Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession – When cannot be relied upon – Appellant convicted for the murder of his live-in partner (‘M’), on the basis of extra-judicial confession allegedly made by him before PW-1 (landlord) and PW-3 (brother of the deceased) endorsed by PW-4 (wife of PW-3) and PW-6: Held: Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person – The circumstances would not only have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but also have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances – All these circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence – The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence – Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but, great care must be taken in evaluating it – If the evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted – Conduct of the appellant was quite strange – Instead of confessing his guilt before the police/any other authority, he first went to PW-1 and told him about the death of deceased; he further told him that he was on his way to the residence of the PW-3 to inform him about the development – He then went to the residence of PW-3 alongwith his son in a rickshaw and told PW-3 about the death of deceased following assault on her by him – This he stated to PW-3 before PW-4 and PW-6 (person sitting on the steps of the house of PW-3) – Extrajudicial confession of the appellant lacked credibility as PW-3 clearly stated that the appellant was in a confused state of mind when he confessed before him – Accused was thus, not in a fit state of mind when he made the extra-judicial confession before PW-3 – Further, the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-6 also suffered from material omission – Testimony of prosecution witnesses lacks credibility and also hit by contradictions – No corroborating circumstances were brought on record by the prosecution – Though, there is a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of hard evidence – Extra-judicial confession made before the witnesses lacks credibility and hence, cannot be relied upon – Appellant given benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence of the appellant passed by the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court, set aside and quashed – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.161. [Paras 16, 20, 22, 23-25]

 

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 388 : 2025 INSC 147

Ramu Appa Mahapatar v. The State of Maharashtra

(Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2013)

04 February 2025

[Abhay S. Oka and Ujjal Bhuyan,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether on the strength of the evidence of the four witnesses, the appellant-accused can be linked with the offence; whether it can be said that the charge against the accused of committing murder of the deceased stood conclusively proved beyond all reasonable doubt.

Headnotes

Evidence – Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession – When cannot be relied upon – Appellant convicted for the murder of his live-in partner (‘M’), on the basis of extra-judicial confession allegedly made by him before PW-1 (landlord) and PW-3 (brother of the deceased) endorsed by PW-4 (wife of PW-3) and PW-6:

Held: Where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person – The circumstances would not only have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, but also have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances – All these circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence – The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence – Conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but, great care must be taken in evaluating it – If the evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted – Conduct of the appellant was quite strange – Instead of confessing his guilt before the police/any other authority, he first went to PW-1 and told him about the death of deceased; he further told him that he was on his way to the residence of the PW-3 to inform him about the development – He then went to the residence of PW-3 alongwith his son in a rickshaw and told PW-3 about the death of deceased following assault on her by him – This he stated to PW-3 before PW-4 and PW-6 (person sitting on the steps of the house of PW-3) – Extrajudicial confession of the appellant lacked credibility as PW-3 clearly stated that the appellant was in a confused state of mind when he confessed before him – Accused was thus, not in a fit state of mind when he made the extra-judicial confession before PW-3 – Further, the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-6 also suffered from material omission – Testimony of prosecution witnesses lacks credibility and also hit by contradictions – No corroborating circumstances were brought on record by the prosecution – Though, there is a strong suspicion against the appellant but suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of hard evidence – Extra-judicial confession made before the witnesses lacks credibility and hence, cannot be relied upon – Appellant given benefit of doubt – Conviction and sentence of the appellant passed by the Sessions Judge as affirmed by the High Court, set aside and quashed – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.161. [Paras 16, 20, 22, 23-25]

Circumstantial evidence – Extra-judicial confession – Evidentiary value of – Discussed. [Paras 16-19.2]

Case Law Cited

State of Rajasthan v. Raja Ram [2003] Supp. 2 SCR 445 : (2003) 8 SCC 180; Sansar Chand v. State of Rajasthan [2010] 12 SCR 583 : (2010) 10 SCC 604; Sahadevan v. State of Tamil Nadu [2012] 4 SCR 366 : (2012) 6 SCC 403; Alauddin v. State of Assam [2024] 6 SCR 20 : (2024) SCC Online SC 760 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence Act, 1872

List of Keywords

Circumstantial evidence; Extra-judicial confession; Murder; Live-in relationship; Chain of evidence; Inference of guilt; Incriminating facts and circumstances; Incompatible with the innocence of the accused; Guilt of any other person; Hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; Confused state of mind; Fit state of mind; Material omission; Testimony lacks credibility; Contradictions; No corroborating circumstances; Strong suspicion; Benefit of doubt; Not proved beyond reasonable doubt.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 608 of 2013

From the Judgment and Order dated 02.12.2010 of the High Court of Bombay in CRLA No. 252 of 2005

Appearances for Parties

Dr. Nirmal Chopra, Adv. for the Appellant.

Sanjay Kharde, Sr. Adv., Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ujjal Bhuyan, J.

This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and order dated 02.12.2010 passed by the High Court of Bombay at Bombay (High Court) in Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2005 (Ramu Appa Mahapatar Vs. State of Maharashtra) whereby the High Court dismissed Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2005 filed by the appellant.

2.Be it stated that the aforesaid criminal appeal was preferred against the judgment and order dated 15.10.2004 passed by the First Ad-hoc Additional District and Sessions Judge, Thane (Sessions Judge) in Sessions Case No. 52 of 2004 whereby and whereunder appellant was convicted under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1861 (IPC) and sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment (RI) for life and to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to suffer RI for 3 months.

3.Prosecution case in brief is that appellant lived with deceased Manda; it was a live-in relationship. Both of them were living in a chawl of PW-1 Ravinder Gopal Jadhav, who was the landlord. Appellant informed PW-1 that his wife had expired and that he was going to her parents’ house at Dipchale village to inform them. Thereafter, appellant alongwith his son went to Dipchale village where appellant met the brother of the deceased, Bhagwan i.e. PW-3. Appellant told PW-3 in the presence of Shankar PW-6, Pandhari PW-5 and Chanda Bai PW-4 that there was a quarrel between him and Manda following which he had assaulted Manda who succumbed to the injuries.

3.1.Before the appellant could come back to his village Kudus alongwith the relatives of the deceased, PW-1 had already opened the door of the house which was bolted from outside. On opening of the door PW-1 noticed that Manda was lying dead with multiple bleeding injuries. Her mangalsutra and glass bangles were broken; some of the household articles were strewn around on the ground. When appellant reached the place of incident alongwith the relatives of the deceased Manda, PW-1 enquired from him about the incident. At that stage, appellant told PW-1 that deceased Manda had suspected that he (appellant) was having illicit relation with some other woman. This resulted in a quarrel in the course of which appellant had assaulted Manda with the help of a grinding stone and a stick.

3.2.PW-1 then lodged First Information Report (FIR) before the police station whereafter offence under Section 302 IPC was registered against the appellant.

3.3.Investigating officer carried out the investigation in the course of which he drew inquest panchanama, spot panchanama and made seizure of various articles from the place of incident. Appellant was arrested. The weapon of assault was seized. On completion of investigation, chargesheet was filed against the appellant charging him for committing an offence punishable under Section 302 IPC.

4.Learned Sessions Judge read over and explained the charge to the appellant to which he pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried. To prove its case, prosecution examined 10 witnesses. It was a case of circumstantial evidence. Prosecution relied upon the extra-judicial confession of the appellant made before PW-1 Ravindra, PW-3 Bhagwan, PW-4 Chandabai and PW-6 Shankar. After considering the evidence on record, learned Sessions Judge vide the judgment and order dated 15.10.2004 convicted the appellant under Section 302 IPC and sentenced him to undergo RI for life and also to pay fine of Rs. 1,000/-, in default to suffer RI for another 3 months.

5.Aggrieved by the aforesaid conviction and sentence, appellant preferred appeal before the High Court being Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2005. By the judgment and order dated 02.12.2010 (impugned judgment), High Court dismissed the appeal of the appellant. Consequently, conviction and sentence of the appellant have been affirmed.

6.This Court by order dated 21.09.2012 had issued notice in the related petition for special leave to appeal (criminal). Leave was granted vide the order dated 15.04.2013. Hence, the present appeal.

7.Learned counsel for the appellant has taken us to the evidence of PW-1, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6 and submits that the extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant before the above witnesses could not be accepted as a valid piece of evidence. Extra-judicial confession itself is a weak piece of circumstantial evidence. From the testimony of the above witnesses, it is clearly evident that no credence could be given to the theory of extra-judicial confession. Such confession does not inspire any confidence. Beyond the extra-judicial confession, there was no material on record to link the appellant with the death of the deceased. Learned trial court as well as the High Court had erred in placing reliance on the so-called extra-judicial confessions and basing the conviction of the appellant on such evidence. He, therefore, submits that conviction of the appellant is wholly unsustainable and liable to be set aside. Resultantly, the appeal should be allowed.

8.Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent supports the impugned judgment of the High Court. According to him, there is no reason to disbelieve the evidence of PWs 1, 3, 4 and 6. Therefore, the trial court was justified in convicting the appellant on the basis of confessional statement made by the appellant before the above witnesses. High Court had rightly affirmed such conviction and sentence of the learned Sessions Judge. He submits that there is no case for interference with the concurrent findings. Therefore, the criminal appeal is liable to be dismissed.

9.Submissions made by learned counsel for the parties have received the due consideration of the Court.

10.PW-1 is the informant Ravindra; he is the owner of the chawl in which accused used to stay as the tenant alongwith his ‘wife’ and son. On 21.03.2003 at about 06:15 AM, accused came to the residence of PW-1 alongwith his son and informed PW-1 that his wife had expired. Thereafter, the accused went to the house of the parents of his wife to call her relatives. PW-1 stated that he had gone to the house of the accused alongwith his brother and found that it was bolted from outside. Alongwith his brother Shyam Rao Gopal Jadhav, PW-1 opened the door and saw that wife of the accused was lying dead on the floor in a pool of blood.

10.1.Accused brought the brother of the deceased and 4/5 persons. They also saw the dead body. At that stage, PW-1 and his brother enquired with the accused who told them that he had assaulted the deceased with a grinding stone.

10.2.According to PW-1, he went to the police station and lodged the first information which he proved in the court alongwith its contents.

10.3.In cross-examination, he stated that the accused had only told him that his wife had expired. He had talked with the accused for about five minutes. Accused told him that he was going to call her relatives.

10.4.PW-1 denied the suggestion that accused was in a confused state of mind. He stated that he did not feel it necessary to inform the police immediately. He lodged the information between 12 noon to 12:15 PM. He also denied the suggestion that the accused had told him that some people had come in the night and had assaulted him and his wife whereafter they ran away. He further denied the suggestion that accused had told him that somebody had killed his wife and had also assaulted him.

11.PW-3 is Bhagwan. He is the brother of the deceased Manda. On 21.09.2003 at 07:30 AM, he was sitting alongwith Maruti, Pandu Ram Thorat and Shankar Rama Bhoye in front of his house. At that time, accused came alongwith his son Kiran. He told them that there was a quarrel between him and deceased Manda because of which he had assaulted Manda. As a result of the injuries sustained, she died. Hearing this, PW-3 alongwith Maruti, Pandu Ram Thorat and Shankar Rama Bhoye went with the accused to his village.

11.1.When they reached the house of the accused, they found that the landlord (PW-1) was present there. They saw Manda lying dead in a pool of blood. She had injuries on her head, forehead and face. Her saree was soaked in blood and food was strewn around. Accused told them that he had assaulted the deceased with a grinding stone and a wooden stick. Thereafter, they alongwith the landlord (PW-1) went to the police station.

11.2.In his cross-examination, he stated that the accused and the deceased were not married but were staying together. The deceased used to complain to him that accused was beating her.

11.3.Accused told PW-3 and the others that Manda had expired whereupon he was asked as to how she had expired. Though Manda was the younger sister of PW-3, he did not ask the accused whether any complaint was lodged with the police. Maruti Thorat and Pandu Ram Thorat, who are the maternal uncles of PW-3, were present when PW-3 made enquiries with the accused. He had told his maternal uncles Maruti and Pandu Ram to handover the accused to the police.

11.4.PW-3 denied the suggestion that he was not sure as to whether the accused was speaking lies. Since he was to verify as to whether Manda had died, therefore they did not handover the accused to the police. PW-3 clearly stated that when the accused came, he was in a confused state of mind and he did not take tea. His clothes were not torn or blood stained. Accused had brought one mini door rickshaw and in that, PW-3 and the others went to his house. According to PW-3, he had stated before the police that accused had told him that he had assaulted Manda with a grinding stone and had killed her but did not know why it was not written.

11.5.PW-3 stated that they reached the house of the accused around 10:00 AM and thereafter they alongwith the landlord went to the police station to lodge complaint. He denied the suggestion that the accused had never told him about his quarrel with his wife and that he had assaulted her because of which she died. He also denied the suggestion that accused had told him that in the night, some thieves had come and that they had assaulted him and Manda.

12.Chandabai is PW-4. She is the wife of PW-3. According to her, on 21.09.2003 in the morning, her husband was chatting with Shankar, Maruti and Pandu Ram. Meanwhile, the accused came there alongwith his son Kiran and told them that he had quarrelled with Manda because of which he had assaulted her and she died. Leaving behind his son Kiran with PW-4, accused alongwith husband of PW-4 i.e. PW-3 and others went to Kudus i.e. the village of the accused.

12.1.In her cross-examination, she stated that she was residing alongwith her husband PW-3, their three children and now with Kiran, son of the accused. On the day of the incident, her husband PW-3 was sitting outside their home after his breakfast. She stated that she did not directly talk with the accused but came to know about the incident. She denied the suggestion that she only came to know about the incident when her husband PW-3 told her that Manda was assaulted. She denied the suggestion that accused had told her that on that fateful night, 3/4 persons entered their house and had assaulted Manda when the accused ran away alongwith his son from the house. She further denied the suggestion that in the morning, accused had come and found that Manda had died and therefore he informed the landlord and thereafter to PW-4 and others.

12.2.She denied the suggestion that the accused also had injuries and that his clothes were torn.

13.PW-6 Shankar was sitting on the steps of the house of Bhagwan i.e. PW-3 in the morning of 21.09.2003 alongwith Bhagwan, Maruti and Pandu Ram. Accused came there at about 07:30 AM. He had come in a rickshaw alongwith his son. Accused told Bhagwan that he had quarrelled with Manda during which he had assaulted her and that she had died.

13.1.PW-6 stated that son of the accused was kept with the wife of Bhagwan whereafter they all went to the residence of the accused at Kudus. In the house of the accused, they saw that Manda had already expired. She had injuries on her forehead, head and back. They also saw that bangles and mangal sutra were broken and that there was splattering of blood.

13.2.In his cross-examination, he stated that accused was with them for about half an hour to 45 minutes. He did not know the accused prior to that date. He denied the suggestion that the clothes of the accused were torn and that the accused was in a confused state of mind.

13.3.PW-6 further deposed that he had told the police that accused had told Bhagwan in their presence that he had a quarrel with Manda in the night but he did not know why it was not written that accused had told so to Bhagwan in his statement by the police.

13.4.PW-6 denied the suggestion that the accused had told them that in the night, 3/4 drunk persons had entered their house whereafter they had assaulted him and when they were about to assault his son, he ran away with his son.

14.The above four are the witnesses who had deposed that the accused had stated before the informant (PW-1) and PW-3 that he had a quarrel with Manda because of which he assaulted her with a grinding stone and a stick following which she died. There is no dispute about the multiple injuries seen on the body of the deceased or the homicidal nature of the death of the deceased. Question for consideration is whether on the strength of the evidence of the above four witnesses, the accused can be linked with the offence and as to whether it can be said that the charge against the accused of committing murder of the deceased stood conclusively proved beyond all reasonable doubt?

15.Before we analyse the evidence of the above witnesses, it is necessary to briefly examine the law relating to extra-judicial confession as the present is a case of extra-judicial confession allegedly made by the accused before PW-1 and PW-3 which were endorsed by PW-4 and PW-6.

16.Extra-judicial confession of an offence made by the accused before a witness is one of the several instances of circumstantial evidence; there are other circumstances, such as, the theory of last seen together; conduct of the accused before or immediately after the incident; human blood being found on the clothes or person of the accused which matches with that of the accused; leading to discovery, recovery of weapon etc. As we know, circumstantial evidence is not direct to the point in issue but consists of evidence of various other facts which are so closely associated with the fact in issue that taken together, they form a chain of circumstances from which the existence of the principal fact can be legally inferred or presumed. The chain must be complete and each fact forming part of the chain must be proved. It has been consistently laid down by this Court that where a case rests squarely on circumstantial evidence, inference of guilt can be justified only when all the incriminating facts and circumstances are found to be incompatible with the innocence of the accused or the guilt of any other person. The circumstances would not only have to be proved beyond reasonable doubt, those would also have to be shown to be closely connected with the principal fact sought to be inferred from those circumstances. All these circumstances should be complete and there should be no gap left in the chain of evidence. The proved circumstances must be consistent only with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused and totally inconsistent with his innocence. The circumstances taken cumulatively must be so complete that there is no escape from the conclusion that within all human probability the crime was committed by the accused and none else. While there is no doubt that conviction can be based solely on circumstantial evidence but great care must be taken in evaluating circumstantial evidence. If the evidence relied upon is reasonably capable of two inferences, the one in favour of the accused must be accepted.

17.In State of Rajasthan Vs. Raja Ram,1 this Court explained the concept of extra-judicial confession. Confession may be divided into two classes i.e. judicial and extra-judicial. Judicial confessions are those which are made before a magistrate or a court in the course of judicial proceedings. Extra-judicial confessions are those which are made by the party elsewhere than before a magistrate or a court. Extra-judicial confessions are generally those that are made by a party before a private individual who may be a judicial officer also in his private capacity. As to extra-judicial confessions, two questions arise: firstly, whether they are made voluntarily and secondly, are they true? If the court is of the opinion that the confession was not made voluntarily but was a result of an inducement, threat or promise, it would not be acted upon. It follows that a confession would be voluntary if it is made by the accused in a fit state of mind and if it is not caused by any inducement, threat or promise having reference to the charge against him proceeding from a person in authority. Whether or not the confession was voluntary would depend upon the facts and circumstances of each case judged in the light of Section 24 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (briefly ‘the Evidence Act’ hereinafter). The law is clear that a confession cannot be used against an accused person unless the court is satisfied that it was voluntary. At that stage, the question whether it is true or false does not arise. If the facts and circumstances surrounding the making of a confession appear to cast a doubt on the veracity and voluntariness of the confession, the court may refuse to act upon the confession even if it is admissible in evidence. The question whether a confession is voluntary or not is always a question of fact. A free and voluntary confession is deserving of the highest credit because it is presumed to flow from the highest sense of guilt.

17.1.An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind, can be relied upon by the court. The confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the reliability of the witness to whom it is made and who gives the evidence. Extra-judicial confession can be relied upon and conviction can be based thereon if the evidence about the confession comes from a witness who appear to be unbiased, not even remotely inimical to the accused, and in respect of whom nothing is brought out which may tend to indicate that he may have a motive of attributing an untruthful statement to the accused. The words spoken by the witness should be clear, unambiguous and unmistakenly convey that the accused is the perpetrator of the crime and that nothing is omitted by the witness which may militate against it. After subjecting the evidence of the witness to a rigorous test on the touchstone of credibility, the extra-judicial confession can be accepted and can be the basis of a conviction if it passes the test of credibility.

17.2.If the evidence relating to extra-judicial confession is found credible after being tested on the touchstone of credibility and acceptability, it can solely form the basis of conviction. The requirement of corroboration is a matter of prudence and not an invariable rule of law.

18.In Sansar Chand Vs. State of Rajasthan,2 this Court accepted the admissibility of extra-judicial confession and held that there is no absolute rule that an extra-judicial confession can never be the basis of a conviction although ordinarily an extra-judicial confession should be corroborated by some other material.

19.Evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession was again examined in detail by this Court in Sahadevan Vs. State of Tamil Nadu.3 That was also a case where conviction was based on extra-judicial confession. This Court held that in a case based on circumstantial evidence, the onus lies upon the prosecution to prove the complete chain of events which shall undoubtedly point towards the guilt of the accused. That apart, in a case of circumstantial evidence where the prosecution relies upon an extra-judicial confession, the court has to examine the same with a greater degree of care and caution. An extra-judicial confession, if voluntary and true and made in a fit state of mind can be relied upon by the court. However, the confession will have to be proved like any other fact. The value of the evidence as to confession like any other evidence depends upon the veracity of the witness to whom it has been made.

19.1.This Court acknowledged that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent, such evidence should not be considered. This Court held as follows:-

14. It is a settled principle of criminal jurisprudence that extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of evidence. Wherever the court, upon due appreciation of the entire prosecution evidence, intends to base a conviction on an extra-judicial confession, it must ensure that the same inspires confidence and is corroborated by other prosecution evidence. If, however, the extra-judicial confession suffers from material discrepancies or inherent improbabilities and does not appear to be cogent as per the prosecution version, it may be difficult for the court to base a conviction on such a confession. In such circumstances, the court would be fully justified in ruling such evidence out of consideration.

19.2.Upon an indepth analysis of judicial precedents, this Court in Sahadevan (supra) summed up the principles which would make an extra-judicial confession an admissible piece of evidence capable of forming the basis of conviction of an accused:

(i)The extra-judicial confession is a weak evidence by itself. It has to be examined by the court with greater care and caution.

(ii)It should be made voluntarily and should be truthful.

(iii)It should inspire confidence.

(iv)An extra-judicial confession attains greater credibility and evidentiary value if it is supported by a chain of cogent circumstances and is further corroborated by other prosecution evidence.

(v)For an extra-judicial confession to be the basis of conviction, it should not suffer from any material discrepancies and inherent improbabilities.

(vi)Such statement essentially has to be proved like any other fact and in accordance with law.

20.Having surveyed the principles governing the acceptability and evidentiary value of an extra-judicial confession, we may now advert to such confession made by the accused before PW-1, PW-3, PW-4 and PW-6. It is on record that PW-3 in his cross-examination was quite categorical in deposing that he found the accused to be in a confused state of mind. This factum has also come on record in the testimony of the other witnesses before whom such confession was made. In other words, the accused was not in a fit state of mind when he made the extra-judicial confession before PW-3. That apart, there were no blood stains on the clothes worn by the accused; not to speak of any such blood samples matching with the blood of the deceased. While various articles were seized from the place of occurrence, there was no recovery of any blood-stained clothes. There is no evidence on record that the grinding stone was recovered or that there were any blood stains on the recovered stick, not to speak of such blood stains matching the blood of the deceased. Moreover, we find the conduct of the accused to be quite strange; instead of confessing his guilt before the police or any other authority, he first goes to PW-1, the landlord, and tells him about the death of Manda; further telling him that he was on his way to the residence of the brother of Manda (PW-3) to inform him about the development. He goes to the residence of PW-3 alongwith his son in a rickshaw and tells PW-3 about the death of Manda following assault on her by him. This he stated to PW-3 before PW-4 and PW-6. What is more strange is the reaction or non-reaction of PW-3 when the accused confessed before him that he had killed his sister Manda. This is not at all a normal behaviour of a brother. He would have certainly reacted strongly when he heard the accused saying that he had killed his sister. Instead of any such reaction, as per the prosecution case, PW-3 accompanied the accused back to his residence. Further, PW-4 stated in her cross-examination that she did not talk with the accused directly but came to know about the incident. This clearly puts her testimony under a cloud.

21.There is one more aspect which we would like to flag off. From the evidence on record, we find that there is a clear material omission in the cross-examination of PW-3. According to the testimony of PW-3, he had stated before the police that the accused had told him that he had assaulted Manda with a grinding stone and had killed her but the same was not recorded by the police in his statement under Section 161 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (Cr.P.C.). Similarly, PW-6 in his deposition stated that he had told the police that the accused had told Bhagwan (PW-3) in his presence that he had a quarrel with Manda in the night but the police did not record in his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C.

22.From the above, it is evident that not only the extra-judicial confession of the accused lacks credibility as PW-3 is clearly on record stating that the accused was in a confused state of mind when he confessed before him, the testimonies of PW-3 and PW-6 suffer from material omission. Their statements made under Section 161 Cr.P.C. are at variance with their evidence in court regarding the confession made by the accused before PW-3. This Court in Alauddin Vs. State of Assam4 explained the context in which an omission occurs and when such an omission amounts to a contradiction. In the light of the Explanation to Section 162 of the Cr.P.C., this Court held as follows:

7. When the two statements cannot stand together, they become contradictory statements. When a witness makes a statement in his evidence before the court which is inconsistent with what he has stated in his statement recorded by the police, there is a contradiction. When a prosecution witness whose statement under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC has been recorded states factual aspects before the court which he has not stated in his prior statement recorded under Section 161(1) or Section 164 of CrPC, it is said that there is an omission. There will be an omission if the witness has omitted to state a fact in his statement recorded by the police, which he states before the court in his evidence. The Explanation to Section 162 CrPC indicates that an omission may amount to a contradiction when it is significant and relevant. Thus, every omission is not a contradiction. It becomes a contradiction provided it satisfies the test laid down in the Explanation under Section 162. Therefore, when an omission becomes a contradiction, the procedure provided in the proviso to sub-Section (1) of Section 162 must be followed for contradicting witnesses in the cross-examination.

23.As observed above, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses suffers from serious lack of credibility and also hit by contradictions which strike at the very root of the prosecution case. No corroborating circumstances have been brought on record by the prosecution.

24.No doubt there is a strong suspicion against the appellant and the needle of suspicion qua the death of Manda points towards him but as is the settled jurisprudence of this country, suspicion howsoever strong cannot take the place of hard evidence. The evidence on the basis of which the prosecution seeks conviction of the accused i.e. extra-judicial confession made before the above witnesses lack credibility and hence cannot be relied upon. Besides, the evidence suffers from material contradiction. Therefore, it would be wholly unsafe to sustain the conviction of the appellant based on such weak circumstantial evidence which on the top of it lack credibility.

25.For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the appellant must get the benefit of doubt. In view of the above, the conviction and sentence of the appellant vide the judgment and order dated 15.10.2004 passed by the Sessions Judge in Sessions Case No. 52 of 2004 as affirmed by the High Court vide the judgment and order dated 02.12.2010 passed in Criminal Appeal No. 252 of 2005, are hereby set aside and quashed. Since the appellant is in detention, he shall be released from custody forthwith if not required in any other case.

26.Criminal appeal is accordingly allowed.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

1 (2003) 8 SCC 180

2 (2010) 10 SCC 604

3 (2012) 6 SCC 403

4 (2024) SCC Online SC 760

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to: Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40]

 

[2025] 3 S.C.R. 1 : 2025 INSC 160

Geddam Jhansi & Anr. v. The State of Telangana & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025)

07 February 2025

[B.V. Nagarathna and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the criminal proceedings against the appellant(s) under Sections 498A, 506, Penal Code, 1860 and Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 ought to be quashed.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Quashing – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.498A, 506 – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Complainant made specific allegations against her husband and her mother-in-law for demand of dowry and harassment – However, as regards the appellants (complainant’s mother-in-law’s younger sister and her son), the allegation was that they pressurized her to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes – High Court declined to quash criminal proceedings against the appellants – Challenge to:

Held: Impugned judgements set aside – Charges against the accused including the appellants were sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders – Complainant in her complaints did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning cruelty, the demands of dowry or her physical and mental harassment except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details – Nothing on record to show that the parents or the two witnesses witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants – Statements of the Panchayat elder is based on the information provided by the complainant’s father and is hearsay evidence – No prima facie case made out against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial – Pending criminal proceedings quashed qua the two appellants – Constitution of India – Article 142. [Paras 37, 23, 40]

Matrimonial/domestic disputes – Criminalisation of domestic disputes, effect on the institution of family – Tendency to implicate family members/relatives – Duty of Court, discussed – In criminal cases of domestic violence, complaints and charges to be specific. [Paras 31-35]

Case Law Cited

State of Haryana and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors. [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 735 : (1992) 1 Supp. SCC 335; Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi) [2018] 13 SCR 1028 : (2019) 11 SCC 706 – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

List of Keywords

Quashing; Cruelty; Demand for dowry; Physical and mental Harassment; Domestic violence; Harassment; Criminal intimidation; Panchayat witnesses; Identical statements of the witnesses; Generalised allegations; Matrimonial/domestic disputes; Criminal cases relating to domestic violence; Tendency to implicate family members/relatives; Institution of family; Abuse of the process of the law; Charge-sheet; Hearsay evidence.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 609 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 04.04.2022 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 3105 of 2022

With

Criminal Appeal No. 610 of 2025

Appearances for Parties

Nitin Tambwekar, Seshatalpa Sai Bandaru, Shaik Mohammad Haneef, Abdul Mannan, Irshad Ahmad, Advs. for the Appellants.

Ms. Devina Sehgal, Vineet George, Beno Bencigar, Parijat Kishore, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, J.

1.Leave granted in both the SLPs.

2.This common order disposes of both the Criminal Appeals arising out of Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 and Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 as both these appeals relate to similar and connected incidents.

3.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 9556 of 2022 was filed against the judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 under Section 498A, 506 Indian Penal Code (for short “IPC”) and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (for short “Dowry Act”) pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) by holding that, prima facie, there are certain allegations against both the appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali, and that these are triable issues for which the appellants have to face trial and prove their innocence.

4.Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 428 of 2024 has been preferred against the judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 whereunder the High Court declined to quash the criminal proceedings under the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (for short “DV Act”) in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of CrPC on similar ground by holding that, prima facie, there are specific allegations against the sole appellant, Geddam Jhansi, and the same have to be decided only after enquiry.

5.Being aggrieved by the refusal of the High Court to quash the aforesaid criminal proceedings pending before the concerned Magistrates, the present appeals have been preferred.

6.The gravamen of the plea of the appellants in both the appeals is that the allegations against them are vague and are of a generalised nature without any specific overt act attributed to them, thus, incapable of being fastened with criminal liability, which unfortunately, the High Court had failed to appreciate.

7.The relevant facts in brief as may be culled from the pleadings is that a written complaint was filed before the Mahila Police Station Bhuvanagiri on 17.09.2021 by one Premlata (hereinafter referred to as “complainant”) in which it was mentioned that she was married to one Samuel Suresh, a doctor by profession and a resident of Chennai on 17.08.2016 and at the time of marriage her mother-in-law, Pathagadda, had demanded a sum of Rs.30 Lakhs and accordingly, the complainant’s mother had given Rs.10 Lakhs by way of cash and 15 tolas of gold as dowry to her mother-in-law. It was stated that for about five months after the marriage, the complainant’s husband had treated her well and took care of her properly. Unfortunately, later, her husband suspecting her character started harassing her mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10 Lakhs, for which her mother-in-law, the younger sister of her mother-in-law, namely, Geddam Jhansi (Appellant No.1), her brother-in-law, Sudheer, and the son of Geddam Jhansi, namely, Geddam Sathyakama Jabali (Appellant No.2) pressurized her to act according to her husband’s and mother in law’s wishes and also threatened to kill her if the demand for dowry was not met. It was also alleged that because of their behaviour, the complainant’s mother organised panchayat several times before the elders and other family members. It was alleged that in front of the elders, her husband had agreed to take care of her properly but as usual after sometime he started harassing her because of which she ultimately approached the police for counselling but there was no change in their behaviour leaving her no alternative but to file the aforesaid complaint.

8.On the basis of the aforesaid complaint, FIR No. 54 of 2021 was registered at Bhongir Women PS, Rahakonda District, under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the complainant’s husband, complainant’s mother-in-law, complainant’s brother in law and the present two appellants. On completion of the investigation, Charge Sheet No. 46 of 2021 was filed before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Sections 498A, 506 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against the aforesaid accused including the present two appellants, which is now pending before the aforesaid court in C.C. No. 46 of 2022.

9.Apart from the aforesaid complaint filed before the Mahila Police Station, another complaint was filed by the complainant on 20.09.2021 before the Protection Officer, Bhuvanagari alleging cruelty and criminal intimidation under the DV Act, 2005 making similar allegations with the additional allegations that on one occasion, her husband asked her not to touch his clothes and to go away from the kitchen and that he tried to burn his socks because the complainant had washed them. It was also alleged that her husband had influenced his friends to talk ill of her, who in turn used to call the complainant and ask her to leave her husband, further telling her that her husband has a girlfriend who had taken divorce to marry him. It was also alleged that on 17.10.2020 at around 10:00 p.m, the complainant was beaten and pushed out of the matrimonial house by her husband.

10.The complainant accordingly, approached the Judicial Magistrate First Class, Bhongir where a case under DV Act, being DVC No. 25 of 2021 was registered and is now pending.

11.At this stage it may be apposite to mention herein that the allegations are not one way and the husband had made counter allegations against the complainant. Before the aforesaid complaints were filed by the complainant, the husband of the complainant instituted a divorce proceeding before the Court of the Principal District Judge at Kanchipuram, which was registered as I.D.O.P. No. 44 of 2021 under Section 10 of the Indian Divorce Act, 1869 alleging neglect, insensitivity to the needs of the husband, incompatibility, concealment of facts, showing hostile attitude towards the husband, refusal to consummate the marriage, causing mental and physical harassment and desertion since 10 April 2018.

12.As we proceed to examine the issues involved, we may briefly allude to the law relating to quashing of FIRs/criminal proceedings, which is well-settled and summarised by this Court in the State of Haryana and Ors. vs. Bhajan Lal and Ors., 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 in which this Court held as below:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

13.In the present case, the charge-sheet has been filed before the Court of the Magistrate in C.C. No. 46 of 2022 after investigation was completed by the police on the basis of the complaint/FIR lodged by the complainant and another proceeding is also pending under the DV Act before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate. However, this will not preclude this Court from interfering with the criminal proceedings, if upon perusal of the complaints, the materials gathered during the investigation and in the charge-sheet, it is found that no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants and the criminal proceedings amount to abuse of the process of law. As mentioned above, the common plea of the appellants in both the proceedings is that allegations against them are of a generalized nature devoid of specific offending acts to constitute offences punishable under law.

14.In this regard, we may recall what this Court has held in Anand Kumar Mohatta v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2019) 11 SCC 706 as regards permissibility of quashing of proceeding once charge-sheet is filed as follows:

“14. First, we would like to deal with the submission of the learned Senior Counsel for Respondent 2 that once the charge-sheet is filed, petition for quashing of FIR is untenable. We do not see any merit in this submission, keeping in mind the position of this Court in Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] . In Joseph Salvaraj A. [Joseph Salvaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, (2011) 7 SCC 59 : (2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 23] , this Court while deciding the question whether the High Court could entertain the Section 482 petition for quashing of FIR, when the charge-sheet was filed by the police during the pendency of the Section 482 petition, observed : (SCC p. 63, para 16)

“16. Thus, from the general conspectus of the various sections under which the appellant is being charged and is to be prosecuted would show that the same are not made out even prima facie from the complainant’s FIR. Even if the charge-sheet had been filed, the learned Single Judge [Joesph Saivaraj A. v. State of Gujarat, 2007 SCC OnLine Guj 365] could have still examined whether the offences alleged to have been committed by the appellant were prima facie made out from the complainant’s FIR, charge-sheet, documents, etc. or not.”

15. Even otherwise also, it must be remembered that the provision invoked by the accused before the High Court is Section 482 of the CrPC and that this Court is hearing an appeal from an order under Section 482 of the CrPC. Section 482 of the CrPC reads as follows:

“482. Saving of inherent powers of the High Court.—Nothing in this Code shall be deemed to limit or affect the inherent powers of the High Court to make such orders as may be necessary to give effect to any order under this Code, or to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice.”

16. There is nothing in the words of this section which restricts the exercise of inherent powers by the Court to prevent the abuse of process of court or miscarriage of justice only up to the stage of the FIR. It is settled principle of law that the High Court can exercise jurisdiction under Section 482 of CrPC even when the discharge application is pending with the trial court [G. Sagar Suri v. State of U.P., (2000) 2 SCC 636, para 7, Umesh Kumar v. State of A.P., (2013) 10 SCC 591, para 20]. Indeed, it would be a travesty to hold that proceedings initiated against a person can be interfered with at the stage of FIR but not if it has advanced and the allegations have materialised into a charge-sheet. On the contrary it could be said that the abuse of process caused by the registration of the FIR stands aggravated if the FIR has taken the form of a charge-sheet after investigation. The power is undoubtedly conferred to prevent abuse of process of any court.

15.Keeping the aforesaid legal position in mind, we will examine whether the facts/materials obtaining in the present case would warrant interference of this Court under Section 482 of the CrPC for quashing the said criminal proceedings pending before the concerned courts.

16.As far as the first complaint is concerned, out of which the criminal proceeding in “C.C. No.46 of 2022” has arisen, which is pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir, where the charge-sheet has been filed, the relevant portions of the said complaint read as follows: -

“xxxxxx

On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh. S/o. Late Janardhan Rao, aged 38 years, Caste: SC (Madiga). Occupation: Doctor, R/o Pondicherry in Chennai. At the time of marriage, my mother-in-law demanded Rs. 30,00,000/- and accordingly my mother has given Rs. 10.00.000/- by way of cash and 15 tulas gold as dowry to my mother-in-law. After the marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter my husband started suspecting my character and harassed mentally and physically to get additional dowry of Rs.10,00,000/-. I submit that my mother-in-law Pathagadda Bharathi and younger sister of my Mother-in-Law namely Geddam Jhansi, my brother-in-law Sudheer and son of younger sister of my Mother-in-law namely Geddam Satya Rama Jabili all the persons referred above used to pressurize to act according to my husband’s and Mother-in-law’s wish, otherwise they threatened to kill me. In this regard my mother organized Panchayathi several times, before the elders and family members. In front of the elders, my husband agreed to take care of me properly but as usual, after sometime, he started harassing me. Thereafter. I have approached Bhongiri Mahila Police Station and have given a complaint. Thereafter, Police personnel called them for counselling, but there was no change in the behaviour. In view of the above I request to take legal action, on all persons mentioned above.”

(emphasis added)

17.Charge-sheet is filed only on culmination of the investigation during which time the investigating agency collects all the relevant evidence in support of the complaint on the basis of which a clear prima facie case indicating commission of the offence must be made out against the accused warranting trial. The investigation may uncover/throw up more detailed and additional facts and evidence that would support the complaint/FIR. Accordingly, this Court will examine the charge-sheet filed and examine the evidence which has been gathered in the present case relating to “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” to see if any new facts or evidence had been disclosed.

18.In this regard we may refer to the charge-sheet filed in connection with the aforesaid case, relevant portions of which are reproduced hereinbelow: -

“As per the evidence collected, during the course of the investigation and as per detailed and discreet enquiries, prima-facie care is made out against the A-1 to A-5 for the offence punishable U/s 498-(A). 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 Dowry Prohibition Act-1961.

During the further course of the Investigation, since the prima-facie offence is proved against the accused A-1. A-2 & A-4 on 23.09.2021 the LW-07 has Register post under sub-section (1) of Section 41 A of Criminal Procedure Code to them, but A-1, A-2 & A-4 was Rejected the Post, after that A-1 received anticipatory bail Hon’ble court of 5 additional district and sessions judge at Bhongir Cri.M.P.No.410/2021 on 27-11-2021 A-3 & A-5 on 02.11.2021 the LW-07 has served the notices them under sub-section (1) of Section 41.A of Criminal Procedure Code with directions to appear before me. Accordingly, on 03.12.2021, the accused A-3 & A-5 have complied with the instructions of LW-07 by appearing before her. As such, as per the directions of the Hon’ble Apex Court and since the offence is having the punishment of less than seven years Imprisonment, the LW. 07 has served notices under sub-section (3) of section 41 A of Criminal Procedure to the accused A-3 & A-5 directing them to appear before the Hon’ble trial court as when they received the summons.

Investigation done so far in this case it well established that LW-1 Panthagadda Premalatha is the complainant & victim legally wedded of the A-1 is resident of H No 1-11-14. Near By Meg Market. Jangaon (V&M&D), Present at Yadagirigutta (V&M). Yadadri-Bhongir (Dist), the LW-2 S Potta Chandralah, the Lw-3. Smt Potta Bharathamma are parents respectively of victim and circumstant witness to the incident, the LW.4, Sri Eppialapally Narendar, the LW-5 Sri Bollepally Janardhan are panchayath elders & circumstantial witness to the incident. Whereas the accused A-1 Panthagadda Shymul Suresh is the son of A-2, the A-2. Panthagadda Bharathi, are resident of Thiruvikanagar. Madhaliya Pet. Pondicherry, the A-3 /Geddam Jhand. Small Mother-in-law of A-1, the A-4 Panthagadda Sudheer, the AS Geddam Sathyakama Jabal @Amancherla Jabali are Brothers of A-1 are resident of Jawaharagar, Hyderabad.

The LW-1 marriage was performed on 17.08.2016 with the A-1 as per customs prevailing in their community and the presence of their relatives. At the time of LW-1 marriage. her in-laws.

Demand Rs. 30,00,000/-Cash for dowry, in which, LW-2 & 3 have gave Rs. 10,00,000/- cash, 15 Thule’s Gold to them as dowry, After marriage the couple had lead happy conjugal life of 5 Months. thereafter A-1 suspecting the Lw-1 character and also used to harassed mentally and physically to bring Additional Rs.10.00.000/- dowry from her parent’s house otherwise A-1 do the 2 marriage with other women, A-2 to A-5 are supported to A-1 Due to such harassment, the LWs 26 3 was placed the matter before the elders LW1-4 & 5 who are circumstantial witness & Panchayath elders. On request of the LWs 2 & 3, the elders held a panchayath 2018 May month 2 times at Chennai, 2018 July month one time at Hyderabad A-3 House, 2019 February Month one time. 2019 August Month one time convinced them, A-1 to A-5 says in front of panchayath elders take good care of Lw-1. but A-1 to A 5) are again harassed her. Later 2 years ago A1 to A-5 beaten the Lw-1 and necked out in the house to bring additional Rs. 10,00,000/ dowry if not bring the amount they would kill the LW-1. Later Lw-1 filed a complaint against them in Woman PS Bhongir. Police are given counselling them, but A1 to A 5 did not change their · attitude. Thus the A1 to A5 noted in Col. No 12 of this charge sheet committed an offence punishable U/s 498-A. 406, 506 IPC & Sec 3 & 4 DP Act.”

19.Perusal of the charge-sheet would show that the investigating agency had relied on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two other witnesses who are Panchayat elders to substantiate the allegations. As far as the statement of the complainant is concerned, it is in the form of the complaint which has been already reproduced hereinabove. We will now examine whether any new or fresh evidence has been revealed in the course of the investigation from the examination of other witnesses, namely, the complainant’s parents and the two panchayat witnesses.

20.The statements of the parents are carbon copy of each other and as such we may refer to the statement of the father only, relevant portions of which read as follows: -

“I am resident of Yadadri Bhuvangiri district, Bibinagar, Brahmanapalli road. We married our daughter Premalatha in 2016 to Panthagadda SamuelSuresh, s/o Janardhan Rao, resident of Pondicherry. Our son-in-law works as a Doctor. At the time of marriage, the Mother-in-law of my daughter demanded Rs.30,00,000 cash as dowry and we gave Rs. 10,00,000/ cash and 15 sovereigns of gold as per her wish. Five months after marriage, my daughter came to our house and told me: that her husband-was suspecting her with every person she spoke further he told her that he doesn’t like her as she did not get the dowry as demanded by them and asked her to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/ for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that, he can marry again. He was harassing my daughter mentally and physically. My daughter’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, my daughter’s mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, my daughter’s husband’s brother Sudhir, Jabali, all of them supported my daughter’s husband and told that as she brought less dowry they warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used to abuse her and beat her. In this regard we held panchayat with elders. When the elders convinced them, they used to say they will look after her well and taken her with them, but used to harass her again. These type of panchayats took place 4 times in Chennai and 5 times in Hyderabad. Approximately about 2 years ago my daughter came to our house and told me that when she questioned why they were doing like this, they said, how dare you to raise your voice against us and all of them together abused her and beat her and pushed her out of house. They threatened her saying that, if she comes home without getting money of Rs.10,00,000/- they will kill her. After that, my daughter has given a complaint against them in Bhuvanagiri Mahila Police Station and the police called them and counselled them, but there was no change in them is what he stated.”

(emphasis added)

21.The other evidence is in the form of the statements of the two panchayat witnesses, namely, Sri Eppala Pally Narendar and Sri Bollepally Janardhan. It is also noticed that their statements too are reproduction of the other and as such examination of only one of the statements will suffice, for which we may examine the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narendar, relevant portions of which read as follows: -

“I am a resident of Yadadri-Bhuvanagiri district…….After 5 months of their marriage Chandraiah came to me and told me that his daughter came home and told him that her husband is suspecting her with every person she spoke Further he told he doesn’t like her, as she did not get the dowry that they asked for he asked her to get additional dowry of Rs 10,00,000 for his needs or else asked her to leave him so that he can marry again. He used to harass mentally and physically. Premalatha’s Mother-in-law Bharathi, her Mother-in-law’s younger sister Geddam Jhansi and her son Geddam Sathyacama, Jabali, her husband’s brother Subir, all of them together supported her husband and told her that she brought less dowry and warned her to listen to her husband or else they will kill her. They used to say insulting words and used abuse her and beat her Premalatha’s father told me that in this regard, they were holding a panchayat with elders and asked me to come an panchayat elder. Then I along with a few other elders went to the panchayat. We told them to be good and they said we will look after Premalatha well and has taken her with them, but again harassed her in the same way. In May 2018, one time in July 2018, one time in February 2019, one time in 2019 August, in panchayats were held in Chennai and Hyderabad (Jhansi’s house). In the panchayat all the above persons, collectively told that, if they give the dowry they asked for only, they will take Premalatha or else we will get their boy married again. 1 came to know that at about 2 years ago all of them together abused and beat Premalatha and pushed her out of house and threatened her to get Rs.5,00,000 and then only they will allow her enter the house or else they will kill her-is the statement given by him”

22.When we minutely examine the statements of the father and the mother of the complainant, what can be seen is that as far as the demand for dowry of Rs. 30 Lakhs and giving of Rs. 10 lakhs and 15 sovereigns of gold at the time of marriage of the complainant is concerned, it can be said that it was within their direct knowledge. Being the father and mother, the complainant daughter would naturally convey to them what had transpired with her in relation to her husband and family. Thus, as regards other allegations of harassment, the same were informed to them by their daughter but they were not witness to the same.

It may also be noted that as regards the alleged act of beating of the complainant by her husband and other relatives mentioned by the parents, the complainant herself does not mention so in her complaints. Therefore, this allegation of beating of the complainant is something which has been added by the father and the mother of the complainant though they did not themselves witness the same.

23.As regards the statement of Sri Eppala Pally Narender, the Panchayat elder, regarding the incidents of harassment which are the subject matter of the complaint, the same has been stated by him after he was informed by the father of the complainant. Thus, his evidence is nothing but hearsay evidence. As far as the statement regarding holding of panchayat at Hyderabad and Chennai is concerned, where the family members of the husband had allegedly stated that if the dowry is not given as demanded, the complainant would not be taken back and they would get the husband married again, the said statement is of a very generalised nature and vague in the sense that it does not mention exactly when and in which Panchayat the aforesaid incident took place and what roles the appellants played. Further, it is noticed that this witness as well as the other Panchayat witness are residents of Bhongir which is in Telangana. It is not stated how they were also present in the Panchayat meetings held in Chennai.

The aforesaid Panchayat witness mentioned about the alleged demand of dowry and threat meted out to the complainant of being killed if the demand for dowry of Rs. 5 lakhs was not met, and about the threat of the complainant being thrown out of the matrimonial house, but the said statement is based on the information provided to him by the father of the complainant and is not based on personal knowledge of the witness.

24.When the aforesaid statements are examined, it is evident that there certainly are specific allegations made against the husband of the complainant, his mother (mother-in-law of the complainant) about demand of dowry and harassment meted out to the complainant. However, as regards the present appellants, the allegation against them is that they along with the other accused family members used to pressurize the complainant to act according to her husband and her mother-in-law’s wishes. Apart from this generalised allegation, there are no specific or overt acts attributed to the appellants which would tantamount to acts of cruelty or physical or mental harassment or being active participants in the demands for dowry.

25.From the above what is clearly evident is that the statements of the witnesses though support the case of the complainant, do not disclose any new fact or provide better particulars beyond what had already been stated by the complainant. As far as the present appellants are concerned, these witnesses including the complainant merely make generalised allegations without any specific evidence against them.

26.Thus, if the evidence of the complainant as well as the witnesses are taken at their face value, what can be said to have been made out against the appellants is that the appellants and other members of the family used to pressurize the complainant to act according to the wishes of her husband and mother-in-law which is a very generalised allegation devoid of specific particulars.

27.As mentioned above, the statements of the mother and the father of the complainant as annexed in the charge-sheet are carbon copies. Similarly, the same is in respect of the statements of the other two independent witnesses, Epalla Pally Narender and Bollepally Janardhan. Under these circumstances, discussed above, we have no hesitation to say that the identical statements of the witnesses do not inspire confidence of this Court for continuation of the criminal proceedings with regard to the present appellants.

28.Coming to the other case relating to domestic violence pending before the Court of Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir in DVC No. 25 of 2021, the same is based on the second complaint dated 20.09.2021 filed by the complainant, relevant portions of which read as follows:-

“xxxxxx

On 17.08.2016, I was married to Samuel Suresh….

After the, marriage for a period of 5 months or so, my husband has taken care of me properly. Thereafter 1. My husband Samuel Suresh, 2. My mother-in-law Bharati Janardhan. 3. Younger sister of my mother-in law Jhansi Geddam 4. My brother-in-law Pathagadda Sudheer 5. Son of my mother-in-law’s sister Geddam Sathyakama Jabill, all the above referred persons, with a plan, started harassing me physically and mentally and demanded to get additional dowry of Rs. 10,00,000/-. When I informed the same thing to my parents, my parents organized a panchayat before my family members and elders. My husband agreed to take care of me properly, before the elders, but as usual after some days he started harassing me along with his family members. They made me to pay the house rent. At times my husband stayed away from the house during nights. My husband used to tell each and everything to my mother-in-law and he used to act as per her directions. Further my mother-in-law used to pressurize me to purchase a new house and a car. They also tried to get a false report from the psychiatrist, by taking an appointment with the doctor. Thereafter they forced me to address a letter stating that, I was responsible for all the mistakes happened in our marital life. They have taken money from me and have spent for their personal uses.

I submit that when meeting was held at the residence of younger sister of my mother-in-law, my husband promised before my parents that he will take care of me properly. After that when I holded his hand, he pushed me down and used to scold me for every small issue. Further he asked not to touch his clothes and go away from the kitchen. Once he tried to burn his socks. because I washed them. My husband has not supported me, even when requested him, that there is a problem in my job and finally lost the job. My parents have invited my husband for my brother’s marriage, but he refused to attend the marriage and used to pressurize me to sign the letter. He used to tell bad about me to his friends and they used to call me and asked me to leave my husband. One day, a girl called me and said that my husband is having a girlfriend earlier and now she has taken divorce from her husband and therefore he is planning to marry her. They have tortured me in many ways, but I patiently tolerated their ill-treatment for a smooth marriage, but he has not understood me. He tortured me mentally by scolding me and he used to go out with his friends and used to come at 3 or 4 in the early morning. On 17.10.20 at around 10:00 pm he necked me out of the house, therefore I request you to take legal action on my husband Samuel Suresh and other family members for torturing me physically and mentally. Further I request you to take action as per Domestic Violence and see that protection order and residence order is provided in my favor. Further, see that every month Rs.30,000/- is given to me, for my maintenance.”

(emphasis added)

The said second complaint is more or less the reiteration of the allegations made in her first complaint with some additional incidents. Perusal of the second complaint shows that no specific allegations about harassment have been made against the appellants.

29.As far as the allegation of the complainant of being thrown out of her matrimonial house on 17.10.2020 is concerned, she made the specific allegation only against her husband and she did not attribute any role of the appellants except for making a general allegation of harassing her physically and mentally without specifying the actual role of the appellants.

30.It may be also noted that in the second complaint, the complainant had specifically stated that when a meeting was held at the residence of the younger sister of her mother-in-law (Appellant No.1), her husband promised before her parents that he would take care of her properly. This statement shows that the Appellant No. 1 was trying to mediate and broker peace between the complainant, her husband and her mother-in-law, which is inconsistent with the allegation that the appellants were pressurising the complainant in support of the mother-in-law and the husband.

31.Invoking criminal process is a serious matter with penal consequences involving coercive measures, which can be permitted only when specific act(s) which constitute offences punishable under the penal code or any other penal statute are alleged or attributed to the accused and a prima facie case is made out. It applies with equal force when criminal laws are invoked in domestic disputes. Criminalising domestic disputes without specific allegations and credible materials to support the same may have disastrous consequences for the institution of family, which is built on the premise of love, affection, cordiality and mutual trust. Institution of family constitutes the core of human society. Domestic relationships, such as those between family members, are guided by deeply ingrained social values and cultural expectations. These relationships are often viewed as sacred, demanding a higher level of respect, commitment, and emotional investment compared to other social or professional associations. For the aforesaid reason, preservation of family relationship has always been emphasised upon. Thus, when family relationships are sought to be brought within the ambit of criminal proceedings rupturing the family bond, courts should be circumspect and judicious, and should allow invocation of criminal process only when there are specific allegations with supporting materials which clearly constitute criminal offences.

32.We have to keep in mind that in the context of matrimonial disputes, emotions run high, and as such in the complaints filed alleging harassment or domestic violence, there may be a tendency to implicate other members of the family who do not come to the rescue of the complainant or remain mute spectators to any alleged incident of harassment, which in our view cannot by itself constitute a criminal act without there being specific acts attributed to them. Further, when tempers run high and relationships turn bitter, there is also a propensity to exaggerate the allegations, which does not necessarily mean that such domestic disputes should be given the colour of criminality.

33.It goes without saying that genuine cases of cruelty and violence in domestic sphere, which do happen, ought to be handled with utmost sensitivity. Domestic violence typically happens within the four walls of the house and not in the public gaze. Therefore, such violence is not noticed by public at large, except perhaps by the immediate neighbours. Thus, providing visible evidence by the victim of domestic violence may not be easily forthcoming and producing direct evidence may be hard and arduous, which does not necessarily mean that domestic violence does not occur. In fact, to deal with this pernicious phenomenon, stringent statutes like Protection from Domestic Violence Act, 2005, have been enacted with very expansive meaning and scope of what amounts to domestic violence. Since, violence perpetrated within the domestic sphere by close relatives is now criminalised entailing serious consequences on the perpetrators, the courts have to be careful while dealing with such cases by examining whether there are specific allegations with instances against the perpetrators and not generalised allegations. The purpose and mandate of the law to protect the victims of domestic violence is of paramount importance, and as such, a balance has to be struck by ensuring that while perpetrators are brought to book, all the family members or relatives are not indiscriminately brought within the criminal net in a sweeping manner.

34.For a matrimonial relationship which is founded on the basis of cordiality and trust to turn sour to an extent to make a partner to hurl allegations of domestic violence and harassment against the other partner, would normally not happen at the spur of the moment and such acrimonious relationship would develop only in course of time. Accordingly, such a situation would be the culmination of a series of acts which turns, otherwise an amicable relationship, into a fractured one. Thus, in such cases involving allegations of domestic violence or harassment, there would normally be a series of offending acts, which would be required to be spelt out by the complainant against the perpetrators in specific terms to rope such perpetrators in the criminal proceedings sought to be initiated against them. Thus, mere general allegation of harassment without pointing out the specifics against such perpetrators would not suffice, as is the case in respect of the present appellants.

35.We are, thus, of the view that in criminal cases relating to domestic violence, the complaints and charges should be specific, as far as possible, as against each and every member of the family who are accused of such offences and sought to be prosecuted, as otherwise, it may amount to misuse of the stringent criminal process by indiscriminately dragging all the members of the family. There may be situations where some of the family members or relatives may turn a blind eye to the violence or harassment perpetrated to the victim, and may not extend any helping hand to the victim, which does not necessarily mean that they are also perpetrators of domestic violence, unless the circumstances clearly indicate their involvement and instigation. Hence, implicating all such relatives without making specific allegations and attributing offending acts to them and proceeding against them without prima facie evidence that they were complicit and had actively collaborated with the perpetrators of domestic violence, would amount to abuse of the process of law.

36.Our observations, however, should not be generalised to mean that relatives cannot be brought under the purview of the aforesaid penal provisions when they have actively participated in inflicting cruelty on the daughter-in-law/victim. What needs to be assessed is whether such allegations are genuine with specific criminal role assigned to such members of the family or whether it is merely a spill over and side-effect of a matrimonial discord and allegations made by an emotionally disturbed person. Each and every case of domestic violence will thus depend on the peculiar facts obtaining in each case.

37.In the present case, the charges against the accused including the appellants are sought to be substantiated based on the statements of the complainant, her parents and two panchayat elders.

As discussed above, the statements of the two elders are based on the information provided by the father of the complainant. These two witnesses did not witness any of the incidents of physical harassment by the appellants. Though they were present in the panchayat to resolve the dispute between the parties, their account of harassment of the complainant is based on what they had learnt from the father of the complainant. As regards their knowledge of demand of dowry by the appellants, the same is quite vague and without specific details.

Similarly, the statements of the parents of the complainant are based on the information provided by the complainant/daughter. There is also nothing on record to show that the parents witnessed any of the incidents of physical harassment of the complainant at the instance of the appellants.

Thus, the evidence against the appellants in these proceedings boils down to the evidence of the complainant. The complainant in her complaints as mentioned above, did not assign any specific role to the appellants concerning the demands of dowry and physical and mental harassment of the complainant, except for making a sweeping allegation without specific details. The evidence of the complainant is the foundation for the criminal proceedings against the appellants. As discussed above, the evidence of the other witnesses do not disclose anything new as far as the appellants are concerned.

In our considered view, the aforesaid materials do not constitute a prima facie case against the appellants for continuing the criminal proceedings against them in the trial.

38.We have also noted that the appellants do not live with the principal accused. While the marriage took place in Pondicherry and the complainant lived with her husband and mother-in-law in Chennai, the appellants are residents of Hyderabad. As the appellants do not stay together with the complainant and her husband and mother-in-law, to make the appellants as co-accused for alleged offences committed in the matrimonial house of the complainant on the basis of very generalised allegations does not appear to be tenable.

39.Under these circumstances, for the reasons discussed above, we are satisfied that the appellants have been able to make out a case for interference in these proceedings qua the present appellants as in our opinion no prima facie case has been made out against the appellants to continue with the criminal proceedings against them and allowing these to continue would amount to abuse of the process of the law.

40.Accordingly, we allow both the present Criminal Appeals as below:

(i)The impugned judgement and order dated 04.04.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 3105 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in “C.C. No. 46 of 2022” pending before the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 is quashed qua the two appellants, Geddam Jhansi and Geddam Sathyakama Jabali.

(ii)The impugned judgement and order dated 03.02.2022 passed by the Ld. Single Bench of the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No. 1002 of 2022 is set aside and the criminal proceedings in DVC No. 25 of 2021 pending before the Court of the Additional Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Bhongir is quashed qua the appellant, Geddam Jhansi. This is having regard to the criminal proceeding against her being quashed as above and as identical allegation (paragraph 28 above) are made against her in DVC No. 25 of 2021, and in exercise of our powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. This is also by bearing in mind the relationship of the appellant Geddam Jhansi to the complainant, being the latters’s mother-in-law’s sister.

41.However, it is made clear that the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court are in the respect of the allegations made against the present appellants and the same will have no bearing on the criminal proceedings against the other accused persons and the trial courts will not be swayed by the observations and findings recorded herein by this Court and the trial courts are expected to proceed with the criminal proceedings pending against the other accused persons after proper appreciation of evidence and in accordance with law.

Result of the case: Appeals allowed.

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.31(1) and 60(5) – Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 – Respondent No.02-Corporate Debtor was sub-leased a Plot at NOIDA Special Economic Zone by the Appellant-NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority – Appellant’s case that the Corporate Debtor had begun defaulting on lease payments and there was no performance or activity on the said land – In light of the defaults committed by corporate debtor, CIRP was initiated by the appellant before the NCLT – Appellant filed a claim of INR 6,29,18,121/- which was admitted by the Respondent No.01 – Resolution Professional (RP) – A Resolution plan prepared by the Respondent No. 03-Resolution applicant was put before the Committee of Creditors – An application was then filed u/ss.31(1) and 60(5) of the IBC before the NCLT by the RP, seeking an approval of the Resolution Plan on behalf of the Committee of Creditors – The same was allowed by NCLT vide order dated 05.10.2020, granting only INR 50 Lakhs to the appellant against its admitted claim of INR 06.29 Crores – Objections against the said order by appellant were dismissed by the NCLT by order dated 27.11.2020 – Appeals before NCLAT were also dismissed vide the impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022 – Correctness:

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 489 : 2024 INSC 839

Noida Special Economic Zone Authority v. Manish Agarwal & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No(s). 5918-5919 of 2022)

05 November 2024

[Abhay S. Oka and Augustine George Masih,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The appellant-NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority filed a claim of INR 06.29 Crores which was admitted by the Respondent No.01-Resolution Professional. The NCLT vide order dated 05.10.2020, granted only INR 50 Lakhs to the appellant against its admitted claim of INR 06.29 Crores. In the instant appeals, the challenge is to the judgment dated 14.02.2022 passed by NCLAT which were preferred by the appellant being the operational creditor impugning the order dated 05.10.2020 passed by the NCLT approving the Resolution Plan as presented on the approval by the Committee of Creditors.

Headnotes

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – ss.31(1) and 60(5) – Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 – Respondent No.02-Corporate Debtor was sub-leased a Plot at NOIDA Special Economic Zone by the Appellant-NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority – Appellant’s case that the Corporate Debtor had begun defaulting on lease payments and there was no performance or activity on the said land – In light of the defaults committed by corporate debtor, CIRP was initiated by the appellant before the NCLT – Appellant filed a claim of INR 6,29,18,121/- which was admitted by the Respondent No.01 – Resolution Professional (RP) – A Resolution plan prepared by the Respondent No. 03-Resolution applicant was put before the Committee of Creditors – An application was then filed u/ss.31(1) and 60(5) of the IBC before the NCLT by the RP, seeking an approval of the Resolution Plan on behalf of the Committee of Creditors – The same was allowed by NCLT vide order dated 05.10.2020, granting only INR 50 Lakhs to the appellant against its admitted claim of INR 06.29 Crores – Objections against the said order by appellant were dismissed by the NCLT by order dated 27.11.2020 – Appeals before NCLAT were also dismissed vide the impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022 – Correctness:

Held: It is settled that the question of valuation is basically a question of facts, which does not call for any interference if it is based on relevant material on record – The average of the two closest estimates given by the valuers were taken into consideration as fair value and liquidation value respectively, which were found to be just and reasonable – This would be, keeping in view Section 35C of IBC 2016, where the powers and duties of the liquidator have been laid down – Since due process appears to have been followed no fault is found requiring interference – Sections 30 and 31 of IBC 2016, which deal with the submission of the Resolution Plan has rightly been evaluated and analysed NCLAT as per the ratio laid down by the Supreme Court in its various decisions – Conclusion as culled out and elucidated is correct that all the dues, including statutory dues owned by the Central Government, State Government and local authority, which is not the part of the Resolution Plan shall stand extinguished and no proceedings in respect of such dues for the period prior to the date on which the Adjudicating Authority had approved the Resolution Plan could be pressed into service or continues – These observations took care of the assertions of the appellant with regard to the statutory dues and the claims as have been made and put forth relatable to the areas of lease – Beside this, as regards the other claims pertaining to the transfer fees, etc. were not to be interfered with by courts or tribunals as the same stood related to the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors for they being the best persons to determine their interests, and any such interference is non-justiciable except as provided by Section 30(2) of IBC 2016 – There is no such violation of the statute or the procedure – It has come on record and stands admitted that the Resolution Plan had already been implemented and the dues as found payable under the Resolution Plan have been disbursed to the concerned parties and also the appellant – In light of the records and various decisions of the Supreme Court, the claim of the appellant cannot be accepted – Thus, the orders dated 05.10.2020 and 27.11.2020, as passed by the NCLT and approved by the NCLAT vide its impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022, do not call for any interference. [Paras 14, 15, 16, 20]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s.238 – Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 – Overriding effect of IBC, 2016:

Held: As far as the submission that exemptions from NOIDA Special Economic Zone (NSEZ) payments, including any type of fees or penalty for renewal of sub-lease and/or for transfer charges due with regard to the change of directorship or shareholding in favour of the Resolution Applicant has to be dealt with as per Clause 10.9 of the Resolution Plan cannot be accepted in the light of Section 238 of IBC 2016, which provides for the provisions of IBC 2016 to have an overriding effect over the other laws – If that be so, the obvious effect is that the same would prevail, leading to the provisions as contained in the SEZ Act 2005 giving way to IBC 2016. [Para 17]

Case Law Cited

Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others (2000) 1 SCC 633; Maharashtra Seamless Limited v. Padmanabhan Venkatesh and Others [2020] 2 SCR 1157 : (2020) 11 SCC 467; Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and Others [2021] 13 SCR 737 : (2021) 9 SCC 657; K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and Others [2019] 3 SCR 845 : (2019) 12 SCC 150; Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others [2019] 16 SCR 275 : (2020) 8 SCC 531; Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401; DBS Bank Limited Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited and Another [2024] 1 SCR 114 : (2024) 3 SCC 752 – referred to.

List of Acts

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Special Economic Zone Act, 2005.

List of Keywords

Section 31(1) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; Section 60(5) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016; NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority; Operational creditor; Resolution Plan.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 5918-5919 of 2022

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2022 of the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Delhi in CAAT (I) Nos. 90 and 91 of 2021

Appearances for Parties

Manish Singhvi, Sr. Adv., Anshul Rawat, Saurabh George, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the Appellant.

Gopal Jain, Sr. Adv., Abhishek Anand, Ms. Mithu Jain, Karan Kohli, Krishna Sharma, Kunal Godhwani, Karan Batura, Ms. Kinjal Chadha, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Augustine George Masih, J.

1.In the present Appeals challenge is to the Judgment dated 14.02.2022 passed by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal, Principal Bench, New Delhi (hereinafter referred to as “NCLAT”) which were preferred by the Appellant, i.e., NOIDA Special Economic Zone Authority, being the Operational Creditor (hereinafter referred to as “Appellant”) impugning the Order dated 05.10.2020 passed by the Adjudicating Authority of National Company Law Tribunal, New Delhi Bench (hereinafter referred to as “NCLT”) approving the Resolution Plan as presented on the approval by the Committee of Creditors, and also the Order dated 27.11.2020 vide which an application preferred by the Appellant, challenging the approval of the Resolution Plan, stood rejected.

2.Briefly, the facts are that the Respondent No.02, i.e., Shree Bhoomika International Limited, being the Corporate Debtor (hereinafter referred to as “Corporate Debtor”) was sub-leased the Plot bearing No. 59-I admeasuring 16,100 square meters at NOIDA Special Economic Zone (hereinafter referred to as “NSEZ”) by the Appellant, in capacity of lessee of the said land from the NOIDA Authority, vide Lease Deed dated 26.10.1995, and it was valid for a period of 15 years, i.e., up to 31.05.2010. It is the case of the Appellant that the Corporate Debtor had begun defaulting on lease payments in 1999, and moreover, there was no performance or activity on the said land since the year 2003-2004 leading to financial losses to the Government Exchequer, and same also being violative of the Special Economic Zone Rules and guidelines framed therein. Appellant has also made a reference to a Public Notice dated 06.02.2018 by the Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund for sale of immovable and movable assets of the Corporate Debtor through an e-auction, fixing the total reserved price at INR 09.18 Crores.

3.In the light of the defaults committed by the Corporate Debtor, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process (hereinafter referred to as “CIRP”) was initiated by the Appellant before the NCLT. While admitting the said application on 11.07.2019, an Interim Resolution Professional (hereinafter referred to as “IRP”) was appointed. The Committee of Creditors, which comprised of the Sole Financial Creditor, being the Stressed Assets Stabilization Fund – IDBI Bank Limited (hereinafter referred to as “sole Financial Creditor”) was constituted by the IRP after making a public announcement on 17.07.2019 as per the prescribed procedure.

4.In pursuance thereto, the Appellant filed a claim of INR 6,29,18,121/- (Rupees Six Crores Twenty Nine Lakhs Eighteen Thousand and One Hundred Twenty One only) which was admitted by the Respondent No.01 – Resolution Professional (hereinafter referred to as “RP”) in entirety. Valuation of the Corporate Debtor was thereby conducted by two different valuers, and an average thereof was carried out, leading to the fixing of the liquidation value of the Corporate Debtor at INR 04.25 Crores. The Appellant had put forth that the valuers had also observed that the valuations derived by them could be realised, subject to fulfilment of the rules of NSEZ and procedure of approval thereof.

5.The Resolution Plan dated 24.11.2019 (hereinafter referred to as “Resolution Plan”), which was prepared by the Respondent No. 03 – M/s Commodities Trading, being the Resolution Applicant (hereinafter referred to as “Resolution Applicant”) was put before the Committee of Creditors, which approved it in its 4th Meeting dated 06.01.2020.

6.An application was then filed under Sections 31(1) and 60(5) of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBC 2016”) before the NCLT by the RP, seeking an approval of the Resolution Plan on behalf of the Committee of Creditors. The same was allowed by NCLT vide Order dated 05.10.2020, granting only INR 50 Lakhs to the Appellant against its admitted claim of INR 06.29 Crores. Aggrieved, the Appellant put forth its objections before the RP to the Resolution Plan and claimed payment of the entire amount of INR 06.29 Crores from the Corporate Debtor, leaving open the legal remedy to recover the full dues, in case the same was not accepted.

7.Being at loggerhead with the RP with respect to the payment of admitted claim, the Appellant moved an application before the NCLT challenging the Order dated 05.10.2020, which approved the Resolution Plan. This was dismissed vide Order dated 27.11.2020, observing that the said tribunal did not have the jurisdiction to accept the prayer made in the application, which would amount to setting aside of the Resolution Plan, and the Appellant had the remedy of filing an appeal before the NCLAT.

8.Thereafter, the Appellant moved appeals under Section 61 of IBC 2016 before the NCLAT, challenging both the orders, as referred to above. These appeals were also dismissed vide the impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022.

9.The grievance put forth by the Appellant is with regard to the Appellant not being informed about the auction proceedings which were initiated at behest of the RP, thus, depriving it of its participation in the said proceedings. Once the total claim had been admitted by the RP, which was clearly indicated in the Resolution Plan, the said amount should have been disbursed to the Appellant prior to the claim of the other claimants, including the sole Financial Creditor.

10.Another aspect which has been pressed into service is with regard to Clause 10.9 of the Resolution Plan, as regards the exemptions from the NSEZ, asserted to be in direct contravention and contradiction to their established rules and principles of the functioning of the NSEZ. The Appellant, which works under the guidance of the Ministry of Commerce and Industry, Government of India, could not have been commanded relating to its functions by the RP, especially with regard to the charges or penalties relatable to the change in any business model for transfer of units by the original allottee. The attempt to by-pass the payment of statutory fee would be an unjust enrichment to the Resolution Applicant, thus, contradicting Section 34(2)(d) of the Special Economic Zone Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “SEZ Act, 2005”).

11.The Appellant even challenged the fair and liquidation valuation of the Corporate Debtor being conducted by the two valuers. It was so challenged on the ground that no physical inspection of the property in question was carried out by the said valuers. A reference in this regard was made to Regulation 35(1)(a) of Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Insolvency Resolution Process for Corporate Persons) Regulations 2016 (hereinafter referred to as “IBBI Regulations 2016”), which required physical verification of the Corporate Debtor.

12.At the cost of reiteration, the Appellant invariably pressed over and over again assignment of only INR 50 Lakhs as against the admitted claim of INR 6,29,18,121/- (Rupees Six Crores Twenty Nine Lakhs Eighteen Thousand and One Hundred Twenty One only).

13.The learned Senior Advocate appearing for the Appellant has vehemently put forth the submissions as recorded above and has also referred to the statutory provisions before this Court. On considering the same, going through the impugned judgment dated 14.02.2022 passed by the NCLAT and the records, we are not persuaded to take a different view.

14.As regard the fair value and liquidation value of Corporate Debtor, as derived by the valuers is concerned, this Court in Duncans Industries Ltd. v. State of U.P. and Others1 held that the question of valuation is basically a question of facts, which does not call for any interference if it is based on relevant material on record. As stated above, the average of the two closest estimates given by the valuers were taken into consideration as fair value and liquidation value respectively, which were found to be just and reasonable. This would be, keeping in view Section 35C of IBC 2016, where the powers and duties of the liquidator have been laid down. Since due process appears to have been followed no fault is found requiring interference.

15.Sections 30 and 31 of IBC 2016, which deal with the submission of the Resolution Plan has rightly been evaluated and analysed NCLAT as per the ratio laid down by this Court in Maharashtra Seamless Limited v. Padmanabhan Venkatesh and Others,2 Ghanashyam Mishra and Sons Private Limited v. Edelweiss Asset Reconstruction Company Limited and Others,3 and K. Sashidhar v. Indian Overseas Bank and Others,4 reference thereof has been made by the NCLAT in extenso. Conclusion as culled out and elucidated is correct that all the dues, including statutory dues owned by the Central Government, State Government and local authority, which is not the part of the Resolution Plan shall stand extinguished and no proceedings in respect of such dues for the period prior to the date on which the Adjudicating Authority had approved the Resolution Plan could be pressed into service or continues. These observations took care of the assertions of the Appellant with regard to the statutory dues and the claims as have been made and put forth relatable to the areas of lease.

16.Beside this, as regards the other claims pertaining to the transfer fees, etc. were not to be interfered with by courts or tribunals as the same stood related to the commercial wisdom of the Committee of Creditors for they being the best persons to determine their interests, and any such interference is non-justiciable except as provided by Section 30(2) of IBC 2016. We do not find violation of the statute or the procedure as also the norms fixed as per the decisions referred to above of this Court, the Resolution Plan as approved by the Committee of Creditors, and the same having been accepted deserves and has rightly been left untouched.

Fundamentally, the financial decisions as have been taken by Committee of Creditors, especially with regard to viability or otherwise, while evaluating the plan would thus prevail.

17.As far as the submission of the Learned Senior Counsel that exemptions from NSEZ payments, including any type of fees or penalty for renewal of sub-lease and/or for transfer charges due with regard to the change of directorship or shareholding in favour of the Resolution Applicant has to be dealt with as per Clause 10.9 of the Resolution Plan cannot be accepted in the light of Section 238 of IBC 2016, which provides for the provisions of IBC 2016 to have an overriding effect over the other laws. If that be so, the obvious effect is that the same would prevail, leading to the provisions as contained in the SEZ Act 2005 giving way to IBC 2016.

18.It has come on record and stands admitted that the Resolution Plan had already been implemented and the dues as found payable under the Resolution Plan have been disbursed to the concerned parties. As regards the Appellant is concerned, the amount was disbursed vide Demand Draft dated 22.10.2020 which has been received and accepted by the Appellant. Leading to the dismissal of the appeal vide impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022.

19.In the light of above and having perused the record while bearing in mind the extensive observations made by 3-Judge Bench of this Court in Committee of Creditors of Essar Steel India Limited v. Satish Kumar Gupta and Others,5 and its reiteration by numerous subsequent decisions of this Court such as the Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another6 and in the latest decision in DBS Bank Limited Singapore v. Ruchi Soya Industries Limited and Another,7 we find ourselves not in a position to accept the claim of the Appellant as sought to be made and put forth in these appeals.

20.The Orders dated 05.10.2020 and 27.11.2020, as have been passed by the NCLT and approved by the NCLAT vide its impugned Judgment dated 14.02.2022, do not call for any interference in the present Appeals. The appeals being devoid of merit, stand dismissed.

21.There shall be no order as to costs.

22.Pending application(s), if any, also stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

1 (2000) 1 SCC 633

2 [2020] 2 SCR 1157 : (2020) 11 SCC 467

3 [2021] 13 SCR 737 : (2021) 9 SCC 657

4 [2019] 3 SCR 845 : (2019) 12 SCC 150

5 [2019] 16 SCR 275 : (2020) 8 SCC 531

6 [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401

7 [2024] 1 SCR 114 : (2024) 3 SCC 752

©2024 Supreme Court of India. All Rights Reserved.

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – ss.3, 4, 44(1)(b), 65 and 71 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Respondents contended before the High Court that it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of s.197 of the CrP.C. before taking cognizance of the complaints – The High Court upheld the respondents' contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents – Propriety:

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 510 : 2024 INSC 843

Directorate of Enforcement v. Bibhu Prasad Acharya, etc.

(Criminal Appeal Nos. 4314-4316 of 2024)

06 November 2024

[Abhay S. Oka* and Augustine George Masih, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The appellant filed complaints against the respondents and others u/s.44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002. The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to the respondents and other accused persons. However, the High Court held that it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of s.197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents.

Headnotes

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 – ss.3, 4, 44(1)(b), 65 and 71 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Respondents contended before the High Court that it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of s.197 of the CrP.C. before taking cognizance of the complaints – The High Court upheld the respondents' contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents – Propriety:

Held: There are two conditions for applicability of s.197(1) – The first condition is that the accused must be a public servant removable from his office by or with the government's sanction – The second condition is that the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his duty – The first condition is satisfied in the case of both the respondents as they are civil servants – In the case of both respondents, the acts alleged against them are related to the discharge of the duties entrusted to them – It is not the allegation in the complaints that the two respondents were not empowered to do the acts they have done – There is a connection between their duties and the acts complained of – The second condition for the applicability of s.197(1) also stands satisfied, and therefore, in this case, s.197(1) of CrPC applies to the respondents, assuming that s.197(1) of CrPC applies to the proceedings under the PMLA – As far as the applicability of s.197 of CrPC to the PMLA is concerned, there are two relevant provisions in the form of s.65 and 71 of the PMLA – S.65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA – The words ‘All other proceedings’ in s.65 include a complaint u/s.44 (1)(b) of the PMLA – There is no provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of s.197(1) of CrPC – Therefore, the provisions of s.197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint u/s.44(1)(b) of the PMLA – When a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of s.65 of the PMLA, s.71 (1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA – In the instant case, the cognizance of the offence u/s.3, punishable u/s.4 of the PMLA, was taken against the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction u/s.197(1) of CrPC – Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct. [Paras 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.197 – Object of:

Held: The object is to protect the public servants from prosecutions – It ensures that the public servants are not prosecuted for anything they do in the discharge of their duties – This provision is for the protection of honest and sincere officers – However, the protection is not unqualified – They can be prosecuted with a previous sanction from the appropriate government. [Para 6]

Case Law Cited

Prakash Singh Badal and Another v. State of Punjab and Others [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1; Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 746 : (2005) 8 SCC 202 – relied on.

S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Others [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431; Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and Another [1998] 3 SCR 22 : (1998) 5 SCC 91; P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim [2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704 – referred to.

List of Acts

Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 65 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 71 of Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002; Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Prior sanction; Protection of public servants; Discharge of duties; Protection of honest and sincere officers.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal Nos. 4314-4316 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 21.01.2019 of High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 3988 of 2016, CRLP No. 11942 of 2018 and WP No. 2253 of 2018

Appearances for Parties

Suryaprakash V Raju, A.S.G., Mrs. Sonia Mathur, Sr. Adv., Arvind Kumar Sharma, Kanu Agarwal, Annam Venkatesh, Zoheb Hussain, Mukesh Kumar Maroria, Advs. for the appellant.

Mrs. Kiran Suri, Sr. Adv., Abhaya Nath Das, Sunil Kumar Das, Ms. Vidushi Garg, B.C. Bhatt, Satish Kumar, Advs for the respondents

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Abhay S. Oka, J.

FACTUAL ASPECT

1.The appellant has filed complaints against the respondents and others under Section 44(1)(b) of the Prevention of Money Laundering Act, 2002 (for short, ‘the PMLA’). The complaint is for an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA, which is punishable under Section 4. Both private respondents are accused in the complaints. They are Bibhu Prasad Acharya (described hereafter as the first respondent) and Adityanath Das (described hereafter as the second respondent). The Special Court took cognizance of the complaints and issued summons to the respondents and other accused persons. Both of them filed writ petitions before the High Court challenging the cognizance taken by the Trial Court and inter alia prayed for quashing the complaints on the ground that both of them were public servants and, therefore, it was necessary to obtain prior sanction under sub-section (1) of Section 197 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short, ‘the CrPC’). By the impugned judgment, the High Court upheld the respondents’ contentions and quashed the orders of taking cognizance passed by the Special Court on the complaints only as against the said respondents.

SUBMISSIONS

2.Shri S.V. Raju, learned Additional Solicitor General for India, appeared for the appellant-Enforcement Directorate. He submitted that in view of Section 71 of the PMLA, the provisions thereof have an overriding effect over the provisions of the other statutes, including the CrPC. He submitted that considering the object of the PMLA, the requirement of obtaining a sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC will be inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA.

3.He pointed out from the assertions made in the complaints that at the relevant time, the first respondent was the Vice Chairman and Managing Director of Andhra Pradesh Industrial Infrastructure Corporation Ltd. (for short, ‘the Corporation’). His submission is that he was not a public servant within the meaning of Section 197(1) of CrPC, as it cannot be said that while holding the said position, he was not removable from the office save by or with the sanction of the Government. He relied upon the decisions of this Court in the case of S.S. Dhanoa v. Municipal Corporation Delhi and Others1 and Mohd. Hadi Raja v. State of Bihar and Another.2 He submitted that the first respondent was not employed in connection with the affairs of the State Government at the time of the commission of the offence. He submitted that officers of such Corporations are not public servants within the meaning of Section 197(1). He also relied upon a decision of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal and Another v. State of Punjab and others.3 He submitted that the issue of the requirement of sanction will have to be decided at the time of the trial. He submitted that the respondents’ act of money laundering cannot be considered to have been done in the discharge of their official duties.

4.Mrs Kiran Suri, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondents accused, invited our attention to the Memorandum and Articles of the Association (for short, “the Memorandum”) of the said Corporation and, in particular, Clauses 70 and 71 (b) thereof and submitted that power to appoint a Director of the Corporation and power to remove him vested in the State Government. Therefore, the first respondent continued to be a public servant as contemplated by Section 197(1) of CrPC. She submitted that the plea of absence of sanction can be raised at any stage of the proceedings, and it is not necessary to wait till the final hearing of the complaint.

CONSIDERATION OF SUBMISSIONS

5.Section 197 (1) of CrPC (which corresponds to Section 218 of Bhartiya Nagrik Suraksha Sanhita, 2023) reads thus:

“197. Prosecution of Judges and public servants.— (1) When any person who is or was a Judge or Magistrate or a public servant not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Government, is accused of any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty, no Court shall take cognizance of such offence except with the previous sanction —

(a) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of the Union, of the Central Government;

(b) in the case of a person who is employed or, as the case may be, was at the time of commission of the alleged offence employed, in connection with the affairs of a State, of the State Government:

[Provided that where the alleged offence was committed by a person referred to in clause (b) during the period while a Proclamation issued under clause (1) of Article 356 of the Constitution was in force in a State, clause (b) will apply as if for the expression “State Government” occurring therein, the expression “Central Government” were substituted.]

[Explanation.—For the removal of doubts it is hereby declared that no sanction shall be required in case of a public servant accused of any offence alleged to have been committed under section 166A, section 166B, section 354, section 354A, section 354B, section 354C, section 354D, section 370, section 375, section 376 [section 376A, section 376AB, section 376C, section 376D, section 376DA, section 376DB] or section 509 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).]

6.The object of Section 197(1) must be considered here. The object is to protect the public servants from prosecutions. It ensures that the public servants are not prosecuted for anything they do in the discharge of their duties. This provision is for the protection of honest and sincere officers. However, the protection is not unqualified. They can be prosecuted with a previous sanction from the appropriate government.

7.The expression “to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty” has been judicially interpreted. A bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of Centre for Public Interest Litigation v. Union of India,4 in paragraph no 9, observed thus:

“9………………….. This protection has certain limits and is available only when the alleged act done by the public servant is reasonably connected with the discharge of his official duty and is not merely a cloak for doing the objectionable act. If in doing his official duty, he acted in excess of his duty, but there is a reasonable connection between the act and the performance of the official duty, the excess will not be a sufficient ground to deprive the public servant from the protection. The question is not as to the nature of the offence such as whether the alleged offence contained an element necessarily dependent upon the offender being a public servant, but whether it was committed by a public servant acting or purporting to act as such in the discharge of his official capacity. Before Section 197 can be invoked, it must be shown that the official concerned was accused of an offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. It is not the duty which requires examination so much as the act, because the official act can be performed both in the discharge of the official duty as well as in dereliction of it. The act must fall within the scope and range of the official duties of the public servant concerned. It is the quality of the act which is important and the protection of this section is available if the act falls within the scope and range of his official duty. There cannot be any universal rule to determine whether there is a reasonable connection between the act done and the official duty, nor is it possible to lay down any such rule. One safe and sure test in this regard would be to consider if the omission or neglect on the part of the public servant to commit the act complained of could have made him answerable for a charge of dereliction of his official duty. If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, it may be said that such act was committed by the public servant while acting in the discharge of his official duty and there was every connection with the act complained of and the official duty of the public servant. This aspect makes it clear that the concept of Section 197 does not get immediately attracted on institution of the complaint case.”

(emphasis added)

8.In the decision of this Court in the case of Prakash Singh Badal and Another,3 in paragraph 38, this Court held thus:

“38. The question relating to the need of sanction under Section 197 of the Code is not necessarily to be considered as soon as the complaint is lodged and on the allegations contained therein. This question may arise at any stage of the proceeding. The question whether sanction is necessary or not may have to be determined from stage to stage.”

(emphasis added)

In the present case, after completing the investigation, the appellant has filed exhaustive complaints under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA. Cognizance has been taken based on the complaints. Therefore, the issue of the absence of sanction will arise at this stage.

9.The second respondent was at the relevant time holding the post of Principal Secretary, I&CAD Department of the Government of Andhra Pradesh. It is not disputed that even the first respondent was a civil servant but was appointed on deputation as the Corporation’s Vice Chairman and Managing Director during the relevant period. It is undisputed that as far as the second respondent is concerned, he was removable from his office by or with the sanction of the Government.

10.As far as the first respondent is concerned, we find from clause 71(a) of the Memorandum that the power to appoint Directors of the Corporation by nomination is vested in the Government of the erstwhile State of Andhra Pradesh. Under Clause 81 of the Memorandum, the State Government was empowered to appoint any of the Corporation’s Directors to be the Corporation’s Managing Director. Thus, the appointment of the first respondent as a Director and subsequently as the Managing Director has been made by the State Government. Sub-clause (b) of Clause 71 of the Memorandum provides that the Government shall have the power to remove any Director, including the Chairman, Vice Chairman and Managing Director. Therefore, at the relevant time, the State Government had the power to remove the first respondent from the post of Vice Chairman and Managing Director of the Corporation.

11.There are two conditions for applicability of Section 197(1). The first condition is that the accused must be a public servant removable from his office by or with the government’s sanction. The second condition is that the offence alleged to have been committed by the public servant while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his duty.

12.We have perused the decisions relied upon by learned ASG. In the case of Mohd. Hadi Raja,2 this Court took the view that the protection of Section 197 of CrPC will not be available to the officer of the Government Companies or Public Sector Undertakings. The first respondent is a civil servant. As such, the State Government appointed him as the Corporation’s Vice Chairman and Managing Director on deputation. Therefore, the decision in the abovementioned case will not apply to the first respondent.

13.The first condition is satisfied in the case of both the respondents as they are civil servants. The allegation in the complaint against the first respondent is that he, in conspiracy and connivance with Shri Y.S. Jagan Mohan Reddy (the then Chief Minister of the state), another accused, allotted 250 acres of land for the SEZ project to M/s. Indu Tech Zone Private Ltd. by violating the existing norms, regulations and procedures. Further allegation against the first respondent is that he was indirectly involved in the offence of money laundering by knowingly assisting M/s. Indu group of companies in the creation of vast proceeds of crime. The allegation against the second respondent, who was at the relevant time Principal Secretary, I & CAD Department of the State Government, is that in conspiracy with Shri Y.S.Jagan Mohan Reddy, he extended favour to India Cement Limited by allotting an additional 10 lakh litres of water from River Kagna without referring the matter to Interstate Water Resources Authority and by violating the existing norms, regulations and procedures.

14.A Bench of three Hon’ble Judges of this Court in the case of P.K. Pradhan v. State of Sikkim,5 in paragraphs 5 and 15 held thus:

“5. The legislative mandate engrafted in sub-section (1) of Section 197 debarring a court from taking cognizance of an offence except with the previous sanction of the Government concerned in a case where the acts complained of are alleged to have been committed by a public servant in discharge of his official duty or purporting to be in the discharge of his official duty and such public servant is not removable from office save by or with the sanction of the Government, touches the jurisdiction of the court itself. It is a prohibition imposed by the statute from taking cognizance. Different tests have been laid down in decided cases to ascertain the scope and meaning of the relevant words occurring in Section 197 of the Code: “any offence alleged to have been committed by him while acting or purporting to act in the discharge of his official duty”. The offence alleged to have been committed must have something to do, or must be related in some manner, with the discharge of official duty. No question of sanction can arise under Section 197, unless the act complained of is an offence; the only point for determination is whether it was committed in the discharge of official duty. There must be a reasonable connection between the act and the official duty. It does not matter even if the act exceeds what is strictly necessary for the discharge of the duty, as this question will arise only at a later stage when the trial proceeds on the merits. What a court has to find out is whether the act and the official duty are so interrelated that one can postulate reasonably that it was done by the accused in the performance of official duty, though, possibly in excess of the needs and requirements of the situation”

“15. Thus, from a conspectus of the aforesaid decisions, it will be clear that for claiming protection under Section 197 of the Code, it has to be shown by the accused that there is reasonable connection between the act complained of and the discharge of official duty. An official act can be performed in the discharge of official duty as well as in dereliction of it. For invoking protection under Section 197 of the Code, the acts of the accused complained of must be such that the same cannot be separated from the discharge of official duty, but if there was no reasonable connection between them and the performance of those duties, the official status furnishes only the occasion or opportunity for the acts, then no sanction would be required. If the case as put forward by the prosecution fails or the defence establishes that the act purported to be done is in discharge of duty, the proceedings will have to be dropped. It is well settled that question of sanction under Section 197 of the Code can be raised any time after the cognizance; maybe immediately after cognizance or framing of charge or even at the time of conclusion of trial and after conviction as well. But there may be certain cases where it may not be possible to decide the question effectively without giving opportunity to the defence to establish that what he did was in discharge of official duty. In order to come to the conclusion whether claim of the accused that the act that he did was in course of the performance of his duty was a reasonable one and neither pretended nor fanciful, can be examined during the course of trial by giving opportunity to the defence to establish it. In such an eventuality, the question of sanction should be left open to be decided in the main judgment which may be delivered upon conclusion of the trial.”

(emphasis added)

Thus, there is no embargo on considering the plea of absence of sanction, after cognizance is taken by the Special Court of the offences punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA. In this case, it is not necessary to postpone the consideration of the issue.

15.We have carefully perused the allegations against the respondents in the complaint. The allegation against the second respondent is of allocating an additional 10 lakh litres of water to India Cement Ltd. Taking the averments made in the complaint against him as it is, the act alleged against him has been committed by him while purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. The allegation against the first respondent is of the allotment of land measuring 250 acres to M/s. Indu Tech Zone Private Ltd. Taking the averments made in the complaint as correct, the act alleged against him has been done by him purporting to act in the discharge of his official duties. In the case of both respondents, the acts alleged against them are related to the discharge of the duties entrusted to them. It is not even the allegation in the complaints that the two respondents were not empowered to do the acts they have done. There is a connection between their duties and the acts complained of. The second condition for the applicability of Section 197(1) also stands satisfied, and therefore, in this case, Section 197(1) of CrPC applies to the respondents, assuming that Section 197(1) of CrPC applies to the proceedings under the PMLA.

16.As far as the applicability of Section 197 of CrPC to the PMLA is concerned, there are two relevant provisions in the form of Section 65 and 71 of the PMLA which read thus:

“65. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 to apply.-- The provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974) shall apply, in so far as they are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act, to arrest, search and seizure, attachment, confiscation, investigation, prosecution and all other proceedings under this Act.”

“71. Act to have overriding effect.-- The provisions of this Act shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force.”

17.Section 65 makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to all proceedings under the PMLA, provided the same are not inconsistent with the provisions contained in the PMLA. The words ‘All other proceedings’ include a complaint under Section 44 (1)(b) of the PMLA. We have carefully perused the provisions of the PMLA. We do not find that there is any provision therein which is inconsistent with the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC. Considering the object of Section 197(1) of the CrPC, its applicability cannot be excluded unless there is any provision in the PMLA which is inconsistent with Section 197(1). No such provision has been pointed out to us. Therefore, we hold that the provisions of Section 197(1) of CrPC are applicable to a complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA.

18.Section 71 gives an overriding effect to the provisions of the PMLA notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time being in force. Section 65 is a prior section which specifically makes the provisions of the CrPC applicable to PMLA, subject to the condition that only those provisions of the CrPC will apply which are not inconsistent with the provisions of the PMLA. Therefore, when a particular provision of CrPC applies to proceedings under the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 71(1) cannot override the provision of CrPC which applies to the PMLA. Once we hold that in view of Section 65 of the PMLA, Section 197(1) will apply to the provisions of the PMLA, Section 71 cannot be invoked to say that the provision of Section 197(1) of CrPC will not apply to the PMLA. A provision of Cr. P.C., made applicable to the PMLA by Section 65, will not be overridden by Section 71. Those provisions of CrPC which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65 will continue to apply to the PMLA, notwithstanding Section 71. If Section 71 is held applicable to such provisions of the CrPC, which apply to the PMLA by virtue of Section 65, such interpretation will render Section 65 otiose. No law can be interpreted in a manner which will render any of its provisions redundant.

19.In this case, the cognizance of the offence under Section 3, punishable under Section 4 of the PMLA, has been taken against the respondents accused without obtaining previous sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC. Therefore, the view taken by the High Court is correct. We must clarify that the effect of the impugned judgment is that the orders of the Special Court taking cognizance only as against the accused B.P. Acharya and Adityanath Das stand set aside. The order of cognizance against the other accused will remain unaffected. However, it will be open for the appellant to move the Special Court to take cognizance of the offence against the two respondents if a sanction under Section 197(1) of CrPC is granted in future. This liberty will be subject to legal and factual objections available to the respondents. Hence, the appeals must fail and are dismissed subject to what is observed above.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

1 [1981] 3 SCR 864 : (1981) 3 SCC 431

2 [1998] 3 SCR 22 : (1998) 5 SCC 91

3 [2006] Supp. 10 SCR 197 : (2007) 1 SCC 1

4 [2003] Supp. 3 SCR 746 : (2005) 8 SCC 202

5 [2001] 3 SCR 1119 : (2001) 6 SCC 704

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