Service law – Recruitment – Recruitment to the posts of Lower Division Clerk-LDC in the Kerala Water Authority – Notification by Kerala Public Service Commission-KPSC – Qualification prescribed was Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from the named Institute or from similar/equivalent government approved institution – Stand of KPSC, in the earlier round that DCA was not a qualification to be considered eligible for appointment to the post of LDC – However, later, KPSC adopted a stand that a higher qualification was not barred, and considered candidates with DCA/higher qualification also while preparing the probability list – Candidates with Diploma in Computer Applications-DCA/higher qualifications, if eligible for appointment to the post of LDC: Held: A State instrumentality seized of the solemn responsibility of making selections to public services must maintain a high standard of probity and transparency and is not expected to remain nebulous as to its norms or resort to falsehoods before the Court, contrary to what it had stated in its earlier sworn affidavits – KPSC, with its vacillating and dithering stance, largely responsible for this long-pending litigation, impacting the lives, hopes and aspirations of nearly twelve hundred candidates – KPSC, changed its stance, without any foundational inquiry to determine the superiority of the so-called higher qualifications over the prescribed qualification – It was a purely whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion on its part without actual application of mind as per required parameters – KPSC to desists, from trifling with the lives, hopes and aspirations of candidates who seek public employment – Furthermore, on basis of the Rules of 2011 and the Notification, it is clear that a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from a Government approved similar/equivalent institution would be valid – Equivalence is, not of the qualification itself but of the institution from which the said Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation is obtained – Thus, no error committed by the Division Bench of the High Court in confirming the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court, non-suiting candidates with DCA/higher qualifications who aspired for selection to the post of LDC – Kerala Water Authority (Administrative, Ministerial and Last Grade) Service Rules, 2011. [Paras 15-17, 21, 25, 27, 28]

[2024] 11 S.C.R. 325 : 2024 INSC 828

Anoop M. and Others v. Gireeshkumar T.M. and Others Etc.

(Civil Appeal Nos. 12173-12174 of 2024)

04 November 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sanjay Kumar,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Candidates with Diploma in Computer Applications-DCA/higher qualifications, if could be considered for selection to the post of Lower Division Clerk in the Kerala Water Authority, when the qualification prescribed was Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from the named Institute or from a similar/equivalent government approved institution.

Headnotes

Service law – Recruitment – Recruitment to the posts of Lower Division Clerk-LDC in the Kerala Water Authority – Notification by Kerala Public Service Commission-KPSC – Qualification prescribed was Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from the named Institute or from similar/equivalent government approved institution – Stand of KPSC, in the earlier round that DCA was not a qualification to be considered eligible for appointment to the post of LDC – However, later, KPSC adopted a stand that a higher qualification was not barred, and considered candidates with DCA/higher qualification also while preparing the probability list – Candidates with Diploma in Computer Applications-DCA/higher qualifications, if eligible for appointment to the post of LDC:

Held: A State instrumentality seized of the solemn responsibility of making selections to public services must maintain a high standard of probity and transparency and is not expected to remain nebulous as to its norms or resort to falsehoods before the Court, contrary to what it had stated in its earlier sworn affidavits – KPSC, with its vacillating and dithering stance, largely responsible for this long-pending litigation, impacting the lives, hopes and aspirations of nearly twelve hundred candidates – KPSC, changed its stance, without any foundational inquiry to determine the superiority of the so-called higher qualifications over the prescribed qualification – It was a purely whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion on its part without actual application of mind as per required parameters – KPSC to desists, from trifling with the lives, hopes and aspirations of candidates who seek public employment – Furthermore, on basis of the Rules of 2011 and the Notification, it is clear that a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from a Government approved similar/equivalent institution would be valid – Equivalence is, not of the qualification itself but of the institution from which the said Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation is obtained – Thus, no error committed by the Division Bench of the High Court in confirming the view taken by the Single Judge of the High Court, non-suiting candidates with DCA/higher qualifications who aspired for selection to the post of LDC – Kerala Water Authority (Administrative, Ministerial and Last Grade) Service Rules, 2011. [Paras 15-17, 21, 25, 27, 28]

Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 – Kerala Water Authority (Administrative, Ministerial and Last Grade) Service Rules, 2011 – Applicability, in matter pertaining to selection to the post of Lower Division Clerk in the Kerala Water Authority:

Held: Rules of 2011 are Special Rules for the Kerala Water Authority – Thus, to the extent the Rules of 2011 make special provision as to the qualification required for a particular post, the same would prevail over the general rule pertaining to qualifications in Part II of the Rules of 1958, subject to r. 10(a)(ii) of the Rules of 1958 which, prevails over the Special Rules also – Furthermore, given the phraseology of the Rules of 2011, the Rules of 1958 will not have general and all-pervasive applicability at the stage of direct recruitment even before a candidate is selected and appointed to any of the posts in the categories covered by the Rules of 2011, i.e., before he/she becomes an ‘employee’ of the Kerala Water Authority – Also, Rule 2 in Part II of the Rules of 1958, titled ‘Relation to the Special Rules’, states that if any provision in the General Rules contained in Part II thereof is repugnant to a provision in the Special Rules applicable to any particular service contained in Part III thereof, the latter shall, in respect of that service, prevail over the provision in the General Rules in Part II of the Rules of 1958. [Para 13]

Case Law Cited

Jyoti K.K. and Others v. Kerala Public Service Commission (2010) 15 SCC 596 – distinguished.

Ajith K and others v. Aneesh K.S. and Others [2019] 11 SCR 495 : (2019) 17 SCC 147; Sheo Shyam v. State of U.P. [2004] 2 SCR 406 : (2005) 10 SCC 314; Sivanandan C.T. and Others v. High Court of Kerala and Others [2017] 13 SCR 226 : (2024) 3 SCC 799; State of Bihar and others v. Shyama Nandan Mishra [2022] 11 SCR 1136 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 554 – referred to.

List of Acts

Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958; Kerala Water Authority (Administrative, Ministerial and Last Grade) Service Rules, 2011; Kerala High Court Rules.

List of Keywords

Diploma in Computer Applications-DCA; Higher qualifications; Selection to the post of Lower Division Clerk in Kerala Water Authority; Qualification prescribed; Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation; Named Institute; Similar/equivalent government approved institution; Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Science and Technology, Institute of Human Resources Development; Eligible qualification; Equivalent qualifications; Special Rules; General Rules; Acquisition of lesser qualification; Whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion; State instrumentality; Solemn responsibility; Public services; High standard of probity and transparency; Public employment; Direct recruitment.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 12173-12174 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 30.01.2024 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in WA Nos. 1941 and 1945 of 2023

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 12175-12176,12177-12178 and 12179-12180 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

V.Giri, Shaji P Chaly, Sr. Advs., Vipin Nair, M.R. Ramya, Mohd Aman Alam, P.B. Sashaankh, Aditya Narendranath, Roy Abraham, Ms. Reena Roy, Adithya Koshy Roy, Yaduinder Lal, Ms. Rajni Ohri Lal, Shrey Kumar, Himinder Lal, Mohammed Sadique T.A., Kaleeswaram Raj, Ms. Thulasi K Raj, Ms. Aprana Menon, Ms. Aparna Menon, Ms. Chinnu Maria Antony, P. Nandakumar, Abdulla Naseeh V.T., Shivam Sharma, Ms. Abreeda Banu, Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Ajith Anto Perumbully, M.B. Ramya, Advs. for the appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjay Kumar, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.With a tortuous trajectory spanning over a dozen years, this weary litigation craves closure. Hanging in balance is recruitment to several posts of Lower Division Clerk (LDC) in the Kerala Water Authority. A notification was issued by the Kerala Public Service Commission (KPSC) in this regard on 16.07.2012 for filling up 102 existing vacancies and 43 anticipated vacancies in the said post. 1192 applications were received in response thereto. The qualifications prescribed in the notification were:

(i)Degree in any discipline and

(ii)Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation of minimum 3 months (120 hours) duration awarded by Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Science and Technology (LBS), Institute of Human Resource Development (IHRD), or from similar/equivalent institution approved by the Government.

3.While so, one Shebin A.S., who held a Diploma in Computer Applications (DCA), filed WP (C) No. 24279 of 2012 before the High Court of Kerala contending that the qualifications, as prescribed, would eliminate candidates who held higher qualifications as it restricted the zone of consideration to certificate holders only. By judgment dated 01.08.2014, a learned Judge agreed with him and allowed the writ petition. The learned Judge opined that the notification should have been more transparent with regard to the qualifications, specifying whether equivalent/higher qualifications could also be accepted. The KPSC was accordingly directed to issue a revised notification, keeping this aspect in mind.

4.Aggrieved thereby, the KPSC filed Review Petition No. 884 of 2014 pointing out that there was no stipulation in the notification or in the Special Rules applicable to the post of LDC that a higher/equivalent qualification is also acceptable. The KPSC further stated that it had examined the issue in detail and decided that applications of persons with DCA qualification could not be accepted for the said post. It specifically averred that 590 applications of persons having DCA qualification had been received but were not treated as valid. Asserting that the judgment, if complied with, would go against the Rules as DCA was not a notified qualification, the KPSC sought review of the direction to issue a revised notification. However, the Review Petition was dismissed on 24.02.2015.

5.The KPSC, thereupon, filed Writ Appeal No. 1501 of 2015. It asserted that, as an equivalent or higher qualification was not prescribed under the Rules, it was not accepting DCA qualification for the post of LDC. It further asserted that, at no point of time had it taken any decision to accept applications of candidates with DCA qualification as the qualification prescribed and notified for the post did not indicate that persons with DCA qualification would also be permitted to participate in the selection process. Accepting the stand of the KPSC, a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court allowed its writ appeal, vide judgment dated 13.06.2022. The Division Bench took note of the KPSC’s contention that it had never notified any change in the qualifications and that it had already decided that DCA was not an equivalent qualification for the post in question as the equivalence mentioned in the notification was only with respect to the institution. The Division Bench, therefore, opined that, as no change had been made by the KPSC with regard to the qualification after issuance of the notification and, as a matter of fact, the KPSC had decided that DCA was not an equivalent qualification for the post in question, there was no warrant for allowing the writ petition and issuing a direction to revise the notification. The Division Bench noted that even if a person with higher qualification had applied, the same would have been rejected during the scrutiny before shortlisting of candidates for interviews. The Division Bench accordingly set aside the judgment of the learned Judge and dismissed the writ petition.

6.Despite this judgment in its favour, the KPSC surprisingly chose to shortlist candidates in a ranked list by including persons who held DCA qualification or other higher qualifications. Aggrieved thereby, Gireeshkumar T.M. and six others, who held the prescribed Certificates in Data Entry and Office Automation, filed WP (C) No. 23679 of 2023 before the Kerala High Court. Their prayer therein was to quash the KPSC’s ranked list, which included candidates who did not possess the prescribed qualification, and to direct the KPSC to publish a modified ranked list, including only such candidates who had the prescribed qualification. They also sought a declaration that only candidates who had the prescribed qualification were entitled to be appointed as LDCs in the Kerala Water Authority. WP (C) No. 19463 of 2023 was filed on the same lines and with similar prayers by Sajitha S. and three others. It may be noted that, by the date of disposal of these cases, 29 candidates with DCA/higher qualification figured as respondents in WP (C) No. 23679 of 2023, while 72 such candidates were shown as respondents in WP (C) No. 19463 of 2023.

7.Notably, the KPSC filed a counter affidavit taking a position contrary to its earlier stand. According to it, after the Division Bench judgment, selection to the posts of LDC was taken up and an OMR examination was conducted. On the basis of the results thereof, a probability list was published on 03.06.2023 of candidates who had secured 40 marks or above. The KPSC claimed that, as a higher qualification was not barred, it had considered such candidates also while preparing the probability list and those with DCA/higher qualification were also included therein. Reference was made by the KPSC to Rule 10(a)(ii) of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958.

8.A learned Judge of the Kerala High Court noted that the KPSC had changed its stance despite carrying the matter in appeal on the earlier occasion and held that the KPSC could not be permitted to alter its stand, as permitting such reversal of position by it would mean reopening the previously concluded judgments. The learned Judge was of the opinion that, even if erroneous, an inter-party judgment would bind the parties thereto. The learned Judge, accordingly, allowed the writ petitions on 30.10.2023 and directed the KPSC to recast and rework the ranked list, by excluding candidates who were not qualified, and to publish a modified ranked list by including therein only those candidates who possessed the requisite qualification as prescribed in the Notification dated 16.07.2012.

9.The correctness of this common judgment dated 30.10.2023 was canvassed in Writ Appeal Nos. 1941 and 1945 of 2023 before a Division Bench of the Kerala High Court. Writ Appeal No. 1941 of 2023 was filed by Rikha Susheel and four candidates, who held DCA/higher qualifications, while Writ Appeal No. 1945 of 2023 was filed by Rikha Susheel and fifteen such other candidates. All of them had figured as respondents in the two writ petitions. These writ appeals were dismissed, vide common judgment dated 30.01.2024. The Division Bench held therein that there was no error in the reasoning of the learned Judge.

10.It is this judgment that is subjected to challenge before us. One set of appeals was filed by the KPSC while the other three sets of appeals were filed by candidates holding DCA/higher qualifications. One such set of appeals was filed by Anoop M and twenty-nine candidates who were not parties to the subject proceedings before the Kerala High Court.

11.We may note, at this stage, that the issue of non-impleadment of all the affected candidates was not argued before us. However, as it has been raised in the grounds, we deem it proper to consider the same also. Rule 148 of the Kerala High Court Rules states that all persons directly affected should be made parties to the petition but where such persons are numerous, one or more of them may, with the permission of the Court, be impleaded on behalf of or for the benefit of all persons so affected, but notice of the original petition, on admission, should be given to all such persons either by personal service or by public advertisement. As already noted, several candidates possessing DCA/higher qualifications were either impleaded or got impleaded in the two writ petitions. In all, 101 of them figured as parties therein. This aspect was noted by the Division Bench and it was held that there was sufficient representation of their collective interest. Further, the very purpose of Rule 148 is to protect the interest of those affected persons who may be ignorant of the litigation and would be taken by surprise by the adverse developments therein. Given the long history of this litigation, none of the affected candidates can be presumed to have remained unaware of it. We, therefore, find no merit in this ground.

12.The qualification set out in the Notification dated 16.07.2012 for the post of LDC was strictly in keeping with the qualification prescribed therefor at Category No.27 in ‘Wing II – Ministerial Service’ in the Kerala Water Authority (Administrative, Ministerial and Last Grade) Service Rules, 2011 (for brevity, ‘the Rules of 2011’). Rule 6 of the Rules of 2011 provides that the rules relating to reservation of appointments, i.e., General Rules 14 to 17 of the Kerala State and Subordinate Service Rules, 1958 (for brevity, ‘the Rules of 1958’), shall apply to the appointments by direct recruitment to the categories of posts therein. Rule 10 of the Rules of 2011 speaks of the applicability of Parts I, II and III of the Rules of 1958 to the ‘employees’ of the Kerala Water Authority in matters of pay fixation, joining time, travelling allowances, leave, pension, other retirement benefits, etc.

13.Given the phraseology of the Rules of 2011, the Rules of 1958 will not have general and all-pervasive applicability at the stage of direct recruitment even before a candidate is selected and appointed to any of the posts in the categories covered by the Rules of 2011, i.e., before he/she becomes an ‘employee’ of the Kerala Water Authority. It is relevant to note that Rule 2 in Part II of the Rules of 1958, titled ‘Relation to the Special Rules’, states that if any provision in the General Rules contained in Part II thereof is repugnant to a provision in the Special Rules applicable to any particular service contained in Part III thereof, the latter shall, in respect of that service, prevail over the provision in the General Rules in Part II of the Rules of 1958. The Rules of 2011 are Special Rules for the Kerala Water Authority. Therefore, to the extent the Rules of 2011 make special provision as to the qualification required for a particular post, the same would prevail over the general rule pertaining to qualifications in Part II of the Rules of 1958. However, this would be subject to Rule 10(a)(ii) of the Rules of 1958 which, as specifically provided therein, prevails over the Special Rules also.

14.Rule 10 in Part II (General Rules) of the Rules of 1958 deals with qualifications. It reads as follows:

‘10. Qualifications.- (a) (i) The educational or other qualifications, if any, required for a post shall be as specified in the Special Rules applicable to the service in which that post is included or as specified in the executive orders of Government in cases where Special Rules have not been issued for the post/service.

(ii) Notwithstanding anything contained in these rules or in the Special Rules, the qualifications recognized by executive orders or standing orders of Government as equivalent to a qualification specified for a post, in the Special Rules or found acceptable by the Commission as per rule 13 (b) (i) of the said rules in cases where acceptance of equivalent qualifications is provided for in the rules and such of those qualifications which pre-suppose the acquisition of the lower qualification prescribed for the post, shall also be sufficient for the post.

15.Pertinently, insofar as the post of LDC is concerned, the Rules of 2011 do not speak of a qualification ‘equivalent’ to a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Science and Technology, Institute of Human Resources Development, also being eligible. What is stated therein is that a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from a similar/equivalent institution, approved by the Government, would be accepted as an eligible qualification. The equivalence is, thus, not of the qualification itself but of the institution from which the said Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation is obtained.

16.Significantly, where they so intend, the Rules of 2011 specifically provide for ‘equivalent qualifications’ being eligible in relation to particular posts. For instance, for the post of Legal Assistant in ‘Wing II – Ministerial Service’ a Degree in Law from a University in Kerala or from a University recognized by any of the Universities in Kerala is the prescribed qualification, but its equivalent is also acceptable. Similarly, for the post of Confidential Assistant Grade II, equivalent qualifications to those prescribed are acceptable. So is the case with the post of Lower Division Typist, where equivalent qualifications are explicitly shown to be acceptable. In effect, the failure to mention an ‘equivalent qualification’ being acceptable for the post of LDC clearly manifests the deliberate design and intent of the Rules of 2011 to limit the equivalence in that context only to the institution from which the Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation is obtained and not to enlarge the eligibility by encompassing equivalent qualifications also.

17.Given the aforestated rule position in the Rules of 2011 and the verbatim reproduction of the same in the Notification dated 16.07.2012, it is clear and certain that a qualification equivalent to a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from Lal Bahadur Shastri Centre for Science and Technology, Institute of Human Resource Development, is not acceptable but a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from a Government approved similar/equivalent institution would be valid. Without the prescription of an equivalent qualification being recognized, the first part of Rule 10(a)(ii) of the Rules of 1958 would not be attracted, as it speaks of applicability only in cases where acceptance of equivalent qualifications is provided for in the Special Rules. On the other hand, the latter part of Rule 10(a)(ii) speaks of qualifications that presuppose acquisition of the prescribed lower qualification being treated as sufficient. It is the case of the appellants before us that they would fall in this category as they possess either a Diploma in Computer Applications or other higher qualifications, such as a Diploma in Computer Engineering/Diploma in Data Entry and Console Operation/MCA/M.Sc. in Software Engineering, etc.

18.The Secretary of the KPSC filed an additional affidavit on 20.04.2024 before us, wherein he brazenly stated that the submission before the High Court earlier was never that qualifications such as DCA from all institutions would be rejected. This statement is incorrect on the face of it as the KPSC had categorically stated, both in its review petition as well as the grounds of appeal in the earlier round, that DCA qualification would not be accepted by it as a qualification for selection to the notified post. It had also asserted that it examined the issue in detail and decided that applications of persons with DCA qualification could not be accepted.

19.The KPSC then filed an additional affidavit on 02.09.2024. Therein, it was stated by its Secretary that recognition of DCA as a higher qualification was not a one-time isolated decision but a well-considered practice that the KPSC consistently applied in various selections over several years. Instances were given of the KPSC accepting DCA as a higher qualification in selections made during the years 2017, 2018, 2019, 2023 and 2024. He stated that this practice was consistently implemented by the KPSC even before issuance of the subject ranked list. He pointed out that this ‘equivalence’ principle had been applied to selections made for a variety of posts, such as Data Entry Operator, Typist Grade-II, Lower Division Clerk, Computer Operator and Confidential Assistant Grade-II. According to him, while finalizing the selections for the LDC posts, DCA/higher qualifications from institutions which were not recognized by the Government were rejected. He furnished the list of unrecognized institutions and said that about 120 institutions, offering DCA/PGDCA, were recognized by the Government. He gave the names of fifteen such institutions. He concluded by stating that 590 applications from candidates with DCA/higher qualifications from unrecognized institutions had been rejected, on the one hand, but more than 175 applications from candidates with DCA/higher qualifications from recognized institutions had been accepted. Reference was made to internal correspondence dated 13.06.2017 in relation to the selections for the post of Data Entry Operator in District Cooperative Banks, wherein the higher qualifications, which were to be accepted in lieu of a Certificate in Data Entry, were furnished. Reference was also made to File No. DR V(1)1223/13/GW, pertaining to the above mentioned post of Data Entry Operator, adverting to the acceptability of 38 qualifications and 8 experience certificates.

20.Notwithstanding this change in its approach, there is no getting over the fact that in the earlier round of this litigation, the KPSC was uncompromising in its refusal to consider DCA as an eligible qualification for appointment to the post of LDC in the Kerala Water Authority. So much so that it felt aggrieved by the direction of a learned Judge to the contrary and went to the extent of filing a review petition and also a writ appeal thereafter. The Memorandum of Grounds filed by the KPSC in the said writ appeal clearly demonstrated its adamant stand that DCA was not a qualification to be considered eligible for appointment to the subject post. It is apparent that the KPSC did a volte-face thereafter, be it for whatever reason, and now seeks to adopt a stand that DCA should be treated as a higher qualification which presupposes the lesser qualification of the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation.

21.However, no material has been placed before us to demonstrate that the KPSC undertook any exercise to study the curriculum of each of the courses in question to assess and decide whether any of the so-called ‘higher qualifications’ can be said to presuppose acquisition of the lesser qualification prescribed for the post. The qualification prescribed, being a Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation from the named Institute or from a similar/equivalent government approved institution, it was necessary for the KPSC to ascertain the number of hours of actual data entry and office automation that is put in by a candidate who possesses the so-called higher qualification to decide whether he/she can be treated as superior to a candidate with the prescribed qualification. Without undertaking this exercise, the KPSC cannot straightaway assume that, merely because the higher qualification is a Degree/Diploma in a computer-related subject, a candidate possessing the same would have more experience and expertise in data entry and office automation than a candidate with the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation.

22.Useful reference in this regard may be made to the judgment of this Court in Ajith K and others vs. Aneesh K.S. and others.1 That was also a case from the State of Kerala and involved the post of Junior Health Inspector Grade-II in Municipal Common Service. Minimum qualifications were prescribed for the post in the alternative. While so, candidates possessing a Diploma in Health Inspector Course, a two-year course which was not included in the prescribed qualifications, also aspired for selection. In this context, this Court considered whether the said Diploma could be treated as a higher qualification which presupposed acquisition of the prescribed lower qualification. Relevantly, the KPSC did not undertake any exercise to come to a sustainable finding that acquisition of the Diploma would presuppose acquisition of the prescribed lesser qualification, ultimately leading to this Court rejecting such a claim. Similar is the position presently as the KPSC, except for furnishing data of the institutions offering DCA that were treated as eligible due to Government recognition, did not undertake an independent assessment of the higher qualifications to determine whether candidates who possessed those qualifications would have put in equivalent or more number of hours in data entry and office automation than a candidate who underwent a three months course to obtain the prescribed Certificate in Data Entry and Office Automation.

23.The decision of this Court in Jyoti K.K. and others vs. Kerala Public Service Commission2 is distinguishable on facts, as that was a case where the higher qualification clearly presupposed acquisition of the lesser qualification. The prescribed qualification for the post in question in that case was a Diploma/Certificate in Electrical Engineering, whereas the higher qualifications which were under consideration were B.Tech/B.E Degrees in Electrical Engineering. The same cannot be said to be the case presently, as every computer-related Degree/Diploma course cannot be assumed to impart similar experience or expertise in data entry and office automation as the prescribed Certificate course.

24.In Sheo Shyam vs. State of U.P.,3 this Court considered a recruitment process undertaken by the Union Public Service Commission. There was lack of consensus between the Commission and the State Government and the career of eleven candidates stood at risk owing to such inconsistent and varying stands adopted by the State Government and the Commission at different stages for different purposes. In this context, this Court observed that, though there cannot be any estoppel in law, yet a statutory body like the Commission could not blow hot and cold in the same breath, as there has to be consistency in its view. To rule out unfortunate situations like the one in that case recurring again, this Court cautioned the State Government and the Commission to be more vigilant and constructive in their approach. This Court observed that, when dealing with careers of a large number of candidates, their stands have to be consistent and not varied to avoid giving room for unsavoury suspicions and to ensure that the system works more transparently.

25.Presently also, it is manifest that it is the KPSC, with its vacillating and dithering stance, that is largely responsible for this long-pending litigation, impacting the lives, hopes and aspirations of nearly twelve hundred candidates. The KPSC, as already noted supra, was steadfast in its stand in the earlier round that DCA was not a qualification to be considered eligible for appointment to the subject post of LDC in the Kerala Water Authority. Thereafter, the change in its stance, without any foundational inquiry to determine the superiority of the so-called higher qualifications over the prescribed qualification, leaves this Court with no doubt that it was a purely whimsical and arbitrary exercise of discretion on its part without actual application of mind as per required parameters.

26.Recently, in Sivanandan C.T. and others vs. High Court of Kerala and others,4 a Constitution Bench held thus:

‘In a constitutional system rooted in the rule of law, the discretion available with public authorities is confined within clearly defined limits. The primary principle underpinning the concept of rule of law is consistency and predictability in decision-making. A decision of a public authority taken without any basis in principle or rule is unpredictable and is, therefore, arbitrary and antithetical to the rule of law. [S.G. Jaisinghani v. Union of India, 1967 SCC OnLine SC 6] The rule of law promotes fairness by stabilising the expectations of citizens from public authorities. This was also considered in a recent decision of this Court in SEBI v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan [SEBI v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan (2023) 2 SCC 643], wherein it was observed that regularity and predictability are hallmarks of good regulation and governance. [SEBI v. Sunil Krishna Khaitan (2023) 2 SCC 643] This Court held that certainty and consistency are important facets of fairness in action and non-arbitrariness: (Sunil Krishna Khaitan case, SCC pp 678-679, para 59)

“59….. Any good regulatory system must promote and adhere to principle of certainty and consistency, providing assurance to the individual as to the consequences of transactions forming part of his daily affairs. ……. This does not mean that the regulator/ authorities cannot deviate from the past practice, albeit any such deviation or change must be predicated on greater public interest or harm. This is the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India which requires fairness in action by the State, and non-arbitrariness in essence and substance. Therefore, to examine the question of inconsistency, the analysis is to ascertain the need and functional value of the change, as consistency is a matter of operational effectiveness.” ’

Earlier, in State of Bihar and others vs. Shyama Nandan Mishra,5 this Court observed that the State cannot be allowed to change course and belie legitimate expectation as regularity, predictability, certainty and fairness are necessary concomitants of governmental action.

27.We, therefore, have no hesitation in placing the blame for this entire imbroglio on the KPSC as it laid the genesis for this litigation owing to its changing stances at different points of time. A State instrumentality seized of the solemn responsibility of making selections to public services must maintain a high standard of probity and transparency and is not expected to remain nebulous as to its norms or resort to falsehoods before the Court, contrary to what it had stated in its earlier sworn affidavits. We can only hope that the Kerala Public Service Commission learns from this experience and desists, at least in future, from trifling with the lives, hopes and aspirations of candidates who seek public employment.

28.On the above analysis, we hold that no error was committed by the Division Bench of the Kerala High Court in confirming the view taken by the learned Judge, non-suiting candidates with DCA/higher qualifications who aspired for selection to the post of Lower Division Clerk in the Kerala Water Authority.

The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Parties shall bear their own costs.

Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

1 [2019] 11 SCR 495 : (2019) 17 SCC 147

2 (2010) 15 SCC 596

3 [2004] 2 SCR 406 : (2005) 10 SCC 314

4 [2017] 13 SCR 226 : (2024) 3 SCC 799

5 [2022] 11 SCR 1136 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 554

©2024 Supreme Court of India. All Rights Reserved.

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Clarity and certainity in interpretation: Held: This Court noticed that while following Tulsamma, the subsequent decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani Mudaliar and Shakuntala Devi have made passing observations about the discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha but they have not been clearly and categorically overruled – Perhaps this is the reason why the subsequent decisions consistently followed the idea in Karmi and enunciated different principles in the subsequent decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh and that perspective continued on its own strength – This Court having realised that there are a large number of decisions which are not only inconsistent with one another on principle but have tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them on facts or by simply ignoring the binding decision – This Court is of the view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act – In view of the above, the Registry is directed to place the order of this Court along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 23, 24 and 25]

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 500 : 2024 INSC 945

Tej Bhan (D) Through Lr. & Ors. v. Ram Kishan (D) Through Lrs. & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022)

09 December 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

Headnotes

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Clarity and certainity in interpretation:

Held: This Court noticed that while following Tulsamma, the subsequent decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani Mudaliar and Shakuntala Devi have made passing observations about the discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha but they have not been clearly and categorically overruled – Perhaps this is the reason why the subsequent decisions consistently followed the idea in Karmi and enunciated different principles in the subsequent decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh and that perspective continued on its own strength – This Court having realised that there are a large number of decisions which are not only inconsistent with one another on principle but have tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them on facts or by simply ignoring the binding decision – This Court is of the view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act – In view of the above, the Registry is directed to place the order of this Court along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act. [Paras 23, 24 and 25]

Case Law Cited

V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs [1977] 3 SCR 261 : (1977) 3 SCC 99; Karmi v. Amru (1972) 4 SCC 86; Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors [2006] Supp. 5 SCR 799 : (2006) 8 SCC 75; Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh [1987] 3 SCR 576 : (1987) 3 SCC 674; Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma [1991] 3 SCR 717 : (1991) 4 SCC 312; Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh & Ors. [2000] 3 SCR 61 : (2000) 6 SCC 310; Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla (2005) 5 SCC 390; Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna [2015] 14 SCR 374 : (2016) 2 SCC 56; V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam [2020] 9 SCR 619 : (2021) 16 SCC 543; Bhura and Ors. v. Kashiram [1994] 1 SCR 16 : (1994) 2 SCC 111; Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy and Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy and Anr. [2010] 11 SCR 656 : (2010) 9 SCC 602; Jagan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Dhanwanti and Anr. [2012] 2 SCR 303 : (2012) 2 SCC 628; Shivdev Kaur (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. RS Grewal [2013] 5 SCR 267 : (2013) 4 SCC 636; Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna and Anr. [2017] 13 SCR 542 : (2018) 12 SCC 1; Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar and Ors. [2022] 9 SCR 766 : (2022) 4 SCC 274; Mangal Singh and Ors. v. Rattno (Dead) by LRs. and Anr. [1967] 3 SCR 454 : AIR 1967 SC 1786; Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi [1970] 2 SCR 95 : (1969) 2 SCC 586; Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh (1989) 3 SCC 572; C. Masilamani Mudaliar and Ors. v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil and Ors [1996] 1 SCR 1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525; Gumpha v. Jaibal [1994] 1 SCR 901 : (1994) 2 SCC 511; Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 332 : (1997) 10 SCC 673; ; Nazar Singh v. Jagjit Kaur [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 162 : (1996) 1 SCC 35; Santosh & Ors. v. Smt Saraswathibai & Anr [2007] 12 SCR 375 : (2008) 1 SCC 465; Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (D) v. Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal (D) [2022] 3 SCR 876 : (2022) 17 SCC 434; Kallakuri Pattabhiramswamy (D) Through LRs v. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors, 2024 INSC 883 – referred to.

List of Acts

Hindu Succession Act, 1956.

List of Keywords

Section 14 of Hindu Succession Act, 1956; Disposition of property in favour of hindu female.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 6557 of 2022

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.08.2013 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in RSA No. 2897 of 1986

Appearances for Parties

Dhruv Mehta, Sr. Adv., Sachin Jain, Ajay Kumar Agarwal, Ms. Nishi Sangtani, Vishal, Mrs. Subhadra Dwivedi, Rajiv Ranjan Dwivedi, Advs. for the Appellants.

Sunil K. Mittal, Anshul Mittal, Archit Upadhyay, Sameer Dawar, Mrs. Vaishali Mittal Dawar, Ms. Khushi Aggarwal, Ayush Kumar, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1.Interpreting Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956,1 in V. Tulasamma & Ors. v. Sesha Reddy (Dead) by LRs.2”, Justice Bhagwati observed that this is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and has proved to be a paradise for lawyers. Raising concern about the legislative indifference and interpretative difficulties presented by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14, leading to judicial divergence, which might as well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess, Justice Bhagwati observed;

“67. ….. The question is of some complexity and it has evoked wide diversity of judicial opinion not only amongst the different High Courts but also within some of the High Courts themselves. It is indeed unfortunate that though it became evident as far back as 1967 that sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 were presenting serious difficulties of construction in cases where property was received by a Hindu female in lieu of maintenance and the instrument granting such property prescribed a restricted estate for her in the property and divergence of judicial opinion was creating a situation which might well be described as chaotic, robbing the law of that modicum of certainty which it must always possess in order to guide the affairs of men, the legislature, for all these years, did not care to step in to remove the constructional dilemma facing the courts and adopted an attitude of indifference and inaction, untroubled and unmoved by the large number of cases on this point encumbering the files of different courts in the country, when by the simple expedient of an amendment, it could have silenced judicial conflict and put an end to needless litigation. This is a classic instance of a statutory provision which, by reason of its inapt draftsmanship, has created endless confusion for litigants and proved a paradise for lawyers….”

2.With this trepidation, they proceeded to resolve the confusion surrounding the interplay between sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Act and to enunciate the principles that govern disposition of property in favour of Hindu female. The principles formulated in Tulsamma, as extracted in paragraph 4 of this judgment, substantially hold the field. However as of date, there are atleast 18 judgments from this Court comprising decisions from two and three Judge benches that are varying and sometimes inconsistent with the view taken in Tulsamma’s case. While arriving at their respective decisions, these judgments sought to explain, distinguish, negotiate or ignore the principles in Tulsamma and in the process they have either contradicted Tulsamma or implicitly departed from its principles sub-silentio. Almost four decades after the judgment in Tulsamma, we have two streams of thoughts. While the first applies principles in Tulsamma as an inviolable principle steadfastly holding that property possessed by a Hindu female before or after the commencement of the Act shall be held by her as a full owner. The other seems to be evolving from case to case, influenced by, i) the method and manner by which the Hindu female is possessed of the property, ii) the instrument through which the right is acquired, and iii) the time at which such possession takes place, to mention a few.

3.Having gone through the precedents in detail, our endeavour was to reconcile the judgments and restate the principles with clarity and certainty. However, in view of the fact that we are in a combination of a two-Judge bench, such an exercise will not be fruitful as our judgment would be subject to the decision of many three Judge benches which need to be reconciled. The issue is of utmost importance as it affects the rights of every Hindu female, her larger family and such claims and objections that may be pending consideration in almost all original and appellate courts across the length and breadth of the country. It is absolutely necessary that there must be clarity and certainty in the position of law that would govern proprietary interests of parties involving interpretation of Section 14.

4.In this view of the matter, we have directed the Registry to place our order along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for referring the matter to an appropriate larger bench. In order to assist the Hon’ble CJI, we have reviewed the precedents that have caused some inconsistencies and uncertainties.

5.Before we examine the precedents in detail, the short facts involved in the present appeal are as under:

6.The appellant before the court is the purchaser of the suit scheduled property under a sale deed dated 02.03.1981 executed by the wife of one Kanwar Bhan, the testator, who was the original owner of the property. Mr. Kanwar Bhan during his lifetime executed a will dated 03.03.1965 in favour of his wife. The will created a life estate in favour of his wife. The relevant portion of the will creating the life estate is as under:

“After my death, whatever rights I will be having in my above said property, in that eventuality, out of the land situated at village Nalvi Kalan, my wife Smt. Lachhmi Bai shall be having ownership of land measuring about 2½ Acre comprised in Rectangle No.4, Killa No.17/2, 18, 19/1, 23/1, and she will be entitled to maintain herself out of the proceeds from the same. She will not be entitled to mortgage or sell the said land. Of the remaining property, my son Shri Mool Chand will be owner to the extent of 1/2 share and Ram Kishan and Nand Lal sons of Shri Mool Chand (my grand-sons), will be absolute owners of 1/2 share in equal shares. My wife Smt.Lachhmi Bai will be owner, of the houses situated at village Kunjpura and she will be entitled to reside in the said house or to rent out the same. She will not be able to mortgage or sell the same. After her death, my son Shri Mool Chand will be absolute owner of the same to the extent of 1/2 share and my grand-sons Shri Ram Kishan Lal and Nand Lal to the extent of 1/2 share.”

7.After the execution of the above referred will, the testator Kanwar Bhan died on 11.10.1965. As indicated earlier, his wife executed a sale deed in favour of the appellant herein leading to the son and grandson of Tej Bhan instituting a suit for declaration that the sale deed in favour of the petitioner is void and also sought delivery of possession.

8.In its judgment dated 31.01.1986, the Trial Court relied on decision in Tulsamma’s case and held that the property given to the wife of Kanwar Bhan is in the nature of maintenance and such a pre-existing right shall enlarge into full estate. Rejecting the contention of the respondent plaintiffs based on Section 14(2) and also rejecting the applicability of the judgment of this Court in Karmi v. Amru3 and certain other decisions of the same High Court, the Trial Court dismissed the suit. Even in the first appeal, the respondent-plaintiffs relied on Karmi (supra) and certain other decisions of this Court to submit that the disposition of the property by the wife of the testator falls under sub-section (2) of Section 14. The First Appellate Court dismissed the appeal and affirmed the decision of the Trial Court following the principle in Tulsamma and also rejected the submission of the respondent based on Karmi’s decision. The High Court, from which the impugned order arises reversed the concurrent findings of the court below only on a question of law. According to the High Court, the correct principles were laid down in the decision of Sadhu Singh v. Gurdwara Sahib Narike & Ors.4

9.Mr. Dhruv Mehta, learned senior counsel appearing on behalf of the appellant submitted that Sadhu Singh (supra) is wrongly decided and is contrary to the principles laid down in Tulsamma. He has also referred to a number of other decisions such as Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh,5 Thota Sesharathamma v. Thota Manikyamma,6 Balwant Kaur v. Chanan Singh & Ors.,7 Shakuntala Devi v. Kamla,8 Jupudy Pardha Sarathy v. Pentapati Rama Krishna9 and V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam.10 On the other hand, Mr. Sunil K. Mittal, learned counsel for the respondents has submitted that the decision of Karmi (supra) is of a three-Judge bench and it has not been overruled. He would further submit that the said judgment was in fact followed in Bhura and Ors. v. Kashiram11 where the position of law involving interplay between sub-section 1 and 2 of Section 14 has been explained. He would also rely on the decision in Sadhu Singh (supra) which was also relied on by the High Court. Further, it was submitted that judgments in Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy and Ors. v. Gaddam Ramireddy and Anr.,12 Jagan Singh (Dead) through LRs. v. Dhanwanti and Anr.,13 Shivdev Kaur (Dead) by LRs. and Ors. v. RS Grewal,14 Ranvir Dewan v. Rashmi Khanna and Anr.15 and Jogi Ram v. Suresh Kumar and Ors16 adopt the same line.

10.We will first reproduce Section 14 of the Act, before referring and reviewing the judgments of this Court interpreting the Section.

“Sec 14. Property of a female Hindu to be her absolute property.— (1) Any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner.

Explanation.—In this sub-section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance or devise, or at a partition, or in lieu of maintenance or arrears of maintenance, or by gift from any person, whether a relative or not, before, at or after her marriage, or by her own skill or exertion, or by purchase or by prescription, or in any other manner whatsoever, and also any such property held by her as stridhana immediately before the commencement of this Act.

(2) Nothing contained in sub-section (1) shall apply to any property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree or order of a civil court or under an award where the terms of the gift, will or other instrument or the decree, order or award prescribe a restricted estate in such property.”

11.We will commence with a 1967 judgment of this Court in Mangal Singh and Ors. v. Rattno (Dead) by LRs. and Anr.17 In this decision, the court explained the scope and ambit of the expression of “any property possessed by a female Hindu” in Section 14(1) of the Act. In Seth Badri Prasad v. Smt. Kanso Devi,18 a three Judge bench observed that sub-section (2) of Section 14 is more in the nature of a proviso or an exception to sub-section (1) and it comes into operation if acquisition of the property by a female Hindu is made through any of the methods mentioned therein for the first time and without their being any pre-existing right.

12. Tulsamma was decided in 1977. It referred19 to a number of decisions of this Court and that of the High Courts and has followed,20 approved21 or overruled22 them.

The principles that were formulated in this landmark decision are as follows;

“(1) The Hindu female’s right to maintenance is not an empty formality or an illusory claim being conceded as a matter of grace and generosity, but is a tangible right against property which flows from the spiritual relationship between the husband and the wife and is recognised and enjoined by pure Shastric Hindu Law and has been strongly stressed even by the earlier Hindu jurists starting from Yajnavalkya to Manu. Such a right may not be a right to property but it is a right against property and the husband has a personal obligation to maintain his wife and if he or the family has property, the female has the legal right to be maintained therefrom. If a charge is created for the maintenance of a female, the said right becomes a legally enforceable one. At any rate, even without a charge the claim for maintenance is doubtless a pre-existing right so that any transfer declaring or recognising such a right does not confer any new title but merely endorses or confirms the pre-existing rights.

(2) Section 14(1) and the Explanation thereto have been couched in the widest possible terms and must be liberally construed in favour of the females so as to advance the object of the 1956 Act and promote the socio-economic ends, sought to be achieved by this long needed legislation.

(3) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 is in the nature of a proviso and has a field of its own without interfering with the operation of s.14(1) materially. The proviso should not be construed in a manner so as to destroy the effect of the main provision or the protection granted by s. 14(1) or in a way so as to become totally inconsistent with the main provision.

(4) Sub-section (2) of s. 14 applies to instruments, decrees, awards, gifts etc. which create independent and new titles in favour of the females for the first time and has no application where the instrument concerned merely seeks to confirm, endorse, declare or recognise preexisting rights. In such cases a restricted estate in favour of a female is legally permissible and s. 14(1) will not operate in this sphere. Where, however, an instrument merely declares or recognises a pre-existing right, such as a claim to maintenance or partition or share to which the female is entitled, the sub-section has absolutely no application and the female’s limited interest would automatically be en- larged into an absolute one by force of s. 14(1) and the restrictions placed, if any, under the document would have to be ignored. Thus where a property is allotted or transferred to a female in lieu of maintenance or a share at partition, the instrument is taken out of the ambit of subsection (2) and would be governed by s. 14(1) despite any restrictions placed on the powers of the transferee.

(5) The use of express terms like “property acquired by a female Hindu at a partition”, “or in lieu of maintenance”, “or arrears of maintenance” etc. in the Explanation to s. 14(1) clearly makes sub-s. (2) inapplicable to these categories which have been expressly excepted from the operation of sub-s. (2).

(6) The words “possessed by” used by the Legislature in s. 14(1) are of the widest possible amplitude and include the state of owning a property even though the owner is not in actual or physical possession of the same: Thus, where a widow gets a share in the property under a preliminary decree before or at the time when the 1956 Act had been passed but had not been given actual possession under a final decree, the property would be deemed to be possessed by her and by force of s. 14(1) she would get absolute interest. in the property. It is equally well settled that the possession of the widow, however, must be under some vestige of a claim, right or title, because the section does not contemplate the possession of any trespasser without any right or title.

(7) That the words “restricted estate” used in s. 4(2) are wider than limited interest as indicated in s. 14(1) and they include not only limited interest, but also any other kind of limitation that may be placed on the transferee.”

13.The decision in Tulsamma (supra) was followed in the case of Gulwant Kaur v. Mohinder Singh23 and this was affirmed by a three-Judge bench in Jaswant Kaur v. Major Harpal Singh.24

14.In a 1991 decision, a two-Judge bench in Thota Sesharathamma (supra), while following the decision in Tulsamma (supra), noticed another three-Judge bench decision in Karmi (supra) which was not noticed in Tulsamma. Having examined the matter in detail, one of the Judges observed that the decision in Karmi (supra) “is a short judgment without adverting to any provisions of Section 14(1) or 14(2) of the Act. The judgment neither makes any mention of any argument raised in this regard nor there is any mention of the earlier decision in Badri Pershad v. Smt Kanso Devi. The decision in Mst Karmi cannot be considered as an authority on the ambit and scope of Section 14(1) and (2) of the Act”.25 Taking a similar stand, the concurring Judge held that in Karmi (supra) “the attention of this Court to Section 14(1) was not drawn nor had an occasion to angulate in this perspective. Therefore, the ratio therein is of little assistance to the appellant ”.26

15.It is true that the decision in Karmi (supra) neither analysed the provisions of the Act nor has considered the purpose and object of Section 14 and the precedents on this subject. However, the principle on the basis of which the Court in Karmi (supra) decided the case resonates in many subsequent decisions which have in fact followed it as a precedent.

16.A 1996 decision of this Court in the case of C. Masilamani Mudaliar and Ors. v. Idol of Sri Swaminathaswami Swaminathaswami Thirukoil and Ors27 is important for the reason that it is of a three Judge bench and it identifies a discordant note in a subsequent case of a two Judge bench in Gumpha v. Jaibai,28 the court observed that :

“28. In Gumpha case though the Will was executed in 1941 and the executor died in 1958 after the Act had come into force, the concept of limited right in lieu of maintenance was very much in the mind of the executor when Will was executed in 1941 but after the Act came into force, the Will became operative. The restrictive covenant would have enlarged it into an absolute estate; but unfortunately the Bench had put a restrictive interpretation which in our considered view does not appear to be sound in law.”

17.The above referred decision in Masilamani Mudaliar (supra) was followed in Bhoomireddy Chenna Reddy v. Bhoospalli Pedda Verrappa29 and V. Kalyanaswamy v. L. Bakthavatsalam, Nazar Singh v. Jagjit Kaur,30 Balwant Kaur (supra), Shakuntala Devi (supra), Santosh & Ors. v. Smt Saraswathibai & Anr,31 Jupudy Pardha Sarathy (supra) as well as the recent, Munni Devi Alias Nathi Devi (D) v. Rajendra Alias Lallu Lal (D)32 and Kallakuri Pattabhiramswamy (D) Through LRs v. Kallakuri Kamaraju & Ors33 are other decisions that have followed Tulsamma (supra).

18.The other stream of thought seems to have originated in a three-Judge bench of this Court in Karmi (supra) about which we have already mentioned. The conclusion in this decision is drawn from a different perspective of statutory construction, elucidation of which is seen in the subsequent decision of this Court in Bhura (supra). However, it is only in Gumpha (supra) that the principle of the alternate thoughts are formulated as under:

1.While qualifying the law relating to intestate succession, to become a complete code, the Act also deals with testamentary succession. In Section 30, the law which had been judicially expounded is incorporated by creating absolute power in a Hindu to dispose of his property by will. This power extends to creating restricted right in favour of a female.

2.Will under Indian Succession Act, applies to Hindu Succession Act as well, operates from the date of death of the testator.

3.Position of the property contemplated in Section 14(1) cannot include acquisition by will.

4.The expression, ‘any manner whatsoever’, will not include a will, which is specifically mentioned in Section 14(2).

5.Even though the instances in the explanation are not exhaustive, it cannot include disposition by way of a will under Section 14(2).

6.Parliament has never intended to confirm a higher right on a Hindu female, than what was enjoyed by a male Hindu.

7.Possession under Section 14(1) must be legal, therefore if the position is placeable to a will, then she cannot get a higher right than what is stipulated in the document.

8.A combined reading of the Sections is that when the law attempts to remove the disability imposed by customary Hindu law, it does not enlarge and exchange the right she will get under a will.

9.The judgement in the case of Thota (supra) is not relevant for interpretation. As in that case, the testator died before the Hindu Succession Act came into force and the widow was in possession as limited owner and her rights became absolute.

10.In the present case succession opened after the Act has come into force.

19.In the above referred decision of this Court in Gumpha (supra), the Court distinguishes the decision in Thota Sesharathamma (supra) on the ground that the testator died before the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act.

20.The next important decision of this Court is Sadhu Singh (supra) the principle as formulated in this judgment can be restated as under:

1.A hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband u/s.18 HAMA and a hindu widow, being a dependent u/s.21 HAMA, is entitled to claim maintenance from heirs of her husband u/s.22 HAMA to the extent of the estate inherited by them. Further, s.28 HAMA entitles her to claim maintenance against a transferee even. However, this aforesaid entitlement nowhere allows her to create a charge on her husband’s property. In fact, s.27 HAMA expressly states to the contrary.

2.The test therefore is to look at the nature of right acquired by a female hindu - If she takes as an heir, she does it absolutely. But if it’s under a devise, then any restriction placed will apply in view of s.14(2).

3.S.30 is an affirmation to an owner’s right to deal with his property. Thus, when an owner executes a will, laying down the bequest with respect to his estate, the legatee takes subject to terms therein. S.14(2) reaffirms the affirmation in s.30. Any interpretation of s.14(1) which renders s.14(2) and s.30 otios cannot be allowed.

4.Ratio in Tulasamma has application only when a female Hindu is possessed of the property on the date of the Act under semblance of a right (limited or pre-existing). The decision in Karmi can only be justified on the premise that the widow had no pre-existing right in the self-acquired property of her husband. Decision in Bhura and Sharad Subramanyan Vs. Soumi Mazumdar & Ors.34 is along the same lines.

5.Thus, the essential ingredients for determining application of s.14(1) are as follows - antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be.

6.Any acquisition of possession of property (not right) by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the Act, cannot normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act.

21.As this judgment is argued to be contrary to the principles laid down in Tulsamma and also bad in law for the reason that it is a decision of a two-Judge bench, it is necessary to extract the portion of the judgment. The extract will also indicate how Tulsamma was understood and analysed in this judgment. The relevant portion of this judgment is extracted herein for ready reference:

“4. Under Section 18 of the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act, a Hindu wife is entitled to be maintained by her husband during her lifetime, subject to her not incurring the disqualifications provided for in sub-section (3) of that section. The widow is in the list of dependants as defined in Section 21 of the Act. The widow remains a dependant so long as she does not remarry. Under Section 22, an obligation is cast on the heirs of the deceased Hindu to maintain the dependant of the deceased out of the estate inherited by them from the deceased. Under sub-section (2), where a dependant has not obtained by testamentary or intestate succession, any share in the estate of a Hindu dying after the commencement of the Act, the dependant would be entitled, but subject to the provisions of the Act, to maintenance from those who take the estate. It is seen that neither Section 18 relating to a wife nor Section 21 dealing with a widow, provides for any charge for the maintenance on the property of the husband. To the contrary, Section 27 specifies that a dependant’s claim for maintenance under that Act, shall not be a charge on the estate of the deceased unless one would have been created by the will of the deceased, by a decree of court, by an agreement between the dependant and the owner of the estate or otherwise. Thus a widow has no charge on the property of the husband. Section 28 provides that where a dependant had a right to receive maintenance out of an estate, that right could be enforced even against a transferee of the property if the transferee had notice of the right, or if the transfer is gratuitous, but not against a transferee for consideration without notice of the right. Section 28 is in pari materia with Section 39 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Kerala High Court in Kaveri Amma v. Parameswari Amma [AIR 1971 Ker 216 : 1971 KLT 299] has liberally interpreted the expression “right to receive maintenance” occurring in the section as including a right to claim enhanced maintenance against the transferee. The sum and subtotal of the right under the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act is only to claim maintenance and the right to receive it even against a transferee. In the absence of any instrument or decree providing for it, no charge for such maintenance is created in the separate properties of the husband.

11. On the wording of the section and in the context of these decisions, it is clear that the ratio in V. Tulasamma v. Shesha Reddy [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977) 3 SCR 261] has application only when a female Hindu is possessed of the property on the date of the Act under semblance of a right, whether it be a limited or a pre-existing right to maintenance in lieu of which she was put in possession of the property. Tulasamma [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977) 3 SCR 261] ratio cannot be applied ignoring the requirement of the female Hindu having to be in possession of the property either directly or constructively as on the date of the Act, though she may acquire a right to it even after the Act. The same is the position in Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh [(1998) 6 SCC 314 : AIR 1998 SC 2401] wherein the testamentary succession was before the Act. The widow had obtained possession under a will. A suit was filed challenging the will. The suit was compromised. The compromise sought to restrict the right of the widow. This Court held that since the widow was in possession of the property on the date of the Act under the will as of right and since the compromise decree created no new or independent right in her, Section 14(2) of the Act had no application and Section 14(1) governed the case, her right to maintenance being a pre-existing right. In Karmi v. Amru [(1972) 4 SCC 86 : AIR 1971 SC 745] the owner of the property executed a will in respect of a self-acquired property. The testamentary succession opened in favour of the wife in the year 1938. But it restricted her right. Thus, though she was in possession of the property on the date of the Act, this Court held that the life estate given to her under the will cannot become an absolute estate under the provisions of the Act. This can only be on the premise that the widow had no pre-existing right in the self-acquired property of her husband. In a case where a Hindu female was in possession of the property as on the date of the coming into force of the Act, the same being bequeathed to her by her father under a will, this Court in Bhura v. Kashi Ram [(1994) 2 SCC 111] after finding on a construction of the will that it only conferred a restricted right in the property in her, held that Section 14(2) of the Act was attracted and it was not a case in which by virtue of the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, her right would get enlarged into an absolute estate. This again could only be on the basis that she had no pre-existing right in the property. In Sharad Subramanyan v. Soumi Mazumdar [(2006) 8 SCC 91 : JT (2006) 11 SC 535] this Court held that since the legatee under the will in that case, did not have a pre-existing right in the property, she would not be entitled to rely on Section 14(1) of the Act to claim an absolute estate in the property bequeathed to her and her rights were controlled by the terms of the will and Section 14(2) of the Act. This Court in the said decision has made a survey of the earlier decisions including the one in Tulasamma [(1977) 3 SCC 99 : (1977) 3 SCR 261] . Thus, it is seen that the antecedents of the property, the possession of the property as on the date of the Act and the existence of a right in the female over it, however limited it may be, are the essential ingredients in determining whether sub-section (1) of Section 14 of the Act would come into play. What emerges according to us is that any acquisition of possession of property (not right) by a female Hindu after the coming into force of the Act, cannot normally attract Section 14(1) of the Act. It would depend on the nature of the right acquired by her. If she takes it as an heir under the Act, she takes it absolutely. If while getting possession of the property after the Act, under a devise, gift or other transaction, any restriction is placed on her right, the restriction will have play in view of Section 14(2) of the Act.

13. An owner of property has normally the right to deal with that property including the right to devise or bequeath the property. He could thus dispose it of by a testament. Section 30 of the Act, not only does not curtail or affect this right, it actually reaffirms that right. Thus, a Hindu male could testamentarily dispose of his property. When he does that, a succession under the Act stands excluded and the property passes to the testamentary heirs. Hence, when a male Hindu executes a will bequeathing the properties, the legatees take it subject to the terms of the will unless of course, any stipulation therein is found invalid. Therefore, there is nothing in the Act which affects the right of a male Hindu to dispose of his property by providing only a life estate or limited estate for his widow. The Act does not stand in the way of his separate properties being dealt with by him as he deems fit. His will hence could not be challenged as being hit by the Act.

14. When he thus validly disposes of his property by providing for a limited estate to his heir, the wife, the wife or widow has to take it as the estate falls. This restriction on her right so provided, is really respected by the Act. It provides in Section 14(2) of the Act, that in such a case, the widow is bound by the limitation on her right and she cannot claim any higher right by invoking Section 14(1) of the Act. In other words, conferment of a limited estate which is otherwise valid in law is reinforced by this Act by the introduction of Section 14(2) of the Act and excluding the operation of Section 14(1) of the Act, even if that provision is held to be attracted in the case of a succession under the Act. Invocation of Section 14(1) of the Act in the case of a testamentary disposition taking effect after the Act, would make Sections 30 and 14(2) redundant or otiose. It will also make redundant, the expression “property possessed by a female Hindu” occurring in Section 14(1) of the Act. An interpretation that leads to such a result cannot certainly be accepted. Surely, there is nothing in the Act compelling such an interpretation. Sections 14 and 30 both have play. Section 14(1) applies in a case where the female had received the property prior to the Act being entitled to it as a matter of right, even if the right be to a limited estate under the Mitakshara law or the right to maintenance.”

22.It is important to note that except, Karmi (supra), the decisions in Bhura, Gumpha and Sadhu Singh (supra) are all by two Judge benches. The larger perspective in which Section 14 was interpreted holistically commenced from Karmi and was followed in many subsequent cases. Some of the decisions in the same line are Gaddam Ramakrishnareddy, Jagan Singh, Shivdev Kaur, Ranvir Dewan and Jogi Ram (supra).

23.We have noticed that while following Tulsamma, the subsequent decisions in Thota Sesharathamma, Masilamani Mudaliar and Shakuntala Devi (supra) have made passing observations about the discordant note in the case of Karmi, Bhura and Gumpha (supra) but they have not been clearly and categorically overruled. Perhaps this is the reason why the subsequent decisions consistently followed the idea in Karmi and enunciated different principles in the subsequent decisions of Gumpha, Sadhu Singh (supra) and that perspective continued on its own strength.

24.We heard the present appeal in detail and have also taken a view in the matter, but having realised that there are a large number of decisions which are not only inconsistent with one another on principle but have tried to negotiate a contrary view by distinguishing them on facts or by simply ignoring the binding decision, we are of the view that there must be clarity and certainty in the interpretation of Section 14 of the Act.

25.In view of the above, we direct the Registry to place our order along with the appeal paper book before the Hon’ble Chief Justice of India for constituting an appropriate larger bench for reconciling the principles laid down in various judgments of this Court and for restating the law on the interplay between sub-section (1) and (2) of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act.

Result of the case: Matter referred to Chief Justice for constituting appropriate Bench.

1 Hereinafter the ‘Act’.

2 [1977] 3 SCR 261 : (1977) 3 SCC 99

3 (1972) 4 SCC 86

4 [2006] Supp. 5 SCR 799 : (2006) 8 SCC 75

5 [1987] 3 SCR 576 : (1987) 3 SCC 674

6 [1991] 3 SCR 717 : (1991) 4 SCC 312

7 [2000] 3 SCR 61 : (2000) 6 SCC 310

8 (2005) 5 SCC 390

9 [2015] 14 SCR 374 : (2016) 2 SCC 56

10 [2020] 9 SCR 619 : (2021) 16 SCC 543

11 [1994] 1 SCR 16 : (1994) 2 SCC 111

12 [2010] 11 SCR 656 : (2010) 9 SCC 602

13 [2012] 2 SCR 303 : (2012) 2 SCC 628

14 [2013] 5 SCR 267 : (2013) 4 SCC 636

15 [2017] 13 SCR 542 : (2018) 12 SCC 1

16 [2022] 9 SCR 766 : (2022) 4 SCC 274

17 [1967] 3 SCR 454 : AIR 1967 SC 1786

18 [1970] 2 SCR 95 : (1969) 2 SCC 586

19 Referred to: Gummalapura Taggina Matada Kotturuswami v. Setra Veeravva [1959] Supp. 1 SCR 968; SS Munna Lal v. SS Rajkumar [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 418, Mangal Singh v. Rattno, AIR 1967 SC 1786; Narayan Rao Ramachandra Pant v. Ramabai, LR 5 IA 114; Mst Dan Kuer v. Mst Sarla Devi, LR 73 IA 208; Pratapmull Agarwalla v. Dhanabati Bibi, LR 63 IA 33; Namangini Dasi v. Kedarnath Kundu Chowdhry, ILR 16 Cal 758 (PC).

20 Followed: Seth Badri Parsad v. Smt. Kanso Devi (1969) 2 SCC 586; Nirmal Chand v. Vidya Wanti (1969) 3 SCC 628; Rani Bai v. Yadunandan Ram (1969) 1 SCC 604; SS Munnalal v. SS Raj Kumar [1962] Supp. 3 SCR 418; Eramma v. Veerupana [1966] 2 SCR 626; Mangal Singh v. Rattno [1967] 2 SCR 454; Sukhram v. Gauri Shankar [1968] 1 SCR 476;

21 Approved: B.B. Patil v. Gangabai, AIR 1972 Bom 16, Sumeshwar Misra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, AIR 1970 Pat 348; Gadew Reddayya v. Varapula Venkataraju, AIR 1965 AP 66; Lakshmi Devi v. Shankar Jha, AIR 1967 Mad 428; H Venkanagouda v. Hanamanagouda, AIR 1972 Mys 286; Smt Sharbati Devi v. Pt. Hiralal, AIR 1964 Punj 114; Seshadhar Chandra Devi v. Tara Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 438; Saraswathi Ammal v. Anantha Shenoi, AIR 1966 Ker 66; Kunji Thomman v. Meenakshi, ILR (1970) 2 Ker 45; Sumeshwar Mishra v. Swami Nath Tiwari, AIR 1970 Pat 348; Sasadhar Chandra Day v. Tara Sundari Dasi, AIR 1962 Cal 438.

22 Overruled: Naraini Devi v. Ramo Devi (1976) 1 SCC 574, Gurunadham v. Sundrarajulu, ILR (1968) 1 Mad 467; Santhanam v. Subramania, ILR (1967) 1Mad 68; S Kachapalaya Gurakkal v. Subramania Gurukkal, AIR 1972 Mad 219; Shiva Pujan Rai v. Jamuna Missir, ILR (1947) Pat 1118; Gopisetti Kondaiah v. Gunda Subbarayudu, ILR (1968) AP 621; Ram Jag Misir v. Director of Consolidation, AIR 1975 All 151; Ajab Singh v. Ram Singh, AIR 1959 J&K 92; Narayan Patra v. Tara Patrani (1970) 36 Cut LT 567; Gopisetty Kondaiah v. Gunde Subbarayodu, ILR 1968 AP 621; Gurunadham v. Sundrajulu Chetty, ILR (1968) 1 Mad 567.

23 Id no. 5- See para nos. 4 and 9.

24 (1989) 3 SCC 572

25 Id n 6 – See para 10

26 Ibid – See para 29

27 [1996] 1 SCR 1068 : (1996) 8 SCC 525

28 [1994] 1 SCR 901 : (1994) 2 SCC 511

29 [1996] Supp. 9 SCR 332 : (1997) 10 SCC 673

30 [1995] Supp. 5 SCR 162 : (1996) 1 SCC 35

31 [2007] 12 SCR 375 : (2008) 1 SCC 465

32 [2022] 3 SCR 876 : (2022) 17 SCC 434

33 2024 INSC 883; in addition to Tulasamma this case also relied on Raghubar Singh v. Gulab Singh (1998) 6 SCC 314, Mangat Mal v. Punni Devi (1995) 6 SCC 88 and Jaswant Kaur v. Harpal Singh (1989) 3 SCC 572.

34 (2006) 8 SCC 91

©2024 Supreme Court of India. All Rights Reserved.

Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Growing misuse of, to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife – Matrimonial discords – Implication of all the members of the husband’s family without specific allegations indicating their active involvement – Generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence – Practice deprecated – Cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case.

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 559 : 2024 INSC 953

Dara Lakshmi Narayana & Others v. State of Telangana & Another

(Criminal Appeal No. 5199 of 2024)

10 December 2024

[B.V. Nagarathna* and Nongmeikapam Kotiswar Singh, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, whether the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.

Headnotes

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.482 – Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – ss.3, 4 – Refusal to quash criminal proceedings, when not justified – FIR lodged by respondent No.2-wife against appellants under Section 498A, IPC and Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Act – Appellants sought quashing of the criminal proceedings – Refused by High Court – Challenge to:

Held: Respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1-husband with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage – Later, she came back assuring to have a cordial relationship however, once again left the matrimonial house – Complaint under Section 498A, IPC was lodged by the respondent No.2 as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the appellant No.1 – No substantial and specific allegations were made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 (family members of appellant No.1) other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry – Allegations against the appellants were vague and omnibus, too far-fetched and not believable – Appellant Nos.2 to 6 were living in different cities and admittedly, never resided with the couple and their children – FIR filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives and is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No.1 and his family members – Present case falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal case – High Court erred in not exercising the powers under Section 482, CrPC – Impugned order set aside – Quashing petition allowed – FIR under Section 498A, IPC and Sections 3 and 4, Dowry Act, chargesheet and the trial pending against the appellants, quashed. [Paras 21, 22, 24-26, 29, 32, 33]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Growing misuse of, to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife – Matrimonial discords – Implication of all the members of the husband’s family without specific allegations indicating their active involvement – Generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence – Practice deprecated – Cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case.

Words and Phrases – ‘Cruelty’ – Penal Code, 1860 – s.498A – Discussed.

Case Law Cited

State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1990] Supp. 3 SCR 259 : (1992) Supp. 1 SCC 335; G.V. Rao v. L.H.V. Prasad [2000] 2 SCR 123 : (2000) 3 SCC 693; Preeti Gupta v. State of Jharkhand [2010] 9 SCR 1168 : (2010) 7 SCC 667 – relied on.

Arnesh Kumar v. State of Bihar [2014] 8 SCR 128 : (2014) 8 SCC 273 – referred to.

List of Acts

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860; Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961.

List of Keywords

Quashing; Refusal to quash; FIR; Ongoing criminal proceedings; Complaint under Section 498A, IPC; Matrimonial house/home; Counterblast; Petition for dissolution of marriage; Family members of husband; No substantial and specific allegations; Harassment of innocent family members; Family members living in different cities; Instigate; No harassment for dowry; Allegations vague and omnibus; Matrimonial dispute/discord; Domestic disputes; Ulterior motives; Cruelty; Not a genuine complaint; Retaliatory measure; Settle scores/grudges; Abuse of Court’s process; Mere reference to the names of family members; Without active involvement; Tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family; Generalised and sweeping accusations; Misuse of legal provisions and legal process.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No. 16239 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 16.02.2022 of the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLP No. 1479 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Shubham Kumar, Anubhav Jain, Ms. Nayan Saini, Dhruv Goyal, Ms. Honey Verma, Rahul Mohod, Sanjay Gyan, Dr. Varnit Sharma, Chand Qureshi, Advs. for the Petitioners.

Ms. Devina Sehgal, S Uday Bhanu, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Nagarathna, J.

Leave granted.

2.Being aggrieved by the order dated 16.02.2022 passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana in Criminal Petition No.1479 of 2022 refusing to quash the criminal proceedings in FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda against the appellant Nos.1 to 6 herein (collectively referred as “appellants”) under Sections 498A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”, for short) and Section 3 and 4 of Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 (“Dowry Act”, for short), the appellants have preferred this appeal.

3.Briefly stated the facts of this case are that the marriage of appellant No.1 husband and respondent No.2 wife was solemnised on 08.03.2015 as per Hindu rites and rituals at Chennakesava Swamy Temple, Marakapuram, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos.2 and 3 are the father-in-law and mother-in-law respectively of respondent No.2 and appellant Nos.4 to 6 are sisters-in-law of respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 lodged a complaint against the appellant Nos.1 to 6 and accused No.7 who is her brother-in-law which was registered as FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 for the offences punishable under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda. As per the said FIR, it was alleged that at the time of her marriage, the father of respondent No.2 gave net cash of Rs.10 lakhs, 10 tolas of gold, and other household articles as dowry and also spent Rs. 5 lakhs towards marriage expenses. After the marriage, the couple started residing at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where appellant No.1 was working in Southern Railways. Out of their wedlock, respondent No.2 and appellant No.1 have 2 minor children. The first child was born in the year 2016 and the second child was born in the year 2017. After marriage, appellant No.1 started harassing her both physically and mentally for want of additional dowry. Appellant No.1 also used to abuse respondent No.1 in filthy language and used to suspect her character. He also used to come home inebriated and harassed her by having an illegal affair with one Mounika. In so far as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, respondent No.2 alleged that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry her.

4.Being aggrieved by the said criminal proceedings pending against them, the appellants and accused No.7 approached the High Court by filing Criminal Petition No.1479 of 2022 under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1908 (“CrPC”) seeking quashing of the FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda.

5.By the impugned order dated 16.02.2024, the High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants and accused No.7 in FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 and disposed of the Criminal Petition No.1479 of 2022 directing the Investigation Officer to follow the mandatory procedure contemplated under Section 41-A of CrPC and also the guidelines issued by this Court in Arnesh Kumar vs. State of Bihar (2014) 8 SCC 273. The High Court further granted protection by directing the Investigation Officer not to arrest to appellants until the chargesheet is filed. The High Court noted that there are matrimonial disputes between appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and that in matrimonial disputes, custodial interrogation of the accused is not required. Being aggrieved by the High Court’s refusal to quash the criminal proceedings arising out of FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022, the appellants herein have preferred the instant appeal.

6.Subsequent to the impugned order dated 16.02.2022, the police have filed a chargesheet dated 03.06.2022 before the Court of 1st Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri, Cyberabad vide C.C. No.1544 of 2022 against the appellant Nos.1 to 6 under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act. However, the charges were dropped against accused No.7 (respondent No.2’s brother-in-law). The criminal case against the appellants herein is pending trial in the Court of 1st Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum- Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri.

7.We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent-State and perused FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022. There is no appearance on behalf of respondent No.2 despite service of notice.

8.Learned counsel for the appellants submitted that the appellants never demanded any dowry from respondent No.2. Respondent No.2 in fact used to leave the matrimonial house uninformed. In fact, on one such occasion when she left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021, appellant No.1 made a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police found her whereabouts, she was allegedly living with someone. Respondent No.2 after being counselled, returned to her matrimonial house. It was further submitted that respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1 wherein she admitted that she had left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 because of one Govindan, with whom she was talking over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She also stated that she would not repeat such acts in future. Learned counsel for the appellants further submitted that respondent No.2 again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and children behind. It was submitted that having no other option, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice dated 13.12.2021 to respondent No.2 seeking divorce by mutual consent. Therefore, it was argued that only as a counterblast, the present FIR has been lodged by respondent No.2. on 01.02.2022. Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, learned counsel for the appellants submitted that no specific allegation is made against them in the FIR. It was further submitted that appellant Nos.2 to 6 did not live in the matrimonial house of the couple and have been unnecessarily dragged into this case. Therefore, it was submitted that the present case is a fit case for quashing the FIR and accordingly prayed that this Court may set-aside the impugned order dated 16.02.2022 and quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants herein arising out of FIR No. 82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022.

9.Per contra, the learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that on a perusal of the FIR, it would reveal that a prima facie case has been made out against the appellants. It was submitted that, as per the FIR, respondent No.2 was harassed both physically and mentally for want of additional dowry and that appellant No.1 used to come home in a drunken state and used to have an illicit affair with one Mounika. Learned counsel for the respondent-State submitted that the father of respondent No.2 was examined as LW3 who stated in the examination that at the time of marriage, he gave Rs.10 lakhs and 10 tolas of gold as dowry. It was further submitted that after the marriage, appellant No.1 used to harass and abuse respondent No.2 and appellant Nos.2 to 6 used to provoke and instigate appellant No.1. Hence, learned counsel for the respondent-State argued that the High Court, vide impugned order, was justified in declining to quash the criminal proceedings pending against the appellants herein arising out of FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 and prayed for the dismissal of the present appeal as well.

10.Having heard the learned counsel for the respective parties and having perused the material on record, the only question that arises for our consideration is whether FIR No.82 of 2022, dated 01.02.2022, lodged against the appellants herein should be quashed.

11.In State of Haryana vs. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 (“Bhajan Lal”), this Court formulated the parameters under which the powers under Section 482 of the CrPC could be exercised. While it is not necessary to revisit all the parameters, a few that are relevant to the present case may be set out as under:

“102. In the backdrop of the interpretation of the various relevant provisions of the Code under Chapter XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary power under Article 226 or the inherent powers under Section 482 of the Code which we have extracted and reproduced above, we give the following categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice, though it may not be possible to lay down any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive list of myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be exercised.

(1) Where the allegations made in the first information report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

x x x

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

12.In the instant case, the allegations in the FIR are under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.

13.Section 498A of the IPC deals with offences committed by the husband or relatives of the husband subjecting cruelty towards the wife. The said provision reads as under:

“498A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.— Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.

Explanation.— For the purpose of this section, “cruelty” means—

(a)any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or

(b)harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.”

14.Further, Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act talk about the penalty for giving or taking or demanding a dowry.

“3. Penalty for giving or taking dowry.—

(1)If any person, after the commencement of this Act, gives or takes or abets the giving or taking of dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years, and with fine which shall not be less than fifteen thousand rupees or the amount of the value of such dowry, whichever is more.

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be recorded in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than five years.

(2)Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to, or in relation to,—

(a)presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bride without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act;

(b)presents which are given at the time of a marriage to the bridegroom without any demand having been made in that behalf:

Provided that such presents are entered in a list maintained in accordance with the rules made under this Act:

Provided further that where such presents are made by or on behalf of the bride or any person related to the bride, such presents are of a customary nature and the value thereof is not excessive having regard to the financial status of the person by whom, or on whose behalf, such presents are given.

4. Penalty for demanding dowry.—If any person demands, directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardian of a bride or bridegroom, as the case may be, any dowry, he shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees:

Provided that the Court may, for adequate and special reasons to be mentioned in the judgment, impose a sentence of imprisonment for a term of less than six months.”

15.An offence is punishable under Section 498A of the IPC when a husband or his relative subjects a woman to cruelty, which may result in imprisonment for a term extending up to three years and a fine. The Explanation under Section 498A of the IPC defines “cruelty” for the purpose of Section 498A of the IPC to mean any of the acts mentioned in clauses (a) or (b). The first limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that “cruelty” means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide. The second limb of clause (a) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC, states that cruelty means any wilful conduct that is of such a nature as to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman. Further, clause (b) of the Explanation of Section 498A of the IPC states that cruelty would also include harassment of the woman where such harassment is to coerce her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.

16.Further, Section 3 of the Dowry Act deals with penalty for giving or taking dowry. It states that any person who engages in giving, taking, or abetting the exchange of dowry, shall face a punishment of imprisonment for a minimum of five years and a fine of not less than fifteen thousand rupees or the value of the dowry, whichever is greater. Section 4 of the Dowry Act talks of penalty for demanding dowry. It states that any person demanding dowry directly or indirectly, from the parents or other relatives or guardians of a bride or bridegroom shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than six months, but which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to ten thousand rupees.

17.The issue for consideration is whether, given the facts and circumstances of the case and after examining the FIR, the High Court was correct in refusing to quash the ongoing criminal proceedings against the appellants arising out of FIR No. 82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.

18.A bare perusal of the FIR shows that the allegations made by respondent No.2 are vague and omnibus. Other than claiming that appellant No.1 harassed her and that appellant Nos.2 to 6 instigated him to do so, respondent No.2 has not provided any specific details or described any particular instance of harassment. She has also not mentioned the time, date, place, or manner in which the alleged harassment occurred. Therefore, the FIR lacks concrete and precise allegations.

19.Further, the record reveals that respondent No.2 on 03.10.2021 left the matrimonial house leading appellant No.1 to file a police complaint on 05.10.2021. When the police officials traced her, respondent No.2 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting to close the complaint made by appellant No.1. In the said letter, respondent No.2 admitted that she left her matrimonial house after quarrelling with appellant No.1 as she was talking to a person by name Govindan over the phone for the past ten days continuously. She further admitted that appellant No.1 was taking good care of her. She also stated that she will not engage in such actions in future. Despite that, in 2021 itself, respondent No.2 once again left the matrimonial house leaving appellant No.1 and also her minor children.

20.Losing hope in the marriage, appellant No.1 issued a legal notice to respondent No.1 seeking divorce by mutual consent on 13.12.2021. Instead of responding to the said legal notice issued by appellant No.1, respondent No.2 lodged the present FIR 82 of 2022 on 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act.

21.Given the facts of this case and in view of the timing and context of the FIR, we find that respondent No.2 left the matrimonial house on 03.10.2021 after quarrelling with appellant No.1 with respect to her interactions with a third person in their marriage. Later she came back to her matrimonial house assuring to have a cordial relationship with appellant No.1. However, she again left the matrimonial house. When appellant No.1 issued a legal notice seeking divorce on 13.12.2021, the present FIR came to be lodged on 01.02.2022 by respondent No.2. Therefore, we are of the opinion that the FIR filed by respondent No. 2 is not a genuine complaint rather it is a retaliatory measure intended to settle scores with appellant No.1 and his family members.

22.Learned counsel for respondent No.1 State contended that a prima facie case was made out against the appellants for harassing respondent No.2 and demanding dowry from her. However, we observe that the allegations made by respondent No.2 in the FIR seem to be motivated by a desire for retribution rather than a legitimate grievance. Further, the allegations attributed against the appellants herein are vague and omnibus.

23.Respondent No.2 has not contested the present case either before the High Court or this Court. Furthermore, it is noteworthy that respondent No.2 has not only deserted appellant No.1 but has also abandoned her two children as well, who are now in the care and custody of appellant No.1. The counsel for the appellants has specifically submitted that respondent No.2 has shown no inclination to re-establish any relationship with her children.

24.Insofar as appellant Nos.2 to 6 are concerned, we find that they have no connection to the matter at hand and have been dragged into the web of crime without any rhyme or reason. A perusal of the FIR would indicate that no substantial and specific allegations have been made against appellant Nos.2 to 6 other than stating that they used to instigate appellant No.1 for demanding more dowry. It is also an admitted fact that they never resided with the couple namely appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 and their children. Appellant Nos.2 and 3 resided together at Guntakal, Andhra Pradesh. Appellant Nos.4 to 6 live in Nellore, Bengaluru and Guntur respectively.

25.A mere reference to the names of family members in a criminal case arising out of a matrimonial dispute, without specific allegations indicating their active involvement should be nipped in the bud. It is a well-recognised fact, borne out of judicial experience, that there is often a tendency to implicate all the members of the husband’s family when domestic disputes arise out of a matrimonial discord. Such generalised and sweeping accusations unsupported by concrete evidence or particularised allegations cannot form the basis for criminal prosecution. Courts must exercise caution in such cases to prevent misuse of legal provisions and the legal process and avoid unnecessary harassment of innocent family members. In the present case, appellant Nos.2 to 6, who are the members of the family of appellant No.1 have been living in different cities and have not resided in the matrimonial house of appellant No.1 and respondent No.2 herein. Hence, they cannot be dragged into criminal prosecution and the same would be an abuse of the process of the law in the absence of specific allegations made against each of them.

26.In fact, in the instant case, the first appellant and his wife i.e. the second respondent herein resided at Jollarpeta, Tamil Nadu where he was working in Southern Railways. They were married in the year 2015 and soon thereafter in the years 2016 and 2017, the second respondent gave birth to two children. Therefore, it cannot be believed that there was any harassment for dowry during the said period or that there was any matrimonial discord. Further, the second respondent in response to the missing complaint filed by the first appellant herein on 05.10.2021 addressed a letter dated 11.11.2021 to the Deputy Superintendent of Police, Thirupathur Sub Division requesting for closure of the said complaint as she had stated that she had left the matrimonial home on her own accord owing to a quarrel with the appellant No.1 because of one Govindan with whom the second respondent was in contact over telephone for a period of ten days. She had also admitted that she would not repeat such acts in future. In the above conspectus of facts, we find that the allegations of the second respondent against the appellants herein are too far-fetched and are not believable.

27.We find that the High Court noted that there were also allegations against respondent No.2 and matrimonial disputes are pending between the parties. Therefore, the High Court came to the conclusion that custodial interrogation of the appellants was not necessary and protected the personal liberty of the appellants directing the Investigation Officer not to arrest the appellants till the completion of the investigation and filing of the charge-sheet. Albeit the said findings and observations, the High Court ultimately refused to quash the criminal proceedings against the appellants.

28.The inclusion of Section 498A of the IPC by way of an amendment was intended to curb cruelty inflicted on a woman by her husband and his family, ensuring swift intervention by the State. However, in recent years, as there have been a notable rise in matrimonial disputes across the country, accompanied by growing discord and tension within the institution of marriage, consequently, there has been a growing tendency to misuse provisions like Section 498A of the IPC as a tool for unleashing personal vendetta against the husband and his family by a wife. Making vague and generalised allegations during matrimonial conflicts, if not scrutinized, will lead to the misuse of legal processes and an encouragement for use of arm twisting tactics by a wife and/or her family. Sometimes, recourse is taken to invoke Section 498A of the IPC against the husband and his family in order to seek compliance with the unreasonable demands of a wife. Consequently, this Court has, time and again, cautioned against prosecuting the husband and his family in the absence of a clear prima facie case against them.

29.We are not, for a moment, stating that any woman who has suffered cruelty in terms of what has been contemplated under Section 498A of the IPC should remain silent and forbear herself from making a complaint or initiating any criminal proceeding. That is not the intention of our aforesaid observations but we should not encourage a case like as in the present one, where as a counterblast to the petition for dissolution of marriage sought by the first appellant-husband of the second respondent herein, a complaint under Section 498A of the IPC is lodged by the latter. In fact, the insertion of the said provision is meant mainly for the protection of a woman who is subjected to cruelty in the matrimonial home primarily due to an unlawful demand for any property or valuable security in the form of dowry. However, sometimes it is misused as in the present case.

30.In the above context, this Court in G.V. Rao vs. L.H.V. Prasad (2000) 3 SCC 693 observed as follows:

“12. There has been an outburst of matrimonial disputes in recent times. Marriage is a sacred ceremony, the main purpose of which is to enable the young couple to settle down in life and live peacefully. But little matrimonial skirmishes suddenly erupt which often assume serious proportions resulting in commission of heinous crimes in which elders of the family are also involved with the result that those who could have counselled and brought about rapprochement are rendered helpless on their being arrayed as accused in the criminal case. There are many other reasons which need not be mentioned here for not encouraging matrimonial litigation so that the parties may ponder over their defaults and terminate their disputes amicably by mutual agreement instead of fighting it out in a court of law where it takes years and years to conclude and in that process the parties lose their “young” days in chasing their “cases” in different courts.”

31.Further, this Court in Preeti Gupta vs. State of Jharkhand (2010) 7 SCC 667 held that the courts have to be extremely careful and cautious in dealing with these complaints and must take pragmatic realties into consideration while dealing with matrimonial cases. The allegations of harassment by the husband’s close relatives who had been living in different cities and never visited or rarely visited the place where the complainant resided would have an entirely different complexion. The allegations of the complainant are required to be scrutinized with great care and circumspection.

32.We, therefore, are of the opinion that the impugned FIR No.82 of 2022 filed by respondent No.2 was initiated with ulterior motives to settle personal scores and grudges against appellant No.1 and his family members i.e., appellant Nos.2 to 6 herein. Hence, the present case at hand falls within category (7) of illustrative parameters highlighted in Bhajan Lal. Therefore, the High Court, in the present case, erred in not exercising the powers available to it under Section 482 CrPC and thereby failed to prevent abuse of the Court’s process by continuing the criminal prosecution against the appellants.

33.We, accordingly allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 16.02.2022 in Criminal Petition No.1479 of 2022 filed under Section 482 CrPC. The Criminal Petition No.1479 of 2022 under Section 482 of CrPC shall accordingly stand allowed. FIR No.82 of 2022 dated 01.02.2022 registered with Neredmet Police Station, Rachakonda under Section 498A of the IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of the Dowry Act against appellant Nos.1 to 6, charge-sheet dated 03.06.2022 filed in the Court of 1st Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri, Cyberabad and the trial pending in the Court of 1st Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-Additional Metropolitan Magistrate, Malkajgiri against the appellants herein shall accordingly stand quashed.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

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