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Thursday, March 21, 2024

Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 306, 107 – Abetment of suicide – Allegations set out in the suicide note, if constitutes necessary ingredients of abetment to commit suicide – Suicide note by the victim-posted as Senior Clerk, that he was frustrated and bothered by the style of functioning of the appellant-District Saving Officer and of the Chief Development Officer and thus, was left with no option but to end his life, and was also bothered by the pressure of working in two districts – Criminal proceedings against the appellant for the offences punishable u/s. 306 and s. 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act – Application by the appellant u/s. 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings – Rejected by the High Court – Justification:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 157 : 2024 INSC 172

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra

v.

The State of U.P. & Anr.

(Criminal Appeal No.(s). 1397 of 2024)

05 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

High Court, if justified in rejecting the application filed by the accused

appellant u/s. 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceeding of the criminal

case registered against him u/s. 306 IPC and s. 3(2)(v) of the Schedule

Castes and the Schedule Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989.

Headnotes

Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 306, 107 – Abetment of suicide –

Allegations set out in the suicide note, if constitutes necessary

ingredients of abetment to commit suicide – Suicide note by

the victim-posted as Senior Clerk, that he was frustrated and

bothered by the style of functioning of the appellant-District

Saving Officer and of the Chief Development Officer and

thus, was left with no option but to end his life, and was also

bothered by the pressure of working in two districts – Criminal

proceedings against the appellant for the offences punishable

u/s. 306 and s. 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act – Application by the

appellant u/s. 482 CrPC seeking quashing of proceedings –

Rejected by the High Court – Justification:

Held: Prosecution of the appellant for the offence u/s.3(2)(v) of

the SC/ST Act is ex facie illegal and unwarranted since from the

admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary ingredients

of the offence u/s.3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are not made out –

Prosecution case is entirely based on the suicide note left behind

by the victim before committing suicide – On a minute perusal of the

suicide note, the contents thereof do not indicate any act or omission

on the part of the appellant which could make him responsible for

abetment as defined u/s. 107 – Suicide note clearly shows that

the deceased was frustrated on account of work pressure and

was apprehensive of various random factors unconnected to his

official duties – Necessary ingredients of the offence of abetment

to commit suicide are not made out from the chargesheet – Thus,

allowing prosecution of the appellant is grossly illegal for the offences 

158 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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punishable u/s.306 and s.3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act tantamounts to

gross abuse of process to law – Also, investigating agency itself

proposed a closure report in the matter after conducting thorough

investigation – Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court

and all proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant in the

criminal case pending, quashed and set aside. [Paras 16, 18, 22-25]

Case Law Cited

Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v. State of Maharashtra,

[2000] 1 SCR 1155 : (2000) 3 SCC 557; Netai Dutta v.

State of W.B., (2005) 2 SCC 659; M. Mohan v. State

represented by the Deputy Superintendent of Police,

[2011] 3 SCR 437 : (2011) 3 SCC 626 – referred to.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860; Schedule Castes and the Schedule Tribes

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989; Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

List of Keywords

Abetment of suicide; Suicide; Suicide note; Caste; Act or omission;

Frustrated on account of work pressure.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1397

of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 26.07.2022 of the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad in A482 No.12691 of 2015

Appearances for Parties

Pallav Shishodia, Sr. Adv., Danish Zubair Khan, Ajeet Pandey, Dr.

Lokendra Malik, Advs. for the Appellant.

Ankit Goel, Ram Shiromani Yadav, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated 26th July, 2022

passed by the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad rejecting the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 159

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

Criminal Misc. Application No. 12691 of 2015 filed by the accused

appellant herein under Section 482 of Court of Criminal Procedure,

1973(hereinafter being referred to as ‘CrPC’).

3. By way of the said application, the accused appellant sought

quashing of proceeding of the Criminal Case No. 6476 of 2005

pending against him in the Court of learned Chief Judicial Magistrate,

Farrukhabad for the offences punishable under Section 306 of the

Indian Penal Code, 1860(hereinafter being referred to as the ‘IPC’)

and Section 3(2)(v) of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989 (hereinafter being referred

to as ‘SC/ST Act’).

4. The case aforesaid came to be registered on the basis of a chargesheet filed by the investigating agency pursuant to investigation of

C.C. No. 516/2002 P.S. Kotwali, District Farrukhabad.

5. The accused appellant herein was working as the District Savings

Officer in Kannauj District. It is alleged that one Data Ram(deceased),

posted as Senior Clerk, Child Welfare Board, Fatehgarh, committed

suicide on 3rd October, 2002 by consuming a poisonous substance

in his own house. The deceased wrote a suicide note before ending

his life.

6. The dead body of the Data Ram was recovered lying in his house, i.e.

Mohalla Gwal Toli, Fatehgarh, District-Farrukhabad. FIR No. 249/2002

came to be registered at P.S. Kotwali, Fatehgarh on the basis of the

suicide note left behind by the deceased for the offences punishable

under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.

7. The Investigating Officer conducted the investigation and filed a

closure report. Later on, investigation was re-opened and Chargesheet No. 253 of 2002 came to be filed against the accused appellant

for the offences punishable under Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)

(v) of the SC/ST Act.

8. The suicide note written by the deceased which forms the basis of

the FIR and the charge-sheet is reproduced hereinbelow for the

sake of ready reference: -

“The learned District Magistrate

It is hereby informed that on 1.10.2002 in night time at

8 ‘O’ Clock, the District Savings Officer Kannauj Shri 

160 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Prabhat Mishra made telephonic call to me and even

got my conversations done from Chief Development

Officer, Kannauj and told that you come to Kannauj on

2.10.2002 in morning at 11 O’ Clock and meet me and

some information has to be prepared. On 2.10.2002, at

10 O’Clock, I went to District Social Welfare Officer for

obtaining permission to go to Kannauj, then he directed

me to not go to Kannauj. When, it has already been written

to the District Savings Officer that you call your record,

then, you do not need to go there. Thereafter, I returning

back to the Office, started performing official work. In noon

time at 12.30 O’ Clock, the Chief Development Officer,

gave me information on telephone that you leave all your

work and go to Kannauj and meet the learned District

Magistrate. I immediately reached Kannauj by Scooter,

where, at 2:15 O’ Clock, I went the bungalow of District

Magistrate, where, it was told that the learned District

Magistrate has departed and you please meet the District

Savings Officer Prabhat Mishra, then, I went to Shri

Mishra at 2:45 O’ Clock, then, he continued sitting me in

his Office till 5:30 O’ Clock and told me that the learned

District Magistrate has not sit till now and we will go from

here at 5 O’clock. At 5:30 O’ Clock, Shri Mishra had taken

me to the Chief Development Officer Shri Shashidhar

Dwivedi. Conversation of Shri Mishra had already taken

place previously with CDO Sahab. The CDO Sahab

asked that why the pension of 327 widows has not been

distributed yet, then I replied that due to non-availability

of their bank accounts, it could not have been distributed.

On this, he, while using very indecent words, used odd

words against me very much and that I am unable to give

full particulars of above. He told me that even after my

call, you did not come to me, have you become a very big

governor. Further says that DM Sahab has refused to go

there and thereat, he keeps filling the Officers a lot and

does not want to perform work and even everything was

told about Suspension and other things. Thereafter, Shri

Mishra had taken me at the residence of learned District

Magistrate from where, I was called at 7:30 O’clock. After

making me aware about the information, the respected 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 161

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

sir asked me reason for not coming to Kannauj, then, I

made him aware about the situation.

Sir, it is requested that I, even after the fact that the post

of District Probation Officer is lying vacant, am executing,

and discharging my duties diligently with honesty and full

devotion. Due to non-availability of my Officers in two

districts, now, it is beyond my control to perform work with

two different Officers. Sir, it was told by you that to not

go to Kannauj and discharge your duty of Farrukhabad

smoothly, but, I was suddenly given order to go to Kannauj

that you leave all the work and come to Kannauj and then,

I have already sent the information on 1.10.2002, to the

District Economics and Statistics Officer, Kannauj, where

it was available, but, I was called only for insulting me.

Even I also understand this fact that during my lifetime,

duties of both the Districts will not be discharged and I

will continuously grinding in between two Officers equally.

So, for avoiding from the torture of Shri Prabhat Mishra

and Shri Shashidhar Dwivedi, Chief Development Officer,

I am sacrificing my life, so that, I, while visiting Kannauj,

may not be compelled to be harassed till now, I have

not been insulted and harassed by any learned District

Magistrate/ Chief Development Officer, in this manner

and all the Officers have appreciated my duties and work.

With touching feet with respect, please forgive me. With

best regards.”

9. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid suicide note is the only foundation

of the charge-sheet filed against the accused appellant. The accused

appellant approached the High Court by filing an application under

Section 482 CrPC for quashing of the chargesheet and proceedings

of the criminal case registered against him. The said application

was rejected vide order dated 26th July 2022 which is challenged

in this appeal.

10. Mr. Pallav Shishodia, learned senior counsel appearing for the accused

appellant contended that even if the allegations as set out in the suicide

note are taken to be true on their face value, the same do not constitute

the necessary ingredients of the offences alleged and hence, it is a fit

case wherein the charge-sheet deserves to be quashed.

162 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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11. Learned senior counsel contended that from the admitted allegations

as set out in the aforesaid suicide note (supra), no inference can

be drawn that the appellant in any manner, instigated or abetted

the deceased to commit suicide. At best, what can be inferred from

the suicide note (supra) is that the deceased was frustrated and

bothered by the style of functioning of the appellant herein and of

Shashidhar Dwivedi, CDO, and thus he felt that he was left with no

option but to end his life. He also seems to have been bothered by

the pressure of working in two districts and took the extreme step

of ending his life being unable to withstand the pressure.

12. Learned senior counsel further urged that all proceedings sought

to be taken against the appellant as a consequence of the charge

sheet, deserve to be quashed as the same amount to an abuse of

process of the Court.

13. Per contra, Mr. Ankit Goel, learned standing counsel for the State

of Uttar Pradesh has opposed the submissions advanced by the

learned senior counsel representing the accused appellant.

14. Learned counsel for the State urged that the appellant and Shashidar

Dwivedi, CDO being the superior officers of the deceased, harassed

and humiliated him to such an extent that he was left with no

option but to end his life. The allegations set out in the suicide note

constitute the necessary ingredients of abetment to commit suicide.

Thus, it is not a fit case warranting interference in the well-reasoned

order passed by the High Court refusing to interfere and quash the

proceedings of the criminal case registered against the appellant.

15. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions

advanced at bar and have gone through the material placed on record.

16. At the outset, we may take note of the fact that the prosecution of

the appellant herein for the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/

ST Act is ex facie illegal and unwarranted because it is nowhere the

case of the prosecution in the entire charge-sheet that the offence

under IPC was committed by the appellant upon the deceased on

the basis of his caste.

17. This Court in the case of Masumsha Hasanasha Musalman v.

State of Maharashtra1 considered this issue and held as under:-

1 [2000] 1 SCR 1155 : (2000) 3 SCC 557

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 163

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

“9. Section 3(2)(v) of the Act provides that whoever, not

being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe, commits any offence under the Penal Code, 1860

punishable with imprisonment for a term of ten years or

more against a person or property on the ground that such

person is a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe or such property belongs to such member, shall be

punishable with imprisonment for life and with fine. In the

present case, there is no evidence at all to the effect that

the appellant committed the offence alleged against him on

the ground that the deceased is a member of a Scheduled

Caste or a Scheduled Tribe. To attract the provisions of

Section 3(2)(v) of the Act, the sine qua non is that the victim

should be a person who belongs to a Scheduled Caste or

a Scheduled Tribe and that the offence under the Penal

Code, 1860 is committed against him on the basis that such

a person belongs to a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled

Tribe. In the absence of such ingredients, no offence under

Section 3(2)(v) of the Act arises. In that view of the matter,

we think, both the trial court and the High Court missed

the essence of this aspect. In these circumstances, the

conviction under the aforesaid provision by the trial court

as well as by the High Court ought to be set aside.”

18. Thus, from the admitted allegations of the prosecution, the necessary

ingredients of the offence under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are

not made out so as to justify prosecution of the accused appellant

for the said offence.

19. The parameters required to bring an act or omission by the person

charged within the purview of the offence under Section 306 IPC

have been elaborated by this Court time and again and a few of

these judgments are quoted below for ready reference.

20. In the case of Netai Dutta v. State of W.B.2 in almost similar

circumstances, this Court quashed the proceedings sought to be

taken against the petitioner under Section 306 IPC. The relevant

observations from the said judgment are reproduced as under:-

2 (2005) 2 SCC 659

164 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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“4. One Pranab Kumar Nag was an employee of M/s M.L.

Dalmiya & Co. Ltd. During the course of his employment,

he had been posted at various worksites of the Company

and on 11-9-1999 he was transferred to the worksite of

the Company’s stores located at 160, B.L. Saha Road,

Kolkata. It seems that pursuant to the transfer order, Pranab

Kumar Nag did not join duty and after a period of about two

years he sent in a letter of resignation written in his own

hand wherein he expressed his grievance of stagnancy of

salary and also alleged that he was a victim of unfortunate

circumstances. The Company accepted his resignation

with immediate effect. On 16-2-2001, a dead body was

found at the railway tracks near Ballygunge Railway Station

and it was revealed that it was the body of Pranab Kumar

Nag. His brother went to the office where Pranab Kumar

Nag had worked and made enquiries. The dead body of

Pranab Kumar Nag was released to his brother after the

post-mortem examination on 19-2-2001. After a period

of two months, a complaint was lodged before the police

post on the basis of a suicide note allegedly recovered

from the dead body of Pranab Kumar Nag. Based on the

complaint, a case was registered against the appellant

and some others. A translated copy of the suicide note is

produced before us by the appellant. We have carefully

read the alleged suicide note. The substance of this

suicide note is that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag alleged

that appellant Netai Dutta and one Paramesh Chatterjee

engaged him in several wrongdoings (he has shown as a

type of torture) and at the end of the letter, a reference is

also made to Paramesh Chatterjee and Netai Dutta alleging

that he reported certain incidents to them. A reading of

the letter would show that deceased Pranab Kumar Nag

was not very much satisfied with the working conditions

in the office. In the letter he has stated that he had to be

at the workplace sometimes throughout the day and night

and he had to remain in the company of some drivers who

had been sometimes in drunken condition at about one

o’clock or two o’clock in the night. It is also alleged that

the drivers who had been present at the workplace had 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 165

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

been having non-vegetarian food. He also complained that

he had to work even on Sundays. He further stated that

one day he could leave the workplace at 8 o’clock in the

evening and all the restaurants were closed and that he

reported the matter to the present appellant.

5. There is absolutely no averment in the alleged suicide

note that the present appellant had caused any harm to

him or was in any way responsible for delay in paying

salary to deceased Pranab Kumar Nag. It seems that the

deceased was very much dissatisfied with the working

conditions at the workplace. But, it may also be noticed

that the deceased after his transfer in 1999 had never

joined the office at 160, B.L. Saha Road, Kolkata and

had absented himself for a period of two years and that

the suicide took place on 16-2-2001. It cannot be said

that the present appellant had in any way instigated the

deceased to commit suicide or he was responsible for the

suicide of Pranab Kumar Nag. An offence under Section

306 IPC would stand only if there is an abetment for the

commission of the crime. The parameters of “abetment”

have been stated in Section 107 of the Penal Code,

1860. Section 107 says that a person abets the doing

of a thing, who instigates any person to do that thing; or

engages with one or more other person or persons in any

conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal

omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, or

the person should have intentionally aided any act or illegal

omission. The Explanation to Section 107 says that any

wilful misrepresentation or wilful concealment of a material

fact which he is bound to disclose, may also come within

the contours of “abetment”.

6. In the suicide note, except referring to the name of the

appellant at two places, there is no reference of any act

or incidence whereby the appellant herein is alleged to

have committed any wilful act or omission or intentionally

aided or instigated the deceased Pranab Kumar Nag in

committing the act of suicide. There is no case that the

appellant has played any part or any role in any conspiracy, 

166 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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which ultimately instigated or resulted in the commission

of suicide by deceased Pranab Kumar Nag.

7. Apart from the suicide note, there is no allegation

made by the complainant that the appellant herein in

any way was harassing his brother, Pranab Kumar Nag.

The case registered against the appellant is without any

factual foundation. The contents of the alleged suicide

note do not in any way make out the offence against the

appellant. The prosecution initiated against the appellant

would only result in sheer harassment to the appellant

without any fruitful result. In our opinion, the learned Single

Judge seriously erred in holding that the first information

report against the appellant disclosed the elements of a

cognizable offence. There was absolutely no ground to

proceed against the appellant herein. We find that this is

a fit case where the extraordinary power under Section

482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is to be invoked.

We quash the criminal proceedings initiated against the

appellant and accordingly allow the appeal.”

21. In the case of M. Mohan v. State represented by the Deputy

Superintendent of Police3

, this Court held as below:-

“36. We would like to deal with the concept of “abetment”.

Section 306 of the Code deals with “abetment of suicide” which

reads as under:

“306. Abetment of suicide. —If any person commits

suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide,

shall be punished with imprisonment of either description

for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also

be liable to fine.

37. The word “suicide” in itself is nowhere defined in the Penal

Code, however, its meaning and import is well known and

requires no explanation. “Sui” means “self” and “cide” means

“killing”, thus implying an act of self-killing. In short, a person

committing suicide must commit it by himself, irrespective of the

means employed by him in achieving his object of killing himself.

3 [2011] 3 SCR 437 : (2011) 3 SCC 626

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 167

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

38. In our country, while suicide itself is not an offence

considering that the successful offender is beyond the reach

of law, attempt to suicide is an offence under Section 309 IPC.

39. “Abetment of a thing” has been defined under Section 107

of the Code. We deem it appropriate to reproduce Section 107,

which reads as under:

“107.Abetment of a thing.—A person abets the doing of

a thing, who—

First.—Instigates any person to do that thing; or

Secondly.—Engages with one or more other person or

persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if

an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that

conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or

Thirdly.—Intentionally aides, by any act or illegal omission,

the doing of that thing.”

Explanation 2 which has been inserted along with Section

107 reads as under:

Explanation 2.—Whoever, either prior to or at the time

of the commission of an act, does anything in order to

facilitate the commission of that act, and thereby facilitates

the commission thereof, is said to aid the doing of that act.

40. The learned counsel also placed reliance on yet another

judgment of this Court in Ramesh Kumar v. State of Chhattisgarh

[(2001) 9 SCC 618], in which a three- Judge Bench of this Court

had an occasion to deal with the case of a similar nature. In a

dispute between the husband and wife, the appellant husband

uttered “you are free to do whatever you wish and go wherever

you like”. Thereafter, the wife of the appellant Ramesh Kumar

committed suicide.

41. This Court in SCC para 20 of Ramesh Kumar [(2001) 9

SCC 618 has examined different shades of the meaning of

“instigation”. Para 20 reads as under: (SCC p. 629)

“20. Instigation is to goad, urge forward, provoke, incite

or encourage to do ‘an act’. To satisfy the requirement of

instigation though it is not necessary that actual words 

168 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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must be used to that effect or what constitutes instigation

must necessarily and specifically be suggestive of the

consequence. Yet a reasonable certainty to incite the

consequence must be capable of being spelt out. The

present one is not a case where the accused had by his

acts or omission or by a continued course of conduct

created such circumstances that the deceased was left with

no other option except to commit suicide in which case an

instigation may have been inferred. A word uttered in the

fit of anger or emotion without intending the consequences

to actually follow cannot be said to be instigation.

In the said case this Court came to the conclusion that

there is no evidence and material available on record

wherefrom an inference of the appellantaccused having

abetted commission of suicide by Seema (the appellant’s

wife therein) may necessarily be drawn.

42. In State of W.B. v. Orilal Jaiswal [(1994) 1 SCC 73], this

Court has cautioned that (SCC p. 90, para 17) the Court should

be extremely careful in assessing the facts and circumstances

of each case and the evidence adduced in the trial for the

purpose of finding whether the cruelty meted out to the victim

had in fact induced her to end her life by committing suicide.

If it appears to the Court that a victim committing suicide was

hypersensitive to ordinary petulance, discord and difference in

domestic life, quite common to the society, to which the victim

belonged and such petulance, discord and difference were

not expected to induce a similarly circumstanced individual

in a given society to commit suicide, the conscience of the

Court should not be satisfied for basing a finding that the

accused charged of abetting the offence of suicide should

be found guilty.

43. This Court in Chitresh Kumar Chopra v. State (Govt. of NCT

of Delhi) [(2009) 16 SCC 605] had an occasion to deal with this

aspect of abetment. The Court dealt with the dictionary meaning

of the word “instigation” and “goading”. The Court opined that

there should be intention to provoke, incite or encourage the

doing of an act by the latter. Each person’s suicidability pattern

is different from the others. Each person has his own idea of 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 169

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

self-esteem and self-respect. Therefore, it is impossible to

lay down any straitjacket formula in dealing with such cases.

Each case has to be decided on the basis of its own facts and

circumstances.

44. Abetment involves a mental process of instigating a person

or intentionally aiding a person in doing of a thing. Without a

positive act on the part of the accused to instigate or aid in

committing suicide, conviction cannot be sustained.

45. The intention of the legislature and the ratio of the cases

decided by this Court are clear that in order to convict a person

under Section 306 IPC there has to be a clear mens rea to

commit the offence. It also requires an active act or direct act

which led the deceased to commit suicide seeing no option and

this act must have been intended to push the deceased into

such a position that he/she committed suicide.

46. In V.P. Shrivastava v. Indian Explosives Ltd. [(2010) 10

SCC 361] this Court has held that when prima facie no case

is made out against the accused, then the High Court ought

to have exercised the jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC and

quashed the complaint.

47. In a recent judgment of this Court in Madan Mohan Singh

v. State of Gujarat [(2010) 8 SCC 628], this Court quashed

the conviction under Section 306 IPC on the ground that the

allegations were irrelevant and baseless and observed that

the High Court was in error in not quashing the proceedings.

48. In the instant case, what to talk of instances of instigation,

there are even no allegations against the appellants. There is

also no proximate link between the incident of 14-1-2005 when

the deceased was denied permission to use the Qualis car with

the factum of suicide which had taken place on 18-1-2005.

Undoubtedly, the deceased had died because of hanging. The

deceased was undoubtedly hypersensitive to ordinary petulance,

discord and differences which happen in our day-to-day life. In

a joint family, instances of this kind are not very uncommon.

Human sensitivity of each individual differs from person to

person. Each individual has his own idea of self-esteem and

self-respect. Different people behave differently in the same 

170 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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situation. It is unfortunate that such an episode of suicide had

taken place in the family. But the question that remains to be

answered is whether the appellants can be connected with that

unfortunate incident in any manner?

49. On a careful perusal of the entire material on record and

the law, which has been declared by this Court, we can safely

arrive at the conclusion that the appellants are not even remotely

connected with the offence under Section 306 IPC. It may

be relevant to mention that criminal proceedings against the

husband of the deceased Anandraj (A-1) and Easwari (A-3)

are pending adjudication.

******

62. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335]

this Court in the backdrop of interpretation of various relevant

provisions of the Code of Criminal Procedure under Chapter

XIV and of the principles of law enunciated by this Court in a

series of decisions relating to the exercise of the extraordinary

power under Article 226 of the Constitution of India or the

inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, gave the following

categories of cases by way of illustration wherein such power

could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of

the court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. Thus, this

Court made it clear that it may not be possible to lay down

any precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelised and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive

list to myriad kinds of cases wherein such power should be

exercised : (SCC pp. 378-79, para 102)

“(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at

their face value and accepted in their entirety do

not prima facie constitute any offence or make out

a case against the accused.

(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR

do not disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an

investigation by police officers under Section 156(1)

of the Code except under an order of a Magistrate

within the purview of Section 155(2) of the Code.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 171

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support

of the same do not disclose the commission of any

offence and make out a case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute

a cognizable offence but constitute only a noncognizable offence, no investigation is permitted by

a police officer without an order of a Magistrate as

contemplated under Section 155(2) of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the

basis of which no prudent person can ever reach

a just conclusion that there is sufficient ground for

proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any

of the provisions of the Code or the Act concerned

(under which a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the

institution and continuance of the proceedings and/

or where there is a specific provision in the Code or

the Act concerned, providing efficacious redress for

the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is

maliciously instituted with an ulterior motive for

wreaking vengeance on the accused and with a view

to spite him due to private and personal grudge.”

*****

65. This Court in Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd.

Sharaful Haque [(2005) 1 SCC 122] observed thus : (SCC p.

128, para 8)

“8. ... It would be an abuse of process of the court to

allow any action which would result in injustice and

prevent promotion of justice. In exercise of the powers,

court would be justified to quash any proceeding if it finds

that initiation/continuance of it amounts to abuse of the

process of court or quashing of these proceedings would

otherwise serve the ends of justice. When no offence 

172 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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is disclosed by the complaint, the court may examine

the question of fact. When a complaint is sought to be

quashed, it is permissible to look into the materials to

assess what the complainant has alleged and whether

any offence is made out even if the allegations are

accepted in toto.”

*****

68. In the light of the settled legal position, in our considered

opinion, the High Court was not justified in rejecting the petition

filed by the appellants under Section 482 CrPC for quashing the

charges under Section 306 IPC against them. The High Court

ought to have quashed the proceedings so that the appellants

who were not remotely connected with the offence under Section

306 IPC should not have been compelled to face the rigmaroles

of a criminal trial. As a result, the charges under Section 306

IPC against the appellants are quashed.”

22. It is not in dispute that the prosecution case is entirely based on

the suicide note left behind by the deceased before committing

suicide. On a minute perusal of the suicide note, we do not find that

the contents thereof indicate any act or omission on the part of the

accused appellant which could make him responsible for abetment

as defined under Section 107 IPC.

23. We have minutely perused the suicide note (reproduced supra)

which clearly shows that the deceased was frustrated on account

of work pressure and was apprehensive of various random factors

unconnected to his official duties. He was also feeling the pressure

of working in two different districts. However, such apprehensions

expressed in the suicide note, by no stretch of imagination, can be

considered sufficient to attribute to the appellant, an act or omission

constituting the elements of abetment to commit suicide. The facts

of the case at hand are almost identical to the case of Netai Dutta

(supra). Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that the necessary

ingredients of the offence of abetment to commit suicide are not

made out from the chargesheet and hence allowing prosecution

of the appellant is grossly illegal for the offences punishable under

Section 306 IPC and Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act tantamounts

to gross abuse of process to law.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 173

Prabhat Kumar Mishra @ Prabhat Mishra v. The State of U.P. & Anr.

24. It may be noted that in the first instance, the investigating agency itself

proposed a closure report in the matter after conducting thorough

investigation. In this background, we are of the opinion that there

do not exist any justifiable ground so as to permit the prosecution

of the appellant for the offences under Section 306 IPC and Section

3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act.

25. Thus, the impugned order passed by the High Court and all

proceedings sought to be taken against the appellant in the criminal

case pending for the offences punishable under Section 306 IPC and

Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST Act are hereby quashed and set aside.

26. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

27. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Nidhi Jain Result of the case:

Appeal allowed.

Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 – S.20(1), (2) & (3) – Interpretation of:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 60 : 2024 INSC 173

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act

and Chief District Health Officer

v.

Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

(Civil Appeal No. 3831 of 2024)

04 March 2024

[J.K. Maheshwari* and K.V. Viswanathan, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

The interpretation of power of Section 20(1) & (2) and Section

20(3) of the Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques

(Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 for cancellation,

suspension or suspension in public interest respectively by the

appropriate authority specified in Section 17 of PC & PNDT Act.

Headnotes

Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques

(Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 – S.20(1), (2)

& (3) – Interpretation of:

Held: Bare reading of the provisions makes it clear that s.20(1)

& (2) deals with both suspension or cancellation as the case

may be, while s.20(3) only deals with suspension in public

interest – The authority, while exercising power under subsections (1) & (2) of s.20 of PC&PNDT Act, may act suo moto

or on a complaint and after notice to the Genetic Counselling

Centre, Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic for the reasons

to show cause why its registration should not be suspended or

cancelled, and affording reasonable opportunity of hearing and

having regard to the advice of the Advisory Committee and on

being satisfied that there was a breach of the provisions of the

PC&PNDT Act or the Rules, without prejudice to any criminal

action, may suspend or cancel its registration as the case

maybe – Sub-Section (3) of s.20 only deals with suspension

and confers independent power to the appropriate authority

irrespective and notwithstanding the power under sub-sections

(1) or (2) of s.20 – The said power may only be exercised by

the appropriate authority if the said authority is of the opinion

that exercise of such power is necessary or expedient in public 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 61

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

interest – Meaning thereby that the exercise of such power of

suspension by appropriate authority is in a contingency where

it is expedient or necessary to take immediate action in public

interest – While exercising such power, it is incumbent on the

authority to form an opinion for reasons to be recorded in writing

to indicate the said public interest – The said power is not akin

to the power as specified in sub-section 2 of s.20 of PC&PNDT

Act and the Rules thereto. [Paras 10, 11]

Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques

(Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 – S.20(1), (2)

& (3) – During inspection of the hospital run by respondent

no.1, the appropriate authority and its team found some lapses

contravening the provisions of PC&PNDT Act – On 25.10.2010,

the appropriate authority without giving any notice passed an

order suspending the registration of the hospital in exercise

of the power u/s. 20(1) & (2) of the PC & PNDT Act – Appellate

Authority directed the appropriate authority to pass a suitable

order – Pursuant thereto, appropriate authority passed fresh

order on 29.12.2010 that there was breach of mandatory

provisions and suspended the registration u/s. 20(3) of the

PC&PNDT Act in public interest – Propriety:

Held: The power of sub-section (3) of s.20 of PC&PNDT Act is

notwithstanding the power of sub-sections (1) & (2) of s.20 – The

said power can only be exercised when the appropriate authority

forms an opinion that it is necessary or expedient in public interest

to do so – It is incumbent upon the appropriate authority to form

its opinion based on reasons expedient or necessary to exercise

the power of suspension – The contents of the suspension order

dated 29.12.2010 does not contain reasons as required to form

an opinion that it is necessitated or expedient in public interest to

exercise the power of suspension –Therefore, it does not fulfill the

requirement of sub-section (3) of s.20 of PC&PNDT Act – Neither

the first order of suspension dated 25.10.2010 nor the second

order of suspension dated 29.12.2010 qualifies the requirement

of sub-section (3) of s.20 of the PC&PNDT Act – The said view is

fortified by the Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High

Court. [Para 16]

Pre-conception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques

(Regulation & Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994 – S.20 (2) &

(3) – Intendment of:

62 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Held: It is clarified that if the appropriate authority finds breach

of provisions of PC&PNDT Act or the Rules it may, after issuing

notice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard,

without prejudice to any criminal action against the licensed

entity, suspend its registration for such period as it may think

fit or cancel the same as the case maybe – The appropriate

authority has also been conferred with a power under sub-section

(3) of s.20 notwithstanding the power under sub-section (1) &

(2) of s.20 – In the said situation in case, the authority forms

an opinion that it is necessary or expedient in public interest,

then after recording reasons in writing, it may suspend the

registration of the licensed entity without notice as specified in

sub-section (1) of s.20 – Thus, the power of sub-section (3) is

intermittent and in addition to the power of sub-section (2) but

it may be exercised sparingly, in exceptional circumstances in

public interest. [Para 17]

Case Law Cited

Malpani Infertility Clinic Pvt. Ltd. vs. Appropriate

Authority, 2004 SC Online Bom 834; J. Sadanand M.

Ingle (Dr) vs. State of Maharashtra, 2013 SCC online

Bom 697; Priykant Mokalal Kapadia vs. State of Gujarat,

Special Civil Application No. 9424 of 2014; Sujit

Govind Dange vs. State of Maharashtra and others,

2012(6) Mh.L.J. 289 – referred to.

List of Acts

Preconception and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation

& Prevention of Misuse) Act, 1994.

List of Keywords

Cancellation or suspension of registration; Issue of notice;

Reasonable opportunity of hearing; Breach of provisions;

Recording of reasons in writing; Exercise of power in exceptional

circumstance.

Case Arising From

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No.3831 of 2024

From the Judgment and Order dated 06.01.2015 of the High Court

of Gujarat at Ahmedabad in LPA No.311 of 2014

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 63

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

Appearances for Parties

Sanjay Parikh, Sr. Adv., Ms. Rashmi Nandakumar, Advs. for the

Appellant.

Hemal Kiritkumar Sheth, Ms. Hemantika Wahi, Ms. Swati Ghildiyal,

Ms. Devyani Bhatt, Srikant Swaroop, Advs. for the Respondents.

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

J.K. Maheshwari J.

1. Leave Granted

2. In the present appeal, the issue concerns the interpretation of power

of Section 20(1) & (2) and Section 20(3) of the Pre-conception

and Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (Regulation & Prevention of

Misuse) Act, 1994 (hereinafter to be referred to as the “PC&PNDT

Act”) for cancellation, suspension or suspension in public interest

respectively by the appropriate authority specified in Section 17 of

the PC&PNDT Act.

3. The brief facts are that the respondent no.1 is running a hospital

at Ahmedabad by the name of “Dev Hospital” which is a type of

polyclinic having doctors from multiple branches like gynecology,

general physician and general surgeon treating patients in the

said hospital. The hospital was registered under the PC&PNDT

Act and the said registration was valid up to 23.05.2015. On the

basis of one complaint made by Shilpa Punani of Wadhwan District

Surendranagar, an inspection of the hospital was conducted on

21.10.2010. During inspection, the appropriate authority and its team

found some lapses contravening the provisions of PC&PNDT Act.

Consequently, the sonography machine operated in the hospital was

seized. On 25.10.2010, the appropriate authority without giving any

notice passed an order suspending the registration of the hospital

in exercise of the power under Section 20(1) & (2) of the PC&PNDT

Act. On filing appeal by respondent no.1, the appellate authority vide

order dated 21.12.2010 directed the appropriate authority to pass a

suitable order within 15 days and to clarify whether the order dated

25.10.2020, was passed in exercise of the power under Section

20(1) & (2) or under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act. The appropriate

authority taking cue from the order of the appellate authority, passed 

64 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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a fresh order on 29.12.2010 that there is a breach of mandatory

provisions and accordingly suspended the registration purportedly

under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act in public interest till finalization

of the criminal proceedings.

4. An appeal preferred against the subsequent order dated 29.12.2010

by respondent no.1 was dismissed on 17.03.2011 by the appellate

authority. Being aggrieved, by the order of suspension dated

29.12.2010 and the order passed in appeal dated 17.03.2011, writ

application being SCA No. 6215/2011 was filed by respondent no.1

before the High Court of Gujarat (hereinafter referred to as “High

Court”) to set aside the said orders and to revoke the suspension

of registration of the hospital. Prayer was also made to release the

sonography machine seized by the appropriate authority.

5. Learned Single Judge vide order dated 05.08.2013 was pleased

to allow the writ application inter alia observing that looking to the

condition of foetus in the womb, once the patient has consented

for abortion, she cannot make a complaint for alleged violation of

provisions of PC&PNDT Act. The Court found that neither any notice

was issued nor an opportunity of hearing was afforded prior to passing

the order suspending the registration. It was further held that while

passing the first order of suspension on 25.10.2010, powers were

exercised by appropriate authority under Sections 20(1) & (2) of

PC&PNDT Act without affording an opportunity of hearing, which was

contrary to the spirit of the said provisions and wholly unjustified.

The Learned Single Judge was of the view that appellate authority

was not justified to remit the matter in appeal against the order

of suspension to the appropriate authority suggesting clarification

whether such powers were exercised by him under Section 20(1)

& (2) or under Section 20(3) of the PC&PNDT Act and how far the

reasons for exercising such power are justified. The Court further

held that the reason as assigned in the subsequent order, if accepted

as valid, then each and every case of suspension would fall within

the purview of Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act and the provisions

of Section 20(1) & (2) will be rendered redundant.

6. Being aggrieved by the order of Learned Single Judge, appropriate

authority challenged the same by filing the Letters Patent Appeal which

was dismissed by the order impugned by the Division Bench, putting

a stamp of approval to reasonings of the Learned Single Judge. The 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 65

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

Division Bench was of the opinion that all the cases of suspension

would not automatically fall within the purview of Section 20(3) of

the PC&PNDT Act. It was observed that the reasons assigned in

subsequent order of suspension by the appropriate authority are not

valid to exercise such power in public interest. Therefore, the Letters

Patent Appeal filed by the appropriate authority was dismissed.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant authority submits that on the scope

of Sections 20(1), (2) & (3) of PC&PNDT Act, there is no judgment of

this Court, so the question involved in the case is of general public

interest. He has placed reliance on the judgment of Malpani Infertility

Clinic Pvt. Ltd. vs. Appropriate Authority, 2004 SC Online Bom 834

to urge that if power is exercised by appropriate authority to suspend

the registration due to pendency of the prosecution, such power may

be exercised in public interest under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act.

It is contended that looking to the object of PC&PNDT Act, if the

appropriate authority considers that the activity of the licensed entity

is affecting the public at large, the power to suspend the registration

or license is permissible. However, it is fairly stated that the High

Court of Bombay has given a conflicting judgment in the case of

J. Sadanand M. Ingle (Dr) vs. State of Maharashtra, 2013 SCC

online Bom 697 which lays down that sub-section (3) starts with nonobstante clause and empowers the appropriate authority to suspend

the registration temporarily. Dealing with the scope of Sections 20(3)

and 30 of the PC&PNDT Act, it was observed that, both Sections are

independent and action can be taken independent to each other. It

is also urged that issuance of the order dated 25.10.2010 referring

to the wrong provisions, would not itself render the said order illegal.

The power under Section 20(3) is of interim nature which can be

exercised in public interest in a time bound manner. Thus, by the

subsequent order dated 29.12.2010, suspension of the registration

as directed by the appellant authority was justified and prayed for

to allow this appeal and to set-aside the orders of the High Court.

8. Per contra, learned counsel for the respondent No. 1 submits that

considering the tenor of the order passed by the appropriate authority

and the reasons so stated, it cannot be said to be an order suspending

the registration in public interest. Relying upon the judgment of High

Court of Gujarat passed on 16.4.2018 in Special Civil Application

No. 9424 of 2014 in the case of Priykant Mokalal Kapadia vs.

State of Gujarat, it is urged that the power of Section 20(3) of the 

66 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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PC&PNDT Act is exceptional in nature and can be exercised only in

public interest after forming opinion and recording the reasons in this

regard, otherwise, such power ought not to be exercised. In support

of the said contention, reliance has also been placed on a judgment

of the Bombay High Court in the case of Sujit Govind Dange vs.

State of Maharashtra and others, 2012(6) Mh.L.J. 289 to urge

that the powers under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act are extraordinary and the appropriate authority ought to have exercised such

power in larger public interest and in exceptional circumstances, in

particular when the said authority is of the opinion that it is necessary

or expedient to do so in public interest by recording such reasons,

otherwise such power should not be exercised.

9. We have heard learned counsel for both the parties at length and to

appreciate the scope of powers as specified under Section 20(1), (2)

& (3) of PC&PNDT Act, it is necessary to refer the said provisions.

For ready reference, Section 20(1), (2) & (3) of PC&PNDT Act are

being quoted hereinbelow:

20. Cancellation or suspension of registration.—

(1) The Appropriate Authority may suo moto, or on

complaint, issue a notice to the Genetic Counselling Centre,

Genetic Laboratory or Genetic Clinic to show cause why

its registration should not be suspended or cancelled for

the reasons mentioned in the notice.

(2) If, after giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard

to the Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic Laboratory

or Genetic Clinic and having regard to the advice of the

Advisory Committee, the Appropriate Authority is satisfied

that there has been a breach of the provisions of this Act

or the rules, it may, without prejudice to any criminal action

that it may take against such Centre, Laboratory or Clinic,

suspend its registration for such period as it may think fit

or cancel its registration, as the case may be.

(3) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-sections (1)

and (2), if the Appropriate Authority is of the opinion that it

is necessary or expedient so to do in the public interest,

it may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, suspend the

registration of any Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 67

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

Laboratory or Genetic Clinic without issuing any such

notice referred to in sub-section (1).

10. Bare reading of the aforesaid provisions makes it clear that Section

20(1) & (2) deals with both suspension or cancellation as the case

may be, while Section 20(3) only deals with suspension in public

interest. The authority, while exercising power under sub-sections

(1) & (2) of Section 20 of PC&PNDT Act, may act suo moto or on a

complaint and after notice to the Genetic Counselling Centre, Genetic

Laboratory or Genetic Clinic for the reasons to show cause why its

registration should not be suspended or cancelled, and affording

reasonable opportunity of hearing and having regard to the advice

of the Advisory Committee and on being satisfied that there was a

breach of the provisions of the PC&PNDT Act or the Rules, without

prejudice to any criminal action, may suspend or cancel its registration

as the case maybe. Meaning thereby that for breach of the provisions

of the PC&PNDT Act and the Rules, power of suspension for such

period as may deem fit or of cancellation may be exercised parallelly

by the appropriate authority.

11. Sub-Section (3) of Section 20 only deals with suspension and confers

independent power to the appropriate authority irrespective and

notwithstanding the power under sub-sections (1) or (2) of Section 20.

The said power may only be exercised by the appropriate authority

if the said authority is of the opinion that exercise of such power is

necessary or expedient in public interest. Meaning thereby that the

exercise of such power of suspension by appropriate authority is in

a contingency where it is expedient or necessary to take immediate

action in public interest. While exercising such power, it is incumbent

on the authority to form an opinion for reasons to be recorded in

writing to indicate the said public interest. The said power is not akin

to the power as specified in sub-section 2 of Section 20 of PC&PNDT

Act and the Rules thereto.

12. In the light of the discussion of the above provisions, it is required

to be seen whether the order of suspension passed on 25.10.2010

is really an order under sub-section (2) or under sub-section (3) of

Section 20 of the PC&PNDT Act. To understand the real intent of the

order, it would be proper to reproduce the order dated 25.10.2010

as under:

68 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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“No. DP/H/PNDT/Regn. Susp/Dr. Jasmina Devda/315/10

O/O Appropriate Authority, PNDT Act, 1994 & CDHO,

District Panchayat, Health Branch, Ahmedabad

Date: 25.10.2010

Read:

1. The facts of the observations by Appropriate Authority

during the visit & the search & Seizure operation at

clinic of Dr. Jasmina D. Devda, Dev Hospital, Vasna,

Ahmedabad on 21st October, 2010.

2. Advice of the PNDT Advisory Committee meeting

held on 22/10/2010.

3. Powers conferred under Section 20(1) & (2) of

PC&PNDT Act, 1994

Office Order:-

As per the points read above, a search & seizure

operation was conducted at the clinic of Dr. Jasmina

D. Devda, Dev Hospital, Kesariyaji Bus Stop, Dr.

Jivraj Mehta Hospital Road, Vasna, Ahmedabad on

21st October, 2010.

Dr. Jasmina D. Devda, Dev Hospital, Vasna, Ahmedabad

has convincingly contravened the Sections 4(3),5(2),

5(a) & Rules 9(1), 9(4), 9(8), 10(1A) and 13 of the

PC&PNDT Act, 1994. As per powers conferred under

Section No. 21(1) & 20(2) of PC&PNDT Act, 1994, the

PNDT registration No. 564 allotted to the clinic of the

same at the above address is hereby suspended till

the next order TV undersigned.

Appropriate Authority

PNDT Act, 1994 & CDHO,

District Panchayat,

Ahmedabad.

To

Dr. Jasmina D. Devda,

Dev Seva Trust, Kesariyaji Bus Stop

Dr. Jivraj Mehta Hospital Road, Vasna,

Ahmedabad.”

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 69

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

13. Having gone through the order and the provisions of sub-section

(2) of Section 20 of the PC&PNDT Act, in our view, the order dated

25.10.2010 cannot be said to be an order under sub-section (3) of

Section 20 of PC&PNDT Act. In fact, it is simplicitor an order passed

under sub-section (2) of Section 20 alleging contraventions of the

provisions of PC&PNDT Act and the Rules. Therefore, we have no

hesitation to say that the appellate authority, while remanding the

matter vide order dated 21.12.2010, was not required to ask the

appropriate authority to clarify whether the order of suspension was

under sub-section (3) or under sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 20

of PC&PNDT Act.

14. After remand, the subsequent order of suspension dated 29.12.2010

passed in public interest was assailed before the appellate authority

and the writ court. To appreciate the contents of the said order and the

provisions of sub-Sections (1), (2) & (3) of Section 20 of PC&PNDT

Act, it is necessary to reproduce the order dated 29.12.2010 which

is as under:

“OW No. DP/H/PNDT/Regn. Susp/Dr. Jasmina

Devda/852/100/0 Appropriate Authority, PNDT Act, 1994

& CDHO, District Panchayat, Health Branch, Ahmedabad

Date: 29.12.2010

Read:- (1) The facts of the observation by Appropriate

Authority during the visit 1 the search and seizure operation

at clinic of Dr. Jasmina D. Devda, Dev Hospital, Vasna,

Ahmedabad on 21st October, 2010.

(2) Power conferred under Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT

Act, 1994.

(3) Order dated 21/12/2010 passed in Appeal No. 5/2010

by State Appropriate Authority, PC & PNDT Act.

OFFICE ORDER

As per the points read above, a search & seizure operation

was conducted at the clinic of Dr. Jasmina D. Devda, Dev

Hospital, Kesariyaji Bus Stop, Dr. Jivraj Mehta Hospital

Road, Vasna, Ahmedabad on 21st October, 2010.

Dr. Jasmina D. Devda, Dev Hospital, Vasna, Ahmedabad

has convincingly contravened the Sections 4(3), 5(2), 6(a) 

70 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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& Rules 9(1), 9(4), 9(5), 10(1A) & 13 of the PNDT Act,

1994. As per power conferred under Section No. 20(3)

of PC&PNDT Act, 1994, the PNDT Registration No. 564

allotted to the clinic of the same at the above address is

hereby suspended, for following reason till finalization of

criminal proceedings.

There is clear breach of mandatory provisions as mentioned

in the order dated 25/10/2010 viz. Section 4(3), 5(2), 6(a) &

Rules 9(1), 9(4), 9(8), 10(1A) & 13. This defeats the basic

purpose of the Act & hence contrary to the public interest.

Thus in public interest it is required to check the activity

of yours as you are not acting as per statutory provisions

of Act & hence, suspension of the PNDT registration is

desirable.

Appropriate Authority,

PNDT Act 1994 & CDHO,

District Panchayat,

Ahmedabad.”

15. Perusal of the above order reveals that the appropriate authority

while passing the order sought to exercise power under sub-section

(3) of Section 20 of PC&PNDT Act and directed suspension of the

registration of the clinic till finalization of the criminal proceedings

because of the contraventions of the provisions of the PC&PNDT

Act and the Rules. Therefore, it is said to be contrary to the public

interest and such activity is required to be curbed.

16. As per the discussion made hereinabove, in our view, the power of

sub-section (3) of Section 20 of PC&PNDT Act is notwithstanding

the power of sub-sections (1) & (2) of Section 20. The said power

can only be exercised when the appropriate authority forms an

opinion that it is necessary or expedient in public interest to do so.

It is incumbent upon the appropriate authority to form its opinion

based on reasons expedient or necessary to exercise the power of

suspension. The contents of the suspension order dated 29.12.2010

does not contain reasons as required to form an opinion that it is

necessitated or expedient in public interest to exercise the power of

suspension. Therefore, in our view, it does not fulfill the requirement

of sub-section (3) of Section 20 of PC&PNDT Act. As per the above

discussions, neither the first order of suspension dated 25.10.2010 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 71

District Appropriate Authority under the PNDT Act and Chief District

Health Officer v. Jashmina Dilip Devda & Anr.

nor the second order of suspension dated 29.12.2010 qualifies the

requirement of sub-Section (3) of Section 20 of the PC&PNDT Act.

The said view is fortified by the reasoning recorded by the learned

Single Judge and Division Bench which we find just and concur

by its reasoning. Therefore, we are not inclined to interfere in this

appeal.

17. In the above context, it is necessary to refer to the intendment of

Section 20(2) and Section 20(3) of PC&PNDT Act. At the cost of

reiteration, we clarify that if the appropriate authority finds breach

of provisions of PC&PNDT Act or the Rules it may, after issuing

notice and giving a reasonable opportunity of being heard, without

prejudice to any criminal action against the licensed entity, suspend its

registration for such period as it may think fit or cancel the same as

the case maybe. The appropriate authority has also been conferred

with a power under sub-section (3) of Section 20 notwithstanding

the power under sub-section (1) & (2) of Section 20. In the said

situation in case, the authority forms an opinion that it is necessary

or expedient in public interest, then after recording reasons in writing,

it may suspend the registration of the licensed entity without notice

as specified in sub-section (1) of Section 20. Thus, the power of subsection (3) is intermittent and in addition to the power of sub-section

(2) but it may be exercised sparingly, in exceptional circumstances in

public interest. In our view, the power of suspension, if any exercised,

by the appropriate authority deeming it necessary or expedient in

public interest for the reasons so specified, it should be for interim

period and not for an inordinate duration.

18. As per above discussion of the legal position, in the facts of the

present case as is apparent, the inspection was made on 21.10.2010,

and the order of suspension was passed on 25.10.2010 without any

notice or affording any opportunity of hearing as per sub-section

(2) of Section 20. On filing appeal, the appellate authority remitted

it to the appropriate authority which passed the subsequent order

of suspension dated 29.12.2010 exercising the power under subsection (3) of Section 20, which in our view is not justified and has

rightly been set-aside by Learned Single Judge and confirmed by

the Division Bench. Therefore, the appeal filed by the appropriate

authority is hereby dismissed and the order passed by Learned

Single Judge and the Division Bench are hereby upheld. Since the

order under challenge has been implemented and the hospital is 

72 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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operational, therefore no further consequential orders are required

to be passed directing to revive the registration. In the facts and

circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeal dismissed.

Evidence – Dying declaration, sole basis of conviction – Appellants convicted for offences punishable u/ss.302 and 34, Penal Code, 1860 – Correctness:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 36 : 2024 INSC 169

Naeem

v.

State of Uttar Pradesh

(Criminal Appeal No. 1978 of 2022)

05 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai* and Sandeep Mehta, JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Conviction of the appellants-accused for offences punishable

u/ss.302 and 34, Penal Code, 1860 based solely on the dying

declaration, if justified.

Headnotes

Evidence – Dying declaration, sole basis of conviction –

Appellants convicted for offences punishable u/ss.302 and

34, Penal Code, 1860 – Correctness:

Held: Dying declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction

if it inspires the full confidence of the court – Court is required

to satisfy itself that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at

the time of making the statement and that it was not the result

of tutoring, prompting or imagination – There cannot be an

absolute rule of law that the dying declaration cannot form the

sole basis of conviction unless corroborated – Rule requiring

corroboration is merely a rule of prudence – Where the Court is

satisfied that the dying declaration is true, voluntary, free from

any effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement and

it is coherent and consistent, it can base its conviction without

any further corroboration– Material placed on record revealed

that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making

the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting

or imagination – Dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) was cogent,

consistent, trustworthy and reliable to base the conviction on

the same – No reason to interfere with the concurrent findings

of fact that the dying declaration was true and free from any

effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement – No

legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction without

there being any independent corroboration – However, in the 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 37

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

dying declaration, the motive attributed by the deceased was

to accused No.1-deceased’s devar who she had a quarrel over

partition of the house and the role of pouring kerosene on the

victim and setting her ablaze was also attributed to him – Insofar

as accused No.2 (wife of accused No.1) and her brother-accused

No.3 are concerned, the statement of the victim only states that

they aided accused No.1 however, no specific role of how they

assisted him could be found in the dying declaration – Thus, the

said dying declaration can be the sole basis of maintaining the

conviction of accused No.1 – Accused No. 2 and accused No.

3 entitled to the benefit of doubt and are acquitted – Impugned

judgment upholding the conviction and sentence in respect of the

said appellants is quashed and set aside – Appeal qua accused

No.1 is dismissed. [Paras 7, 11, 14-16]

Case Law Cited

Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi, [2010] 9 SCR

993 : (2010) 9 SCC 1 : 2010 INSC 491 – relied on.

List of Acts

Penal Code, 1860.

List of Keywords

Dying declaration; Sole basis of the conviction; Corroboration rule

of prudence; Voluntary dying declaration.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No.1978

of 2022

From the Judgment and Order dated 17.12.2019 of the High Court

of Judicature at Allahabad in CRLA No.7393 of 2017

Appearances for Parties

Sharan Thakur, AAG, Dr. Sushil Balwada, Kaushal Yadav, Nandlal

Kumar Mishra, Srilok Nath Rath, Ms. Reena Rao, Mohd Adeel

Siddiqui, Bipin Kumar Jha, Ms. Komal Jha, Ms. Nandani Gupta, Dr.

Mrs. Vipin Gupta, Sudeep Kumar, Mustafa Sajad, Ms. Rupali, Ms.

Keerti Jaya, Advs. for the appearing parties.

38 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

B.R. Gavai, J.

1. These appeals challenge the judgment and order dated 17th December

2019, passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Judicature

at Allahabad in Criminal Appeal Nos. 1589 of 2018 and 7393 of 2017,

whereby the Division Bench dismissed both the criminal appeals

preferred by the appellants, namely, Pappi @ Mashkoor (accused

No.1), Naeema (accused No.2) and Naeem (accused No.3) and

upheld the order of conviction and sentence dated 24th October 2017

as recorded by the learned Sessions Judge, Moradabad (hereinafter

referred to as the ‘trial court’) in Sessions Trial No. 260 of 2017.

2. Shorn of details, the facts leading to the present appeals are as under:

2.1. On 1st December 2016, the Police Station Katghar, District

Moradabad received a written report at 08:15 pm which was

a transcription of the complaint made by Shahin Parveen

(deceased) who had been admitted in the District Hospital,

Moradabad on 1st December 2016, at 02:20 pm with 80% deep

thermal and facial burns. In her complaint, the deceased had

alleged that she had been set ablaze by the accused/appellants

who had been pressuring her into entering the profession of

immoral trafficking and prostitution. On the basis of the written

report (Ext. Ka-3), a First Information Report (“FIR” for short)

was registered at Police Station Katghar, District Moradabad

vide Case Crime Number 1332 of 2016 for the offence

punishable under Section 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(hereinafter referred to as “IPC”). On the same day, Raj Kumar

Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib Tehsildar, Sadar, Moradabad

was telephonically summoned by the Tehsildar to record the

statement of Shahin Parveen (deceased), after she was admitted

in the hospital. Between the hours of 08:48 pm and 09:15 pm,

dying declaration of Shahin Parveen (deceased) (Ext. Ka-6)

came to be recorded by PW-5. Subsequently, the victim was

admitted in Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi on 2nd December

2016, where she eventually succumbed to her injuries at 07:55

pm. Consequently, the Case Crime No. 1332 of 2016 was

altered to the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC. 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 39

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

According to the Post-Mortem Report (Ext. Ka-11), the cause

of death was shock as a result of ante-mortem burn injuries.

2.2. After the death of the husband of the deceased two years prior

to the incident, she had been residing at her matrimonial house

with her two children along with Pappi @ Mashkoor (accused

No. 1) who was her brother-in-law (devar) and his wife Naeema

(accused No.2). Naeem (accused No.3) is Naeema’s brother.

The prosecution case is that, after the death of the husband

of the deceased, the accused/appellants started pressuring

her into entering the profession of immoral trafficking and

prostitution. As the deceased did not concede to the same,

she was physically and sexually assaulted and asked to vacate

the house. On the day of the incident at about 01:30 pm, the

accused/appellants caught hold of the deceased and poured

kerosene on her. Pappi @ Mashkoor (accused No.1) and

Naeema (accused No.2) ignited the matchstick and threw it

at her. Thereafter, the accused/appellants surrounded her so

that she could not escape. On being set ablaze, the deceased

ran out of the house whereafter her neighbours put out the fire

and informed her mother and brother namely, Islam @ Babli

(PW-2) who took her to the hospital. This version of events was

brought out in the complaint made by the deceased which was

transcribed by Faisal Zamal (PW-3). On the basis of PW-3’s

written report, bearing the thumb impression of the deceased,

the FIR came to be registered at 08:15 pm on 1st December

2016. Thereafter, on the same day, between 08:48 pm and

09:15 pm, PW-5 recorded the dying declaration of the deceased

(Ext. Ka-6) wherein she stated that there was an outstanding

dispute between her and Pappi @ Mashkoor (accused No.1)

with regards to the partition of their shared residence. On the

date of the incident at about 12:30 pm, another quarrel broke

out between the deceased and the accused/appellants, during

which accused No.1 poured kerosene on the deceased and

set her ablaze. He was accompanied and assisted by his

wife Naeema (accused No.2) and Naeem, brother of Naeema

(accused No.3). She was taken to the District Hospital,

Moradabad by her brother Islam @ Babli (PW-2) and thereafter

shifted to Safdarjang Hospital, New Delhi, where she eventually

succumbed to her injuries.

40 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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2.3. After completion of the investigation, a charge-sheet came to be

filed before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Moradabad.

Since the case was exclusively triable by the Sessions Court,

the same came to be committed to the learned Sessions Judge.

2.4. Charges came to be framed by the learned Sessions Judge

for the offences punishable under Sections 302 and 34 of the

IPC. The accused pleaded not guilty and claimed to be tried.

2.5. The prosecution examined 8 witnesses to bring home the guilt

of the accused persons. While Papi @ Mashkoor (accused

No.1) took the defence that he was absent from the spot of

the incident at the relevant time and that the deceased had

committed suicide since she was depressed after the death of

her husband, Naeema (accused No.2) and Naeem (accused

No.3) set up the defence of bare denial. The defence did not

lead any evidence.

2.6. At the conclusion of the trial, the trial court found that the

prosecution had proved the case against the accused/appellants

beyond reasonable doubt and accordingly convicted them for

offences punishable under Sections 302 and 34 of the IPC and

sentenced them to undergo imprisonment for life along with fine.

2.7. Being aggrieved thereby, the accused/appellants preferred

appeals before the High Court. The High Court by the impugned

judgment dismissed the same and affirmed the order of

conviction and sentence awarded by the trial court. Being

aggrieved thereby, the present appeals.

3. We have heard Shri Mohd. Adeel Siddiqui, learned counsel appearing

on behalf of the appellants and Shri Sharan Thakur, learned Additional

Advocate General (AAG) appearing on behalf of the respondent-State.

4. Shri Mohd. Siddiqui submits that the conviction is based only on

the dying declaration of the deceased (Ex. Ka-6). He submits

that the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) is not free from doubt. It is

submitted that the Discharge Slip (Ext. Ka-7) would show that the

deceased was discharged from the District Hospital, Moradabad on

1st December 2016 at 05:00 pm. It is therefore impossible that the

dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) could have been recorded between

08:48 pm and 09:15 pm. The learned counsel therefore submits

that the said dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) cannot be said to be 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 41

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

trustworthy, reliable and cogent so as to base the conviction solely

on the basis of the same.

5. Per contra, Shri Thakur submits that, both the trial court and the High

Court, on the correct appreciation of evidence, rightly convicted the

accused/appellants and as such, no interference would be warranted

with the concurrent findings of the trial court and the High Court. The

learned AAG submits that Raj Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib

Tehsildar, has deposed about the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6). Shri

Thakur submits that the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) also contains

the certification by Dr. A.K. Singh, Emergency Medical Officer, District

Hospital, Moradabad regarding the medical fitness of the victim both

prior to and after recording the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6).

6. Undisputedly, in the present case, the conviction is based solely on

the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6). The law with regard to conviction on

the sole basis of dying declaration has been considered by this Court

in a catena of judgments. After considering the earlier judgments,

this Court, in the case of Atbir v. Government of NCT of Delhi1

,

has laid down certain factors to be taken into consideration while

resting the conviction on the basis of dying declaration. It will be

apposite to refer to para (22) of the said judgment, which reads thus:

“22. The analysis of the above decisions clearly shows that:

(i) Dying declaration can be the sole basis of conviction

if it inspires the full confidence of the court.

(ii) The court should be satisfied that the deceased

was in a fit state of mind at the time of making the

statement and that it was not the result of tutoring,

prompting or imagination.

(iii) Where the court is satisfied that the declaration is

true and voluntary, it can base its conviction without

any further corroboration.

(iv) It cannot be laid down as an absolute rule of law that

the dying declaration cannot form the sole basis of

conviction unless it is corroborated. The rule requiring

corroboration is merely a rule of prudence.

1 (2010) 9 SCC 1 : 2010 INSC 491

42 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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(v) Where the dying declaration is suspicious, it should

not be acted upon without corroborative evidence.

(vi) A dying declaration which suffers from infirmity

such as the deceased was unconscious and could

never make any statement cannot form the basis of

conviction.

(vii) Merely because a dying declaration does not contain

all the details as to the occurrence, it is not to be

rejected.

(viii) Even if it is a brief statement, it is not to be discarded.

(ix) When the eyewitness affirms that the deceased was

not in a fit and conscious state to make the dying

declaration, medical opinion cannot prevail.

(x) If after careful scrutiny, the court is satisfied that it is

true and free from any effort to induce the deceased

to make a false statement and if it is coherent and

consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to

make it the basis of conviction, even if there is no

corroboration.”

7. It can thus be seen that this Court has clearly held that dying

declaration can be the sole basis of the conviction if it inspires the

full confidence of the court. The Court is required to satisfy itself

that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making

the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting or

imagination. It has further been held that, where the Court is satisfied

about the dying declaration being true and voluntary, it can base its

conviction without any further corroboration. It has further been held

that there cannot be an absolute rule of law that the dying declaration

cannot form the sole basis of conviction unless it is corroborated. It

has been held that the rule requiring corroboration is merely a rule

of prudence. The Court has observed that if after careful scrutiny,

the court is satisfied that it is true and free from any effort to induce

the deceased to make a false statement and if it is coherent and

consistent, there shall be no legal impediment to make it the basis

of conviction, even if there is no corroboration.

8. A perusal of the material placed on record would reveal that Raj

Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib Tehsildar has deposed that 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 43

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

he was directed by the Tehsildar on phone to record the statement

of the victim Shahin Parveen at the District Hospital, Moradabad.

He came to the hospital and asked the Chief Medical Officer of

the hospital about the condition of the victim Shahin Parveen, who

informed that Shahin Parveen was in a sound condition and was also

fit to give her statement. He further deposed about the certificate

issued by the doctor. He also deposed that, after recording the

statement, the deceased put her thumb impression. He has further

deposed that the deceased answered in full sense and she was

understanding the questions. The deposition of PW-5 would also

reveal that he had taken care to ensure that none of the relatives of

the deceased were present when the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6)

was being recorded.

9. Insofar as the contention of the learned counsel for the appellants

that the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) was recorded between 08:48

pm and 09:15 pm and the Discharge Slip (Ext. Ka-7) was issued

at 05:00 pm is concerned, no question was put to that effect in the

cross-examination of Raj Kumar Bhaskar (PW-5), the then Naib

Tehsildar. As such, his testimony, in spite of cross-examination, has

gone unchallenged on the material aspect of recording of the dying

declaration.

10. A perusal of the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) would reveal that

before recording the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6), the victim was

examined by Dr. A.K. Singh, Emergency Medical Officer at District

Hospital, Moradabad on 1st December 2016 at 08:45 pm, who has

certified her to be fully conscious and fit to give the statement.

After the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) was recorded, a certification

by Dr. A.K. Singh, Emergency Medical Officer at District Hospital,

Moradabad is recorded once again to the effect that the deceased

was fully conscious while giving the statement (Ext. Ka-6). It can

thus clearly be seen that the material placed on record would reveal

that the deceased was in a fit state of mind at the time of making

the statement and that it was not the result of tutoring, prompting

or imagination.

11. We have no reason to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact

that the dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) is true and free from any

effort to induce the deceased to make a false statement. The dying

declaration (Ext. Ka-6) is coherent and consistent and as such, there 

44 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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should be no legal impediment to make it the basis of conviction

without there being any independent corroboration. We find that the

dying declaration (Ext. Ka-6) is cogent, trustworthy and reliable to

base the conviction on the same.

12. That leaves us with the question as to whether the conviction of all

the three accused is tenable or not.

13. It will be apposite to refer to the relevant part of the dying declaration

(Ext. Ka-6), which reads thus:

“Answer: I had been into a dispute with my devar

(husband’s younger brother) Mashkoor Hussain s/o

Maqdoom Hussain over partition of the house for many

days. Today i.e. 01.12.2016 at 12:30 O’clock I had a

quarrel with my devar over partition of the house, during

which he poured kerosene on me and set me ablaze. In

commission of the act, my devrani (husband’s younger

brother’s wife) Naeema Parveen and her brother Naeem

aided my devar (husband’s younger brother). When they

set my body ablaze, I ran outside the house. People from

the neighbourhood doused fire engulfing my body and

saved me. Residents of the locality informed my mother

and brother, thereafter, my brother and mother brought

and admitted me to the hospital.”

14. The statement of the victim would therefore reveal that the motive

attributed by the deceased is to accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor.

She stated that she had a quarrel with her devar Pappi @ Mashkoor

over partition of the house. It can further be seen that the role of

pouring kerosene on the victim and setting her ablaze is also attributed

to accused No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor.

15. Insofar as other two accused i.e. Naeema (wife of accused No.1

Pappi @ Mashkoor) and her brother Naeem are concerned, the

statement of the victim only states that they aided her devar Pappi

@ Mashkoor. However, no specific role of how they assisted accused

No. 1 Pappi @ Mashkoor could be found in the dying declaration

(Ext. Ka-6). We therefore find that, though the said dying declaration

can be the sole basis of maintaining the conviction of accused No.

1 Pappi @ Mashkoor, in the absence of any specific role attributed

to accused No. 2 Naeema and accused No. 3 Naeem, they are

entitled to the benefit of doubt.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 45

Naeem v. State of Uttar Pradesh

16. In the result, we pass the following order:

(i) Criminal Appeal No. 1978 of 2022 qua appellant Naeem and

Criminal Appeal No. 1979 of 2022 qua appellant Naeema are

allowed. The order of conviction and sentence dated 24th October

2017 passed by the trial court and maintained by the High Court

vide impugned judgment and order dated 17th December 2019

in respect of the aforesaid appellants is quashed and set aside.

They are acquitted of all the charges charged with and are

directed to be released forthwith if not required in any other case

(ii) Criminal Appeal No. 1979 of 2022 qua appellant Pappi @

Mashkoor is dismissed.

17. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Divya Pandey Result of the case:

Criminal Appeal No. 1978 of 2022

qua accused No.3 and Criminal Appeal

No. 1979 of 2022 qua accused No.2

are allowed. Criminal Appeal No. 1979

of 2022 qua accused No.1 is dismissed.

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.8(c) r/w. s.20(b)(ii)(c) – Prosecution case that PW-1-Inspector and team members intercepted a vehicle and A-1 and A-2 were present in the vehicle – It was alleged that three bundles of ganja weighing around 80 kgs found lying in the vehicle were seized in the presence of PW-1 and the panchas – A-1 and A-2 were arrested on the spot and interrogated – Acting on their interrogation/confession, A-3 and A-4 were arrested – Propriety:

* Author

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 23 : 2024 INSC 158

Mohammed Khalid and Another

v.

The State of Telangana

(Criminal Appeal No(s). 1610 of 2023)

01 March 2024

[B.R. Gavai and Sandeep Mehta,* JJ.]

Issue for Consideration

Whether the High Court was justified in affirming the judgment of

the trial court convicting and sentencing the accused appellants

for the charge u/s. 8(c) r/w. s.20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and

Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985.

Headnotes

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985 – s.8(c)

r/w. s.20(b)(ii)(c) – Prosecution case that PW-1-Inspector and

team members intercepted a vehicle and A-1 and A-2 were

present in the vehicle – It was alleged that three bundles of

ganja weighing around 80 kgs found lying in the vehicle were

seized in the presence of PW-1 and the panchas – A-1 and A-2

were arrested on the spot and interrogated – Acting on their

interrogation/confession, A-3 and A-4 were arrested – Propriety:

Held: A perusal of the evidence of the Seizure Officer (Inspector

PW1) and the confession-cum-seizure panchnama (Exhibit P-3)

would reveal that the prosecution claims to have recovered the

contraband from three bags wherein the ganja as well as green

chillies were present – Seizure Officer(Inspector PW-1) made

no effort whatsoever to conduct a separate weighment of the

contraband by segregating the chillies – Rather, the panchnama

is totally silent about presence of chillies with the bundles of ganja

– When PW-5-Investigating officer appeared for deposition, he

produced the muddamal ganja in the Court and it was seen that

the same was packed in seven new bags as against the three

bags referred to in the seizure memo (Exhibit P-3) – Neither

any proceedings were conducted nor any memo was prepared

by the police officers for repacking the seized ganja bundles in

new packaging – Two independent panchas were not examined

– LW-10, who prepared three samples of ganja as per PW-5 was

also not examined – In addition thereto, the prosecution neither 

24 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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examined any witness nor produced any document to satisfy the

Court regarding safe keeping of the samples right from the time

of the seizure till the same reached the FSL – No proceedings

u/s. 52A were undertaken by the Investigating officer for preparing

inventory and obtaining samples in presence of jurisdictional

Magistrate – As far as A-3 and A-4 are concerned, it is not the

case of the prosecution that the accused A-3 and A-4 were found

in possession of ganja – The entire case of the prosecution as

against these two accused is based on the interrogation notes of

A-1 and A-2 – It is trite that confession of an accused recorded

by a Police Officer is not admissible in evidence as the same is

hit by Section 25 of the Evidence Act – The evidence of the police

witnesses is full of contradictions and is thoroughly unconvincing

– The conviction of the accused appellants as recorded by the

trial Court and affirmed by the High Court is illegal on the face of

record and suffers from highest degree of perversity. [Paras 19-24]

List of Acts

Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985; Evidence

Act, 1872.

List of Keywords

Recovery of narcotics; Confession-cum-seizure panchnama; Power

of seizure and arrest in public place; Power to stop and search

conveyance; Independent panch witnesses; Safe keeping of

samples; Preparation of inventory; Obtaining samples in presence

of jurisdictional Magistrate; Confession recorded by Police.

Case Arising From

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1610

of 2023

From the Judgment and Order dated 10.11.2022 of the High Court

for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad in CRLA No. 594 of 2011

Appearances for Parties

C. Nageswara Rao, Sr. Adv., Vikram Hegde, Chitwan Sharma, Ms.

Chinmayi Shrivastava, Shreeyash Uday Lalit, Tushar Singh, Praseena

Elizabeth Joseph, Advs. for the Appellants.

Kumar Vaibhaw, Ms. Devina Sehgal, Mohd. Ashaab, Advs. for the

Respondent.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 25

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

Judgment / Order of the Supreme Court

Judgment

Mehta, J.

1. These appeals take exception to the final impugned judgment

dated 10th November, 2022 passed by the High Court for the State

of Telangana at Hyderabad rejecting the Criminal Appeal No.

594 of 2011 preferred by the appellants assailing the judgment

dated 30th May, 2011 passed by the Metropolitan Sessions Judge,

Hyderabad(hereinafter being referred to as ‘trial Court’) in Sessions

Case No. 563 of 2010.

2. By the aforesaid judgment, the learned trial Court, convicted the

appellants for the offence punishable under Section 8(c) read

with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic

Substances Act, 1985(hereinafter being referred to as the

‘NDPS Act’) and sentenced each of them to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a period of ten years and to pay a fine of

Rs.1,00,000/- each, in default, to suffer simple imprisonment for

a period of six months.

3. During the pendency of the appeal before the High Court, A-1 (Mohd.

Ishaq Ansari) expired and, therefore, the proceedings qua him stood

abated before the High Court.

4. For the sake of convenience, the accused will be referred to as

A-1(Md. Ishaq Ansari)(expired), A-2(S.A. Shafiullah), A-3(Mohd.

Khalid) and A-4(Md. Afsar).

Brief Facts :

5. Mr. M. Srinivasa Rao, Inspector of Police(PW-1), West Zone Task

Force (hereinafter being referred to as ‘Inspector PW-1’) claims

to have received credible information on 8th May, 2009 regarding

transportation of ganja by two persons from Sangareddy to

Hyderabad in a ‘Toyota Qualis’ vehicle. PW-1 apprised his superior

officers about such source information and after obtaining permission,

secured the presence of two panchas, namely, Shareef Shah and

Mithun Jana, to associate as panchas and proceeded to the spot

along with his team. The Inspector PW-1 and the team members

intercepted a Toyota Qualis vehicle bearing registration no. AP 09 

26 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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AL 6323 near Galaxy Theatre at 15:00 hours. A-1 and A-2 were

allegedly found present in the vehicle. The Inspector PW-1 served

them a notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. On the request of

the accused, a Gazetted Officer i.e., Inspector PW-4(V. Shambabu)

was called to the spot to associate in the proceedings. The accused

were again given a notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act by PW4(V. Shyambabu) who also participated in the search proceedings

and it is alleged that three bundles of ganja weighing around 80

kgs found lying in the vehicle were seized in presence of Inspector

PW-1 and the panchas.

6. A-1 and A-2 were arrested and interrogated at the spot. Three samples

weighing about 50 grams were drawn from each bundle contraband

and remaining muddamal ganja was seized vide confession-cumseizure panchnama (Exhibit P-3). One part of the sample was handed

over to A-1 and A-2.

7. Inspector PW-1 thereafter proceeded to hand over the accused along

with the seized articles to LW-10(G. Naresh Kumar, Sub-Inspector

of Police, Golkonda Police Station)(hereinafter being referred to as

‘Sub-Inspector LW-10’) for further action. Based on these proceedings,

a complaint came to be lodged at the Golkonda Police Station and

Criminal Case No. 181 of 2009 was registered and investigation

was commenced.

8. One part of sample collected from the recovered contraband was

forwarded to the Forensic Science Laboratory (FSL) from where a

report (Exhibit P-11) was received concluding that the sample was

of ganja as defined under Section 2(b) of the NDPS Act. Acting on

the confession/interrogation of the two occupants of the car, i.e.

A-1 and A-2, the Investigating Officer (PW-5 K. Chandrasekhar

Reddy)(hereinafter being referred to as ‘Investigating Officer PW5’) apprehended the accused A-3 and A-4. After concluding the

investigation, a charge-sheet was filed against the four accused in

the trial Court.

9. Upon being charged for the offence punishable under Section 8 read

with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act, the accused pleaded not

guilty and claimed trial. The prosecution examined five witnesses

and exhibited 13 documents to prove its case as per the following

table:-

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 27

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

PW1 M. Srinivasa Rao, complainant-cum-investigating

officer

PW2 Mohd. Illiyas Akber, panch witness

PW3 Sk. Shamshuddin Ahmed, panch

PW4 V. Shyambabu, Gazetted Officer

PW5 K. Chandrasekhar Reddy, Investigating Officer

Exhibit P1 Notice to accused

Exhibit P2 Complaint

Exhibit P3 Confession-cum-seizure panchnama of A1 and A2

Exhibit P4 Bunch of (2) photographs

Exhibit P5 Signature of PW2 on panchnama of A3

Exhibit P6 Signature of PW2 on panchnama of A4

Exhibit P7 Signature of PW3 on panchnama of A3

Exhibit P8 Signature of PW3 on panchnama of A4

Exhibit P9 Notice to accused No. 1 and 2

Exhibit P10 First Information Report

Exhibit P11 FSL Report

Exhibit P12 Seizure panchnama of A3

Exhibit P13 Seizure panchnama of A4

10. The accused, upon being questioned under Section 313 of Code of

Criminal Procedure, 1973(hereinafter being referred to as ‘CrPC’)

denied the prosecution allegations but chose not to lead any evidence

in defence. The trial Court proceeded to convict and sentence the

accused in the above terms by the judgment dated 30th May, 2011.

11. Being aggrieved by their conviction and the sentence awarded by

the trial Court, the accused preferred an appeal under Section 374(2)

CrPC in the High Court for the State of Telangana at Hyderabad

which stood rejected vide the judgment dated 10th November, 2022.

12. A-3 and A-4 have preferred Criminal Appeal No. 1610 of 2023 and

A-2 has preferred Criminal appeal No. 1611 of 2023 for assailing

the impugned judgment dated 10th November, 2022 of High Court

whereby the conviction recorded and sentences awarded to the

accused by the trial Court have been affirmed.

28 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Submissions on behalf of the accused appellants :

13. Learned counsel representing A-2(S.A. Shafiullah) advanced the

following submissions to assail the impugned judgment and seeking

acquittal for the accused:-

(i) That the independent panch witnesses associated with the

search and seizure were not examined in evidence and hence

the entire search and seizure proceedings become doubtful

and are vitiated;

(ii) That it is admitted that the contraband ganja was seized from

three bags which were also having green chillies therein.

However, the Seizure Officer made no effort whatsoever to

segregate the chillies and the alleged contraband and hence it

cannot be held with any degree of certainty that the recovered

contraband ganja fell within the category of commercial quantity;

(iii) That the prosecution failed to ensure compliance of the

requirements of Section 52A of the NDPS Act inasmuch as,

no sampling procedure was undertaken before the Magistrate;

(iv) That the Seizure Officer (Inspector PW-1) claims to have

collected a total of three samples (one from each bundle of

ganja) and handed over one part of the sample to the accused.

However, when the articles were received at the FSL, three

distinct sample packages were found which upon testing gave

the presence of ‘cannabis sativa’. It was thus submitted that

only two samples remained with the Investigation Officer and

hence there is a grave contradiction and doubt regarding the

sanctity of the samples collected by the Seizure Officer (Inspector

PW-1) at the time of seizure.

(v) Attention of the Court was also drawn to the evidence of PW-5

who stated that three samples of ganja were taken by SubInspector LW-10, who handed over these sample packets to

witness. However, this fact is contradicted by the evidence of

the Seizure Officer(Inspector PW-1)), who stated that it was he

who collected three samples from the contraband(three bundles

of ganja) and handed one over to the accused under proper

acknowledgment. Thus, as per the learned counsel, the FSL

report is honest in the eyes of law as the sampling procedure

is totally flawed; 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 29

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

(vi) That three bundles/packets of ganja were allegedly seized

from the vehicle ‘Toyota Qualis’ in possession of A-1(Mohd.

Ishaq Ansari) and A-2(S.A. Shafiullah) but when Investigating

Officer PW-5 appeared in the witness box, he produced seven

packets wherein the contraband was packed. These packets

were not having any seals or identifying marks, i.e., signature

of the accused and the panchas. Thus, it is apparent that the

original muddamal seized at the spot was never produced and

exhibited in the Court;

(vii) That Sub-Inspector LW-10 who allegedly handed over

the sample packets to Investigating Officer PW-5 was not

examined in evidence. Furthermore, the carrier Constable who

transmitted the samples to the FSL was also not examined by

the prosecution;

(viii) No document pertaining to deposit of the samples at the Police

Station and the transmission thereof to the FSL was exhibited

on record. The samples were forwarded to the FSL after a

gross delay of more than two months and hence, the FSL

report cannot be read in evidence because the required link

evidence is missing.

14. Learned counsel representing A-3 and A-4 urged that these accused

were not found present at the spot at the time of seizure. They were

arrested on 30th May, 2009 merely on the basis of the interrogation

notes of A-1 and A-2 and were charged for offence under Section 8

read with Section 20(b)(ii)(c) of NDPS Act. As the prosecution never

came out with a case that the contraband was recovered from the

possession of these two accused, their conviction for the offence

under Section 8 read with Section 20(b)(ii)(C) of the NDPS Act is ex

facie illegal and unsustainable on the face of the record.

Arguments on behalf of State :

15. Per contra, learned counsel representing the State, vehemently and

fervently opposed the submissions advanced by learned counsel

for the appellants. He urged that two Courts, i.e., the trial Court as

well as the High Court, have recorded concurrent findings of facts

for convicting the appellants and for affirming their conviction and

hence, this Court in exercise of the jurisdiction under Article 136 of

the Constitution of India should be slow to interfere in such concurrent

findings of facts. He thus implored the Court to dismiss the appeals.

30 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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Discussion and Conclusion :

16. We have given our thoughtful consideration to the submissions

advanced at the Bar and have gone through the impugned judgment

and the evidence available on record.

17. Before discussing the prosecution evidence, we would like to note

that the case as set up by the prosecution is regarding recovery

of narcotics from a vehicle which was stopped during transit.

Thus, the procedure of search and seizure would be governed

by Section 43 read with Section 49 of the NDPS Act which are

reproduced below:-

“43. Power of seizure and arrest in public place.—Any

officer of any of the departments mentioned in Section

42 may—

(a) seize in any public place or in transit, any narcotic drug

or psychotropic substance or controlled substance in

respect of which he has reason to believe an offence

punishable under this Act has been committed, and,

along with such drug or substance, any animal or

conveyance or article liable to confiscation under

this Act, any document or other article which he

has reason to believe may furnish evidence of the

commission of an offence punishable under this Act

or any document or other article which may furnish

evidence of holding any illegally acquired property

which is liable for seizure or freezing or forfeiture

under Chapter V-A of this Act;

(b) detain and search any person whom he has reason

to believe to have committed an offence punishable

under this Act, and if such person has any narcotic

drug or psychotropic substance or controlled

substance in his possession and such possession

appears to him to be unlawful, arrest him and any

other person in his company.

Explanation.—For the purposes of this section, the

expression “public place” includes any public conveyance,

hotel, shop, or other place intended for use by, or accessible

to, the public.

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 31

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

49. Power to stop and search conveyance.—Any officer

authorised under Section 42, may, if he has reason to

suspect that any animal or conveyance is, or is about to be,

used for the transport of any narcotic drug or psychotropic

substance [or controlled substance], in respect of which

he suspects that any provision of this Act has been, or

is being, or is about to be, contravened at any time, stop

such animal or conveyance, or, in the case of an aircraft,

compel it to land and—

(a) rummage and search the conveyance or part thereof;

(b) examine and search any goods on the animal or in

the conveyance;

(c) if it becomes necessary to stop the animal or the

conveyance, he may use all lawful means for stopping

it, and where such means fail, the animal or the

conveyance may be fired upon.”

18. We now proceed to some important excerpts from the prosecution

evidence:-

(a) Complaint dated 8th May, 2009(Exhibit P-2)

“Then I recorded the confession-cum-seizure panchnama

of the accused persons A-1 and seized three bundles

containing Ganja in it from their possession. On weighing

the three bundles it was found about 80 kgs of Ganja in it.

Out of the seized Ganja we have taken three samples and

marked as S-1 and S-3 each sample packet containing

50 grams of Ganja and affixed panch chits. Also seized

Maroon, colour Qualis vehicle bearing No. AP 09AL 6323

Engine No. 2L9722612, Chassis No. LF50-104863512/01

from the possession of the accused persons. Out of the

seized Ganja drawn three samples containing 50 grams

marked S-1 to S-3, each packed in polythene covers and

attached panch chits to them. The sample is supplied to

the accused Mohd Ishaq Ansari and S.A. Ashafiullah.”

(b) Exhibit P-11(FSL Report) –

“Received one sealed cloth parcel sealed with six seals,

which are intact and tallying with the sample seal labelled as 

32 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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“Cr. No. 181/2009” containing a cardboard box containing

three closed polythene packets each labelled as “S-1,

S-2 & S-3” respectively described below through Sri K.

Narsimulu, PC 7770 on 14/07/2009.”

(C) PW-1

“I collected three samples weighing about 50 gms each

and given one sample to the accused under proper

acknowledgement.”

“M.O.I is the ganja packed in seven bags.”

“There are no panch chits right now on M.O.I bags.”

“It is true that the bags, deposited before the court are

not having, seals. I, have weighed the Ganja only and it

is weighing 80 Kgs, but I have not weighed the chillies.

The total weight of the Ganja bundles as mentioned in

the panchnama includes the weight, of chillies. I have not

mentioned about sealing of samples in my panchnama. I

have not mentioned in panchnama in what containers. I

have taken, the samples.”

“As per the panchnama one sample was given to the

accused. I have taken 3 samples and out of them I have

given one sample to both the accused and two samples

I handed over in police station.”

(d) PW-4

“PW1 seized 3 ganja bundles weighing around 80 kgs and

collected samples of 50 grams from the bundles.”

(e) PW-5

“Originally three bundles of ganja was seized from the

accused and as the Ganja was becoming dry and turning

into dust, and due to the holes of the bags it is coming

out, and therefore we transferred the Ganja into 7 new

bags, which was already marked as M.O.1.”

“Three samples of Ganja have been taken by LW 10 and

handed over the samples to me. We have forwarded the

three samples to FSL through A.C.P., and submitted FSL

report Ex. P.11.”

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 33

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

“The samples were taken on 8.5.2009 and they were

forwarded to FSL on 7.7.2009 i.e. after two months of

taking of samples. The samples were not deposited in

the court.”

“I did not file any document to show that where the

property was kept in Maalkhana. I did not produce any

Maalkhana register in this case. The property was sent to

FSL after two months of its seizure. The FSL report, does

not disclose about the panch chits and seals and quantity

of samples. The property deposited in court is not having

any official seals.”

“I did not report to the court till today that the ganja was

getting dried up and becoming dust, I converted them from

three bundles to 7 bags for safe custody.”

19. A perusal of the evidence of the Seizure Officer (Inspector PW-1) and

the confession-cum-seizure panchnama (Exhibit P-3) would reveal

that the prosecution claims to have recovered the contraband from

three bags wherein the ganja as well as green chillies were present.

Seizure Officer(Inspector PW-1) made no effort whatsoever to conduct

a separate weighment of the contraband by segregating the chillies.

Rather, the panchnama is totally silent about presence of chillies

with the bundles of ganja. Thus, it cannot be said with any degree of

certainty that the recovered ganja actually weighed 80 kgs. Seizure

Officer(Inspector PW-1) also stated that he collected three samples

of ganja at the spot and handed over one sample to accused. If this

was true, apparently only two sample packets remained for being

sent to the FSL. Contrary to the evidence of PW-1, PW-5 stated

that three samples of ganja were taken by LW-10 who handed the

same over to him. Thereafter, these samples were forwarded to the

FSL through the ACP and a FSL report (Exhibit P-11) was received.

When PW-5 appeared for deposition, he produced the muddamal

ganja in the Court and it was seen that the same was packed in

seven new bags as against the three bags referred to in the seizure

memo (Exhibit P-3). Neither any proceedings were conducted nor

any memo was prepared by the police officers for repacking the

seized ganja bundles in new packaging.

20. The two independent panch witnesses i.e. Shareef Shah and Mithun

Jana who were associated in the recovery proceedings, were 

34 [2024] 3 S.C.R.

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not examined in evidence and no explanation was given by the

prosecution as to why they were not being examined.

21. Sub-Inspector LW-10, who prepared three samples of ganja, as per

the testimony of PW-5, was not examined in evidence. In addition

thereto, the prosecution neither examined any witness nor produced

any document to satisfy the Court regarding safe keeping of the

samples right from the time of the seizure till the same reached the

FSL. The official who collected the samples from the police station

and carried the same to the FSL was not examined at the trial.

From the quoted portion of the evidence of Seizure Officer(Inspector

PW-1), it is clear as day light that he handed over one of the three

samples to the accused. The witness also admitted that he did not

mention about sealing of the samples in the panchnama. Contrary

to the evidence of PW-1, PW-5 stated that three samples of ganja

were taken out by Sub-Inspector LW-10 and were handed over to

the witness who forwarded the same to the ACP for sending it to

FSL. In cross-examination, the witness admitted that he did not file

any document to show that the property was kept in malkhana. The

malkhana register was not produced in the Court. The FSL report

(Exhibit P-11) does not disclose about the panch chits and seals

and signature of the accused on samples. The property deposited in

the Court(muddamal) was not having any official seals. The witness

also admitted that he did not take any permission from the Court for

changing the original three packets of muddamal ganja to seven new

bags for safe keeping. These glaring loopholes in the prosecution

case give rise to an inescapable inference that the prosecution has

miserably failed to prove the required link evidence to satisfy the Court

regarding the safe custody of the sample packets from the time of

the seizure till the same reached the FSL. Rather, the very possibility

of three samples being sent to FSL is negated by the fact that the

Seizure Officer handed over one of the three collected samples to

the accused. Thus, their remained only two samples whereas three

samples reached the FSL. This discrepancy completely shatters the

prosecution case.

22. Admittedly, no proceedings under Section 52A of the NDPS Act

were undertaken by the Investigating Officer PW-5 for preparing an

inventory and obtaining samples in presence of the jurisdictional

Magistrate. In this view of the matter, the FSL report(Exhibit P-11)

is nothing but a waste paper and cannot be read in evidence. The 

[2024] 3 S.C.R. 35

Mohammed Khalid and Another v. The State of Telangana

accused A-3 and A-4 were not arrested at the spot. The offence under

Section 20(b)(ii)(c) deals with production, manufacture, possession,

sale, purchase, transport, import or export of cannabis. It is not the

case of the prosecution that the accused A-3 and A-4 were found

in possession of ganja. The highest case of the prosecution which

too is not substantiated by any admissible or tangible evidence is

that these two accused had conspired sale/purchase of ganja with

A-1 and A-2. The entire case of the prosecution as against these

two accused is based on the interrogation notes of A-1 and A-2.

23. It is trite that confession of an accused recorded by a Police Officer

is not admissible in evidence as the same is hit by Section 25 of the

Evidence Act. Neither the trial Court nor the High Court adverted

to this fatal flaw in the prosecution case and proceeded to convict

A-3 and A-4 in a sheerly mechanical manner without there being

on iota of evidence on record of the case so as to hold them guilty.

24. As a consequence of the above discussion, we are of the firm

opinion that the prosecution has miserably failed to prove the charges

against the accused. The evidence of the police witnesses is full

of contradictions and is thoroughly unconvincing. The conviction of

the accused appellants as recorded by the trial Court and affirmed

by the High Court is illegal on the face of record and suffers from

highest degree of perversity.

25. Resultantly, the judgment dated 10th November, 2022 passed by the

High Court affirming the judgment of the trial Court convicting and

sentencing the accused appellants for the charge under Section 8(c)

read with 20(b)(ii)(c) of the NDPS Act is hereby quashed and set

aside. The appellants are acquitted of all the charges. They are in

custody and shall be released forthwith, if not wanted in any other

case.

26. The appeals are accordingly allowed.

27. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.

Headnotes prepared by: Ankit Gyan Result of the case:

Appeals allowed.