr.P.C., will be defeated. 

The case was dismissed by the learned trial Court on the ground that the Petitioner has not obtained divorce from her first husband through the Court. 

In that view, the present petition is liable to be allowed.


APHC010080562022

IN THE HIGH COURT OF ANDHRA PRADESH

AT AMARAVATI

(Special Original Jurisdiction)

[3396]

MONDAY, THE FIFTH DAY OF AUGUST

TWO THOUSAND AND TWENTY FOUR

PRESENT

THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA

CRIMINAL PETITION NO: 1329/2022

Between:

Karra Subhashini ...PETITIONER/ACCUSED

AND

Karra Ramaiah and Others ...RESPONDENT/COMPLAINANT(S)

Counsel for the Petitioner/Accused:

1.S SYAMSUNDER RAO

Counsel for the Respondent/Complainant(S):

1.

2.PUBLIC PROSECUTOR (AP)

The Court made the following:

ORDER:

 The instant petition under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 (in short, “Cr.P.C.”) has been preferred against the

impugned orders in M.C.No.7 of 2017 dated 03.06.2019 on the file of the

Additional Junior Civil Judge, Ponnur, dismissing the claim of

maintenance which was confirmed in C.R.P.No.49 of 2019 dated

17.01.2020 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Guntur.

2025:APHC:1571

2

VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

Brief facts of the case:

2. The Petitioner is the wife of Respondent No.1 herein. She has

filed M.C.No.7 of 2017 under Section 125 of Cr.P.C., seeking

maintenance at the rate of Rs.20,000/- per month from Respondent No.1.

The said case was dismissed on the ground that her marriage with her

first husband is subsisted and she obtained divorce before the police and

not from court of law. Therefore, she is not legally wedded wife of the

Respondent No.1 for claiming maintenance. Being aggrieved by the

impugned order passed by the trial Court, the Petitioner carried the

matter in Revision before the Sessions Court, Guntur. Learned Sessions

Judge in C.R.P.No.49 of 2019 confirmed the order of M.C.No.7 of 2017,

dismissing the Revision.

3. Feeling aggrieved and dissatisfied, the Petitioner preferred the

present petition under Sec.482 of Cr.P.C. on the ground that the trial

Court as well as the Sessions Court relied upon the authorities in the

judgments of Nagireddy Sai Kumari v. Nagireddy Varanageswara

Rao1

 and Hemalatha Karayat v. Vijay Kumar Karayat2

, wherein it is

held that,

 “A married woman cannot claim maintenance from her second

husband during the subsisting of first marriage. It is pertinent to mention

here that the case on hand is that the first marriage dissolved and got


1

 2008(2) ALT (Crl) 171

2

 2014(Crl) 4935

2025:APHC:1571

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VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

divorce before the Police Station. Hence, the above cited judgments

cannot apply to the case on hand”.

4. In the present case, the marriage of the petitioner with the 1st


respondent was performed on 06.10.2014 as per the traditions and

customs of Christian Marriage and a marriage certificate was also issued

to that effect which is marked as Ex.P2 in the MC proceedings before the

Trial Court. The Husband as RW.1, in cross examination, admitted about

his signature on the Ex.P2. The trial Court as well as the Sessions Court

failed to consider this crucial evidence. There is ample evidence on the

record to prove the marriage of the Petitioner with Respondent No.1.

Strict proof of marriage is not essential under the provisions of Section

125 of Cr.P.C., since it is meant to prevent vagrancy.

5. Heard Sri S.Syam Sundar Rao, learned counsel for the Petitioner.

Notice which was sent to Respondent No.1 was returned as refused.

6. Ms. D.Prasanna Lakshmi, learned Assistant Public Prosecutor for

the State/Respondent No.2 is in attendance.

7. Having heard the submissions made by the learned counsel

representing both parties and on perusal of the material available on

record, the point for determination is,

Whether the case against the Petitioner in C.R.P.No.49 of

2019 on the file of the Principal Sessions Judge, Guntur, is

liable to be quashed by exercising jurisdiction under

Section 482 of the Cr.P.C.?

2025:APHC:1571

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VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

Determination by the Court

8. Learned counsel for the Petitioner would submit that a Coordinate

Bench of Madras High Court placed reliance on the judgment of Hon’ble

Apex Court on the point of granting maintenance to the wife and the

marriage is not a valid marriage. Learned counsel took the attention of

this Court to Para No.19 in the judgment of Loyola Selva Kumar v.

M.Sharon Nisha and another, vide Crl.R.C.(MD) No.417 of 2021 and

Crl.M.P.(MD) No.4388 of 2021 dated 26.06.2023, where in it was held:

“19. Considering the above evidence, it is evident that the

petitioners have proved that the first petitioner and the respondent

were living together as husband and wife and due to their

relationship, the second petitioner was born to them. At this

juncture, it is necessary to refer the judgment of the Hon'ble Apex

Court in Badshah Vs. Urmila Badshah Godse and another

reported in 2014 1 SCC 188 = 2013 (6) CTC 86, and the relevant

passages are extracted hereunder :

15. Firstly, in Chanmuniya case, the parties had been

living together for a long time and on that basis question

arose as to whether there would be a presumption of

marriage between the two because of the said reason,

thus, giving rise to claim of maintenance under Section

125, Cr.P.C. by interpreting the term “wife” widely. The

Court has impressed that if man and woman have been

living together for a long time even without a valid

marriage, as in that case, term of valid marriage entitling

such a woman to maintenance should be drawn and a

woman in such a case should be entitled to maintain

application under Section 125, Cr.P.C. On the other hand,

in the present case, respondent No.1 has been able to

prove, by cogent and strong evidence, that the petitioner

and respondent No.1 had been married each other.

2025:APHC:1571

5

VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

16. Secondly, as already discussed above, when the

marriage between respondent No.1 and petitioner was

solemnized, the petitioner had kept the respondent No.1

in dark about her first marriage. A false representation

was given to respondent No.1 that he was single and was

competent to enter into martial tie with respondent No.1.

In such circumstances, can the petitioner be allowed to

take advantage of his own wrong and turn around to say

that respondents are not entitled to maintenance by filing

the petition under Section 125,Cr.P.C. as respondent No.1

is not “legally wedded wife” of the petitioner? Our answer

is in the negative. We are of the view that at least for the

purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C., respondent No.1 would be

treated as the wife of the petitioner, going by the spirit of

the two judgments we have reproduced above. For this

reason, we are of the opinion that the judgments of this

Court in Adhav and Savitaben cases would apply only in

those circumstances where a woman married a man with

full knowledge of the first subsisting marriage. In such

cases, she should know that second marriage with such a

person is impermissible and there is an embargo under

the Hindu Marriage Act and therefore she has to suffer

the consequences thereof. The said judgment would not

apply to those cases where a man marriages second time

by keeping that lady in dark about the first surviving

marriage. That is the only way two sets of judgments can

be reconciled and harmonized.

17. Thirdly, in such cases, purposive interpretation needs

to be given to the provisions of Section 125,Cr.P.C. While

dealing with the application of destitute wife or hapless

children or parents under this provision, the Court is

dealing with the marginalized sections of the society. The

purpose is to achieve “social justice” which is the

Constitutional vision, enshrined in the Preamble of the

Constitution of India. Preamble to the Constitution of

India clearly signals that we have chosen the democratic

path under rule of law to achieve the goal of securing for

all its citizens, justice, liberty, equality and fraternity. It

specifically highlights achieving their social justice.

2025:APHC:1571

6

VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

Therefore, it becomes the bounden duty of the Courts to

advance the cause of the social justice. While giving

interpretation to a particular provision, the Court is

supposed to bridge the gap between the law and society.

21. Considering the above, this Court is of the clear view that for

the purpose of Section 125 Cr.P.C, the first petitioner can very well

be considered as wife and the second petitioner as the son of the

respondent. Hence, the finding of the trial Court that the petitioners

are entitled to get maintenance from the respondent cannot be

found fault with”.

(Emphasis supplied)

10. In the present case, the Petitioner has obtained divorce not before

the Court of law, but before the Police. Taking advantage of the same,

the husband has taken a plea that she is not entitled for maintenance,

since the marriage between them is not a valid marriage. This Court does

not find any force in the said contention, since it may give scope to the

husband to leave the wife to her fate, under the guise of the void

marriage. Such being the case, the purpose and object of introducing

Section 125 of Cr.P.C., will be defeated. The case was dismissed by the

learned trial Court on the ground that the Petitioner has not obtained

divorce from her first husband through the Court. In that view, the present

petition is liable to be allowed.

11. In the result, the Criminal Petition is allowed. The matter is

remanded to the trial Court for fresh disposal according to law, since

there are no findings on other aspects.

2025:APHC:1571

7

VJP,J

Crl.P.No.1329 of 2022

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall

stand closed.

 ___________________________________

 VENKATA JYOTHIRMAI PRATAPA, J

Date: 05-08-2024

PND

2025:APHC:1571


Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – s.23 – Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances – Appellant-mother sought cancellation of the Gift Deed transferring her property to the respondent-son subject to the condition that he provides for her maintenance – Appellant alleged that the conditions in the promissory note and the gift deed w.r.t her maintenance were grossly unfulfilled and there was a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties – Gift Deed in question, if ought to be quashed: Held: Yes – Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr. [2022] 17 SCR 876, expounded two conditions for attracting the application of Section 23(1), (a) the transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor; and (b) the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor – In the present case, the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with – Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled – View of the Division Bench which set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and took a strict view of a beneficial legislation, not agreed with – Impugned judgment set aside – Gift Deed quashed – Possession of the premises be restored to the Appellant. [Paras 21, 23, 26] Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – s.23 – Jurisdiction of the Tribunal – If can order eviction and transfer of possession of the property – Impugned order observed that Section 23 is a standalone provision of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only to find out whether the condition in the gift deed or otherwise contained a clause providing for basic amenities and whether the transferee has refused or failed to provide them and there is no other jurisdiction vested with the Tribunal – Correctness: Held: Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen – It cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred – This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly – The relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of the country, in some cases, are not being looked after – It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee. [Paras 24, 25]


[2025] 1 S.C.R. 105 : 2025 INSC 20


Urmila Dixit v. Sunil Sharan Dixit and Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 10927 of 2024)


02 January 2025


[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Tribunal granting benefit of Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007, to the Appellant-mother.


Headnotes


Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – s.23 – Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances – Appellant-mother sought cancellation of the Gift Deed transferring her property to the respondent-son subject to the condition that he provides for her maintenance – Appellant alleged that the conditions in the promissory note and the gift deed w.r.t her maintenance were grossly unfulfilled and there was a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties – Gift Deed in question, if ought to be quashed:


Held: Yes – Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr. [2022] 17 SCR 876, expounded two conditions for attracting the application of Section 23(1), (a) the transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor; and (b) the transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor – In the present case, the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with – Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled – View of the Division Bench which set aside the judgment of the Single Judge and took a strict view of a beneficial legislation, not agreed with – Impugned judgment set aside – Gift Deed quashed – Possession of the premises be restored to the Appellant. [Paras 21, 23, 26]


Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – s.23 – Jurisdiction of the Tribunal – If can order eviction and transfer of possession of the property – Impugned order observed that Section 23 is a standalone provision of the Act and the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is only to find out whether the condition in the gift deed or otherwise contained a clause providing for basic amenities and whether the transferee has refused or failed to provide them and there is no other jurisdiction vested with the Tribunal – Correctness:


Held: Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen – It cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred – This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly – The relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of the country, in some cases, are not being looked after – It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee. [Paras 24, 25]


Interpretation of Statutes – Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 – Beneficial legislation – Interpretation – Rules for – Discussed.


Case Law Cited


Brahmpal v. National Insurance Company [2020] 9 SCR 504 : (2021) 6 SCC 512; K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob [2019] 14 SCR 928 : (2020) 14 SCC 126; Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd. (2024) 7 SCC 140; X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2022] 7 SCR 686 : (2023) 9 SCC 433; S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors. [2020] 12 SCR 1057 : (2021) 15 SCC 730; Vijaya Manohar Arbat Dr v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai and Anr. [1987] 2 SCR 331 : (1987) 2 SCC 278; Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr. [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188; Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India [2019] 12 SCR 30 : (2019) 2 SCC 636; Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr. [2022] 17 SCR 876 : 2022 SCC Online SC 1684 – relied on.


Rajnesh v. Neha and Another [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324 – referred to.


List of Acts


Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007.


List of Keywords


Gift Deed; Cancellation of the Gift Deed; Transfer of property; Void; Subject to the condition; Maintenance; Promissory note; Breakdown of peaceful relations; Gift Deed quashed; Transferee; Transferor; Donor; Donee; Basic amenities; Basic physical needs; Senior citizens; Beneficial legislation; Liberal construction; Strict view; Statement of object and reasons of the Act; Intent of the legislature; Elderly citizens; Eviction; Possession of the premises/property.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 10927 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 31.10.2022 of the High Court of M.P. Principal Seat at Jabalpur in WA No. 1085 of 2022


Appearances for Parties


V. Mohanna, Sr. Adv., Sarvam Ritam Khare, Ms. Jayasree Narasimhan, Ms. Vrinda Kapoor, Akash Shukla, Ms. Bhavya Pande, Gokul Athithya, Kushagra Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.


Mrs. Madhavi Deewan, Sr. Adv., Uday Prakash, Nakul Dev, Ms. Harshita, S K Giri, Ramjee Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sanjay Karol J.


1.The present appeal arises from the final judgment and order dated 31.10.2022 passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Appeal No. 1085 of 2022, whereby the judgment and order dated 02.08.2022 of the Single Judge of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Writ Petition No. 11796 of 2022 was set aside.


2.The Single Judge of the High Court had, in turn, affirmed the judgment dated 25.04.2022 passed by the Collector, District Chhatarpur in Case No. 91/Appeal/2021-22 and the judgment dated 27.09.2021 passed by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate and Chairman, Chhatarpur in Case No. 98/B-121/2021-22, allowing the application filed by the Appellant herein under Section 23 of the Maintenance and Welfare of the Parents and Senior Citizens Act, 2007 (hereinafter “the Act”) seeking setting aside of Gift Deed dated 09.09.2019.


Factual Matrix


3.The Appellant herein is the mother of the Respondent (son). The subject property was purchased by her on 23.01.1968. On 07.09.2019, the Appellant executed a Gift Deed in favour of the Respondent wherein it has been stated that the donee (Respondent) maintains the donor and makes provision for everything. This deed came to be registered on 09.09.2019. Allegedly, on the same day, a vachan patra / promissory note is executed by the Respondent wherein it has been stated that he will take care of the Appellant till the end of her life and if he does not do so, the Appellant will be at liberty to take back the Gift Deed. The Respondent, before this Court, has alleged this vachan patra to be fabricated.


4.Thereafter, on 24.12.2020, the Appellant filed an application under Sections 22 and 23 of the Act before the Sub Divisional Magistrate, Chhatarpur, alleging that she and her husband were attacked by the Respondent for further transfer of property and that the love and affection between the parties has completely ended. She prayed for setting aside the Gift Deed in question. This application came to be allowed, and the Gift Deed, transferring the property of the Appellant to the Respondent, was declared null and void. The Respondents preferred an appeal against this order, which came to be dismissed vide order dated 25.04.2022.


5.The Respondents, aggrieved, filed a Writ Petition bearing number 11796/2022 before the High Court of Madhya Pradesh, at Jabalpur. The Single Judge affirmed the orders of the Courts below while observing that the Respondents had not approached the Court with clean hands and had failed to serve their parents who are senior citizen. The orders of the Courts below were held to be well-reasoned and in consonance with the Act.


6.A Writ Appeal was preferred thereafter, assailing the order of the Single Judge which has been allowed vide the impugned order. The Division Bench of the High Court, while setting aside the judgments of the Ld. Single Judge, vide the impugned order, made the following observations:-


6.1Section 23 of the Act is a standalone provision, and the function of the Tribunal is only to find out whether the condition in the gift deed or otherwise contains a clause providing for basic amenities and whether the transferee has refused or failed to provide them. There is no other jurisdiction vested with the Tribunal.


6.2No condition is there in the gift deed dated 09.09.2019 for maintenance of the transferor.


6.3The argument relating to the affidavit dt. 07.09.2019, cannot be accepted. If the intention of the parties was such, the gift deed should have had a clause to the same effect.


Issues for Consideration


7.We have heard Ms. V. Mohana, learned senior counsel for the Appellant, and Ms. Madhavi Divan, learned senior counsel appearing for the Respondents. We have also perused the written submissions filed by both sides. The issue which arises for consideration of this Court is whether the High Court was correct in setting aside the order of the Tribunal, granting benefit of Section 23 of the Act, to the Appellant?


8.To answer the issue at hand, it is imperative for this Court to discuss the rules of interpretation to be applied when interpreting a beneficial legislation akin to the Act at hand. While dealing with certain provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, this Court, in Brahmpal v. National Insurance Company,1 observed that a beneficial legislation must receive a liberal construction in consonance with the objectives that the concerned Act seeks to serve.


9.This Court in K.H. Nazar v. Mathew K. Jacob2 reiterated the above expositions and stated that:


“11. Provisions of a beneficial legislation have to be construed with a purpose-oriented approach. [Kerala Fishermen’s Welfare Fund Board v. Fancy Food (1995) 4 SCC 341] The Act should receive a liberal construction to promote its objects. [Bombay Anand Bhavan Restaurant v. ESI Corpn. (2009) 9 SCC 61 : (2009) 2 SCC (L&S) 573 and Union of India v. Prabhakaran Vijaya Kumar (2008) 9 SCC 527 : (2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 813] Also, literal construction of the provisions of a beneficial legislation has to be avoided. It is the Court’s duty to discern the intention of the legislature in making the law. Once such an intention is ascertained, the statute should receive a purposeful or functional interpretation [Bharat Singh v. New Delhi Tuberculosis Centre (1986) 2 SCC 614 : 1986 SCC (L&S) 335]



13. While interpreting a statute, the problem or mischief that the statute was designed to remedy should first be identified, and then a construction that suppresses the problem and advances the remedy should be adopted. [Indian Performing Rights Society Ltd. v. Sanjay Dalia (2015) 10 SCC 161 : (2016) 1 SCC (Civ) 55] It is settled law that exemption clauses in beneficial or social welfare legislations should be given strict construction [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik (1984) 1 SCC 588] . It was observed in Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik [Shivram A. Shiroor v. Radhabai Shantram Kowshik (1984) 1 SCC 588] that the exclusionary provisions in a beneficial legislation should be construed strictly so as to give a wide amplitude to the principal object of the legislation and to prevent its evasion on deceptive grounds. Similarly, in Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council [Minister Administering the Crown Lands Act v. NSW Aboriginal Land Council, 2008 HCA 48: (2008) 237 CLR 285], Kirby, J. held that the principle of providing purposive construction to beneficial legislations mandates that exceptions in such legislations should be construed narrowly.”


(emphasis supplied)


10.More recently, in Kozyflex Mattresses (P) Ltd. v. SBI General Insurance Co. Ltd.,3 this Court held the definition of a consumer under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986 to include a company or corporate person in view of the beneficial purpose of the Act.


11.While considering the provisions of the Medical Termination of Pregnancy Act, this Court in X2 v. State (NCT of Delhi),4 reiterated that interpretation of the provisions of a beneficial legislation must be in line with a purposive construction, keeping in mind the legislative purpose. Furthermore, it was stated that beneficial legislation must be interpreted in favour of the beneficiaries when it is possible to take two views.


12.It is in the above background that we must proceed to examine the Act. The statement of object and reasons of the Act indicates the purpose behind the enactment, as relied upon by this Court in S. Vanitha v. Deputy Commissioner, Bengaluru Urban District and Ors.,5 is:


“Traditional norms and values of the Indian society laid stress on providing care for the elderly. However, due to withering of the joint family system, a large number of elderly are not being looked after by their family. Consequently, many older persons, particularly widowed women are now forced to spend their twilight years all alone and are exposed to emotional neglect and to lack of physical and financial support. This clearly reveals that ageing has become a major social challenge and there is a need to give more attention to the care and protection for the older persons. Though the parents can claim maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, the procedure is both time-consuming as well as expensive. Hence, there is a need to have simple, inexpensive and speedy provisions to claim maintenance for parents.”


13.The preamble of the Act states that it is intended towards more effective provisions for maintenance and welfare of parents and senior citizens, guaranteed and recognised under the Constitution.


14.Therefore, it is apparent, that the Act is a beneficial piece of legislation, aimed at securing the rights of senior citizens, in view of the challenges faced by them. It is in this backdrop that the Act must be interpreted and a construction that advances the remedies of the Act must be adopted.


15.Before adverting to the provisions of the Act, we must be cognizant of the larger issue that this case presents, i.e., the care of senior citizens in our society. This Court in Vijaya Manohar Arbat Dr v. Kashirao Rajaram Sawai and Anr.6 highlighted that it is a social obligation for both sons and daughters to maintain their parents when they are unable to do so.


16.In Badshah v. Urmila Badshah Godse and Anr.,7 this Court observed that when a case pertaining to maintenance of parents or wife is being considered, the Court is bound to advance the cause of social justice of such marginalised groups, in furtherance of the constitutional vision enshrined in the preamble. Recently, this exposition came to be reiterated in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another.8


17.While issuing a slew of directions for the protection of senior citizens in Ashwani Kumar v. Union of India,9 this Court had highlighted:


“3. The rights of elderly persons is one such emerging situation that was perhaps not fully foreseen by our Constitution-framers. Therefore, while there is a reference to the health and strength of workers, men and women, and the tender age of children in Article 39 of the Constitution and to public assistance in cases of unemployment, old age, sickness and disablement and in other cases of undeserved want in Article 41 of the Constitution, there is no specific reference to the health of the elderly or to their shelter in times of want and indeed to their dignity and sustenance due to their age.


4. Eventually, age catches up with everybody and on occasion, it renders some people completely helpless and dependent on others, either physically or mentally or both. Fortunately, our Constitution is organic and this Court is forward looking. This combination has resulted in path-breaking developments in law, particularly in the sphere of social justice, which has been given tremendous importance and significance in a variety of decisions rendered by this Court over the years. The present petition is one such opportunity presented before this Court to recognise and enforce the rights of elderly persons—rights that are recognised by Article 21 of the Constitution as understood and interpreted by this Court in a series of decisions over a period of several decades, and rights that have gained recognition over the years due to emerging situations.”


(emphasis supplied)


18.Keeping in mind the beneficial intention of the statute and the above expositions, we now proceed to consider the issue at hand.


19.Section 23 of the Act reads:


23. Transfer of property to be void in certain circumstances.—


(1) Where any senior citizen who, after the commencement of this Act, has transferred by way of gift or otherwise, his property, subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor and such transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs, the said transfer of property shall be deemed to have been made by fraud or coercion or under undue influence and shall at the option of the transferor be declared void by the Tribunal.


(2) Where any senior citizen has a right to receive maintenance out of an estate and such estate or part thereof is transferred, the right to receive maintenance may be enforced against the transferee if the transferee has notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous; but not against the transferee for consideration and without notice of right.


(3) If, any senior citizen is incapable of enforcing the rights under sub-section (1) and (2), action may be taken on his behalf by any of the organisation referred to in Explanation to sub-section (1) of Section 5.


20.In Sudesh Chhikara v. Ramti Devi and Anr.,10 this Court refused to grant the benefit of Section 23 in the absence of an averment that the transfer in question was subject to a condition for maintenance of the parents. It was observed:


“14. When a senior citizen parts with his or her property by executing a gift or a release or otherwise in favour of his or her near and dear ones, a condition of looking after the senior citizen is not necessarily attached to it. On the contrary, very often, such transfers are made out of love and affection without any expectation in return. Therefore, when it is alleged that the conditions mentioned in sub-section (1) of Section 23 are attached to a transfer, existence of such conditions must be established before the Tribunal.”


(emphasis supplied)


21.Furthermore, in Sudesh (supra) for attracting the application of Section 23(1), the following essentials were expounded:


(a)The transfer must have been made subject to the condition that the transferee shall provide the basic amenities and basic physical needs to the transferor; and


(b)The transferee refuses or fails to provide such amenities and physical needs to the transferor.


22.Adverting to the facts at hand, we find that there are two documents on record. One, a promissory note dated 07.09.2019 which records that the promisor (Respondent) shall serve the Appellant and her husband till the end of their life, and in the absence of him fulfilling such obligation, the subsequent deed can be taken back by the Appellant. Second, the Gift Deed dated 07.09.2019 also records a similar condition, i.e. the donee maintains the donor, and the former makes all necessary provisions for the peaceful life of the Appellant-donor. Both these documents were signed simultaneously.


23.The Appellant has submitted before us that such an undertaking stands grossly unfulfilled, and in her petition under Section 23, it has been averred that there is a breakdown of peaceful relations inter se the parties. In such a situation, the two conditions mentioned in Sudesh (supra) must be appropriately interpreted to further the beneficial nature of the legislation and not strictly which would render otiose the intent of the legislature. Therefore, the Single Judge of the High Court and the tribunals below had rightly held the Gift Deed to be cancelled since the conditions for the well-being of the senior citizens were not complied with. We are unable to agree with the view taken by the Division Bench, because it takes a strict view of a beneficial legislation.


24.Before parting with the case at hand, we must clarify the observations made vide the impugned order qua the competency of the Tribunal to hand over possession of the property. In S. Vanitha (supra), this Court observed that Tribunals under the Act may order eviction if it is necessary and expedient to ensure the protection of the senior citizen. Therefore, it cannot be said that the Tribunals constituted under the Act, while exercising jurisdiction under Section 23, cannot order possession to be transferred. This would defeat the purpose and object of the Act, which is to provide speedy, simple and inexpensive remedies for the elderly.


25.Another observation of the High Court that must be clarified, is Section 23 being a standalone provision of the Act. In our considered view, the relief available to senior citizens under Section 23 is intrinsically linked with the statement of objects and reasons of the Act, that elderly citizens of our country, in some cases, are not being looked after. It is directly in furtherance of the objectives of the Act and empowers senior citizens to secure their rights promptly when they transfer a property subject to the condition of being maintained by the transferee.


26.In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order with the particulars as described in paragraph one of this judgment, is set aside. Consequently, the Gift Deed dated 07.09.2019 is quashed. In the attending facts and circumstances of this case, the Appeal is allowed. Possession of the premises shall be restored to the Appellant by 28.02.2025.


27.The Registry is directed to communicate this judgment to the concerned authorities of the State of Madhya Pradesh who shall ensure compliance. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 [2020] 9 SCR 504 : (2021) 6 SCC 512


2 [2019] 14 SCR 928 : (2020) 14 SCC 126


3 (2024) 7 SCC 140


4 [2022] 7 SCR 686 : (2023) 9 SCC 433


5 [2020] 12 SCR 1057 : (2021) 15 SCC 730


6 [1987] 2 SCR 331 : (1987) 2 SCC 278


7 [2013] 10 SCR 259 : (2014) 1 SCC 188


8 [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 324


9 [2019] 12 SCR 30 : (2019) 2 SCC 636


10 [2022] 17 SCR 876 : 2022 SCC Online SC 1684



Succession Act, 1925 – s.63 – SR-Testator was the owner of 1/4th share of a land – The Testator had no children and resided with his nephew appellant-GK – He executed a Will on 07.11.2005 and passed away the next day on 08.11.2005 – Having received the said land/property by the virtue of the said Will, the appellant transferred the same in favour of his four sons – Thereafter, the said property was sold jointly – Respondent nos.1 to 7 herein filed a suit seeking declaration to the effect inter alia that the Will dated 07.11.2005 was forged and fabricated – Trial Court held that the Will cannot be relied on – The Will was held to be valid and genuine by the Lower Appellate Court, so also it was held that the consequent sale deeds cannot be held invalid – However, the High Court held that the Will had not been proved – Correctness: Held: The view taken by the High Court is that the attesting witness, in his deposition, did not state that the act of affixing his thumb impression on the Will subject matter of dispute was at the direction of the Testator and, therefore, the requirement stipulated u/s. 63 of the Act was not met – The language of Section 63(c) of the Act uses the word ‘OR’ – It states that each Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses who have seen the Testator sign or affix his mark on the Will OR has seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the Testator OR has received a personal acknowledgment from the Testator of his signature or mark etc – What flows therefrom is that the witnesses who have attested the Will ought to have seen the Testator sign or attest his mark OR have seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence of and on the direction of the Testator – In the instant case, the testimony of DW-1 is clear that he had seen the deceased affix his mark on the Will – That alone would ensure compliance of Section 63(c) – The part of the Section that employs the term ‘direction’ would come into play only when the attestor to the Will would have to see some other person signing the Will – Such signing would explicitly have to be in the presence and upon the direction of the Testator – The requirement of law while undoubtedly present, was not of concern in the instant dispute – On that count, the High Court to have erred in law – As such the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside – The Judgment of the First Appellant Court stand restored – Consequently, the Will of SR is valid and so are the subsequent Sale Deeds executed by GK. [Paras 11, 13, 14, 15]


[2025] 1 S.C.R. 93 : 2025 INSC 18


Gopal Krishan & Ors. v. Daulat Ram & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 13192 of 2024)


02 January 2025


[C.T. Ravikumar and Sanjay Karol,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration


Impugned in this appeal is the judgment and order of the High Court dated 26.03.2018 whereby it has been held that the Will, subject matter of controversy, allegedly of one Testator-SR, had not been proved, thereby finding that the Lower Appellate Court had erred in holding otherwise.


Headnotes


Succession Act, 1925 – s.63 – SR-Testator was the owner of 1/4th share of a land – The Testator had no children and resided with his nephew appellant-GK – He executed a Will on 07.11.2005 and passed away the next day on 08.11.2005 – Having received the said land/property by the virtue of the said Will, the appellant transferred the same in favour of his four sons – Thereafter, the said property was sold jointly – Respondent nos.1 to 7 herein filed a suit seeking declaration to the effect inter alia that the Will dated 07.11.2005 was forged and fabricated – Trial Court held that the Will cannot be relied on – The Will was held to be valid and genuine by the Lower Appellate Court, so also it was held that the consequent sale deeds cannot be held invalid – However, the High Court held that the Will had not been proved – Correctness:


Held: The view taken by the High Court is that the attesting witness, in his deposition, did not state that the act of affixing his thumb impression on the Will subject matter of dispute was at the direction of the Testator and, therefore, the requirement stipulated u/s. 63 of the Act was not met – The language of Section 63(c) of the Act uses the word ‘OR’ – It states that each Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses who have seen the Testator sign or affix his mark on the Will OR has seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the Testator OR has received a personal acknowledgment from the Testator of his signature or mark etc – What flows therefrom is that the witnesses who have attested the Will ought to have seen the Testator sign or attest his mark OR have seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence of and on the direction of the Testator – In the instant case, the testimony of DW-1 is clear that he had seen the deceased affix his mark on the Will – That alone would ensure compliance of Section 63(c) – The part of the Section that employs the term ‘direction’ would come into play only when the attestor to the Will would have to see some other person signing the Will – Such signing would explicitly have to be in the presence and upon the direction of the Testator – The requirement of law while undoubtedly present, was not of concern in the instant dispute – On that count, the High Court to have erred in law – As such the impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside – The Judgment of the First Appellant Court stand restored – Consequently, the Will of SR is valid and so are the subsequent Sale Deeds executed by GK. [Paras 11, 13, 14, 15]


Case Law Cited


Meena Pradhan and Others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another (2023) 9 SCC 734; Shivakumar and Others v. Sharanabasappa and Others [2020] 6 SCR 666 : (2021) 11 SCC 277 – relied on.


Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Mandeo Kadam [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 175 : (2003) 2 SCC 91; Kanwaljit Kaur v. Joginder Singh Badwal (deceased through LRs) RSA No. 5252 of 2012; Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs v. Chandrika and Ors. [2016] 3 SCR 1018 : (2016) 6 SCC 157 – referred to.


Books and Periodicals Cited


Justice G.P Singh’s treatise, ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation


List of Acts


Succession Act, 1925


List of Keywords


Will; Testator; Mental faculties; Attesting Witnesses; Direction of the Testator; Attestor to the Will; Section 63 of Succession Act, 1925.


Case Arising From


CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 13192 of 2024


From the Judgment and Order dated 26.03.2018 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 1935 of 2015


Appearances for Parties


T. V. S. Raghavendra Sreyas, Ms. Gayatri Gulati, Siddharth Vasudev, Advs. for the Appellants.


Abhimanyu Tewari, Ms. Eliza Bar, Manav Bhalla, Sidhant Awasthy, Siddhant Saroha, Praveer Singh, Abhijeet Chaudhary, Advs. for the Respondents.


Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court


Judgment


Sanjay Karol J.


1.Impugned in this appeal is the judgment and order of the Punjab and Haryana High Court in RSA No. 1935 of 2015 dated 26th March 2018 whereby it has been held that the Will, subject matter of controversy, allegedly of one Sanjhi Ram, had not been proved, thereby finding that the Lower Appellate Court1 had erred in holding otherwise. The said Lower Appellate Court had set aside the decree of the Civil Court2 which had found that the Will and the subsequent mutation of the properties enumerated therein was bad in law, as the Will was “illegal ”, “null ” and “void ”. The question that falls for our consideration is-


“What do the words “by the direction of the testator” as they appear in Section 63 (c) of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 mean? Is the term to be interpreted liberally or strictly? Consequently, was the High Court correct in holding, in agreement with the Civil Court, that the Will, subject matter of dispute, stood not proved?”


2.Facts, shorn of unnecessary details, as they appear from the record are as follows: -


2.1Sanjhi Ram,3 was the owner of 1/4th share of land measuring 40 canals, 3 marlas, comprised in Khewat no.7, Khatauni no.9, Rett no. 9, Kila no. 9/8 situated in the Revenue Estate of Village Umarpura, Khurd, Tehsil and District Gurdaspur, Punjab. His share in the aforesaid property was to the extent of 10 canals and 1 marla.4


2.2The Testator had no children and resided with his nephew Gopal Krishan.5 He executed a Will on 7th November 2005 and passed away the next day on 8th November 2005. The death certificate issued by the competent authority is dated 19th November 2005.


2.3Having received the property by virtue of the aforesaid Will, the appellant transferred the same in favour of his four sons viz., Ravinder Kumar; Rajinder Kumar; Satish Kumar and Roop Lal vide Sale Deed dated 16th January 2006. The said property was sold jointly for a sum of Rs.98,000/- to Madhu Sharma and Meena Kumari, vide Sale Deed dated 3rd February 2006.


2.4Respondent nos.1 to 7 herein filed a Suit bearing No. 282 of 2006 before the Civil Court, seeking declaration to the effect inter alia (i) that the plaintiffs (respondents herein) were the owners of Sanjhi Ram’s 1/4th share; (ii) that the Will dated 7th November 2005 was forged and fabricated; and (iii) that the mutation carried out subsequent to the execution of such a Will is illegal and not binding on the plaintiffs.


2.5By way of written statement dated 24th April 2006 the contentions made in the plaint were denied.


3.The Trial Court framed seven issues primarily pertaining to, (a) validity of the Will subject matter of the present lis; (b) whether the plaintiffs are estopped by their act and conduct from filing the suit; and (c) whether the plaintiffs have the locus standi to file the suit and whether the same is maintainable, within limitation and filed with sufficient court fees, being affixed thereto.


3.1Of primary importance to the present adjudication is the findings qua issue no.1. The relevant extracts from the judgment of the Civil Court are as below:-


“10. On going through the file I find it has been admitted by the witnesses of the defendants that Sanjhi Ram remained ill. The claim of the Plaintiffs is that he died on 7.11.2005 and the claim of the Defendants that the died on 8.11.2005. The defendants did not being the death certificate of Shri Sanjhi Ram on the file and thus failed to rebut the contention of the Plaintiffs. The visit of Sanjhi Ram at Tehsil Gurdaspur on 7.11.2005 and then executing the Will on the said day without any registration of the same and adjustment of lines on the page in the lower portion and further adjusting the seal by the scribe in the left margin and further the place the thumb mark alleged to be of Sanjhi Ram make the will suspicious which cannot be relied on.”


4.On appeal the Lower Appellate Court relied on a judgment returned by a Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad and one judgment of the Rajasthan High Court to hold that even if the Testator was ill, so long as his mental faculties were not affected, no inference could be drawn that he was not of sound state of mind or that he could not execute a Will. In the facts of the instant case, it was observed that nowhere did the case record reflect that Sanjhi Ram’s mental faculties were in any way questionable nor was he disoriented or affected by illness. In regard to other observations of the Civil Court reproduced (supra) the Lower Appellate Court held as under:-


“16. As noted above, learned Lower Court had found the Will Ex.D1 suspicious also for the reason that the spacing in between last lines in this Will was narrower than the space available between lines in remaining upper part of this Will. In this context learned counsel for the appellants has relied upon Judgment Bahadur Singh versus Poonam Sin h & Ors, (Supra) which applies to the facts of the case in hand. Vide it Hon’ble High Court categorically observed that merely because the spacing of last two three lines is less than the earlier lines it cannot be said that the Will is not genuine. To accommodate writing in one page, sometimes last lines are written closely and therefore such circumstances should not be considered as adverse circumstances. In the case in hand also Will Ex.P1 is on a single page. Moreover, the lines on more than two third of this page have equal spacing between them. It is in the last 1/3rd part of the page of Will that spacing goes on narrowing. When the Will is on a single page only narrowing of space towards end of the writing has to be taken as a natural phenomenon.”


Having observed as above, the Will was held to be valid and genuine, so also it was held that the consequent sale deeds cannot be held invalid. The judgment of the lower Court was set aside.


5.In second appeal the High Court found that: -


(A)The reduction of space while concluding the Will had “totally escaped the notice of the Court’s below ”, and that this was a glaring illegality and perversity. The attesting witness, Janak Raj (DW-1) had not stated in his examination that his thumb print had been appended to the Will upon the direction of the Testator which is a requirement in law. For such a conclusion, reliance was placed on Janki Narayan Bhoir v. Narayan Mandeo Kadam 6 and the Judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court titled Kanwaljit Kaur v. Joginder Singh Badwal (deceased through LRs).7


(B)Placing reliance on the Constitution Bench Judgment of this Court in Pankajakshi (Dead) through LRs v. Chandrika and Ors.,8 the Court without framing substantial questions of law set aside the judgment of the Lower Appellate Court. The appeal preferred by the present respondents was thus allowed.


6.Having traversed the Courts below as aforesaid, the dispute stands before us. We have heard the learned counsel for the parties.


7.Section 63 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 runs thus:-


“63. Execution of unprivileged Wills.—


Every testator, not being a soldier employed in an expedition or engaged in actual warfare, or an airman so employed or engaged, or a mariner at sea, shall execute his Will according to the following rules:—


(a)The testator shall sign or shall affix his mark to the Will, or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction.


(b)The signature or mark of the testator, or the signature of the person signing for him, shall be so placed that it shall appear that it was intended thereby to give effect to the writing as a Will.


(c) The Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses, each of whom has seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the Will or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgement of his signature or mark, or the signature of such other person; and each of the witnesses shall sign the Will in the presence of the testator, but it shall not be necessary that more than one witness be present at the same time, and no particular form of attestation shall be necessary.”


(emphasis supplied)


As seen above, Section 63(c) enumerates five distinct situations:


A is the testator of the Will in question. B and C have signed the Will. For B and C to qualify as attestors,-


Situation 1:


Each of them has to have seen A sign the will or put his mark on it;


OR


Situation 2:


They should have seen some other person, let’s say D sign the will in the presence of and on the direction of A;


OR


Situation 3:


They ought to have received a personal acknowledgment from A to the effect that A had signed the Will or has affixed his mark thereon;


With the use of the conjunctive, ‘and’ one further stipulation has been provided:


B, C, D or any other witness is required to sign the Will in the presence of A however it is not necessitated that more than one witness be present at the same time.


The statutory language also clarifies that B and C, the attestors, are not required to follow any particular prescribed format.


8.The requisites for proving of a Will are well established. They were recently reiterated in a Judgment of this Court in Meena Pradhan and others v. Kamla Pradhan and Another.9 See also Shivakumar and Others v. Sharanabasappa and Others.10 The principles as summarised by the former are reproduced as below:-


“…10.1. The court has to consider two aspects : firstly, that the will is executed by the testator, and secondly, that it was the last will executed by him;


10.2. It is not required to be proved with mathematical accuracy, but the test of satisfaction of the prudent mind has to be applied.


10.3. A will is required to fulfil all the formalities required under Section 63 of the Succession Act, that is to say:


(a) The testator shall sign or affix his mark to the will or it shall be signed by some other person in his presence and by his direction and the said signature or affixation shall show that it was intended to give effect to the writing as a will;


(b) It is mandatory to get it attested by two or more witnesses, though no particular form of attestation is necessary;


(c) Each of the attesting witnesses must have seen the testator sign or affix his mark to the will or has seen some other person sign the will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a personal acknowledgment of such signatures;


(d) Each of the attesting witnesses shall sign the will in the presence of the testator, however, the presence of all witnesses at the same time is not required;


10.4. For the purpose of proving the execution of the will, at least one of the attesting witnesses, who is alive, subject to the process of court, and capable of giving evidence, shall be examined;


10.5. The attesting witness should speak not only about the testator’s signatures but also that each of the witnesses had signed the will in the presence of the testator;


10.6. If one attesting witness can prove the execution of the will, the examination of other attesting witnesses can be dispensed with;


10.7. Where one attesting witness examined to prove the will fails to prove its due execution, then the other available attesting witness has to be called to supplement his evidence;


10.8. Whenever there exists any suspicion as to the execution of the will, it is the responsibility of the propounder to remove all legitimate suspicions before it can be accepted as the testator’s last will. In such cases, the initial onus on the propounder becomes heavier;


10.9. The test of judicial conscience has been evolved for dealing with those cases where the execution of the will is surrounded by suspicious circumstances. It requires to consider factors such as awareness of the testator as to the content as well as the consequences, nature and effect of the dispositions in the will; sound, certain and disposing state of mind and memory of the testator at the time of execution; testator executed the will while acting on his own free will;


10.10. One who alleges fraud, fabrication, undue influence et cetera has to prove the same. However, even in the absence of such allegations, if there are circumstances giving rise to doubt, then it becomes the duty of the propounder to dispel such suspicious circumstances by giving a cogent and convincing explanation;


10.11. Suspicious circumstances must be “real, germane and valid” and not merely “the fantasy of the doubting mind [Shivakumar v. Sharanabasappa (2021) 11 SCC 277]”. Whether a particular feature would qualify as “suspicious” would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. Any circumstance raising suspicion legitimate in nature would qualify as a suspicious circumstance, for example, a shaky signature, a feeble mind, an unfair and unjust disposition of property, the propounder himself taking a leading part in the making of the will under which he receives a substantial benefit, etc.”


9.This case raises the question whether the third requirement u/s 63 of the Act stands met in the present case particularly as to the contours of the meaning of the phrase ‘direction of the testator’.


10.The word ‘direction’, as discussed in the Cambridge Dictionary, can be employed in various contexts – (a) giving instructions to someone to find a particular place or location; (b) looking to an area or position where someone is placed; (c) a sense of direction i.e., the ability to find or locate a particular place; (d) control or instruction; and (e) information or orders telling somebody how or what to do.


11.The present case concerns (d) and/or (e) as above. The view taken by the High Court is that the attesting witness, in his deposition, did not state that the act of affixing his thumb impression on the Will subject matter of dispute was at the direction of the Testator and, therefore, the requirement stipulated u/s 63 Iof the Act was not met.


12.The above said conclusion of the High Court is based on the testimony of Janak Raj, who is DW-1. His testimony reads as under:-


“1. That I know both the parties. I also knew Sanjhi Ram, Son of Shri Tulsi Ram, who was a resident of our Village. He was residing at Gopal Krishan. Sanjhi Ram died issueless. His wife is predeceased him. Gopal Krishan used to serve deceased Sanjhi Ram and was looking after him. Shri Sanjhi Ram who was real uncle of Gopal Krishan, while possessed of sound disposing mind, executed a valid Will on 7.1.2005 in favour of Gopal Krishan. I have seen the original WILL which bears my thumb impression. The WILL is Ex.D.1. The same was scribed by the Deed Writer at the instance of Shri Sanjhi Ram. He further scribing the same, read over and explained the contents of the WILL Ex.D1. Sh. Sanjhi Ram after admitting the contents of the WILL, appended his thumb impression in my presence and as well as in the presence of other attesting witness Sh. Tarsem Lal and thereafter I and other attesting witness put my thumb impression and signature respectively. On the basis of WILL Ex.D.1 Shri Gopal Krishan defendant is owner in possession of the land of the land of Shri Sanjhi Ram. The Plaintiffs have got no right, title or interest in the land let by Shri Sanjhi Ram. …”


(emphasis supplied)


13.The language of Section 63(c)of the Act uses the word ‘OR’. It states that each Will shall be attested by two or more witnesses who have seen the Testator sign or affix his mark on the Will OR has seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence and by the direction of the Testator OR has received a personal acknowledgment from the Testator of his signature or mark etc. What flows therefrom is that the witnesses who have attested the Will ought to have seen the Testator sign or attest his mark OR have seen some other persons sign the Will in the presence of and on the direction of the Testator. The judgment relied on by the learned Single Judge in the impugned judgment, i.e., Kanwaljit Kaur (supra) holds that the deposition of the attesting witness in the said case had not deposed in accordance with Section 63(c) of the Act, where two persons had undoubtedly attested the Will, but the aspect of the ‘direction of the testator’ was absent from such deposition. In the considered view of this Court, the Learned Single Judge fell in error in arriving at such a finding for the words used in the Section, which already stands extracted earlier,read-“or has seen some other person sign the Will, in the presence and by the direction of the testator, or has received from the testator a…”. That being the case, there is no reason why the ‘or’ employed therein, should be read as ‘and’. After all, it is well settled that one should not read ‘and ’ as ‘or ’ or vice-versa unless one is obliged to do so by discernible legislative intent. Justice G.P Singh’s treatise, ‘Principles of Statutory Interpretation’ tells us that the word “or ” is normally disjunctive while the word “and” is normally conjunctive. Further, it is equally well settled as a proposition of law that the ordinary, grammatical meaning displayed by the words of the statute should be given effect to unless the same leads to ambiguity, uncertainty or absurdity. None of these requirements, to read a word is which is normally disjunctive, as conjunctive herein, are present.


14.In the present case the testimony of DW-1 is clear that he had seen the deceased affix his mark on the Will. That alone would ensure compliance of Section 63(c). The part of the Section that employs the term ‘direction’ would come into play only when the attestor to the Will would have to see some other person signing the Will. Such signing would explicitly have to be in the presence and upon the direction of the Testator.


15.The requirement of law while undoubtedly present, was not of concern in the instant dispute. On that count, we find the High Court to have erred in law. As such the impugned judgment of the High Court with the particulars as described in para 1 is set aside. The Judgment of the First Appellant Court stand restored. Consequently, the Will of Sanjhi Ram is valid and so are the subsequent Sale Deeds executed by Gopal Krishan.


Appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s) if any shall stand disposed of.


Result of the case: Appeal allowed.


1 Civil Appeal No. 27 of 2011, judgment dated 5th September 2014 delivered by The Court of Additional District Judge (Adhoc), Fast Track Court, Gurdaspur.


2 Civil Suit No. 282 of 2006, judgment dated 24th February 2011 delivered by Civil Judge, Senior Division, Gurdaspur.


3 Testator


4 Suit property


5 Hereafter appellant no.1


6 [2002] Supp. 5 SCR 175 : (2003) 2 SCC 91


7 RSA No.5252 of 2012


8 [2016] 3 SCR 1018 : (2016) 6 SCC 157


9 (2023) 9 SCC 734


10 [2020] 6 SCR 666 : (2021) 11 SCC 277