* Author
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 241 : 2024 INSC 286
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors.
v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
[Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 31248 of 2018]
08 April 2024
[Bela M. Trivedi and Pankaj Mithal,* JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the
delay of 5659 days in filing the proposed appeal against the
judgment of the reference court under the Land Acquisition Act,
1894, by some of the Legal Representatives of a deceased Claimant
who died pending the reference and who were not impleaded in
the reference proceeding.
Headnotes
Limitation – Object of the law of limitation – Explained
Held: The law of limitation is based on public policy and is enshrined
in the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium”, meaning
there might be an end to a litigation – Statutes of limitation and
prescription are statutes of peace and repose – When a right is
not exercised or a remedy is not availed for a long time, it must
cease to exist and law of limitation is a way to achieve it – Law of
limitation bars time barred remedy rather than right with passage
of time. [Paras 7 & 8]
Limitation Act – The interplay between sections 3 and 5 –
Section 5 needs “sufficient cause” to be proved as a condition
precedent to condone delay
Held: Section 3 being a substantive provision of mandatory nature
needs to be interpreted strictly – Section 5 being a discretionary
provision has to be interpreted liberally because it helps the
Courts to do substantial justice – Based on the object of the
law of limitation, viz., public policy, both these sections have to
be construed harmoniously – The existence of ‘sufficient cause’
for condoning delay in filing the suit, appeal or application is a
condition precedent to exercise the discretionary power of Courts
to condone the delay. [Paras 14-16]
242 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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Limitation Act – Section 5 – Discretionary power – Explained
Held: Where a case is brought before the court beyond the period
of limitation, the applicant has to explain to the court as to what
was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate and enough
reason which prevented him to approach the court within the
period of limitation – Even after ‘sufficient cause’ is established,
the Court has the discretion to decide whether to allow or dismiss
the application for condonation of delay upon the bonafides of the
party – The discretion will not be exercised by the Court when the
delay is caused by negligence, inaction or lack of bonafides – In
such cases, even though the law of limitation harshly affects or
causes inconvenience to the party, the Court has to apply it with
all its rigour. [Paras 18, 23 to 25]
Limitation Act – Section 5 – Non applicability of equity
considerations
Held: Equity has no place in condoning the delay under Section
5 of the Limitation Act – When a party does not adhere to the
mandatory provisions of limitation, Courts cannot condone the
delay on grounds of sympathy or compassion as it will be unjust
to a person who files a case for remedies diligently and within
time. [Paras 19 and 20]
Limitation Act – Section 5 – Whether liberal interpretation
of ‘Sufficient cause’ overrides substantial law of limitation?
Held: Concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented
approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to override
the substantial law of limitation – The Courts have to exercise
the discretion systematically and in an informed manner to allow
application for condonation of delay. [Para 21]
Limitation Act – Section 5 – Relevance of merits of the case
at hand
Held: The merits of the case cannot be considered while dealing with
the application for condonation of delay in filing appeals. [Para 22]
Limitation Act – Principles regarding relevance of law of
limitation, scope of section 3, power of court to condone
delay under section 5 – Summarised
Held: (i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there
should be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy
rather than the right itself;
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 243
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after a
fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict sense
whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may be
kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the substantial
law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise of
power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised even if
sufficient cause is established for various factors such as, where
there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if the
court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in filing
the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in
condoning the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay for the reason that
the conditions have been imposed, tantamounts to disregarding
the statutory provision. [Para 26]
Case Law Cited
Basawaraj and Anr. v. Special Land Acquisition Officer.
[2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81 – relied on.
Bhag Mal alias Ram Bux and Ors. v. Munshi (Dead)
by LRs. and Ors. [2007] 1 SCR 1114 : (2007) 11 SCC
285; Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors.
v. Katiji and Ors. [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC
107; Ramlal, Motilal and Chhotelal v. Rewa Coalfields
Ltd. [1962] 2 SCR 762 : A.I.R. 1962 SC 361; Maqbul
Ahmad and Ors. v. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors. A.I.R. 1935 PC 85; Brijesh Kumar and Ors. v.
State of Haryana and Ors. 2014 (4) SCALE 50; Lanka
244 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
Venkateswarlu v. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors. [2011]
3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363; State of Jharkhand &
Ors. v. Ashok Kumar Chokhani & Ors. AIR 2009 SC
1927 – referred to
Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal Representatives &
Ors. v. State of Haryana & Ors. (2014) 14 SCC 127;
Imrat Lal & Ors. v. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.
(2014) 14 SCC 133 – distinguished.
List of Acts
Land Acquisition Act, 1894; Limitation Act, 1963
List of Keywords
Law of Limitation; Condonation of delay; Sufficient cause; Liberal
construction; Substantial justice.
Case Arising From
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 31248 of 2018
From the Judgment and Order dated 18.01.2017 of the High Court
of Judicature at Hyderabad for the State of Telangana and the State
of Andhra Pradesh in LAASM No. 714 of 2016
Appearances for Parties
Mrs. Madurima Tatia, V. Sridhar Reddy, Abhijit Sengupta, Rohit
Jaiswal, Advs. for the Petitioners.
Santosh Krishnan, Girish Chowdhary, Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal,
Advs. for the Respondent.
Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Pankaj Mithal, J.
1. Some land in village Gandluru, District Guntur, Andhra Pradesh
was acquired some time in 1989 for Telugu Ganga Project. Not
satisfied by the compensation offered under the award, the
claimants (16 in number) preferred a reference under Section
18 of Land Acquisition Act (hereinafter for short the ‘Act’) i.e.,
L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990 titled Juvvala Gunta China Chinnaiah
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 245
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
(dead) and Ors. vs. Special Deputy Collector (Land Acquisition)
Telugu Ganga Project, Podalakur at Nellore. Out of the 16 claimants
in the above reference, claimants No. 1, 3 and 11 died during
the pendency of the reference before the Court of Addl. Senior
Civil Judge, Gudur. No steps were taken to substitute the heirs
and legal representatives of the above deceased persons. The
said reference was dismissed on merits along with some other
references vide common judgment and order dated 24.09.1999
upholding the award of the collector.
2. After the lapse of more than 5/6 years, an appeal was proposed to
be filed in the High Court Under Section 54 of the Act challenging
the dismissal of the reference. The said appeal was proposed to
be filed only by some of the heirs and legal representatives of the
deceased claimant No. 11 in the reference i.e., Pathapati Subba
Reddy. No other claimant or their legal heirs from amongst the other
15 who were parties in the reference joined the heirs and legal
representatives of claimant No. 11 in filing the appeal. They did not
even prefer any separate or independent appeal of their own. In
other words, out of the 16 claimants, 15 of them impliedly accepted
the judgment and order of the reference court and it is only the heirs
and legal representatives of claimant No. 11, who feel aggrieved and
have proposed to file the appeal.
3. The above appeal, as stated earlier, was preferred with the delay of
5659 days. Accordingly, an application supported by an affidavit of
the surviving daughter of the deceased claimant No. 11 was filed for
condoning the delay in filing the proposed appeal. It was averred in
the said application that the proposed appellants are the heirs and
legal representatives of the deceased claimant No. 11 i.e. Pathapati
Subba Reddy, who died on 15.05.1995 during the pendency of the
reference but they were not brought on record before the decision
of the reference. The said deceased claimant No.11 was survived
by his two daughters. The elder one died and that the proposed
appellants are the surviving second daughter and her descendants.
Since she was living in her matrimonial house, she had no knowledge
of the above reference. It was only on 28.05.2015 when one of the
grandsons of the said daughter of the deceased claimant visited
the office of the L.A.O. for the purpose of obtaining submersion
certificate to secure a job that he came to know that there was
a reference which was dismissed on 24.09.1999, whereupon the
246 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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proposed appeal was immediately filed along with an application to
condone the delay in its filing.
4. There is no dispute to the fact that in L.A.O.P. No. 38 of 1990 there
were 16 claimants in all. During the pendency of the aforesaid
reference, claimants No. 1, 3 and 11 were dead but the heirs and
legal representatives of none of them were brought on record. None
of the other claimants or their heirs and legal representatives made
any effort to challenge the order of the dismissal of the reference
except the proposed appellants which indicates that the others have
accepted the same. It is only one of the surviving daughters of the
deceased claimant No. 11 and her descendants who have sought
to prefer the proposed appeal against the judgment and order dated
24.09.1999 with an inordinate delay of 5659 days. The High Court
not being satisfied by the explanation furnished in preferring the
proposed appeal beyond limitation, refused to condone the delay in
filing the proposed appeal and consequently dismissed it as barred
by time by the order impugned dated 18.01.2017.
5. The present Special Leave Petition has been filed challenging the
judgment and order dated 18.01.2017 of the High Court passed
in L.A.A.S.M.P. No. 714 of 2016 in L.A.A.S. (SR) No. 6950 of
2015 whereby the High Court has dismissed the application of the
petitioners herein for condoning the delay of 5659 days in filing the
proposed appeal.
6. The moot question before us is whether in the facts and circumstances
of the case, the High Court was justified in refusing to condone the
delay in filing the proposed appeal and to dismiss it as barred by
limitation.
7. The law of limitation is founded on public policy. It is enshrined in
the legal maxim “interest reipublicae ut sit finis litium” i.e. it is for the
general welfare that a period of limitation be put to litigation. The
object is to put an end to every legal remedy and to have a fixed
period of life for every litigation as it is futile to keep any litigation or
dispute pending indefinitely. Even public policy requires that there
should be an end to the litigation otherwise it would be a dichotomy
if the litigation is made immortal vis-a-vis the litigating parties i.e.
human beings, who are mortals.
8. The courts have always treated the statutes of limitation and
prescription as statutes of peace and repose. They envisage that a
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 247
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
right not exercised or the remedy not availed for a long time ceases
to exist. This is one way of putting to an end to a litigation by barring
the remedy rather than the right with the passage of time.
9. Section 3 of the Limitation Act in no uncertain terms lays down that
no suit, appeal or application instituted, preferred or made after the
period prescribed shall be entertained rather dismissed even though
limitation has not been set up as a defence subject to the exceptions
contained in Sections 4 to 24 (inclusive) of the Limitation Act.
10. Section 3(1) of the Limitation Act, for the sake of convenience, is
reproduced hereinbelow:
“3. Bar of limitation. - (1) Subject to the provisions
contained in sections 4 to 24 (inclusive), every suit
instituted, appeal preferred, and application made after the
prescribed period shall be dismissed, although limitation
has not been set up as a defence.”
11. Though Section 3 of the Act mentions about suit, appeal and
application but since in this case we are concerned with appeal, we
would hereinafter be mentioning about the appeal only in context
with the limitation, it being barred by time, if at all, and if the delay
in its filing is liable to be condoned.
12. In view of the above provision, the appeal which is preferred after
the expiry of the limitation is liable to be dismissed. The use of the
word ‘shall’ in the aforesaid provision connotes that the dismissal is
mandatory subject to the exceptions. Section 3 of the Act is peremptory
and had to be given effect to even though no objection regarding
limitation is taken by the other side or referred to in the pleadings.
In other words, it casts an obligation upon the court to dismiss an
appeal which is presented beyond limitation. This is the general law
of limitation. The exceptions are carved out under Sections 4 to 24
(inclusive) of the Limitation Act but we are concerned only with the
exception contained in Section 5 which empowers the courts to admit
an appeal even if it is preferred after the prescribed period provided
the proposed appellant gives ‘sufficient cause’ for not preferring the
appeal within the period prescribed. In other words, the courts are
conferred with discretionary powers to admit an appeal even after
the expiry of the prescribed period provided the proposed appellant
is able to establish ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing it within time. The
248 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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said power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred
after the expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be
exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host of other
factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due diligence etc.
13. It is very elementary and well understood that courts should not
adopt an injustice-oriented approach in dealing with the applications
for condonation of the delay in filing appeals and rather follow a
pragmatic line to advance substantial justice.
14. It may also be important to point out that though on one hand, Section
5 of the Limitation Act is to be construed liberally, but on the other
hand, Section 3 of the Limitation Act, being a substantive law of
mandatory nature has to be interpreted in a strict sense. In Bhag Mal
alias Ram Bux and Ors. vs. Munshi (Dead) by LRs. and Ors.1
,
it has been observed that different provisions of Limitation Act may
require different construction, as for example, the court exercises
its power in a given case liberally in condoning the delay in filing
the appeal under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, however, the same
may not be true while construing Section 3 of the Limitation Act. It,
therefore, follows that though liberal interpretation has to be given in
construing Section 5 of the Limitation Act but not in applying Section
3 of the Limitation Act, which has to be construed strictly.
15. It is in the light of the public policy upon which law of limitation is
based, the object behind the law of limitation and the mandatory and
the directory nature of Section 3 and Section 5 of the Limitation Act
that we have to examine and strike a balance between Section 3 and
Section 5 of the Limitation Act in the matters of condoning the delay.
16. Generally, the courts have adopted a very liberal approach in construing
the phrase ‘sufficient cause’ used in Section 5 of the Limitation Act
in order to condone the delay to enable the courts to do substantial
justice and to apply law in a meaningful manner which subserves the
ends of justice. In Collector, Land Acquisition, Anantnag and Ors.
vs. Katiji and Ors.2
, this Court in advocating the liberal approach in
condoning the delay for ‘sufficient cause’ held that ordinarily a litigant
does not stand to benefit by lodging an appeal late; it is not necessary
1 [2007] 1 SCR 1114 : (2007) 11 SCC 285
2 [1987] 2 SCR 387 : (1987) 2 SCC 107 : AIR 1987 SC 1353
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 249
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
to explain every day’s delay in filing the appeal; and since sometimes
refusal to condone delay may result in throwing out a meritorious
matter, it is necessary in the interest of justice that cause of substantial
justice should be allowed to prevail upon technical considerations and
if the delay is not deliberate, it ought to be condoned. Notwithstanding
the above, howsoever, liberal approach is adopted in condoning the
delay, existence of ‘sufficient cause’ for not filing the appeal in time, is
a condition precedent for exercising the discretionary power to condone
the delay. The phrases ‘liberal approach’, ‘justice-oriented approach’
and cause for the advancement of ‘substantial justice’ cannot be
employed to defeat the law of limitation so as to allow stale matters
or as a matter of fact dead matters to be revived and re-opened by
taking aid of Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
17. It must always be borne in mind that while construing ‘sufficient cause’
in deciding application under Section 5 of the Act, that on the expiry
of the period of limitation prescribed for filing an appeal, substantive
right in favour of a decree-holder accrues and this right ought not
to be lightly disturbed. The decree-holder treats the decree to be
binding with the lapse of time and may proceed on such assumption
creating new rights.
18. This Court as far back in 1962 in the case of Ramlal, Motilal And
Chhotelal vs. Rewa Coalfields Ltd3 has emphasized that even after
sufficient cause has been shown by a party for not filing an appeal
within time, the said party is not entitled to the condonation of delay
as excusing the delay is the discretionary jurisdiction vested with
the court. The court, despite establishment of a ‘sufficient cause’ for
various reasons, may refuse to condone the delay depending upon
the bona fides of the party.
19. In Maqbul Ahmad and Ors. vs. Onkar Pratap Narain Singh and
Ors.4
, it had been held that the court cannot grant an exemption from
limitation on equitable consideration or on the ground of hardship.
The court has time and again repeated that when mandatory
provision is not complied with and delay is not properly, satisfactorily
and convincingly explained, it ought not to condone the delay on
sympathetic grounds alone.
3 [1962] 2 SCR 762 : A.I.R. 1962 SC 361
4 A.I.R. 1935 PC 85
250 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
20. In this connection, a reference may be made to Brijesh Kumar and
Ors. vs. State of Haryana and Ors.5
wherein while observing, as
above, this Court further laid down that if some person has obtained
a relief approaching the court just or immediately when the cause of
action had arisen, other persons cannot take the benefit of the same
by approaching the court at a belated stage simply on the ground
of parity, equity, sympathy and compassion.
21. In Lanka Venkateswarlu vs. State of Andhra Pradesh & Ors.6
,
where the High Court, despite unsatisfactory explanation for the delay
of 3703 days, had allowed the applications for condonation of delay,
this Court held that the High Court failed to exercise its discretion
in a reasonable and objective manner. High Court should have
exercised the discretion in a systematic and an informed manner.
The liberal approach in considering sufficiency of cause for delay
should not be allowed to override substantial law of limitation. The
Court observed that the concepts such as ‘liberal approach’, ‘justiceoriented approach’ and ‘substantial justice’ cannot be employed to
jettison the substantial law of limitation.
22. It has also been settled vide State of Jharkhand & Ors. vs. Ashok
Kumar Chokhani & Ors.7
, that the merits of the case cannot be
considered while dealing with the application for condonation of
delay in filing the appeal.
23. In Basawaraj and Anr. vs. Special Land Acquisition Officer8
,
this Court held that the discretion to condone the delay has to
be exercised judiciously based upon the facts and circumstances
of each case. The expression ‘sufficient cause’ as occurring in
Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be liberally interpreted if
negligence, inaction or lack of bona fide is writ large. It was also
observed that even though limitation may harshly affect rights of
the parties but it has to be applied with all its rigour as prescribed
under the statute as the courts have no choice but to apply the
law as it stands and they have no power to condone the delay on
equitable grounds.
5 2014 (4) SCALE 50
6 [2011] 3 SCR 217 : (2011) 4 SCC 363
7 AIR 2009 SC 1927
8 [2013] 8 SCR 227 : (2013) 14 SCC 81
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 251
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
24. It would be beneficial to quote paragraph 12 of the aforesaid decision
which clinches the issue of the manner in which equilibrium has to be
maintained between adopting liberal approach and in implementing
the statute as it stands. Paragraph 12 reads as under:
“12. It is a settled legal proposition that law of limitation
may harshly affect a particular party but it has to be
applied with all its rigour when the statute so prescribes.
The Court has no power to extend the period of limitation
on equitable grounds. “A result flowing from a statutory
provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore
that provision to relieve what it considers a distress
resulting from its operation.” The statutory provision may
cause hardship or inconvenience to a particular party but
the court has no choice but to enforce it giving full effect
to the same. The legal maxim dura lex sed lex which
means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted
in such a situation. It has consistently been held that,
“inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered
while interpreting a statute.”
25. This Court in the same breath in the same very decision vide
paragraph 15 went on to observe as under:
“15. The law on the issue can be summarised to the effect
that where a case has been presented in the court beyond
limitation, the applicant has to explain the court as to
what was the “sufficient cause” which means an adequate
and enough reason which prevented him to approach
the court within limitation. In case a party is found to be
negligent, or for want of bona fide on his part in the facts
and circumstances of the case, or found to have not acted
diligently or remained inactive, there cannot be a justified
ground to condone the delay. No court could be justified
in condoning such an inordinate delay by imposing any
condition whatsoever. The application is to be decided only
within the parameters laid down by this Court in regard to
the condonation of delay. In case there was no sufficient
cause to prevent a litigant to approach the court on time
condoning the delay without any justification, putting any
condition whatsoever, amounts to passing an order in
252 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
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violation of the statutory provisions and it tantamounts to
showing utter disregard to the legislature.”
(emphasis supplied)
26. On a harmonious consideration of the provisions of the law, as
aforesaid, and the law laid down by this Court, it is evident that:
(i) Law of limitation is based upon public policy that there should
be an end to litigation by forfeiting the right to remedy rather
than the right itself;
(ii) A right or the remedy that has not been exercised or availed
of for a long time must come to an end or cease to exist after
a fixed period of time;
(iii) The provisions of the Limitation Act have to be construed
differently, such as Section 3 has to be construed in a strict
sense whereas Section 5 has to be construed liberally;
(iv) In order to advance substantial justice, though liberal approach,
justice-oriented approach or cause of substantial justice may
be kept in mind but the same cannot be used to defeat the
substantial law of limitation contained in Section 3 of the
Limitation Act;
(v) Courts are empowered to exercise discretion to condone the
delay if sufficient cause had been explained, but that exercise
of power is discretionary in nature and may not be exercised
even if sufficient cause is established for various factors such
as, where there is inordinate delay, negligence and want of
due diligence;
(vi) Merely some persons obtained relief in similar matter, it does
not mean that others are also entitled to the same benefit if
the court is not satisfied with the cause shown for the delay in
filing the appeal;
(vii) Merits of the case are not required to be considered in condoning
the delay; and
(viii) Delay condonation application has to be decided on the
parameters laid down for condoning the delay and condoning
the delay for the reason that the conditions have been imposed,
tantamounts to disregarding the statutory provision.
[2024] 4 S.C.R. 253
Pathupati Subba Reddy (Died) by L.Rs. & Ors. v.
The Special Deputy Collector (LA)
27. It is in the light of the above legal position that now we have to test
whether the inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal ought to
be condoned or not in this case.
28. The submission of learned counsel for the petitioners is that in
somewhat similar situation, delay in filing appeal for the enhancement
of compensation had been condoned by this Court. He placed
reliance upon the case of Dhiraj Singh (Dead) through Legal
Representatives & Ors. vs. State of Haryana & Ors.9
. In this case,
delay in filing appeal was condoned as in other appeals compensation
awarded at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. was upheld and the
proposed appellants were also held entitled to the same benefit of
compensation at the rate of Rs.200/- per sq. yd. instead of Rs.101/-
per sq. yd. as awarded but with the rider that they will not be entitled
for interest for the period of delay in approaching the High Court.
29. The other decision relied upon in this regard is the case of Imrat
Lal & Ors. vs. Land Acquisition Collector & Ors.10. In this case
also the matter was regarding determination of compensation for
the acquired land and there was a delay of 1110 days in filing the
appeal for enhancement of compensation. Despite findings that no
sufficient cause was shown in the application for condoning the delay,
this Court condoned the delay in filing the appeal as a large number
of similarly situate persons have been granted relief by this Court.
30. The aforesaid decisions would not cut any ice as imposition of
conditions are not warranted when sufficient cause has not been
shown for condoning the delay. Secondly, delay is not liable to
be condoned merely because some persons have been granted
relief on the facts of their own case. Condonation of delay in such
circumstances is in violation of the legislative intent or the express
provision of the statute. Condoning of the delay merely for the reason
that the claimants have been deprived of the interest for the delay
without holding that they had made out a case for condoning the delay
is not a correct approach, particularly when both the above decisions
have been rendered in ignorance of the earlier pronouncement in
the case of Basawaraj (supra).
9 (2014) 14 SCC 127
10 (2014) 14 SCC 133
254 [2024] 4 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
31. Learned counsel for the petitioners next submitted on the basis of
additional documents that in connection with the land acquisition in
some other Special Leave Petitions, delay was condoned taking a
lenient view and the compensation was enhanced with the rider that
the claimants shall not be entitled for statutory benefits for the period
of delay in approaching this Court or the High Court. The said orders
do not clearly spell out the facts and the reasons explaining the delay
in filing the appeal(s) but the fact remains that the delay was condoned
by taking too liberal an approach and putting conditions which have
not been approved of by this Court itself. In the absence of the facts
for getting the delay condoned in the referred cases, vis-à-vis, the
facts of this case, it cannot be said that the facts or the reasons of
getting the delay condoned are identical or similar. Therefore, we are
unable to exercise our discretionary power of condoning the delay
in filing the appeal on parity with the above order(s).
32. Moreover, the High Court, in the facts of this case, has not found it fit
to exercise its discretionary jurisdiction of condoning the delay. There
is no occasion for us to interfere with the discretion so exercised by
the High Court for the reasons recorded. First, the claimants were
negligent in pursuing the reference and then in filing the proposed
appeal. Secondly, most of the claimants have accepted the decision
of the reference court. Thirdly, in the event the petitioners have not
been substituted and made party to the reference before its decision,
they could have applied for procedural review which they never did.
Thus, there is apparently no due diligence on their part in pursuing
the matter. Accordingly, in our opinion, High Court is justified in
refusing to condone the delay in filing the appeal.
33. In the above situation, we do not deem it proper and necessary to
interfere with the decision of the High Court refusing to condone the
inordinate delay in filing the proposed appeal.
34. The Special Leave Petition, as such, lacks merit and is dismissed.
Headnotes prepared by: Result of the case:
Swathi H. Prasad, Hony. Associate Editor Special Leave
(Verified by: Liz Mathew, Sr. Adv.) Petition dismissed.
