Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – ss.13, 14 – Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – ss.12, 16 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.122 – Effects of adoption – Principle of Relation Back – Death of the original owner of the property – Following his death, property dispute between his two wives – Property divided among the two on basis of a compromise decree – Thereafter, the first wife-defendant no. 1 who was issueless, adopted the appellant – Thirteen years later, the defendant no. 1 executed sale deed in respect of schedule A properties and gift deed in respect of schedule B and C properties in favour of defendants – Appellant filed suit for partition and separate possession of the schedule properties as also challenged the execution of sale deed and gift deed – Trial court declared gift deed as null and void and granted the entire suit schedule B and C properties to the appellant since he was the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 and rejected his claim as regards the sale deed upholding the sale deed – High Court set aside the order as regards alienation under the gift deed, however, upheld the sale deed – Interference: Held: Principle of Relation Back is that an adoption by a widow would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus entitled to inherit his property – Adoption by defendant No.1-widow of the original owner would relate back to the date of death of the adoptive father but then all lawful alienations made by defendant No.1-adoptive mother would be binding on the appellant-adopted son – Adoptive son’s right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the capacity of defendant No.1 who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation – First alienation is the one where defendant no.1 effected sale of the properties – Concurrent findings by the courts below that defendant no.1 got absolute right to effect the sale of the property warrant no interference – By applying the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’, the appellant is bound by the said alienation – As regards the alienation by gift deed, the nature of action of alienation is gift – In order to be valid gift, acceptance of the gift is a pre- requisite – Gift deed has no reference about the delivery of property by the donor and taking possession of property by the donee – Trial court’s holding that the appellant is entitled to entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of deceased defendant no.1, not faulty as it is the inevitable consequence of application for the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’; and that the prerequisite for making the gift valid was absent and as such defendant nos. 4 and 5 could not become absolute owners of the schedule properties through gift deed – High Court interfered with the sound reasoning of the trial court, and set aside without providing any good and sustainable reason – Such finding could be reversed only if it is found that the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence – Concurrent finding of the courts below that the sale deed is valid is upheld – Impugned judgment pertaining to the alienation of properties through gift deed quashed and set aside. [Paras 16-31] Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.12 – Effects of adoption – 'Relation Back Principle': Held: Principle is that the adoption by a widow would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus entitled to inherit his property. [Para 18]

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 62 : 2025 INSC 14

Sri Mahesh v. Sangram & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No(s). 36-37 of 2025)

02 January 2025

[C.T. Ravikumar* and Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose whether by virtue of operation of the provisions of ss. 14(1) and 12(c) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the defendant no.1-adoptive mother would become absolute owner of the property prior to the adoption of appellant-adopted son; and as regards the effect of adoption on sale deed and gift deed executed thereafter by adoptive mother.

Headnotes

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – ss.13, 14 – Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 – ss.12, 16 – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.122 – Effects of adoption – Principle of Relation Back – Death of the original owner of the property – Following his death, property dispute between his two wives – Property divided among the two on basis of a compromise decree – Thereafter, the first wife-defendant no. 1 who was issueless, adopted the appellant – Thirteen years later, the defendant no. 1 executed sale deed in respect of schedule A properties and gift deed in respect of schedule B and C properties in favour of defendants – Appellant filed suit for partition and separate possession of the schedule properties as also challenged the execution of sale deed and gift deed – Trial court declared gift deed as null and void and granted the entire suit schedule B and C properties to the appellant since he was the sole legal heir of defendant No.1 and rejected his claim as regards the sale deed upholding the sale deed – High Court set aside the order as regards alienation under the gift deed, however, upheld the sale deed – Interference:

Held: Principle of Relation Back is that an adoption by a widow would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus entitled to inherit his property – Adoption by defendant No.1-widow of the original owner would relate back to the date of death of the adoptive father but then all lawful alienations made by defendant No.1-adoptive mother would be binding on the appellant-adopted son – Adoptive son’s right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the capacity of defendant No.1 who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation – First alienation is the one where defendant no.1 effected sale of the properties – Concurrent findings by the courts below that defendant no.1 got absolute right to effect the sale of the property warrant no interference – By applying the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’, the appellant is bound by the said alienation – As regards the alienation by gift deed, the nature of action of alienation is gift – In order to be valid gift, acceptance of the gift is a pre- requisite – Gift deed has no reference about the delivery of property by the donor and taking possession of property by the donee – Trial court’s holding that the appellant is entitled to entire 'B' and 'C' schedule properties as the sole legal heir of deceased defendant no.1, not faulty as it is the inevitable consequence of application for the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’; and that the prerequisite for making the gift valid was absent and as such defendant nos. 4 and 5 could not become absolute owners of the schedule properties through gift deed – High Court interfered with the sound reasoning of the trial court, and set aside without providing any good and sustainable reason – Such finding could be reversed only if it is found that the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence – Concurrent finding of the courts below that the sale deed is valid is upheld – Impugned judgment pertaining to the alienation of properties through gift deed quashed and set aside. [Paras 16-31]

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.12 – Effects of adoption – 'Relation Back Principle':

Held: Principle is that the adoption by a widow would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus entitled to inherit his property. [Para 18]

Case Law Cited

Kasabai Tukaram Karvar and Others v. Nivruti (Dead) Through Legal Heirs and Others, 2022 INSC 733 : [2022] 5 SCR 899 : 2022 SCC Online 918; Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar, 1974 INSC 43 : [1974] 3 SCR 474 : (1974) 2 SCC 156 – relied on.

Mst. Deu and Ors. v. Laxmi Narayan and Ors. (1998) 8 SCC 701 – referred to.

List of Acts

Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956; Transfer of Property Act, 1882.

List of Keywords

Adoption; Absolute owner; Adoptive son’s right in properties; Relation Back Principle; Execution of sale deed by adoptive mother; Execution of gift deed by adoptive mother; Nature of alienation; Lawful alienations; Constituents of valid gift; Offer and acceptance of gift; No delivery of gift; No acceptance of gift in legal sense; Adoptive mother as absolute owner; Adoptive son sole legal heir.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 36-37 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 14.02.2024 of the High Court of Karnataka Circuit Bench at Dharwad in RFA Nos. 100168 and 100247 of 2018

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Aparajita Singh, Sr. Adv., Rahul Pratap, Mahadev Ganpat Patil, Shubham Rajhans, Advs. for the Appellant.

Shailesh Madiyal, Sr. Adv., M/s. Dharmaprabhas Law Associates, Chandrashekhar A. Chakalabbi, S.K Pandey, Awanish Kumar, Anshul Rai, Abhinav Garg, Ms. G. Anusha, Mahesh Thakur, Ms. Divija Mahajan, Ranvijay Singh Chandel, Mrs. Geetanjali Bedi, Chinmay Deshpande, Anirudh Sanganeria, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

C.T. Ravikumar, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.In the captioned appeals by Special Leave the appellant calls in question the common judgment dated 14.02.2024 of the Karnataka, High Court, Dharwad Bench, passed in RFA Nos.100168 and 100247, of 2018 which emanated from the judgment and preliminary decree dated 31.03.2018 in OS No.122 of 2009 of the Court of IIIrd Additional Senior Civil Judge, Belagavi.

3.The self-same appellant was the plaintiff in OS No.122 of 2009 filed for partition of the suit schedule properties and separate possession against the defendants. Respondent Nos.1 to 4 herein were the original defendant Nos. 2 to 5 respectively in the said suit. Pending the first appeals, respondent No.5/defendant No.6 died and consequently, his legal representatives were impleaded as additional respondent Nos.5A to 5F and they are respondent Nos.5 to 10 in these appeals.

4.The facts of the case necessary for disposal of the captioned appeals are as follows:-

One Bhavakanna Shahapurkar was the original owner of the suit schedule properties and original defendant No.1-Smt. Parvatibai was his legally wedded wife. They had no issues in their wedlock and hence, with the consent of defendant No.1 the said Bhavakanna married one Laxmibai without dissolving his first marriage with defendant No.1. In his wedlock with Smt. Laxmibai, Bhavakanna Shahpurkar got two children, namely, Parashuram and Renuka. On 04.03.1982, Bhavakanna Shahapurkar died leaving behind two widows. After his demise, OS No.266/1982 was filed by defendant No.1 against Laxmibai, and her children Parashuram and Renuka for partition and separate possession of suit schedule properties. Based on a compromise, a decree was drawn in the said suit and later, in the final decree proceedings defendant No.1 was allotted and thereby acquired 9/32 share in schedule ‘A’ and ‘D’ properties. The appellant herein/the plaintiff was adopted by defendant No.1-Parvatibai on 16.07.1994. The adoption deed was signed and got registered by his natural father and the adoptee mother (defendant No.1) and other witnesses. Later, the appellant came and started residing with defendant No.1 as her adopted son after relinquishing all his rights in his natural family. At the time of his adoption the appellant was aged 21 years. The case of the appellant/plaintiff in OS No.122 of 2009 is that on being adopted he became the legal heir of Bhavakanna and, therefore, entitled to half share in the suit schedule properties. According to him, in such circumstances, defendant No.1 was not having absolute right or title to execute sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour of defendants 2 and 3 without his consent as also to execute gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5. Earlier, the appellant demanded for partition of the suit schedule properties. However, defendant No.1 refused to effect partition which made him to institute the aforementioned Original Suit. In fact, in the said suit beside seeking partition and separate possession of the suit schedule properties he also sought to set aside a sale deed executed on 13.12.2007 by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 (respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein) and a gift deed dated 27.08.2008 made by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void.

5.Defendant No.1 filed written statement stating, inter alia, that the suit schedule properties are wrongly described. While admitting the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff on 16.07.1994 as also the fact that subsequently, he came to stay with her, defendant No.1 would state that she became the full and absolute owner of the suit schedule properties after the death of her husband Bhavakanna and further that by virtue of adoption of the appellant/plaintiff she was not divested off her ownership over the suit schedule properties. She had also refuted the claims of the appellant/plaintiff that without his consent she could not have sold the property covered under sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and that she had played fraud in creating gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in respect of properties described in para 1B and C of the plaint, in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 viz., respondent Nos.3 and 4. Above all, defendant No.1 denied the claim of acquisition of half share of the suit schedule properties by virtue of his adoption by her and thereby becoming the legal heir of her husband Sri Bhavakanna Shahapurkar.

6.Defendant Nos.2 and 3 jointly filed a separate written statement, but adopting the contentions raised by defendant No.1. They claimed that they are in possession of suit schedule property covered by the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 from the date of its purchase.

7.Defendant Nos.4 and 5 also jointly filed a separate written statement, essentially, reiterating the stand of defendant Nos.1 to 3 regarding the absolute ownership of defendant No.1 over the suit schedule properties and especially, stating that defendant No.1 was having absolute right and title over the property gifted to them under gift deed dated 27.08.2008 and that since its execution they became the absolute owners of the same.

8.Defendant No.6 filed a separate written statement even denying the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff by defendant No.1. He would further state that based on the compromise decree in OS No.266/1982 filed by defendant No.1 whereunder she consented to give him half share in each of the suit schedule properties and after the demise of defendant No.1 he became the only legal heir of Bhavakanna and defendant No.1 as his sister Renuka died in her early age itself on 12.05.1990.

9.Based on the rival pleadings the trial Court framed the following issues and additional issues:-

“ISSUES

1) Whether the plaintiff is entitled for ½ share in the suit schedule property?

2) Whether the plaintiff proves that the sale deed executed on 13/12/2007 is not at all binding upon the plaintiff?

3) Whether the defendant No.1 was competent to sell the suit schedule property to the defendant No. 2 and 3?

4) What other relief is the plaintiff entitled to?

5) What order or decree?

Additional issue dtd: 10/02/2012

1) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the only legal representative of the deceased defendant No. 1?

Additional Issues dtd: 20/10/2012.

1) Whether the plaintiff proves that he is the only legal representatives of deceased defendant No. 1?

2) Whether the defendants No. 4 and 5 prove that they are the only legal representatives of the deceased defendant No. 1?

3) Whether the defendants No. 4 and 5 prove that they became the absolute owners of the properties mentioned in para 1B and 1C of the plaint by virtue of the gift deed executed by deceased defendant No.1 in their favour on 27/08/2008 and the said gift deed is valid and so the plaintiff has no right over the said properties?

Additional issues framed on 29/07/2017:

1) Whether the defendant No. 6 proves that the plaintiff got executed an adoption deed dtd: 19/07/1994 fraudulently, by force by taking undue advantage of the old age of defendant No.1?

2) Whether the defendant No.6 proves that the defendant No.2 and 3 got executed a sale deed dtd: 13/12/2007 with respect to “A” schedule property from defendant No.1 by undue influence and coercion?

10.It is to be noted that during the pendency of the suit the defendant No.1 died.

11.As per judgment dated 31.03.2018 in OS No.122/2009, the suit was partly decreed and declared gift deed executed by defendant No.1 dated 27.08.2008 in favour of respondent Nos.3 and 4 (defendant Nos.4 and 5) as null and void and granted the entire suit schedule B and C properties to the appellant as he being the sole legal heir of defendant No.1. However, the trial Court rejected his claim in regard to suit schedule A property and thereby, upheld the sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of respondent No.1 and 2 viz., defendant Nos.2 and 3. In such circumstances, RFA No.100247/2018 was filed by the appellant herein and RFA No.100168/2018 was filed by defendant Nos.4 and 5 wherein the plaintiff is the respondent No. 1 and defendant Nos.2,3 & 6 were respondent Nos.2 to 4 respectively. On perusing the records and considering the rival submissions, the High Court formulated the following points for consideration:-

1)Whether the plaintiff is entitled for half share in the suit schedule properties.

2)Whether the plaintiff proves that defendant No.1 is not competent to sell ‘A’ schedule property in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 under registered sale deed?

3)Whether plaintiff proves that defendant No. l had no right to execute the gift deed in respect of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 and the gift deed is not binding on the plaintiff?

4)Whether the plaintiff proves that dismissal of the suit for the relief of declaration that registered sale deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos. 2 and 3 is arbitrary and erroneous?

5)Whether defendant Nos.4 and 5 prove that judgment and decree passed by the trial court declaring that registered gift deed executed by defendant No. l in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 as null and void, is arbitrary and erroneous?

6)What order or decree?

12.While considering the first point formulated the High Court took note of the compromise decree passed in OS No.266/1982 filed by defendant No.1 which was followed Ext.D14 and the consequential allotment of shares in favour of defendant No.1 Paragraph 22 of the impugned common judgment would reveal that as per Ext.D14 only 9/32 share in schedule ‘A’ to ‘D’ properties were allotted to and acquired by the defendant. Ultimately, the High Court found that as relates to the properties acquired pursuant to Ext.D14, the defendant No.1 became its absolute owner.

13.As per the impugned common judgment dated 14.02.2024 the High Court, dismissed RFA No.100247/2018 filed by the appellant herein and allowed RFA No.100168/2018 filed by respondent Nos.4 and 5, and the judgment and decree by the trial Court was set aside. Consequent to the setting aside of the decree the suit filed by the appellant viz., OS No.122/2009 was dismissed. In view of the dismissal of RFA No.100247/2018, the Interlocutory Application being IA No.1/2018 therein for temporary injunction was held as not surviving and consequently the same was also dismissed. It is in the said circumstances that the appellant herein who was the plaintiff filed the captioned appeals.

14.In view of the narration of the facts as above, before considering the rival contentions, we think it apposite to refer to the relevant provisions of law as well as the law settled in regard to the questions involved in this matter. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for short ‘the Act’) reads thus:-

“14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.―(1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.―In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”

15.Section 13 of the Act reads thus:-

“13. Computation of degrees.―(1) For the purposes of determining the order of succession among agnates or cognates, relationship shall be reckoned from the intestate to the heir in terms of degrees of ascent or degrees of descent or both, as the case may be.

(2) Degrees of ascent and degrees of descent shall be computed inclusive of the intestate.

(3) Every generation constitutes a degree either ascending or descending.”

16.We will firstly consider the law relating to adoption in view of the case of the appellant that he was adopted by defendant No.1. Though there was an attempt on the part of the defendants to defy adoption concurrently it was found that defendant No.1 had adopted the appellant/the plaintiff as her son. The trial Court and the High Court found that plaintiff has succeeded in proving adoption orally and by producing Ext.P1 registered adoption deed. The Courts have also found that defendant No.1 in her written statement admitted that she had taken plaintiff in adoption. In the contextual situation, it is relevant to refer to the decision in Mst. Deu and Ors. v. Laxmi Narayan and Ors.,1 where this Court held by virtue of Section 16 the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 (for brevity ‘The Act of 1956’), that wherever any document registered under the law is produced before the court purporting to record an adoption made and is signed by the persons mentioned therein, the court should presume that the adoption has been made in compliance with the provisions of the said statute unless and until it is disproved. It was further held therein in view of Section 16 of the Act of 1956 that it would be open to the persons who challenge the registered deed of adoption to disprove the same by taking independent proceedings. As noticed hereinbefore in the case on hand the appellant plaintiff had succeeded in proving the factum of his adoption by defendant No.1 and in that regard, he had produced and proved Ext.P1 which is a registered deed of adoption and above all defendant No.1 herself admitted the factum of his adoption in her written statement. In such circumstances, the position is that the appellant/plaintiff was indisputably adopted by defendant No.1 on 16.07.1994.

17.We have already extracted Sections 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act. For a proper consideration of the questions involved in the case on hand it is only apposite to refer to Section 12(c) of the Act of 1956. It reads thus:-

“12. Effects of adoption.―An adopted child shall be deemed to be the child of his or her adoptive father or mother for all purposes with effect from the date of the adoption and from such date all the ties of the child in the family of his or her birth shall be deemed to be severed and replaced by those created by the adoption in the adoptive family;

(a)…

(b)…

(c) the adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested in him or her before the adoption.”

18.Thus, going by proviso (c) to Section 12 of the Act of 1956, it is clear that an adopted child shall not divest any person of any estate which vested him or her before the adoption. We have already taken note of the fact that the date of adoption was 16.07.1994. In the contextual situation it is also relevant to refer to the ‘Relation Back Principle’. The said principle is that adoption by a widow would relate back to the date of death of her husband, creating an immediate coparcenary interest in the joint property, meaning that the adopted child is treated as if they were born to the deceased husband, thus entitled to inherit his property. In Kasabai Tukaram Karvar and Others v. Nivruti (Dead) Through Legal Heirs and Others,2 this Court extracted Paragraph 6 of Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar,3 with agreement thus:-

“10. As far as the doctrine of relation back goes, we need only notice decisions of this Court in Govind Hanumantha Rao Desai v. Nagappa alias Narahari Laxman Rao Deshpande and Sever (1972) 1 SCC 515 and Shripad Gajanan Suthankar v. Dattaram Kashinath Suthankar (1974) 2 SCC 156. We may only further expatiate by referring to paragraphs 6, 7 and 9 of Shripad Gajanan Suthankar (Supra).

6. It is established law that the adoption by a widow relates back to the date of the death of the adoptive father, which, in this case, took place in 1921. Indeed, the complexity of the present case arises from the application of this legal fiction of “relation-back” and the limitations on the amplitude of that fiction visa-vis the partition of 1944, in the light of the rulings of the various High Courts and of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, and of this Court, the last of which is Govind v. Nagappa. According to the appellant, the rights of the adopted son, armed as he is with the theory of “relation-back”, have to be effectuated retroactively, the guidelines wherefor are available from the decided cases. It is no doubt true that “when a member of a joint family governed by Mitakshara law dies and the widow validly adopts a son to him, a coparcenary interest in the joint property is immediately created by the adoption co-extensive with that which the deceased coparcener had, and it vests at once in the adopted son”. (See Mulla on Hindu Law, 13th Edn. p.516.)

11. The same author, however, points out that:

“the rights of an adopted son arise for the first time on his adoption. He may, by virtue of his rights as adopted son, divest other persons in whom the property vested after the death of the adoptive father, but all lawful alienations made by previous holder would be binding on him. His right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the capacity of the holder who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation. When the holder was a male, who had unfettered right of transfer, e.g., the last surviving member of a joint family, the adopted son could not impeach the transfer. In case of females who had restricted rights of transfer even apart from any adoption, the transfers would be valid only when they are supported by legal necessity”. (ibid; pp. 516 – 517; para 507.)

“An adopted son is bound by alienations made by his adoptive father prior to the adoption to the same extent as a natural-born son would be. (ibid; p. 517 : para 508.)

7. It is settled law that the rights of an adopted son spring into existence only from the moment of the adoption and all alienations made by the widow before the adoption, if they are made for legal necessity or otherwise lawfully, such as with the consent of the next reversioners, are binding on the adopted son.”

19.In fact, the defendants who refuted the claim of the appellant, including defendant No.1 would rely on Section 14(1) of ‘the Act’ and Section 12(c) of the Act of 1956, besides the compromise decree in OS No.266 of 1982 to contend that defendant No.1 became the absolute owner of the suit schedule properties by virtue of the adoption and the operation of the aforesaid provisions much earlier to the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff on 16.07.1994. In fact, it is so contended by them to drive home the point that since defendant No.1 became the absolute owner of the suit schedule property prior to the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff and the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 (respondent Nos.1 and 2 herein) as also the gift deed dated 27.08.2007 in favour of defendant No.4 and 5 (respondent Nos.3 and 4 herein), the appellant/plaintiff was bound by such alienation made by defendant No.1.

20.In view of the position of law referred above and the factual position obtained in the case on hand the crucial legal position to be looked into is what is the effect of the compromise decree passed in OS No.266 of 1982 and whether it would be binding on the appellant. In this context, it is also relevant to note that indisputably the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff was on 16.07.1994 and the adoption deed is a registered one which was not disproved by defendants though it is permissible under Section 16 of the Act of 1956. Furthermore, it is relevant to note that it is indisputable that the sale deed in question was executed only on 13.12.2007 by defendant No.1 and the gift deed was executed by her only on 27.08.2007. In other words, the sale deed and the gift deed were executed only subsequent to the adoption of the appellant by defendant No.1 on 16.07.1994. It is in this context that the aforementioned question assumes relevance.

21.As noticed hereinbefore, defendant No.1 filed OS No.266 of 1982 against her husband Bhavakanna, Smt. Laxmibai, the second wife of Bhavakanna, Parsuram and Renuka who are the children of Laxmibai through Bhavakanna. True that the said suit was compromised and a decree was passed in terms of the compromise petition. Defendant No.1 filed Final Decree Proceedings No.75/1988 and in the said proceedings the parties entered into compromise and the compromise petition was marked as Ext.D14 and by virtue of the same defendant No.1 was allotted 9/32 share in A to D schedule properties. Indisputably the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff was subsequent to the compromise decree and Ext.D14 in terms of which defendant No.1 was allotted the shares mentioned as above. In such circumstances, the question is whether by virtue of operation of the provisions of Section 14(1) of the Act and Section 12(c) of the Act of 1956, the defendant No.1 would become the absolute owner of the property prior to the adoption of appellant on 16.07.1994.

22.Obviously, in the case on hand, the factum of adoption of the appellant/the plaintiff by defendant No.1 after the death of adoptive father, on 16.07.1994 is established by the appellant/the plaintiff and it is pertinent to note that the same was admitted by defendant No.1 as well, in her written statement. In such circumstances, in view of the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and by applying the law laid down in Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) relied on with agreement in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra) the adoption by defendant No.1, the widow of Bhavakanna Shahpurkar, would relate back to the date of death of the adoptive father which is 04.03.1982 but then all lawful alienations made by defendant No.1 would be binding on the appellant/plaintiff. As held in Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) in paragraph 11 his right to impeach previous alienations would depend upon the capacity of defendant No.1 who made the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation.

23.The first among the alienations under challenge in the case on hand is the one where defendant No.1 effected sale of the properties covered by registered sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in respect of ‘A’ schedule property in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3. There is concurrency with respect to the said issue between the trial Court and the High Court. The Courts have held that defendant No.1 got absolute right to effect the sale of the property covered thereunder and that the sale was done in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 in accordance with the law. Admittedly, in regard to the sale, defendant No.1 executed the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and she was not having a case that she had not received sale consideration. By applying the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and the ratio of decisions in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) it can only be held that the appellant/plaintiff is bound by the said alienation. This is because of the cumulative effect of the compromise decree in OS No.122 of 2009 followed by Ext.D14 and the allotment of share based on the same. In this context it is also relevant to note that the factum of execution of the sale deed is not disputed by the appellant but his contention is only that defendant No.1 could not have sold the property without his consent and knowledge. Though the alienation was subsequent to his adoption by virtue of the fact that defendant No.1 got absolute right and title in regard to the property covered by the said sale deed dated 13.12.2007 and that a valid sale was effected following the procedures, the challenge of the appellant against the said alienation of property by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is not liable to be interfered with. We have no hesitation to hold that the concurrent findings of the trial Court and the High Court in regard to the said sale deed warrant no interference. In such circumstances, dismissal of RFA No.100247 of 2018 filed by the appellant/plaintiff challenging the alienation under the registered sale deed dated 13.12.2007 is only to be confirmed.

24.The other alienation of property by defendant No.1 which is under challenge is the alienation of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties by registered gift deed dated 27.08.2008 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5. It is to be noted that the trial Court and the High Court are at issue in regard to the said alienation. Obviously, the trial Court held that the gift deed dated 27.08.2008 executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 is null and void and is not binding on the plaintiff. Consequent to such declaration the trial Court found that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties as he being the sole legal heir of deceased defendant No.1. Per contra, the High Court found that since defendant No.1 was the absolute owner of the said suit schedule properties as well the appellant/plaintiff got no locus standi to challenge the registered gift deed executed by defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5. It is the said finding that resulted in allowing RFA No.100168 of 2018 filed by defendant Nos.4 and 5. Consequently, the High Court set aside the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court to that extent and resultantly dismissed the suit filed by the appellant/plaintiff.

25.In the light of the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and the ratio in the decisions in Kasabhai Tukaram Karwar’s case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra) we have already found that all lawful alienations made by defendant No.1 will bind the appellant/plaintiff and his right to impeach previous alienation would depend upon the capacity of the holder who make the alienation as well as on the nature of the action of alienation. The nature of action of alienation is gift and it is allegedly made in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5. It is to be noted that defendant Nos.4 and 5 though got a case that earlier defendant No.1 executed a Will in regard to the said properties in their favour they themselves would admit and plead that subsequently the properties were given in gift as per registered gift deed dated 27.08.2008. The very fact that the defendant Nos.4 and 5 themselves relied on the gift deed would go to show that if at all there was a Will that was revoked. At any rate, it is a fact that even defendant Nos.4 and 5 did not rely on the same.

26.Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 (for short, ‘the TP Act’) defines gift as under:-

“122. “Gift” defined.—“Gift” is the transfer of certain existing moveable or immoveable property made voluntarily and without consideration, by one person, called the donor, to another, called the donee, and accepted by or on behalf of the donee.

Acceptance when to be made.— Such acceptance must be made during the lifetime of the donor and while he is till capable of giving,

If the donee dies before acceptance, the gift is void.”

27.A perusal of Section 122 of the TP Act would make it clear about the pre-requisites of a valid gift. Going by the same, two things are necessary to constitute a valid gift, namely, (i) an offer and, (ii) its acceptance. A scanning of the judgment of the trial Court in regard to the alienation by a gift by the defendant No.1 in favour of defendant Nos.4 and 5 it is to be noted that several reasons have been given for holding the same as null and void. To start with, it is to be noted that in the gift deed dated 27.08.2008 it is recited thus:-

“WHEREAS, the Donees are natural Grand Childrens of Donor i.e., (Donor’s own daughter’s own childrens), the Donor is full and absolute owner of the Properties, more fully described in the Schedule hereunder and hereinafter referred to as the Schedule Property’, by virtue of Final Court Decree No. FDP-75/88, dated 02.01.1990 & Exe. Nos. 319/90 R. No.: 1799 dated 05.09.1990. And the said Schedule mentioned properties are exclusive properties which are in actual physical possession and enjoyment of the said Donor.”

28.Going by the afore extracted recital in the deed of gift, the donees are natural grand-children of donor i.e., donor’s own daughter’s own children. But the fact is that even the defendant witnesses who are related to defendant Nos.2 and 3 would admit the fact that defendant Nos.4 and 5 are not the children of own daughter of defendant No.1. The adoption deed itself would go to show that the adoptive mother who is defendant No.1 was issueless. Thus, when the admitted position is that defendant No.1 got no children, the defendant Nos.4 and 5 cannot claim the status that they are the own children of the own daughter of defendant No.1. That apart, going by the afore extracted recital, the schedule mentioned properties in the gift deed viz., the suit schedule ‘B’ and ‘C’ properties are exclusive properties in the actual physical possession and enjoyment of defendant No.1. It is to be noted that the very case of appellant/plaintiff is that he is in exclusive possession of the said suit schedule properties. In the contextual situation, it is to be noted that in Ext.D6(a) gift deed there is no reference about the delivery of property by the donor and taking possession of property by the donee. Defendant No.4 was examined in the suit as DW-3. During cross-examination he would depose that he did not know as to who are in possession of properties comprised in CTS No.667 and CTS No.4879/67 and 278, he also would say that he is absolutely unaware as to who is using CTS 667 and who is residing in CTS No.4879/67, it is to be noted that they are the properties described as ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties in the suit and also as properties gifted to defendant Nos.4 and 5 as per Ext.D6(a) gift deed dated 27.08.2008. It is also relevant to note that while being cross-examined as DW-3 the fourth defendant would also depose that when the gift deed was registered the said properties covered by the same were not in his possession and he voluntarily stated that it was with defendant No.1 till her lifetime. It is also evident from his oral testimony that he would admit that the possession of the said property was not taken either on the date of Ext.D6 or even thereafter. It is in the said circumstances specifically dealt with in detail that the trial Court arrived at the conclusion that defendant No.1 was not knowing the contents of Ext.D6(a) gift deed and further that ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties referred to in Ext.D6(a) were not delivered to the possession of defendant Nos.4 and 5 even on the date of execution of Ext.D6(a) and even at the time of examination before the Court defendant Nos.4 was not aware as to who are the persons who are in possession of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties. Same was the case with respect to defendant No.5. Moreover, the trial Court took note of the fact that the evidence on record would reveal that defendant No.1 was residing at Nanawadi at the time of her death along with DW-5. As noticed hereinbefore when the fact is that the properties covered by the gift deed are not delivered either at the time of the alleged execution of the gift deed or at any later point of time and the fact that the defendant(s) got no case that at any later point of time that they had initiated any steps to get possession of the same either during the lifetime of defendant No.1 or even after her lifetime, we do not find any reason as to how the trial Court could be said to have erred in holding that defendant Nos.4 and 5 could not become absolute owners of ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties through Ext.D6(a) gift deed.

29.It is the said finding of the trial Court that was set aside by the High Court in the first appeal with respect to the alienation under the gift deed dated 27.08.2008. A careful scanning of the impugned common judgment of the High Court would reveal that the sound reasoning of the trial Court in regard to this issue was interfered with and set aside without detailed discussion and at the same time without providing any good and sustainable reason therefor. It appears that the High Court was carried away by the fact that the gift deed is a registered one. We have already taken note of the fact that in order to be valid, acceptance of the gift is a pre-requisite. When the very case of one of the donees of the gift viz., the defendant No.4 that the property was in the possession of the donor herself till her death itself would reveal that the properties were not delivered and in other words in the legal sense there was no acceptance. The fact that defendant No.4 himself depose before the Court that he was not aware of the fact as to in whose possession the gifted properties lie with, would justify the conclusions arrived at by the trial Court. True that the First Appellate Court will be having the power to reappreciate the entire evidence and to substitute any finding of the trial Court if it is legally required. At the same time, when once it is found that a sound reasoning given by a trial Court for returning a finding with respect to a definite issue the same cannot be likely interfered without giving appropriate sustainable reasons. The position with respect to the gift deed is discussed in detail by the trial Court and when it arrived at the conclusion that the pre-requisite for making the same valid was absent such a finding could be reversed only if it is found that the said finding was based on perverse precision of evidence. In the case on hand, the discussion as above would reveal that the pre-requisite to constitute a valid gift is lacking and the evidence discussed by the trial Court would support the said finding we do not find any reason for the Appellate Court to interfere with the same. The declaration that gift deed dated 27.08.2008 is null and void is made by the trial Court in the aforesaid circumstances and it is only as a necessary sequel that the trial Court held that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties as the sole legal heir of deceased defendant No.1. As noted hereinbefore, DW-1 herself in her written statement admitted the adoption of the appellant/plaintiff as her son and the registered adoption deed could fortify the same. When that be so the finding that the appellant is entitled to the said properties being the sole legal heir of deceased defendant No.1 cannot be said to be faulty as it is the inevitable consequence of application for the ‘Doctrine of Relation Back’ and the ratio of the decisions in Kasabai Tukaram Karvar’s case (supra) and Sripad Gajanan Suthankar’s case (supra).

30.In the result the appeal is partly allowed. The concurrent finding of the courts below that the sale deed dated 13.12.2007 in favour of defendant Nos.2 and 3 is valid and that the appellant/plaintiff is not entitled to any share in ‘A’ schedule property is confirmed and consequently the appeal against the judgment in RFA No.100247 of 2018, viz., SLP (C) No.10558 of 2024 is dismissed.

31.The appeal against the judgment in RFA No.100168 of 2018 against the reversal of the judgment and the decree of the trial Court pertaining to the alienation of properties through gift deed dated 27.08.2008 and the gift deed itself, is allowed and the judgment of the High Court in RFA No.100168/2018 is quashed and set aside. Consequently, the judgment and decree of the trial Court holding the gift deed dated 27.08.2008 as null and void and the finding that the appellant/plaintiff is entitled to entire ‘B’ and ‘C’ schedule properties as the sole heir of deceased defendant No.1 are restored.

32.In the circumstances there will be no order as to costs.

Result of the case: Appeal partly allowed.

1 (1998) 8 SCC 701

2 2022 INSC 733 : [2022] 5 SCR 899 : 2022 SCC Online 918

3 1974 INSC 43 : [1974] 3 SCR 474 : (1974) 2 SCC 156

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25, 106 – Extra judicial confession – Admissibility – Extra judicial confession to Police Patil, if admissible – Appellant-husband charged for the murder of his wife – Extra judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to the village Police Patil – Trial court acquitted the accused for the offence punishable u/ss.302 and 201 IPC holding that extra judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to Village Police Patil was inadmissible as per s.25 – High Court set aside the acquittal and held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder – Correctness: Held: Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police Officer for the purpose of s.25 – Extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused before village Police Patil is admissible in evidence and is not hit by s.25 – However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true and trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty – Extra-judicial confession should also be found to be free of any inducement, coercion etc. and should be shown to have been made by the accused on his own free will and volition – What is alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an extra- judicial confession – Very omnibus and vague statement seems to have been made – High Court erred in relying upon the extra-judicial confession even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer – Panch witnesses did not support the prosecution case – Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved – However, I.O. cannot be said to be proving the contents of the panchnama in accordance with law and the circumstance of discovery cannot be relied upon – Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused – Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution – However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours and that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him – Prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke s.106 – It cannot straightaway invoke s.106 and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence – In view thereof, the High Court erred in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder – Impugned judgment set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201. [Paras 27, 31, 36-38, 42, 47-49, 50-51, 55, 56, 58]

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 592 : 2025 INSC 93

Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil v. The State of Maharashtra

(Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017)

09 January 2025

[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ]

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose whether Village Police Patil is a Police Officer in terms of s. 25 of the Evidence Act; and whether the High Court erred in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder.

Headnotes

Evidence Act, 1872 – ss.25, 106 – Extra judicial confession – Admissibility – Extra judicial confession to Police Patil, if admissible – Appellant-husband charged for the murder of his wife – Extra judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to the village Police Patil – Trial court acquitted the accused for the offence punishable u/ss.302 and 201 IPC holding that extra judicial confession allegedly made by the appellant to Village Police Patil was inadmissible as per s.25 – High Court set aside the acquittal and held the appellant guilty of the offence of murder – Correctness:

Held: Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police Officer for the purpose of s.25 – Extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused before village Police Patil is admissible in evidence and is not hit by s.25 – However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true and trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty – Extra-judicial confession should also be found to be free of any inducement, coercion etc. and should be shown to have been made by the accused on his own free will and volition – What is alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an extra- judicial confession – Very omnibus and vague statement seems to have been made – High Court erred in relying upon the extra-judicial confession even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer – Panch witnesses did not support the prosecution case – Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved – However, I.O. cannot be said to be proving the contents of the panchnama in accordance with law and the circumstance of discovery cannot be relied upon – Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused – Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt – Initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution – However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours and that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him – Prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke s.106 – It cannot straightaway invoke s.106 and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence – In view thereof, the High Court erred in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder – Impugned judgment set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 201. [Paras 27, 31, 36-38, 42, 47-49, 50-51, 55, 56, 58]

Case Law Cited

Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle v. State of Maharashtra (2009) Criminal Law Journal 3816; C.K. Ravindra v. the State of Kerala [1999] Supp. 5 SCR 140 : AIR 2000 SC 369; Ram Singh v. the State of Maharashtra & Anr (1999) Criminal Law Journal 3763; Balwinder Singh v. State of Punjab (1995) Supplementary 4 SCC 259 – referred to.

List of Acts

Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967.

List of Keywords

Extra judicial confession; Admissibility of extra judicial confession to Police Patil; Police Patil, if termed as a Police Officer; Panch witnesses; Motive.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1718 of 2017

From the Judgment and Order dated 03.07.2015 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in CRLA No. 70 of 1994

Appearances for Parties

Sachin Patil, Geo Joseph, Risvi Muhammed, Rishabh Agarwal, Advs. for the Appellant.

Aniruddha Joshi, Sr. Adv., Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1.This appeal arises from the Judgment and Order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay dated 3-7-2015 in Criminal Appeal No.70/94 by which the High Court allowed the acquittal appeal filed by the State of Maharashtra and thereby set aside the Judgment of the Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur dated 13-7-1993 in Sessions Case No.48/91 acquitting the appellant - herein (original accused) for the offence punishable under Sections 302 and 201 respectively of the Indian Penal Code (for short, the “IPC”).

2.The case of the prosecution may be summarized as under:-

The deceased by name Lata was married to the appellant herein. A son was born in the wedlock. However, it appears that marital life was not happy. The appellant – herein was entertaining a doubt in his mind as regards the chastity of his wife. One day all of a sudden, the deceased went missing.

3.In such circumstances, the maternal uncle of the deceased by name – Yashwant Ganpati Patil (PW 5) went to the house of Village Police Patial by name Mr. Vasant Dattu Bhosale & informed him that his niece had gone missing.

4.It appears that on 20-10-1990 at about 9.30 p.m. PW 5 brought to the notice to PW 2 that his niece Lata was missing.

5.The PW – 2, being the Village Police Patil, visited the house of the appellant – herein and found that the dead-body of the deceased lying in one corner of the house. The materials on record further indicate that the brother of the appellant – herein by name Madhukar and his wife Laxmi (PW 4) along with their daughter Mangal (PW 3) were also residing in the same house but separately in one part.

6.Upon recovery of the dead-body of the deceased, the inquest panchnama was drawn. The body of the deceased was sent for postmortem examination. The postmortem examination report noted that the cause of death was asphyxia due to strangulation. It is the case of the prosecution that the appellant – herein strangulated his wife to death with the help of an iron rod.

7.This iron rod is also stated to have been discovered from the place of the incident itself by way of a discovery panchnama drawn by the Investigating Officer in the presence of the panch witnesses.

8.The appellant was arrested in connection with the First Information Report that came to be lodged by the PW-2 himself at the concerned Police Station for the offence of murder.

9.Upon completion of investigation, the Investigating Officer filed charge-sheet for the offence enumerated above.

10.The case being exclusively triable by a Sessions Judge came to be committed to the Court of Sessions.

11.The Trial Court framed charge vide order dated 20.02.1993 which reads thus:

“CHARGE

I, V. B. Deshmukh, 4th Additional Sessions Judge, Kolhapur hereby charge you accused.

Shri. Sadashiv Dhondiram Patil, Age-33 years, Resident of Takali, Tal. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur as follows:-

That you accused on or about 25.10.1990 at about 1.00 a.m. at Mouje Sainik Takali, Tal. Shirol, Dist. Kolhapur did commit murder of your wife Sou. Lata Sadashiv Patil, Age-25 years by pressing her neck and thereby committed an offence punishable section 302 of the Indian Penal Code.

Secondly that you on aforesaid date, time and place knowingly that certain offence, to wit that you committed murder of your wife by pressing her neck and offence punishable with death or imprisonment for life has been committed, did cause of certain evidence of the said offence to disappear to wit. that you put the dead body of your wife in a gunny bag and thrown in the (iso) where the food-grains are preserved with an intention to screening yourself from legal punishment and thereby committed an offence punishable under section 201 of the Indian Penal code, and within my cognizance.

And, hereby I direct you that you be tried by me on aforesaid charges.

Today this 20th day of February, 1993 at Kolhapur.

(V.B.Deshmukh),

4th Additional Sessions Judge,

Kolhapur..”

12.In the course of the trial, the prosecution examined the following witnesses:-

1.Mr. Yeshvant Govind Chavan Exhibit 13

2.Mr. Vasant Dattu Bhosale (Patil) Exhibit 16

3.Ms. Mangal Exhibit 19

4.Ms. Laxmi wife of Madhukar Patil Exhibit 20

5.Mr. Yashvant Ganapati Patil Exhibit 21

6.Mr. Yamnappa Bhimrao Murali Exhibit 22

7.Mr. Amrut Rama Mane Exhibit 24

8.Dr. Shashikant Lakshman Pawar Exhibit 32

13.The prosecution also relied upon the following pieces of documentary evidence:-

1.First Information Report (Exhibit 17)

2.Inquest Panchnama (Exhibit 8)

3.Spot Panchnama (Exhibit 10)

4.Arrest Panchnama (Exhibit 11)

5.Memorandum of the Statement of accused (Exhibit 14)

6.Seizure punchnama of iron-rod, Article No.1 (Exhibit 15)

7.Seizure punchnama of the clothes of the deceased (Exhibit 12)

8.The Memorandum of Post-mortem examination (Exhibit 33)

9.Advance Medical Certificate (Exhibit 9)

10.Seven photographs (Exhibit 37 to 43)

14.Upon closure of the recording of the evidence, the further statement of the appellant – herein was recorded under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973

15.In the further statement, the appellant stated as under:-

Q.75 Do you want to say anything more about your defence?

Answer : I am giving written statement.

WRITTEN STATEMENT OF THE ACCUSED UNDER SECTION 313 of Cr. P.C.

Few months prior to death of my wife, I became disciple of Shri Rane of Shirol. He told me not to sleep at home for 6 months. Therefore I use to stay at night generally at Shirol. If I am at Takali, then I use to sleep at Kalleshwar temple. 2-3 days prior to missing of my wife from the home, I was at Shirol. When I returned on Thursday or Friday, I came to know about missing of my wife from the home. I enquired with, her maternal uncle, but she did not go there. I am implicated in the present case only on the basis of doubt.

16.The Trial Court upon appreciation of the oral as well as the documentary evidence on record came to the conclusion that the prosecution had failed to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt. The Trial Court accordingly acquitted the appellant – herein.

17.It may not be out of place to state that at this stage that the Trial Court looked into only one piece of circumstance, i.e., the extra judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant – herein before the (PW 2), i.e., the village Police Patil in the presence of his sister-in-law (PW 4) – Laxmi.

18.It is also important to note that Madhukar (brother of the accused) passed away during the course of trial and he could not have been examined as one of the prosecution witnesses.

19.The Trial Court took the view that the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been by the appellant – herein before (PW 2) could not be said to be admissible in evidence being hit by Section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act.

20.The Trial Court also disbelieved the discovery of the iron rod under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.

21.The State, being dissatisfied with the Judgment and Order of acquittal passed by the Trial Court, went in appeal before the High Court.

22.The High Court reversed the acquittal and held the appellant – herein guilty of the offence of murder and accordingly sentenced him to undergo life imprisonment.

23.In such circumstances, referred to above, the appellant is here before this Court with the present appeal.

24.We have heard Mr. Sachin Patil, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. Aniruddha Joshi, the learned Senior counsel appearing for the respondent – State.

25.We take notice of the fact that the entire case hinges on circumstantial evidence. The High Court relied upon the four pieces of incriminating evidence for the purpose of holding the accused guilty of the offence of murder of his wife:-

(i)extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the appellant before (PW 2) on 29-10-1990

(ii)discovery of the weapon of offence, i.e., the iron rod;

(iii)motive to commit crime;

(iv)the incident occurred inside the house and, therefore, the appellant could be said to be within the special knowledge as to what had happened on the fateful day of the incident.

26.The High Court while reversing the acquittal invoked Section 106 of the Evidence Act and shifted the burden on the appellant – herein to establish or rather explain what exactly had happened with his wife.

27.It appears that when the Trial Court acquitted the appellant – herein, the position of law as regards the admissibility of an extra-judicial confession said to have been made before the Village Police Patil was something different. A Division Bench of the High Court in “Ram Singh vs. the State of Maharashtra & Anr” (1999) Criminal Law Journal 3763 had held that a village Police Patil is a Police officer and, therefore, any confession made to him is inadmissible in evidence in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

28.In the said Judgment, the Division Bench also looked into & discussed Section 14 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, under which a Police Patil is appointed.

29.We quote the relevant observations of the said Judgment as under:-

13. Section 14 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, provides inter alia:

“(1) The Police Patil shall apprehend any person within the limits of his village who he may have reason to believe has committed any serious offence, and shall forward such person, together with all articles likely to be useful as evidence, to the Station Officer.

(2) Every person so apprehended shall within 24 hours be produced before the nearest Magistrate, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place where he is apprehended to the Court of the Magistrate.”

14. Sub-section (1) of S. 13 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, provides:

“The Police Patil shall forthwith proceed to the place of incident and call upon two or more intelligent persons belonging to the village or neighbourhood, who shall investigate the causes of death and all the circumstances of the case, and make a written report of the same, which the Police Patil shall cause to be forthwith delivered to the Station Officer.” 15. Section 15 of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, provides inter alia:

“(1) The Police Patil, in making any investigation coming within the scope of his duty, shall have authority to call and examine witnesses, and record their statement, and to search for concealed articles, taking care that no search be made in a dwelling-house between sunset and sunrise without urgent occasion.

(2) The Police Patil shall also have authority, in carrying out any search or any pursuit of supposed criminal, to enter and act within the limits of other villages, being bound however to have immediate information to the Police Patil thereof, who shall afford him all the assistance in his power, and be immediately responsible for continuing the search and pursuit.”

16. On plain reading of these provisions under the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, it will be clear that the Police Patil has power to apprehend a person, if he suspects that a person has committed serious offence. He has to send report to the Police Station and the person is required to be produced within 24 hours from the time and Police Patil apprehend such person. Not only that a preliminary investigation with respect to such crime also can be made by the Police Patil and he can even chase the accused and apprehend the accused. So, it is obvious that the observations of the learned Additional Sessions Judge quoted above are made without reading the appropriate provisions. Before making any such observations in the judgment, the Judge, at least, of the cadre of Additional Sessions Judge, is expected to go through the relevant provisions of law. Sweeping observations should not be made just to boost the reasoning which is being given in the judgment.

17. In the light of the provisions of the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967, it has to be seen whether any confession made before the Police Patil is hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The powers of the Police Patil which are referred to above clearly indicate that when any offence takes place, he can act as a Police Officer. He is not a mere spectator or informant. So, for all practical purposes, he is a Police Officer and, therefore, any confession made before the Police Patil would become inadmissible in evidence as being made before a Police Officer.

18. In this respect, we would like to refer two rulings of our High Court. The first is, in the case of Queen Empress v. Bhima ((1894) ILR 17 Bom 485), and the other is in the case of Vistari Narayan Shebe v. The State of Maharashtra 1978 Cri LJ 891. It is observed in the case of Vistari Narayan Shebe by the Division Bench, as follows (at page 895):

“In our opinion, it is fairly well established that the police patil is a police officer within the meaning of Sec. 25 of the Evidence Act. As early as in 1893 this Court held in Queen Empress v. Bhima ((1894) ILR 17 Bom 485), that a police patil is a police officer within the meaning of Ss. 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act. A confession made to a police patil is inadmissible in evidence. It must be remembered that the words “a police officer” found in S. 25 of the Indian Evidence Act should not be read in any strict technical sense but according to its more comprehensive and more popular meaning. Nor is the term confined to a person actually in charge of investigating the offence under the Cr. P.С.”

19. Thus, it will be very clear that any confessional statement made by the accused before the Police Patil is not admissible in evidence. If the learned Additional Sessions Judge had considered this aspect in that perspective, he would not have relied upon the evidence of the Police Patil to hold that the extra judicial confession made by the accused before the Police Patil could be sufficient to convict the accused. The deposition of the Police Patil as well as the F.I.R. which include this confessional statement are inadmissible in evidence and, therefore, this evidence brought on record by the prosecution has to be excluded altogether”.

30.In the year 2009, a Full Bench of the Bombay High Court, answered a reference titled “Rajeshwer S/o Hiraman Mohurle vs. State of Maharashtra” reported in (2009) Criminal Law Journal 3816. The Full Bench was called upon to answer whether a Village Police Patil is a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act or not.

31.The Full Bench of the High Court overruled the above referred Division Bench Judgment and took the view that a Village Police Patil is not a Police Officer within the meaning of Section 25 of the Evidence Act and any confession made before him would be admissible in evidence as an extra-judicial confession. We may quote the relevant paragraphs of the said Full-Bench Judgment as under:-

“18. Upon objective analysis of the principles aforestated, it can be stated with some certainty that merely because a person is appointed to a post which vests him with limited powers of Investigation and inquiry or any power ancillary thereto or empowers him to prevent commission of crime in an area would not per se make him a Police Officer in law so as to attract the bar contained in section 25 of the Evidence Act. We have already noticed in some detail that the powers vested in Police Patil under the Village Police Act are expected to be exercised for performance of duties and functions stated under section 6 of that Act. The duties and functions of the Police Patil are of a very restricted nature and do not vest in him all the powers including the power to file a charge-sheet under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code which a Police Officer under the Code possess. On the contrary, he is expected to assist the Police Officers when called upon by them in performance of their duties. He has to act under the orders of the District Magistrate and even is expected to collect and communicate to the Station Officer intelligence affecting the public peace. The basic and primary distinction between the powers of the Police Officer under the Code and the power and duties of the Police Patil under the Village Police Act, is that while the investigating officer or Police Officer in charge of a Police Station is duty bound in, law to conduct inquiry or, investigation in a just, proper and fair manner independently being uninfluenced by any other facts. There the restricted duties and powers relating to investigation and even otherwise vested in the Police Patil are to be exercised under the supervision of higher authorities as indicated in the provisions of the Village Police Act. Police Patil is required to perform his functions and discharge his duties subject to the orders of the Magistrate and is also required to assist and help the Police Officers in discharge of their duties. In these circumstances, it will be a far fetched submission that the Police Patil has to be treated as a Police Officer in law for all intent and purposes. The consistent view of the Supreme Court as is evident from the above referred judgments is that the officer, other than a police officer, invested with powers of an officer -In-charge of a Police Station is not entitled, to exercise all the powers under Chapter XII of the Code Including the power to submit a report or charge-sheet/challan under section 173 of the Code. This feature has been the hallmark and is held to be determinative factor by the Supreme Court. Once this aspect is missing from the ambit of the powers vested in the officer, he cannot be stated to be a Police Officer for the purposes of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act. The Police Patil under the Village Police Act is also not a Police Officer on the deeming fiction of law as there is no provision in the Statute which specifically or even otherwise requires the Police Patil to be treated as a Police Officer for all intent and purpose.

19. It will be useful to refer to the reasoning recorded by the Supreme Court in the case of Badku Joti Savant (supra) even at the cost of repetition. In paragraph 9 while discussing section 21 of the Central Excise Act which states that a Central Excise Officer under the Act has all the powers of an officer in-charge of a Police Station under Chapter XIV of the Criminal Procedure Code, the Court rejected the contention that therefore he should be deemed to be a Police Officer within the meaning of section 25 of the Evidence Act. Reference was made to the provisions of section 78(3) of the Bihar and Orissa Excise Act, 1955 and section 77 of that Act which stated that Excise Officer empowered under the provisions shall be deemed to be the officer in-charge of a Police Station and shall have the power of such officer to investigate a cognizable case. But even there the Supreme Court held that this power does not include the power to submit a charge-sheet under section 173 of the Criminal Procedure Code under the Excise Act unlike the Bihar and Orissa Act and thus held that Central Excise Officer is not an officer deemed to be in-charge of a Police Station. In other words, the Supreme Court declined to accept the applicability of the deemed fiction of law to the extent of terming the Central Excise Officer as a Police Officer for the purpose of section 25 of the Evidence Act.

20. The distinction between the powers of investigation given to a Police Officer under the Code and that of a Police Patil under the Village Police Act is quite obvious from the provisions of the two Statutes. Police Patil has been vested with very limited powers that too under the control and for the benefit of the Executive Magistrate/Police Officer and his duties are primarily to ensure that offences and public nuisance are not committed in the village and to bring the offenders to justice. The expression “bringing the offenders to justice” appearing in section 6 of the Village Police Act along with its other provisions has to be given its normal and plain meaning. There is no need, keeping in view the scheme of the Act or the legislative intent, to expand the meaning of this expression and enlarge the scope of provisions of this section on certain presumption of law. The powers of the Police Patil as stated under section 13 to 15 of the Village Police Act, are to be read and construed ejusdem generis to the provisions of section 6. The bare reading of these provisions show that Police Patil is not vested with the powers of preparing and filing a charge-sheet before the Court of competent jurisdiction. The powers of Police Patil to investigate and control over the apprehended persons are very limited in contradistinction to powers of a Police Officer under the Code. In terms of section 156 of the Code, a Police Officer is vested with the power to investigate any cognizable case under the provisions of Chapter XIII even without orders of the Magistrate. On the other hand, when a Police Patil apprehends a person in exercise of his powers vested under section 14(i) of the Village Police Act, he has to forward such person to the Station Officer, who in turn shall produce such person before the Magistrate within twenty four hours. Thus Legislative intent behind section 6 appears to be that Police Patil is a person responsible primarily for village surveillance, prevention of crime and providing his assistance and help to the police in discharge of his duties. Even above all this, his duties and functions have been made subject to orders of the District Magistrate. The Police Patil does not enjoy absolute freedom in relation to investigation, apprehending the suspect and even in exercise of other powers vested in him under law. The powers to be exercised and duties and functions to be performed by him are under the supervisory control of the stated authorities. The duties, functions and powers vested in an authority by a Statute are relatable to the source which prescribes such functions and powers. The ambit, scope and effect of exercise of such power can be tested by two different concepts i.e. quo modo and actio quaelibet it suia via. In what manner the powers are to be exercised as per the prescribed procedure, the performance or action must follow its prescribed procedure. On applying the above stated principles and testing them with reference to the maxims stated (supra), it is not possible for the Court to hold that either the manner of functions and powers of Police Patil or method in which they are to be performed are equitable to the authority, powers and functions of a Police Officer, in law. Therefore, we are unable to contribute to the view that Police Patil is a Police Officer in law for all intent and purpose and confession before him would attract the bar contemplated under section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872.

21. In view of our above discussion, now we proceed to record the answer to the question of law framed by the Division Bench. Our answer is as follows:-

“We are of the considered view that the Police Patil appointed under the Maharashtra Village Police Act, 1967 is not a ‘Police Officer’ for the purposes of section 25 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872”.

32.It appears that the High Court while reversing the acquittal relied upon the above-referred Full Bench Decision for the purpose of taking the view that the extra-judicial confession made by the appellant – herein before PW 2 could be said to be admissible in evidence.

33.One interesting question that arises for our consideration at this stage is that at the relevant point of time i.e., in 1993 when the Trial Court acquitted the appellant – herein the position of law was that an extra-judicial confession said to have been made by an accused before a village Police Patil could be said to be inadmissible in evidence being hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act.

34.In the year 2009, the Full Bench of the Bombay High Court while answering a reference held that a Village Police Patil is not a Police Officer. Therefore, if the accused herein had stood acquitted having regard to the position of law prevailing at the relevant point of time then relying on a subsequent decision taking a contrary view whether the accused could have been held guilty?

35.It could be argued that the Full Bench decision of the Bombay High Court came to be delivered in the year 2009 whereas the appellant was acquitted by the Trial Court sometime in the year 1993. The position of law till 2009 was that a Village Police is a Police Officer and therefore, any confession made to him would be inadmissible in evidence in view of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, more particularly in view of the Division Bench decision of the Bombay High Court rendered in Ram Singh (supra). We do not propose to consider the question whether the High Court could have relied upon the Full Bench decision after the appellant came to be acquitted by the Trial Court in 1993 thereby giving retrospective effect as regards its applicability.

36.We proceed on the footing that PW 2 – Vasant Dattu Bhosale, Police Patil of the Village cannot be termed as a Police Officer for the purpose of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. We also proceed on the footing that the extra-judicial confession alleged to have been made by the accused before PW 2 is admissible in evidence and is not hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act. However, such extra-judicial confession should be found to be true & trustworthy before it is relied upon by the Court to hold the accused guilty.

37.Besides, the above such extra-judicial confession should also be found to be free of any inducement, coercion etc. and it should be shown to have been made by the accused on his own free will and volition.

38.We requested the learned counsel appearing for the State to show us from the oral evidence on record, more particularly, the deposition of PW 2 as well as the deposition of PW 5, the exact words alleged to have been uttered by the appellant – herein in the form of an extra-judicial confession.

39.We on our own also looked into and are convinced that what is alleged to have been conveyed cannot be said to be an extra-judicial confession. A very omnibus & vague statement seems to have been made as deposed by both the witnesses in their oral evidence.

40.This Court in “C.K. Ravindra vs. the State of Kerala” AIR 2000 SC 369 had held that before placing reliance upon the extra-judicial confession, the Court must be convinced as regards the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible. This Court took the view that it would be difficult to rely upon the extra-judicial confession if the exact words or even the words as nearly as possible have not been reproduced, the said statement cannot be said to be voluntary. In such circumstances, the same may have to be excluded from the purview of consideration.

41.This Court in “Balwinder Singh vs. State of Punjab” (1995) Supplementary 4 SCC 259 had held that an extra-judicial confession by its very nature is rather a weak type of evidence and requires appreciation with a great deal of care and caution. Where extra-judicial confession is surrounded by suspicious circumstances, its credibility becomes doubtful and would lose its importance.

42.In such circumstances, referred to above, we are of the view that the High Court fell in error in relying upon the extra-judicial confession even while rightly holding that the same was admissible in evidence as Village Police Patil cannot be said to be a Police Officer.

43.We now come to the second piece of the circumstance relied upon.

44.It is the case of the prosecution that after the arrest of the appellant – herein, he is said to have on his own free will and volition made a statement before the Investigating Officer and he was ready and willing to point out the place where he had concealed the weapon, i.e., the iron rod.

45.Accordingly, the Investigating Officer along with two independent witnesses in the form of panchas went to the place as led by the appellant – herein.

46.The place was the house itself where the incident had occurred. According to the Investigating Officer, the appellant pointed out the iron rod which was lying in one corner of the house. The same was seized in the presence of the panch witnsses and was sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory for chemical analysis.

47.In this regard, we may only say that panch witnesses have not supported the case of the prosecution. They failed to prove the contents of the discovery panchnama.

48.If the panch witnesses are declared hostile then the prosecution is obliged to prove the contents of the said discovery panchnama through the evidence of the Investigating Officer. The question is how is the I.O. expected to prove the contents of the panchnama.

49.The position of law in this regard is very clear. Just because the panch witnesses have turned hostile does not mean that such discovery should be disbelieved. From the plain reading of the oral evidence of the Investigating Officer if the discovery is believable and inspires confidence, the same can definitely be looked into as one of the incriminating pieces of evidence against the accused.

50.However, unfortunately in the case on hand, all that the I.O. did was to depose that he had drawn the panchnama and in the end identified his signature on the same and that of the panch witnesses. This cannot be said to be proving the contents of the panchnama in accordance with law. In such circumstances, the circumstance of discovery also cannot be relied upon.

51.We are now left with motive. Motive is a double-edged weapon. Motive cannot be the sole basis for convicting the accused and that too for a serious offence like murder. Motive may be considered along with other pieces of reliable evidence in the form of incriminating circumstances.

52.We now come to the last part of the matter.

53.The learned counsel appearing for the State submitted that the dead body of the deceased was recovered from the house itself, i.e., the place where the family was residing. He would submit that in normal circumstances, the husband could be said to be the best person to explain as to what had happened to his wife on the date of the incident.

54.According to the learned counsel, when an offence is committed within the four walls of the house and that too in secrecy, it is difficult for the prosecution to establish its case beyond reasonable doubt and, therefore, under Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it is for the accused to explain what had actually happened and in the absence of any such explanation, it could be said that the accused committed the crime as alleged.

55.The law in the aforesaid regard is well-settled. Prosecution has to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt & that too on its own legs. The initial burden of proof is always on the prosecution. However, in cases where husband is alleged to have killed his wife in the night hours & that too within the residential house, then undoubtedly the husband has to offer some explanation as to what had actually happened and if he fails to offer any plausible explanation, this can go against him. However, Section 106 of the Evidence Act is subject to one well-settled principle of law. The prosecution has to first lay the foundational facts before it seeks to invoke Section 106 of the Evidence Act. If the prosecution has not been able to lay the foundational facts for the purpose of invoking Section 106 of the Evidence Act, it cannot starightaway invoke the said Section and throw the entire burden on the accused to establish his innocence.

56.In the overall view of the matter, we are convinced that the High Court committed error in holding the appellant guilty of the offence of murder.

57.In the result, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed.

58.The impugned Judgment and Order passed by the High Court is hereby set aside.

59.We are informed that the appellant has been enlarged on bail by this Court. His bail bonds stand discharged.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113A – Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women – Invocation of s.113A – When – Deceased died on account of severe burn injuries, by setting herself on fire – Order of conviction and sentence of the appellant-brother-in-law u/ss.306 and 498 IPC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, however, acquitted for the offence punishable u/s.304B IPC – Correctness: Held: When the courts below want to apply s.113A, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty and harassment – In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke s.113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide – No evidence on the basis of which it could be said that the brother-in-law abetted the commission of suicide – Judgment and order of conviction passed by courts below set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.306, 498-A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – s.4. [Paras 11, 13, 14]

[2025] 1 S.C.R. 484 : 2025 INSC 71

Ram Pyarey v. The State of Uttar Pradesh

(Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015)

09 January 2025

[J.B. Pardiwala and R. Mahadevan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Correctness of the order of conviction against the brother-in-law for the offences punishable u/ss.306, 498-A IPC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, in the absence of any cogent evidence.

Headnotes

Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113A – Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married women – Invocation of s.113A – When – Deceased died on account of severe burn injuries, by setting herself on fire – Order of conviction and sentence of the appellant-brother-in-law u/ss.306 and 498 IPC and s.4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, however, acquitted for the offence punishable u/s.304B IPC – Correctness:

Held: When the courts below want to apply s.113A, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty and harassment – In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke s.113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide – No evidence on the basis of which it could be said that the brother-in-law abetted the commission of suicide – Judgment and order of conviction passed by courts below set aside – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.306, 498-A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – s.4. [Paras 11, 13, 14]

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Evidence Act, 1872.

List of Keywords

Abetment to suicide; Presumption as to dowry death; Presumption as to abetment to suicide; Cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1408 of 2015

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.08.2013 of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench in CRLA No. 401 of 1993

Appearances for Parties

Bharat Bhushan, Keshav Bansal, Advs. for the Appellant.

K. Parmeshwar, Sr. Adv/A.A.G., Shaurya Sahay, Aditya Kumar, Ms. Ruchil Raj, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1.This appeal arises from the judgment and order passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, Lucknow Bench dated 6th August, 2013 in Criminal Appeal No. 401 of 1993 by which the High Court dismissed the appeal filed by the appellant herein and three other co-accused and thereby affirmed the judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court for the offence punishable under Sections 306 and 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short the “IPC”) and Section 4 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

2.It appears from the materials on record that the appellant herein is the brother-in-law (Jeth) of the deceased. The deceased was married to one Ram Sajeevan.

3.It is the case of the prosecution that there was harassment at the end of the husband, in-laws and the appellant (Jeth) herein to the deceased.

4.The deceased doused herself with kerosene and set herself on fire on 27-09-1990. She died on account of severe burn injuries. The father of the deceased lodged a First Information Report with the Ajgain Police Station, District Unnao on the very same day. The gist of the complaint lodged by the father of the deceased reads thus:-

“To,

SHO, Police Station Ajgain,

District Unnao:

Sir,

It is respectfully submitted that the complainant Shiv Prasad Sahu, S/o. Laxman Sahu is resident of Village Bhakat,

P.S. Kotwali, District Unnao. That the father in law Lal Bahadur., S/o. Jugnu, Village Sambhar Kheda, Majra Nana Tikur, P.S. Ajgain, Distt. Unnao took my daughter Kusum with him on 25.09.1990. That in the intervening night of 26.09.1990 and 27.09.1990 my daughter was killed by burning by her in-laws. Before this they were demanding the buffalo and gold chain in dowry after marriage. And told my daughter Kusum Devi if you will not give the dowry then we will kill you. They threatened her. On that I did not send her to her matrimonial house for one year and on 25.09.1990 my daughter was went to her matrimonial house alongwith her father in law Lal Bahadur, Son of Jugnu. They said that she is our responsibility. However, in the intervening night of 26.09.1990 and 27.09.1990 at about 2.00 A.M. Lal Bahadur, S/o. Jugnu, Ram Sajeevan, S/o. Lal Bahadur, Ram Pyare, S/o. Lal Bahadur, Sonawati, W/o. Lal Bahadur killed my daughter Kusum Devi by burning after pouring kerosene oil on her.

The complaint of the complainant is against all the four accused. Action may kindly be taken under law after reporting the case. Will be highly greatful.

Written by Nand Kishore Sahu,

S/o. Ram Nath, village Rajepur,

P.S. and P.O. Marvi, Distt. Unnao.

Complainant Shiv Prasad Sahu

S/o. Laxman Sahu R/o. Village

Bakhat, Distt. Unnao

27.09.1990”

5.On conclusion of the investigation, charge-sheet was filed for the offence of dowry death punishable under Section 304B of the IPC, against four accused persons which included the appellant herein. The offence being exclusively triable by the Sessions Court was committed under the provisions of Section 209 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Charges were framed against four accused persons including the appellant herein.

6.It appears that although the original charge framed by the trial court was one for dowry death punishable under Section 304B of the IPC yet, the trial court acquitted all the accused persons for the offence punishable under Section 304-B, however convicted them for the offence of abetment of suicide punishable under Sections 306 and 498A of the IPC respectively.

7.We are informed that the father-in-law and mother-in-law passed away while the appeal before the High Court was pending. So far as, the husband is concerned he has already undergone the sentence as imposed by the trial court. In fact, he did not file any appeal against his conviction.

8.The present appellant who is the brother-in-law of the deceased is here before us with this appeal.

9.We have heard Mr. Bharat Bhushan, the learned counsel appearing for the appellant and Mr. K. Parmeshwar, the learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Uttar Pradesh.

10.We have looked into the oral evidence on record. We have also looked into the nature of the allegations levelled against the appellant herein.

11.We are of the view that there is practically no evidence on the basis of which it could be said that the appellant herein as brother-in-law abetted the commission of suicide. We need not say anything further in the matter.

12.The law as regards the abetment of suicide punishable under Sections 306 of the IPC is now well settled. It appears that the Courts below laid much emphasis on Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 (for short, “the Evidence Act”). Sections 113A & 113B of the Evidence Act talks about presumption. Sections 113A and 113B respectively read thus:-

“113A. Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.─ When the question is whether the commission of suicide by a woman had been abetted by her husband or any relative of her husband and it is shown that she had committed suicide within a period of seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such relative of her husband had subjected her to cruelty, the Court may presume, having regard to all the other circumstances of the case, that such suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative of her husband.

Explanation.─ For the purposes of this section, “cruelty” shall have the same meaning as in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).

113B. Presumption as to dowry death.─ When the question is whether a person has committed the dowry death of a woman and it is shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand for dowry, the Court shall presume that such person had caused the dowry death.

Explanation.─ For the purposes of this section, “dowry death” shall have the same meaning as in section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860).”

13.It is relevant to note that under Section 113B, the Court shall presume dowry death unlike Section 113A where the provision says that Court may presume abetment of suicide. This is the vital difference between the two provisions which raises presumption as regards abetment of suicide. When the Courts below want to apply Section 113A of the Evidence Act, the condition precedent is that there has to be first some cogent evidence as regards cruelty & harassment. In the absence of any cogent evidence as regards harassment or abetment in any form like aiding or instigating, the court cannot straightway invoke Section 113A and presume that the accused abetted the commission of suicide.

14.In view of the aforesaid, this appeal succeeds and is hereby allowed. The judgment and order of conviction passed by the trial court as confirmed by the High Court is hereby set aside.

15.The appellant is already on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.

16.Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Appellant was residing with the victim-deceased and was assisting him in his work – On the fateful day, the appellant left in morning however, returned early claiming his cycle got punctured – He asked PW-5 (wife of victim) for money to get puncture repaired – To give appellant money PW-5 went to market to sell paddy, leaving appellant and her victim-husband behind – When she returned, she saw her husband lying on floor dead, bleeding with his neck severed – FIR was registered – Trial Court convicted appellant for offence u/s.302 IPC and same was upheld by the High Court – Correctness: Held: It is settled that the chain of events leading to the prosecution of the convict must conclusively be established with certainty and there shall not be any room for any second opinion which may lead to the innocence of the accused – In the instant case, it is alleged that there was some discord between appellant and the deceased in connection with non-payment/untimely payment of wages – The issue of non-payment of wages is hardly material and is so trivial a matter so as to compel anyone to take an extreme step of committing a crime of such a grave nature – Moreover, there is no material evidence to prove any discord between the two – It is the consistent case of all the witnesses including PW-5 that the appellant had left in the morning for his native place and that as told by PW-5 he returned as his cycle’s tyre got punctured – The fact that he actually returned as alleged does not stand established by any independent evidence except for the statement of PW-5 – However, her statement could not be corroborated by any piece of evidence – The cycle of the appellant was recovered by the police but no effort was made to find out if either of the tyres was actually punctured, which could have proved that the appellant may have returned as the cycle’s tyre got punctured – The weapon of crime i.e., farsi (Ex P/6) with blood stains was set to have been recovered after 20-25 days of the incident on the pointing out of the appellant – However, no forensic report was brought on record to prove that the blood stains on it matched with that of the blood of the deceased – Merely for the reason that the doctor opined that the injuries on the deceased may have been caused by a similar weapon would not conclude that the recovered farsi was the weapon of crime – That apart, JR, who lodged the complaint, in his cross-examination stated that the farsi was lying in an open place, referring to the place of the commission of the crime – The said statement completely belies the fact that the farsi was recovered subsequently from the field of one C – The recovery of the weapon of crime or the farsi, which was recovered, is doubtful and it is also not certain that it was actually the weapon of crime – Also, PW-5 had not found and seen the appellant at the place of the crime after her return as he had already fled – However, in her cross examination she took a summersault and stated that when she came back, she saw the appellant running from the house with the farsi – Further, the evidence of none of the two witnesses (PW-1 and PW-3) could conclusively establish that they saw the appellant running or fleeing from the place of crime or from the village – The identity of the person running away had not been established by any evidence – The circumstances raising finger upon the appellant, are not of a conclusive nature to prove beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person responsible for the commission of the crime – Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the benefit of doubt goes in his favour. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17]

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 612 : 2025 INSC 178

Hansraj v. State of Chhattisgarh

(Criminal Appeal No. 1387 of 2012)

10 February 2025

[Pankaj Mithal* and Ahsanuddin Amanullah, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The appellant was convicted for offence u/s.302 IPC. Whether the appellant can be held guilty of the commission of offence beyond reasonable doubt.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – s.302 – Appellant was residing with the victim-deceased and was assisting him in his work – On the fateful day, the appellant left in morning however, returned early claiming his cycle got punctured – He asked PW-5 (wife of victim) for money to get puncture repaired – To give appellant money PW-5 went to market to sell paddy, leaving appellant and her victim-husband behind – When she returned, she saw her husband lying on floor dead, bleeding with his neck severed – FIR was registered – Trial Court convicted appellant for offence u/s.302 IPC and same was upheld by the High Court – Correctness:

Held: It is settled that the chain of events leading to the prosecution of the convict must conclusively be established with certainty and there shall not be any room for any second opinion which may lead to the innocence of the accused – In the instant case, it is alleged that there was some discord between appellant and the deceased in connection with non-payment/untimely payment of wages – The issue of non-payment of wages is hardly material and is so trivial a matter so as to compel anyone to take an extreme step of committing a crime of such a grave nature – Moreover, there is no material evidence to prove any discord between the two – It is the consistent case of all the witnesses including PW-5 that the appellant had left in the morning for his native place and that as told by PW-5 he returned as his cycle’s tyre got punctured – The fact that he actually returned as alleged does not stand established by any independent evidence except for the statement of PW-5 – However, her statement could not be corroborated by any piece of evidence – The cycle of the appellant was recovered by the police but no effort was made to find out if either of the tyres was actually punctured, which could have proved that the appellant may have returned as the cycle’s tyre got punctured – The weapon of crime i.e., farsi (Ex P/6) with blood stains was set to have been recovered after 20-25 days of the incident on the pointing out of the appellant – However, no forensic report was brought on record to prove that the blood stains on it matched with that of the blood of the deceased – Merely for the reason that the doctor opined that the injuries on the deceased may have been caused by a similar weapon would not conclude that the recovered farsi was the weapon of crime – That apart, JR, who lodged the complaint, in his cross-examination stated that the farsi was lying in an open place, referring to the place of the commission of the crime – The said statement completely belies the fact that the farsi was recovered subsequently from the field of one C – The recovery of the weapon of crime or the farsi, which was recovered, is doubtful and it is also not certain that it was actually the weapon of crime – Also, PW-5 had not found and seen the appellant at the place of the crime after her return as he had already fled – However, in her cross examination she took a summersault and stated that when she came back, she saw the appellant running from the house with the farsi – Further, the evidence of none of the two witnesses (PW-1 and PW-3) could conclusively establish that they saw the appellant running or fleeing from the place of crime or from the village – The identity of the person running away had not been established by any evidence – The circumstances raising finger upon the appellant, are not of a conclusive nature to prove beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person responsible for the commission of the crime – Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the benefit of doubt goes in his favour. [Paras 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17]

Case Law Cited

Sharad Birdhichand Sarda v. State of Maharashtra [1985] 1 SCR 88 : (1984) 4 SCC 116 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Section 302 of Penal Code, 1860; Circumstantial evidence; Conclusion of guilt; Hypothesis of guilt; Chain of evidence; Innocence of accused; Motive; Last seen theory; Recovery of weapon of crime; Benefit of doubt.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 1387 of 2012

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.07.2010 of the High Court of Chhattisgarh at Bilaspur in CRLA No. 291 of 2003

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Rukhsana Choudhury, Adv. for the Appellant.

Vikrant Bais, A.A.G., Abhishek Pandey, Prashant Kumar Umrao, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pankaj Mithal, J.

1.The appellant Hansraj is a convict for offence under Section 302 IPC1 for murdering Ramlal of village Ghotha Sakulpara Bhanupratappur, District Kanker, Chhattisgarh and has been awarded life imprisonment and fine of Rs.1000/-.

2.The order of conviction and sentence of the Trial Court dated 19.12.2002 has been confirmed by the High Court in appeal by the impugned judgment and order dated 30.07.2010.

3.The appellant preferred the Special Leave Petition with delay of 653 days which was condoned and leave to appeal was granted. Since the appellant had remained in jail for over 10 years, he was directed to be released on bail by this Court.

4.The case of the prosecution is based only on circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the incident.

5.The argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is that it is a completely false case and that even the circumstances have not been proved conclusively to hold the appellant guilty and there are stark contradictions in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses.

6.The incident is of 28.03.2002. It is alleged that the appellant was residing with the deceased and was assisting him in his work for the last over two months. On the fateful day the appellant at 7:00 am in the morning left for his native place on cycle with a bag but is set to have returned at around 9:00 am claiming that his cycle got punctured. He therefore asked for money from Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the wife of the deceased, to get the puncture repaired. Budhiyarin Bai told him that she had no money readily available at home and that he can take paddy and sell it in the market, but he refused. So, Budhiyarin Bai herself went to the market to sell the paddy, leaving the appellant and her husband at home. When she returned at about 9:30 am, she saw the appellant fleeing with a farsi (Ex P/6) in his hand and discovered that her husband is lying on the floor, profusely bleeding with his neck severed. She therefore raised an alarm and upon hearing her cries her neighbours Jogeshwar (PW-3) and Jhadu Ram (PW-4) came and they also saw her husband lying dead. The neighbours informed another villager namely Jogi Ram (PW-1) who also came on the spot and thereafter proceeded to the Police Station Bhanupratappur to lodge an FIR. He lodged the FIR at 11:15 am on the same day.

7.It is alleged that the relationship of the appellant with the deceased was strained probably on account of non-payment/untimely payment of his wages. The appellant was the person last seen in the company of the deceased and that the weapon of recovery i.e., farsi was recovered at his pointing out. The injuries sustained by the deceased were opined to have been caused by the weapon recovered. In these circumstances, the prosecution asserts that the evidence on record proves beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant alone is the person who committed the offence and that he has been rightly convicted and sentenced by the two Courts below.

8.Undisputedly, the case of the prosecution is based on circumstantial evidence and there is no eyewitness to the commission of the offence in as much as the wife of the deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, was also not present at the time of the commission of the offence and had discovered that her husband was lying on the floor bleeding profusely with neck severed upon returning from the market. She probably saw the accused fleeing from the scene of crime.

9.The law with regard to a case based purely on circumstantial evidence stands crystalised by the decision of this Court in the case of Sharad Birdhichand Sarda vs State of Maharashtra2 wherein five golden principles known as panchsheel proof of a case based on circumstantial evidence were enshrined namely (i) the circumstances from which the conclusion of guilt is to be drawn should be fully established crafting out a distinction between ‘may be’ established and ‘must or should’ be established; (ii) the facts established should be consistent with the hypothesis of the guilt of the accused; (iii) the circumstances should be of a conclusive nature; (iv) the circumstance should exclude every other possible hypothesis except the one to be proved i.e., the guilt of the accused; and (v) there must be a chain of evidence so complete as not to leave any reasonable ground for conclusion that the accused is innocent and must show that in all human probability the act must have been done by the accused.

10.In other words, the chain of events leading to the prosecution of the convict must conclusively be established with certainty and there shall not be any room for any second opinion which may lead to the innocence of the accused.

11.The appellant is said to have a motive to kill the deceased. The alleged motive being that he was living as a servant of the deceased for the last two months and there was some discord between him and the deceased in connection with non-payment/untimely payment of wages. However, such a discord is not of such a nature of extent which may lead to such a drastic action on part of the appellant to kill the deceased. The issue of non-payment of wages is hardly material and is so trivial a matter so as to compel anyone to take an extreme step of committing a crime of such a grave nature. Moreover, there is no material evidence to prove any discord between the two.

12.In so far as the last seen theory is concerned, that the appellant was in the company of the deceased at the time when Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) the wife of the deceased went to the market to sell paddy also appears to be a little doubtful. It is the consistent case of all the witnesses including Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) that the appellant had left in the morning at about 7:00 am for his native place and that as told by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) he returned around 9:00 am as his cycle’s tyre got punctured. The fact that he actually returned as alleged does not stand established by any independent evidence except for the statement of Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5). However, her statement could not be corroborated by any piece of evidence. It is hardly believable that a person whose relationship with the deceased was not cordial and has left for his native place in disgust would return soon thereafter. The cycle of the appellant was recovered by the police but no effort was made to find out if either of the tyres was actually punctured, which could have proved that the appellant may have returned as the cycle’s tyre got punctured.

13.The weapon of crime i.e., farsi (Ex P/6) was set to have been recovered after 20-25 days of the incident on the pointing out of the appellant. It has come in evidence that it had some blood stains. However, no forensic report was brought on record to prove that the blood stains on it matched with that of the blood of the deceased. Merely for the reason that the doctor opined that the injuries on the deceased may have been caused by a similar weapon would not conclude that the recovered farsi was the weapon of crime. Similar and identical instruments like farsi are found in almost every home in the village as it is one of the most used farming equipment. That apart, Jogi Ram, who lodged the complaint, in his cross examination stated that the farsi was lying in an open place, referring to the place of the commission of the crime. The said statement completely belies the fact that the farsi was recovered subsequently from the field of one Chamaru Ram. The recovery of the weapon of crime or the farsi, which was recovered, is doubtful and it is also not certain that it was actually the weapon of crime.

14.One important circumstance pointing to the involvement of the appellant is that he was seen running from the village both by Budhiyarin Bai (PW-5) and Jogi Ram (PW-1). Budhiyarin Bai in her statement in unequivocal terms stated that when she returned home after selling the paddy, the appellant had fled. It means that she had not found and seen the appellant at the place of the crime after her return as he had already fled. However, in her cross examination she took a summersault and stated that when she came back, she saw the appellant Hans Raj running from the house with the farsi. Jogi Ram (PW-1) who at the time of occurrence of the incident was working in his field, stated that he had seen the appellant running before he came to know about the incident through Jogeshwar (PW-3), whereupon he went to the house of the deceased. In his cross examination, he further stated that the wife of the deceased, Budhiyarin Bai, told him that when she came back after selling paddy, her husband was lying on the spot and the appellant had disappeared. PW-1 nowhere stated that Budhiyarin Bai saw the appellant fleeing from the spot rather, she only informed that the appellant had already disappeared when she returned from the market. Later, in the cross-examination, Jogi Ram stated that while working in the field collecting mahuva he only saw a man running from a distance of more than a furlong. But he never named the person who was running. Therefore, the evidence of none of the two witnesses could conclusively establish that they saw the appellant running or fleeing from the place of crime or from the village. The identity of the person running away had not been established by any evidence.

15.In addition to this, according to the prosecution, the clothes of the appellant which he was wearing at the time of the incident were produced by one Pritam Singh (PW-9) who was declared to be hostile. The said clothes again had the blood stains but no forensic report was produced to prove that the blood of those stains matched with the blood of the deceased.

16.In the aforesaid facts, the circumstances raising finger upon the appellant, are not of a conclusive nature to prove beyond the shadow of doubt that the appellant was the person responsible for the commission of the crime. The possibility of innocence of the appellant does not stand excluded as per the chain of events.

17.Thus, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant cannot be held guilty of the commission of the offence beyond reasonable doubt and therefore, in such circumstances the benefit of doubt goes in his favour. Accordingly, we are of the opinion that the Courts below have manifestly erred in convicting him for the aforesaid offence.

18.The impugned judgment and orders dated 19.12.2002 and 30.07.2012 are hereby set aside and the appellant is acquitted from the offence charged with. He has already suffered incarceration for over 10 years. He is already on bail. His sureties and bail bonds are discharged.

19.The appeal is allowed accordingly.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

1 Indian Penal Code

2 (1984) 4 SCC 116

Insurance – Insurance claim – Entitlement – Valid National permit – Non-depositing of authorization fee – Truck of the appellant, insured with the respondent-insurance company, caught fire during the insurance period – Direction by the State Commission to the respondent to settle the claim on non-standard basis – However, the National Commission held that the insurance claim cannot be allowed in the absence of any valid permit and set aside the order passed by the State Commission – Correctness: Held: National permit was valid – Authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar as it was registered in the State of Bihar and the truck caught fire in the State of Bihar itself, thus, the respondent company could not have repudiated the claim on such a frivolous ground – Permit was issued by the competent authority in Bihar, thus, no requirement of paying authorization fee when the truck was being used in the State of Bihar – As per the terms and conditions of the National Permit, authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar – Thus, the apellant entitled for the insurance claim as held by the State Commission – Order passed by the National Commission set aside – Appellant not only entitled for the entire claim amount right from the date it became due but also entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the complaint made before State Commission till the date, the amount is actually paid to him. [Paras 8, 9]

 

[2025] 2 S.C.R. 521 : 2025 INSC 154

Shri Binod Kumar Singh v. National Insurance Company Ltd.

(Civil Appeal No. 2214 of 2025)

07 February 2025

[B.V. Nagarathna and Satish Chandra Sharma,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose as regards the order of the National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission disallowing the insurance claim of the appellant.

Headnotes

Insurance – Insurance claim – Entitlement – Valid National permit – Non-depositing of authorization fee – Truck of the appellant, insured with the respondent-insurance company, caught fire during the insurance period – Direction by the State Commission to the respondent to settle the claim on non-standard basis – However, the National Commission held that the insurance claim cannot be allowed in the absence of any valid permit and set aside the order passed by the State Commission – Correctness:

Held: National permit was valid – Authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar as it was registered in the State of Bihar and the truck caught fire in the State of Bihar itself, thus, the respondent company could not have repudiated the claim on such a frivolous ground – Permit was issued by the competent authority in Bihar, thus, no requirement of paying authorization fee when the truck was being used in the State of Bihar – As per the terms and conditions of the National Permit, authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar – Thus, the apellant entitled for the insurance claim as held by the State Commission – Order passed by the National Commission set aside – Appellant not only entitled for the entire claim amount right from the date it became due but also entitled for interest @ 9% per annum from the date of the complaint made before State Commission till the date, the amount is actually paid to him. [Paras 8, 9]

Case Law Cited

National Insurance Company v. Nitin Khandelwal, Criminal Appeal No. 8463/2014; Amrit Paul Singh and Anr. v. TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 558 – referred to.

List of Acts

Insurance; Authorization fee; Validity of insurance cover; Non-standard basis; National permit; State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission; National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission; Insurance claim; Valid National permit; Non-depositing of authorization fee; Insurance period; Non-standard basis; Absence of valid permit; Repudiation of claim; Interest.

List of Keywords

Compounding of offence; Compounding application; First offence; Actual date of filing of return of income; Due date for filing of returns; Subsequent furnishing of return of income by assessee; Failure to furnish returns of income; “Voluntary disclosure”; Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2014; Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2008; Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2019; Guidelines for Compounding of Offences under Direct Tax Laws, 2022; Delay in filing return.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 2214 of 2025

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.08.2020 of the National Consumers Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi in FA No. 1778 of 2017

Appearances for Parties

Neeraj Shekhar, Mrs. Kshama Sharma, Rajesh Maurya, Ram Bachhan Choudhary, Amrendra Singh, Ms. Priya Chakraborty, Ujjwal Ashutosh, Advs. for the Appellant.

Amit Kumar Singh, Ms. K Enatoli Sema, Ms. Chubalemla Chang, Prang Newmai, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Satish Chandra Sharma, J.

1.Leave Granted.

2.The present appeal is arising out of order dated 19.08.2020 passed by National Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, New Delhi, (for short, “the National Commission”) in First Appeal No. 1778 of 2017.

3.The facts of the case reveal that the appellant before this Court is the owner of Truck bearing registration No. BR-02-Q9220 make TATA-251625.0LPKTC. The truck was insured with the respondent National Insurance Company for a period of one year i.e. from 18.09.2013 to the midnight of 17.09.2014 and unfortunately, the truck caught fire on account of short-circuit on 08.06.2014 meaning thereby during the validity of insurance cover.

4.The appellant preferred a complaint before the State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bihar, Patna (for short, “the State Commission”) and the State Commission placing reliance on the judgment delivered in the case of National Insurance Company Vs. Nitin Khandelwal (Criminal Appeal No. 8463/2014) directed the respondent insurance company to settle the claim on non-standard basis within a period of three months if other requirements were fulfilled by the appellant.

5.The respondent National Insurance Company being aggrieved by the order passed by the State Commission dated 07.07.2017 preferred an appeal before the National Commission and the National Commission has allowed the appeal holding that the judgment delivered by this Court in the case of Nitin Khandelwal (supra) does not help the appellant as it was a theft case whereas the present case relates to damage by fire. The National Commission after placing reliance upon the judgment delivered in the case of Amrit Paul Singh and Anr. Vs. TATA AIG General Insurance Co. Ltd. & Ors. (2018) 7 SCC 558 has allowed the appeal and held that the insurance claim cannot be allowed in the absence of any valid permit thereby setting aside the order passed by the State Commission.

6.Learned counsel for the appellant has vehemently argued before this Court that the All India Permit (National Permit) was issued having validity period with effect from 14.10.2012 to 13.10.2017 and for State of Bihar, the permit was in force from 13.10.2012 to 13.10.2013 meaning thereby, on the date the truck caught fire on 08.06.2014, there was a valid National Permit in existence.

7.Learned counsel for the respondent National Insurance Company has vehemently argued before this Court that as per the terms and conditions of the permit, the fee was deposited for a period with effect from 13.10.2012 to 13.10.2017 and the authorization fee was not deposited beyond 14.10.2013 and, therefore, and in the absence of non-depositing of authorization fee, National Permit cannot be said to be a valid permit.

8.This Court has carefully gone through the permit which is on record and the National Permit is certainly valid up to 13.10.2017. The authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar as it was registered in the State of Bihar and the truck caught fire on account of short-circuit on 08.06.2014 in the State of Bihar itself and, therefore, the respondent company could not have repudiated the claim on such a frivolous ground. The permit in question was issued by the competent authority in Bihar and, therefore, there was no requirement of paying authorization fee when the truck was being used in the State of Bihar and as per the terms and conditions of the National Permit, authorization fee was required to be paid only when the truck was moving out of State of Bihar. Thus, in the considered opinion of this Court, the appellant was certainly entitled for the insurance claim as held by the State Commission and, therefore, the order passed by the National Commission, dated 19.08.2020, deserves to be set aside and is accordingly set aside. The respondent National Insurance Company is directed to process the claim of the appellant and to pay the amount to the appellant within a period of 60 days from today. It is needless to mention that the claim became due in the year 2014 and it was repudiated by the respondent National Insurance Company in the year 2014 itself. The order of the State Commission allowing the claim was passed in the year 2017 which was reversed by the National Commission in the year 2020. Therefore, in the considered opinion of this Court, the appellant was not only entitled for the entire claim amount right from the date it became due but he is also entitled for interest from the date of the complaint made before State Commission till the date, the amount is actually paid to him. The appellant shall be entitled to interest @ 9% per annum and the same with the proposed amount be paid positively within 60 days from today.

9.With the aforesaid, the appeal stands allowed. No orders as to costs. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.