Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Quantum of maintenance – Permanent alimony – The respondent’s application for enhanced interim maintenance rested on her assertion of significant changes in circumstances since the last maintenance order, including the increased financial requirements of herself and the son:

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 543 : 2024 INSC 961

Parvin Kumar Jain v. Anju Jain

(Civil Appeal No(s). 14277-14278 of 2024)

10 December 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

In the instant case, the parties were married and have a son born from their wedlock, however, the realtionship soured and they have been living separately for more than two decades. The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant-husband to the respondent-wife.

Headnotes

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Quantum of maintenance – Permanent alimony – The respondent’s application for enhanced interim maintenance rested on her assertion of significant changes in circumstances since the last maintenance order, including the increased financial requirements of herself and the son:

Held: It is evident from the records that the relationship between the parties appears to be strained from the beginning and only further soured over the years – Reconciliation proceedings during the pendency of the divorce petition also failed – The parties have been litigating maintenance proceedings for a prolonged period, and there appears to be no cogent reason to only deal with the issue of interim maintenance after twenty years of strained relationship and separation – These facts are admitted by the parties, and they have also mutually agreed for the dissolution of their marriage – Therefore, the marriage between the parties is dissolved while exercising the discretionary power u/Art. 142 of the Constitution of India – Now, the issue of maintenance pendente lite is infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony – There cannot be strict guidelines or a fixed formula for fixing the amount of permanent maintenance – The quantum of maintenance is subjective to each case and is dependent on various circumstances and factors – In the instant case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years – The appellant is currently working as the Chief Executive Officer of Vision Bank in Dubai and his estimated salary is about AED 50,000 per month which means that he is earning around Rs. 10 to 12 Lakhs per month – His DEMAT account details from 2010 reveal investment of Rs. 5 crores – Further, he has three properties – For the respondent, considering the standard of living enjoyed by her during subsistence of the marriage, the prolonged period of separation, and the appellant’s financial capacity, a one-time settlement amount of Rs. 5 crores (Rupees five crores only), appears to be just, fair and reasonable amount for the respondent to be paid by the appellant towards settlement of all pending claims also – Since, the appellant herein has sufficient means to support his child, and thus provision should also be made for his maintenance and financial security as well – An amount of Rs. 1 crore (Rupees one crore only) towards the maintenance and care of the son appears to be fair, which he can utilize for his higher education and as security till he becomes financially independent. [Paras 27, 31, 34, 36, 40, 41]

Case Law Cited

Ajay Mohan and Ors. v. H.N, Rai and Ors. [2007] 13 SCR 298 : (2008) 2 SCC 507; Rajnesh v. Neha and Another [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 32; Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan [2023] 5 SCR 165 : (2022) 15 SCC 754; Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel [2024] 7 SCR 942 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1724; Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri [1997] 2 SCR 875 : (1997) 4 SCC 226; Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar [2011] 6 SCR 118 : (2011) 5 SCC 234; Vinny Paramvir Parmar v. Paramvir Parmar [2011] 9 SCR 371 : (2011) 13 SCC 112; Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal [2012] 7 SCR 607 : (2012) 7 SCC 288 – referred to.

List of Acts

Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.

List of Keywords

Quantum of maintenance; Permanent alimony; Pendente lite maintenance; Divorce; One-time settlement amount; Maintenance and financial security; Increased financial requirements; Article 142 of the Constitution.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 14277-14278 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 01.08.2024 of the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in MATAPP (FC) Nos. 226 of 2018 and 120 of 2019

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Mukta Gupta, Sr. Adv., Viresh B. Saharya, Ujas Kumar, Ms. Tara Narula, Ms. Nitya Gupta, Ms. Aditi Gupta, Akshat Agarwal, Rishabh Mathur, Advs. for the Appellant.

Sanjay Jain, Sr. Adv., Ms. Anu Narula, Sarfaraz Ahmad, Ms. Harshita Sukhija, Nishank Tripathi, Ms. Palak Jain, Rishi Raj Sharma, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.The present appeals arise out of the impugned order dated 01.08.2024 passed by the Delhi High Court in MAT. APP.(F.C.) 226/2018 & CM APPL. 36723/2018. CM APPL. 4245/2021. CM APPL. 51379/2022, CM APPL. 52044/2022 and MAT.APP. (F.C.) 120/2019. Vide the impugned order, the High Court dismissed MAT. APP. (F.C.) 226/2018 filed by the Husband against the order of the Family Court, in an application for maintenance pendente lite under section 24 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 19551 along with all pending applications, with costs of Rs. 1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only). By the same common order, the MAT.APP. (F.C) 120/2019 filed by the Wife is allowed to the extent that the interim maintenance granted to the Wife under Section 24 of the HMA is enhanced from Rs.1,15,000/-(Rupees one lakh fifteen thousand only) to Rs.1,45,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty five thousand only) per month from the date of filing of enhancement application.

3.The parties were married as per Hindu rites and ceremonies on 13.12.1998 and have one son born from their wedlock on 28.05.2001. However, the marital relationship soured and the parties began living separately from January, 2004. Since the date of separation, the son has been residing with the respondent–wife. Subsequently, on 11.05.2004, the appellant–husband filed a petition under Section 13(1) (ia) of the HMA, before the Family Court seeking divorce on the ground of cruelty. During the pendency of the divorce petition, the respondent, on 27.05.2004, filed an application under Section 24 of the HMA seeking pendente lite maintenance for herself and the son. This application was disposed of by the Family Court vide order dated 20.09.2004, directing the appellant to pay a cumulative sum of ₹18,000/- (Rupees eighteen thousand only) per month, comprising ₹15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) to the respondent and ₹3,000/- to the son.

4.Both parties challenged the Family Court’s order through separate appeals before the High Court. Consequently, vide order dated 21.11.2005, the High Court enhanced the maintenance amount to ₹20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) per month, allocating ₹15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) to the respondent and ₹5,000/- (Rupees five thousand only) to the son. Subsequently, the respondent filed an application under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA, seeking further enhancement of interim maintenance. In her application, she claimed an enhanced amount of ₹1,45,000/- (Rupees one lakh forty five thousand only) per month, contending that the appellant’s income had increased significantly, exceeding ₹4,00,000/- (Rupees four lakhs only) per month, inclusive of salary, perks, allowances, and bonuses. She further argued that the financial needs of both, her and the son, had increased manifold since the prior determination of maintenance.

5.During the pendency of the application, the appellant, in July 2015, voluntarily increased the interim maintenance to ₹65,000/- (Rupees sixty five thousand only) per month. He agreed to pay ₹50,000/- (Rupees fifty thousand only) to the respondent, effective from the date of filing the enhancement application on 28.02.2009, and ₹15,000/- (Rupees fifteen thousand only) to the son, effective from July 2015. However, the appellant contended that following the dismissal of his divorce petition on 14.07.2016 upon being withdrawn by him, the Family Court had become functus officio, rendering it incapable of granting any further relief under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA. He also submitted that the provisions of Section 26 of the HMA do not permit granting of maintenance to an adult male child.

6.The respondent’s application for enhanced interim maintenance rested on her assertion of significant changes in circumstances since the last maintenance order, including the increased financial requirements of herself and the son. On the other hand, the appellant’s position focused on the legal implications of the withdrawal of his divorce petition and the applicability of Section 26 of the HMA concerning the maintenance of an adult male child.

7.The Family Court, in its order dated 16.08.2018, allowed the respondent’s application for enhancement of maintenance and held that the relief in an application filed under Section 24 of the HMA can only be granted from the date of filing of the application, i.e., 28.02.2009, until the date the main divorce petition was dismissed as withdrawn, i.e., 14.07.2016. Proceedings under Section 26 of the HMA are independent of the main divorce proceedings, and relief under this section can be granted for a period beyond the dismissal of the main divorce petition. The Court therein observed that the appellant had adopted delaying tactics, which prevented the timely resolution of the respondent’s enhancement application. The appellant had been evasive in disclosing his actual income and assets, concealing his true financial status, including his movable and immovable properties. Therefore, he failed to discharge his moral and legal obligations to provide reasonable and just maintenance to his wife and son, commensurate with their social and economic standing.

8.The Family Court held that the respondent and her son are entitled to enhanced maintenance considering the increased expenditures for a growing child and the respondent’s requirements aligned with her social status. Accordingly, the Family Court directed the appellant to pay the following amounts:

i.₹1,15,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifteen thousand only) per month as pendente lite maintenance to the wife and the son from 28.02.2009 to 14.07.2016, when the divorce petition was withdrawn.

ii.₹35,000/- (Rupees thirty five thousand only) per month to the son from 15.07.2016, until he attains the age of 26 years or becomes financially independent, whichever is earlier. This amount shall be subject to a 10% increase every two years starting 28.05.2019.

iii.Litigation costs of ₹2,00,000/- (Rupees two lakhs only).

9.Both the parties challenged the above order of the Family Court vide two separate appeals before the High Court. It is the judgment passed in these appeals by the High Court, which is challenged before us by the appellant.

10.The High Court considered whether the Family Court loses its jurisdiction to decide pending applications under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA, upon withdrawal of the main divorce petition. The appellant argued that the Family Court becomes functus officio upon such withdrawal, and therefore, proceedings for interim maintenance and child-related relief under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA, respectively, could not be adjudicated. This contention was based on the assumption that the statutory jurisdiction under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA is ancillary to the divorce proceedings and cannot survive withdrawal of the main case. The High Court rejected this argument, holding that both provisions are independent in nature and continue to operate despite the withdrawal of the divorce petition. The High Court observed that the legislature’s intent behind Section 24 of the HMA is to ensure that a financially dependent spouse is not left without resources during the pendency of matrimonial disputes, and this obligation cannot be unilaterally nullified by withdrawal of the petition. It emphasized that allowing withdrawal of the main petition to terminate Section 24 of the HMA proceedings would render the dependent spouse financially vulnerable and create a procedural loophole for evasion of legal obligations. The High Court concluded that interim maintenance proceedings have an independent existence and are not strictly ancillary to the main proceedings. It held that the Family Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate interim maintenance under Section 24 of the HMA extends until the date of withdrawal of the main petition, thereby ensuring that the dependent spouse’s financial security is not abruptly disrupted by procedural tactics.

11.With respect to Section 26 of the HMA, which pertains to custody, maintenance, and education of minor children, the High Court provided a detailed analysis of the statutory language and intention. It held that the provision explicitly permits Courts to make orders “from time to time,” granting or modifying reliefs related to children, irrespective of the pendency or withdrawal of the main matrimonial proceedings. The High Court reasoned that matters concerning the welfare of children are not merely incidental to the matrimonial dispute but are of paramount and enduring importance. Recognizing that the interests of the children are paramount, the High Court clarified that the Family Court retains jurisdiction under Section 26 of the HMA even after withdrawal of the main petition, ensuring that children’s needs are addressed in an ongoing and dynamic manner.

12.The High Court also dismissed the appellant’s appeal placing reliance on the this Court’s decision in Ajay Mohan and Ors. v. H.N, Rai and Ors.,2 observing that the judgment was delivered in a different context and was not applicable to matrimonial proceedings under the HMA. It noted that this Court in Ajay Mohan (Supra), did not address the specific statutory framework or the unique considerations governing Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA. Reaffirming its position, the High Court underscored that the provisions under Sections 24 and 26 of the HMA serve distinct and independent purposes—one ensuring financial support for the dependent spouse and the other protecting the welfare of minor children. It concluded that the Family Court’s jurisdiction to adjudicate these matters persists independent of the status of the primary matrimonial dispute, thereby reinforcing the legislative objective of ensuring fairness and equity in matrimonial proceedings.

13.The High Court, while deciding the correctness of interim maintenance provided by the Family Court, heavily relied on the judgment of this Court in Rajnesh v. Neha and Another.3 This Court, in this judgment laid down the principles to ensure equitable determination of financial support for the wife and dependent child. It reiterated that maintenance should be determined after considering the status and lifestyle of the parties, reasonable needs of the wife and children, the wife’s educational qualifications, professional skills, and earning capacity, as well as the appellant’s financial standing and obligations. It must also address the rising cost of living and inflation to ensure a standard of living that is proportionate to the appellant’s financial capacity and consistent with the standard of living the wife and children were accustomed to prior to separation. This Court highlighted that a husband cannot evade his duty of disclosure by concealing assets, as financial transparency is critical to the fair adjudication of maintenance claims.

14.In this case, the High Court observed that the appellant’s income, primarily from employment and investments, demonstrated his ability to provide for the wife and child’s maintenance adequately. The evidence revealed that the appellant earned over ₹4,00,000 (Rupees four lakhs only) per month between 2007 and 2016. Although he claimed higher living expenses due to his residence in Mauritius, the High Court found his arguments to be unsubstantiated, as his financial resources allowed him to meet maintenance obligations without undue hardship. The High Court further noted several instances of the appellant’s deliberate attempts to mislead the judicial process. He withheld critical financial documents and selectively disclosed information to conceal the full extent of his wealth. The inquiry into the statutory forms of the appellant revealed that he had investments in mutual funds valued at ₹5.10 crores as early as 2009-2010, significant sums deposited in bank accounts, and other financial transactions that were not initially disclosed.

15.The High Court also identified false representations by the appellant regarding his property and income. He denied ownership of a property located at F-146, Richmond Park, Gurgaon, despite evidence of its ownership and rental income accruing to him. Additionally, the appellant misrepresented his association with Prasham Consultants LLP, wherein he continued to receive financial benefits until his father replaced him in 2016. These findings demonstrated a pattern of deliberate suppression of material facts and assets by the appellant, aimed at minimizing his maintenance liability. Such conduct warranted judicial intervention to ensure justice and provide adequate financial support to the wife and child, reflecting principles of fairness, transparency, and equity. Consequently, the High Court directed the appellant to pay interim maintenance that adequately addressed the needs of the wife and child, proportionate to his financial capacity and consistent with the obligations of a responsible spouse and parent.

16.Consequently, the High Court dismissed the appellant’s appeal challenging the order of interim maintenance granted by the Family Court, and, while allowing the respondent’s appeal, granted the following relief:

i.MAT.APP. (F.C) 120/2019 filed by the wife is allowed to the extent that the interim maintenance granted to the wife under Section 24 of the HMA is enhanced from Rs. 1,15,000/- (Rupees one lakh fifteen thousand only) to Rs. 1,45,000/- (Rupees on lakh forty five thousand only) per month from the date of filing of enhancement application i.e. 28.02.2009 till the date of withdrawal of divorce petition by the appellant i.e. 14.07.2016.

ii.All amounts paid by the appellant to the wife and the son till date shall be duly adjusted.

iii.The appellant shall also be liable to pay interest at the rate of 12% per annum towards the shortfall in the maintenance amount for the concerned period. The interest shall be calculated on the amount of deficit from the time it became due in a particular month and till the time it is paid.

iv.Based on the aforesaid, the arrears of maintenance to both the wife and the son, along with the interest, shall be paid within a period of eight (8) weeks from today.

17.The appellant is before us challenging the above judgment of the High Court on the grounds that the respondent has played a fraud on the Courts by concealing material/relevant documents and by filing false affidavits in support of her enhancement application, and that the son could not be granted maintenance till the age of twenty-six years as per the law. The interest @ 12% per annum in punitive in nature even though he had never defaulted in payment of interim maintenance.

18.We heard the parties in camera to discuss the possibility of an amicable solution but during the proceedings both the parties submitted that they are willing to have the marriage annulled by mutual consent as there remains no possibility of a reunion between them.

19.During the interaction before this Court, we found both the parties to be fair and reasonable in their approach, demeanor and conduct. They have shown an honest intention to amicably settle their disputes instead of maligning each other and unnecessarily delaying the proceedings.

20.Learned senior counsels for the respective parties have made their submissions at length. The parties have also filed their affidavits of assets as directed by this Court.

21.Before we proceed further, it is relevant to note that the parties stayed together only for around five years of the marriage, and even though they have a son out of the wedlock, they have been staying separately for almost over two decades now. They have made multiple serious allegations against each other and have been conducting litigations. They have no intention of reconciling, their marriage exists only for namesake, and there has been no cohabitation between the parties since 2004. Though the petition for dissolution of marriage has been withdrawn by the appellant, the interim maintenance proceedings have been going on between the parties since 2004.

22.The admitted long-standing separation, nature of differences, prolonged litigations pending adjudication, and the unwillingness of the parties to reconcile, are evidence enough to show that the marriage between the parties has completely broken down irretrievably.

23.A Constitution Bench of this Court in its judgment in the case of Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan,4 laid down that it has the discretionary power to dissolve a marriage which in its opinion and on the evidence has broken down irretrievably. The Court is required to exercise this discretion cautiously while analyzing the facts and evidence of each case. In order to arrive at the decision regarding whether the marriage has irretrievably broken down, the Court needs to factually examine and firmly establish the same, after careful consideration.

24.In Shilpa Sailesh (Supra), this Court further laid down the factors to be considered for such examination, and the same were reiterated in the case of Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel.5 This Court in both these judgments opined that the factors to be examined include the period of cohabitation between the parties, the period of separation, the attempts made for reconciliation, nature and gravity of allegations made between the parties, and such other similar factors.

25.This Court in plethora of judgments, such as Shilpa Sailesh (Supra) and Kiran Jyot Maini (Supra), Ashok Hurra v. Rupa Bipin Zaveri6 and Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar,7 has laid down the clear position that a marriage can be dissolved by this Court on the ground of irretrievable breakdown when the relationship is so strained that the marriage has succumbed to the long standing differences between the parties and it has become impossible to save such a relationship. When the Court is convinced that there is no scope for the marriage to survive and no useful purpose, emotional or practical, would be served by continuing the soured relationship, and it finds that the marriage is completely dead, then it can exercise its inherent power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve the marriage.

26.In the present case, even though the parties cohabited for about five to six years after marriage, but they have been living separately for more than two decades now. From the material on record, it also appears that even during the period of cohabitation the relationship between the parties was strained. The parties have made multiple serious allegations against each other. The appellant has contended that the respondent was short-tempered, hostile and behaved inappropriately with him and his parents, which led him into depression. The respondent has alleged that the appellant’s family was indifferent towards her from the beginning, they had created an uncomfortable environment for her, and the appellant showed no concern or care towards her. She further alleged that in the five years of cohabitation, the appellant was hostile towards her, she was treated like a domestic help, was never taken care of, and she was never treated as a wife by him. She finally left her matrimonial house fearing threat to her life, after hearing conversations between the appellant and his mother.

27.It is evident that the relationship between the parties appears to be strained from the beginning and only further soured over the years. Reconciliation proceedings during the pendency of the divorce petition also failed. The parties have been litigating maintenance proceedings for a prolonged period, and there appears to be no cogent reason to only deal with the issue of interim maintenance after twenty years of strained relationship and separation. These facts are admitted by the parties before us, and they have also mutually agreed for the dissolution of their marriage. Therefore, we believe that the marriage between the parties should be dissolved by this Court while exercising the discretionary power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

28.Thus, considering the facts of this case, all the material on record, submissions of the parties and analyzing the same in light of the factors stated above, the marriage between the appellant and the respondent is ordered to be dissolved.

29.The main issue between the parties all these years, since separation, is the quantum of maintenance to be paid by the appellant to the respondent. The issue of maintenance pendente lite is now infructuous with the dissolution of marriage, but the financial interest of the wife still needs to be protected through grant of permanent alimony. The learned senior counsels for the parties have made submissions at length regarding the financial condition of both the parties. In order to establish the correct financial position of both the parties, they have filed their respective affidavits of income and assets as ordered by this Court.

30.Before going into the details of the financial position of the parties, it is imperative that we highlight the position of law with regard to determination of permanent alimony. This Court, in a catena of judgments, has laid down the factors that needs to be considered in order to arrive at a just, fair and reasonable amount of permanent alimony.

31.There cannot be strict guidelines or a fixed formula for fixing the amount of permanent maintenance. The quantum of maintenance is subjective to each case and is dependent on various circumstances and factors. The Court needs to look into factors such as income of both the parties; conduct during the subsistence of marriage; their individual social and financial status; personal expenses of each of the parties; their individual capacities and duties to maintain their dependents; the quality of life enjoyed by the wife during the subsistence of the marriage; and such other similar factors. This position was laid down by this Court in Vinny Paramvir Parmar v. Paramvir Parmar,8 and Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal.9

32.This Court in the case of Rajnesh v. Neha (Supra), provided a comprehensive criterion and a list of factors to be looked into while deciding the question of permanent alimony. This judgment lays down an elaborate and comprehensive framework necessary for deciding the amount of maintenance in all matrimonial proceedings, with specific emphasis on permanent alimony. The same has been reiterated by this Court in Kiran Jyot Maini v. Anish Pramod Patel (Supra). The primary objective of granting permanent alimony is to ensure that the dependent spouse is not left without any support and means after the dissolution of the marriage. It aims at protecting the interests of the dependent spouse and does not provide for penalizing the other spouse in the process. The Court in these two judgments laid down the following factors to be looked into:

i.Status of the parties, social and financial.

ii.Reasonable needs of the wife and the dependent children.

iii.Parties’ individual qualifications and employment statuses.

iv.Independent income or assets owned by the applicant.

v.Standard of life enjoyed by the wife in the matrimonial home.

vi.Any employment sacrifices made for the family responsibilities.

vii.Reasonable litigation costs for a non-working wife.

viii.Financial capacity of the husband, his income, maintenance obligations, and liabilities.

These are only guidelines and not a straitjacket rubric. These among such other similar factors become relevant.

33.This Court in Kiran Jyot Maini (Supra), while discussing the husband’s obligation to maintain the wife and the importance of his financial capacity in deciding the quantum, observed that:

“26. Furthermore, the financial capacity of the husband is a critical factor in determining permanent alimony. The Court shall examine the husband›s actual income, reasonable expenses for his own maintenance, and any dependents he is legally obligated to support. His liabilities and financial commitments are also to be considered to ensure a balanced and fair maintenance award. The court must consider the husband’s standard of living and the impact of inflation and high living costs. Even if the husband claims to have no source of income, his ability to earn, given his education and qualifications, is to be taken into account. The courts shall ensure that the relief granted is fair, reasonable, and consistent with the standard of living to which the aggrieved party was accustomed. The court’s approach should be to balance all relevant factors to avoid maintenance amounts that are either excessively high or unduly low, ensuring that the dependent spouse can live with reasonable comfort post-separation.”

34.In the present case, it is a matter of record and an admitted fact that the respondent is unemployed while the appellant is a well accomplished banker who has worked in multiple senior roles at various banks over the years. We have perused the records of finances produced before us. Even though the records of the DEMAT accounts and the employment letters produced by the appellant are almost ten years ago or earlier, his financial position can be suitably ascertained from them.

35.It is admitted on record that the respondent is a home maker and has not been working in all these years, the son lives with her, who has now completed his B. Tech. course, and they reside in a house owned by the respondent’s mother. The appellant has paid for the son’s education as well as paid the interim maintenance as ordered by the Family Court. The son is now major and has also completed his graduation.

36.The appellant is currently working as the Chief Executive Officer of Vision Bank in Dubai and his estimated salary is about AED 50,000 per month which means that he is earning around Rs. 10 to 12 Lakhs per month. Though he has filed details of his DEMAT accounts from 2010, it is revealed that he had investments of around Rs.5 crores at that time. Further, he has three properties worth approximately Rs.2 crores, Rs.5 crores and Rs.10 crores, respectively.

37.During the period of cohabitation, the parties were initially residing in Mumbai when the appellant was working as a Foreign Exchange Executive with Global Trust Bank and subsequently in Chennai when the appellant changed his job. The appellant has worked at multiple positions in prestigious Banks and stayed in metropolitan cities with the respondent during the subsistence of the marriage.

38.In compliance of this Court’s order dated 23.09.2024, the appellant has also paid Rs. 72 Lakhs as arrears of maintenance in addition to the maintenance already paid by him.

39.It is not disputed that the appellant has the legal obligation as well as the financial capacity to maintain the respondent after dissolution of the marriage. As held by us in Kiran Jyot Maine (Supra), it is also necessary to ensure that the amount of permanent alimony should not penalize the husband but should be made with the aim of ensuring a decent standard of living for the wife.

40.Considering the material on record, the totality of the circumstances and the facts of this case, a one-time settlement amount with provision for the respondent as well as the son, would be a fair arrangement. For the respondent, considering the standard of living enjoyed by her during subsistence of the marriage, the prolonged period of separation, and the appellant’s financial capacity, a one-time settlement amount of Rs. 5 crores (Rupees five crores only), appears to be just, fair and reasonable amount for the respondent to be paid by the appellant towards settlement of all pending claims also.

41.It is also equitable and only obligatory for a father to provide for his children, especially when they have the means and the capacity to do the same. Even though the son is now major and has just finished his engineering degree, the High Court has rightly observed that it is only after completion of a college/ university degree and in some cases, completing a post-graduation/ professional degree, would the child be able to secure employment. In fact, it can safely be concluded that, in today’s competitive world, gainful employment may be feasible only after the child has pursued education beyond 18 years of age. Mere completion of his engineering degree does not guarantee a gainful employment, in these competitive times. The appellant herein has sufficient means to support his child, and thus provision should also be made for his maintenance and financial security as well. An amount of Rs. 1 crore (Rupees one crore only) towards the maintenance and care of the son appears to be fair, which he can utilize for his higher education and as security till he becomes financially independent.

42.Therefore, we fix the above mentioned amount as one-time settlement amount to be paid by the appellant to the respondent and his son within a period of four months from the date of this judgment.

43.Consequently, the appeals are disposed of with the above observations and directions to the parties. Accordingly, decree of divorce be granted in exercise of this Court’s power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. Further, the appellant shall pay the amount provided above towards permanent alimony to the respondent and his son within the time stipulated above. The Registry to draw a decree accordingly.

Result of the case: Appeals disposed of.

1 HMA

2 [2007] 13 SCR 298 : (2008) 2 SCC 507

3 [2020] 13 SCR 1093 : (2021) 2 SCC 32

4 [2023] 5 SCR 165 : (2022) 15 SCC 754

5 [2024] 7 SCR 942 : (2024) SCC OnLine SC 1724

6 [1997] 2 SCR 875 : (1997) 4 SCC 226

7 [2011] 6 SCR 118 : (2011) 5 SCC 234

8 [2011] 9 SCR 371 : (2011) 13 SCC 112

9 [2012] 7 SCR 607 : (2012) 7 SCC 288

©2024 Supreme Court of India. All Rights Reserved.

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.23 r.3 – Compromise of suit – Suit for declaration and injunction by the appellant – Dismissed by trial court – Appellant filed first appeal – During pendency, compromise reached between parties and in terms thereof, the High Court disposed the first appeal – However, failure of the respondent to comply with compromise terms – Application to restore the appeal filed by the appellant alleging fraud – High Court dismissed the same on the ground that parties not given liberty to restore the appeal while recording compromise – Correctness: Held: Explanation to Ord.23 r.3 clearly states that void and voidable agreements under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful – By alleging fraud in his recall application, the appellant is effectively impugning the legality of the compromise as proving the same would render the agreement voidable under the Contract Act – When the court disposes of a proceeding pursuant to a compromise u/Ord.23, r.3, it bears the duty to examine this issue and be satisfied that the agreement or compromise is lawful – Said issue can be agitated by way of a recall application even after the compromise decree has been passed – High Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the order recording the compromise does not grant liberty to restore the appeal – This is not the correct approach, as it defeats the statutory right and remedy available to the appellant under the CPC – Only the court that entertains the petition of compromise can determine its legality, at the time of recording the compromise or when it is questioned by way of a recall application – No other remedy is available to the party who is aggrieved by the compromise decree as appeal or fresh suit not maintainable – High Court not correct in curtailing the statutory remedy available to the appellant – When there is a statutory remedy available to a litigant, no question of a court granting liberty to avail of such remedy – No occasion for the court to deny liberty to file for restoration and the consequent dismissal of the recall application by the impugned order on this ground alone does not arise – As a matter of public policy courts must not curtail statutorily provisioned remedial mechanisms available to parties – Compromise deed itself recognises the parties’ right to approach the court to question its validity – Order of the High Court set aside – Matter remanded to High Court for deciding application for recall. [Paras 13-17]

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 453 : 2024 INSC 970

Navratan Lal Sharma v. Radha Mohan Sharma & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No. 14328 of 2024)

12 December 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Manoj Misra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Issue arose as regards the right of a party to get the first appeal restored if compromise decree specifically does not give such liberty.

Headnotes†

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Ord.23 r.3 – Compromise of suit – Suit for declaration and injunction by the appellant – Dismissed by trial court – Appellant filed first appeal – During pendency, compromise reached between parties and in terms thereof, the High Court disposed the first appeal – However, failure of the respondent to comply with compromise terms – Application to restore the appeal filed by the appellant alleging fraud – High Court dismissed the same on the ground that parties not given liberty to restore the appeal while recording compromise – Correctness:

Held: Explanation to Ord.23 r.3 clearly states that void and voidable agreements under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful – By alleging fraud in his recall application, the appellant is effectively impugning the legality of the compromise as proving the same would render the agreement voidable under the Contract Act – When the court disposes of a proceeding pursuant to a compromise u/Ord.23, r.3, it bears the duty to examine this issue and be satisfied that the agreement or compromise is lawful – Said issue can be agitated by way of a recall application even after the compromise decree has been passed – High Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the order recording the compromise does not grant liberty to restore the appeal – This is not the correct approach, as it defeats the statutory right and remedy available to the appellant under the CPC – Only the court that entertains the petition of compromise can determine its legality, at the time of recording the compromise or when it is questioned by way of a recall application – No other remedy is available to the party who is aggrieved by the compromise decree as appeal or fresh suit not maintainable – High Court not correct in curtailing the statutory remedy available to the appellant – When there is a statutory remedy available to a litigant, no question of a court granting liberty to avail of such remedy – No occasion for the court to deny liberty to file for restoration and the consequent dismissal of the recall application by the impugned order on this ground alone does not arise – As a matter of public policy courts must not curtail statutorily provisioned remedial mechanisms available to parties – Compromise deed itself recognises the parties’ right to approach the court to question its validity – Order of the High Court set aside – Matter remanded to High Court for deciding application for recall. [Paras 13-17]

Case Law Cited

Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 524 : (1993) 1 SCC 581; Pushpa Devi v. Rajinder Singh [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566 – relied on.

Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar [2004] Supp. 6 SCR 1104 : (2005) 1 SCC 787; Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers [2003] 3 SCR 762 : (2003) 6 SCC 659; R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy [2014] 14 SCR 535 : (2014) 15 SCC 471; Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh [2020] 4 SCR 650 : (2020) 6 SCC 629; R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumaraswamy [2021] 6 SCR 333 : (2021) 9 SCC 114; Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad [2022] 3 SCR 1081 : (2022) 5 SCC 736; Basavaraj v. Indira [2024] 2 SCR 935 : (2024) 3 SCC 705 – referred to.

List of Acts

Contract Act, 1872; Code of Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords

Right of party to get the first appeal restored; Compromise decree; Compromise of suit; Void and voidable agreements; Fraud in recall application; Statutory right and remedy; Restoration; Remedial mechanisms; Compromise deed.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No. 14328 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 19.10.2023 of the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan at Jaipur in SBCMA No. 162 of 2022

Appearances for Parties

Varinder Kumar Sharma, Adv. for the Appellant.

Ms. Surabhi Guleria, Ms. Megha Karnwal, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.The appellant initially filed a suit for declaration and injunction, which was dismissed by the Trial Court. The appellant then filed a first appeal. During its pendency, the parties reached a compromise, agreeing to dispose of the appeal based on its terms. On 14.07.2022, the High Court decided the appellant’s application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 19081 and disposed of the first appeal in terms of the compromise. However, when the respondent failed to comply with the compromise terms, the appellant filed an application to restore the appeal. Unfortunately, this application was dismissed by the order impugned before us, citing that the High Court had not granted liberty for restoration of the appeal while recording the compromise.

3.After careful consideration of the statutory framework and Order 23, Rules 3 and 3A, as informed by relevant judicial precedents, we have allowed the appeal. We have directed that, in such circumstances, restoration is the sole remedy, which the aggrieved party may exercise as a statutory right.

4.The short facts are that the appellant is the owner of the suit property. He filed a suit against the respondents for cancellation of the power of attorney dated 19.07.2010 and 27.07.2010, sale deeds dated 31.08.2010 and 15.09.2010, and grant of permanent and mandatory injunction on the ground that respondent no. 1 forged the abovementioned power of attorney and subsequently entered into the abovementioned sale deeds for the suit property in favour of respondent no. 2. The Trial Court dismissed the suit on 17.02.2014, and the appellant preferred a first appeal before the Rajasthan High Court.

5.During the pendency of the first appeal, the appellant and respondent no. 2 entered into a compromise, recorded in deed dated 18.05.2022 and corrigendum compromise dated 08.07.2022. The compromise contemplated development of the suit property, as per which certain amounts were to be paid by respondent no. 2 to the appellant. Paras 4 and 7 of the compromise deed dated 18.05.2022 are relevant and extracted hereinbelow for ready reference:

“(4) That there is a first appeal no. between the parties in the Honourable State High Court. 210/2014 is pending. The said compromise will be presented in other cases and both the parties will be able to get them resolved on the basis of the compromise, but if the terms of the compromise are violated then the second party will have the right to get the said appeal number 210/2014 reinstated by submitting an application.

***

(7) That the first party issued a check dated 18/5/22 to the second party, check no. 160711 amount of Rs 11,00,000/- has been given today itself, payment can be taken by presenting the check in the bank on the date written in it. After giving the lease of the developed land, an amount equal to the value of the said amount will be transferred to Khasra No. Out of 11, the second party will give it to the first party. If any check is dishonoured, the agreement will be considered void.”

6.The parties filed an application under Order 23, Rule 3 of the CPC for disposal of the first appeal as per the compromise, wherein it was stated that respondent no. 1 does not have any objection to the compromise and that the appellant can file for restoration of the appeal if the agreed payment is not completed and the cheques are dishonoured.

7.By order dated 14.07.2022, the High Court disposed of the first appeal by taking the compromise dated 18.05.2022 and the corrigendum compromise dated 08.07.2022 on record and making them a part of its order. However, it also held that the parties do not have liberty to get the first appeal restored. The relevant portion of the order reads:

“5. This Court, without entering into the merits of appeal but without giving any liberty to get restored the first appeal, is of considered opinion that when both parties have entered into the terms of compromise and have agreed to abide by the terms of compromise, this appeal deserves to be disposed of accordingly.

6. Hence the compromise dated 18.05.2022 along with corrigendum compromise dated 08.07.2022 is taken on record and the first appeal is disposed of in terms of compromise.

7. The compromise dated 18.05.2022 along with corrigendum compromise dated 08.07.2022 shall be treated as part of this order.”

(emphasis supplied)

8.When the cheques issued by respondent no. 2, said to be in furtherance of the compromise were dishonoured, the appellant moved the High Court for restoration of the appeal alleging fraud and illegal interference with his possession and attempts to get the land converted without paying the agreed amounts. By the order impugned before us, the High Court dismissed the application on the only ground that in its order dated 14.07.2022, the Court clearly recorded that the parties were not given liberty to restore the appeal. The High Court observed that since the order dated 14.07.2022 was a consensual order and the parties were aware that there was no liberty to get the first appeal restored, the application for restoration was not entertainable even if the compromise is not acted upon. The short order of the High Court dated 19.10.2023 is extracted hereinbelow:

“1. Instant misc. application has been filed by the appellant-plaintiff seeking to restore S.B. Civil First Appeal NO.210/2014 by recalling the order dated 14.07.2022 whereby and whereunder the first appeal was disposed of in terms of compromise dated 18.05.2022 arrived at between parties.

2. It has been stated in the application that cheques issued by respondents in terms of the compromise have been dishonoured and respondents have not adhered to the terms of the compromise, hence the first appeal be restored to be heard on merits.

3. By perusal of the order dated 14.07.2022, more particularly para No.5, it stands clear that this Court while disposing of the first appeal in terms of the compromise has clearly observed that parties would be not at liberty to get restore this first appeal. The order dated 14.07.2022 is consensual order and both parties were well aware that no liberty to restore the first appeal is available, even though the compromise may or may not be acted upon. Therefore, the application for restoration of first appeal is not entertainable.

4. Thus, in view of above, the prayer for restoration of the first appeal is uncalled for. In case, the terms of the compromise dated 18.05.2022 have not been complied with, the applicant-plaintiff is at liberty to take appropriate steps in accordance with law.

5. With aforesaid observations, without recalling of the order dated 14.07.2022, the misc. application stands disposed of.

6. Stay application and any other pending application, if any, stand disposed of.”

9.We have heard the learned counsels for the parties.

10.The relevant provisions under the CPC that govern compromise decrees are contained in Order 23, Rules 3 and 3A, which are extracted hereunder:

“3. Compromise of suit. — Where it is proved to the satisfaction of the Court that a suit has been adjusted wholly or in part by any lawful agreement or compromise in writing and signed by the parties or where the defendant satisfied the plaintiff in respect to the whole or any part of the subject-matter of the suit, the Court shall order such agreement, compromise or satisfaction to be recorded, and shall pass a decree in accordance therewith so far as it relates to the parties to the suit, whether or not the subject matter of the agreement, compromise or satisfaction is the same as the subject-matter of the suit:

Provided that where it is alleged by one party and denied by the other that an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, the Court shall decide the question; but not adjournment shall be granted for the purpose of deciding the question, unless the Court, for reasons to be recorded, thinks fit to grant such adjournment.

Explanation.— An agreement or compromise which is void or voidable under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 (9 of 1872), shall not be deemed to be lawful within the meaning of this rule.

3A. Bar to suit.—No suit shall lie to set aside a decree on the ground that the compromise on which the decree is based was not lawful.”

11.This Court in Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi 2 has laid down the law on the disposal of a proceeding in accordance with a compromise between the parties and on recall of a compromise decree. It held that under Order 23, Rule 3, the Court must be satisfied upon applying judicial mind that the agreement between the parties is lawful before accepting the same and disposing the suit. Further, the proviso and the Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 mandate that the court must “decide the question” of whether an adjustment or satisfaction has been arrived at, and it is clarified that void and voidable agreements under the Indian Contract Act, 1872 3 shall be deemed to be not lawful.4 Upon such reading of the provision, it held that the court recording the compromise can examine the legality of the agreement, in accordance with the provisions of the Contract Act, even after the compromise decree is passed and when a party moves an application for recall.5

12.The law on the issue is summarised in Pushpa Devi Bhagat v. Rajinder Singh.6 In this case, the Court also took note of Section 96(3) of the CPC7 and the deletion of Order 43, Rule 1(m) of the CPC by way of an amendment in 1976, as well as Order 23, Rule 3A. The consequence of these is that an appeal against a consent decree and an order recording (or refusing to record) a compromise is not maintainable, nor can a fresh suit be filed for setting aside such decree. Hence, the only remedy available to the aggrieved party is to approach the court that recorded the compromise under the proviso to Order 23, Rule 3. The Court held:

“17. The position that emerges from the amended provisions of Order 23 can be summed up thus:

(i) No appeal is maintainable against a consent decree having regard to the specific bar contained in Section 96(3) CPC.

(ii) No appeal is maintainable against the order of the court recording the compromise (or refusing to record a compromise) in view of the deletion of clause (m) of Rule 1 Order 43.

(iii) No independent suit can be filed for setting aside a compromise decree on the ground that the compromise was not lawful in view of the bar contained in Rule 3-A.

(iv) A consent decree operates as an estoppel and is valid and binding unless it is set aside by the court which passed the consent decree, by an order on an application under the proviso to Rule 3 Order 23.

Therefore, the only remedy available to a party to a consent decree to avoid such consent decree, is to approach the court which recorded the compromise and made a decree in terms of it, and establish that there was no compromise. In that event, the court which recorded the compromise will itself consider and decide the question as to whether there was a valid compromise or not. This is so because a consent decree is nothing but contract between parties superimposed with the seal of approval of the court. The validity of a consent decree depends wholly on the validity of the agreement or compromise on which it is made…”

(emphasis supplied)

13.In the present case, the appellant has alleged fraud by the respondents in his recall application, which he bears the burden to prove.8 The Explanation to Order 23, Rule 3 clearly states that void and voidable agreements under the Contract Act shall not be deemed to be lawful. By alleging fraud in his recall application, the appellant is effectively impugning the legality of the compromise as proving the same would render the agreement voidable under the Contract Act.9 When the court disposes of a proceeding pursuant to a compromise under Order 23, Rule 3, it bears the duty to examine this issue and be satisfied that the agreement or compromise is lawful. The proviso explicitly obligates the court that entertains the petition of compromise to determine this issue, and as per the law laid down by this Court in Banwari Lal (supra), this issue can be agitated by way of a recall application even after the compromise decree has been passed.

14.By the impugned order, the High Court dismissed the application solely on the ground that the order dated 14.07.2022 recording the compromise does not grant liberty to restore the appeal. We are of the opinion that this is not the correct approach, as it defeats the statutory right and remedy available to the appellant under the CPC. This Court in Pushpa Devi Bhagat (supra), as well as several other cases,10 has held that only the court that entertains the petition of compromise can determine its legality, at the time of recording the compromise or when it is questioned by way of a recall application. No other remedy is available to the party who is aggrieved by the compromise decree as an appeal and fresh suit are not maintainable under the CPC.

15.In view of this legal position, the High Court was not correct in curtailing the statutory remedy available to the appellant in the first place.11 In fact, when there is a statutory remedy available to a litigant, there is no question of a court granting liberty to avail of such remedy as it remains open to the party to work out his remedies in accordance with law.12 Therefore, there was no occasion for the court to deny liberty to file for restoration by its order dated 14.07.2022 and the consequent dismissal of the recall application by the impugned order on this ground alone does not arise. Further, as a matter of public policy, courts must not curtail statutorily provisioned remedial mechanisms available to parties.

16.It is also relevant that para 4 of the compromise deed dated 18.05.2022 recognises the appellant’s right to file for restoration of appeal in case of non-compliance. Further, para 7 stipulates that the compromise will be considered void in case of non-payment. Reading these clauses together, it is clear that the compromise deed itself recognises the parties’ right to approach the court to question its validity in certain circumstances. These clauses are in line with the public policy consideration of access to justice reflected in Section 28 of the Contract Act that stipulates that agreements which restrain a party from enforcing his rights through legal remedies are void.

17.In this view of the matter, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned order dated 19.10.2023, and remand the matter to the High Court to decide the application for recall on its own merits. Needless to say that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the matter.

18.No order as to costs. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

Result of the case: Appeal allowed.

1 Hereinafter “CPC”.

2 [1992] Supp. 3 SCR 524 : (1993) 1 SCC 581

3 Hereinafter “the Contract Act”.

4 Banwari Lal (supra), paras 11-13.

5 ibid, para 14.

6 [2006] Supp. 3 SCR 370 : (2006) 5 SCC 566

7 Section 96(3) of the CPC reads:

“96. Appeal from original decree.—

(3) No appeal shall lie from a decree passed by the Court with the consent of parties.”

8 Shanti Budhiya Vesta Patel v. Nirmala Jayprakash Tiwari (2010) 5 SCC 104; K. Srinivasappa v. M. Mallamma (2022) 17 SCC 460.

9 Section 19 of the Contract Act provides that when consent to an agreement is caused by fraud, it is voidable at the option of the party whose consent was so caused.

10 R. Rajanna v. S.R. Venkataswamy (2014) 15 SCC 471, para 11; Triloki Nath Singh v. Anirudh Singh (2020) 6 SCC 629, paras 17 and 18; R. Janakiammal v. S.K. Kumaraswamy (2021) 9 SCC 114; Sree Surya Developers & Promoters v. N. Sailesh Prasad (2022) 5 SCC 736, para 9; Basavaraj v. Indira (2024) 3 SCC 705, para 9.

11 See Bhanu Kumar Jain v. Archana Kumar (2005) 1 SCC 787, paras 28 and 36.

12 See Shiv Shakti Coop. Housing Society, Nagpur v. Swaraj Developers (2003) 6 SCC 659, para 36.

©2024 Supreme Court of India. All Rights Reserved.

Whether appellant had the intention to commit murder; whether the appellant’s act can be brought under section 304, IPC in light of the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under exception 2 to section 300, IPC; whether appellant’s sentence should be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused.

[2024] 12 S.C.R. 392 : 2024 INSC 937

Kunhimuhammed@Kunheethu v. The State of Kerala

(Criminal Appeal No. 5097 of 2024)

06 December 2024

[Vikram Nath* and Prasanna B. Varale, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether appellant had the intention to commit murder; whether the appellant’s act can be brought under section 304, IPC in light of the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under exception 2 to section 300, IPC; whether appellant’s sentence should be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – The sympathizers of two political groups fought against each other – Appellant along with other accused committed murder of victim-S and injured CW-1 – Trial Court held appellant guilty u/ss.302, 324 and 326/34 of IPC and sentenced him to life imprisonment and the same was upheld by the High Court – Correctness:

Held: The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased has been central to the Courts’ conclusion that the act qualifies as murder under Section 300 of the IPC – As per the post-mortem report, the deceased sustained both external and internal ante-mortem injuries that were identified as being inflicted by a sharp-edged knife – The prosecution established beyond doubt that these injuries were inflicted by the appellant-accused no. 1 using a knife, which was recovered during the investigation based on the appellant’s disclosure statement – Further, the doctor PW-6 has stated that these injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature – Cross-examination of these witnesses did not reveal any inconsistencies that could undermine the credibility of the evidence – Consequently, the courts have rightly concluded that the fatal injuries inflicted by the appellant were the direct cause of the deceased’s death – As far as intention of appellant to commit murder is concerned, the injuries were concentrated on the vital parts of the deceased’s body, such as the chest and ribs, which house critical organs like the heart and lungs – The deliberate targeting of these areas indicates a clear intent to cause harm that could lead to death – There is also the testimony of the injured witnesses that accused used considerable force while stabbing – The other co-accused were reportedly armed with sticks, the appellant-accused no. 1 was in possession of a sharp knife, which was used to inflict severe injuries – The decision to carry and use such a weapon during the scuffle reflects a readiness to escalate violence beyond a mere physical altercation – The third clause of Section 300, IPC defines murder as the act of causing death by causing such bodily injury as is likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature – In the instant case, the appellant’s actions satisfy these criteria – The appellant was armed with a knife, which he used to inflict multiple injuries on vital organs – The fatal nature of these injuries, as confirmed by medical evidence, and the circumstances of the attack clearly point to an intent to cause death or at least an intention to inflict injuries with the knowledge that they were likely to result in death – Even if it is presumed that the appellant-accused no. 1 did not have an intention to cause such bodily injury, the act of causing injuries with knife to vital parts is reflective of the knowledge that causing such injuries is likely to cause death in the ordinary course. [Paras 25.1, 25.7, 25.8, 25.16]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.304 – Whether the appellant’s act can be brought under section 304, IPC in light of the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under exception 2 to section 300, IPC:

Held: The courts below have made a categorical finding that the appellant-accused no.1 and his co-accused were the aggressors in the altercation – The attack was initiated by the accused group, who were armed with sticks and a knife, with the intent to intimidate or harm the victim and his companions – This fact is substantiated by the testimony of PW-1, an injured eyewitness, who described the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing – Even if it were assumed that the appellant-accused no. 1 acted in self-defense, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the force used was excessive and disproportionate – The act of stabbing the deceased multiple times in vital organs such as the chest and heart goes far beyond what is permissible under the right of private defense – In the post-mortem report and corroborated by the testimony of PW-6 (the police surgeon), the injuries inflicted on the deceased were severe and intentional, including a fatal wound to the heart – In light of the above findings, the plea of exceeding the right of private defense under Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, is not applicable to the appellant’s case. [Paras 26.5, 26.6, 26.7]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – Appellant- accused no.1 was convicted u/ss.302, 324 and 326/34 of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment – Whereas, accused no.2 was found guilty of offences punishable u/s.326 and u/ss.324/34 of IPC and he was sentenced to six years imprisonment u/s.326 and two years rigorous imprisonment u/s.324 of IPC – The third accused was also awarded the same sentence as accused no.2 – The sentences were to run concurrently – All the three accused filed separate appeals before the High Court, which were dismissed – The second and third accused preferred a separate SLP, wherein this Court extended benefit of doubt to accused no.3 whereas accused no.2’s conviction was upheld, however, his sentence u/s.326 for six years was reduced to three years – Whether appellant’s sentence should be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused:

Held: The doctrine of parity ensures fairness in sentencing when co-accused persons are similarly situated and share the same level of culpability – However, parity is not an automatic entitlement; the role, intent, and actions of each accused must be individually assessed to determine their degree of involvement in the crime – In the instant case, the courts have carefully evaluated the evidence against each accused and tailored their sentences accordingly – The appellant’s argument for parity fails to recognize the qualitative differences in their roles and the gravity of their actions – The appellant’s actions were not only more severe but also demonstrated a clear intent to cause death – The fatal injuries inflicted on the deceased, as detailed in the post-mortem report, leave no room for doubt about the appellant-accused no. 1’s culpability – The courts below have correctly observed that the appellant’s role in the crime is incomparable to that of his co-accused – The principle of parity does not apply in the present case, as the appellant’s actions were materially different from those of his co-accused. [Paras 27.2, 27.6, 27.7]

Penal Code, 1860 – ss.302, 324 and 326/34 – Appellant convicted u/ss.302, 324 and 326/34 of IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment – Plea of old age and deteriorating health:

Held: A murder committed with the intent to target vital organs, particularly in a group setting, reflects a level of intent and cruelty that demands an appropriate punitive response – To reduce the sentence in such a case would risk undermining the seriousness of the crime and the sanctity of life itself, principles that the judicial system is duty-bound to uphold – While the Court acknowledges the appellant’s advanced age and medical condition, these factors cannot outweigh the need for justice and the imperative to uphold the rule of law – When the minimum sentence itself is life imprisonment, then grounds like parity, leniency, old age, health concerns, etc. shall not be of any aid to the accused while seeking reduction of sentence – Therefore, the appellant herein has been granted the minimum sentence for committing the offence of murder. [Paras 28.4, 28.5, 29]

Case Law Cited

Manubhai Atabhai v. State of Gujarat [2007] 7 SCR 1115 : (2007) 10 SCC 358; Arun Nivalaji More v. State of Maharashtra [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 301 : (2006) 12 SCC 613; Nishan Singh v. State of Punjab [2008] 4 SCR 500 : (2008) 17 SCC 505; Vinod Kumar v. Amritpal [2021] 11 SCR 954 : (2021) 19 SCC 181; Balkar Singh v. State of Uttarakhand [2009] 5 SCR 242 : (2009) 15 SCC 366; Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab [2010] 1 SCR 642 : (2010) 2 SCC 333; V. Subramani v. State of Tamil Nadu [2005] 2 SCR 536 : (2005) 10 SCC 358; Sone Lal v. State of U.P. [1981] 3 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 531 – referred to.

List of Acts

Evidence Act, 1872; Penal Code, 1860; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Third clause of Section 300, IPC; Injuries were sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature; Exception 2 to section 300, IPC; Private defence; Doctrine of parity; Reduction of sentence; Old age of accused; Deteriorating health of accused.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Criminal Appeal No. 5097 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 18.09.2018 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in CRLA No. 1477 of 2012

Appearances for Parties

Nikhil Goel, Sr. Adv., Haris Beeran, Azhar Assees, Anand B. Menon, Ms. Maneesha Sunilkumar, Radha Shyam Jena, Advs. for the Appellant.

P.V. Dinesh, Sr. Adv., Nishe Rajen Shonker, Mrs. Anu K Joy, Alim Anvar, Ms. Anna Oommen, Ms. Urvashi Chauhan, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Vikram Nath, J.

1.Leave granted.

2.This appeal assails the correctness of the judgment and order dated 18.09.2018 whereby the appeal of the appellant-accused no.1, against his conviction under sections 302, 324 and 326/34 of Indian Penal Code, 18601 has been dismissed. The prosecution story in brief is:

2.1.On 10.04.2006, the sympathizers of United Democratic Front (UDF) and Left Democratic Front (LDF) fought against each other in connection with the dispute regarding the drawing of their election symbol at a place near a library in Kunnappalli, Pathaikkara Village. A criminal case with non-bailable offences was registered against the sympathisers of UDF in connection with the above incident.

2.2.On 11.04.2006, The appellant along with the other accused who are sympathisers of Indian Union Muslim League on account of above enmity and with the intention to commit murder of deceased Subrahmannian and CW-1 Vasudevan Ramachandra, waited at Mukkilaplavu Junction for their arrival and at about 08:45 PM when the deceased along with Vasudevan Ramachandra reached at the above-mentioned place, the first accused attempted to beat the deceased with a tamarind stick, on his head. The deceased saved himself from the said attack and snatched the stick from the first accused and started assaulting the first accused on his forehead and back with the same stick. At this stage, the first accused took out a knife from his hip region and stabbed the deceased on the left side of chest, back of the head and the left shoulder. On seeing the above incident, CW-1 made an attempt to obstruct the first accused from assaulting the deceased, however, the first accused stabbed him on the left side of the buttock of CW-1 with the same knife. When CW-1 fell on the ground, the second accused caused a fracture on the right foot bone of CW-1 by beating him with another tamarind stick. Thereafter, the third accused assaulted CW-1 by beating on his right chest with a wooden stick.

2.3.After the said incident, the injured and the deceased were taken to the Maulana Hospital where Additional Sub-Inspector CW-32 reached and recorded the statement of CW-1 on the basis of which the First Information Report was registered as Crime No.260 of 2006 against the three accused under sections 302/324 read with section 34 IPC. The accused were thereafter arrested. The Investigating Officer prepared the inquest report, spot map, and recovered the knife under the seizure memo on the basis of the disclosure statement made by the first accused.

2.4.After completing the investigation, the charge sheet was submitted under sections 302/307 read with section 34 IPC. The Magistrate took cognizance and committed the case for trial to the Sessions Court. The Trial Court framed the charges under the aforesaid sections and read them over to the accused who denied the same and claimed trial.

3.The Prosecution examined 19 witnesses and filed 28 Exhibits and 18 material objects. The statements of the accused under section 313 of Code of Criminal Procedure, 19732 were recorded wherein again they claimed that they were innocent and had nothing to do with the said incident. They claimed to have been falsely implicated on account of political rivalry at the instance of the leaders of Communist Party of India (Marxist) (CPI(M)).

4.The Trial Court after appreciating the evidence led by the parties held that the appellantwas found guilty of offences punishable under sections 302, 324 and 326/34 IPC and accordingly sentenced him to life imprisonment with a fine of Rs.1 Lakh under section 302, IPC, six years rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.25,000/- under section 326, IPC, and two years imprisonment under section 324, IPC. Accused no.2 was found guilty of offences punishable under section 326 and under sections 324/34 IPC and he was sentenced to six years imprisonment under section 326, IPC with a fine of Rs.25,000/- and two years rigorous imprisonment under section 324 IPC. The third accused was also awarded the same sentence as accused no.2. The sentences were to run concurrently.

5.Three appeals were preferred before the High Court by the three accused separately. The High Court by the impugned order dismissed all the three appeals. The second accused and the third accused had preferred a separate SLP registered as SLP(Crl.) No.2822 of 2019. In the said SLP, leave was granted, and it was partly allowed vide judgment and order dated 29.07.2019. This Court extended benefit of doubt to accused no.3 whereas accused no.2’s conviction was upheld, however, his sentence under section 326 for six years was reduced to three years.

6.We have heard Shri Nikhil Goel, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant and Shri P.V. Dinesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the State of Kerala and perused the material on record. The submissions of Shri Goel are limited to the extent that this was not a case of premeditated pre planned murder. There was no mens rea for committing culpable homicide amounting to murder. The intention was only of assaulting with the stick but later on during the fight as the deceased overpowered the appellant and started assaulting him with the same stick after snatching it from the appellant, the appellant pulled out the knife from his back and stabbed the deceased and also the injured to save him. He has drawn attention to the evidence on record as also to the judgment of the Trial Court wherein specific finding was recorded to that extent by the Trial Court but despite the same, the Trial Court proceeded to record conviction under section 302 IPC and not section 304 IPC.

7.He also submitted that the appellant is aged 67 years and is suffering from multiple ailments and that having undergone almost twelve and half years of actual sentence, this Court may consider reducing the sentence by converting the conviction to under section 304 IPC Part II.

8.On the other hand, Mr. P.V. Dinesh, learned senior counsel appearing for the respondent-State submitted that the Trial Court and the High Court have both dealt with this aspect of the matter and have concurrently found that this was a case of culpable homicide amounting to murder. The fact that the appellant was carrying a knife and the number of assaults made by him on the deceased as also the injury would clearly show that the intention was to commit murder.

9.Having heard the learned counsels for the parties, we find it imperative to look into the evidence, witness testimonies, and injury reports to better understand and analyse the incident to see whether the culpable homicide in the present case amounts to murder or not. A meticulous analysis of the evidence on record is necessary to check whether the appellant had the intention to kill the deceased or if he can be given the benefit of reduction of sentence on the grounds pleaded in the appeal. To understand the evidence and their probative value in establishing the offence, it is necessary to look at the categorical findings of both the courts below.

FINDINGS OF THE TRIAL COURT

10.The Trial Court found appellant guilty of offences under Sections 302, 326, and 324, IPC. The Trial Court’s findings were primarily based on the direct testimony of PW1, an eyewitness who was also injured in the incident, and corroborative evidence from medical and forensic reports.

11.The evidence of PW1 was crucial to the prosecution’s case. The Trial Court carefully analyzed his testimony and found it credible, reliable, and consistent with the injuries sustained by the deceased and PW1, as recorded in the medical reports. Although the defense argued that PW1 was an interested witness and highlighted omissions and contradictions in his testimony, the Trial Court concluded that these discrepancies were minor and did not affect the core narrative. The Trial Court also noted that PW1’s statements were corroborated by PW2, who arrived at the scene shortly after the incident and observed the accused fleeing. PW2’s account was deemed trustworthy and supported the prosecution’s version.

12.The recovery of the murder weapon (a knife, marked as MO1) at the instance of appellant was a significant factor in the Trial Court’s findings. The knife was recovered under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 based on information provided by appellant during his custodial interrogation. Forensic examination confirmed that the knife bore human blood matching the deceased’s blood group. This finding provided compelling corroboration of PW1’s testimony regarding the role of Accused No. 1 in the fatal assault. Additional physical evidence, such as blood-stained sticks recovered from the crime scene, further substantiated the prosecution’s case.

13.Medical evidence also played a vital role. The postmortem report of the deceased, prepared by PW-6 (a police surgeon), confirmed that the cause of death was multiple stab injuries inflicted with a sharp-edged weapon like MO1. PW6 identified specific fatal injuries to the heart and lungs, which were consistent with the prosecution’s narrative of the assault. Similarly, the wound certificate of PW1 corroborated his account of the injuries he sustained during the attack. The Trial Court observed that the injuries detailed in the medical reports aligned with the testimonies of PW1 and PW2, reinforcing the prosecution’s case.

14.The defense attempted to argue that the incident occurred in the exercise of private defense, claiming that the accused were attacked by CPI(M) workers, including the deceased and PW1. However, the Trial Court rejected this claim, finding it unsubstantiated and improbable. The injuries on appellant, documented in the wound certificate, were deemed minor and inconsistent with the defense’s narrative of a large-scale attack. The Court concluded that the accused were the aggressors and were not entitled to claim the right of private defense.

15.Ultimately, the Trial Court held that the prosecution had proved beyond reasonable doubt that appellant intentionally caused the death of Subrahmannian and grievously injured PW1. The recovery of the murder weapon, corroborative forensic and medical evidence, and the reliable testimony of PW1 and PW2 were central to this conclusion. Accordingly, appellant was convicted under Sections 302, 326, and 324 IPC and sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder charge, along with additional terms for the other offenses.

FINDINGS OF THE HIGH COURT

16.The High Court of Kerala meticulously analyzed the roles and culpability of each accused based on the evidence presented during the trial. The findings highlight the distinct involvement of each accused in the crime, with a particular focus on the actions of appellant. This comprehensive assessment ensures that the degree of liability is proportionate to their individual actions and intentions as discerned from the evidence on record.

17.The High Court affirmed the findings of the Trial Court that Accused No. 1 played a pivotal role in the murder. The evidence of PW-1, an injured eyewitness, was central to establishing the sequence of events. PW-1 testified that appellant first beat the deceased with a wooden stick, causing injuries to his left shoulder. When the deceased tried to flee, appellant – accused no. 1 drew the knife and inflicted a stab wound to his back. As PW-1 intervened to protect the deceased, appellant–turned on him, stabbing him in the buttock. This act of aggression was corroborated by medical evidence, which indicated that PW-1 sustained injuries consistent with the use of the weapon recovered during the investigation. Despite PW-1’s injuries, appellant resumed his attack on the deceased, stabbing him multiple times in the chest and other vital areas.

18.The High Court emphasized the significance of the post-mortem report, which revealed eight incised wounds on the deceased, including fatal injuries to the chest, heart, and lungs. PW-6, the police surgeon, testified that these injuries were consistent with the knife recovered and that the fatal wounds were sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. The chemical analysis linking the knife to appellant was further corroborated by the presence of human blood matching the deceased’s blood group on the weapon. The recovery of the knife, facilitated by a disclosure statement from appellant, lent further credence to the prosecution’s case.

19.The High Court also addressed the appellant’s argument that the testimony of PW-1 was unreliable due to alleged embellishments regarding the number of stab injuries. The Court rejected this contention, noting that minor omissions in the First Information Statement (FIS) could not undermine the credibility of PW-1’s account, especially given the traumatic circumstances under which the FIS was recorded. The court reasoned that PW-1, having sustained a stab injury himself, may not have been able to provide exhaustive details at the time but consistently identified appellant – accused no. 1 as the primary assailant. The testimony of PW-2, an independent eyewitness, corroborated PW-1’s account, further strengthening the prosecution’s case against appellant.

20.The High Court concluded that the actions of appellant demonstrated clear intent to cause death. The deliberate targeting of vital organs with a sharp weapon indicated premeditation or, at the very least, the formation of intent during the incident. The court observed that while the altercation may have initially involved the use of sticks, appellant’s decision to escalate the violence by drawing and using a knife was an intentional and unilateral act. This conduct set him apart from the other accused, whose actions were limited to assaulting the victims with sticks.

21.In contrast, accused nos. 2 and 3 were found guilty of lesser offenses under Section 326 IPC for causing grievous hurt to PW-1. The evidence established that they used sticks to beat PW-1, resulting in non-fatal injuries, including a fracture to his leg. The High Court concurred with the Trial Court’s finding that there was insufficient evidence to prove that Accused Nos. 2 and 3 shared a common intention with appellant to commit murder. The court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that they were aware of the knife concealed by appellant or his intent to use it. This lack of knowledge precluded the application of Section 34, IPC to hold them vicariously liable for the murder.

22.The High Court underscored the principle that liability must be determined based on the specific actions and intentions of each accused. While accused nos. 2 and 3 were complicit in the assault, their participation did not extend to the homicidal attack perpetrated by accused no. 1. The court further noted that the initial assault with sticks did not indicate a pre-arranged plan to kill the deceased. Had there been such an intention, the attack would have begun with the use of the knife rather than sticks.

23.The High court also dismissed the appellant’s plea for leniency based on parity with the co-accused. It emphasized that the role of appellant was materially different and far more culpable than that of accused Nos. 2 and 3. The fatal injuries inflicted by appellant on the deceased were deliberate, targeted, and intended to cause death, whereas the actions of the co-accused were confined to non-fatal assaults on PW-1. The principle of parity, therefore, did not apply in this case.

24.The High Court upheld the conviction of appellant under Section 302 IPC for the murder of Subrahmannian. The court noted that the evidence against him was overwhelming, including eyewitness testimonies, medical reports, and forensic findings. The sentences imposed on Accused Nos. 2 and 3 under Section 326 IPC were also affirmed, as they appropriately reflected their limited roles in the incident.

FINDINGS ON THE GROUNDS FOR REDUCTION OF SENTENCE

25.SCUFFLE AND LACK OF INTENT: The appellant’s counsel has argued that the incident arose out of a scuffle between two rival factions, during which the act of stabbing and killing the deceased was not premeditated but rather occurred spontaneously in the heat of the moment. According to the appellant, there was no deliberate intent to commit murder, and the unfortunate event resulted from a confrontation that escalated during the altercation. However, this submission has been closely examined and dismissed by both the Trial Court and the High Court, based on substantial evidence presented during the proceedings.

A.Fatal Injuries:

25.1The severity of the injuries inflicted on the deceased has been central to the Courts’ conclusion that the act qualifies as murder under Section 300 of the IPC. As per the post-mortem report, the deceased sustained both external and internal ante-mortem injuries that were identified as being inflicted by a sharp-edged knife. These injuries, detailed in the Trial Court’s order, include multiple incised penetration wounds to vital regions such as the chest, rib cage, lungs, and heart.

25.2The evidence of PW-6, the police surgeon who conducted the post-mortem examination, was instrumental in establishing the fatal nature of the injuries. He testified that the death resulted from multiple injuries, including several incised wounds caused by the knife recovered during the investigation. The injuries sustained by the deceased, as per the report, were as follows:

External Antemortem Injuries:

1.(a) Incised wound 4x2x0.5cm involving back of right side of head, horizontal, upper inner end at 2 cm below occiput and 2 cm outer to midline back, with tapering ends.

2.Incised penetrating wound 12x3x1-2cm involving top and back of left shoulder, extending vertically downwards and backwards, upper inner end at 17 cm outer to mid line front and on top of shoulder.

3.(a) Incised penetrating wound (stab wounds) 3x2x3.5cm involving front of left chest, oblique, upper end near to midline front than lower, upper inner end at 12 cm outer to midline front and II cm below middle of collar bone, directed downwards. backwards and right wards, with tapering ends, and contusion of margins.

4.(a) Incised penetrating wound (stab wound) 2x1.5x3.5cm including · front of right chest, oblique, upper end away from midline front than lower end, upper inner end at 10 cm outer to midline front and 17 cm below middle of collar bone, directed downwards, backwards and leftwards, with tapering ends and contusion of margins.

5.Incised wound 2x0.8x0.5cm involving dorsum of left hand at the root of middle finger.

Internal Antemortem Injuries:

1. (b)Contusions of scalp 17x10 em involving front half and 5x3cm involving right side of back. Inter one is. under neath and around the injury No. 1-(a).

2. (b) (i)contusion 23x9cm involving left front chest wall upper inner end at collar bone and in midline front.

(ii)Incised penetrating wound 8x0.5x I cm involving left front chest wall (rib cage and inter costal muscles), oblique, which penetrates into chest cavity, with fracture separation of 3rd and 4th ribs and contusion of edges the upper inner end at I 0 cm outer to midline front and 9 cm below middle of collar bone.

(iii)Incised penetrating wound 7x2x1.5 em involving left atrium and upper part of left ventricle of heart, which penetrates through entire thickness of antero lateral wall into cavity, tearing mitral valve leaflets, with contusion at the edges of the wound.

(iv)Laceration of left lung 4xlx0.5cm involving outer aspect of upper lobe and 2x2x0.5cm including outer aspect · of lower lobe and contusion 6x3 cm involving outer aspect of lower lobe just below the previous injury

Injury No. 3 (b) is underneath and corresponds with and continuation of injury no. (3) (a), and total depth of both injuries taken together is 6 cm.

4. (b) (i)Contusion 10x7 cm involving right front chest wall upper inner end at 13 cm belowcollar bone and in midline front.

(ii)Incised penetrating wound 4x2x2cm involving right front chest wall (rib cage and intercostale muscles), oblique, penetrates into the chest cavity, with fracture separation of 5th rib, the upper inner end at 9 cm outer to midline front and 20 cm below middle of collar bone, with contusion of edges.

(iii)Laceration of right lung 2x1x0.5 cm involving outer aspect of middle lobe.

Injury No. (4) (b) is underneath, corresponds with and continuation of injury No. (4) (a) and the total depth of both injuries taken together is 5 cm.

25.3Among the injuries, some were specifically identified as fatal, including:

i.Penetrating wounds to the chest and rib cage. These injuries caused significant trauma to the internal organs, including the lungs and heart.

ii.Laceration of the heart. The most critical injury involved a penetrating wound measuring 7x2x1.5 cm in the left atrium and the upper part of the left ventricle, which extended through the entire thickness of the anterolateral wall of the heart. This injury also tore the mitral valve leaflets and caused contusions at the edges of the wound. The medical expert opined that this particular injury was sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Additionally, other injuries inflicted on the deceased were of such severity that they compounded the fatal outcome.

25.4This Court held in Virsa Singh vs. State of Pepsu,3 that to see whether the injury intended and thus caused by the accused was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death or not, it must be examined in each case on the basis of the facts and circumstances. In that case, the injury was caused with a knife blow to the stomach and it was inflicted with such force that the knife penetrated the abdomen of the deceased and caused injuries to the bowel. The expert opinion of the doctor therein stated on record that such an injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. Further, in the absence of any evidence or circumstances to prove that the injury was accidental or unintentional, it was presumed that the accused had intended to cause such injury, thus making it fall under clause 3 of Section, 300 IPC.

25.5It has been held by this Court in several cases such as Manubhai Atabhai vs. State of Gujarat,4 and Arun Nivalaji More vs. State of Maharashtra,5 that when the ocular evidence of eye witnesses are reliable and well corroborated by medical, and other evidence also inspires the confidence that the accused had the intention to cause such fatal injuries, then such evidence is enough to prove the charge of murder beyond reasonable doubt. This intention is to be gathered from a number of circumstances and evidence like the place of injury the nature of the weapon, the force applied while inflicting the injury, and other such considerations. Whether the accused had any intention to kill the deceased has to be judged upon taking into consideration the facts of each case.

25.6This position has been elaborated by this Court in the case of Nishan Singh vs. State of Punjab,6 where the accused person had snatched the weapon carried by someone else and brutally inflicted injuries on the deceased. The Court stated that in such a case it cannot be said that he did not have the intention to cause death.

25.7The prosecution established beyond doubt that these injuries were inflicted by the appellant–accused no. 1 using a knife, which was recovered during the investigation based on the appellant’s disclosure statement. PW-18, the Investigating Officer, corroborated this recovery, and the seizure report was further attested by PW-16, an independent witness. Further, the doctor PW-6 has stated that these injuries are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature. Cross-examination of these witnesses did not reveal any inconsistencies that could undermine the credibility of the evidence. Consequently, the courts have rightly concluded that the fatal injuries inflicted by the appellant were the direct cause of the deceased’s death.

B.Intention to Commit Murder

25.8The appellant’s primary defence has been the absence of intent to commit murder. However, intent can be inferred from the circumstances surrounding the act, including the nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the weapon used, and the actions of the appellant during the incident. The injuries were concentrated on the vital parts of the deceased’s body, such as the chest and ribs, which house critical organs like the heart and lungs. The deliberate targeting of these areas indicates a clear intent to cause harm that could lead to death. According to the testimony of the injured eyewitness, the appellant stabbed the deceased with considerable force, further corroborating the prosecution’s argument that the injuries were inflicted intentionally or at least with the knowledge of their natural consequence. While other co-accused were reportedly armed with sticks, the appellant–accused no. 1 was in possession of a sharp knife, which was used to inflict severe injuries. The decision to carry and use such a weapon during the scuffle reflects a readiness to escalate violence beyond a mere physical altercation. Even if the appellant did not have a prior intention to murder the deceased, the circumstances demonstrate that such injuries were caused which were sufficient in the ordinary course to cause death. The deliberate act of stabbing vital parts of the body, coupled with the force used, indicates that the appellant must have been aware of the likely fatal consequences of his actions. Under the provisions of Section 300 IPC, an intention to cause such injuries that are sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death qualifies as murder, and even if ingredients other than intention to cause murder are proved, mere knowledge of the result of fatal actions is enough to ascribe culpability to the accused person.

25.9The lower courts have also dismissed the appellant’s argument that the act was not premeditated. While the attack may not have been planned in advance, intent can emerge in the heat of the moment, particularly during a violent confrontation. The appellant’s decision to use a lethal weapon and the precise targeting of the victim’s vital organs are sufficient to establish the requisite intent for murder or at least knowledge of the possible consequences of one’s actions and to hold the appellant liable for death of the deceased as per clause 3 of Section 300, IPC.

25.10This Court held in Virsa Singh (Supra), that the prosecution must prove that there was an intention to inflict that particular injury, that is to say that the injury was not accidental or unintentional or that some other kind of injury was intended, and that particular injury was sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

25.11The third clause of section 300 speaks of an intention to cause bodily injury which is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. This Court in the above-mentioned judgment held that to bring the case under this part of the section the prosecution must establish objectively:

1.That a bodily injury is present;

2.That the nature of injury must be proved;

3.It must be proved that there was an intention to inflict that particular bodily injury;

4.That the injury inflicted is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of the nature.

25.12The Court further held that:

“13. Once these four elements are established by the prosecution (and, of course, the burden is on the prosecution throughout) the offence is murder under S. 300, “Thirdly. It does not matter that there was no intention to cause death. It does not matter that there was no intention even to cause an injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature (not that there is any real distinction between the two). It does not even matter that there is no knowledge that an act of that kind will be likely to cause death. Once the intention to cause the bodily injury actually found to be present is proved, the rest of the enquiry is purely objective and the only question is whether, as a matter of purely objective inference, the injury is sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death. No one has a licence to run around inflicting injuries that are sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature and claim that they are not guilty of murder. If they inflict injuries of that kind, they must face the consequences; and they can only escape if it can be shown, or reasonably deduced that the injury was accidental or otherwise unintentional.”

25.13This position has further been upheld by this Court recently in the case of Vinod Kumar vs. Amritpal,7 wherein the bench observed that:

“24. Once the prosecution establishes the existence of the three ingredients forming a part of “thirdly” in Section 300, it is irrelevant whether there was an intention on the part of the accused to cause death. Further, it does not matter that there was no intention even to cause the injury of a kind that is sufficient to cause death in ordinary course of nature. Even the knowledge that an act of that kind is likely to cause death is not necessary to attract “thirdly”.”

25.14This Court in the case of Balkar Singh vs. State of Uttarakhand,8 while following the judgment in Virsa Singh (Supra) further elaborated the position of law and laid down that culpable homicide is murder if two conditions are fulfilled:

a.the act which caused death is done with the intention of causing death or is done with the intention of causing a bodily injury; and

b.the injury intended to be inflicted in sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause death.

25.15The Court in the above-mentioned judgment clarified that even if the intention of accused was limited to inflicting a bodily injury sufficient to cause death in the ordinary course of nature, the offence of murder would still be made out.

25.16The third clause of Section 300, IPC defines murder as the act of causing death by causing such bodily injury as is likely to result in death in the ordinary course of nature. In the present case, the appellant’s actions satisfy these criteria. The appellant was armed with a knife, which he used to inflict multiple injuries on vital organs. The fatal nature of these injuries, as confirmed by medical evidence, and the circumstances of the attack clearly point to an intent to cause death or at least an intention to inflict injuries with the knowledge that they were likely to result in death. Even if it is presumed that the appellant – accused no. 1 did not have an intention to cause such bodily injury, the act of causing injuries with knife to vital parts is reflective of the knowledge that causing such injuries is likely to cause death in the ordinary course.

25.17The defence’s argument that the incident was a spontaneous scuffle does not absolve the appellant of liability. While the scuffle may have triggered the attack, the appellant’s use of a lethal weapon and the manner in which the injuries were inflicted elevate the act from culpable homicide to murder. Courts have consistently held that intent can be inferred from the nature and severity of injuries, as well as the choice of weapon and the manner of its use. The use of a lethal weapon and the deliberate targeting of vital parts of the body are strong indicators of such intent.

25.18In light of the evidence and the legal principles involved, the appellant’s plea for leniency on the grounds of spontaneity and lack of premeditation cannot be sustained. The nature and location of the injuries inflicted, the choice of weapon, and the circumstances of the attack unequivocally establish the liability of the appellant for causing the death of Subrahmannian. The argument that the act was committed in the spur of the moment does not diminish the gravity of the offence or the appellant’s culpability.

26.Plea of Private Defence: The appellant’s counsel has invoked the right of private defence arguing that the act of stabbing was carried out under a perceived threat to the appellant–accused no. 1’s life. It is further contended that the appellant exceeded the bounds of lawful defence, thereby bringing the act within the ambit of Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, which reads:

“Culpable homicide is not murder if the offender, in the exercise of good faith of the right of private defence of person or property, exceeds the power given to him by law and causes the death of the person against whom he is exercising such right.”

26.1To bring the appellant’s act under section 304, IPC in light of the offence being committed in exercise of private defense and thereby exceeding the power given under the law, that is under exception 2 to section 300, IPC – the ingredients therein must be proved. The ingredients for this exception are:

1.The accused must be free from fault in bringing about the encounter;

2.There must be an impending peril to life or of great bodily harm, either real or apparent;

3.Injuries received by the accused;

4.The injuries caused by the accused;

5.The accused did not have time or opportunity to take recourse to public authorities.

26.2This Court in Darshan Singh v. State of Punjab,9 held that the law provides for the right of private defense to citizens to enable them to protect themselves when confronted with imminent danger or unlawful aggression. But such protection must not be misused or extend beyond the necessities of the case.

26.3The counsel for the appellant has argued that the appellant acted under a genuine belief of impending harm. However, this argument falls short upon scrutiny of the injuries sustained by the appellant during the altercation. As per the wound certificate, the appellant suffered only minor injuries:

i.A contusion on the back of the buttock.

ii.An abrasion over the forehead.

26.4The medical evidence confirms that these injuries were superficial and did not pose any real or imminent threat to the appellant’s life or safety. The courts below have rightly concluded that the appellant’s perception of danger was neither reasonable nor proportional to the force he employed in response. It is a settled position of law that the number of injuries on the accused side by itself may not be sufficient to establish right of private defense, as has been held by this Court in V. Subramani vs. State of Tamil Nadu.10 But it has further been held that an overall view of the case has to be taken to check whether a case for private defense is made out from the evidence on record.

26.5Even if the appellant claims to have acted in defense, his role in bringing about the altercation cannot be overlooked. The appellant cannot benefit from the exception when he was instrumental in creating the circumstances that led to the confrontation. It has been held in the case of Sone Lal vs. State of U.P.,11 that when the aggressors, even if they receive injuries from the victims of their aggression, cannot have the right of private defence. The courts below have made a categorical finding that the appellant–accused no.1 and his co-accused were the aggressors in the altercation. The attack was initiated by the accused group, who were armed with sticks and a knife, with the intent to intimidate or harm the victim and his companions. This fact is substantiated by the testimony of PW-1, an injured eyewitness, who described the sequence of events leading up to the stabbing. Even if it were assumed that the appellant–accused no. 1 acted in self-defense, the evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that the force used was excessive and disproportionate. The act of stabbing the deceased multiple times in vital organs such as the chest and heart goes far beyond what is permissible under the right of private defense.

26.6As noted in the post-mortem report and corroborated by the testimony of PW-6 (the police surgeon), the injuries inflicted on the deceased were severe and intentional, including a fatal wound to the heart. The appellant’s actions cannot be justified as a defensive response to the minor injuries he sustained.

26.7In light of the above findings, the plea of exceeding the right of private defense under Exception 2 to Section 300, IPC, is not applicable to the appellant’s case. The courts below have rightly rejected this argument, holding that the appellant was not under any imminent peril and that his actions were deliberate and excessive.

27.Parity with Other Accused Persons:

27.1The appellant has further contended that his sentence should be reduced on the grounds of parity with his co-accused. It is argued that since one co-accused had his sentence reduced, and another was acquitted by this Court, the appellant should be afforded similar leniency. The appellant is seeking similar leniency on the ground that the circumstances and involvement of all accused were substantially similar.

27.2The doctrine of parity ensures fairness in sentencing when co-accused persons are similarly situated and share the same level of culpability. However, parity is not an automatic entitlement; the role, intent, and actions of each accused must be individually assessed to determine their degree of involvement in the crime.

27.3The evidence presented during the trial clearly establishes that the appellant played a distinct and more culpable role in the incident. While the co-accused were armed with sticks and caused non-fatal injuries to the victims, the appellant alone was armed with a knife and used it to inflict fatal injuries on the deceased. The testimony of PW-1 reveals that the appellant stabbed the deceased after his stick was snatched during the altercation. This sequence of events demonstrates a deliberate escalation by the appellant, who resorted to using a deadly weapon with the intent to cause grievous harm.

27.4Nothing has been brought on record to show that the other accused persons had knowledge of appellant being in possession of the knife. Thus, there is no evidence to show that the other accused persons shared a common intention with the appellant to commit murder. The courts below have meticulously analyzed the evidence and concluded that the co-accused did not share a common intention to commit murder. While the group acted in concert to assault the victims, the fatal stabbing by the appellant was an independent and unilateral act. This finding is crucial in distinguishing the appellant’s culpability from that of his co-accused. The absence of common intention among the co-accused precludes the application of vicarious liability under Section 34, IPC, for the act of murder.

27.5The sentence of Accused No. 2 was reduced from six years to three years on the grounds that he caused only grievous hurt with a stick and did not participate in the stabbing and was also unaware of the knife in possession of appellant. Accused no.3 was given the benefit of doubt and was acquitted due to lack of evidence linking him to the assault.

27.6The courts have carefully evaluated the evidence against each accused and tailored their sentences accordingly. The appellant’s argument for parity fails to recognize the qualitative differences in their roles and the gravity of their actions. The appellant’s actions were not only more severe but also demonstrated a clear intent to cause death. The fatal injuries inflicted on the deceased, as detailed in the post-mortem report, leave no room for doubt about the appellant – accused no. 1’s culpability. The courts below have correctly observed that the appellant’s role in the crime is incomparable to that of his co-accused.

27.7The principle of parity does not apply in the present case, as the appellant’s actions were materially different from those of his co-accused. The sentence imposed on the appellant reflects the gravity of his offense and his individual culpability.

28.Plea of old age and deteriorating health:

28.1Another ground taken by the appellant for reduction in sentence is that he is a senior citizen and has severe health concerns necessitating continuous treatment and physiotherapy. This Court had once previously granted interim bail to the appellant on medical grounds owing to the fact that he had suffered a stroke and partial paralysis as a result.

28.2The Court is cognizant of the appellant’s advanced age and deteriorating medical condition, considerations that warrant a humane and compassionate approach to justice. These factors, when presented in cases of serious offences, often invite the judiciary to weigh individual circumstances against the broader interest of justice. However, the Court is also tasked with balancing these personal hardships against the severity and nature of the offence, as well as its impact on the rule of law and societal harmony.

28.3In the present case, the appellant has been convicted of murder, committed in the course of a group attack fueled by political rivalry. The act was not one of sudden provocation or impulse but arose from a premeditated and collective intent to harm the victim, even if the initial intention was to cause hurt. The evidence unequivocally establishes that the appellant actively participated in the attack, which culminated in the brutal stabbing of the victim in vital parts of the body, leading to his death. Such an act, carried out with the clear objective to eliminate the victim, underscores its heinous nature and deliberate execution.

28.4While this Court has carefully considered the appellant’s plea for leniency on account of old age and a medical condition, these factors alone cannot absolve or mitigate the responsibility for a crime of this magnitude. A murder committed with the intent to target vital organs, particularly in a group setting, reflects a level of intent and cruelty that demands an appropriate punitive response. To reduce the sentence in such a case would risk undermining the seriousness of the crime and the sanctity of life itself, principles that the judicial system is duty-bound to uphold.

28.5Furthermore, the offence occurred in a context of political rivalry, a factor that exacerbates its gravity. Crimes rooted in such motives often have far-reaching consequences beyond the immediate loss of life, contributing to social unrest and weakening public confidence in the rule of law. The Court must therefore ensure that its decisions reinforce the principle of accountability and deter the recurrence of such violent acts, particularly those that disrupt public order. The medical evidence, corroborated by eyewitness testimony and the recovery of the weapon, leaves no room for doubt. While the Court acknowledges the appellant’s advanced age and medical condition, these factors cannot outweigh the need for justice and the imperative to uphold the rule of law.

28.6In light of the above, while we empathize with the appellant’s personal circumstances, we find no compelling justification to interfere with the sentence imposed by the lower Court. The nature of the offence, its deliberate execution, and its societal implications necessitate that the punishment reflects the seriousness of the crime.

29.Lastly, once conviction under Section 302 of IPC is confirmed by all the Courts, then the minimum sentence is imprisonment for life, as provided under the provision itself. Thus, no ground or reason for granting a lesser sentence arises. When the minimum sentence itself is life imprisonment, then grounds like parity, leniency, old age, health concerns, etc. shall not be of any aid to the accused while seeking reduction of sentence. Therefore, the appellant herein has been granted the minimum sentence for committing the offence of murder.

30.After thoroughly examining the appellant’s submissions and the evidence presented in the case, the Court concludes that the appeal against conviction and the request for a reduction in sentence are without merit. The findings of both the Trial Court and the High Court are well-founded and supported by compelling evidence.

31.The courts below have rightly concluded that the appellant’s actions amount to murder under Section 300, IPC and thus punishable under Section 302, IPC. Accordingly, the appeal for reduction of the sentence is dismissed. The conviction and sentence are upheld.

Result of the case: Appeal dismissed.

1 IPC

2 CrPC

3 [1958] SCR 1495

4 [2007] 7 SCR 1115 : (2007) 10 SCC 358

5 [2006] Supp. 4 SCR 301 : (2006) 12 SCC 613

6 [2008] 4 SCR 500 : (2008) 17 SCC 505

7 [2021] 11 SCR 954 : (2021) 19 SCC 181

8 [2009] 5 SCR 242 : (2009) 15 SCC 366

9 [2010] 1 SCR 642 : (2010) 2 SCC 333

10 [2005] 2 SCR 536 : (2005) 10 SCC 358

11 [1981] 3 SCR 352 : (1981) 2 SCC 531