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Thursday, March 28, 2024

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – clause (a) to subsection (2) of s.25, s.238, s.243 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 – Regn. 29 – The appellant-Airtel entities argued that they are entitled to statutory set-off or insolvency set-off, in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Proceedings under Chapter II Part II of the IBC:

* Author

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 140 : 2024 INSC 15

Case Details

Bharti Airtel Limited and Another

v.

Vijaykumar V. Iyer and Others

(Civil Appeal Nos. 3088-3089 of 2020)

03 January 2024

[Sanjiv Khanna* and S.V.N. Bhatti, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The present appeals raise a question on the right to claim set-off in

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, when the Resolution

Professional proceeds in terms of clause (a) to sub-section (2) of

s.25 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 to take custody

and control of all the assets of the corporate debtor.

Headnotes

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – clause (a) to subsection (2) of s.25, s.238, s.243 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 – Regn.

29 – The appellant-Airtel entities argued that they are entitled

to statutory set-off or insolvency set-off, in the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Proceedings under Chapter II Part II

of the IBC:

Held: The IBC is a complete code relying upon the opening part of

the enactment and s.238 and s.243 nullifies the argument raised

by the appellant Airtel entities that they are entitled to statutory

set-off or insolvency set-off, in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution

Proceedings under Chapter II Part II of the IBC – Regulation 29

of the Liquidation Regulations does not apply to Part II of the

IBC – The legislation or even the legislative intent permits neither

statutory set-off, nor insolvency set-off. [Para 37]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Difference between

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and the

liquidation process:

Held: There is a difference between the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process and the liquidation process of the IBC – The

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process focuses on and fosters

rehabilitation, revival and resolution of the corporate debtor, 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 141

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

whereas the liquidation process focuses on the constellation of

assets of the company in liquidation, and distribution and payment

to the creditors from the liquidation estate in terms of the order of

preference set out in the insolvency statute. [Para 12]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Insolvency and

Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations,

2016 – Regn. 29 – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or. VIII, r.6 –

Application of the Provisions of statutory set-off to Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process:

Held: The provisions of statutory set-off in terms of Or. VIII, r. 6

of CPC or insolvency set-off as permitted by Regulation 29 of

the Liquidation Regulations cannot be applied to the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process – The aforesaid rule would be,

however, subject to two exceptions or situations – The first, if at

all it can be called an exception, is where a party is entitled to

contractual set-off, on the date which is effective before or on the

date the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is put into motion

or commences – The reason is simple – The Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process does not preclude application of contractual

set-off – The second exception will be in the case of ‘equitable

set-off’ when the claim and counter claim in the form of set-off are

linked and connected on account of one or more transactions that

can be treated as one – The set-off should be genuine and clearly

established on facts and in law, so as to make it inequitable and

unfair that the debtor be asked to pay money, without adjustment

sought that is fully justified and legal – The amount to be adjusted

should be a quantifiable and unquestionable monetary claim, as

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is a time-bound

summary procedure. [Paras 30 and 32]

Words and Phrases – Set-off – Meaning of:

Held: Set-off in generic sense recognises the right of a debtor

to adjust the smaller claim owed to him against the larger claim

payable to his creditor – Set-off is given legal preference for three

reasons – First, in economic terms, set-off is a form of security

recognised in law – It is, however, not a security in a strict sense,

but a right that enhances provision of credit and acts as a stimulus

to trade and commerce by giving a degree of confidence to parties

dealing with each other – Secondly, it helps reduce litigation,

promotes economy of time and is an efficient method in resolving

debt between parties – Thirdly, natural equity requires that cross-

142 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

demands should compensate each other by deducting the lesser

sum from the greater – At least five different meanings can be

ascribed to the term ‘set-off’, namely, (a) statutory or legal set-off;

(b) common law set-off; (c) equitable set-off; (d) contractual set-off;

and (e) insolvency set-off. [Paras 3, 4 and 5]

Words and Phrases – Contractual set-off – Meaning of:

Held: Contractual set-off is a matter of agreement, rather than a

separate application of set-off – The parties are free to mutually

agree on the outcomes they desire – Being consensual, when

expressly stated, the normal rules of set-off regarding mutuality of

credits or debts, liquid debts, and connected debts-aspects relevant

and noticed below while dealing with statutory/legal set-offs or

even insolvency set-off - may not apply – The contract, however,

should be within bounds of legality and public policy – Further,

the normal requirements of the law of contracts, viz. intention to

create legal relationship, acceptance, consideration etc. should

be established for a valid contractual set-off – Ascertaining the

applicability of contractual set-off requires an assessment of the

understanding whether the right is conferred by the agreement, as

the court gives effect to the intention of the parties as to how they

should deal – The right to set-off may be explicit in the words of

the agreement, or can be gathered by existence of oral or implied

agreement to set-off, reflecting an understanding to the said effect.

[Paras 6 and 7]

Words and Phrases – Statutory or legal set-off:

Held: Statutory or legal set-off is created by a statute – For

example, Order VIII Rule 6 of the CPC states that where a suit for

recovery of money is filed, the defendant can claim set-off against

the plaintiff’s demand for any ascertained sum of money legally

recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff, but not exceeding

the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court – It requires that

both the parties should fill the same character as they fill in the

plaintiff’s suit. [Para 8]

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India (Liquidation

Process) Regulations, 2016 – Regn. 29 – Mutual dealings:

Held: The expression ‘mutual dealings’ for the purpose of

Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations, is wider than the

statutory set-off postulated under Order VIII Rule 6 of CPC, as

well as, equitable set-off under the common law as applicable in 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 143

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

India – Insolvency set-off applies when demands are between the

same parties – There must be commonality of identity between

the person who has made the claim and the person against

whom the claim exists – Even when there are several distinct and

independent transactions, mutuality can exist between the same

parties functioning in the same right or capacity – Mutual dealings

are not so much concerned with the nature of the claims, but with

the relationship and apposite identity of the parties giving rise to

the respective claims, such that it would offend one’s sense of

fairness or justice to allow one to be enforced without regard to

the other. [Para 22]

List Of Citations and Other References

Indian Overseas Bank v. RCM Infrastructure Ltd. and

Another:(2022) 8 SCC 516; Innoventive Industries

Limited v. ICICI Bank and Another [2017] 8 SCR

33:(2018) 1 SCC 407; Embassy Property Developments

Private Limited. v. State of Karnataka and Others [2019]

17 SCR 559:(2020) 13 SCC 308; V. Nagarajan v. SKS

Ispat and Power Limited and Others (2022) 2 SCC

244; Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree

Thakurji Educational Society, 2023 SCC OnLine SC

586; The Official Liquidator of High Court of Karnataka

v. Smt. V. Lakshmikutty [1981] 2 SCR 349:(1981) 3

SCC 32 – referred to.

Ebix Singapore Private Limited v. Committee of Creditors

of Educomp Solutions Limited and Another. (2022) 2

SCC 401; Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and Another

v. Union of India and Others [2019] 3 SCR 535:(2019)

4 SCC 17 – held inapplicable.

Jurong Aromatics Corporation Pte Ltd. and Others v.

BP Singapore Pte Ltd. and Another, (2018) SGHC 215;

Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. v. Molena Alpha

Inc., (1978) Q.B. 927; Ministre du Revenu national c.

Caisse Populaire du bon Conseil, 2009 SCC 29; Jeffs

v. Wood, [1723] 2 Eq Ca. Ab. 10; Citibank Canada v.

Confederation of Life Insurance Company, 42 CRB (3)

(d) 288; Ramdhari v. Premanand, 19 Cal WN 1183;

Re.: Bank of Credit and Commerce International SA

(No. 8) [1996] Ch. 245; Stein v. Blake [1996] A.C.

243; National Westminster Bank Ltd. v. Halesowen 

144 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Presswork & Assemblies Ltd. 1972 AC 785; Gye v.

McIntyre (1991) 171 CLR 609; BP Singapore Pte Ltd

v. Jurong Aromatics Corp Pte Ltd and Others (2020)

SGCA 09; Belmont Park Investments v. BNY Corporate

Trustee Services Ltd. [2012] 1 AC 383; British Eagle

International Airlines Ltd v. Compagnie Nationale Air

France 1975 1 WLR 758 – referred to.

Maheswari Metals & Metal Refinery, Bangalore v.

Madras State Small Industries Corporation, AIR 1974

Mad 39; Gokul Chit Funds and Trades Private Ltd. v.

Thoundasseri Kochu Ouseph Vareed and Others AIR

1977 Ker 68 – referred to.

Philip R. Wood, Set-off and Netting, Derivatives,

Clearing Systems, (Sweet & Maxwell 2007); Kelly

R. Palmer, The Law of Set Off in Canada (Canada

Law Book 1993); Canadian Encyclopedic Digest,

Release 3, “Personal Property” by Gloria Mintah, §

187, CD-ROM (Thomson Reuters Canada Limited,

August 2009); Rory Derham, Derham on the Law of

Set-Off (Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2010) ;Gerard

McCormack, Set-off under the European Insolvency

Regulation (and English Law), 29 IIR 100, 100-117

(2020); UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency

Law, Chapter G. p.155-156 (2005) – referred to.

List of Acts

Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016 – Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 2016 – Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908.

List of Keywords

Insolvency; Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process; Set-off;

Statutory or legal set-off; Common law set-off; Equitable set-off;

Contractual set-off; Insolvency set-off; Mutual dealings.

Other Case Details Including Impugned Order and

Appearances

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos.3088-3089 of

2020.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 145

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

From the Judgment and Order dated 13.07.2020 of the National

Company Law Appellate Tribunal, New Delhi in Company Appeal

(AT) (Insolvency) Nos.530 and 700 of 2019.

Appearances:

Darius Khambata, Sr. Adv., Harsh Kaushik, Sandeep Devashish Das,

Ramakant Rai, Somesh Srivastava, Tushar Hathiramani, Kumar

Gourav, Varun Kumar Tikmani, Advs. for the Appellants.

N Venkataraman, A.S.G., Shyam Divan, Sr. Adv., Rishi Agrawala,

Mahesh Agarwal, Victor Das, E. C. Agrawala, M/s. Cyril Amarchand

Mangaldas, Raunak Dhillon, Ms. Ananya Dhar Choudhury, Ms.

Niharika Shukla, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of The Supreme Court

Judgment

Sanjiv Khanna, J.

The present appeals raise an interesting question on the right to claim

set-off in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, when the

Resolution Professional proceeds in terms of clause (a) to sub-section

(2) of Section 25 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 20161

 to

take custody and control of all the assets of the corporate debtor.

2. In order to decide the issue raised in these appeals, we are required

to refer to the facts in brief:

2.1 In April 2016, Bharti Airtel Limited and Bharti Hexacom Limited2

entered into eight spectrum trading agreements with Aircel

Limited and Dishnet Wireless Limited3 for purchase of the

right to use the spectrum allocated to the latter in the 2300

MHz band. The agreement was contingent on approval of the

Department of Telecommunications4, Government of India.

The DoT for grant of approval demanded bank guarantees in

relation to certain licence dues and spectrum usage dues from

the Aircel entities. Challenging this direction, the Aircel entities

1 For short, ‘IBC’.

2 For short- ‘The appellants’ or ‘Airtel entities’.

3 For short- ‘Aircel entities’.

4 For short- ‘DoT’.

146 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

approached the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate

Tribunal5

. By the interim order dated 3rd June 2016, TDSAT

directed Aircel entities to submit the bank guarantees. As the

Aircel entities did not have the means to procure and submit

the bank guarantees for approximately Rs.453.73 crores, they

approached the Airtel entities to submit bank guarantees on

their behalf to the DoT.

2.2 In terms of the eight spectrum transfer agreements, the Airtel

Entities were to pay Rs.4,022.75 crores to the Aircel entities.

The Airtel entities and Aircel entities entered into three Letters

of Understanding whereby the Airtel entities agreed to furnish

the bank guarantees to the DOT on behalf of the Aircel entities.

The Airtel entities were to deduct Rs.586.37 crores from the

consideration payable to the Aircel entities under the spectrum

transfer agreements. On the Aircel entities replacing the bank

guarantees furnished by the Airtel entities and the Airtel entities

receiving the bank guarantees from the DOT, Rs.411.22 crores

were payable by the Airtel entities to the Aircel entities.

2.3 TDSAT vide order dated 9th January 2018 held that the DOT’s

demand of Rs.298 crores against the Aircel entities was

untenable, and directed the DoT to return the bank guarantees

to the Aircel entities. However, the bank guarantees were not

returned by the DoT, which preferred Civil Appeal No. 5816

of 2018 before this Court. Cross-appeals were filed by Aircel

entities.

2.4 This Court by order dated 28th November 2018 held at the

interim stage, that the order of the TDSAT dated 9th January

2018, insofar as bank guarantees are concerned, shall be given

effect to. However, the DoT did not return the bank guarantees.

2.5 In view of the aforesaid, the Airtel entities wrote to the bank

seeking confirmation of cancellation of the bank guarantees.

As the banks were reluctant, the Airtel entities approached this

Court, which vide order dated 8th January 2019, directed that

the bank guarantees shall be cancelled and shall not be used

for any purpose whatsoever.

5 For short- ‘the TDSAT’.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 147

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

2.6 Thereupon the Airtel entities made a payment of Rs.341.80

crores due to the Aircel entities on 10th January 2019. The

balance amount of Rs.145.20 crores was set-off by the Airtel

entities on the ground that this amount was owed by the

Aircel entities to the Airtel entities. According to Airtel entities,

Rs.145.20 crores was the adjusted or the net amount payable

by the Aircel entities towards operational charges, SMS charges

and interconnect usage charges6

 to the Airtel entities.

2.7 In the meanwhile, Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

was initiated against Aircel entities, namely Aircel Limited and

Dishnet Wireless Limited. The Adjudicating Authority7

, Mumbai

Bench, admitted the petitions against Aircel Limited and Dishnet

Wireless Limited vide the orders dated 12th March 2018 and

19th March 2018.

2.8 Claims on account of the interconnect charges were filed by

Bharti Airtel Limited, including the claim on behalf of Telenor

(India) Communications Private Limited8

, in light of Telenor’s

merger with Bharti Airtel Limited, effective from 14th May 2018.

Claim was also filed by Bharti Hexacom Limited. The total claim

by the Airtel Entities was Rs.203.46 crores. However, the Airtel

entities also owed Rs.64.11 crores towards interconnect charges

to the Aircel entities.

2.9 The claims submitted by the Airtel entities were admitted by the

Resolution Professional to the extent of Rs.112 crores. Claim on

account of receivable of about Rs.5.85 crores owed by Aircel

entities to Telenor India, which had been merged with Bharti

Airtel Limited, was not accepted.

2.10 By the letter dated 12th January 2019, the Resolution

Professional for Aircel Limited, Dishnet Wireless Limited and

Aircel Cellular Limited, wrote to Bharti Airtel Limited, stating that

they had suo moto adjusted an amount of Rs.112.87 crores

from the amount of Rs.453.73 crores payable by Airtel entities

to Aircel entities, consequent to the discharge and cancellation

6 For short- ‘interconnect charges’.

7 Section 5(1) of IBC– “Adjudicating Authority”, for the purposes of this Part, means National Company

Law Tribunal constituted under Section 408 of the Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013).

8 For short- ‘Telenor India’.

148 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

of the bank guarantees. Bharti Airtel Limited was asked to pay

Rs.112.87 crores to Aircel entities, which were undergoing

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, failing which the

Resolution Professional would be obligated to take steps for

recovery. The Airtel entities objected on several grounds, and

also claimed set-off of the amount due to them by the Aircel

entities from the amount payable by them to the Aircel entities.

Their reply and claim for set-off was rejected by the Resolution

Professional.

2.11 The Airtel entities thereupon approached the Adjudicating

Authority in Mumbai, who, vide order dated 1st May 2019 held

that the Airtel entities had a right to set off Rs.112.87 crores

from the payment, which was retained, and due and payable

to Aircel entities.

2.12 This order was challenged by the Resolution Professional

before the National Company Law Appellate Tribunal9

. The

NCLAT vide order dated 17th May 2019 allowed the appeal,

inter alia, holding that set-off is violative of the basic principles

and protection accorded under any insolvency law. Set-off is

antithetical to the objective of the IBC. Reference was made to

the non-obstante provisions in the form of Section 238 of the

IBC. As moratorium under Section 14(4) applies till the date of

completion of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process,

which is till the resolution plan is approved or the liquidation

order is passed, to permit set-off will be contrary to law. Further,

the set-off being claimed is in respect of two separate and

unrelated transactions.

Meaning of set-off and types and principles of set-off.

3. Set-off in generic sense recognises the right of a debtor to adjust

the smaller claim owed to him against the larger claim payable to

his creditor.10 Philip R. Wood11 calls it a form of payment. Palmer12

notes a distinction between ‘set-off’ as in accounting, and ‘set-off’ as

a defence. The former focuses on the practical effect of set-off which

9 For short- ‘NCLAT’.

10 Philip R. Wood, Set-off and Netting, Derivatives, Clearing Systems, (Sweet & Maxwell 2007).

11 Ibid.

12 Kelly R. Palmer, The Law of Set Off in Canada (Canada Law Book 1993). 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 149

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

results in discharge of reciprocal obligations, while the latter focuses

on set-off pleaded as a defence to a claim, albeit not as a ‘sword’.

4. Set-off is given legal preference for three reasons. First, in economic

terms, set-off is a form of security recognised in law. It is, however,

not a security in a strict sense, but a right that enhances provision

of credit and acts as a stimulus to trade and commerce by giving a

degree of confidence to parties dealing with each other. Secondly,

it helps reduce litigation, promotes economy of time and is an

efficient method in resolving debt between parties. Thirdly, natural

equity requires that cross-demands should compensate each other

by deducting the lesser sum from the greater.

5. At least five different meanings can be ascribed to the term ‘set-off’,

namely, (a) statutory or legal set-off; (b) common law set-off; (c)

equitable set-off; (d) contractual set-off; and (e) insolvency set-off.13

It is observed that the streams of common law and equity on the

right of set-off have flown together and have so combined as to be in

the modern era indistinguishable from one another.14 It is necessary

to briefly explain the contours of contractual set-off, statutory/legal

set-off, equitable set-off and insolvency set-off.

6. Contractual set-off is a matter of agreement, rather than a separate

application of set-off. The parties are free to mutually agree on the

outcomes they desire. Being consensual, when expressly stated, the

normal rules of set-off regarding mutuality of credits or debts, liquid

debts, and connected debts – aspects relevant and noticed below

while dealing with statutory/legal set-offs or even insolvency set-off

– may not apply. The contract, however, should be within bounds

of legality and public policy.15 Further, the normal requirements

of the law of contracts, viz. intention to create legal relationship,

acceptance, consideration etc. should be established for a valid

contractual set-off.16

7. Ascertaining the applicability of contractual set-off requires an

assessment of the understanding whether the right is conferred by

13 Jurong Aromatics Corporation Pte Ltd. and Others v. BP Singapore Pte Ltd. and Another, (2018) SGHC

215. (High Court of Republic of Singapore)

14 Federal Commerce and Navigation Co. v. Molena Alpha Inc., (1978) Q.B. 927. (Lord Denning)

15 Palmer, supra note 12, at 263.

16 Palmer, supra note 12, at 263.

150 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

the agreement, as the court gives effect to the intention of the parties

as to how they should deal.17 The right to set-off may be explicit in

the words of the agreement, or can be gathered by existence of oral

or implied agreement to set-off, reflecting an understanding to the

said effect. There are earlier judgments in common law countries

that suggest that courts may rely on the equitable foundations of setoff to relax the evidentiary burden required to prove an agreement

to set-off.18 It is suggested that courts accept slighter evidence of

agreement to set-off than is usually required in order to establish

disputed facts,19 but this is too broad a statement. Rather, the courts

should consider that netting of cross dues is both legitimate and

equitable, and in that context make an assessment of the relevant

facts to decide whether or not the set-off rights are conferred.

8. Statutory or legal set-off is created by a statute. For example,

Order VIII Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 190820 states that

where a suit for recovery of money is filed, the defendant can claim

set-off against the plaintiff’s demand for any ascertained sum of

money legally recoverable by the defendant from the plaintiff, but

not exceeding the pecuniary limits of the jurisdiction of the court. It

requires that both the parties should fill the same character as they

fill in the plaintiff’s suit. The defendant may, at the first hearing of

the suit, and not afterwards, unless permitted by the court, present

the written statement containing particulars of debts sought to be

set-off.21 For set-off in law, the obligations existing between the

17 Ministre du Revenu national c. Caisse Populaire du bon Conseil, 2009 SCC 29 (S.C.C.) (Supreme

Court of Canada)

18 Jeffs v. Wood, [1723] 2 Eq Ca. Ab. 10.

19 Canadian Encyclopedic Digest, Release 3, “Personal Property” by Gloria Mintah, § 187, CD-ROM

(Thomson Reuters Canada Limited, August 2009); See also Palmer, supra note 12, at 263.

20 Order VIII Rule 6. Particulars of set-off to be given in written statement.—(1) Where in a suit for

the recovery of money the defendant claims to set-off against the plaintiff’s demand any ascertained

sum of money legally recoverable by him from the plaintiff, not exceeding the pecuniary limits of the

jurisdiction of the Court, and both parties fill the same character as they fill in the plaintiff’s suit, the

defendant may, at the first hearing of the suit, but not afterwards unless permitted by the Court, present

a written statement containing the particulars of the debt sought to be set-off.

(2) Effect of set-off.—The written statement shall have the same effect as a plaint in a cross-suit so

as to enable the Court to pronounce a final judgment in respect both of the original claim and of the

set-off, but this shall not affect the lien, upon the amount decreed, of any pleader in respect of the costs

payable to him under the decree.

(3) The rules relating to a written statement by a defendant apply to a written statement in answer to a

claim of set-off.

21 For the purpose of the present decision, we need not examine the contours and conditions of Order

VIII Rule 6 CPC.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 151

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

two parties must be debts which are for liquidated sums or money

demands which can be ascertained with certainty. Both the debts

must be mutual cross-obligations, that is, cross-claims between the

parties in the same right.22

9. A few judgments of this Court and the High Courts allow the defendant

to claim equitable set-off in respect of an unascertained sum of

money payable as damages. Equitable set-off can also be claimed

in respect of an ascertained sum of money.23 However, the claim for

an equitable set-off must have a connection between the plaintiff’s

claim for the debt and the defendant’s claim to set-off, which would

make it inequitable to drive the defendant to a separate suit.24 It

has been accordingly held that the claim for set-off should arise

out of the same transaction, or transactions which can be regarded

as one transaction. Equitable set-off is allowed in common law, as

distinguished from legal set-off, which is allowed by the court only for

an ascertained sum of money and is a statutory right. We shall be

subsequently examining the right to equitable set-off while examining

the provisions of the IBC.

10. Rory Derham on the law of set-offs observes that insolvency setoffs should not be equated with equitable set-offs.25 This statement

reflects the development of law in the United Kingdom, which has

resulted in enactment of special provisions on set-off in case of

insolvency. We need not examine in detail the law as applicable to

insolvency set-off in the United Kingdom for the present decision,

albeit it is relevant to state that they are broader and wider than

the provisions of equitable set-off. Insolvency set-off under the law

of the United Kingdom is permitted when there are mutual debts,

mutual credits and other mutual dealings between the parties at the

relevant cut-off time, which is essentially the stage of commencement

of the liquidation process. We shall subsequently examine the term

“mutual dealings” as applicable to liquidation proceedings in India.

22 Citibank Canada v. Confederation of Life Insurance Company, 42 CRB (3)(d) 288.

23 Ramdhari v. Premanand, 19 Cal WN 1183.

24 Maheswari Metals & Metal Refinery, Bangalore v. Madras State Small Industries Corporation, AIR 1974

Mad 39.

25 Rory Derham, Derham on the Law of Set-Off (Oxford University Press 4th ed. 2010).

152 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Analysis of the provisions of IBC relating to the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process, liquidation proceedings and

application to the facts of present case.

11. In the present case we are examining and concerned with the

provisions as applicable to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution

Process in Chapter II Part II of the IBC, which consists of the

compendium of Sections from 6 to 32A of the IBC. In the course of

our discussion, we would also be referring to Section 53 of the IBC,

which is a part of Chapter III Part II, and relates to the liquidation

process.

12. At the outset we should record, that there is a difference between

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and the liquidation

process of the IBC. The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

focuses on and fosters rehabilitation, revival and resolution of the

corporate debtor, whereas the liquidation process focuses on the

constellation of assets of the company in liquidation, and distribution

and payment to the creditors from the liquidation estate in terms of

the order of preference set out in the insolvency statute.

13. Unlike the provisions of the Companies Act, 1956 or the Companies

Act, 2013, IBC in the case of Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

does not give the indebted creditors the right to set-off against the

corporate debtor. The earlier enactments – the Companies Act,

1956 vide Section 529, and the Companies Act, 2013 vide Section

325 (now omitted) – did permit set-off per the Provincial Insolvency

Act, 1920, which enactment is now repealed. Accordingly, under

the Companies Acts, in terms of the provisions of Section 46 of the

Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920, indebted creditors’ right to set-off

against the corporate debtor was statutorily recognised subject

to satisfaction of certain conditions. Significantly, in the case of

partnerships and individual bankruptcies, Section 17326 of the IBC

26 Section 173. Mutual credit and set-off.—(1) Where before the bankruptcy commencement date,

there have been mutual dealings between the bankrupt and any creditor, the bankruptcy trustee shall—

(a) take an account of what is due from each party to the other in respect of the mutual dealings and

the sums due from one party shall be set-off against the sums due from the other; and

(b) only the balance shall be provable as a bankruptcy debt or as the amount payable to the bankruptcy trustee as part of the estate of the bankrupt.

(2) Sums due from the bankrupt to another party shall not be included in the account taken by the

bankruptcy trustee under sub-section (1), if that other party had notice at the time they became due

that an application for bankruptcy relating to the bankrupt was pending.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 153

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VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

permits set-off. Regulation 29 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy

Board of India (Liquidation Process) Regulations, 201627 provides

for mutual credits and set-off and reads:

“29. Mutual credits and set-off.— Where there are mutual

dealings between the corporate debtor and another party,

the sums due from one party shall be set off against the

sums due from the other to arrive at the net amount payable

to the corporate debtor or to the other party.”

The title of the Liquidation Regulations states that they

shall apply to the process under Chapter III Part II of the

IBC. In other words, the Liquidation Regulations are not

applicable to Chapter II Part II of the IBC, which relates

to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

14. Section 36(4) in Chapter III Part II of the IBC28 deals with the

exclusion of assets that do not form part of the liquidation estate.

Section 36(4) permits the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Board of India29

to specify assets which could be subject to set-off on account of

mutual dealings between the corporate debtor and the creditor. When

an asset is excluded from the liquidation estate, it is not available

for distribution in the liquidation process. It follows that if a creditor

exercises and is allowed set-off, then in terms of Section 36(4) of

the IBC this creditor is given a preferred status over others, including

the secured creditors, to the extent of the set-off value.

27 For short- ‘the Liquidation Regulations’.

28 Section 36 (4). The following shall not be included in the liquidation estate assets and shall not

be used for recovery in the liquidation—

(a) assets owned by a third party which are in possession of the corporate debtor, including—

(i) assets held in trust for any third party;

(ii) bailment contracts;

(iii) all sums due to any workman or employee from the provident fund, the pension fund and the gratuity

fund;

(iv) other contractual arrangements which do not stipulate transfer of title but only use of the assets; and

(v) such other assets as may be notified by the Central Government in consultation with any financial sector

regulator;

(b) assets in security collateral held by financial services providers and are subject to netting and set-off in

multilateral trading or clearing transactions;

(c) personal assets of any shareholder or partner of a corporate debtor as the case may be provided such

assets are not held on account of avoidance transactions that may be avoided under this Chapter;

(d) assets of any Indian or foreign subsidiary of the corporate debtor; or

(e) any other assets as may be specified by the Board, including assets which could be subject to set off on

account of mutual dealings between the corporate debtor and any creditor.

29 For short- ‘the Board’.

154 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

15. The Liquidation Regulations have been framed in exercise of powers

conferred on the Board by Sections 5, 33, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40,

41, 43, 45, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 196 and 208 read with Section 240 of

the IBC. Notwithstanding the omission in the Liquidation Regulations

to refer to Section 36(4) of the IBC, set-off on account of mutual

dealings is permitted in terms of Regulation 29 of the Liquidation

Regulations. The sums due mutually can be set off to arrive at the

net amount payable to the corporate debtor or the other party. The

exclusion will result in reduction of the liquidation estate and therefore

has consequences as noticed above. In the present case, we are

not concerned with what is to be included and is a part, or not a

part of the liquidation estate.

16. The expression ‘mutual dealings’ is the condition to be satisfied

for insolvency set-off under Regulation 29. We will examine what

is meant by the expression ‘mutual dealings’, and how insolvency

set-off is different from contractual, statutory and equitable set-off.

17. Insolvency set-off under the United Kingdom insolvency law was

examined in Re.: Bank of Credit and Commerce International

SA (No. 8) 30, to imply that the set-off must relate to dealings prior

to bankruptcy. It states in explicit terms that the requirement of

mutuality is central to bankruptcy set-off and must be rigorously

enforced. It is held that it is not the function of an insolvency set-off

to confer a benefit to a debtor who has not been a part of mutual

dealings, or to give preference to a creditor who has secondary or

no liability. The insolvency set-off regime in the United Kingdom is

wider than statutory/legal set-off or equitable set-off. However, there

is a requirement that the debt should have been provable in the

insolvency process.

17.1 An earlier decision in Stein v. Blake31 had held that the

bankruptcy set-off applies to all claims from mutual credits or

dealings prior to bankruptcy, including claims, which at the

time of bankruptcy were due but not payable, unascertained

or contingent. This is supplemented by the United Kingdom

insolvency set-off regime permitting the estimation of liabilities

and calculation of trends. The parties are not required at any

30 [1996] Ch. 245. (Appeal Committee of the House of Lords)

31 [1996] A.C. 243. (House of Lords)

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 155

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VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

particular time to meet and calculate the extent of each other’s

liabilities. Further, the account is a deemed account by which

the claim and counterclaim are automatically reduced to a net

balance. The original choses in action, that is, the claim and

the counterclaim, are in effect replaced by a claim to a net

balance. We must also note that the provisions of Section 323

of the Insolvency Act, 1986, as applicable in the United Kingdom

uses the expressions “mutual credits, mutual debts, or other

mutual dealings between the bankrupt and any creditor of the

bankrupt, proving or claiming to prove for a bankruptcy debt.”

Further, Rule 2.85 of the Insolvency Rules, 1986, applicable to

the administration, which is similar to the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process, states that at the time of distribution,

only the balance (if any) of the account held by the creditor

is provable in the administration. Alternatively, the balance (if

any) owed to the company is payable to the administrator as

a part of the assets, subject to the exceptions as provided.

17.2 There are also decisions as in the case of National Westminster

Bank Ltd. v. Halesowen Presswork & Assemblies Ltd.32,

which highlight the mandatory nature of insolvency set-off in the

United Kingdom. The Insolvency Rules, 1986 imply that the right

to set-off co-exists with the moratorium during administration,

because of the time at which the dues owed to each party are

calculated.33 The set-off does not occur automatically once

the company enters into the administration process. It applies

once the intention to distribute the assets is announced by

the administrator. Also, the doctrine of set-off does not apply

in case of company voluntary arrangement under Part I of

the Insolvency Act, 1986. Rory Derham observes that the

insolvency set-off section not being expressly applicable to a

company voluntary arrangement, any set-off, in the absence

of contractual right of set-off, does not apply. He observes that

the right to set-off in the absence of contractual right to set-off

depends on the statute of set-off and equitable set-off. Further, a

claim against the corporate debtor incurred after initiation of the

administration cannot be set-off against the debtor’s cross-claim

32 1972 AC 785.

33 Derham, supra note 25, ¶6.124.

156 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

for lack of mutuality. A claim against the debtor after initiation

of administration is not against the corporate debtor itself.

18. The High Court of Australia in Gye v. McIntyre34 states that the

word ‘mutual’ conveys the notion of reciprocity rather than that of

correspondence. Mutuality means that the demands must be between

the same parties and they must be held in the same capacity, or

right or interest. Mutuality is concerned with the status of the parties

and their relationship with each other, and not with the nature of the

claims themselves. There must be identity between the persons

beneficially interested in the claims and the person against whom the

claim existed. Therefore, an obligation arising out of an instrument

may be set-off against a simple contract debt, and a secured debt

may be set-off against an unsecured creditor. The court, however,

expressed that the requirement of same parties means that A’s

right to sue B cannot be set-off against A’s debt to C or that a joint

demand cannot be set-off against a separate demand.

19. The Court of Appeal of Republic of Singapore in BP Singapore Pte

Ltd v. Jurong Aromatics Corp Pte Ltd and Others35 observes

that the requirement of mutuality will fail in respect of prior claims

against the debtor company, where the receiver (read – Resolution

Professional) carries on business of the debtor company under a

specific agreement to which the creditor and the corporate debtor

are also parties.

20. The Court of Appeal of Republic of Singapore in BP Singapore

Pte Ltd. (supra) had also examined whether the claim of set-off in

the said case was available under the head ‘equitable set-off’. The

court observed that it is not necessary that the claim and cross-claim

should arise on the same contract, albeit it should be a close and

inseparable relationship or connection between the dealings and

the transactions which give rise to the respective claims, such that it

would offend one’s sense of fairness or justice to allow one’s claim to

be enforced without regard to the other. The law relating to equitable

set-off in India is explained in paragraph 9 supra. Claim for equitable

set-off should arise out of the same transaction, or transactions that

can be regarded as one transaction. There should be a connection

34 (1991) 171 CLR 609.

35 (2020) SGCA 09.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 157

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VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

between the plaintiff’s claim for the debt and the defendant’s claim

for set-off, which would make it inequitable to drive the defendant

to a separate suit.

21. On the question of mutual dealings, Airtel entities have referred to

the judgment of the High Court of Kerala in Gokul Chit Funds and

Trades Private Ltd. v. Thoundasseri Kochu Ouseph Vareed and

Others36, which we believe allows set-off in terms of the Kerala

Insolvency Act, 1955. In the context of mutual dealings, it observes

that mutuality can exist when there are even several distinct and

independent transactions, albeit between the same parties functioning

in the same right or capacity. It is not necessary that the same should

arise out of a single transaction. When the transactions between

the parties, which are connected, give rise to reciprocal claims and

demands on account of the parties acting on the same right or

capacity, principle of mutuality will be satisfied. Thus, the contention

that each kuri is a distinct and separate transaction was not accepted

so as to defeat the mandatory right to set-off observing that rights

and liabilities arising out of the different chit fund transactions should

be allowed to be adjusted against each other.

22. In light of the aforesaid discussion, the expression ‘mutual dealings’

for the purpose of Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations, is

wider than the statutory set-off postulated under Order VIII Rule

6 of CPC, as well as, equitable set-off under the common law as

applicable in India. Insolvency set-off applies when demands are

between the same parties. There must be commonality of identity

between the person who has made the claim and the person against

whom the claim exists. Even when there are several distinct and

independent transactions, mutuality can exist between the same

parties functioning in the same right or capacity. Mutual dealings

are not so much concerned with the nature of the claims, but with

the relationship and apposite identity of the parties giving rise to the

respective claims, such that it would offend one’s sense of fairness

or justice to allow one to be enforced without regard to the other.

23. The relationship and the nature of identity of the Corporate Debtor

undergo a change on the commencement of the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process. Set-off of the dues payable by the Corporate

36 AIR 1977 Ker 68.

158 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Debtor for a period prior to the commencement of the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Process cannot be made and is not permitted

in law from the dues payable to the Corporate Debtor post the

commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.37

Further, a debtor cannot, after notice of assignment of his debt by

the creditor, improve his position as regards set-off by acquiring

debts incurred by the assignor creditor which are payable to a third

party. This will not meet the mandate of mutual dealing. This will be

contrary to equity and would amount to misuse of the provision for

insolvency set-off.38 One must also be on guard against misuse of

insolvency set-off in case of voluntary winding up.

24. Insolvency set-off as a proposition mitigates against the doctrine of

pari passu. Insolvency set-off gives primacy and an overriding effect

to the creditor who is entitled to set-off mutual credits. When cross

demands are set-off, the assets available for distribution amongst

the general body of creditors, would be depleted in favour of a

single creditor with a set-off entitlement. This consequently results in

reduction of the dividend payable. In other words, it puts and grants

priority to the creditor, even an operational creditor, to the extent of

the set-off. Some jurists have doubted the efficacy of the justification

that right to set-off acts as a stimulus to trade and commerce on the

ground that rarely any party would treat the possibility of set-off as

a form of security. The principle of pari passu though not explicitly

mentioned in the IBC, is apparent as the edifice of Section 53 read

with Section 52 of the IBC, as these provisions create a liquidation

hierarchy with the stipulation that each class of creditors shall rank

equally among each other. The same class of creditors should be

given equal treatment. As set-offs can mitigate against the pari

passu principle, they should be allowed when mandated, or can be

justified by law.

25. Apart from the pari passu principle which refers to treating creditors of

the same class in the same manner, the United Kingdom insolvency

37 The position may be different where the dues are payable by the debtor to the Corporate Debtor, in

which case the liquidator may seek adjustment as a form of payment by the debtor. The reason is that

the liquidator is under a statutory obligation to recover the dues from the debtor. Adjustment in such

cases is statutory or legal set-off under the IBC/Companies Act. Insolvency set-off in Regulation 29 will

not apply for want of mutuality.

38 This will not satisfy the requirements of legal/statutory set-off and equitable set-off under the Code of

Civil Procedure, 1908. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 159

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VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

law also relies on the common law principle of anti-deprivation. The

principle encapsulates that a person cannot contract to obtain a

more beneficial position in the event of bankruptcy, than what the

law otherwise provides. A contract which states that a man’s property

shall remain his until his bankruptcy, and in that event shall go to

someone else, is not a valid contract. Both, the pari passu principle

and the anti-deprivation principle sprout from the common ground

that parties cannot contract out of an insolvency legislation. Their

distinction lies in their impacts. The pari passu principle is aimed at

ensuring that all creditors get their proportional dues by preventing

any one creditor from getting more than their deserved share.39 The

anti-deprivation principle on the other hand aims at conservation of

the insolvent estate for the benefit of the creditors.40

26. Having examined the different concepts of set-off including insolvency

set-off, we would now like to examine the contentions raised by the

parties with reference to the provisions of the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process under the IBC.

27. The IBC is an Act to consolidate and amend the laws relating to

reorganisation and insolvency resolution of corporate persons,

partnership firms and individuals in a time bound manner for

maximisation of value of assets of such persons, to promote

entrepreneurship, availability of credit and balance the interest

of stakeholders, etc. The IBC codifies the law of insolvency and

bankruptcy. The IBC is a complete code in itself, except where it

refers and permits application of the provisions of other enactments,

as has been consistently held by this Court in Indian Overseas

Bank v. RCM Infrastructure Ltd. and Another41, Innoventive

Industries Limited v. ICICI Bank and Another42, Embassy Property

Developments Private Limited. v. State of Karnataka and Others43,

and V. Nagarajan v. SKS Ispat and Power Limited and Others44.

39 Belmont Park Investments v. BNY Corporate Trustee Services Ltd. [2012] 1 AC 383.

40 In the present decision, we are not examining the extent of, and the manner in which the anti-deprivation principle is applicable in India.

41 (2022) 8 SCC 516.

42 (2018) 1 SCC 407.

43 (2020) 13 SCC 308.

44 (2022) 2 SCC 244.

160 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

28. Section 23845 of the IBC states that the provisions of the Code would

override other laws. The provisions of this Code shall have effect,

notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any

other law for the time being in force.

29. Section 243 deals with the repeal of certain enactments and also

incorporates the savings clause. Sub-section (1) states that Provincial

Insolvency Act, 1920 is hereby repealed. Sub-section (2) does not

apply in the present case. Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 did not

apply to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process stage.

30. Given the aforesaid legal position, we do not think that the provisions

of statutory set-off in terms of Order VIII Rule 6 of CPC or insolvency

set-off as permitted by Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations

can be applied to the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

The aforesaid rule would be, however, subject to two exceptions

or situations. The first, if at all it can be called an exception, is

where a party is entitled to contractual set-off, on the date which is

effective before or on the date the Corporate Insolvency Resolution

Process is put into motion or commences. The reason is simple.

The Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process does not preclude

application of contractual set-off. During the moratorium period with

initiation of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, recovery,

legal proceedings etc. cannot be initiated, enforced or remain in

abeyance. Besides the moratorium effect, the terms of the contract

remain binding and are not altered or modified.

31. The foundation of contractual set-off is based on the same ground as

in the case of equitable set-off, which is impeachment of title, albeit

contractual set-off is a result of mutual agreement that permits setoff and adjustment. Therefore, if a debtor’s title to sue is impeached

before the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process is set into

motion, so should the title of the Resolution Professional, who in

terms of Section 25 of the IBC has the duty to preserve and protect

assets of the corporate debtor, including continuing the business

operations of the corporate debtor. The Resolution Professional

takes the debtor’s property subject to all clogs and fetters affecting

it in the hands of the debtor.

45 Section 238. Provisions of this Code to override other laws.—The provisions of this Code shall

have effect, notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith contained in any other law for the time

being in force or any instrument having effect by virtue of any such law.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 161

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

32. The second exception will be in the case of ‘equitable set-off’ when

the claim and counter claim in the form of set-off are linked and

connected on account of one or more transactions that can be treated

as one. The set-off should be genuine and clearly established on

facts and in law, so as to make it inequitable and unfair that the

debtor be asked to pay money, without adjustment sought that is fully

justified and legal. The amount to be adjusted should be a quantifiable

and unquestionable monetary claim, as the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process is a time-bound summary procedure. It is not a

civil suit where disputed questions of law and facts are adjudicated

after recording evidence. Set-off of this nature does not require legal

proceedings. Further, set-off of money is to be given against money

alone. It will not apply to assets. Lastly, being an equitable right, it

can be denied when grant of relief will defeat equity and justice.

33. We would in fact borrow the term ‘transactional set-off’46 instead

of equitable set-off, when we describe the second exception. The

reason is that the second exception refers to an ascertained amount,

which is a requirement for legal set-off under Order VIII Rule 6 of

CPC and at the same time relies on equitable right when the statute

is silent and there is no reason to deny set-off under the common

law. It is an equitable right because the transactions are close and

connected, harbingering the claim and the counterclaim. It would be

manifestly unjust to bifurcate the connected transactions to accept

and enforce the claim of one party without adjusting the amount due

to the second party. This, in our opinion, does not contradict the

eclipse by way of moratorium, because the transactions are treated

as singular and one. When transactions are closely connected, a

claim for transactional set-off during the moratorium period on a claim

by the Resolution Professional, is by way of a defence to protect the

legitimate expectation and respect legal certainty.

34. Thus, while accepting contractual and transactional set-off on the

conditions specified, we have struck a balance with the doctrines

of pari passu and anti-deprivation, which we believe is just and

fair. Insolvency set-off in terms of Regulation 29 of the Liquidation

Regulations is statutory.

46 See Derham, supra note 25 and Gerard McCormack, Set-off under the European Insolvency Regulation (and English Law), 29 IIR 100, 100-117 (2020).

162 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

35. In the context of the present case, the aforesaid legal position

takes care of the argument raised on behalf of the appellant Airtel

entities that the Resolution Professional had allowed set-off of about

Rs. 64 crores which was due and payable by the corporate debtor

Aircel entities under the operational services agreement, the SMSs

services agreement, and the interconnect usage agreements prior

to commencement of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process

from the dues payable by the corporate debtor (Aircel entities) to

the Airtel entities. The contractual set-off had occurred prior to the

commencement date. This aspect has been further elucidated in

paragraph 50 below.

36. The decision of the House of Lords in British Eagle International

Airlines Ltd v. Compagnie Nationale Air France47 demonstrates

the interaction between the contractual set-off mechanism and the

set-off rules as applicable to insolvency in the United Kingdom. In this

case, the company under liquidation was a member of International

Airport Transport Association which had a clearing house system

for ticket sales by member airlines. All payments were channelised

through the clearing house and at the end of the accounting period,

all debits and credits due to transactions were totalled to arrive at a

figure for a net debit or credit. In the said case, British Eagle went

into liquidation and were net debtors to the clearing house. They had

a claim against Air France. The House of Lords held that Air France

was bound to pay the liquidator the money owed to British Eagles.48

The majority judgment also observed that the clearing house medium

was possibly analogous to that of secured creditors, albeit without

creation and registration of security interests. Therefore, preference

to the clearing house agent would be contrary to public policy. 49

37. Our finding that the IBC is a complete code relying upon the opening

part of the enactment and Sections 238 and 243 takes care and

nullifies the argument raised by the appellant Airtel entities that they

are entitled to statutory set-off or insolvency set-off, in the Corporate

Insolvency Resolution Proceedings under Chapter II Part II of the

47 1975 1 WLR 758.

48 McCormack, supra note 46.

49 The contractual and consequently the legal position has undergone a change as the IATA clearing

house rules have since been amended. Therefore, this judgment should be read and understood with

caution. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 163

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

IBC. Regulation 29 of the Liquidation Regulations does not apply

to Part II of the IBC. The legislation or even the legislative intent

permits neither statutory set-off, nor insolvency set-off. In support

of our conclusion, we would like to refer to the statutory provisions,

and meet the arguments to the contrary raised by the appellants.

38. This brings us to the argument raised by the Airtel entities who have

placed reliance on Section 30(2)(b)(ii) and Section 53 of the IBC.

The relevant provisions of the said Sections read as under:

“30. Submission of resolution plan. –

xx xx xx

(2) The resolution professional shall examine each

resolution plan received by him to confirm that each

resolution plan-

(b) provides for the payment of debts of operational

creditors in such manner as may be specified by the Board

which shall not be less than—

xx xx xx

(ii) the amount that would have been paid to such creditors,

if the amount to be distributed under the resolution plan

had been distributed in accordance with the order of priority

in sub-section (1) of Section 53,

xx xx xx

53. Distribution of assets.— (1) Notwithstanding anything

to the contrary contained in any law enacted by the

Parliament or any State Legislature for the time being

in force, the proceeds from the sale of the liquidation

assets shall be distributed in the following order of priority

and within such period and in such manner as may be

specified, namely—

(a) the insolvency resolution process costs and the

liquidation costs paid in full;

(b) the following debts which shall rank equally between

and among the following—

164 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

(i) workmen’s dues for the period of twenty-four

months preceding the liquidation commencement

date; and

(ii) debts owed to a secured creditor in the event

such secured creditor has relinquished security

in the manner set out in Section 52;

(c) wages and any unpaid dues owed to employees

other than workmen for the period of twelve months

preceding the liquidation commencement date;

(d) financial debts owed to unsecured creditors;

(e) the following dues shall rank equally between and

among the following:—

(i) any amount due to the Central Government and

the State Government including the amount to

be received on account of the Consolidated

Fund of India and the Consolidated Fund of

a State, if any, in respect of the whole or any

part of the period of two years preceding the

liquidation commencement date;

(ii) debts owed to a secured creditor for any amount

unpaid following the enforcement of security

interest;

(f) any remaining debts and dues;

(g) preference shareholders, if any; and

(h) equity shareholders or partners, as the case may be.

(2) Any contractual arrangements between recipients under

sub-section (1) with equal ranking, if disrupting the order

of priority under that sub-section shall be disregarded by

the liquidator.

(3) The fees payable to the liquidator shall be deducted

proportionately from the proceeds payable to each class of

recipients under sub-section (1), and the proceeds to the

relevant recipient shall be distributed after such deduction.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 165

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Explanation.—For the purpose of this section—

(i) it is hereby clarified that at each stage of the

distribution of proceeds in respect of a class of

recipients that rank equally, each of the debts will

either be paid in full, or will be paid in equal proportion

within the same class of recipients, if the proceeds

are insufficient to meet the debts in full; and

(ii) the term “workmen’s dues” shall have the same

meaning as assigned to it in Section 326 of the

Companies Act, 2013 (18 of 2013).”

39. The Airtel entities have contested the conclusion by urging that Section

30 of the IBC seeks to ensure that the assets and liabilities of the

corporate debtor, as recorded in the resolution plan, correspond to the

liquidation estate of the corporate debtor in the event of liquidation.

The provision is to ensure smooth transition between reorganisation

under the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process and the liquidation

process. In case a contrary view is taken, anomalies will arise. In the

event the corporate debtor undergoes liquidation, Section 36(4)(e) and

Regulation 29 would apply. However, if the Resolution Professional

proceeds in terms of Section 25 and secures the assets from the

creditors, the creditors would not be entitled to claim set-off during

the course of the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, which

is earlier in the point of time.

40. The arguments are fallacious and should not be accepted. Subsection (2)(b)(ii) to Section 30 does not support the contention

of the Airtel entities. Sub-section (2) to Section 30 deals with the

resolution plan and the quantum of payment required to be made

when considering a resolution plan under Chapter II Part II of the

IBC. The provision requires that the Resolution Professional shall

examine each resolution plan received by him to confirm that each

plan provides for payment of debts of the operational creditor in

the manner as may be specified by the Board. The Board has not

specified the manner in which payment of debts to the operational

creditor shall be made. However, the stipulation that the payment of

debts to the operational creditor shall not be less than the amount

that the operational creditors are entitled to in terms of the order

of priority in sub-section (1) to Section 53 of the IBC is mandatory.

166 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

41. There are several reasons why in our opinion clause (ii) to subsection (2)(b) of Section 30 does not support the plea of insolvency

set-off. The section does not make Chapter III Part II, that is, Section

36(4)(e) or Regulation 29, applicable to the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process under Chapter II Part II of the IBC. Secondly,

clause (ii) to Section 30(2)(b) deals with the amounts to be paid to

the creditors and not the amount payable by the creditors to the

corporate debtor. Thirdly, clause (ii) to Section 30(2)(b) has appliance

when the resolution plan is being considered for approval. Fourthly,

and for the reasons elaborated earlier, and in view of the specific

legislative mandate as incorporated and reflected in Chapter II Part

II of the IBC, we should hold that the provisions of the IBC relating

to Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process do not recognise the

principle of insolvency set-off. We would not extend it by implication,

when the legislature has not accepted applicability of mutual setoff at the initial stage, that is, the Corporate Insolvency Resolution

Process stage.

42. The judgment of this Court in Ebix Singapore Private Limited

v. Committee of Creditors of Educomp Solutions Limited and

Another.50, that one of the objects of the IBC is to provide for a

comprehensive and a time-bound framework with smooth transition

in between organisation and liquidation, has no application and

relevance to the context and issue in question. The observations

were made in the context of the time bound framework specified in

the IBC and the need to adhere to the timelines. Reorganisation or

resolution process should not get prolonged or continued indefinitely.

43. Similarly, the decision in Swiss Ribbons Private Limited and

Another v. Union of India and Others51, which refers to a claim for

set-off being considered by the Resolution Professional during the

resolution process, is an obiter dicta and not a ratio decidendi to the

issue in question. The judgment states that a set-off between the

corporate debtor and a financial creditor is a rarity. It also observes

that it is not the case that legitimate set-offs may not be considered

at all, and that they can be considered at the stage of filing proof

50 (2022) 2 SCC 401.

51 (2019) 4 SCC 17.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 167

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

of claims. These observations were made to differentiate between

financial and operational creditors, and how the process of filing

an application for initiating the resolution process is distinct viz. the

financial creditors and operational creditors under the IBC. Whether

the set-off should be considered at the stage of filing of proof of

claims during the resolution process was not an issue before the

court in Swiss Ribbons (supra). These observations are not ratio

decidendi when we apply the inversion test and other tests for the

issue in question.52

44. The judgment of this Court in The Official Liquidator of High Court

of Karnataka v. Smt. V. Lakshmikutty53 had applied Section 46 of

the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 and had accordingly permitted

insolvency set-off on interpretation and application of Sections 529

and 530 of the Companies Act, 1956. In that context, it is observed

that the English courts, on interpretation of corresponding provisions

of the English Companies Act, had taken a similar view. In the present

matter, we are dealing with the provisions of the IBC. Secondly, the

corporate debtor is not an insolvent company undergoing liquidation

process, but is undergoing the Corporate Insolvency Resolution

Process.

45. Similarly, the reliance placed by Airtel entities on Section 60(5)54 of

the IBC, which confers jurisdiction on the Adjudicatory Authority to

entertain and dispose of any application or proceeding by or against

a corporate debtor, including claims against any of the subsidiaries

or any question of priority or question of law and facts, arising out

of or in relation to insolvency resolution or liquidation proceeds of

the corporate debtor, does not come to the aid of the Airtel entities.

These are enabling provisions which entitle the Adjudicating Authority

52 Career Institute Educational Society v. Om Shree Thakurji Educational Society, 2023 SCC OnLine SC

586.

53 (1981) 3 SCC 32.

54 Section 60 Adjudicating authority for corporate persons.—

(5) Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law for the time being in force, the

National Company Law Tribunal shall have jurisdiction to entertain or dispose of—

(a) any application or proceeding by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person;

(b) any claim made by or against the corporate debtor or corporate person, including claims by or against

any of its subsidiaries situated in India; and

(c) any question of priorities or any question of law or facts, arising out of or in relation to the insolvency resolution or liquidation proceedings of the corporate debtor or corporate person under this Code.

168 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

to go into several aspects to aid and assist the Corporate Insolvency

Resolution Process. They cannot be read as allowing a creditor/debtor

to claim set-off in the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process.

46. Relying upon several decisions under the United Kingdom Insolvency

Act and Rules, it has been argued that insolvency set-off is selfexecuting. Reliance is placed on Innoventive Industries Ltd. (supra),

wherein it is observed that the English Insolvency Act has served as

a model for the IBC. We do not agree that insolvency set-off under

the IBC is automatic and self-executing. We do not find any provision

in the IBC which states so. In the context of the IBC, insolvency

set-off is neither automatic, nor self-executing.

47. Airtel entities have also argued that the definitions of ‘claim’ and

‘debt’ in sub-sections (6) and (11) of Section 3 of the IBC buttress

the argument that set-off under the IBC is self-executing.55 The

argument is self-serving and evasive because neither clause uses

the expression ‘set-off’, nor is it implied. We would not extend on

and remodel the definitions on the basis of predisposed and selfserving suppositions.

48. Therefore, we would reject the argument that insolvency set-off is

automatic and self-executing. Self-execution may be acceptable in

cases of contractual set-off, as held above.

49. Reference is also made to the UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on

Insolvency Law56 which states that right to set-off is essential to avoid

misuse of insolvency proceedings by a corporate debtor. The said guide

states that insolvency law of set-off of mutual obligations arising out

of pre-commencement transactions or activities of the debtor leads to

commercial predictability and availability of credit. It checks strategic

misuse of the insolvency proceedings. In the context of Chapter II

Part II of the IBC, we are not concerned with the liquidation estate or

55 Section 3 Definitions. —

(6) “claim” means—(a) a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, disputed,

undisputed, legal, equitable, secured or unsecured;

(b) right to remedy for breach of contract under any law for the time being in force, if such breach gives rise

to a right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced to judgment, fixed, matured, unmatured,

disputed, undisputed, secured or unsecured.

(11) “debt” means a liability or obligation in respect of a claim which is due from any person and includes a

financial debt and operational debt.

56 UNCITRAL Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Chapter G. p.155-156 (2005).

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 169

BHARTI AIRTEL LIMITED AND ANOTHER v.

VIJAYKUMAR V. IYER AND OTHERS

the liquidation process. At this stage, we are examining the question

of rehabilitation and revival of the corporate debtor. The focus and

objective is entirely different. Therefore, in our opinion, the said guide

is of no avail or instructive to us. Further, the provisions relating to

Chapter II Part II being explicit and not ambiguous, do not require

purposive interpretation. We should, however, take on record that the

UNCITRAL guide does distinguish between the set-off obligations

maturing prior to the commencement of the insolvency proceedings

and set-off obligations after the commencement of the insolvency

proceedings.57 Only the former should be permitted in insolvency

proceedings, while the latter should be disallowed or allowed to a

limited extent.

50. On the aspect of mutual dealings and also equity, it is to be noted

that adjustment of the inter-connect charges are under a separate

and distinct agreement. The telephone service providers use each

other’s facilities as the caller or the receiver may be using a different

service provider. Accordingly, adjustments of set-off are made on the

basis of contractual set-off. These are also justified on the ground of

equitable set-off. The set-off to this extent has been permitted and

allowed by the Resolution Professional. The transaction for purchase

of the right to use the spectrum is an entirely different and unconnected

transaction. The agreement to purchase the spectrum encountered

obstacles because the DoT had required bank guarantees to be

furnished. Accordingly, Airtel entities, on the request of Aircel entities

had furnished bank guarantees on their behalf. The bank guarantees

were returned and accordingly Airtel entities became liable to pay

the balance amount in terms of the letters of understanding. The

amounts have become payable post the commencement of the

Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process. For the same reason, we

will also reject the argument that by not allowing set-off, new rights

are being created and, therefore, Section 14 of the IBC will not be

operative and applicable. Moratorium under Section 14 is to grant

protection and prevent a scramble and dissipation of the assets of

the corporate debtor. The contention that the “amount” to be set-off

is not part of the corporate debtor’s assets in the present facts is

misconceived and must be rejected.

57 Ibid.

170 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

DIGITAL SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Conclusion

51. Having considered the contentions raised by the appellant Airtel

entities in detail, and in light of the provisions of the IBC relating to

the Corporate Insolvency Resolution Process, we do not find any

merit in the present appeals and the same are dismissed. There will

be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case: Appeals dismissed.

Service Law – Female Reservation – Non-Creamy Layer certificate – Change of category – Appellant contended that she did not submit her application under the ‘Reserved Female Category’ on account of her inability to obtain an NCL Certificate which was valid as on the last date of submission of the application form i.e., 01.06.2022 – However, upon the issuance of the Corrigendum, the appellants’ eligibility qua the ‘Reserved Female Category’ came to be revived as the appellant was no longer mandated to furnish an NCL Certificate which was valid as on the last date of submission of the application form but instead was called upon to furnish an NCL Certificate pertaining to current financial year:

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1223 : 2024 INSC 98

Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni

v.

Maharashtra Public Service Commission

 Civil Appeal No. 1982 of 2024

29 January 2024

[Vikram Nath and Satish Chandra Sharma, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Appellant was not able to take benefit of female reservation on

account of her inability to produce a valid Non-Creamy Layer

(NCL) certificate on the last date of submission of the application

form. Later, a corrigendum enabled candidates to submit an NCL

certificate valid in the current financial year. However, the High

Court held that since the petitioner had applied from Open General

Category because she did not hold the NCL certificate, her prayer

for change of category cannot be accepted.

Headnotes

Service Law – Female Reservation – Non-Creamy Layer

certificate – Change of category – Appellant contended that

she did not submit her application under the ‘Reserved

Female Category’ on account of her inability to obtain an NCL

Certificate which was valid as on the last date of submission

of the application form i.e., 01.06.2022 – However, upon the

issuance of the Corrigendum, the appellants’ eligibility qua the

‘Reserved Female Category’ came to be revived as the appellant

was no longer mandated to furnish an NCL Certificate which

was valid as on the last date of submission of the application

form but instead was called upon to furnish an NCL Certificate

pertaining to current financial year:

Held: Admittedly, the appellant i.e., a candidate who was

scrupulously following the terms and conditions of the impugned

advertisement was constrained to apply under the ‘Open General

Category’ only on account of certain logistical limitations preventing her from obtaining a valid NCL Certificate – Consequently, in

the absence of the requisite documents evidencing status as a 

1224 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

person belonging to the NCL under the impugned advertisement

read with the Circular i.e., a valid NCL Certificate as on the

date of submission of the application form, the appellant did not

mark ‘yes’ against the specific question pertaining to her status

as a person belonging to the NCL – The aforenoted conduct of

the appellant is bonafide – Accordingly, the appellant cannot be

unfairly deprived of the benefit of female reservation merely on

account of the appellant’s honesty and restraint which did not allow

her to mark ‘yes’ against a column inquiring about a prospective

candidates’ status as a person belonging to the NCL, in the

absence of the underlying supporting document – Additionally,

other similarly situated candidates have been granted the benefit

under the Corrigendum; and their otherwise defective applications

have now been considered by the Respondent – The High Court

adopted a hypertechnical interpretation of the instructions without

appreciating that such an interpretation would nullify the effect of

the Corrigendum – Impugned order set aside. [Paras 16, 17, 18]

Case Law Cited

State of T.N. v. G. Hemalathaa (2020) 19 SCC 430 –

referred to.

List of Keywords

Service Law; Female reservation; Non-creamy Layer certificate;

Eligibility qua ‘reserved female category; hypertechnical

interpretation of instructions; Benefit of corrigendum; Relaxed

instructions.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.1982 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 23.08.2023 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay in WP No.9040 of 2023

Appearances for Parties

Abhijeet Pawar, Praveen B. Kamble, Lalit Kaushik, Dinesh Bhardwaj,

Sashank Gaurav, Amit Sharma, Advs. for the Appellant.

Rahul Chitnis, Garv Singh, Ms. Samiksha Gupta, Chander Shekhar

Ashri, Advs. for the Respondent.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1225

Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public

Service Commission

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. Leave granted.

2. The decision of the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature

at Bombay (the “High Court”) wherein the High dismissed Writ

Petition No. 9040 of 2023; and consequently, granted imprimatur

to the decision of the Maharashtra Administrative Tribunal, Mumbai

(the “MAT”) dated 07.07.2023 in Original Application No. 396 of 2023

(the “OA”) is assailed before us (the “Impugned Order”).

3. An advertisement was issued by the Respondent on 11.05.2022

in relation to the State Services Preliminary Examination for the

recruitment of person(s) to the gazetted post of ‘Group A’ and ‘Group

B’ officers under the Government of Maharashtra (the “Impugned

Advertisement”). Pertinently, Paragraph 5.5 of the Impugned

Advertisement contemplated the benefit of inter alia female reservation

subject to certain prerequisites which included (i) that the candidate

must be a domicile of Maharashtra; and (ii) that the candidate must

belong to the Non-Creamy Layer (“NCL”).

4. Furthermore, under Paragraph 5.10 read with Paragraph 5.14 of

the Impugned Advertisement, a candidate seeking to avail inter alia

female reservation must not only clearly state that he/she is domiciled

in Maharashtra but should also submit an NCL Certificate issued by

the competent authority which must be valid as on the last date of

submission of the application form i.e., 01.06.2022.

5. In the aforesaid context, the Appellant i.e., a candidate employed

as State Tax Officer in the Goods and Services Tax (“GST”)

Department, Nodal 3, Pune, Maharashtra submitted her application

for the aforesaid examination under the ‘Open General Category’ on

account of her inability to produce a valid NCL Certificate as on the

last date of submission of the application form. However admittedly,

and undoubtedly the Appellant was otherwise eligible to apply under

‘Reserved Female Category’ qua the underlying examination being

conducted pursuant to the Impugned Advertisement.

6. Thereafter, the Appellant cleared the preliminary examination and

qualified for the main examination. Subsequently, on 11.10.2023,

the Appellant cleared the main examination from the ‘Open General

Category’.

1226 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

7. However, in the interregnum, on 17.02.2023, the Department

of Other Backward Bahujan Welfare issued a corrigendum (the

“Corrigendum”) amending Clause 2 (iii) of a circular bearing

number CBC-2012/P.No.182/Vijabhaj-1, dated 25.03.2013 issued by

Department of Social Justice and Special Assistance, Government

of Maharashtra whereunder (i) the procedure of obtaining; and (ii)

validity of inter alia NCL Certificates’ were regulated (the “Circular”).

Pertinently, the Corrigendum enabled candidates to submit an NCL

Certificate which would have been valid in the current financial year

as against an NCL Certificate which had to have been valid as on

the last date of submission of the application form i.e., 01.06.2022.

8. In light of the changed circumstances following the issuance of the

Corrigendum as more particularly delineated above, the Appellant,

who had otherwise been eligible to apply under the ‘Reserved Female

Category’ but for mandatory requirement of a valid NCL Certificate

as on 01.06.2022, subsequently obtained an NCL Certificate on

09.03.2023. Thereafter, the Appellant made a representation to the

Respondent to consider her candidature as a ‘Reserved Female

Category’ candidate.

9. Aggrieved by the non-consideration of her representation, the

Appellant preferred the OA before the MAT. Vide an order dated

07.07.2023, the MAT dismissed the OA observing inter alia that the

Appellant was not in possession of an NCL Certificate prior to the

issuance of the Corrigendum (the “Underlying Order”). Aggrieved

by the Underlying Order, the Appellant herein preferred a writ petition

before the High Court. Vide the Impugned Order, the writ petition

came to be dismissed. The operative paragraph of the Impugned

Order is reproduced below:

“6. Therefore, after hearing both the side and considering

the conspectus of the matter, it is amply clear that the

Petitioner had applied from Open General Category,

because she did not hold the NCL Certificate. Having

appeared for the Preliminary examination as well as Main

examination from the “Open General” Category, merely

because a corrigendum is issued, the Petitioner cannot

be allowed to change the category at this stage, more so,

on background of the general instructions to the candidate

contained in paragraph Nos.1.2.5.6 and 1.2.5.7, which does 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1227

Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public

Service Commission

not permit to make any changes once the form is filled in.

If the Petitioner was desirous of making an Application for

general women category, she ought to have obtained the

NCL in advance showing diligence, which she has failed.

At this stage, if the Petitioner is allowed to change her

category, it will open a flood gate of litigation, as observed

by the MAT. Hence, the said prayer of the Petitioner cannot

be considered.”

10. Mr. Amit Sharma, Ld. Counsel appearing on behalf of the Appellant

has fairly submitted before us that the Appellant did not submit her

application under the ‘Reserved Female Category’ on account of her

inability to obtain an NCL Certificate which was valid as on the last

date of submission of the application form i.e., 01.06.2022. However,

upon the issuance of the Corrigendum, the Appellants’ eligibility qua

the ‘Reserved Female Category’ came to be revived as the Appellant

was no longer mandated to furnish an NCL Certificate which was

valid as on the last date of submission of the application form but

instead was called upon to furnish an NCL Certificate pertaining to

current financial year.

11. Furthermore, Mr. Sharma has submitted before us that 7 (seven) – 8

(eight) other persons who dishonestly applied under the ‘Reserved

Female Category’ without a valid NCL Certificate, have been

granted the benefit under the Corrigendum, and subsequently upon

producing the NCL Certificate as per the terms of the Corrigendum,

the Respondent has proceeded to consider their candidature under

the ‘Reserved Female Category’.

12. On the other hand, Mr. Rahul Chitnis, Ld. Counsel appearing on

behalf of the Respondent has vehemently opposed the aforesaid

submission(s). The main thrust of the arguments of Mr. Chitnis

is two-fold i.e., (i) the Appellant cannot be allowed to change the

category of her candidature in light of Clause 1.2.5.6 and 1.2.5.7 of

the General Instructions to Candidates published on the Respondent

Commission’s website (the “Instructions”)1

; and (ii) the Appellant

has failed to mark ‘yes’ against the specific question pertaining to a

prospective candidates’ status as a person belonging to the NCL.

Accordingly, it was submitted that the Appellant’s case is differently

1 Reliance in this regard was placed on State of T.N. v. G. Hemalathaa, (2020) 19 SCC 430.

1228 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

placed from the other 7 (seven) – 8 (eight) persons whom whilst

having applied without a valid NCL Certificate, marked ‘yes’ against

the specific question pertaining to their status as a person belonging

to the NCL, and accordingly were granted the benefit under the

Corrigendum.

13. Upon a perusal of Paragraph 5.10 read with Paragraph 5.14 of

the Impugned Advertisement, it is clear that any application under

the ‘Reserved Female Category’ was to be supported by an NCL

Certificate that was valid as on the last date of submission of the

application form i.e., 01.06.2022. Subsequently, vide the issuance of

the Corrigendum, the aforenoted position changed; and candidates

were now eligible to furnish an NCL Certificate pertaining to the

current financial year.

14. Additionally, Clause 1.2.5.6 and 1.2.5.7 of the Instructions although

prohibits any modification and / or change in the application

submitted pursuant to the Impugned Advertisement, could not have

been interpreted in such a manner so as to nullify the effect of the

Corrigendum.

15. In this regard, the reliance placed on G. Hemalathaa, (Supra) is

misdirected as therein a rule issued by the Tamil Nadu Public Service

Commission was admittedly contravened; and thereafter relaxed by

the High Court on humanitarian grounds erroneously. Herein, it is the

on account of the Corrigendum that certain relaxations have been

awarded to all person(s) however, on account of an overly restrictive

interpretation of (i) the Corrigendum; and (ii) the Instructions, the

benefit(s) under the Corrigendum are being selectively restricted

by the Respondent.

16. Admittedly, the Appellant i.e., a candidate who was scrupulously

following the terms and conditions of the Impugned Advertisement

was constrained to apply under the ‘Open General Category’ only

on account of certain logistical limitations preventing her from

obtaining a valid NCL Certificate. Consequently, in the absence of

the requisite documents evidencing status as a person belonging

to the NCL under the Impugned Advertisement read with the

Circular i.e., a valid NCL Certificate as on the date of submission

of the application form, the Appellant did not mark ‘yes’ against the

specific question pertaining to her status as a person belonging

to the NCL.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1229

Priyanka Prakash Kulkarni v. Maharashtra Public

Service Commission

17. The aforenoted conduct of the Appellant is bona-fide. Accordingly,

in our view the Appellant cannot be unfairly deprived of the benefit

of female reservation merely on account of the Appellant’s honesty

and restraint which did not allow her to mark ‘yes’ against a column

inquiring about a prospective candidates’ status as a person belonging

to the NCL, in the absence of the underlying supporting document.

Additionally, other similarly situated candidates have been granted

the benefit under the Corrigendum; and their otherwise defective

applications have now been considered by the Respondent.

18. In our considered opinion, the High Court adopted a hyper-technical

interpretation of the Instructions without appreciating that such an

interpretation would nullify the effect of the Corrigendum. Such an

interpretation ought not to have been adopted especially in light of

the fact that other persons have been granted the benefit of the

Corrigendum; and that the Respondent has relaxed the Instructions

qua such persons so as to enable valid NCL Certificates to be

furnished.

19. In light of the aforesaid, we find that the Impugned Order and

resultantly, the Underlying Order ought to be set aside. Accordingly,

taking note of the peculiar facts of the case; and that the Appellant is

a meritorious candidate who has cleared the main examination under

the ‘Open General Category’ despite being deserving of the benefit

of female reservation, we are inclined to balance the equities and do

justice by exercising our power under Article 142 of the Constitution

of India. Accordingly, we direct the Respondent to forthwith treat the

Appellant as a candidate under the ‘Reserved Female Category’.

20. The appeal is allowed in the aforesaid terms. Pending application(s),

if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.

Suit – Suit for declaration related to a property dismissed for default – Application for restoration dismissed – Appeal dismissed – Revision petition dismissed by High Court – Application for restoration of the revision petition and condonation of delay dismissed by High Court – SLP thereagainst. Held: The facts indicate that the suit that was filed in 1982 never took off as even summons were not issued – The suit that was filed in the year 1982 relates to an alleged unauthorized sale more than four decades back – The suit has virtually become infructuous for more than one reason – SLP dismissed. [Paras 13, 15]

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1219 : 2024 INSC 93

Omdeo Baliram Musale & Ors.

v.

Prakash Ramchandra Mamidwar & Ors.

(Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 11258 of 2015)

24 January 2024

[Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and Aravind Kumar, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court erred in dismissing the application for

restoration of revision petition (in a suit for declaration) and

accompanying application for condonation of delay.

Headnotes

Suit – Suit for declaration related to a property dismissed

for default – Application for restoration dismissed – Appeal

dismissed – Revision petition dismissed by High Court

– Application for restoration of the revision petition and

condonation of delay dismissed by High Court – SLP

thereagainst.

Held: The facts indicate that the suit that was filed in 1982 never

took off as even summons were not issued – The suit that was

filed in the year 1982 relates to an alleged unauthorized sale more

than four decades back – The suit has virtually become infructuous

for more than one reason – SLP dismissed. [Paras 13, 15]

List of Keywords

Suit for declaration; Revision petition; Application for restoration;

Condonation of delay; Default; Summons; Infructuous.

Case Arising From

EXTRAORDINARY APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave

Petition No. 11258 of 2015

From the Judgment and Order dated 05.11.2014 of the High Court

of Judicature at Bombay at Nagpur in CA (CAO) No. 1109 of 2013

in MCA St. No. 12275 of 2013 in CRA No. 284 of 2003

1220 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

Digital Supreme Court Reports

Appearances for Parties

Ms. Jayshree Satpute, Ms. Manju Jetley, Advs. for the Petitioners.

Satyajit A. Desai, Siddharth Gautam, Abhinav K. Mutyalwar, Gajanan

N Tirthkar, Vijay Raj Singh Chouhan, Luv Kumar, Ananya Thapliyal,

Ms. Anagha S. Desai, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Order

1. This Special Leave Petition is against the decision of the High

Court1

 in dismissing an application for restoration of a Civil Revision

Application and the accompanying application for condonation of

delay in sheer exasperation. The facts are as follows:

2. A simple prayer was made by the petitioners in a suit for declaration

that the property belonging to the joint family, but their father wrongly

sold it to third parties through a sale deed in the year 1980.

3. The suit came to be dismissed for default for not paying the process

fee for service of notice on the LRs. of defendant no.2. The petitioners

therefore filed an application for restoration in 1993.

4. This application for restoration was decided after seven years and the

Trial Court on 04.02.2000 dismissed the application on the ground

that it was filed under Order IX Rule 9 of the CPC whereas it ought

to have been filed under Order IX Rule 4 of the CPC as the suit

was originally dismissed under Order IX, Rule 2 of the CPC. The

petitioner filed an appeal against this order.

5. After three years, the appeal came to be dismissed on 25.06.2003.

The petitioner then filed a revision petition in which the High Court

issued notice.

6. While the revision was pending before the High Court, the petitioner

was unable to serve respondent no. 8 for a long time due to some

issue about change in the names. Having waited for long, High Court

passed a peremptory order on 01.12.2005 that if the objections were

not removed within a period of two weeks, the revision petition would

stand dismissed without reference to the Court.

1 In CA No. 1109/2013 in MCA No. 12275/2013 in CRA No. 284/2003 dated 05.11.2014.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1221

Omdeo Baliram Musale & Ors. v. Prakash Ramchandra

Mamidwar & Ors.

7. On 12.12.2005, the petitioner’s advocate is said to have prepared

an application for change of name of respondent no. 8 and a copy

was also served on the respondent’s advocate but in the meanwhile

the peremptory order came into operation and the revision petition

came to be dismissed on 15.12.2005.

8. Despite the dismissal of the revision petition, the petitioner filed the

application for change in name of respondent no. 8 on 21.12.2005.

9. The sad story continues. In 2011, i.e. after six years, an M.A. for

restoration was filed by the petitioner through his son. The son’s

affidavit was taken on record. However, the High Court by order

dated 03.07.2013 dismissed the M.A. only on the ground that it was

not moved by the original party to the revision petition.

10. In view of the above referred order, another application was filed in

2013 by the petitioner himself for restoration of the revision petition and

condonation of delay. The High Court by the order dated 05.11.2014,

impugned herein, dismissed the application for restoration.

11. The story does not stop here. The petitioner then filed a Special

Leave Petition against the above-said impugned order and notice

was issued by this Court on 06.04.2015.

12. From 2015, the matter has been pending before this Court.

Proceedings in the case indicate that the SLP was listed several

times between 2015 and 2024 but could not be heard as notice on

some respondents was not complete.

13. The above referred facts indicate that the suit that was filed in 1982

never took off as even summons were not issued. It might not be

surprising for lawyers, judges and those who are acquainted with civil

court proceedings. The real danger is when we accept this position

and continue with it as part of a systematic problem. Until and unless

we believe that this situation is unacceptable and act accordingly, the

power, authority and jurisdiction of Courts to address simple reliefs

of citizens will be consumed and destroyed by passage of time. This

is not acceptable at all.

14. There must be a solution, idea and resolve to rectify this situation

and ensure that simple, quick and easy remedies are available to

correct an illegality for a rightful restitution. We have referred to all

this only to take note of what has happened and take steps to rectify

it in the time to come. 

1222 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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15. Coming back to this case, we have noticed that the suit that was

filed in the year 1982 relates to an alleged unauthorized sale by

father more than four decades back. The suit has virtually become

infructuous for more than one reason. The Special Leave Petition

is dismissed.

16. Pending application(s) shall also stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Bibhuti Bhushan Bose Result of the case:

SLP dismissed.

Environment – Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Central Empowered Committee (CEC) – Institutionalisation and Reconstitution – Central Empowered Committee (CEC) constituted by Supreme Court’s order in 2002 functioned as an ad hoc body almost for two decades – Suggestion of the Court to constitute the CEC as a permanent statutory body was accepted – Draft notification published by Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) for constitution of the CEC – Examined, suggestions made were incorporated – Eventually, notification dtd. 05.09.2023 u/s.3(3), Environment (Protection) Act was issued by MoEFCC constituting the CEC as a permanent authority:

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1194 : 2024 INSC 78

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad

v.

Union of India and Ors.

(Writ Petition (Civil) No. 202 of 1995)

31 January 2024

[B.R. Gavai, Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha and

Prashant Kumar Mishra, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Institutionalisation and Reconstitution of the Central Empowered

Committee.

Headnotes

Environment – Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Central

Empowered Committee (CEC) – Institutionalisation and

Reconstitution – Central Empowered Committee (CEC)

constituted by Supreme Court’s order in 2002 functioned as

an ad hoc body almost for two decades – Suggestion of the

Court to constitute the CEC as a permanent statutory body

was accepted – Draft notification published by Ministry of

Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC) for

constitution of the CEC – Examined, suggestions made

were incorporated – Eventually, notification dtd. 05.09.2023

u/s.3(3), Environment (Protection) Act was issued by MoEFCC

constituting the CEC as a permanent authority:

Held: By virtue of the Notification dtd. 05.09.2023, the concerns

regarding the functioning of the CEC as an ad hoc body and its

institutionalisation as a permanent body have been taken care

of – The Notification provides for the constitution of the CEC, its

powers, functions, mandate, members, method of appointment,

terms of service, and monitoring of its functioning – CEC to adopt the

measures directed to promote institutional transparency, efficiency,

and accountability in its functioning. [Paras 20, 21]

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 – Notification issued

constituting the CEC as a permanent authority – It provided

that the States or Central Government shall give reasons in 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1195

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

writing for not accepting any suggestion/recommendation of

the CEC and the decision of the Central Government shall

be final; in case of deferment of the decision of any State

Government with the CEC’s recommendation, the matter shall

be referred to the Central Government and its decision shall be

final and binding – Decisions of the Central Government/State

Governments are subject to the orders of Court, reiterated:

Held: Decisions of the Central Government or State Governments

are always subject to the orders of this Court – When this notification

was placed before this Court, this position was clarified – Order

of the State and/or Central Government under clauses 3 and 4

will be subject to any direction or order that this Court may pass

from time to time. [Para 17]

Environment – Environmental governance – Environmental

rule of law – Role of constitutional courts:

Held: Environmental rule of law refers to environmental governance

that is undergirded by the fundamental tenets of rule of law –

While several laws, rules, and regulations exist for protection

of the environment, their objective is not achieved as there is a

considerable gap as these laws remain unenforced or ineffectively

implemented – Rule of law in environmental governance seeks to

redress this issue as the implementation gap has a direct bearing

on the protection of the environment, forests, wildlife, sustainable

development, and public health, eventually affecting fundamental

human rights to a clean environment that are intrinsically tied

to right to life – In India, environmental rule of law must draw

attention to the existing legal regime, rules, processes, and norms

that environmental regulatory institutions follow to achieve the

goal of effective and good governance and implementation of

environmental laws – More importantly, the focus must be on the

policy and regulatory and implementation agencies – In doing

so, environmental rule of law fosters open, accountable, and

transparent decision making and participatory governance – The

renewed role of constitutional courts will be to undertake judicial

review to ensure that institutions and regulatory bodies comply with

the principles of environmental rule of law. [Paras 23-25]

1196 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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Environment – Environmental governance – Environmental rule

of law – Existing institutional governance of the environment

in India – Principles formulated for the effective monitoring

of various bodies, institutions and regulators established for

protecting forests, wildlife, environment and ecology – An

overview of the bodies regulating the environment in India

encapsulated – Bodies, authorities, and officers under the

Union and States involved in environmental governance

also enumerated – Importance of ensuring the effective

functioning of these environmental bodies for the protection,

restitution, and development of the ecology, reiterated –

Role of the constitutional courts is to monitor the proper

institutionalisation of environmental regulatory bodies and

authorities – The bodies, authorities, regulators, and executive

offices entrusted with environmental duties must function with

the institutional features as stipulated. [Paras 26, 30 and 31]

Words and Phrases – ‘Rule of law’ – Discussed. [Para 23]

Case Law Cited

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2013)

8 SCC 198; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of

India, [1996] 9 Suppl. SCR 982 : (1997) 2 SCC 267;

T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, [1997]

2 SCR 642 : (1997) 3 SCC 312; T.N. Godavarman

Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2002) 10 SCC 646; T.N.

Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2009) 17

SCC 755; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of

India, (2013) 8 SCC 204; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad

v. Union of India, [2008] 3 SCR 141 : (2008) 3 SCC

182; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India,

(2009) 16 SCC 401; T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v.

Union of India, (2022) 10 SCC 584; Vijay Rajmohan v.

CBI, [2022] 19 SCR 563 : (2023) 1 SCC 329; Greater

Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha, [2021] 10 SCR 1 : 2021 SCC

OnLine SC 897; S. Jagannath v. Union of India, [1996]

9 Suppl. SCR 848 : (1997) 2 SCC 87; M.C. Mehta v.

Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 312 ; Hanuman Laxman

Aroskar v. Union of India, [2019] 5 SCR 916 : (2019) 15

SCC 401 ; Himachal Pradesh Bus-Stand Management

& Development Authority v. Central Empowered

Committee, (2021) 4 SCC 309 – referred to.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1197

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

Books and Periodicals Cited

United Nations, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global

Report’ (2019) https://www.unep.org/resources/assessment/

environmental-rule-law-first-global-report, p.1, 8.

List of Acts

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; Forest (Conservation) Act,

1980; Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; Air

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; Wildlife Protection

Act, 1972; Biological Diversity Act, 2002; National Green Tribunal

Act, 2010.

List of Keywords

Central Empowered Committee; Reconstitution; Institutionalisation;

Ad hoc body; Permanent statutory body; Institutional transparency;

Environmental governance; Environmental rule of law; Principles

of environmental rule of law; Rule of law; Environmental

jurisprudence; Role of constitutional courts; Judicial review;

Environmental matters;

Case Arising From

CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION : Writ Petition (Civil) No.202 of

1995.

Appearances for Parties

A.D.N. Rao, Harish N. Salve, Ms. Aparajita Singh, Sr. Advs. [A.Cs.],

Siddhartha Chowdhury, K. Parameshwar, Advs. [A.Cs.], M.V.

Mukunda, Ms. Kanti, Ms. Aarti Gupta, Chinmay Kalgaonkar, Advs.

Tushar Mehta, SG, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, A.S.G., A.N.S. Nadkarni,

Sr. Adv., Ms. Shagun Thakur, Ms. Manisha Chava, Gurmeet Singh

Makker, Ms. Archana Pathak Dave, Ms. Suhashini Sen, S. S. Rebello,

Shyam Gopal, Raghav Sharma, Sughosh Subramanyam, Ms. Ruchi

Kohli, Atul Sharma, Salvador Santosh Rebello, Ms. Deepti Arya, Ms.

Arzu Paul, Siddhant Gupta, Ms. Manisha Gupta, Rishikesh Haridas,

Abhishek Atrey, Ms. Vidyottma Jha, Shailesh Madiyal, Sravan Kumar

Karanam, Santhosh Kumar Puppala, Shireesh Tyagi, Advs for the

appearing parties.

Petitioner/Applicant-in-person

1198 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

P. C.

1. This judgment is in the context of institutionalisation and reconstitution

of the Central Empowered Committee.1

 The CEC was originally

directed to be constituted by an order of this Court dated 09.05.2002.2

Almost for a period of two decades, the CEC was functioning as an

ad hoc body. We noticed that the present composition of the CEC

also consisted of persons who are more than 75 years of age and

some of whom are also residing outside India. We also noticed

that much water had flown when the CEC was initially constituted,

inasmuch as, various enactments concerning environmental issues

were enacted, so also various regulatory bodies were constituted

under the said enactments. We further found it necessary to have a

relook at the CEC’s functioning. We, therefore, passed orders dated

24.03.2023 and 18.05.2023 in this regard.

2. The Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change thereafter

issued a Notification dated 05.09.2023 under Section 3(3) of the

Environment (Protection) Act, 1986, constituting the CEC as a

permanent body for “the purposes of monitoring and ensuring

compliance of the orders of the Supreme Court covering the subject

matter of Environment, Forest and Wildlife, and related issues arising

out of the said orders and to suggest measures and recommendations

generally to the State, as well as Central Government, for more

effective implementation of the Act and other orders of the Court”.

3

By our order dated 18.08.2023, we have approved the aforesaid

Notification. While approving the Notification, we also declared

that the CEC shall continue to function subject to such orders and

directions that this Court may pass from time to time.

3. In Part I of this judgment, we will first present the conception,

constitution, functions, and finally the institutionalisation of the CEC.

In Part II, to entrench environmental rule of law in our environmental

1 Hereinafter ‘CEC’.

2 In IA No. 295 in WP(C) No. 202/1995 reported as T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India,

(2013) 8 SCC 198. Pursuant to the said direction, a notification dated 17.09.2002 was issued by the

Central Government constituting the CEC as a statutory authority under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

3 See the Preamble of the notification dated 05.09.2023.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1199

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

governance, we have attempted to formulate some new principles for

the effective monitoring of various bodies, institutions, and regulators

established for protecting our forests, wildlife, environment, and

ecology.

PART - I

4. Original Constitution and Functioning of CEC till 2023: This Court’s

endeavours to protect forests in India and to ensure regulation of

non-forest activities in forests commenced in 1996. Even prior to

the constitution of the CEC, this Court directed the constitution

of various bodies to oversee and monitor the compliance of its

orders. In one of the most important orders dated 12.12.1996,4

 this

Court defined the term ‘forest’ as covering all statutorily recognised

forests, irrespective of how they were designated (either as reserved,

protected or otherwise). The term ‘forest land’ in Section 2 of the

Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 was held to include any area recorded

as a forest in government records, irrespective of its ownership.

Along with mandating prior approval of the Central Government to

undertake any non-forest activities in forests and issuing directions

on the felling of trees, this Court also directed the constitution of

Expert Committees by each state government to identify ‘forests’

and sustainable existence of saw mills in forests. This Court also

directed each state government to constitute a committee with the

Principal Chief Conservator of Forests and another Senior Official to

oversee the compliance of its orders and the filing of status reports

by the states.

5. In its order dated 04.03.1997,5

 this Court constituted a High-Powered

Committee6

 to oversee the implementation of its orders in the NorthEastern region and to also oversee preparation of inventory of timber,

apart from permitting its sale. By order dated 17.04.2000,7

 this Court

empowered the HPC to also supervise the transportation of illegal

timber, oversee investigation into cases of illegal felling of trees, and

to re-examine licensing of units.

4 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, [1996] Supp. (9) SCR 982 : (1997) 2 SCC 267.

5 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulkpad v. Union of India, [1997] 2 SCR 642 : (1997) 3 SCC 312.

6 Hereinafter ‘HPC’.

7 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2002) 10 SCC 646.

1200 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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6. The CEC was constituted by this Court by order dated 09.05.20028

to monitor the implementation of its orders and to present cases of

non-compliance, including with respect to encroachment removals,

implementation of working plans, compensatory afforestation,

plantations and other conservation issues. The Court directed that the

CEC must be constituted until such time that the Central Government

constitutes a statutory body under Section 3 of the Environment

(Protection) Act. The CEC, so constituted comprised: (i) a Chairman,

nominated by the Ministry of Environment and Forests9

 in consultation

with the amicus curiae, (ii) a nominee of the MoEF, (iii) two NGOs

who are to be nominated in consultation with the amicus curiae, and

(iv) a Member Secretary. These members (other than the nominee

of the MoEF) could not be removed without the Court’s permission.

7. The above order required that the reports and affidavits filed by states

pursuant to this Court’s orders were to be placed before the CEC

for its examination and recommendations. The recommendations

of the CEC would be placed before this Court for orders. Further,

persons who are aggrieved by any steps taken by the government

in purported compliance of this Court’s orders could seek relief from

the CEC, which must decide the applications in conformity with the

Court’s orders. To perform these functions, the CEC was given the

power to call for documents from any person or government, summon

any person and receive evidence on oath, and seek assistance/

presence of any person or official, including the power to co-opt

persons as special invitees for dealing with specific issues. When an

issue pertains to a particular state, the Chief Secretary and Principal

Chief Conservator of Forests of that state were to be co-opted as

special invitees wherever feasible. The composition of the CEC was

finalised by this Court by order dated 09.09.2002.10 In this order, the

Court also took note of the draft proposed notification under Section

3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act that constituted the CEC

8 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2013) 8 SCC 198.

9 Hereinafter ‘MoEF’.

10 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2009) 17 SCC 755. Under this order, the Court appointed the following members of the CEC:

a. PV Jayakrishnan, Secretary, Government of India as Chairman;

b. Shri NK Joshi, ADG of Forests, Member;

c. Valmik Thapar, Ranthambore Foundation as Member;

d. Advocate Mahendra Vyas as Member;

e. MK Jiwrajka, IGF as Member Secretary.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1201

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

as a statutory body for five years. The Court directed that once the

notification is issued, the functions and responsibilities of the CEC are

to be exercised as a statutory committee. The Central Government

issued the notification constituting the CEC under Section 3(3) on

17.09.2002.11

8. The first modification of the order dated 09.05.2002 came by way

of order dated 14.12.2007.12 The modified terms of reference, which

superseded all previous orders, were as follows:

“1.2. The committee shall exercise the following powers and

perform the following functions:

(i) to monitor the implementation of this Court’s orders and

place reports of non-compliance before the Court and the

Central Government for appropriate action;

(ii) to examine pending interlocutory applications in the said

writ petitions (as may be referred to it by the Court) as

well as the reports and affidavits filed by the States in

response to the orders passed by the Hon’ble Court and

place its recommendations before the Court for orders;

(iii) to deal with any applications made to it by any aggrieved

person and wherever necessary, to make a report to this

Court in that behalf;

(iv) for the purposes of effective discharge of powers conferred

upon the Committee under this order, the Committee can:

(a) call for any documents from any persons or the

Government of the Union or the State or any

other official;

(b) undertake site inspection of forest area involved;

(c) seek assistance or presence of any person(s) or

official(s) required by it in relation to its work;

(d) co-opt one or more persons as its members or as

special invitees for dealing with specific issues;

11 No.13-21/98-SU-PT.II.

12 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2013) 8 SCC 204. 

1202 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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(e) co-opt, wherever feasible, the Chief Secretary or

his representative and Principal Chief Conservator

of Forests of the State as special invitees while

dealing with issues pertaining to a particular State;

(f) to suggest measures generally to the State, as

well as Central Government, for the more effective

implementation of the Act and other orders of this

Court;

(v) to examine and advise/recommend on any issue referred

to the Committee.”

9. The composition of the CEC was modified by this Court by its order

dated 21.02.200813 and the term of office for the new members was

directed to be for three years or until further orders, whichever is

earlier. In another order dated 11.09.2009, one of the members of

the CEC was replaced14 and by order dated 03.02.2017, the Member

Secretary was replaced.15

10. Developments in 2023: It is in the context of IA No. 174896/2019

seeking permission of this Court to construct a Convention Centre at

Patnitop that the present issue of reconstitution of CEC is taken up.

The said application was allowed by this Court on 24.02.2023 subject

to obtaining clearance from the concerned statutory authorities.16

11. The CEC submitted its report on the subject matter on 13.03.2023.

When the report was placed before this Court on 24.03.2023, the

Court made the following observations regarding the functioning

of the CEC. The relevant portion of the order dated 24.03.2023 is

extracted below:17

“10. In any case, we are of the view that once an order is

passed by this Court, it is not appropriate for a Committee

which was constituted under the very orders of this Court

to give a report which in effect, questions the correctness

or otherwise, of the orders passed by this Court.

13 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, [2008] 3 SCR 141 : (2008) 3 SCC 182.

14 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2009) 16 SCC 401.

15 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, (2022) 10 SCC 584.

16 IA No. 196062 and 174896 of 2019 in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No.

202/1995, order dated 24.02.2023

17 IA No. 196062 and 174896 of 2019 along with CEC Report No. 11/2023 in T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, W.P. (C) No. 202/1995, order dated 24.03.2023.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1203

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

11. A Committee which is constituted under the orders of

the Court cannot consider itself to be an appellate authority

in regard to the orders passed by this Court.

12. We are further informed by the learned Solicitor General

that at times, the members of the CEC are not ad idem on

all the issues, which are ultimately reported to this Court.

13. We, therefore, direct that hereinafter, wherever there

is a separate or dissenting opinion of any of the members

of the CEC, such opinion shall also be placed before the

Court alongwith the report.

14. It is further informed that some of the members of the

Committee have crossed the age of 75 years and some

of the members are also living abroad.

15. No doubt, the Committee has rendered yeomen

services to the cause of environment. However, we are

of the view that for effective functioning of the CEC, it is

appropriate that some experts in the relevant fields who

are relatively younger to the present incumbents, can

contribute in a more energetic and efficient manner. It will

therefore be appropriate that some of the old members,

who have attained an advanced age or are not available

in India all the time, are replaced by younger members.

16. We, therefore, request the learned Solicitor General and

both the learned Amicus Curiae to give a list of persons,

who have expertise in environmental and ecological fields.

The same shall be done within three weeks from today.

17. List these applications on 19.04.2023 for direction.”

12. When the matter was next listed on 18.05.2023,18 learned Solicitor

General submitted that the Central Government had accepted the

suggestion of the Court to constitute the CEC as a permanent

statutory body. Union of India was to publish a draft notification under

Section 3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 to constitute the

CEC within 15 days and place the notification before this Court. This

18 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, I.A. Nos. 196062 and 174896 of 2019 in W.P. No.

202/1995, order dated 18.05.2023.

1204 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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notification would contain provisions on the qualification of members,

their tenure, powers and responsibilities, etc. The relevant portion

of the order dated 18.05.2023 is extracted below:

“On the last date when the matter was heard, a suggestion

was made by the Bench that instead of the CEC (Central

Empowered Committee) being an ad-hoc body, it would be

in the larger interest that the CEC as an institution should

be a permanent statutory body.

Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General, has accepted

the said suggestion. He states that the Union of India would

publish a draft notification under the provisions of Section

3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 providing for

the constitution of the CEC.

He submitted that the draft notification would contain

provisions related to the qualification of the Members to be

appointed, their tenure, their powers and responsibilities

etc.

Learned Solicitor General submits that the draft notification

will be published within a period of 15 days from today

and that the same shall be placed before the Court on

the next date.”

13. On 18.08.2023,19 a draft notification issued by the Ministry of

Environment, Forest and Climate Change20 for constitution of the

CEC was placed before the Court, with a copy to the learned amicus

curiae. We examined the draft notification in detail and made certain

suggestions about incorporating certain features for the effective

and efficient functioning of the CEC. Certain suggestions were also

made by the learned amicus curiae. The learned Solicitor General

did not have any objection to the same and submitted that the

suggestions would be incorporated in the final notification. Pursuantly,

the Central Government was permitted to proceed with the issuance

of the notification to constitute the CEC as a permanent body in the

interest of all stakeholders. This Court also permitted the MoEFCC to

19 T.N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India, I.A. Nos. 196062 and 174896 of 2019 in W.P. No.

202/1995, order dated 18.08.2023.

20 Hereinafter ‘MoEFCC’.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1205

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

proceed with the constitution of members of the CEC in accordance

with the notification. The relevant portion of the order passed by this

Court is extracted below:

“2. In pursuance of the aforesaid order, Mr. Tushar

Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India, has handed

over a draft notification to be issued by the Ministry of

Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC)

regarding constitution of Central Empowered Committee

(CEC). The said draft has already been shared with Mr.

K. Parameshwar, learned Amicus Curiae.

3. Learned Amicus Curiae submits that he has only one

suggestion to the draft notification i.e. there should be a

provision for periodical audit of the functioning of the CEC

by the MoEFCC.

4. Learned Solicitor General does not have any objection

to the said suggestion. He states that the suggestion given

by the learned Amicus Curiae would be incorporated in

the final notification that would be issued by the MoEFCC.

5. We, therefore, permit the Union of India to proceed

further with the issuance of notification for constitution of

the CEC as a permanent body.

6. We find that rather than CEC functioning as an ad hoc

body, it functioning as a permanent body would be in the

interest of all the stake holders.

7. We also permit the MoEFCC to proceed further with the

constitution of the CEC in accordance with the notification

that will be issued by the MoEFCC.”

14. Pursuant to the above referred orders dated 18.05.2023 and

18.08.2023, the MoEFCC issued a Notification dated 05.09.202321

under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act to constitute

a permanent authority, i.e., the Central Empowered Committee

(CEC), for monitoring and ensuring compliance of this Court’s orders

covering the subject-matter of environment, forest, and wildlife and

related issues arising out of these orders; and to suggest measures

and make recommendations to the states and Central Government

for more effective implementation of the Act and this Court’s orders.

21 E. F. No. 13-12/2022-SU.

1206 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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15. Under the new notification, the CEC shall comprise: i) Chairman,

ii) Member Secretary, and iii) Three expert members (one each

from the fields of environment, forest, and wildlife). The Chairman

and three expert members are to be nominated by the Central

Government for a tenure of 3 years, which can be extended to one

more tenure subject to the prescribed age limit of 66 years. The

Member Secretary is appointed by the Central Government to be

the Chief Coordinating Officer of the CEC and to assist the CEC in

the discharge of its functions.

16. The notification also provides for the functions and powers of the

CEC in accordance with the orders of this Court along with certain

other functions. They are:

“2. The Committee shall exercise the following powers and

perform the following functions:-

A. Powers and functions conferred upon the Committee by

the Hon’ble Supreme Court of India in Writ Petition (Civil)

No. 202/1995 and 171/1996 in the case of T. N. Godavarman

Thirumalpad Vs. Union of India and others:-

a) to monitor the implementation of Supreme Court’s orders

in above matters and place reports of noncompliance

before the Central Government for appropriate actions;

b) to deal with any applications made to it by any aggrieved

person and wherever necessary, to make a report to the

Central Government in that matter;

c) for the purposes of effective discharge of powers conferred

upon the Committee under this order; the Committee can:-

i. call for any documents from any persons or the

government of the Union or the State or any other

official.

ii. undertake site inspection.

iii. seek assistance or presence of any person(s) or

official(s) required by it in relation to its work.

iv. co-opt one or more persons as special invitees for

dealing with specific issues. 

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1207

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

v. co-opt, wherever feasible, the Secretary of the State

Government dealing with the subjects related to

Forest or Wildlife or Environment or his representative

or the Principal Chief Conservator of Forests of the

State as special invitees while dealing with issues

pertaining to a particular State.

vi. to suggest or recommend measures generally to the

State as well as Central Government, for the more

effective implementation of the Act and other orders

of the Supreme Court in above matters.

B. to examine and advise or recommend on any issue referred to

the Committee by the Central Government, from time to time.”

17. The notification provides that the states or Central Government

shall give reasons in writing for not accepting any suggestion

or recommendation of the CEC and the decision of the Central

Government shall be final.22 Further, in case of deferment of the

decision of any State Government with the CEC’s recommendation,

the matter shall be referred to the Central Government and the

decision of the Central Government shall be final and binding.23

We may clarify at this very stage that the decisions of the Central

Government, or, for that matter, State Governments, are always

subject to the orders of this Court. When this notification was placed

before us, we clarified this position, and we hereby reiterate that the

order of the State and/or Central Government under clauses 3 and

4 will be subject to any direction or order that this Court may pass

from time to time.

18. The members of the CEC are appointed in their personal capacity

and are to function under the administrative control of the MoEFCC,

with headquarters in Delhi.24 The salaries and allowances payable,

other perks and conditions of service of the Chairperson and members

are to be prescribed and they cannot be varied to their disadvantage

after the appointment.25 MoEFCC is required to provide suitable and

adequate office accommodation for the CEC and requisite manpower,

22 ibid, s.3.

23 ibid, s.4.

24 ibid, s.5.

25 ibid, s.6.

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budgetary support, and infrastructure for the discharge of functions

and powers delegated to the CEC.26 MoEFCC is also required to

meet the expenditure incurred, including salaries and remuneration

to members and supporting staff.27 The CEC is required to submit

quarterly reports to the Central Government and MoEFCC for

periodical review and audit of the CEC’s functioning.28

19. Finally, the Central Government appointed the members of the CEC

by another notification dated 08.09.2023, and the composition is as

follows:29 i) Sri Siddhant Das, Chairman, ii) Sri Chandra Prakash

Goyal, Member, iii) Sri Sunil Limaye, Member, iv) Dr. J.R. Bhatt,

Member and v) Ms Banumathi G, Assistant Inspector General of

Forests, MoEFCC, Member Secretary. Thereafter, the matter came

up before us on 11.12.2023. On the said date, we heard the learned

Solicitor General as well as the learned amicus curiae at length.

We had also called for suggestions for more effective functioning

of the CEC.

20. We find that by virtue of the Notification dated 05.09.2023, our

concerns regarding the functioning of the CEC as an ad hoc body

and that hereinafter it should be institutionalised as a permanent

body have been taken care of. The said Notification provides for the

constitution of the CEC, its powers, functions, mandate, members,

method of appointment, terms of service, and monitoring of its

functioning.

21. We further direct the CEC to adopt the following measures to

promote institutional transparency, efficiency, and accountability in

its functioning:

i. The CEC shall formulate guidelines for the conduct of its

functions and internal meetings. The CEC shall formulate the

operating procedures delineating the roles of its members and

the Secretary of the CEC.

ii. The CEC shall formulate guidelines about the public meetings

that it holds, ensure the publication of meeting agenda in

advance on its website, maintain minutes of meetings, and set

out rules regarding notice to parties.

26 ibid. s.7.

27 ibid, s.8.

28 ibid, s.9.

29 F. No. 13-12/2022-SU.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1209

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

iii. The CEC shall formulate guidelines for site visits and, if

necessary, hearing the public and affected parties therein.

iv. The CEC shall formulate guidelines fixing time limits for site

visits, preparation of reports, and also the manner of preparation

of reports.

v. We further direct that these guidelines/regulations must be

accessible for anyone to seek. They shall be posted on the

official website of the CEC.

PART-II

22. As new bodies, authorities, and regulators for environmental

governance emerge from time to time, their institutionalisation

assumes extraordinary importance. Institutionalisation means that

these bodies must work in compliance with institutional norms of

efficiency, integrity, and certainty. In this context, the role of the

constitutional courts is even greater.

23. Environmental Rule of Law: Environmental rule of law refers to

environmental governance that is undergirded by the fundamental

tenets of rule of law.30 The rule of law regime is one that has effective,

accountable, and transparent institutions; responsive, inclusive,

participatory, and representative decision-making; and public access

to information.31 It recognises the vital role that institutions play

in governance and focuses on defining the structural norms and

processes that guide institutional decision-making.32

24. While several laws, rules, and regulations exist for protection of the

environment, their objective is not achieved as there is a considerable

gap as these laws remain unenforced or ineffectively implemented.

30 United Nations, ‘Environmental Rule of Law: First Global Report’ (2019) https://www.unep.org/resources/assessment/environmental-rule-law-first-global-report, p.1, 8. The United Nations has

defined environmental rule of law with reference to 7 core components, which are:

i. Fair, clear, and implementable environmental laws;

ii. Access to information, public participation, and access to justice through courts, tribunals, commissions, and other bodies;

iii. Accountability and integrity of decision-makers and institutions;

iv. Clear and coordinated mandates and roles, across and within institutions;

v. Accessible, fair, impartial, timely and responsive dispute resolution mechanisms;

vi. Recognition of the mutually reinforcing relationship between rights and environmental rule of law; and

vii. Specific criteria for the interpretation of environmental law.

31 Hanuman Laxman Aroskar v. Union of India, [2019] 5 SCR 916 : (2019) 15 SCC 401, para 156.

32 Himachal Pradesh Bus-Stand Management & Development Authority v. Central Empowered Committee, (2021) 4 SCC 309, para 48. 

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Rule of law in environmental governance seeks to redress this issue

as the implementation gap has a direct bearing on the protection

of the environment, forests, wildlife, sustainable development, and

public health, eventually affecting fundamental human rights to a clean

environment that are intrinsically tied to right to life.33 Accountability

of the authorities impressed with the duty to enforce and implement

environmental and other ecological laws is an important feature of

judicial governance. In the context of accountability, this Court in

Vijay Rajmohan v. CBI34 has held:

“34. Accountability in itself is an essential principle of

administrative law. Judicial review of administrative action

will be effective and meaningful by ensuring accountability

of the officer or authority in charge.

35. The principle of accountability is considered as a

cornerstone of the human rights framework. It is a crucial

feature that must govern the relationship between “duty

bearers” in authority and “right holders” affected by their

actions. Accountability of institutions is also one of the

development goals adopted by the United Nations in 2015

and is also recognised as one of the six principles of the

Citizens Charter Movement.

36. Accountability has three essential constituent

dimensions : (i) responsibility, (ii) answerability, and (iii)

enforceability. Responsibility requires the identification

of duties and performance obligations of individuals in

authority and with authorities. Answerability requires

reasoned decision-making so that those affected by their

decisions, including the public, are aware of the same.

Enforceability requires appropriate corrective and remedial

action against lack of responsibility and accountability to

be taken. Accountability has a corrective function, making

it possible to address individual or collective grievances. It

enables action against officials or institutions for dereliction

of duty. It also has a preventive function that helps to

identify the procedure or policy which has become nonfunctional and to improve upon it.”

33 Hanuman Laxman Aroskar (supra), paras 143-144.

34 (2023) 1 SCC 329.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1211

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

25. In India, environmental rule of law must draw attention to the existing

legal regime, rules, processes, and norms that environmental

regulatory institutions follow to achieve the goal of effective and

good governance and implementation of environmental laws. More

importantly, the focus must be on the policy and regulatory and

implementation agencies. In doing so, environmental rule of law

fosters open, accountable, and transparent decision-making and

participatory governance. The renewed role of constitutional courts

will be to undertake judicial review to ensure that institutions and

regulatory bodies comply with the principles of environmental rule

of law.

26. Existing Institutional Governance of the Environment in India:

Environmental regulation in our country is performed by various bodies

constituted under legislations concerning the environment, forests,

and wildlife. Governance is also through the exercise of executive

power by the Central and State Governments. These bodies perform

their function of regulating private and public activities that impact the

environment, forests, and wildlife in accordance with environmental

legislations, rules, regulations, and notifications passed under them.

An overview of some of the main bodies that regulate the environment

in India can be encapsulated as follows:

i. Central Pollution Control Board (CPCB) and State Pollution

Control Boards (SPCB): These Boards were initially constituted

under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974.35

They also function under the Air (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Act, 1981.36 The function of the CPCB under these

Acts is to promote cleanliness of water streams and wells and

to improve air quality and combat air pollution. In furtherance

of these functions, the Board advises the Central Government,

coordinates activities of states, provides technical assistance to

SPCBs, lays down standards, and performs any other function

as may be prescribed. The SPCBs perform similar functions

by advising the State Governments on matters concerning air

and water pollution.37

35 Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, ss. 3 and 4.

36 Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act 1981, ss. 3 and 4.

37 Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974, ss. 16 and 17; Air (Prevention and Control of

Pollution) Act 1981, ss. 16 and 17.

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ii. Authorities concerning protection of wildlife under the Wildlife

Protection Act, 1972: The Central Government appoints a

Director of Wild Life Preservation and the State Government

appoints Chief Wild Life Wardens, Wild Life Wardens, and

Honorary Wild Life Wardens.38

The Central Government shall constitute the National Board

for Wild Life to promote the conservation and development of

wildlife and forests.39 The National Board can frame policies

and advise the Central and State Governments on promoting

wildlife conservation and effectively controlling poaching and

illegal trade; recommend setting up and managing national parks

and sanctuaries; conduct impact assessment of activities on

wildlife; review progress of wildlife conservation; and prepare

and publish status reports on wildlife in the country.40 Similarly,

State Board(s) for Wild Life must also be constituted under the

Act for selecting and managing protected areas; formulating

policies for protection and conservation of wildlife; harmonising

the needs of tribals and forest dwellers with wildlife conservation;

and any other matter referred to it by the State Governments.41

The Central Government must constitute the Central Zoo

Authority that regulates the functioning of zoos by laying down

minimum standards, recognition and derecognition, maintaining

records, coordinating personnel training, and providing

assistance.42 The Central Government must also constitute the

National Tiger Conservation Authority under the Act,43 whose

powers and functions have been set out in Section 38O.

iii. The Central Government constitutes the Advisory Committee

under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980 to advise the Central

Government on the grant of approval for State Government’s use

of forest land for non-forest purposes and on any other matter

connected with forest conservation which may be referred to

it by the Central Government.44

38 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, ss. 3 and 4.

39 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, ss. 5A and 5C.

40 ibid.

41 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, ss. 6 and 8.

42 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, ss. 38A and 38C.

43 Wildlife Protection Act, 1972, s. 38L.

44 Forest (Conservation) Act 1980, s. 3.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1213

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

iv. The Central Government, in exercise of its power under Section

3 of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 constitutes the

State Environment Impact Assessment Authorities (SEIAA) at

the state level to grant prior environmental clearance to certain

projects, as specified in the Environment Impact Assessment

Notification.

v. National Biodiversity Authority and State Biodiversity Boards

are constituted under the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.45

The National Biodiversity Authority has the power to grant

permission for obtaining biological resources and to regulate

matters pertaining to the grant of such permission, including

intellectual property rights. The Authority also advises the Central

Government on conservation and sustainable and equitable use

of biodiversity, the State Governments on the management of

heritage sites, and such other functions as may be prescribed

by the Central Government.46 The State Biodiversity Boards

are tasked with advising State Governments on conservation

and sustainable and equitable use of biodiversity, regulating

the grant of approvals for commercial utilisation, bio-survey and

bio-utilisation of biological resources in India, and such other

functions as may be prescribed by the State Government.47

vi. National Green Tribunal (NGT) has been constituted by the

Central Government by notification under the NGT Act, 2010.48 It

has jurisdiction over all civil cases where a substantial question

relating to the environment is involved and such question arises

out of implementation of various legislations pertaining to the

environment.49 The NGT also has appellate jurisdiction over

certain matters arising out of the Water (Prevention and Control

of Pollution) Act, 1974; Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; Air

(Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; Environment

45 Biological Diversity Act, 2002, ss. 8 and 22.

46 Biological Diversity Act, 2002, s. 18.

47 Biological Diversity Act, 2002, s. 23.

48 NGT Act, 2010, s. 3.

49 As per Schedule I of the NGT Act, the following legislations are covered: (i) The Water (Prevention and

Control of Pollution) Act, 1974; (ii) The Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Cess Act, 1977; (iii)

The Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980; (iv) The Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981; (v)

The Environment (Protection) Act, 1986; (vi) The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991; (vii) The Biological Diversity Act, 2002. 

1214 [2024] 1 S.C.R.

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(Protection) Act, 1986; and Biological Diversity Act, 2002.50 In

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai v. Ankita Sinha,

51

this Court has held that the NGT is a sui generis body with allencompassing jurisdiction to protect the environment. It not only

performs an adjudicatory role but also performs wider functions

in the nature of prevention, remedy, and amelioration.52

vii. In S. Jagannath v. Union of India,

53 which was a writ petition

regarding prawn farming in ecologically fragile coastal areas,

this Court directed the Central Government to constitute an

authority under the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986 and

confer it with powers to protect ecologically fragile coastal areas,

seashores, waterfronts, and other coastal areas. Pursuant to

this judgment, the Central Government by notification under

Section 3(3) constituted the National Coastal Zone Management

Authority,

54 State Coastal Zone Management Authorities,

55

and Union Territory Coastal Zone Management Authorities56 in

coastal states and union territories. The NCZMA coordinates

the actions of SCZMAs and UTCZMAs, examines proposals

for classifying coastal zonal areas, reviews violations, and

provides technical assistance to the State Governments and

Central Government.

viii. In M.C. Mehta v. Union of India,

57 this Court took suo motu

cognisance of falling ground water levels and directed the Central

Government to constitute a Central Groundwater Board as an

authority to regulate and control groundwater management and

development under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection)

Act, 1986. The main object of constituting the Board was the

urgent need to regulate indiscriminate boring and withdrawal

of underground water.58

50 NGT Act 2010, s. 16.

51 2021 SCC OnLine SC 897, para 61.

52 ibid, para 46.

53 (1997) 2 SCC 87, para 52.

54 Hereinafter ‘NCZMA’.

55 Hereinafter ‘SCZMA’.

56 Hereinafter ‘UTCZMA’.

57 (1997) 11 SCC 312, para 9.

58 ibid, para 12.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1215

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

There are many more bodies, authorities, and officers under the

Union and states that are involved in environmental governance. A

comprehensive list of such bodies, including the above, is as follows:

i. Animal Welfare Board of India59

ii. Atomic Energy Regulatory Board60

iii. Central Pollution Control Board61

iv. State Pollution Control Boards62

v. Director of Wild Life Preservation, Chief Wild Life Wardens,

Wild Life Wardens, and Honorary Wild Life Wardens 63

vi. National Board for Wild Life64

vii. State Boards for Wild Life65

viii. Central Zoo Authority66

ix. National Tiger Conservation Authority67

x. Coastal Zone Management Authority68

xi. Central Groundwater Board69

xii. Advisory Committee70

xiii. National Biodiversity Authority71

xiv. State Biodiversity Boards72

xv. National Disaster Management Authority73

59 Constituted under the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act, 1960.

60 Constituted under the Atomic Energy Act, 1962.

61 Constituted under the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 and Air (Prevention and

Control of Pollution Act, 1981.

62 ibid.

63 Appointed under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972.

64 Constituted under the Wildlife Protection Act, 1972.

65 ibid.

66 ibid.

67 ibid.

68 Constituted by the Central Government under Section 3(3) of the Environment Protection Act pursuant

to Supreme Court Directions in S. Jagannath v. Union of India, (1997) 2 SCC 87.

69 Constituted by the Central Government under Section 3(3) of the Environment Protection Act pursuant

to Supreme Court Directions in M.C. Mehta v. Union of India, (1997) 11 SCC 312.

70 Constituted under the Forest (Conservation) Act, 1980.

71 Constituted under the Biological Diversity Act, 2002.

72 ibid.

73 Constituted under The Disaster Management Act, 2005. 

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xvi. State Disaster Management Authorities74

xvii. District Disaster Management Authorities75

xviii. National Green Tribunal76

xix. State Level Advisory Bodies77

xx. National Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and

Planning Authority78

xxi. State Compensatory Afforestation Fund Management and

Planning Authority79

xxii. Environment Impact Assessment Authorities80

xxiii. Expert Appraisal Committee81

xxiv. Dahanu Taluka Environment Protection Authority82

xxv. Wildlife Crime Control Bureau

xxvi. Forest Survey of India

27. The above referred bodies, authorities, regulators, and officers are

constituted with persons having expertise in the field. They have the

requisite knowledge to take appropriate decisions about contentious

issues of the environment, forests, and wildlife, and also to ensure

effective implementation of environmental laws. These bodies

constitute the backbone of environmental governance in our country.

They need to function with efficiency, integrity, and independence.

As duty-bearers, they are also subject to accountability.

28. We may ask a simple question – how effectively are these

environmental bodies functioning today? This question has a direct

bearing on the protection and restoration of ecological balance.

74 ibid.

75 ibid.

76 Constituted under the NGT Act, 2010.

77 Constituted under the Solid Waste Management Rules, 2016.

78 Constituted under the Compensatory Afforestation Fund Act, 2016.

79 ibid.

80 Constituted under the Environment Impact Assessment Notification issued by the Central Government

under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

81 ibid.

82 Constituted by the Central Government under Section 3(3) of the Environment (Protection) Act, 1986.

[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1217

In Re: T. N. Godavarman Thirumulpad v. Union of India and Ors.

29. As environmental governance through these bodies emerges, the

obligation of the constitutional courts is even greater. Hitherto, the

constitutional courts focused on decisions and actions taken by the

executive or private persons impacting the environment and ecology

because the scrutiny by regulators was felt to be insufficient. Their

judgment, review, and consideration did not inspire confidence and

therefore, the Court took up the issue and would decide the case. In

this process, a large number of decisions rendered by this Court on

sensitive environmental, forest, and ecological matters constitute the

critical mass of our environmental jurisprudence. This Court would

continue to exercise judicial review, particularly in environmental

matters, whenever necessary.

30. We however seek to emphasise and reiterate the importance of

ensuring the effective functioning of these environmental bodies as

this is imperative for the protection, restitution, and development

of the ecology. The role of the constitutional courts is therefore to

monitor the proper institutionalisation of environmental regulatory

bodies and authorities.

31. In furtherance of the principles of environmental rule of law, the

bodies, authorities, regulators, and executive offices entrusted with

environmental duties must function with the following institutional

features:

i. The composition, qualifications, tenure, method of appointment

and removal of the members of these authorities must be clearly

laid down. Further, the appointments must be regularly made

to ensure continuity and these bodies must be staffed with

persons who have the requisite knowledge, technical expertise,

and specialisation to ensure their efficient functioning.

ii. The authorities and bodies must receive adequate funding and

their finances must be certain and clear.

iii. The mandate and role of each authority and body must be

clearly demarcated so as to avoid overlap and duplication of

work and the method for constructive coordination between

institutions must be prescribed.

iv. The authorities and bodies must notify and make available

the rules, regulations, and other guidelines and make them

accessible by providing them on the website, including in 

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regional languages, to the extent possible. If the authority or

body does not have the power to frame rules or regulations,

it may issue comprehensive guidelines in a standardised form

and notify them rather than office memoranda.

v. These bodies must clearly lay down the applicable rules

and regulations in detail and the procedure for application,

consideration, and grant of permissions, consent, and approvals.

vi. The authorities and bodies must notify norms for public hearing,

the process of decision-making, prescription of right to appeal,

and timelines.

vii. These bodies must prescribe the method of accountability by

clearly indicating the allocation of duties and responsibilities

of their officers.

viii. There must be regular and systematic audit of the functioning

of these authorities.

32. The role of the constitutional courts is to ensure that such

environmental bodies function vibrantly, and are assisted by robust

infrastructure and human resources. The constitutional courts will

monitor the functioning of these institutions so that the environment

and ecology is not only protected but also enriched.

33. Ordered accordingly.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case: Directions issued.