* Author
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1165 : 2024 INSC 77
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia
v.
State of Bihar & Anr.
(Criminal Appeal No. 523 of 2024)
31 January 2024
[Vikram Nath and Ahsanuddin Amanullah*, JJ.]
Issue for Consideration
Whether the High Court was justified in rejecting the prayer for
quashing of the FIR registered u/ss. 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420
IPC against the vendee for the criminal acts, misuse of power
of attorney-PoA, misappropriation of property, and executing
fraudulent sale deed, when he had no role either in the execution
of the PoA nor in any misdeed by the PoA holder vis-à-vis the
land-owners/principals.
Headnotes
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 482 – Quashing of
FIR – Power of Attorney-PoA executed by the landowners/
principals, including the informant and others in favour of
the one for management and maintenance of their property
– Allegations that the PoA holder sold some portion of the
landowners’ property to the appellant-vendee and executed
the sale deed at Dehradun in favour of the vendee where the
land is located, and when asked, the PoA did not respond to
the legal notice nor gave any information to the informant
and others about the sale – Case registered u/ss. 409, 467,
468, 471 and 420 IPC against the accused and the vendee
alleging commission of criminal acts, that by misusing the
PoA, they misappropriated the property, did not rendition the
account and obtained the Sale Deed without the signatures
of the land-owners – Magistrate, Buxar took cognizance of
the offences – Petition for quashing of FIR – Rejected by the
High Court – Challenge to, by the appellant:
Held: In the appropriate case, protection is to be accorded
against unwanted criminal prosecution and from the prospect
of unnecessary trial – On facts, dispute, if any, is between the
land-owners/principals inter-se and/or between them and the PoA-
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holder – It would not be proper to drag the vendee into criminal
litigation, when he had no role either in the execution of the PoA
nor any misdeed by the PoA holder vis-à-vis the land-owners/
principals – Moreover, the entire consideration amount was paid by
the vendee to the PoA-holder – Furthermore, the only controversy
was related to the Sale Deed executed by the PoA-holder in favour
of the vendee in Dehradun for property located at Dehradun, thus,
needs to be examined by the Dehradun courts – Moreover, a suit
filed by the land-owners/principals at Dehradun for the same cause
of action was dismissed in favour of the vendee – Thus, case for
interference not made out – Impugned judgment is set aside – FIR
as also the order taking cognizance and all consequential acts
emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to the appellant, are
quashed. [Paras 21, 34, 35]
Deeds and documents – Construction of a deed or a contract –
Power of Attorney-PoA executed by the landowners/principals,
in favour of the person from whom the vendee purchased the
land – Clauses 3 and 11 of the PoA together authorized the
PoA-holder to execute deeds, including of/for sale, receive
consideration in this regard and proceed to registration
upon accepting consideration on behalf of the land-owners/
principals – Clause 15 of the PoA, states that the PoA-holder
was authorized to present for registration the sale deeds or
other documents signed by the land-owners/principals and
admit execution thereof – Interpretation of:
Held: Is to be interpreted harmoniously as also logically the effect
of a combined reading of the clauses – When the three clauses
are read, Clause 15 is, in addition to Clauses 3 and 11 of the PoA
and not in derogation thereof – Besides the contingencies where
the PoAholder had been authorized to execute any type of deed
and receive consideration and get registration done, which included
sale of movable/immovable property on behalf of the landowners/
principals, the land owners/principals had also retained the authority
that if a Sale Deed was/had been signed by them, the very same
PoAholder was also authorized to present it for registration and
admit to execution before the authority concerned – Thus, there is no
contradiction between Clauses 3, 11 and 15 of the PoA – All three
clauses are capable of being construed in such a manner that they
operate in their own fields and are not rendered nugatory – Even
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1167
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
if a conflict had been perceived between Clauses 3 and 11, on the
one hand, and Clause 15 on the other, Clauses 3 and 11 would
prevail over Clause 15 as when the same cannot be reconciled,
the earlier clause(s) would prevail over the later clause(s), when
construing a Deed or a Contract. [Paras 24, 27-30]
Case Law Cited
Mukul Agrawal v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC
402; K G Premshankar v Inspector of Police, [2002] 2
Suppl. SCR 350 : (2002) 8 SCC 87; Smt. Raj Kumari
Vijh v Dev Raj Vijh, [1977] 2 SCR 997 : (1977) 2 SCC
190; Radha Sundar Dutta v Mohd. Jahadur Rahim,
[1959] 1 SCR 1309 : AIR 1959 SC 24 – referred to.
Forbes v Git, [1922] 1 AC 256 – referred to.
List of Acts
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Penal Code, 1860.
List of Keywords
Power of Attorney; Quashing of FIR; Sale deed; Legal notice;
Misusing power of attorney; Misappropriation; Unwanted criminal
prosecution; Unnecessary trial; Power of attorney holder; Execution
of power of attorney ; Misdeed by power of attorney holder;
Construction of a Deed or a Contract; Harmonious interpretation;
Consideration; Jurisdiction; Cause of action; Criminal litigation.
Case Arising From
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.523
of 2024.
From the Judgment and Order dated 12.03.2021 of the High Court
of Judicature at Patna in CRLM No.42776 of 2013.
Appearances for Parties
Maninder Singh, Sr. Adv., Ms. Shirin Khajuria, Ms. Oshi Verma, Rajesh
Batra, Ms. Sonia Kukreja, Rohit Chandra, Advs. for the Appellant.
Siddhartha Dave, Sr. Adv., Santosh Krishnan, Simon Benjamin,
Ms. Sonam Anand, Ms. Deepshikha Sansanwal, Ms. Mridul Singh,
Devashish Bharuka, Ms. Sarvshree, Shobhit Dvivedi, Ms. Swati
Mishra, Advs. for the Respondents.
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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court
Judgment
Ahsanuddin Amanullah, J.
Heard learned counsel for the parties.
2. Leave granted.
3. The present appeal arises out of the Final Judgment and Order dated
12.03.2021 (hereinafter referred to as the “Impugned Judgment”)
passed in Criminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013 by the High
Court of Judicature at Patna (hereinafter referred to as the “High
Court”) by which the prayer for quashing First Information Report
No.87 of 2011 dated 19.03.2011 (hereinafter referred to as the “FIR”)
registered at Dumraon Police Station, Buxar, Bihar under Sections
467, 468, 469 and 471 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter
referred to as the “IPC”), has been dismissed.
THE BRIEF FACTS:
4. The informant/respondent no.2 Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay Singh @
Man Vijay Singh gave a statement in writing to the Station House
Officer, Dumraon Police Station alleging that Raj Kumar Karan Vijay
Singh, s/o Group Captain Late Maharaj Kumar Ran Vijay Singh had
sold off property belonging to 5 persons of the informant’s family,
including the informant himself. It was alleged that the informant
and his family members had earlier given a Power of Attorney
(hereinafter referred to as the “PoA”) to Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh
in respect of and as owners of property bearing Khasras No.459G,
472, 474, 475, 476 and 478B and further Khasra No.459E situated in
Village Karbari Grant, Tehsil Vikasnagar, Pargana Pachwain, District
Dehradun. It was stated that the informant Maharaj Kumar Man Vijay
Singh and his brother Kumar Chandra Vijay Singh, both sons of
Maharaja Kamal Singh, Smt. Sangeeta Kumari, Indumati, Ran Vijay
Singh, his father’s Sister, father, sisters and Aunt executed a PoA
on 12.04.1994 for management and maintenance of their property.
It was provided therein that the PoA holder shall pursue litigation,
file plaint after obtaining signature of the land owners/principals of
the PoA. It was alleged that some portion of the property of the
informant and others was sold to the present appellant and on such
knowledge, the informant sent a Legal Notice to the PoA-holder
directing him to give the details of the sale made in conspiracy with
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1169
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
the appellant and a Notice was also given to revoke the PoA but
the agent did not give any information/reply to the informant and
others who had executed the PoA. In this backdrop, and as such, the
criminal case was instituted. It was alleged that criminal acts were
committed by the accused, including the appellant, by misusing the
PoA and alleging that they had misappropriated the property, did not
rendition the account(s) and that the Sale Deed was fraudulent as it
was without obtaining the signatures of the land-owners/Principals
of the PoA-holder. Upon investigation, the police had submitted final
report finding a case under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and 420,
IPC and the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Buxar thereupon took
cognizance of the offences under Sections 409, 467, 468, 471 and
420, IPC on 18.11.2014 in GR No.515 of 2011.
5. During the pendency of Criminal Miscellaneous No.42776 of 2013
on the file of the High Court, originally filed for quashing the FIR,
the appellant filed Interlocutory Application No.1261 of 2017 seeking
amendment of the prayer to include quashing of the order dated
18.11.2014 mentioned above.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE APPELLANT:
6. Learned senior counsel for the appellant submitted that the appellant
is merely the vendee of a portion of the land which was included
in the PoA given to Raj Kumar Karan Vijay Singh on 12.04.1994.
7. He contended that the Sale deed dated 24.08.2000 was on the basis
of the PoA given to Man Vijay Singh, s/o Kamal Singh by the landowners/principals. It was submitted that it was an internal matter
between the land-owners/executors of the said PoA with regard to the
terms, which obviously were binding, inter se, between the parties.
8. Learned senior counsel drew the attention of the Court to the contents
of the PoA, especially Clause 3 thereof and submitted that the same
entitled the PoA-holder to execute any type of Deed and to receive
consideration on behalf of the land-owners/executors of the PoA and
get such Deed registered. Thus, it was contended that the following
was not in dispute: (a) the PoA was admittedly neither forged nor
withdrawn; (b)the appellant was the vendee of a piece of land covered
under the PoA, and (c)for such sale, valuable consideration had also
been paid. In this view, it was submitted, the appellant could not be
held liable for any misdeed, much less, any criminal act.
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9. Learned senior counsel submitted that the Revisional Court was
right that cognizance, as far as the appellant is concerned, was
totally illegal as no offence was made out against the appellant.
It was further contended that even on the jurisdictional issue, the
Sale Deed in question was executed at Dehradun, Uttarakhand and
the land is also situated in Dehradun. It was submitted that even
the consideration was paid in Dehradun. It was contended that the
informant also filed Original Suit No. 27 of 2011 in the Court of the
learned Additional District Judge, Vikas Nagar, Dehradun for setting
aside the Sale Deed executed in favour of the appellant by the PoA
holder and for rendition of accounts, which was dismissed and it was
found that the PoA-holder/agent was duly authorized thereunder to
sell the property after receiving consideration amount on behalf of
the land-owners/principals, who were also not entitled to rendition of
accounts. Thus, it was submitted that in a civil proceeding wherein
the right of the PoA-holder to sell the property in question had been
upheld and the appellant having bought the property from such PoA
holder of the land covered under the PoA, the present FIR itself is
misuse and abuse of the process of law, as far as the appellant is
concerned. Further, he submitted, that the cancellation of the PoA was
only on 09.01.2011, i.e., after almost 10½ years after the execution
of the sale deed on 24.08.2000.
10. Moreover, it was contended that the issue being purely of civil nature
i.e., there being a dispute as to whether the PoA-holder has paid
to the land -owners/principals money received for the land sold, at
best, it may give rise to a cause of action to the principals on the civil
side against the PoA-holder, but the appellant could not be dragged
into any such controversy.
11. Learned senior counsel submitted that at the time of the sale, the
PoA was valid and Clauses 3 and 11 read with 5 gave full authority
to the PoA-holder to sell the property, get the Sale Deed registered
and receive consideration. He submitted that Clause 15, on which
the complainant has relied, was not applicable. Further, neither in the
FIR nor in the order taking cognizance or even in the Legal Notice(s),
is there any reference to the appellant, and the chargesheet merely
states that the seller/PoA-holder did not have the right to sell. It was
contended that while granting anticipatory bail to the appellant, the
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1171
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
High Court by order dated 20.02.2014 in Criminal Miscellaneous
No. 44830 of 2013, which was heard and decided with Criminal
Miscellaneous No. 45146 of 2013 filed by the PoA-holder, the said
PoA-holder had taken the stand that he was ready to give/return
the sale proceed amounts to the informant, without admitting to the
case of the informant and subject to such condition, he was also
granted anticipatory bail.
12. On the civil nature of the dispute, it was submitted that the issue
pertains to interpretation of various clauses of the PoA, which cannot
be done in a criminal proceeding and rightly the Revisional Court had
held it to be a civil dispute. It was also pointed out that the Buxar
Courts would lack territorial jurisdiction.
13. It was submitted that the Original Suit No. 27 of 2011, filed by the
respondent no.2 and others, at Dehradun, was prior to filing of the
FIR, which was dismissed by order dated 07.12.2017 holding that the
PoA holder had the right to sell the land, receive the consideration and
hence the Sale deed was valid. The contention that the respondent
no.2 and others had no knowledge of the Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000
could not be believed and the suit was also held to be time-barred
as the prayer was for setting aside the Sale Deed dated 24.08.2000.
14. Learned senior counsel relied upon the decision in Mukul Agrawal
v State of Uttar Pradesh, (2020) 3 SCC 402, wherein at Paragraph
71, it has been held that the finding of the Civil Court that the
agreement was not a forged document, makes the very substratum
of the criminal complaint vanish.
15. Reliance was also placed on the decision of K G Premshankar v
Inspector of Police, (2002) 8 SCC 87, where at Paragraphs 15,
16, 30-322
, Sections 40-43, of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 have
1 ‘7. In view of the conclusive opinion of the appellate court that the agreement dated 30-3-1988 was not a
forged document, the very substratum of the criminal complaint vanishes. In the circumstances to allow
the appellants to be prosecuted will only be a complete abuse of the process of law. The proceedings in
Complaint Case No. 2705 of 2003 are therefore quashed and the appeal is allowed.’
2 ‘15. Learned Additional Solicitor-General Shri Altaf Ahmed appearing for the respondents submitted that
the observation made by this Court in V.M. Shah case [(1995) 5 SCC 767 : 1995 SCC (Cri) 1077] that
“the finding recorded by the criminal court, stands superseded by the finding recorded by the civil court
and thereby the finding of the civil court gets precedence over the finding recorded by the criminal court”
(SCC p. 770, para 11)
is against the law laid down by this Court in various decisions. For this, he rightly referred to the provi-
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been interpreted with regard to the relevance of decision of a Civil
Court on criminal proceedings against the same person(s) pertaining
to the same cause. As far as territorial jurisdiction is concerned, it
was the stand of the learned senior counsel that the only link in
the chain is that the PoA was executed at Buxar, but in the present
case, there is no dispute with regard to execution of the PoA and the
dispute relates only to execution of the Sale Deed which occurred
in Dehradun where the land lies. Thus, the submission was that the
Courts at Buxar would not have any jurisdiction in the present matter.
16. Learned senior counsel summed up his arguments by contending
that all points raised before us had been taken before the High Court
but have not been dealt with in the Impugned Judgment.
sions of Sections 41, 42 and 43 of the Evidence Act and submitted that under the Evidence Act to what
extent judgments given in the previous proceedings are relevant is provided and therefore it would be
against the law if it is held that as soon as the judgment and decree is passed in a civil suit the criminal
proceedings are required to be dropped if the suit is decided against the plaintiff who is the complainant
in the criminal proceedings.
16. In our view, the submission of learned Additional Solicitor-General requires to be accepted. Sections
40 to 43 of the Evidence Act provide which judgments of courts of justice are relevant and to what extent.
Section 40 provides for previous judgment, order or a decree which by law prevents any court while
taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, to be a relevant fact when the question is whether such court
ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial. Section 40 is as under:
“40. Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.—The existence of any judgment, order or
decree which by law prevents any court from taking cognizance of a suit or holding a trial, is a relevant
fact when the question is whether such court ought to take cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.”
xxx
30. What emerges from the aforesaid discussion is — (1) the previous judgment which is final can be
relied upon as provided under Sections 40 to 43 of the Evidence Act; (2) in civil suits between the same
parties, principle of res judicata may apply; (3) in a criminal case, Section 300 CrPC makes provision that
once a person is convicted or acquitted, he may not be tried again for the same offence if the conditions
mentioned therein are satisfied; (4) if the criminal case and the civil proceedings are for the same cause,
judgment of the civil court would be relevant if conditions of any of Sections 40 to 43 are satisfied, but it
cannot be said that the same would be conclusive except as provided in Section 41. Section 41 provides
which judgment would be conclusive proof of what is stated therein.
31. Further, the judgment, order or decree passed in a previous civil proceeding, if relevant, as provided
under Sections 40 and 42 or other provisions of the Evidence Act then in each case, the court has to
decide to what extent it is binding or conclusive with regard to the matter(s) decided therein. Take for
illustration, in a case of alleged trespass by A on B’s property, B filed a suit for declaration of its title and
to recover possession from A and suit is decreed. Thereafter, in a criminal prosecution by B against A for
trespass, judgment passed between the parties in civil proceedings would be relevant and the court may
hold that it conclusively establishes the title as well as possession of B over the property. In such case,
A may be convicted for trespass. The illustration to Section 42 which is quoted above makes the position
clear. Hence, in each and every case, the first question which would require consideration is — whether
judgment, order or decree is relevant, if relevant — its effect. It may be relevant for a limited purpose,
such as, motive or as a fact in issue. This would depend upon the facts of each case.
32. In the present case, the decision rendered by the Constitution Bench in M.S. Sheriff case [AIR 1954
SC 397 : 1954 Cri LJ 1019] would be binding, wherein it has been specifically held that no hard-andfast rule can be laid down and that possibility of conflicting decision in civil and criminal courts is not a
relevant consideration. The law envisages
“such an eventuality when it expressly refrains from making the decision of one court binding on the
other, or even relevant, except for limited purpose such as sentence or damages”.’
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1173
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
SUBMISSIONS BY THE RESPONDENT NO.2:
17. Per contra, learned senior counsel appearing for respondent no.2
submitted that the case before the High Court was confined to
the question of territorial jurisdiction and it was observed that the
same depends upon evidence. Thus, it was submitted that territorial
jurisdiction does not go to the root of the matter, but is merely for
administrative convenience. Reliance was placed on the decision
in Smt. Raj Kumari Vijh v Dev Raj Vijh, (1977) 2 SCC 190, the
relevant being at Paragraph 73
.
18. It was submitted that the appellant has wilfully purchased the land
of the complainant on the strength of the PoA, which itself required
the assent of the land-owners/principals for sale of land, as would
be clear from Clause 15 of the PoA.
19. Learned senior counsel, in the alternative took the stand that if
relief was granted to the appellant with regard to quashing of the
FIR, it may be confined to the appellant and not of the FIR as a
whole, where the other co-accused has been charge-sheeted and
summoned to face trial. It was urged that it may be left open to the
Trial Court to summon the appellant if the evidence so warrants,
under Section 319, Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter
referred to as the “CrPC”).
SUBMISSIONS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE:
20. A counter has been filed on behalf of the State of Bihar opposing
the prayer made in the present appeal and justifying the prosecution
of the appellant on the basis of the FIR.
3 ‘7. Section 531 of the Code reads as follows:
“531. No finding, sentence or order of any criminal court shall be set aside merely on the ground that the
inquiry, trial or other proceeding in the course of which it was arrived at or passed, took place in a wrong
sessions division, district, sub-division or other local area, unless it appears that such error has in fact
occasioned a failure of justice.”
The section therefore relates to a defect of jurisdiction. As has been stated by this Court in Purushottamdas Dalmia v. State of West Bengal [(1962) 2 SCR 101 : AIR 1961 SC 1589 : (1961) 2 Cri LJ 728]
there are two types of jurisdiction of a criminal court, namely, (1) the jurisdiction with respect to the power
of the court to try particular kinds of offences, and (2) its territorial jurisdiction. While the former goes to
the root of the matter and any transgression of it makes the entire trial void, the latter is not of a peremptory character and is curable under Section 531 of the Code. Territorial jurisdiction is provided “just as
a matter of convenience, keeping in mind the administrative point of view with respect to the work of a
particular court, the convenience of the accused who will have to meet the charge levelled against him
and the convenience of the witnesses who have to appear before the Court”. Sub-section (8) of Section
488 in fact provides that proceedings under the section “may be taken against any person in any district
where he resides or is, or where he last resided with his wife or, as the case may be, the mother of the
illegitimate child”. This therefore is ordinarily the requirement as to the filing of an application under Section 488 within the limits of the jurisdiction of the Magistrate concerned.’
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ANALYSIS, REASONING AND CONCLUSION:
21. Having considered the facts and submissions by the learned counsel
for the parties, this Court finds that a case for interference has been
made out. The undisputed and admitted facts are that the PoA was
executed by the land-owners/principals, including respondent no.2
and others on 12.04.1994, in favour of the person from whom the
appellant purchased the land on 24.08.2000.
22. It is also a fact that the PoA-holder executed a Sale Deed and got
it registered at Dehradun in favour of the appellant as also that the
land is located in Dehradun. Much has been said with regard to a
harmonious reading of the various clauses of the PoA viz. Clauses
3, 11 and 15 which read as under:
‘3. To execute any type of deed and to receipt consideration,
if any, on our behalf and to get the Registration done of
the same.
xxx
11. To sell moveable or immoveable property including
land, live stock, trees etc. and receive payment of such
sales on our behalf.
xxx
15. To present for registration all the sale deeds or other
documents signed by us and admit execution there of
before the District Registrar or the Sub-Registrar or such
other Officer as may have authority to register the said
deeds and documents as the case may be and take back
the same after registration.’
23. A mere perusal of the above indicates that as per Clause 3, the
PoA-holder was authorised to execute any type of deed, to receive
consideration in this behalf and to get the registration done thereof.
Clause 11 of the PoA further makes it clear that the PoA-holder had
the authority to sell movable or immovable property including land,
livestock, trees etc. and receive payment of such sales on behalf of
the land-owners/principals. However, Clause 15 of the PoA, which has
been strenuously relied upon by the respondent no.2, while opposing
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1175
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
the present appeal, states that the PoA-holder was authorized to
present for registration the sale deed(s) or other documents signed
by the land-owners/principals and admit execution thereof before
the District Registrar or the Sub-Registrar or such other officer as
may have authority to register the said deeds and documents, as
the case may be, and take back the same after registration.
24. Thus, the Court is required to interpret harmoniously as also logically
the effect of a combined reading of the afore-extracted clauses. As
such, our endeavour would, in the first instance, necessarily require
us to render all three effective and none otiose. In order to do so, this
Court would test as to whether all the three clauses can independently
be given effect to and still not be in conflict with the other clauses.
25. With this object, when the three clauses are read, it is obvious, at the
cost of repetition, that Clause 3 pertains to execution of any type of
deed and receiving consideration, if any, on behalf of the land-owners/
principals and to get the registration thereof carried out. Basically,
this would take care of any type of deed by which the PoA-holder
was authorized to execute and also receive consideration and get
registration done on behalf of the land-owners/principals.
26. Clause 11 of the PoA deals specifically with regard to sale of movable
or immovable property including land and receiving payments of
such sales on behalf of the land-owners/principals.
27. In this eventuate, Clauses 3 and 11 of the PoA together authorized
the PoA-holder to execute deeds, including of/for sale, receive
consideration in this regard and proceed to registration upon accepting
consideration on behalf of the land-owners/principals.
28. Coming to Clause 15 of the PoA, which states that the PoA-holder
was authorized to present for registration the sale deeds or other
documents signed by the land-owners/principals and admit execution
thereof, is, in our understanding in addition to Clauses 3 and 11
of the PoA and not in derogation thereof. The reason to so hold
is that besides the contingencies where the PoA-holder had been
authorized to execute any type of deed and receive consideration
and get registration done, which included sale of movable/immovable
property on behalf of the land-owners/principals, the land owners/
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principals had also retained the authority that if a Sale Deed was/
had been signed by them, the very same PoA-holder was also
authorized to present it for registration and admit to execution before
the authority concerned.
29. Thus, in the instant case, had it been a situation where the landowners/principals had executed a Sale Deed in favour of any third
party prior to the Sale Deed executed and registered by the PoAholder with regard to the property in question, and the PoA-holder
had not presented the said Sale Deed and had gone ahead with
himself executing and getting registered a different or a subsequent
Sale Deed in favour of the appellant, the matter would be entirely
different. Therefore, clearly, there is no contradiction between
Clauses 3, 11 and 15 of the PoA. To restate, Clause 15 of the PoA
is an additional provision retaining authority for sale with the landowners/principals themselves and the process whereof would also
entail presentation for registration and admission of its execution.
30. We are of the considered opinion that all three clauses are capable
of being construed in such a manner that they operate in their own
fields and are not rendered nugatory. That apart, we are mindful that
even if we had perceived a conflict between Clauses 3 and 11, on the
one hand, and Clause 15 on the other, we would have to conclude
that Clauses 3 and 11 would prevail over Clause 15 as when the
same cannot be reconciled, the earlier clause(s) would prevail over
the later clause(s), when construing a Deed or a Contract. Reference
for such proposition is traceable to Forbes v Git, [1922] 1 AC 2564
,
as approvingly taken note of by a 3-Judge Bench of this Court in
Radha Sundar Dutta v Mohd. Jahadur Rahim, AIR 1959 SC 24.
However, we have been able, as noted above, to reconcile the three
clauses in the current scenario.
4 ‘The principle of law to be applied may be stated in few words. If in a deed an earlier clause is followed by a later clause which destroys altogether the obligation created by the earlier clause,
the later clause is to be rejected as repugnant and the earlier clause prevails. In this case the two
clauses cannot be reconciled and the earlier provision in the deed prevails over the later. Thus, if
A covenants to pay 100 and the deed subsequently provides that he shall not be liable under his
covenant, that later provision is to be rejected as repugnant and void, for it altogether destroys
the covenant. But if the later clause does not destroy but only qualifies the earlier, then the two
are to be read together and effect is to be given to the intention of the parties as disclosed by the
deed as a whole. …’
[2024] 1 S.C.R. 1177
Bharat Sher Singh Kalsia v. State of Bihar & Anr.
31. Another fact which cannot be lost sight of, is that it is apparent that
the matter relates to a dispute among the co-sharers as the PoAholder is the son of one of the co-sharers/principals namely Smt.
Indumati R. V. Singh.
32. The PoA and its execution/registration not being in dispute, the only
controversy relating to the Sale Deed executed by the PoA-holder in
favour of the appellant in Dehradun for property located at Dehradun
would thus, in the emerging factual matrix, clearly be an issue for the
Courts at Dehradun to examine, much less give rise to any cause
of action at Buxar.
33. We may add that this issue of jurisdiction is limited to the transaction
of the execution of the Sale Deed in favour of the appellant, and
not to any other controversy or dispute the land-owners/principals
may have, either inter-se or against the PoA-holder. Moreover, a suit
filed by the land-owners/principals at Dehradun prior to the lodging
of the FIR, for the same cause of action, has been dismissed in
favour of the appellant, where a specific plea to cancel the Sale
Deed stands rejected.
34. In sum, the dispute, if any, is between the land-owners/principals
inter-se and/or between them and the PoA-holder. We think it would
be improper to drag the appellant into criminal litigation, when he
had no role either in the execution of the PoA nor any misdeed by
the PoA-holder vis-à-vis the land-owners/principals. Moreover, the
entire consideration amount has been paid by the appellant to the
PoA-holder.
35. On an overall circumspection of the entire facts and circumstances,
we find that the Impugned Judgment needs to be and is hereby set
aside. This Court has held that in the appropriate case, protection
is to be accorded against unwanted criminal prosecution and from
the prospect of unnecessary trial5
. We quash FIR No.87 of 2011
dated 19.03.2011, Dumraon Police Station, Buxar, Bihar as also
the order taking cognizance dated 18.11.2014 and all consequential
acts emanating therefrom, insofar as they relate to the appellant.
5 Priyanka Mishra v State of Madhya Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 978 and Vishnu Kumar Shukla
v State of Uttar Pradesh, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1582.
1178 [2024] 1 S.C.R.
Digital Supreme Court Reports
36. Learned senior counsel for the respondent no. 2 had submitted that
the Trial Court be allowed to exercise power under Section 319, CrPC
against the appellant, if warranted. Expressing no opinion thereon, we
insert the caveat that the Trial Court will act in accordance with law.
37. The appeal is accordingly allowed, leaving the parties to bear their
own costs.
Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case: Appeal allowed.
