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Saturday, May 4, 2024

Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.67, 67A – Penal Code, 1860 – s.292 – “obscenity” – Test for – Complaint filed that Season 1, Episode 5 of the web-series ‘College Romance’, titled ‘Happily F****d Up’, had vulgar and obscene language in its title and various portions constituting offence inter alia u/ss.292, 294, 509, Penal Code, 1860 and ss.67, 67A, IT Act – High Court dismissed the petition filed by appellants (actors, creators etc. of the web-series) for quashing the orders of ACMM and ASJ directing registration of FIR against them, and directed registration of FIR u/ss.67 and 67A, IT Act – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1147 : 2024 INSC 223

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc.

v.

State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1694-1695 of 2024)

19 March 2024

[A.S. Bopanna and Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the use of expletives and profane language in the titles

and content of the episodes of the web-series ‘College Romance’

constitutes an offence of publication and transmission of obscene

and sexually explicit content u/ss.67 and 67A of the Information

Technology Act, 2000.

Headnotes

Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.67, 67A – Penal Code,

1860 – s.292 – “obscenity” – Test for – Complaint filed that

Season 1, Episode 5 of the web-series ‘College Romance’,

titled ‘Happily F****d Up’, had vulgar and obscene language

in its title and various portions constituting offence inter alia

u/ss.292, 294, 509, Penal Code, 1860 and ss.67, 67A, IT Act –

High Court dismissed the petition filed by appellants (actors,

creators etc. of the web-series) for quashing the orders of

ACMM and ASJ directing registration of FIR against them,

and directed registration of FIR u/ss.67 and 67A, IT Act –

Correctness:

Held: High Court purportedly applied the community standard

test – However, it incorrectly framed the question for inquiry as to

whether the language employed in the episode was contemporarily

used by the youth and whether it met the threshold of decency

– Enquiry u/s.292, IPC or under s.67, IT Act does not hinge on

whether the language or words are decent, or whether they are

commonly used in the country – Rather, the inquiry is to determine

whether the content is lascivious, appeals to prurient interests, or

tends to deprave and corrupt the minds of those in whose hands

it is likely to fall – High Court found that the language was full of

swear words, profanities, and vulgar expletives that could not be

heard in open court and held that the content was obscene as

it would affect and tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable 

1148 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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minds – Specific material which it found to be obscene, was “foul,

indecent and profane” language – High Court equated profanities

and vulgarity with obscenity, without undertaking a proper or

detailed analysis into how such language, by itself, could be sexual,

lascivious, prurient, or depraving and corrupting – Vulgarity and

profanities do not per se amount to obscenity – Obscenity relates

to material that arouses sexual and lustful thoughts, which is not

at all the effect of the abusive language or profanities employed

in the episode – While the literal meaning of the terms used may

be sexual in nature and refer to sexual acts, their usage does not

arouse sexual feelings or lust in any viewer of ordinary prudence

and common sense – Rather, the common usage of these words

is reflective of emotions of anger, rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps

excitement – By taking the literal meaning of these words, High

Court failed to consider the specific material (profane language)

in the context of the larger web-series and by the standard of an

“ordinary man of common sense and prudence” – When the use

of such language is noticed in the context of the plot and theme of

the web-series, a light-hearted show on the college lives of young

students, it is clear that the use of these terms was not related

to sex and did not have any sexual connotation – Neither did the

creator of the web-series intend for the language to be taken in its

literal sense nor is that the impact on a reasonable viewer – There

was a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court

in analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity

– Standard for determination cannot be an adolescent’s or child’s

mind, or a hypersensitive person susceptible to such influences –

High Court incorrectly used the standard of “impressionable minds”

to gauge the effect of the material and thus erred in applying the

test for obscenity correctly – No offence made out u/ss.67, 67A, IT

Act – Judgment of High Court set aside – FIR registered against

appellants u/ss.67 and 67A, IT Act, quashed. [Paras 33-35, 37,

39, 48 and 49]

Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.67 – Penal Code, 1860

– s.292 – “obscenity” defined in s.292 and s.67 – Difference:

Held: “Obscenity” has been similarly defined in s.292 and s.67

as material which is lascivious; or appeals to the prurient interest;

or its effect tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely,

having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear

the matter contained or embodied in it – However, the difference

between them is only that s.67 is a special provision that applies 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1149

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

when the obscene material is published or transmitted in the

electronic form – Since, in the present case, the alleged offending

material is a web-series, the case is considered u/s.67, IT Act but

the same test for obscenity as laid down u/s.292 will apply since

the provisions are similarly worded in that respect. [Para 12]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.292 – “Obscenity” – Material if obscene

– Process and method to objectively judge – Discussed.

Information Technology Act, 2000 – s.67A – ‘sexually explicit

act or conduct’ – s.67A when not attracted:

Held: Facts of the present case do not attract s.67A as the

complainant’s grievance was about excessive usage of vulgar

expletives, swear words, and profanities – There was no allegation

of any ‘sexually explicit act or conduct’ in the complaint and as

such, s.67A does not get attracted – High Court did not give any

reason whatsoever on how s.67A was attracted to the facts of

the present case – Offence of s.67A not made out. [Para 45, 46]

Penal Code, 1860 – s.292 – “Obscenity” – Hicklin test;

“Community Standard Test” – Discussed – Precedents on

s.292 traced.

Information Technology Act, 2000 – ss.67A, 67 – “explicit”,

“act”, “conduct” – ‘obscenity’:

Held: s.67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to

publish or transmit in electronic form any material that contains

sexually explicit act or conduct – Though the three expressions

“explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable

of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen

in the context of ‘obscenity’ as provided in s.67 – Thus, there

could be a connect between s.67A and s.67 itself – For example,

there could be sexually explicit act or conduct which may not

be lascivious – Equally, such act or conduct might not appeal

to prurient interests – On the contrary, a sexually explicit act or

conduct presented in an artistic or a devotional form may have

exactly the opposite effect, rather than tending to deprave and

corrupt a person. [Para 47]

Case Law Cited

Sharat Babu Digumarti v. Government (NCT of Delhi)

[2016] 8 SCR 1015 : (2017) 2 SCC 18 : 2016 INSC

1131; Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal [2014] 2 

1150 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

SCR 263 : (2014) 4 SCC 257 : 2014 INSC 75; Samaresh

Bose v. Amal Mitra [1985] Suppl. 3 SCR 17 : (1985)

4 SCC 289 : 1985 INSC 205; Bobby Art International

v. Om Pal Singh Hoon [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 136 :

(1996) 4 SCC 1 : 1996 INSC 595; K.A. Abbas v. Union

of India [1971] 2 SCR 446 : (1970) 2 SCC 780 : 1970

INSC 200; Ramesh s/o Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India

[1988] 2 SCR 1011 : (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 INSC

44; Sakshi v. Union of India [2004] Suppl. 2 SCR 723 :

(2004) 5 SCC 518 : 2004 INSC 383; Sanjay Dutt v.

State through CBI, Bombay (II) [1994] Suppl. 3 SCR

263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 INSC 371; Girdhari Lal

Gupta v. D.H. Mehta (1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1970 INSC

164; Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar [2003] Suppl. 1

SCR 597 : (2003) 6 SCC 516 : 2003 INSC 320; US

Technologies International (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner

of Income Tax [2023] 4 SCR 382 : (2023) 8 SCC 24 :

2023 INSC 329; Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar

v. State of Maharashtra [2015] 7 SCR 853 : (2015) 6

SCC 1 : 2015 INSC 414; Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of

Maharashtra [1965] 1 SCR 65 : AIR 1965 SC 881, 1964

INSC 171; Shri Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v.

State of Maharashtra [1970] 2 SCR 80 : (1969) 2 SCC

687 : 1969 INSC 202; Director General, Directorate

General of Doordarshan v. Anand Patwardhan [2006]

Suppl. 5 SCR 403 : (2006) 8 SCC 433 : 2006 INSC

558; Ajay Goswami v. Union of India [2006] Suppl.

10 SCR 770 : (2007) 1 SCC 143 : 2006 INSC 995; S.

Khushboo v. Kanniammal [2010] 5 SCR 322 : (2010) 5

SCC 600 : 2010 INSC 247; N. Radhakrishnan v. Union

of India [2018] 11 SCR 1 : (2018) 9 SCC 725 : 2018

INSC 784; NS Madhanagopal v. K. Lalitha [2022] 15

SCR 649 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2030 : 2022 INSC

1323 – referred to.

Vijesh v. State of Kerala 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 854;

Pramod Anand Dhumal v. State of Maharashtra (2021)

SCC OnLine Bom 34; Majeesh K. Mathew v. State of

Kerala 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 23374; Ritesh Sidhwani

v. State of U.P. 2021 SCC OnLine All 856; Jaykumar

Bhagwanrao Gore v. State of Maharashtra 2017 SCC

OnLine Bom 7283; G. Venkateswara Rao v. State of

AP Writ Petition 1420 of 2020; Jaykumar Bhagwanrao 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1151

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

Gore v. State of Maharashtra 2017 SCC OnLine Bom

7283; Pramod Anand Dhumal v. State of Maharashtra

2021 SCC OnLine Bom 34; Ekta Kapoor v. State of

MP 2020 SCC OnLine MP 4581 – referred to.

Roth v. United States 354 US 476 (1957); R v. Butler

(1992) 1 SCR 452 – referred to.

List of Acts

Information Technology Act, 2000; Penal Code, 1860; Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973; Indecent Representation of Women

(Prohibition) Act, 1986.

List of Keywords

Web-series; Publication and transmission of obscene and sexually

explicit content; Obscenity; Expletives; Vulgar expletives; Profane

language; Profanities; Sexually explicit content; Obscene language;

Swear words, Foul indecent language; Hicklin test; “Community

standard test”; Quashing.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal Nos.

1694-1695 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.03.2023 of the High Court of

Delhi at New Delhi in CRLMC Nos. 2399 and 2215 of 2020

With

Criminal Appeal Nos. 1697, 1696 and 1698 of 2024

Appearances for Parties

K.M.Nataraj, A.S.G., Mukul Rohatgi, Sajan Poovayya, Mrs. Madhavi

Divan, Harish Salve, Sr. Advs., Ameet Naik, Mahesh Agarwal,

Ankur Saigal, Ms. Madhu Gadodiaya, Ms. S. Lakshmi Iyer, Chirag

Nayak, Ms. Sanjanthi Sajan Poovayya, Abhishek Kakker, Devansh

Srivastava, Ms. Raksha Agarwal, Ms. Kajal Dalal, E. C. Agrawala,

Ms. Madhu Gadodia, Harshvardhan Jha, Raghav Shankar, Mrs.

Yugandhara Pawar Jha, Sujoy Mukherjee, Ms. Tarini Kulkarni, Aman

Pathak, Ms. Pallavi Mishra, Shreekant Neelappa Terdal, Sharath

Nambiar, Sanjay Kr.Tyagi, Sridhar Potaraju, Ms. Nidhi Khanna,

Karthik Jasra, Dr. Arun Kumar Yadav, Arvind Singh, Advs. for the

appearing parties.

1152 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. The appellants/accused are the actors, casting director, script writers,

creator of the web-series ‘College Romance’1

, and the media company

that owns the YouTube channel on which the web-series was hosted2

.

They are sought to be investigated and prosecuted for production,

transmission, and online publication of obscene and sexually-explicit

material under Sections 67 and 67A of the Information Technology

Act, 20003

. The appellants’ petition under Section 482 of the Code of

Criminal Procedure, 19734

 for quashing the orders of the Additional

Chief Metropolitan Magistrate and Additional Sessions Judge directing

registration of FIR against them was dismissed by the High Court

by the order impugned before us.5

 Having considered the matter in

detail and for the reasons to follow, we have allowed the appeal, set

aside the judgment of the High Court, and quashed the FIR bearing

number 403/2023 dated 16.04.2023 at PS Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi

against the appellants under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act.

3. Facts: The short facts leading to filing of the present appeal are as

follows:

3.1 A complaint was filed by respondent no. 2 before the Assistant

Commissioner of Police that Season 1, Episode 5 of the webseries, titled ‘Happily F****d Up’, has vulgar and obscene

language in its title and various portions of the episode,

constituting an offence under Sections 292, 294 and 509 of the

Indian Penal Code6

, Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act, and

Sections 2(c) and 3 of the Indecent Representation of Women

1 TVF Media Labs Private Ltd.

2 Contagious Online Media Network Pvt Ltd.

3 ‘IT Act’ hereinafter.

4 ‘CrPC’ hereinafter.

5 In Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2399 of 2020, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2215 of 2020

and Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2214 of 2020, judgment dated 06.03.2023 (‘Impugned judgment’

hereinafter).

6 ‘IPC’ hereinafter.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1153

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

(Prohibition) Act, 19867

. On 13.03.2019, the complainant filed

an application under Section 200 read with Section 156(3) of

the CrPC before the ACMM seeking registration of FIR. The

Investigating Officer conducted an enquiry and filed an Action

Taken Report on 09.04.2019 stating that no cognisable offence

is made out and in fact, there is no obscenity in the allegedly

offending content.

3.2 However, the ACMM, by order dated 17.09.2019, allowed the

complainant’s application and directed the registration of an FIR

against the appellants under Sections 292 and 294 of the IPC

and Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act as the vulgar language

used is prima facie capable of appealing to prurient interests

of the audience and is hence obscene.

3.3 The appellants filed a revision petition before the Additional

Sessions Judge, who by order dated 10.11.2020 partially

modified the order of the ACMM and directed the registration

of FIR only under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act by relying

on the decision of this Court in Sharat Babu Digumarti v.

Government (NCT of Delhi)8

.

3.4 The appellants then filed a petition under Section 482 CrPC

before the High Court for quashing the above-mentioned orders,

which came to be dismissed by the judgment dated 06.03.2023,

impugned herein. Against the dismissal and the consequent

direction to register FIR under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT

Act, the present appeals are filed by all the accused/appellants.

3.5 Pursuant to the directions of the High Court, an FIR was

registered under Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act against the

appellants on 16.04.2023.

4. Reasoning of the High Court: The High Court, while dismissing the

petition for quashing, held that the object of Sections 67 and 67A of

the IT Act is to punish the publication and transmission of obscene and

sexually explicit material in the cyber space. It relied on the ‘community

standard test’ to determine whether the material is obscene, as laid

7 ‘IRWP Act’ hereinafter.

8 [2016] 8 SCR 1015 : (2017) 2 SCC 18 : 2016 INSC 1131

1154 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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down by this Court in Aveek Sarkar v. State of West Bengal 9 and

followed in decisions of various High Courts10. By applying this test, the

High Court held as follows: First, applying the standard of a common

prudent man, it found that the episode did not use civil language

and there was excessive use of profanities and vulgar expletives,

and a clear description and reference to sexually explicit acts. The

determination of how the content impacts a common man must be

determined in the Indian context, as per Indian morality, keeping in

mind contemporary standards of civility and morality.11 In the allegedly

offending portion (in Season 1, episode 5 from 5:24 to 6:40 minutes

and 25:28 to 25:46 minutes), the male protagonist in a conversation

with the female protagonist uses terms describing male and female

genitalia and sexual acts, thereby making them sexually explicit and

arousing prurient feelings. While the female protagonist is heard

objecting to the language and expressing disgust over it, she does so

by repeating the same to the male protagonist. The male protagonist

then uses more vulgar expletives and indecent language, which is

repeated by the female protagonist in a later part of the episode.

The High Court held that the depiction of a sexually explicit act is not

necessarily through filming but can also be through spoken language.

It was found that the persons who are likely to be affected or persons

whom such content can deprave or corrupt are impressionable minds

in the present case, as there is no disclaimer or warning that classifies

the web-series as being suitable only for persons who are 18 years

or above. The content crossed the threshold of decency considering

its availability to the public, including children. Further, the Court felt

that the episode could not be heard in the courtroom without shocking

or alarming the people and to maintain the decorum of language.

5. Second, a representation that the language used in the episode is the

one used in the country and by its youth in educational institutions is

not protected under the guarantee of freedom of speech under Article

19(1)(a). Third, that the online content curator and the intermediaries

9 [2014] 2 SCR 263 : (2014) 4 SCC 257 : 2014 INSC 75

10 G. Venkateswara Rao v. State of AP in Writ Petition 1420 of 2020; Jaykumar Bhagwanrao Gore v. State

of Maharashtra 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 7283; Pramod Anand Dhumal v. State of Maharashtra 2021 SCC

OnLine Bom 34; Ekta Kapoor v. State of MP 2020 SCC OnLine MP 4581, as cited in paras 23-26 of the

impugned judgment.

11 In para 37 of the impugned judgment, the High Court relied on Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra [1985]

Suppl. 3 SCR 17 : (1985) 4 SCC 289 : 1985 INSC 205 where it was held that the regard must be given

to contemporary morals and national standards in judging whether content is obscene. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1155

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

are in violation of the Information Technology (Intermediary Guidelines

and Digital Media Ethics Code) Rules, 2021 as the content has not

been correctly classified as ‘A-rated’ and there is no warning regarding

the use of profanities and expletives. Lastly, the Court took note that

vulgar language, profanities, and swear words must be regulated

in the public domain and on social media platforms as they are a

threat to impressionable minds like children of tender age. Further,

a representation that the use of such language in general parlance

is the “new normal” is a distortion of facts as it is still not spoken

in the presence of the elderly, women and children, or at religious

places. To maintain linguistic morality, the sanctity and reverence of

languages must be protected.

6. The High Court also rejected the appellants’ contention that the

mandatory procedure under Section 154(3) of the CrPC, which is

an important procedural safeguard, was not followed before resort to

Section 156(3). The High Court preliminarily negatived this submission

by holding that Section 154(3) only uses the term “may” and not

“shall”, and that the complainant anyways approached the ACP,

Cyber Cell, North District, who is the authority higher to the SHO.

7. Submissions of the Appellants: We heard Mr. Mukul Rohatgi, Mr.

Harish Salve, Ms. Madhavi Divan, Mr. Sajan Poovayya, Sr. Advocates.

Learned senior counsels for the appellants have argued that the

allegedly offending portions of Season 1, Episode 5 of the webseries do not meet the threshold for obscenity and that the High

Court has erred in characterising the material as obscene. Further,

these portions do not contain any sexually explicit act and as such

no offence under Sections 67 or 67A of the IT Act is made out.

Elaborating their submissions, the appellants’ argued:

7.1 Section 67 of the IT Act, that criminalises the publication and

transmission of obscene material in electronic form, covers

material which is lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest

or if its effect is such as to tend to deprave and corrupt persons

who are likely, having regard to all relevant circumstances, to

read, see or hear the matter contained or embodied in it. As

per Aveek Sarkar (supra), the determination of whether some

material is obscene must be made by the ‘community standard

test’ by considering the work as a whole and then looking at

the specific material that has been alleged to be obscene in 

1156 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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the context of the whole work. The web-series is a romantic

comedy that traces the life of a group of friends who are in

college. Its intention is to paint a relatable picture of college life

in a cosmopolitan urban setting. There are two specific portions

that have been alleged to be obscene. The first segment is

where the male protagonist, named Bagga, indiscriminately

uses expletives that are heard by the female protagonist, named

Naira. Naira objects to the use of such language and points out

that the literal meaning of the terms is absurd. Bagga states

that these terms are not meant to be taken literally and are

a part of common parlance. Naira reiterates her disapproval

and threatens Bagga with consequences if he continues to

speak in such a manner. Bagga ‘inadvertently’ uses another

expletive, due to which Naira leaves from there. In the second

segment, Naira and Bagga are with a wider group of friends

where Naira is incensed by the statements of another friend

and angrily uses the same expletives as Bagga, at which Bagga

is delighted. Learned senior counsel has argued that when

these scenes are considered individually and in the context of

the web-series as a whole, they are not obscene. They only

portray the absurdity of the literal meaning of these terms and

show their inevitable presence in common language, including

by those who disapprove of their use.

7.2 Relying on Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra12 and Bobby Art

International v. Om Pal Singh Hoon13, learned senior counsel

has argued that while the alleged portions are vulgar, vulgarity

does not equate to obscenity. Mere words cannot amount to

obscenity unless they involve lascivious elements that arouse

sexual thoughts and feelings, which is not the effect of the

scenes in the present case.

7.3 The effect of the words must be tested from the standard of an

“ordinary man of common sense and prudence”14, “reasonable,

strong-minded, firm and courageous” person and not from the

perspective of a hypersensitive person or a weak and vacillating

12 [1985] Suppl.. 3 SCR 17 : (1985) 4 SCC 289 : 1985 INSC 205

13 [1996] Suppl. 2 SCR 136 : (1996) 4 SCC 1 : 1996 INSC 595

14 K.A. Abbas v. Union of India [1971] 2 SCR 446 : (1970) 2 SCC 780 : 1970 INSC 200

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1157

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

mind15. The terms used in the allegedly offending portions do

not refer to any sexually explicit act and are not obscene as per

the community standard test. Therefore, no offence of obscenity

is made out under Section 67 of the IT Act.

7.4 Learned senior counsel has also argued that the scenes do

not contain any sexually explicit act or conduct, as is required

for an offence under Section 67A. Relying on various cases

by this Court,16 they argue that the words in a penal provision

must be strictly interpreted. The term ‘sexually explicit act or

conduct’ does not cover profanities/ expletives/ swear words,

even if the literal meaning of these terms refers to sexual acts.

The literal meaning is not intended through the common usage

of these words. Rather, they are an expression of emotions

such as frustration, rage, and anger.

7.5 Learned senior counsel has also relied on the 50th Standing

Committee Report on the 2006 Amendment Bill to the IT Act that

introduced the provision, and various High Court decisions,17

to argue that the intention of Section 67A is to criminalise the

publication and transmission of pornographic material that

depicts sexual acts or contains sexually explicit conduct that

falls short of actual depiction of sexual acts. Since the alleged

segments in this case only contain expletives and do not contain

any explicit visual or verbal depiction of sexual activity, there

is no offence under Section 67A.

7.6 It is of course rightly argued that the right to freedom of speech

under Article 19(1)(a) protects artistic creativity and expression.

7.7 Lastly, the learned senior counsel has argued that a higher

threshold of tolerance must apply in the present case as the

web-series is a form of “pull media”. In pull media, the consumer

15 Ramesh s/o Chotalal Dalal v. Union of India [1988] 2 SCR 1011 : (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 INSC 44

16 Sakshi v. Union of India [2004] Suppl. 2 SCR 723 : (2004) 5 SCC 518 : 2004 INSC 383; Sanjay Dutt v.

State through CBI, Bombay (II) [1994] 3 SCR 263 : (1994) 5 SCC 410 : 1994 INSC 371; Girdhari Lal

Gupta v. D.H. Mehta, (1971) 3 SCC 189 : 1970 INSC 164; Union of India v. Rajiv Kumar [2003] Suppl. 1

SCR 597 : (2003) 6 SCC 516 : 2003 INSC 320; US Technologies International (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner

of Income Tax [2023] 4 SCR 382 : (2023) 8 SCC 24 : 2023 INSC 329

17 Vijesh v. State of Kerala, 2021 SCC OnLine Ker 854; Pramod Anand Dhumal v. State of Maharashtra,

(2021) SCC OnLine Bom 34; Majeesh K. Mathew v. State of Kerala, 2018 SCC OnLine Ker 23374;

Ritesh Sidhwani v. State of U.P., 2021 SCC OnLine All 856; Jaykumar Bhagwanrao Gore v. State of

Maharashtra, 2017 SCC OnLine Bom 7283

1158 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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has more choice in deciding whether or not they wish to view

some particular content. Unlike television or radio, where

obscene material may be publicly broadcasted and there is

little to no choice to the users in terms of what content is made

available, the consumption of pull media over the internet gives

the viewer complete control and decision-making over what

they watch. Therefore, the web-series is only available and

accessible to those persons who wish to view it, and hence a

higher threshold of obscenity must be applied to “pull content”.

8. Submissions of the complainant: We have heard learned counsel Mr.

Arvind Singh, advocate-in-person, who is the complainant (respondent

no. 2). He has argued that the present case is not fit for quashing.

The alleged content of the web-series falls within the purview of

Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act and also offends Sections 3

and 4 of the Indecent Representation of Women (Prohibition) Act,

1986, which the High Court has failed to consider. Relying on the

community standard test and the judgments of this Court in Aveek

Sarkar (supra) and Devidas Ramachandra Tuljapurkar v. State of

Maharashtra18, learned counsel has argued that the abovementioned

portions of the web-series are obscene and sexually explicit. First,

the material appeals to prurient interest in sex, as determined by the

average person applying contemporary community standards. The

titles of the episodes and the plot revolves around college students

engaging in sexual activity. The content of the episodes also uses

sexually explicit language and expletives, which cannot be termed

as the “new normal”. Second, the material portrays sexual conduct

in a patently offensive way. Third, the material lacks serious literary,

artistic, political or scientific value. Fourth, the material tends to

arouse sexually impure thoughts. Fifth, the material is not in the

larger interest of public good or in the interest of art, literature,

science and therefore, the obscenity is not justified. Learned counsel

has also pointed out that the material in the present case is freely

available on the internet and is accessible to any person, including

children and hence must be regulated in the interests of public order,

morality, and decency.

9. Analysis: The central issue is whether the use of expletives and

18 [2015] 7 SCR 853 : (2015) 6 SCC 1 : 2015 INSC 414

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1159

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

profane language in the titles and content of the episodes of the

web-series ‘College Romance’ constitutes an offence of publication

and transmission of obscene and sexually explicit content under

Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act. We will examine each of these

provisions in the context of ‘obscenity’ for the purpose of Section

67 and ‘sexually explicit material’ for the purpose of Section 67A.

A. Whether the material is ‘obscene’:

10. We will first deal with the contention that the material is obscene.

Section 67 of the IT Act is as follows:

“67. Punishment for publishing or transmitting obscene

material in electronic form.–Whoever publishes or

transmits or causes to be published or transmitted in the

electronic form, any material which is lascivious or appeals

to the prurient interest or if its effect is such as to tend

to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely, having

regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or hear

the matter contained or embodied in it, shall be punished

on first conviction with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to three years and with fine

which may extend to five lakh rupees and in the event of

second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment of

either description for a term which may extend to five years

and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.”

11. This Court has laid down the meaning, test, standard, and method

for determining whether some material is obscene in the context of

Section 292 of the IPC.

12. Section 292 defines ‘obscene’ as a book, pamphlet, paper, writing,

drawing, painting, representation, figure or any other object that is

lascivious, appeals to the prurient interest, or has such effect, if

taken as a whole, that tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are

likely to read, see or hear the matter contained in it. The provision

criminalises the sale, distribution, public exhibition, circulation, import,

export, etc of obscene material. The provision excludes such material

when the publication is justified as being for public good on the

ground that it is in the interest of science, art, literature, or learning

or other objects of general concern; such material is kept or used for

bona fide religious purposes; it is sculptured, engraved, painted or 

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represented on or in ancient monuments and temples. The relevant

portion of Section 292 has been extracted for reference:

“292. Sale, etc., of obscene books, etc.—(1) For the

purposes of sub-section (2), a book, pamphlet, paper,

writing, drawing, painting, representation, figure or any

other object, shall be deemed to be obscene if it is

lascivious or appeals to the prurient interest or if its effect,

or (where it comprises two or more distinct items) the effect

of any one of its items, is, if taken as a whole, such as

to tend to deprave and corrupt persons, who are likely,

having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see

or hear the matter contained or embodied in it.”

It is evident that “obscenity” has been similarly defined in Section

292 and Section 67 as material which is:

i. lascivious; or

ii. appeals to the prurient interest; or

iii. its effect tends to deprave and corrupt persons who are likely,

having regard to all relevant circumstances, to read, see or

hear the matter contained or embodied in it.

However, the difference between them is only that Section 67 is a

special provision that applies when the obscene material is published

or transmitted in the electronic form.19 Since the alleged offending

material is a web-series, the case must be considered under Section

67 of the IT Act20 but the same test for obscenity as laid down under

Section 292 will apply since the provisions are similarly worded in that

respect. In this context we will examine how obscenity is understood.

13. Recounting the development through judicial precedents: This Court

upheld the constitutional validity of Section 292 as a reasonable

restriction on free speech and applied the Hicklin test21 to determine

whether the book ‘Lady Chatterley’s Lover’ was obscene in the

decision of Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra.22 As per the

19 Sharat Babu Digumarti (supra)

20 ibid.

21 (1868) LR 3 QB 360

22 [1965] 1 SCR 65 : AIR 1965 SC 881 : 1964 INSC 171

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1161

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

Hicklin test, a material is obscene if it has the tendency to deprave and

corrupt the minds of those who are open to such immoral influences

and into whose hands the publication is likely to fall:23

“… I think the test of obscenity is this, whether the tendency

of the matter charged as obscenity is to deprave and

corrupt those whose minds are open to such immoral

influences, and into whose hands a publication of this

sort may fall … it is quite certain that it would suggest to

the minds of the young of either sex, or even to persons

of more advanced years, thoughts of a most impure and

libidinous character.”

14. This test lays emphasis on the potentiality of the material to deprave

and corrupt by immoral influences.24 To determine this, the Court

must apply itself to consider each work at a time. It must take an

overall view of the obscene matter in the setting of the whole work

but also consider the obscene matter by itself and separately to

find out whether it is so grossly obscene and it is likely to deprave

and corrupt. A mere stray word or insignificant passage would not

suffice to qualify the material as obscene.25 The Court also clarified

that sex and nudity in art and literature cannot in and of themselves

be regarded as evidence of obscenity without something more.26

Sex must be treated in manner that is offensive to public decency

and morality, when judged by our national standards, and must be

likely to pander to lascivious, prurient, sexually precocious minds,

and appeal to or have the tendency to appeal to the “carnal side of

human nature” for it to be obscene.27

15. The Court also emphasised its role in maintaining a delicate balance

between protecting freedom of speech and artistic freedom on the

one hand, and public decency and morality on the other. It held that

when art and obscenity are mixed, the art must be so preponderating

that the obscenity is pushed into the shadows or is trivial and

23 ibid, para 14

24 ibid, para 19

25 ibid, 20, 21

26 ibid, para 16

27 ibid, paras 21 and 22

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insignificant and can be overlooked.28 Similarly, if the matter has a

preponderating social purpose and gain that overweighs the obscenity

of the content (such as medical textbooks), then such material is

constitutionally protected by freedom of speech and cannot be

criminalised as obscene.29

16. The Court followed the Hicklin test and Ranjit Udeshi (supra) in Shri

Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodkar v. State of Maharashtra30 but it

also introduced certain caveats and refined the test to some extent.

Considering the material in that case, a Marathi short story Shama,

the Court held that the story read as a whole does not amount to

pornography or pander to the prurient interest. Even if the work is

not of high literary quality and is immature and of bad taste, there

was nothing that could deprave or corrupt those in whose hands it

is likely to fall, including adolescents.31 The Court also cautioned

that the standard for the artist or the writer is not that the adolescent

mind must not be brought in contact with sex or that the work must

be expunged of all references to sex, irrespective of whether it is the

dominant theme.32 The test for obscenity was stated as: “What we

have to see is that whether a class, not an isolated case, into whose

hands the book, article or story falls suffer in their moral outlook or

become depraved by reading it or might have impure and lecherous

thoughts aroused in their minds.”

33

17. In KA Abbas v. Union of India34 the Court summarised the test and

process to determine obscenity as follows:

“(1) Treating with sex and nudity in art and literature

cannot be regarded as evidence of obscenity without

something more.

(2) Comparison of one book with another to find the

extent of permissible action is not necessary.

28 ibid, para 21

29 ibid, paras 9, 22, and 29

30 [1970] 2 SCR 80 : (1969) 2 SCC 687 : 1969 INSC 202

31 ibid, paras 9 and 10

32 ibid, para 12

33 ibid, para 12

34 (1970) 2 SCC 780, para 48

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1163

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

(3) The delicate task of deciding what is artistic and

what is obscene has to be performed by courts and

in the last resort, by the Supreme Court and so, oral

evidence of men of literature or others on the question

of obscenity is not relevant.

(4) An overall view of the obscene matter in the setting

of the whole work would of course be necessary but

the obscene matter must be considered by itself and

separately to find out whether it is so gross and its

obscenity is so decided that it is likely to deprave or

corrupt those whose minds are open to influence of

this sort and into whose hands the book is likely to fall.

(5) The interests of contemporary society and particularly

the influence of the book, etc., on it must not be

overlooked.

(6) Where obscenity and art are mixed, art must be so

preponderating as to throw obscenity into shadow or

render the obscenity so trivial and insignificant that it

can have no effect and can be overlooked.

(7) Treating with sex in a manner offensive to public

decency or morality which are the words of our

Fundamental Law judged by our national standards

and considered likely to pender to lescivious, pourlent

or sexually precocious minds must determine the

result.

(8) When there is propagation of ideas, opinions and

informations or public interests or profits, the interests

of society may tilt the scales in favour of free speech

and expression. Thus books on medical science with

intimate illustrations and photographs though in a

sense immodest, are not to be considered obscene,

but the same illustrations and photographs collected

in a book form without the medical text would certainly

be considered to be obscene.

(9) Obscenity without a preponderating social purpose or

profit cannot have the constitutional protection of free

speech or expression. Obscenity is treating with sex 

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in a manner appealing to the carnal side of human

nature or having that tendency. Such a treating with

sex is offensive to modesty and decency.

(10) Knowledge is not a part of the guilty act. The offender’s

knowledge of the obscenity of the book is not required

under the law and it is a case of strict liability.”

18. In Samaresh Bose (supra), which has been relied on by the appellants,

this Court differentiated vulgarity from obscenity. The material in

question in this case was a Bengali novel titled ‘Prajapati’. The

Court noted that while slang and unconventional words had been

used in the book along with suggestions of sexual acts, there was

no description of any overt act of sex. The words are vulgar and

create a feeling of disgust and revulsion and may shock the reader

but this does not necessarily amount to obscenity, which is the

tendency to deprave and corrupt.35 It held that the use of slang and

unconventional words; an emphasis on sex; a description of female

bodies; and narrations of feelings, thoughts and actions in vulgar

language in the novel do not render the material obscene.36 Further,

a mere reference to sex is insufficient for obscenity and does not

make a material unsuitable for adolescents.37

19. The Court also summarised the process that must be followed to

objectively assess whether some material is obscene. It held that

the judge must first place himself in the position of the author to

understand his perspective and what he seeks to convey and whether

it has any literary or artistic value. The judge must then place himself

in the position of a reader of every age group in whose hands the

book (or material) is likely to fall and determine the possible effect or

influence of the material on the minds of such persons. The relevant

portion reads:

“29. …As laid down in both the decisions of this Court

earlier referred to, “the question whether a particular article

or story or book is obscene or not does not altogether

depend on oral evidence, because it is the duty of the court

35 Samaresh Bose (supra), para 35

36 ibid, para 35

37 ibid, para 35

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1165

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

to ascertain whether the book or story or any passage or

passages therein offend the provisions of Section 292 IPC”.

In deciding the question of obscenity of any book, story or

article the court whose responsibility it is to adjudge the

question may, if the court considers it necessary, rely to an

extent on evidence and views of leading literary personage,

if available, for its own appreciation and assessment and

for satisfaction of its own conscience. The decision of the

court must necessarily be on an objective assessment of

the book or story or article as a whole and with particular

reference to the passages complained of in the book,

story or article. The court must take an overall view of

the matter complained of as obscene in the setting of

the whole work, but the matter charged as obscene must

also be considered by itself and separately to find out

whether it is so gross and its obscenity so pronounced

that it is likely to deprave and corrupt those whose minds

are open to influence of this sort and into whose hands

the book is likely to fall. Though the court must consider

the question objectively with an open mind, yet in the

matter of objective assessment the subjective attitude of

the Judge hearing the matter is likely to influence, even

though unconsciously, his mind and his decision on the

question. A Judge with a puritan and prudish outlook may

on the basis of an objective assessment of any book or

story or article, consider the same to be obscene. It is

possible that another Judge with a different kind of outlook

may not consider the same book to be obscene on his

objective assessment of the very same book. The concept

of obscenity is moulded to a very great extent by the

social outlook of the people who are generally expected

to read the book. It is beyond dispute that the concept of

obscenity usually differs from country to country depending

on the standards of morality of contemporary society in

different countries. In our opinion, in judging the question

of obscenity, the Judge in the first place should try to

place himself in the position of the author and from the

viewpoint of the author the Judge should try to understand

what is it that the author seeks to convey and whether

what the author conveys has any literary and artistic 

1166 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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value. The Judge should thereafter place himself in the

position of a reader of every age group in whose hands

the book is likely to fall and should try to appreciate what

kind of possible influence the book is likely to have in the

minds of the readers. A Judge should thereafter apply his

judicial mind dispassionately to decide whether the book in

question can be said to be obscene within the meaning of

Section 292 IPC by an objective assessment of the book

as a whole and also of the passages complained of as

obscene separately. In appropriate cases, the court, for

eliminating any subjective element or personal preference

which may remain hidden in the subconscious mind and

may unconsciously affect a proper objective assessment,

may draw upon the evidence on record and also consider

the views expressed by reputed or recognised authors

of literature on such questions if there be any for his

own consideration and satisfaction to enable the court

to discharge the duty of making a proper assessment.”

20. The Court then applied this test to the novel in question. By placing

themselves in the position of the author and judging the work from

his perspective, the Court found that his intention was to expose

social evils and ills, for which the author has used his own technique.

Similarly, the Court placed itself in the position of the readers who

are likely to read the book. It held that the book was likely to be

read by readers of “both sexes and all ages between teenagers and

the aged” and found that while it may create a sense of shock and

disgust, no reader would be depraved, debased, or encouraged to

lasciviousness by reading the book.38

21. In Bobby Art International (supra) the question before the Court was

whether certain scenes from the film ‘Bandit Queen’ that depicted

rape and nudity were obscene. Here, obscenity was not considered

under Section 292 but under the 1991 Guidelines for Censor Board

certification under the Cinematograph Act, 1952.39 The Court did not

38 ibid.

39 The relevant guidelines, as extracted in Bobby Art International (supra), are as follows:

“15. The guidelines earlier issued were revised in 1991. Clause (1) thereof reads thus:

“1. The objectives of film certification will be to ensure that—

(a) the medium of film remains responsible and sensitive to the values and

standards of society;

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1167

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

cite or follow the Hicklin test as laid down in Ranjit Udeshi (supra) and

Chandrakant Kalyandas (supra). Instead, it relied on the Guidelines

and laid down the test for obscenity as follows:

“22. The guidelines aforementioned have been carefully

drawn. They require the authorities concerned with film

certification to be responsive to the values and standards of

society and take note of social change. They are required

to ensure that “artistic expression and creative freedom

are not unduly curbed”. The film must be “judged in its

entirety from the point of view of its overall impact”. It must

also be judged in the light of the period depicted and the

contemporary standards of the people to whom it relates,

but it must not deprave the morality of the audience. Clause

2 requires that human sensibilities are not offended by

vulgarity, obscenity or depravity, that scenes degrading

or denigrating women are not presented and scenes of

sexual violence against women are avoided, but if such

scenes are germane to the theme, they be reduced to a

minimum and not particularised.”

22. The Court first considered the plot and theme of the film as a whole

and then considered the individual scenes of nudity and rape. Judging

the work as a whole and the alleged offending material specifically, the

Court held that the scenes are likely to evoke tears, pity, horror, and

shame. Only a perverted mind might be aroused in such a situation,

(b) artistic expression and creative freedom are not unduly curbed;

(c) certification is responsive to social change;

(d) the medium of film provides clean and healthy entertainment; and

(e) as far as possible, the film is of aesthetic value and cinematically of a good

standard.”

Clause (2) states that the Board of Film Censors shall ensure that—

“2. (vii) human sensibilities are not offended by vulgarity, obscenity or depravity;

***

(ix) scenes degrading or denigrating women in any manner are not presented;

(x) scenes involving sexual violence against women like attempt to rape, rape or

any form of molestation or scenes of a similar nature are avoided, and if any such

incident is germane to the theme, they shall be reduced to the minimum and no

details are shown;

***”

Clause (3) reads thus:

“3. The Board of Film Certification shall also ensure that the film—

(i) is judged in its entirety from the point of view of the overall impact; and

(ii) is examined in the light of the period depicted in the film and the contemporary

standards of the country and the people to which the film relates, provided that the

film does not deprave the morality of the audience.”

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and the purpose of censorship is not to protect the pervert or assuage

the susceptibilities of the over-sensitive.40 Further, the use of swear

words and expletives that are heard everyday was also held to be

harmless.41 The Court rather emphasised the overarching social

purpose and message of the film – to condemn rape and violence

against women by showing the trauma and emotional turmoil of a

victim of rape and to evoke sympathy for her and disgust for the

rapist.42 Thus, the material was held as not being obscene.

23. Similarly, in Director General, Directorate General of Doordarshan

v. Anand Patwardhan43, the Court applied the test of ‘contemporary

community standards’ to determine whether a documentary is obscene

for the purpose of certification and telecast on Doordarshan. A threeprong test for obscenity was formulated as follows:

“(a) whether “the average person, applying contemporary

community standards” would find that the work, taken

as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest;

(b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently

offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by

the applicable state law; and

(c) whether the work, taken as a whole, lacks serious

literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 44

24. The Court relied on Ramesh v. Union of India,

45 where it was held

that the effect of the words must be judged from the standards of a

reasonable, strong-minded, firm and courageous person, and not from

the perspective of weak and vacillating minds or those who sense

danger in every hostile point of view.46 Considering the documentary

as a whole to determine its message, which cannot be conveyed by

watching only certain bits, it was held that the film portrays social evils

and does not seek to cater to the prurient interests of any person.47

40 ibid, paras 27 and 28

41 ibid, para 29

42 ibid, paras 28, 31, 33

43 [2006] Suppl. 5 SCR 403 : (2006) 8 SCC 433 : 2006 INSC 558

44 ibid, para 32

45 [1988] 2 SCR 1011 : (1988) 1 SCC 668 : 1988 INSC 44

46 Directorate General of Doordarshan (supra), para 37

47 ibid, para 38

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1169

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

25. The law on determining obscenity has been summarised and

reiterated in Ajay Goswami v. Union of India48 where the Court cited

both Indian precedent and American jurisprudence. The principles

that can be culled out from the judgment are as follows:

i. Obscenity must be judged with regard to contemporary mores

and national standards.49

ii. The work must be judged as a whole and the alleged offending

material must also be separately examined to judge whether

they are so grossly obscene that they are likely to deprave and

corrupt the reader or viewer.50 There must be a clear and present

danger that has proximate and direct nexus with the material.51

iii. All sex-oriented material and nudity per se are not always

obscene.52

iv. The effect of the work must be judged from the standard of

an average adult human being.

53 Content cannot be regulated

from the benchmark of what is appropriate for children as

then the adult population would be restricted to read and see

only what is fit for children.54 Likewise, regulation of material

cannot be as per the standard of a hypersensitive man and

must be judged as per an “ordinary man of common sense

and prudence”.55

v. Where art and obscenity are mixed, it must be seen whether

the artistic, literary or social merit of the work overweighs its

obscenity and makes the obscene content insignificant or

trivial. In other words, there must be a preponderating social

purpose or profit for the work to be constitutionally protected

as free speech. Similarly, a different approach may have to

be used when the material propagates ideas, opinions, and

information of public interest as then the interest of society will

48 [2006] Suppl. 10 SCR 770 : (2007) 1 SCC 143 : 2006 INSC 995

49 ibid, para 67

50 ibid, para 68

51 ibid, para 70

52 ibid, paras 7 and 61

53 ibid, para 7

54 ibid, para 62

55 ibid, para 71

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tilt the balance in favour of protecting the freedom of speech

(for example, with medical textbooks).56

vi. The Court must perform the task of balancing what is artistic and

what is obscene. To perform this delicate exercise, it can rely

on the evidence of men of literature, reputed and recognised

authors to assess whether there is obscenity.57

26. In S. Khushboo v. Kanniammal,

58 the issue pertained to quashing of

FIR filed against the appellant, inter alia under Section 292 of the

IPC, for an interview in a magazine where she called for the social

acceptance of premarital sex, especially in live-in relationships, and

cautioned women to take adequate protection to prevent unwanted

pregnancies and sexually transmitted infections. The Court held that

no offence was made out under Section 292 as the content is not

lascivious (i.e., expressing or causing sexual desire); does not appeal

to the prurient interest (i.e., excessive interest in sexual matters); and

does not have the effect of tending to deprave and corrupt persons

who are likely to read, hear, or see the material.59 It was reiterated

that mere reference to sex does not make the material obscene

without examining the context of such reference.60 The Court held that

obscenity must be gauged with respect to “contemporary community

standards that reflect the sensibilities as well as the tolerance levels

of an average reasonable person.”61 In this case, the appellant had

not described any sexual act or said anything that arouses sexual

desire in the mind of a reasonable and prudent reader to make the

content obscene.62 Hence the FIR was quashed by this Court.

27. A Division Bench of this Court in Aveek Sarkar (supra) also quashed

an FIR under Section 292 against the magazine cover of Sports World

and Anandbazar Patrika that carried the image of Boris Becker, a

tennis player, posing nude with his fiancée, who are an interracial

couple. The Court held that while judging a photograph, article or

56 ibid, para 66

57 ibid, para 69

58 [2010] 5 SCR 322 : (2010) 5 SCC 600 : 2010 INSC 247

59 ibid, para 24

60 ibid, para 25

61 ibid, para 27

62 ibid, para 28

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1171

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

book to be obscene, “regard must be had to the contemporary

mores and national standards and not the standard of a group of

susceptible or sensitive persons”.63 The Court held that the Hicklin

test must not be applied as it “judged for obscenity based on isolated

passages of a work considered out of context and judged by their

apparent influence on most susceptible readers, such as children

or weak-minded adults.”64 Even in the United States, where the test

was first formulated, the courts no longer apply the Hicklin test and

instead apply the test formulated in Roth v. United States65 where

the US Supreme Court held that sex-related material is obscene

only when it has the tendency of exciting lustful thoughts when

judged from the perspective of an average person by applying the

community standards test. Similarly, in Canada, the dominant test

is the ‘community standards problem test’ as per which a work

qualifies as obscene when the exploitation of sex is its dominant

characteristic and such exploitation is undue.66 Taking note of these

jurisprudential developments, the Court in Aveek Sarkar markedly

moved away from the Hicklin test to the “community standard test”

where the material is considered as a whole to determine whether

the specific portions have the tendency to deprave and corrupt.67

28. Applying this test, it was held that a picture of a nude/semi-nude

woman is not per se obscene unless it arouses sexual desire or

overtly reveals sexual desire or has the tendency of exciting lustful

thoughts.68 In the present case, the posture and the background of

the woman posing with her fiancée, whose photograph was taken

by her father, does not have the tendency to deprave or corrupt

those in whose hands the magazine would fall when considered in

light of the broader social message of the picture against apartheid,

racism, and to promote love and marriage across race.69 We may

note that this Court followed the community standards test in Devidas

Ramachandra Tuljapurkar (supra).

63 Aveek Sarkar (supra), para 18

64 ibid, para 20

65 354 US 476 (1957)

66 R v. Butler, (1992) 1 SCR 452 (Can SC) as cited in Aveek Sarkar (supra), para 22

67 Aveek Sarkar (supra), para 23

68 ibid, para 23

69 ibid, paras 27 and 28

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29. Lastly, in N. Radhakrishnan v. Union of India,

70 it was again held that

the Court must not be guided by the sensitivity of a pervert viewer

and the setting of the whole work, its purpose, and the constituent

elements of the character must be kept in mind while judging for

obscenity.71

30. Application of the principles in the above-referred precedents to the

facts of the present case: The purpose of elaborately tracing the

precedents on Section 292 is to identify the essential content of the

offence of obscenity, the test and the standard by which the allegedly

offending material must be judged, and the oral and documentary

evidences and the process that the court must rely on and follow

for arriving at its conclusion.

31. For applying the test for obscenity to the allegedly offending portions

of the web-series, it is important to take note of the approach adopted

by the High Court.

32. The High Court purportedly applied the community standard test

as laid down in Aveek Sarkar (supra) to arrive at its conclusion.72 It

correctly states the position of law that to determine whether certain

content is obscene, the standard of determination is that of an ordinary

common person and not a hypersensitive person.73

33. Wrong question, wrong answer: However, the High Court has

incorrectly framed the question for inquiry. The issue framed by

the High Court is whether the language employed in the episode is

contemporarily used by the youth and whether it meets the threshold

of decency. The High Court has framed the question for inquiry in

the following terms:

“29. As stated above, this Court had watched a few

episodes of the web series “College Romance” and the

episode in question to decide the case more effectively

and fairly. The intent behind watching the said web series

was to analyze fairly as to whether the contention raised

on behalf of the petitioners that the language used in the

70 [2018] 11 SCR 1 : (2018) 9 SCC 725 : 2018 INSC 784

71 ibid, para 33

72 Impugned judgment, paras 21 and 22

73 ibid, para 28

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1173

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

web series is “in language”, or is “language used by new

generation in colleges”, or “the students in law colleges

and the younger generation in colleges uses this language

only”, is without merit or not.

30. This Court also wanted to test/examine the test of

a common prudent man in practicality, acting itself as a

common prudent person, so as to check as to whether such

language, in fact, can be heard by a common prudent man

without being embarrassed or finding it against decency

or against the concept of decency…”

(emphasis supplied)

34. From a plain reading of Section 67 and the material that is

characterised as ‘obscene’ therein, it is clear that the High Court

posed the wrong question, and it has naturally arrived at a wrong

answer. At the outset, the enquiry under Section 292 of the IPC

or under Section 67 of the IT Act does not hinge on whether the

language or words are decent, or whether they are commonly used

in the country. Rather, from the plain language of the provision, the

inquiry is to determine whether the content is lascivious, appeals

to prurient interests, or tends to deprave and corrupt the minds of

those in whose hands it is likely to fall.74 The High Court embarked

on a wrong journey and arrived at the wrong destination.

35. Profanity is not per se obscene: The second threshold error is in the

finding of the High Court that the language is full of swear words,

profanities, and vulgar expletives that could not be heard in open

court and also that it is not the language of the youth. Based on

this finding, the High Court has held that the content is obscene as

it “will affect and will tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable

minds”. In its own words, the High Court held:

“30. …this Court found that the actors/protagonists in

the web series are not using the language used in our

country i.e. civil language. The Court not only found

excessive use of “swear words”, “profane language” and

“vulgar expletives” being used, it rather found that the

web series had a series of such words in one sentence

74 Section 67, IT Act; Ranjit Udeshi (supra)

1174 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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with few Hindi sentences here and there. In the episode

in question, there is clear description and reference to a

sexually explicit act. The Court had to watch the episodes

with the aid of earphones, in the chamber, as the profanity

of language used was of the extent that it could not have

been heard without shocking or alarming the people

around and keeping in mind the decorum of language

which is maintained by a common prudent man whether in

professional or public domain or even with family members

at home. Most certainly, this Court notes that this is not

the language that nation’s youth or otherwise citizens of

this country use, and this language cannot be called the

frequently spoken language used in our country.

36. When the entire content of the series is seen in the

light of above, it would lead any common person to a

conclusion that the language used in the web series is

foul, indecent and profane to the extent that it will affect

and will tend to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds.

Therefore, on the basis of this finding it can be held that

the content of the web series will certainly attract the

criminality as envisaged under Section 67 of the Information

Technology Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

The specific material which the High Court found to be obscene,

i.e., that which tends to deprave and corrupt impressionable minds,

was “foul, indecent and profane” language. Nothing more. The High

Court has equated profanities and vulgarity with obscenity, without

undertaking a proper or detailed analysis into how such language,

by itself, could be sexual, lascivious, prurient, or depraving and

corrupting. It is well-established from the precedents cited that

vulgarity and profanities do not per se amount to obscenity.75 While a

person may find vulgar and expletive-filled language to be distasteful,

unpalatable, uncivil, and improper, that by itself is not sufficient to

be ‘obscene’. Obscenity relates to material that arouses sexual and

lustful thoughts, which is not at all the effect of the abusive language

75 Samaresh Bose (supra), para 35; Bobby Art International (supra), para 29; NS Madhanagopal v. K.

Lalitha, [2022] 15 SCR 649 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 2030 : 2022 INSC 1323

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1175

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

or profanities that have been employed in the episode. Rather, such

language may evoke disgust, revulsion, or shock.76 The reality of

the High Court’s finding is that once it found the language to be

profane and vulgar, it has in fact moved away from the requirements

of obscenity under Section 67 of the IT Act. The High Court failed

to notice the inherent contradiction in its conclusions.

36. No objective consideration: Third, the High Court has erred in the

legal approach followed by it while assessing whether the material

is obscene. In Samaresh Bose (supra), this Court has laid down,

in great depth and detail, the process and method that must be

followed to objectively judge whether the material is obscene.77

The court must consider the work as a whole and then the specific

portions that have been alleged to be obscene in the context of the

whole work to arrive at its conclusion.78 Further, the court must first

step into the position of the creator to understand what he intends

to convey from the work and whether it has any literary or artistic

value. It must then step into the position of the reader or viewer who

is likely to consume the work and appreciate the possible influence

on the minds of such reader.79 However, the High Court has not

followed this judicial process before arriving at its conclusion, which

is as follows:

“43. Coming back to case at hand, the specific complaint

of petitioner is that in Episode 05 of Season 01, airtime

starting from 5 minutes and 24 seconds onwards upto 6

minutes and 40 seconds as well as from 25 minutes and

28 seconds upto 25 minutes and 46 seconds, the language

of male and female protagonist is full of obscenity, vulgar

words and expletives, without there being any warning or

filter imposing restriction of age of viewers to whom the

content should be visible. The language used in Episode

05 of Season 01 was heard by this Court, and the level

of obscenity of the language and sentences used was

such that this Court cannot reproduce it in the judgment

76 Samaresh Bose (supra), para 35

77 Samaresh Bose (supra), para 29

78 ibid; Ranjit Udeshi (supra), paras 20 and 21

79 Samaresh Bose (supra), para 29

1176 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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itself for the purpose of adjudication. The language used

in the web series at the abovementioned time referred to

a sexually explicit act in spoken language. It is not just an

expletive, but is profane and vulgar language being used

referring to a sexually explicit act which certainly cannot

be termed common or commonly accepted language.

Rather the female protagonist in the series itself is heard

objecting to the male protagonist and expressing her

disgust over use of this language by repeating the same

language herself to the male protagonist. In answer to that,

the male protagonist further uses more vulgar expletives

and indecent language which is bound to disgust a normal

prudent man, if heard in public. Later in the said episode,

the female protagonist uses the same obscene, sexually

explicit language to others and the male protagonist is

seen enjoying and appreciating her conduct. The male

protagonist uses words describing male and female

genitalia and sexual act, thus by words, painting pictures

of sexually explicit act which brings it under ambit of

arousing prurient feelings by so doing. There’s no escape

from the same by saying that the said act was not done,

shown or filmed. Depiction does not connote filming alone

but conveying by a medium, which in this case is spoken

language. Therefore, the content as discussed above will

attract the criminality as laid down under Section 67 as

well as 67A of IT Act.”

(emphasis supplied)

37. It is evident from the above passages that the High Court has taken

the meaning of the language in its literal sense, outside the context in

which such expletives have been spoken. While the literal meaning

of the terms used may be sexual in nature and they may refer to

sexual acts, their usage does not arouse sexual feelings or lust in

any viewer of ordinary prudence and common sense. Rather, the

common usage of these words is reflective of emotions of anger,

rage, frustration, grief, or perhaps excitement. By taking the literal

meaning of these words, the High Court failed to consider the specific

material (profane language) in the context of the larger web-series

and by the standard of an “ordinary man of common sense and

prudence”. When we notice the use of such language in the context 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1177

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

of the plot and theme of the web-series, which is a light-hearted

show on the college lives of young students, it is clear that the use

of these terms is not related to sex and does not have any sexual

connotation. Neither did the creator of the web-series intend for the

language to be taken in its literal sense nor is that the impact on

a reasonable viewer who will watch the material. Therefore, there

is a clear error in the legal approach adopted by the High Court in

analysing and examining the material to determine obscenity.

38. Furthermore, the objectivity with which a judicial mind is expected

to examine the work in question was completely lost when the

High Court evidently could not extricate itself from the courtroom

atmosphere. The sensitivity and discomfort of the High Court is

evident when it held:

“29. …The Court had to watch the episodes with the aid

of earphones, in the chamber, as the profanity of language

used was of the extent that it could not have been heard

without shocking or alarming the people around and keeping

in mind the decorum of language which is maintained by

a common prudent man whether in professional or public

domain or even with family members at home…”

39. Application of wrong standard: The last issue is that of the standard or

perspective used by the High Court to determine obscenity. It is wellsettled that the standard for determination cannot be an adolescent’s

or child’s mind, or a hypersensitive person who is susceptible to

such influences.80 However, the High Court has incorrectly used the

standard of “impressionable minds” to gauge the effect of the material

and has therefore erred in applying the test for obscenity correctly.81

40. The High Court has made several remarks on the need to maintain

linguistic purity, civility, and morality by retaining the purity of language

and deprecating the representation of expletives-filled language

as the “new normal”. The real test is to examine if the language is

in anyway obscene under Section 67 of the IT Act. The approach

adopted by the High Court, as explained earlier, is based on irrelevant

considerations.

80 Chandrakant Kalyandas (supra), para 12; Samaresh Bose (supra), para 35; Ajay Goswami (supra);

Aveek Sarkar (supra), para 20

81 Impugned judgment, paras 35, 36 and 74

1178 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

41. Similarly, the metric to assess obscenity and legality of any content

cannot be that it must be appropriate to play in the courtroom while

maintaining the court’s decorum and integrity. Such an approach

unduly curtails the freedom of expression that can be exercised

and compels the maker of the content to meet the requirements of

judicial propriety, formality, and official language. Here again, the

High Court committed a serious error in decision-making.

42. The High Court has also expressed concern and anxiety about the

free availability of the web-series on the internet to the youth and

that it was not classified as being restricted to those above the age

of 18 years. While such anxiety is not misplaced, the availability of

content that contains profanities and swear words cannot be regulated

by criminalising it as obscene. Apart from being a non-sequitur, it is

a disproportionate and excessive measure that violates freedom of

speech, expression, and artistic creativity.

43. For the reasons stated above, we are of the opinion that the High

Court was not correct in its conclusion that the web-series has

obscene content and that therefore the provisions of Section 67 of

the IT Act are attracted.

B. Whether the material is ‘sexually explicit’ for the purpose

of Section 67A:

44. Section 67A of the IT Act criminalises the publication and transmission

of sexually explicit content. The provision is as follows:

“67A. Punishment for publishing or transmitting

of material containing sexually explicit act, etc., in

electronic form.–Whoever publishes or transmits or causes

to be published or transmitted in the electronic form any

material which contains sexually explicit act or conduct shall

be punished on first conviction with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to five years and

with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees and in the

event of second or subsequent conviction with imprisonment

of either description for a term which may extend to seven

years and also with fine which may extend to ten lakh rupees.”

45. The High Court has not given any reason whatsoever on how Section

67A is attracted to the facts of the present case. In our opinion, the

offence of Section 67A is not at all made out. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1179

Apoorva Arora & Anr. Etc. v. State (Govt. of Nct of Delhi) & Anr.

46. The facts of the present case certainly do not attract

Section 67A as the complainant’s grievance is about excessive

usage of vulgar expletives, swear words, and profanities. There is

no allegation of any ‘sexually explicit act or conduct’ in the complaint

and as such, Section 67A does not get attracted.

47. Section 67A criminalises publication, transmission, causing to

publish or transmit – in electronic form – any material that contains

sexually explicit act or conduct. Though the three expressions

“explicit”, “act”, and “conduct” are open-textured and are capable

of encompassing wide meaning, the phrase may have to be seen

in the context of ‘obscenity’ as provided in Section 67. Thus, there

could be a connect between Section 67A and Section 67 itself.

For example, there could be sexually explicit act or conduct which

may not be lascivious. Equally, such act or conduct might not

appeal to prurient interests. On the contrary, a sexually explicit

act or conduct presented in an artistic or a devotional form may

have exactly the opposite effect, rather than tending to deprave

and corrupt a person.

C. Quashing the FIR:

48. No offence of publication or transmission of any material in electronic

form, which is obscene, lascivious, or appealing to prurient interest,

and/or having the effect of tending to deprave and corrupt persons,

as provided under Section 67 of the IT act, is made out. Equally, no

case of publication or transmission of material containing sexually

explicit act or conduct, as provided under Section 67A, is made out

from the bare reading of the complaint. It is settled that a court must

exercise its jurisdiction to quash an FIR or criminal complaint when

the allegations made therein, taken prima facie, do not disclose the

commission of any offence.82

49. In view of the above, we allow the appeals against the judgment of

the High Court dated 06.03.2023 in Criminal Miscellaneous Case

No. 2399 of 2020, Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2215 of 2020

and Criminal Miscellaneous Case No. 2214 of 2020, and set aside

the judgment of the High Court, and quash FIR 403/2023 registered

82 State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, (1992) SCC Supp (1) 335, 1992 INSC 357; State of AP v. Golconda Linga

Swamy, (2004) 6 SCC 522, 2004 INSC 404; Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd v. Mohd Sharaful Haque,

(2005) 1 SCC 122, 2004 INSC 628

1180 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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at Police Station Mukherjee Nagar, Delhi dated 16.04.2023 under

Sections 67 and 67A of the IT Act against the appellants herein.

50. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s. 157 – Protection of action taken under this Act – Interim order by the High Court, criticising the prolonged stay of the search party at the residence of the respondents as unauthorized and illegal – Observation by the High Court that statutory protection contemplated u/s. 157, in the nature of a good faith clause, may not be available to the officers of the State conducting search as their conduct, “may not” justify protection – Challenged to:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1141 : 2024 INSC 277

The State of Gujarat & Anr.

v.

Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

(Civil Appeal No 4618 of 2024)

12 March 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha* and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Matter pertains to expunction of the observation by the High Court

in an interim order that statutory protection contemplated u/s. 157

of the GST Act, in the nature of a good faith clause, not available

to the officers of the State conducting search as their conduct,

“may not” justify protection.

Headnotes

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017 – s. 157 – Protection

of action taken under this Act – Interim order by the High

Court, criticising the prolonged stay of the search party at

the residence of the respondents as unauthorized and illegal

– Observation by the High Court that statutory protection

contemplated u/s. 157, in the nature of a good faith clause, may

not be available to the officers of the State conducting search

as their conduct, “may not” justify protection – Challenged to:

Held: Statutory functionary is equally entitled to take a defense of

good faith – It is for the court to adjudicate and decide – High Court

was not conducting a suit, prosecution, or other legal proceeding

against a statutory functionary – High Court was conscious of

the principles governing good faith clauses and thus, couched its

displeasure and distress by stating that such officials “may not”

be protected or that it “may be difficult” to accept the contention of

good faith – Observations were in the nature of advance rulings,

because even before the initiation of a suit, prosecution or legal

proceeding, the High Court expressed a tentative opinion – If

such observations remain, they would affect the integrity and

independence of that adjudication, compromising the prosecution

and the defence equally – Observation of the High Court is

expunged since the context as well as the conclusions of the High

Court were wrong. [Paras 9-12]

1142 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Words and phrases – Good faith – Scope and ambit of:

Held: Good faith clauses in statutes, explained in the vocabulary

of the rights and duties regime, can be said to be a provision

of immunity to a statutory functionary – Such provisions are in

recognition of public interest in protecting a statutory functionary

against suits, prosecution or legal proceedings against officials

exercising statutory power– This immunity is limited – It is confined

to acts done honestly and in furtherance of achieving the statutory

purpose and objective – s. 3(22) explains ‘good faith’ as an act

done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not – Good faith

clause in a statute will be a defense – If successfully pleaded,

it not only legitimises the action but also protects the statutory

functionary from any legal action – If statutory functionary invokes

the defence of good faith, it is for the court or a judicial body to

adjudicate and determine whether the action was done in good

faith or not – Such scrutiny or examination is done only in a

proceeding against the statutory functionary, which would depend

upon the facts and circumstances of each case – General Clauses

Act,1897 – s. 3(22) – Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017

– s. 157. [Paras 8, 9]

Case Law Cited

Goondla Venkateswarlu v. State of AP [2008] 12 SCR

608 : (2008) 9 SCC 613; Army Headquarters v. CBI

[2012] 5 SCR 599 : (2012) 6 SCC 228 – referred to.

List of Acts

Central Goods and Services Tax Act, 2017; General Clauses Act,

1897.

List of Keywords

Expunction; Expunction of the observation by the High Court;

Interim order; Statutory protection; Good faith clause; Statutory

functionary; Tentative opinion; Rights and duties regime; Immunity

to a statutory functionary; Defence of good faith.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal No.4618 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 24.12.2019 of the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in SCA No. 18463 of 2019

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1143

The State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, Adv. for the Appellants.

Rahul Narayan, Ms. Harshita Malik, Advs. for the Respondent.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. We are called upon to expunge a portion from the interim order of

the High Court and dispose of the appeal as it is represented to us

that the respondent is not interested in initiating proceedings against

the officers in the present matter. We have accepted the request

and hereby dispose of the appeal.

3. The portion sought to be expunged is the observation of the High

Court that the good faith clause in Section 157 of the GST Act1

,

may not be available to the officers of the State as their conduct,

according to the High Court, “may not” justify protection. We have

expunged that portion of the order because the context as well as

the conclusions of the High Court are wrong. We will explain this

after indicating the relevant facts.

4. This civil appeal arises out of an interim order passed by the High

Court of Gujarat2

 in a writ petition filed by the respondent seeking

a direction for protection from arrest under section 69 read with

section 132 of the GST Act. The High Court is still examining the

writ petition, but by the interim order impugned herein, it criticised

the prolonged stay of the search party at the residence of the

respondents as unauthorized and illegal. We need not deal with

the merits of the issue as the matter is still pending before the High

Court, more so when the respondent has submitted that he is not

1 “157. Protection of action taken under this Act.—(1) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings

shall lie against the President, State President, Members, officers or other employees of the Appellate

Tribunal or any other person authorised by the said Appellate Tribunal for anything which is in good faith

done or intended to be done under this Act or the rules made thereunder.

(2) No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against any officer appointed or authorised

under this Act for anything which is done or intended to be done in good faith under this Act or the rules

made thereunder.”

2 In Special Civil Application No. 18463 of 2019, order dated 24.12.2019.

1144 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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interested in proceeding against the officers and seeks a quietus

to the issue.

5. In fact, while issuing notice in the appeal on 16.07.2021, this Court

passed the following order. The order is indicative of the limited scrutiny

sought to be made by this Court and it is evident from the following:

“Without in any manner condoning the conduct of the

officers which has been commented upon, what persuades

us to issue notice is the fact that there are observations

to the effect that the statutory protection available to the

officers would not be a defence in case proceedings were to

be initiated against those officers by the original petitioners

or their family members and such an observation has been

made in the absence of the officers.

Issue notice limited to the aforesaid aspect returnable in

six weeks.”

6. The relevant portion in the order of the High Court that the statutory

protection should not be made available to the officers is in paragraph

28 and it is relevant for us to extract the same.

“28. Lastly the court may sound a word of caution to

the authorities exercising powers under the GST Acts.

Sub-section (2) of section 157 of the GST Acts says that

no suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie

against any officer appointed or authorized under the Act

for anything which is done or intended to be done in good

faith under the Act or the rules made thereunder. An action

like the present one which is not contemplated under any

statutory provision and which infringes the fundamental

rights’ of citizens under article 21 of the Constitution of

India may not be protected under this section. An action

taken may be said to be in good faith if the officer is

otherwise so empowered and he exceeds the scope of his

authority. However, in a case like the present one where

the authorization was for search and seizure of goods

liable to confiscation, documents, books or things and the

concerned officer converted it into a search for a person

and in investigation, which is not otherwise backed by

any statutory provision, it may be difficult to accept that 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1145

The State of Gujarat & Anr. v. Paresh Nathalal Chauhan

such action was in good faith. Protection of such action

under section 157 of the GST Acts may unleash a regime

of terror insofar as the taxable persons are concerned.”

7. In the above-referred paragraph, the High Court was of the view

that the protection contemplated under section 157 of the GST Act,

which is in the nature of a good faith clause, “may not” be available

to the officers. This is the issue with which we are concerned, and

we will dwell upon it.

8. A good faith clause, explained in the vocabulary of the rights and

duties regime, can be said to be a provision of immunity to a

statutory functionary. Such provisions are in recognition of public

interest in protecting a statutory functionary against prosecution or

legal proceedings. This immunity is limited. It is confined to acts

done honestly and in furtherance of achieving the statutory purpose

and objective. Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 best

explains ‘good faith’ as an act done honestly, whether it is done

negligently or not.

3

 Good faith clauses in statutes providing immunity

against suits, prosecution or other legal proceedings against officials

exercising statutory power are therefore limited by their very nature,

that far, and no further. The scope and ambit of good faith has been

explained in a number of decisions of this Court,4

 which need not

be elaborated herein again.

9. A good faith clause in a statute will therefore be a defense. If

successfully pleaded, it not only legitimises the action but also

protects the statutory functionary from any legal action. If a statutory

functionary invokes the defence of good faith in a suit, prosecution

or other legal proceedings initiated against him, it is for the court

or a judicial body to consider, adjudicate, and determine whether

the claim that the action was done in good faith is made out or not.

Such a scrutiny, enquiry, or examination is done only in a proceeding

against the statutory functionary. This Court has held that the scrutiny

3 Section 3(22) of the General Clauses Act, 1897 defines ‘good faith’ as follows:

“3. Definitions.—In this Act, and in all Central Acts and Regulations made after the commencement

of this Act, unless there is anything repugnant in the subject or context,—

(22) a thing shall be deemed to be done in “good faith” where it is in fact done honestly, whether it

is done negligently or not;”

4 See Goondla Venkateswarlu v. State of AP, [2008] 12 SCR 608 : (2008) 9 SCC 613, paras 22 and 23;

Army Headquarters v. CBI [2012] 5 SCR 599 : (2012) 6 SCC 228, paras 69-78

1146 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

whether the act is done in good faith or not would depend upon the

facts and circumstances of each case.5

10. It is in the above referred context that we have examined the

observations made by the High Court in Paragraph 28 extracted

hereinabove. The High Court was not conducting a suit, prosecution,

or other legal proceeding against a statutory functionary. We have no

doubt that the High Court was conscious of the principles governing

good faith clauses and therefore couched its displeasure and distress

by stating that such officials “may not” be protected or that it “may be

difficult” to accept the contention of good faith. We are of the opinion

that these observations are in the nature of advance rulings. This

is because even before the initiation of a suit, prosecution or legal

proceeding, the High Court expressed a tentative opinion. If such

observations remain, they will affect the integrity and independence

of that adjudication, compromising the prosecution and the defence

equally.

11. We say no more than reiterate that a citizen of this country has a

right of accountability, for which he is entitled to initiate and adopt

such legal remedies as are available to him, and in such proceedings

the statutory functionary is equally entitled to take a defense of good

faith. It is for the court to adjudicate and decide.

12. In view of the above, we expunge paragraph 28 and dispose of the

appeal.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal disposed of.

5 See, for example, Army Headquarters (supra), paras 76-78. 

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s. 62 – On facts and to justify withdrawal, it was submitted that in the instant case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented, and were handicapped because of lack of information or rather fraud on the part of the resolution professional – Propriety:

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1044 : 2024 INSC 321

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr.

v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

(Civil Appeal No. 2801 of 2020)

06 March 2024

[Sanjiv Khanna and Dipankar Datta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the judgment dated 07.02.2020 passed by the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal which upholds the order dated

27.09.2019 passed by the National Company Law Tribunal is

legally flawed and unsustainable; Whether the reasons or grounds

taken by the successful resolution applicants in the instant case

qualify and can be treated as a fraud on the part of the resolution

professional.

Headnotes

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – s. 62 – On facts

and to justify withdrawal, it was submitted that in the instant

case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented,

and were handicapped because of lack of information or

rather fraud on the part of the resolution professional –

Propriety:

Held: The Supreme Court in Ebix Singapore Private Limited,

has inter alia held that the resolution applicant cannot withdraw

or modify the resolution plan, after the same is approved by the

Committee of Creditors – It is immaterial that post approval by

the Committee of Creditors, there is consideration under Section

31(1) of the Code by the adjudicating authority for final approval

– The judgment in Ebix Singapore Private Limited elaborates

and sets out several reasons why the resolution applicant

cannot be permitted to withdraw or modify the resolution plan

after approval by the Committee of Creditors, and before an

order under Section 31(1) of the Code is passed – These

reasons include delay, consequences of the delay and the

uncertainty and complexities that would arise in the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process, which are unacceptable and not

contemplated in law – Even the terms of the resolution plan,

will not permit withdrawal or modification in the absence of a 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1045

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

statutory provision, that allow withdrawal or amendment in the

resolution plan after approval by the Committee of Creditors

– The reasons or grounds taken by the successful resolution

applicants in the instant case do not qualify and cannot be

treated as a fraud on the part of the resolution professional –

This is not a case where misinformation or wrong information

was given to the resolution applicants – The impugned judgment

dated 07.02.2020 passed by the NCLAT, upholding the order

passed by the NCLT, dated 27.09.2019 is set aside – The

resolution plan, as submitted by the successful resolution

applicants is approved. [Paras 4, 5, 8, 17]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Resolution Plan –

Preparation of:

Held: Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay

persons – They are submitted after the financial statements and

data are examined by domain and financial experts, who scan,

appraise evaluate the material as available for its usefulness,

with caution and scepticism – Inadequacies and paltriness of

data are accounted and chronicled for valuations and the risk

involved – It is rather strange to argue that the superspecialists

and financial experts were gullible and misunderstood the details,

figures or data – The assumption is that the resolution applicant

would submit the revival/resolution plan specifying the monetary

amount and other obligations, after in-depth analysis of the fiscal

and commercial viability of the corporate debtor – Pointing out the

ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post acceptance

of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors, should

be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and facts

are fudged or concealed – Absence or ambiguity of details and

particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to

ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit

resolution plan. [Para 15]

Case Law Cited

Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors

of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another [2021] 14

SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401 – relied on.

List of Acts

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016.

1046 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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List of Keywords

Resolution Plan; Withdrawal or modification of resolution

plan; Misinformation or wrong information; Financial experts;

Inadequacies and paltriness of data; Revival/resolution plan;

Principle of “clean slate”; Fiscal and commercial viability.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2801 of 2020

From the Judgment and Order dated 07.02.2020 of the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal

(AT) (Insolvency) No. 1281 of 2019

With

Civil Appeal Nos. 2642 and 2432 of 2020

Appearances for Parties

Dr. A.M. Singhvi, Guru Krishna Kumar, Shyam Divan, Sr. Advs.,

Mahesh Agarwal, Rishi Agrawala, Rohan Dakshni, Ms. Nikita Mishra,

Himanshu Satija, Ms. Geetika Sharma, Nidhi Ram Sharma, Ms.

Aakansha Kaul, E. C. Agrawala, S. S. Shroff, Ms. Misha, Anoop

Rawat, Siddhant Kant, Saurav Panda, Nikhil Mathur, Prithviraj

Oberoi, Ms. Anannya Ghosh, Brian Henry Moses, Rohan Talwar,

Ms. Nidhi Ram Shrama, Ms. Nidhi Ram Sharma, Advs. for the

appearing parties.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. This order would decide the cross-appeals under Section 62 of

the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161

 filed by the successful

resolution applicants – Deccan Value Investors L.P. and DVI PE

(Mauritius) Ltd.; the Committee of Creditors of Metalyst Forgings

Limited; and Dinkar Venkatasubramanian - the Resolution Professional

of Metalyst Forgings Limited.

2. The company in question, the corporate debtor, is Metalyst Forgings

Ltd.

1 “the Code” for short 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1047

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

3. In our opinion, the impugned judgment dated 07.02.2020 passed

by the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal2, New Delhi,

which upholds the order dated 27.09.2019 passed by the National

Company Law Tribunal3

, Mumbai Bench, Mumbai, is legally flawed

and unsustainable in view of the judgment of this Court in “Ebix

Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp

Solutions Limited and Another”4

.

4. This Court in Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra), has inter alia

held that the resolution applicant cannot withdraw or modify the

resolution plan, after the same is approved by the Committee of

Creditors. It is immaterial that post approval by the Committee of

Creditors, there is consideration under Section 31(1) of the Code

by the adjudicating authority for final approval.

5. The judgment in Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra) elaborates

and sets out several reasons why the resolution applicant cannot be

permitted to withdraw or modify the resolution plan after approval by

the Committee of Creditors, and before an order under Section 31(1)

of the Code is passed. These reasons include delay, consequences

of the delay and the uncertainty and complexities that would arise in

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, which are unacceptable

and not contemplated in law. Even the terms of the resolution plan,

will not permit withdrawal or modification in the absence of a statutory

provision, that allow withdrawal or amendment in the resolution plan

after approval by the Committee of Creditors. The resolution plan

approved by the Committee of Creditors is a creature of the Code

and not a pure contract between two consenting parties.

6. During the course of arguments, our attention was drawn to the proviso

to Section 31(1) of the Code, which postulates that the adjudicating

authority, before passing an order for approval of the resolution

plan, must satisfy itself that the resolution plan has provisions for

its effective implementation. Ebix Singapore Private Limited (supra)

did examine this provision but rejected the argument on several

grounds, including absence of legislative mandate to direct unwilling

Committee of Creditors to re-negotiate or agree to withdrawal of the

2 “NCLAT” for short

3 “NCLT” or “adjudicating authority”, for short

4 [2021] 14 SCR 321 : (2022) 2 SCC 401

1048 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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resolution plan at the behest of the resolution applicant. The effect

of approval by the adjudicating authority under Section 31(1) of the

Code makes the resolution plan binding on all stakeholders, even

those who are not members of the Committee of Creditors. The

scrutiny by the adjudicating authority for grant of approval in terms

of Section 31(1), read with other provisions of the Code, is limited

and restricted. It does not allow or permit the resolution applicant

to unilaterally amend/modify, or withdraw the resolution plan post

approval by the Committee of Creditors.

7. On facts and to justify the withdrawal, it was submitted that in the

present case, the successful resolution applicants were prevented,

and were handicapped because of lack of information or rather

fraud on the part of the resolution professional. Four aspects were

highlighted: -

(a) It was concealed that 70 per cent of the revenue

of the corporate debtor came from trading, and not

from manufacturing.

(b) The Mott Macdonald Report dated 30.09.2016 is

factually incorrect and flawed.

(c) Misleading and false statement was made with regard

to the uninstalled imported components of 12,500

M.T. Press, which were stored in the land of a sister

concern – Clover Forging and Machining Pvt. Ltd.

(d) The successful resolution applicants were misled in

view of the non-reliability of financial data. There was

ongoing financial/forensic audit.

8. The aforesaid reasons or grounds taken by the successful resolution

applicants do not qualify and cannot be treated as a fraud on the part

of the resolution professional. This is not a case where misinformation

or wrong information was given to the resolution applicants.

9. We have been taken through the information memorandum, as well

as, the data in the virtual data room, access to which was granted

to the prospective resolution applicant(s), before they had submitted

their resolution plan(s).

10. We have also been taken through the documents, which would show

the manufacturing output, as well as the capacity of realisation of the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1049

Deccan Value Investors L.P. & Anr. v.

Dinkar Venkatasubramanian & Anr.

four units of the corporate debtor. The excise returns, as well as the

VAT returns etc., were available in the virtual data room.

11. The Mott Macdonald Report was submitted by the said consultants in

September, 2016 at the behest of the erstwhile promoters/directors of

the corporate debtor. The report itself is hedged with conditions and

disclaimers. Value and worth of the report, the data and projections

were for the prospective resolution applicants to evaluate.

12. On the aspect of 12,500 M.T. Press, it was clearly stated and noted

that the said Press after import, was stored in the shed belonging

to Clover Forging and Machining Pvt. Ltd.

13. Submission regarding the non-availability of Floor Space Index (FSI)

at the plant in Aurangabad, was made with reference to the statement

made by an employee of the corporate debtor. We are not inclined

to accept this version of the successful resolution applicant. The

corporate debtor has four units, three units in Maharashtra and one

unit in Himachal Pradesh. False projection was not made.

14. The resolution plan submitted by the successful resolution applicants

refers to the transaction audits being undertaken and acknowledges

appropriation of the proceeds, if any available, to the resolution

professional on the recoveries being made for prior period. The

principle of “clean slate” is well established and known.

15. Resolution plans are not prepared and submitted by lay persons.

They are submitted after the financial statements and data are

examined by domain and financial experts, who scan, appraise

evaluate the material as available for its usefulness, with caution and

scepticism. Inadequacies and paltriness of data are accounted and

chronicled for valuations and the risk involved. It is rather strange

to argue that the superspecialists and financial experts were gullible

and misunderstood the details, figures or data. The assumption is

that the resolution applicant would submit the revival/resolution plan

specifying the monetary amount and other obligations, after in-depth

analysis of the fiscal and commercial viability of the corporate debtor.

Pointing out the ambiguities or lack of specific details or data, post

acceptance of the resolution plan by the Committee of Creditors,

should be rejected, except in an egregious case were data and

facts are fudged or concealed. Absence or ambiguity of details and

particulars should put the parties to caution, and it is for them to 

1050 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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ascertain details, and exercise discretion to submit or not submit

resolution plan.

16. Records of corporate debtor, who are in financial distress, may

suffer from data asymmetry, debatable or even wrong data. Thus,

the provision for transactional audit etc, but this takes time and is

not necessary before information memorandum or virtual data room

is set up. Financial experts being aware, do tread with caution.

Information memorandum is not to be tested applying “the true picture

of risk” obligation, albeit as observed by the NCLAT the resolution

professional’s obligation to provide information has to be understood

on “best effort” basis.

17. In view of the aforesaid position, we set aside the impugned judgment

dated 07.02.2020 passed by the NCLAT, upholding the order passed

by the NCLT, dated 27.09.2019. In other words, we accept the present

appeals and it is held that the resolution plan, as submitted by the

successful resolution applicants – Deccan Value Investors L.P. and

DVI PE (Mauritius) Ltd., is approved.

18. To cut short the delay, parties are directed to appear before the NCLT

on 09.04.2024, when further proceedings will take place.

19. Recording the aforesaid, the appeals are allowed in the above terms.

20. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.

Constitution of India – Article 142, 226 – Appellant verbally and physically assaulted in police custody – Appellant illegally detained for 4 hours despite being granted bail – Subdivisional Police Officer’s inquiry report found Respondent No. 2 responsible – Special Inspector General of Police imposed punishment of “strict warning” in departmental proceedings – High Court partly allowed Appellant’s writ petition but declined to initiate criminal proceedings – Respondent No. 2 was directed to pay Rs. 75,000/- from his own pocket – Respondent No. 2 paid Rs. 1,75,000/- plus Rs. 25000/- – Respondent No.2 superannuated.

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1014 : 2024 INSC 232

Somnath

v.

The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

(Criminal Appeal No. 1717 of 2024)

18 March 2024

[Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether criminal proceedings should be initiated against a police

officer who has committed excesses on individual in police custody?

Headnotes

Constitution of India – Article 142, 226 – Appellant verbally

and physically assaulted in police custody – Appellant

illegally detained for 4 hours despite being granted bail – Subdivisional Police Officer’s inquiry report found Respondent

No. 2 responsible – Special Inspector General of Police

imposed punishment of “strict warning” in departmental

proceedings – High Court partly allowed Appellant’s writ

petition but declined to initiate criminal proceedings –

Respondent No. 2 was directed to pay Rs. 75,000/- from his

own pocket – Respondent No. 2 paid Rs. 1,75,000/- plus Rs.

25000/- – Respondent No.2 superannuated.

Held: Respondent No. 2 committed excesses against Appellant -

Supreme Court refrained from initiating criminal proceedings in

the peculiar facts – Under Article 226, High Court has power to

award compensation – Zero tolerance approach to be taken by

courts – Direction to police forces and similar agencies to adhere

to all guidelines regarding arrest and police custody. [Paras 21-24]

Case Law Cited

Delhi Judicial Service Association v. State of Gujarat

[1991] 3 SCR 936 : (1991) 4 SCC 406; Sunil Gupta v.

State of Madhya Pradesh [1990] 2 SCR 871 : (1990) 3

SCC 119; Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Administration

[1980] 3 SCR 855 : (1980) 3 SCC 526; Bhim Singh,

MLA v. State of Jammu and Kashmir (1985) 4 SCC

677; D K Basu v. State of West Bengal [1996] Supp. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1015

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

10 SCR 284 : (1997) 1 SCC 416; Sube Singh v. State

of Haryana [2006] 2 SCR 67 : (2006) 3 SCC 178 –

relied on.

Nilabati Behera v. State of Orissa [1993] 2 SCR 581 :

(1993) 2 SCC 746 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Maharashtra Police Act, 1951

List of Keywords

Individual dignity; Personal liberty; Excess use of force; Safeguards,

arrest; Remand; Police custody; Treatment of detenu; Strict warning;

Departmental inquiry; Criminal proceedings; Compensation,

superannuated; Belated prosecution; Police officer; Colour of

official duty; Commit excess; High-handed action.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1717

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 08.10.2018 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay at Aurangabad in CRWP No.215 of 2017

Appearances for Parties

Sandeep Sudhakar Deshmukh, Nishant Sharma, Tushar D.bhelkar,

Akshay Jagtap, Advs. for the Appellant.

Aaditya Aniruddha Pande, Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Bharat Bagla,

Sourav Singh, Aditya Krishna, Atul Babasaheb Dakh, Bitu Kumar

Singh, Praveen Pandey, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.

Leave granted.

2. Heard learned counsel for the parties.

3. The present appeal is directed against the Final Judgment and

Order dated 08.10.2018 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned 

1016 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment”) passed by the High Court of Judicature at Bombay,

Bench at Aurangabad (hereinafter referred to as the “High Court”)

in Criminal Writ Petition No.215 of 2017 by which the writ petition

filed by the appellant was partly allowed and the respondent no.2

was directed to pay a sum of Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five

Thousand only) from his own pocket to the appellant.

BRIEF FACTS:

4. A First Information Report1

 bearing Crime No.1-117 of 2015 for an

offence punishable under Section 3792

 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as the “IPC”) was filed by one Mr. Madhukar

Vikram Gayake on 14.06.2015 with Paithan Police Station, Taluka

Paithan, District Aurangabad, State of Maharashtra (hereinafter

referred to as the “PS”) alleging that on 12.06.2015 the complainant

had come to attend the last rites of his brother-in-law and was standing

in a queue in the holy Nath Temple when some unknown persons

took away Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand only), which he was

carrying in his pocket, which he realized only after coming out from

the temple. The appellant was arrested at 08:30PM in connection

with the said crime on 14.06.2015 on the basis of CCTV3

 footage

showing the involvement of the appellant in the said crime.

5. On 15.06.2015, the appellant was produced before the Magistrate

at 4PM and the investigating agency sought police remand on the

ground that recovery had been made from the appellant. The request

was granted by the Magistrate and he was remanded to police

custody till 18.06.2015.

6. On 17.06.2015, the investigating agency prepared a memorandum

under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 showing recovery

of Rs.30,000/- (Rupees Thirty Thousand) from the house of the

appellant.

7. On 18.06.2015, the investigating agency produced the appellant

before the Magistrate praying for further extension of police custody for

two days and the same was granted till 20.06.2015. On 19.06.2015,

1 FIR.

2 ‘379. Punishment for theft.—Whoever commits theft shall be punished with imprisonment of either

description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both.’

3 Closed-Circuit Television.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1017

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

the appellant was allegedly taken out of the lock-up by the respondent

no.2, the then officiating Inspector of PS, in handcuffs and paraded

half-naked with garland of footwear around his neck and is said

to have been verbally abused with reference to his caste as also

physically assaulted by the respondent no.2.

8. On 20.06.2015, the investigating agency did not ask for any further

extension of police remand and thus the appellant was remanded to

judicial custody till 04.07.2015. On the same day, the appellant filed

an application for bail in the Court of Judicial Magistrate, First Class,

Paithan, which was allowed on the condition that he would visit Police

Station on every alternate day between 1000hrs to 1300hrs till filing

of the Final Report. The appellant was not released pursuant to the

order due to the respondent no.2 not allowing him to be released

and instead had taken the appellant to the PS.

9. Mr. Rahul Raju Kamble, relative of the appellant filed application

before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Paithan, narrating the

chain of events and praying for directions to release the appellant

and, inter alia, praying for issuance of Show-Cause Notice to the

concerned police officer. Thereon, the Magistrate had directed

the prosecution to file its reply. However, the appellant was finally

released on 20.06.2015.

10. The Superintendent of Police, Aurangabad (Rural), on complaint made

by the appellant and others, directed the Sub Divisional Police Officer,

Paithan on 07.07.2015 to initiate inquiry on the entire issue and submit

report. The Sub Divisional Police Officer, Paithan conducted inquiry

relating to the complaint made against the respondent no.2, directing

both the appellant and respondent no.2 and other Police officers/

constables to appear and submit their statements. In his report dated

11.09.2015, it was recorded that on 19.06.2015 the appellant was

taken out from the lock-up by the respondent no.2 and paraded on

the streets of the city of Paithan and was also physically assaulted

during the said procession and held respondent no.2 responsible for

this. It further narrated that despite grant of bail to the appellant he

was illegally detained by respondent no.2 for four hours.

11. On 08.10.2015 and 09.10.2015, the sister of the appellant

complained to various authorities including the Superintendent of

Police, Aurangabad (Rural) and the President [read Chairperson],

National Human Rights Commission (hereinafter referred to as 

1018 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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the “Commission”) seeking initiation of departmental enquiry and

criminal prosecution under the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter referred to

as the “SC/ST Act”).

12. On 25.12.2015, the appellant was charge-sheeted in connection

with another FIR bearing Crime No.1-192/2015 punishable under

Section 3944

, IPC and he was sought to be declared a Proclaimed

Offender despite him being available in town and co-operating with

the investigating agency. However, the appellant was arrested on

24.05.2016 and subsequently released on bail.

13. The Special Inspector General of Police, Aurangabad Range,

Aurangabad, after perusing the Inquiry Report of the Sub Divisional

Police Officer dated 11.09.2015 and not finding the explanation of

respondent no.2 to be satisfactory, imposed punishment of “strict

warning”.

14. The appellant on 02.02.2017, approached the High Court by way

of filing Writ Petition, inter alia, praying for initiation of departmental

inquiry and criminal proceedings against respondent no.2 and also

sought compensation. The writ petition was partly allowed by the

Impugned Judgment by awarding Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five

Thousand only) to be payable to the appellant by respondent no.2

from his own pocket but declining to give any direction for initiating

criminal action under the SC/ST Act.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:

15. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that it would be a

travesty of justice if for such blatant violation of the personal liberty

of the appellant and abuse of authority, the respondent no.2 is let

off with just “strict warning” without any real effective punishment.

It was submitted that the conduct of the respondent no.2 besides

being unprovoked was also in the teeth of the judgments of this

Court in D K Basu v State of West Bengal, (1997) 1 SCC 416

and Sube Singh v State of Haryana, (2006) 3 SCC 178, which

have laid down the guidelines of how a detenu has to be treated

4 ‘394. Voluntarily causing hurt in committing robbery.—If any person, in committing or in attempting

to commit robbery, voluntarily causes hurt, such person, and any other person jointly concerned in

committing or attempting to commit such robbery, shall be punished with 1

[imprisonment for life], or with

rigorous imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.’

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1019

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

when in custody.

16. Learned counsel submitted that one of the grounds for not directing

criminal prosecution of respondent no.2 by the High Court was that

Section 1615

, Maharashtra Police Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred

to as the “Police Act”) gives protection to a police officer from any

belated prosecution, the period being six months. It was submitted

the same should not be so enforced particularly in the facts of the

present case where the appellant belongs to a weaker section and

is without the wherewithal to pursue prosecution of a police officer.

It was submitted that respondent no.2 has in fact been let off without

any punishment as “strict warning” does not translate into any effective

punishment which is also one of the minimum/minor punishments

contemplated, whereas the conduct of the respondent no.2 required

inflicting major punishment upon him.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE STATE:

17. Learned counsel for the State submitted that it has initiated

departmental proceeding against respondent no.2 and punishment

has also been awarded to him pursuant thereto.

SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2:

18. Learned counsel for respondent no.2 submitted that the incident is

totally without any truth and only to browbeat, and to demoralise the

police, the appellant, who is habitual offender, has lodged a false

5 ‘161. Suits or prosecutions in respect of acts done under colour of duty as aforesaid not to be entertained

or to be dismissed if not instituted within the prescribed period.—(1) In any case of alleged offence

by the Revenue Commissioner, the Commissioner, a Magistrate, Police officer or other person, or of a

wrong alleged to have been done by such Revenue Commissioner, Commissioner, Magistrate, Police

officer or other person, by any act done under colour or in excess of any such duty or authority as

aforesaid, or wherein, it shall appear to the Court that the offence or wrong if committed or done was

of the character aforesaid, the prosecution or suit shall not be entertained, or shall be dismissed, if

instituted, more than six months after the date of the act complained of:

Provided that, any such prosecution against a Police Officer may be entertained by the Court, if instituted

with the previous sanction of the State Government within two years from the date of the offence.

(2) In suits as Aforesaid one month’s notice of suit to be given with sufficient description of wrong

complained of. In the case of an intended suit on account of such a wrong as aforesaid, the person

intending to sue shall be bound to give to the alleged wrong-doer one month’s notice at least of the

intended suit with sufficient description of the wrong complained of, failing which such suit shall be

dismissed.

(3) Plaint to set forth service of notice and tender of amends. The plaint shall set forth that a notice art

aforesaid has been served on the defendant and the date of such service, and shall state whether any,

and if any what tender of amends has been made by the defendant. A copy of the mid notice shall be

annexed to the plaint endorsed or accompanied with a declaration by the plaintiff of the time and manner

of service thereof.’

1020 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

complaint, that too, much after the time prescribed under the Police

Act. It was further submitted that respondent no.2 has already paid

Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Seventy Five Thousand only) to the

appellant i.e., Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) beyond what

was directed by the High Court and in terms of the order passed by

this Court on 07.07.20236

. It was submitted that the appellant having

been found committing the offence for which his prosecution began,

from the CCTV footage, cannot claim innocence.

19. Learned counsel submitted that on 20.06.2015 at 3PM when he

was produced before the Magistrate, the appellant did not allege

any ill-treatment much less spoke about him having been subjected

to parade in handcuffs and in a half-naked state with a garland of

footwear around his neck. Even when relatives of the appellant

had filed a complaint before the Magistrate on 20.06.2015, due to

delay in release of the appellant despite grant of bail, there was no

reference of any alleged instance of the appellant being paraded

half-naked on 19.06.2015. Further, the report of the Sub Divisional

Police Officer does not refer to the appellant having been paraded

half-naked with a garland of shoes. It was submitted that due to

the strained relationship of the respondent no.2 with the then Sub

Divisional Police Officer, who had submitted the Report, adverse

findings were recorded against the respondent no.2. Thus, it was

submitted that the Special Inspector General of Police found the

clarification submitted by the respondent no.2 to be satisfactory and

that was the reason why a punishment of only “strict warning” was

awarded. He submitted that pursuant to FIR bearing Crime No.1-

192 of 2015, the appellant could not be traced and was declared

a proclaimed offender under Section 82(4) of the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1973 on 25.12.2015. It was further contended that only on

03.02.2017, the appellant had filed the underlying Writ Petition before

the High Court and for the first time agitating that the respondent

6 ‘Learned counsel for respondent No.2, on instructions, states that he will further compensate the

petitioner by an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh only) within a period of four weeks from

today.

Learned counsel for the petitioner may provide the bank details of the petitioner to the learned counsel

for respondent No.2 within a week from today.

List the matter again on 22.08.2023.

If by the said date, the said amount is paid to the petitioner and the counsel for the parties make a

statement, the matter may be considered for closure on the next date. ’

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 1021

Somnath v. The State of Maharashtra & Ors.

no.2 paraded him half-naked with a garland of shoes.

20. Learned counsel submitted that in terms of Section 161 of the Police

Act, prosecution against a police officer acting under colour of official

duty after six months of the alleged act cannot be entertained and

rightly the High Court has declined to direct any action on such

prosecution.

ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:

21. Having considered the facts and circumstances of the case, this Court

finds that there is enough material to indicate that respondent no.2

did commit excesses against the appellant, as the same has also

been found in an enquiry by the Commission as also relied upon by

the High Court and such finding has not been varied or interfered

with. Thus, the Court has no hesitation in strongly denouncing such

high-handed action by the respondent no.2, who being in a position

of power, totally abused his official position. However, in view of the

fact that the respondent no.2 has superannuated and during the

course of the present proceedings Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh

only), apart from what was ordered by the High Court, has also been

paid by the respondent no.2 from his own pocket to the appellant,

which the appellant accepted, the Court finds that the matter now

requires to be finally given a quietus. Be it noted, the appellant has

additionally received Rs.25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand

only) as ordered by the Commission. We only add that the power of

the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India to award

compensation is undoubtable, reference whereof can be made to

Nilabati Behera v State of Orissa, (1993) 2 SCC 746.

22. Accordingly, the appeal stands disposed of by upholding the Impugned

Judgment, with the modification that the respondent no.2 is held liable

to pay a further sum of Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees One Lakh only) to

the appellant. However, as the same stands already complied with,

no further steps are required to be taken by the respondent no.2.

23. Before parting, the Court would indicate that in such matters the

Courts need to take a very strict view. A zero-tolerance approach

towards such high-handed acts needs to be adopted as such acts,

committed by persons in power against an ordinary citizen, who is in

a non-bargaining position, bring shame to the entire justice delivery

system. As such, we were considering resorting to Article 142 of the 

1022 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Constitution of India to direct initiation of criminal proceedings, but

only because of the fact that respondent no.2 has retired and has

already paid a sum of Rs.1,75,000/- (Rupees One Lakh Seventy Five

Thousand)[Rs.75,000/- (Rupees Seventy Five Thousand) as per the

Impugned Judgment and Rs.1,00,000/- (Rupees one lakh) as per

this Court’s order dated 07.07.2023] in total to the appellant, who

has also been paid Rs. 25,000/- (Rupees Twenty Five Thousand) as

per the Commission’s order, we refrain from so directing, in these

peculiar facts and circumstances. We hold back noting that justice

ought to be tempered with mercy.

POST-SCRIPT:

24. It is sad that even today, this Court is forced to restate the principles

and directions in D K Basu (supra). Before D K Basu (supra), this

Court had expressed its concern as to how best to safeguard the

dignity of the individual and balance the same with interests of the

State or investigative agency in Prem Shankar Shukla v Delhi

Administration, (1980) 3 SCC 526. In Bhim Singh, MLA v State

of Jammu and Kashmir, (1985) 4 SCC 677, this Court noted that

police officers are to exhibit greatest regard for personal liberty of

citizens and restated the sentiment in Sunil Gupta v State of Madhya

Pradesh, (1990) 3 SCC 119. The scenario in Delhi Judicial Service

Association v State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC 406 prompted this

Court to come down heavily on excess use of force by the police. As

such, there will be a general direction to the police forces in all States

and Union Territories as also all agencies endowed with the power

of arrest and custody to scrupulously adhere to all Constitutional

and statutory safeguards and the additional guidelines laid down

by this Court when a person is arrested by them and/or remanded

to their custody.

Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:

Aishani Narain, Hony. Associate Editor Appeal disposed of.

(Verified by: Madhavi Divan, Sr. Adv.)