escalation of price on old sale transaction at the rate of 12% per annum basing on cumulative circumstance requires no interferance = In the present case both, the Reference Court as well as the High Court, have determined the value of the land considering the Sale Deed dated 24.05.1979 which is more than 9 years before the notification of the acquisition. Therefore, considering the observations made by this Court in 18 para 15 in the case of Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (Supra) reproduced hereinabove and considering the fact that time gap between the sale deed relied upon and the date of notification of acquisition is more than 9 years, the courts below ought to have been very cautious in relying upon the Sale Deed dated 24.05.1979. Be that it may and assuming that the Sale Deed dated 24.05.1979 was the best evidence available to determine the value of land acquired in that case also taking annual increase at the rate of 12% is not justified. We are of the opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case the annual increase/escalation ought to have been at the rate of 10% maximum. Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that State of Punjab suffered due to militancy from 1979 onwards till 1992 and because of that the prices would have crashed. Therefore, to grant the escalation/price rise at the rate of 12% would not be justified at all. After considering the case of Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (Supra), it is observed and held by this Court in the case of Lal Chand (Supra) that even if the transaction is 2 to 3 years prior to the acquisition, the Court 19 should, before adopting a standard escalation satisfy itself that there were no adverse circumstances. It is further observed and held that the question is therefore, necessary before increasing the price with reference to the old transactions. Therefore, assuming that the appellants are right in submitting that the increase in land value should have been adopted on cumulative basis, in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case noted hereinabove, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court.

 1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITON

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 3875­3876 OF 2009

Ramesh Kumar   .. Appellant(s)

Versus

Bhatinda Integrated Cooperative 

Cotton Spinning Mill and Ors.        .. Respondent(s)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5669 OF 2021

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.9470 of 2010)

Bant Singh and Ors. .. Appellant(s)

Versus

The State of Punjab & Ors.       .. Respondent(s)

With

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5670  OF 2021

(Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C)No.15117 of 2010)

Gurbachan Singh (D) By LRs and Anr.    ..Appellant(s)

Versus

The State of Punjab and Ors. ..Respondent(s)

With

2

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9185­9196 of 2017

Gurjant Singh & Anr. etc. etc. ..Appellant(s)

Versus

The State of Punjab through Chief Secretary,

Department of Cooperation and Ors. ..Respondent(s)

J U D G M E N T

M. R. Shah, J.

Civil Appeal Nos. 3875­3876 OF 2009

1. Arising out of the impugned common judgment and order

dated 19.09.2008 passed by the High Court in RFA No.3476 of

1999 filed by the original claimants for enhancement and RFA

No.1507 of 1999 filed by the Bhatinda Integrated Co­operative

Cotton Spinning & Ginning Mills Ltd.

Special Leave Petition No.9470 of 2010

Leave granted.

Arising out of RFAs No.2648 of 1999 (Bant Singh and

Ors. vs. State of Punjab and Ors.), the appeal which was filed

3

by   the   original   claimants   for   enhancement   of   the

compensation.  However, it is required to be noted that RFA

No.1505 of 1999 filed by the Bhatinda Integrated Co­Operative

Cotton  Spinning  &  Ginning  Mills  Ltd.  vs.  Bant  Singh  and

others is not under challenge.

Special Leave Petition No.15117 of 2010

Leave granted.

Arising out of RFA No.2645 of 1999 which was filed by

the   original   claimants   Gurbachan   Singh   and   others   for

enhancement of compensation. It is required to be noted that

no   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the   original   claimants

(Gurbachan Singh and others) challenging the order passed in

RFA   No.1505   of   2019   which   was   filed   by   the   Bhatinda

Integrated Co­Operative Cotton Spinning & Ginning Mills Ltd.

which has been allowed by the High Court and the amount of

compensation has been reduced.

4

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.9185­9196 of 2017

Civil Appeal Nos.9895­9897 of 2017 arising out of RFA

Nos.2642, 2643, 2644, 2645, 2646, 2648 of 1999 and RFA

Nos. 1505, 1508, 1509, 1510, 1515 and 1516 of 1999.

2. As common question of law and facts arise in this group

of   appeals,   all   these   appeals   are   decided   and   disposed   of

together by this common Judgment and Order.

2.1 Vide notification dated 06.06.1988 issued under Section

4 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for short, ‘the Act’), the

lands   owned   by   the   original   claimants   admeasuring   297

Kanals and 1 Marla situated in the revenue estate of Jassi Pau

Wali, Distt. Bhatinda, Punjab came to be acquired for public

purpose,   namely,   establishment   of   Bhatinda   Integrated

Cooperative Cotton Spinning and Ginning Mills Ltd. (for short,

‘the Spinning Mill’).  The same was followed by a notification

under   Section   6   of   the   Act   on   08.06.1988.     The   Land

Acquisition Officer vide Award dated 05.10.1989 determined

the value of the land at Rs.25,000/­ per acre and awarded the

compensation accordingly.  At the instance of the land owners

5

the   references   were   made   to   the   Reference   Court.     Vide

common   Judgment   and   Award   dated   27.02.1999,   the

Reference Court determined the market value of the land at

Rs.1,12,000/­ per acre.  Before the Reference Court it was the

case on behalf of the land owners that the acquired land is

situated just on the main Bhatinda Mansa Road and has a

very   potential   value   of   being   used   for   commercial   and

residential purposes as well as the industrial purposes.  Before

the Reference Court the land owners heavily relied upon the

registered Sale Deeds Ex.A.W.6/C to Ex. A.W.6/H executed on

or about 24.05.1979 at the rate of Rs.50,000/­ per acre.  The

Reference   Court   took  into   account   the   aforesaid   sale  deed

Ex.A.W.6/C   to   determine   the   market   value   of   the   lands

acquired   and   considering   the   time   gap   of   about   9   years

between the date of the execution of the aforesaid sale deeds

and Section 4 Notification thereby granted the increase of 12%

in the price of the land per year and applied the cut of 25%

and finally determined the value of the land at Rs.1,12,000/­

6

per acre and accordingly enhanced the award of compensation

by common Judgment and Order dated 27.02.1999.

2.2 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common

Judgment and Award passed by the Learned Reference Court

whereby it enhanced the amount of compensation considering

the market value of the land at Rs.1,12,000/­ per acre, both,

the original claimants as well as the Spinning Mill preferred

the appeals before the High Court.  The land owners preferred

the   appeals   for   enhancement   of   the   compensation.   By

impugned common Judgment and Order the High Court has

allowed the appeals preferred by the Spinning Mill reducing

the amount of compensation and determining the value of

acquired land at Rs.88,400/­ per acre.  The High Court also

considered the Sale Deed Ex.AW6/C as a base for determining

the value of the acquired land and also added 12% annual

increase.   However, the High Court imposed the cut of 15%

instead of 25% as adopted by Learned Reference Court.  Thus,

the appeals preferred by the Spinning Mill came to be partly

allowed.  Consequently, the appeals preferred by the original

7

land   owners   which   were   filed   for   the   enhancement   of   the

compensation came to be dismissed by the High Court.

2.3 Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   common

impugned Judgment passed by the High Court partly allowing

the appeals preferred by the Spinning Mill and dismissing the

appeals   preferred   by   the   land   owners   for   enhancement   of

compensation and determining the value of the acquired land

at Rs.88,400/­ per acre, the land owners have preferred the

present appeals.

3. Shri Vinay Mathew, Shri Yadav Narender Singh and Shri

Sridhar Potaraju, Learned Advocates appearing on behalf of

the appellants – original land owners and Shri Puneet Kansal,

Learned Advocate appearing on behalf of the Respondent –

Spinning Mill.  At this stage, it is required to be noted that so

far as the Bhatinda Integrated Co­operative Cotton Spinning &

Ginning Mills Ltd. is concerned, it has been ordered to be

wound up and the Liquidator has been appointed and Shri

Puneet Kansal, Learned Advocate has appeared on behalf of

Liquidator of the Spinning Mill.

8

4. Learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the land owners

have made the following submissions:

(i) that both, the Learned Reference Court as well as

the High Court have failed to consider the exemplar

being the sale deed dated 04.05.1981 by which the

land   admeasuring   70   meters   away   from   the

acquired land was sold at Rs.1,17,600/­ per acre.

It is submitted that as held by this Court in the case

of  Mehrawal  Khewaji  Trust,  Faridkot  and  Ors.

Vs.  State  of  Punjab  and  Ors.,  (2012) 5 SCC 432

the highest of the exemplars which is a bona fide

transaction has to  be considered.  It is submitted

that the said sale deed was executed in the year

1981 and considering the time given of 7 years the

annual increase of 7 years was required to be taken;

(ii) that   the   High   Court   has   erred   in   taking   annual

increase at the rate of 12% at the flat rate which

would   lead   to   anomalous   results   as   opposed   to

cumulative rate;

9

(iii) it is submitted that exemplar sale deed that was

accepted by the courts below is dated 24.05.1979

which is more than 9 years before the notification of

acquisition   was   made   and   thus   9   years   of

cumulative increase has to be applied to the value

of the land at Rs.50,000/­ per acre.  Heavy reliance

is placed on the decision of this Court in ONGC Ltd.

vs.  Rameshbhai  Jivanbhai  Patel  &  Anr., (2008)

14 SCC 745.

In the aforesaid decision, it is categorically held by

this   Court   that   it   is   logical,   practical   and

appropriate to apply cumulative rate as opposed to

flat rate.  It is submitted that aforesaid decision has

been subsequently followed and/or applied in the

case   of  Ashok   Kumar   and   Ors.   vs.   State   of

Haryana and Ors., (2015) 15 SCC 200;

(iv) that Reference Court as well as the High Court both

have erred in adopting cut of 25%/15% of the value

towards development. It is submitted that while the

10

Reference   Court   has   adopted   cut   of   25%   of   the

market price, the High Court deducted 15%.   It is

submitted that considering the location and nature

of the land that was acquired as well as the purpose

for which it was acquired (for commercial purpose

for   spinning   mill)   no   cut   from   the   market   price

should have been made and the land owners were

entitled to the market price without any cut.  It is

further submitted that the acquired land is only 30

acres and the nature of the land is semi urban and

the   same   was   adjoining   the   municipal   limits   of

Bhatinda and it was further found that the area

surrounding   the   acquired   land   consisted   of

factories,   go­downs,   residential   houses   and   the

cantonment areas thus no deduction on account of

any development charges should have been made;

(v) that   the   land   was   acquired   for   setting   up   profit

making   enterprise   i.e.   cotton   spinning   mill   and

therefore, also no deduction should have been made

11

in the price of the exemplar.  Reliance is placed on

the   decision   of   this   Court   in   the   case   of  Atma

Singh vs. State of Haryana, (2008) 2 SCC 568.

4.1 Making the above submissions and further relying the

decisions of this Court in the cases of Anjani Molu Dessai vs.

State  of  Goa  and  Anr., (2010) 13 SCC 710 and  Trishala

Jain and Anr. Vs. State of Uttaranchal and Anr., (2011) 6

SCC 47, it is prayed to allow the present appeals and enhance

the amount of compensation considering the value of the land

of Rs.1,50,000/­ per acre.

5. All   the   appeals   are   opposed   by   Learned   Counsel

appearing on behalf of the Liquidator of Spinning Mill.   It is

submitted on behalf of the Learned Counsel for Liquidator ­

Spinning Mill that the mill was a Co­operative Society and

became operational only in 1992.   The mill went into huge

losses because of various factors which resulted in complete

erosion   of   the   capital   on   account   of   which   the   mill   was

brought into winding up vide orders dated 09.05.2003.  All the

12

land owners have been paid in full as per the High Court

Judgment.

5.1 Now so far as reliance placed upon the decision in the

case of  Rameshbhai   Jivanbhai   Patel  (Supra)  by the land

owners to apply the rate of 12% increase cumulatively; it is

submitted that the said decision is distinguishable on facts.  It

is submitted that in the subsequent decision in the case of Lal

Chand vs. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 769, this Court has

held   that   the   Court   should,   before   adopting   a   standard

escalation,   satisfy   itself   that   there   were   no   adverse

circumstances.   It is submitted in the present case that the

State of Punjab was engulfed in militancy from 1979 onwards

till 1992.  There was large scale exodus of families belonging to

one particular community from the State on account of which

there were practically no buyers for the land.  It is submitted

that as such on account of militancy prices had crashed to

around Rs.25,000/­ per acre.  

13

5.2 It  is  submitted  that   therefore,  even  the  compensation

granted to the land owners is already on the higher side.  It is

submitted therefore in the facts and circumstances of the case

the submission on behalf of the land owners that there should

not be any deduction at all may not be accepted.

5.3 Now so far as the reliance placed upon the Sale Deed

dated 04.05.1981, it is submitted that the sale deed was for

small portion of land being 1 Kanal 14 Marlas against 297

Kanal 1 Marla of land and therefore, the same has not been

rightly accepted by the Reference Court as well as the High

Court.

5.4 It is further submitted that even otherwise the cut of 15%

towards   development   charges   does   not   require   any

interference as the land was agricultural (soft soil) acquired for

industrial purpose.

5.5 It is submitted that therefore, considering the oral facts

and circumstances of the case no interference of this Court is

14

called   for.     Therefore,   it   is   prayed   to   dismiss   the   present

appeals.

6. Heard  Learned  Counsel  for  the  parties  respectively  at

length.

6.1 In the present case the Notification under Section 4 of

the Act has been issued on 06.06.1988.  The land in question

was acquired for the public purpose for establishing Bhatinda

Integrated Cooperative Cotton Spinning and Ginning Mills Ltd.

The   Land   Acquisition   Officer,   Bhatinda   awarded   the

compensation considering the value of the land at the rate of

Rs.25,000/­ per acre.  The Reference Court relying upon the

sale deed dated 24.05.1979 as Ex. AW6/C by which the land

admeasuring 43 kanals 13 marlas out of the acquired land

was purchased by Shri Sudarshan Kumar and Mrs. Surinder

Anand   at   the   rate   of   Rs.50,000/­   per   acre   and   thereafter

adding 12% per acre and thereafter adopting the cut of 25%

determined   the   compensation   at   Rs.1,12,000/­   per   acre.

Thereafter   the   High   Court   by   the   impugned   common

Judgment and Order has allowed the appeals preferred by the

15

spinning mills and dismissed the appeals preferred by the land

owners, by determining the value at Rs.88,400/­ per acre after

adopting cut of 15%.

6.2 Having   heard   the   Learned   Counsel   for   the   respective

parties the questions which are posed for consideration of this

Court are: 

(i) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the

case the  Courts below  have erred in  taking

annual increase at the rate of 12% at the flat

rate and not applying the cumulative rate?

(ii) Whether in the facts and circumstances of the

case the High Court has erred in adopting the

cut/deduction of 15%, while determining the

value of the land acquired?

6.3 Now   so   far   as   the   submission   on   behalf   of   the   land

owners that while considering the annual increase at the rate

of 12%, the High Court ought to have applied the cumulative

rate and reliance placed upon the decision of this Court in

Rameshbhai   Jivanbhai   Patel  (Supra)  and   in   the   case   of

16

Ashok Kumar (Supra) are concerned, it is true that as held by

this Court in aforesaid two decisions increase in the market

value should be at a cumulative rate and not at a flat rate.  In

the   case   of  Rameshbhai   Jivanbhai   Patel  (Supra)  in

paragraph 18, it is specifically observed and held that when

market value is sought to be ascertained with reference to

transactions which took place before the acquisition, the law

adopted is to collect the year to year increase.   It is further

observed and held that as the percentage of increase is always

with   reference   to   the   previous   year’s   market   value,   the

appropriate method is to adopt the increase cumulatively and

not applying a flat rate.  However, at the same time it is also

observed and held in the said decision that it is reasonably

safe to determine the market value by providing appropriate

escalation over the approved market value of nearby lands in

the   previous   years,   when   relied   on   sale

transactions/acquisitions precede the subject acquisition by

only a few years, i.e., upto 4­5 years.  It is further observed in

the said decision in para 15 that beyond that it may be unsafe,

17

even if it relates to a neighbouring land.   In para 15 it is

observed and held as under:

“ Normally, recourse is taken to the mode of

determining   the   market   value   by   providing

appropriate escalation over the proved market

value   of   nearby   lands   in   previous   years   (as

evidenced by sale transactions or acquisition),

where   there   is   no   evidence   of   any

contemporaneous   sale   transactions   or

acquisitions   of   comparable   lands   in   the

neighbourhood. The said method is reasonably

safe   where   the   relied­on­sale

transactions/acquisitions   precedes   the   subject

acquisition by only a few years, that is upto four

to five years. Beyond that it may be unsafe, even

if it relates to a neighbouring land. What may be

a reliable standard if the gap is only a few years,

may   become   unsafe   and   unreliable   standard

where   the   gap   is   larger.   For   example,   for

determining the market value of a land acquired

in 1992, adopting the annual increase method

with reference to a sale or acquisition in 1970 or

1980 may have many pitfalls. This is because,

over the course of years, the `rate' of annual

increase may itself undergo drastic change apart

from   the   likelihood   of   occurrence   of   varying

periods of stagnation in prices or sudden spurts

in prices affecting the very standard of increase.

In the present case both, the Reference Court as well as

the   High   Court,   have   determined   the   value   of   the   land

considering the Sale Deed dated 24.05.1979 which is more

than   9   years   before   the   notification   of   the   acquisition.

Therefore, considering the observations made by this Court in

18

para 15 in the case of Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel  (Supra)

reproduced hereinabove and considering the fact that time gap

between the sale deed relied upon and the date of notification

of acquisition is more than 9 years, the courts below ought to

have been very cautious in relying upon the Sale Deed dated

24.05.1979.  Be that it may and assuming that the Sale Deed

dated 24.05.1979 was the best evidence available to determine

the value of land acquired in that case also taking annual

increase at the rate of 12% is not justified.   We are of the

opinion that, in the facts and circumstances of the case the

annual increase/escalation ought to have been at the rate of

10% maximum.  Even otherwise, it is required to be noted that

State of Punjab suffered due to militancy from 1979 onwards

till 1992 and because of that the prices would have crashed.

Therefore, to grant the escalation/price rise at the rate of 12%

would not be justified at all.   After considering the case of

Rameshbhai Jivanbhai Patel (Supra), it is observed and held

by this Court in the case of Lal Chand (Supra) that even if the

transaction is 2 to 3 years prior to the acquisition, the Court

19

should,   before   adopting   a   standard   escalation   satisfy   itself

that   there   were   no   adverse   circumstances.     It   is   further

observed and held that the question is therefore, necessary

before   increasing   the   price   with   reference   to   the   old

transactions.     Therefore,   assuming   that   the   appellants   are

right in submitting that the increase in land value should have

been adopted on cumulative basis, in the peculiar facts and

circumstances   of   the   case   noted   hereinabove,   we   see   no

reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order

passed by the High Court.

6.4 Now so far as the submission on behalf of the appellants

of not taking into consideration the other sale deeds, it is

required to be noted that those sale deeds are with respect to

small portions of land and thereafter rightly discarded.

6.5 Now so far as the deduction at the rate of 15% towards

the   development   charges,   it   also   does   not   call   for   any

interference of this Court considering the fact that the land in

question   at   the   relevant   time   was   an   agricultural   land.

However,   taking   into   consideration   the   fact   that   the   sale

20

instance dated 24.07.1979 relied upon was a quite big chunk

of land and the location of the acquired land and the land was

acquired for spinning mill, the High Court has rightly adopted

15% cut, which in the facts and circumstances of the case is

not required to be interfered with. 

7. At this stage, it is also required to be noted that though

the land was acquired in the year 1988, the same was made

operational only in the year 1992 and therefore, has gone into

liquidation   in   the   year   2003.     The   entire   amount   of

compensation as determined by the High Court has been paid.

We see no reason to interfere with the common Judgment

and Order passed by the High Court.  In view of the reasons

stated hereinabove all these appeals fail and deserve to be

dismissed.  The appeals are dismissed accordingly.

However, no order as to costs.

…………………………………J.

              (M. R. SHAH)

…………………………………J.

New Delhi,        (ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

September 13, 2021

21

Subsequent events can also be considered while considering the word curelty - No doubt, the courts below did not find adequate material to come to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled to divorce on grounds of cruelty. However, there are many subsequent circumstances which have arisen in the present case which necessitated the examination of this aspect. The question, thus, is whether the respondent’s conduct after the initial trigger for divorce amounts to mental cruelty. On the basis of material on record, we endeavour to deal with this aspect and, in that behalf, we notice the following: (a) The respondent has resorted to filing multiple cases in courts against the appellant. It may be noticed that such repeated filing of cases itself has been held in judicial pronouncements to amount to mental cruelty.8 (b) Respondent filed W.P. No.20407/2013 praying for a writ of mandamus to initiate disciplinary action against the appellant, who was working as an Asst. Professor in the Department of History in Government Arts College, Karur. This writ petition was dismissed on 6.6.2019. (c) The respondent sought some information from the College vide an RTI application dated 3.6.2013. She claimed the information received from the college was insufficient and filed an appeal. She sought the service records pertaining to the appellant, apart from other documents such as the identity card issued to the appellant under the Star Health Insurance Scheme and 8 K. Srinivas Rao v. DA Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC 558; Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) SCCOnline SC 489. 13 prior permission obtained by the appellant for purchasing a piece of property owned by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board etc. (d) The respondent thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 9516/2014. Even the information already furnished to her was again sought for. The Madras High Court opined, in terms of the judgment dated 3.3.2016, that the respondent had raised unnecessary queries. Her queries sought information about her husband’s remarriage or whether he was living with somebody else, well known to her, and the proceedings were found to be an abuse of the process of the RTI Act. (e) The respondent made representations to the college authorities seeking initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. It was not confined to even those college authorities, but she made representations even to the Director of Collegiate Education and the Secretary, Department of Higher Education (Tamil Nadu). She sought disciplinary proceedings against the appellant on account of the second marriage despite the fact that the second marriage took place soon after the decree of divorce. Thus, she sought to somehow ensure that the appellant loses his job. Filing of such complaints seeking removal of one’s spouse from job has been opined as amounting to mental cruelty. In view of the legal position which we have referred to aforesaid, these continuing acts of the respondent would amount to cruelty even if the same had not arisen as a cause prior to the institution of the petition, as was found by the Trial Court. This conduct shows disintegration of marital unity and thus disintegration of the marriage.10 In fact, there was no initial integration itself which would allow disintegration afterwards. The fact that there have been continued allegations and litigative proceedings and that can amount to cruelty is an aspect taken note of by this court.11 The marriage having not taken of from its inception and 5 years having been spent in the Trial Court, it is difficult to accept that the marriage soon after the decree of divorce, within 6 days, albeit 6 years after the initial inception of marriage, amounts to conduct which can be held against the appellant. 20. In the conspectus of all the aforesaid facts, this is one case where both the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and the ground of cruelty on account of subsequent facts would favour the grant of decree of divorce in favour of the appellant. 21. We are, thus, of the view that a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage between the parties be passed not only in exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India on account of irretrievable breakdown of marriage, but also on account of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act 10 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22 11 Malathi Ravi v. B.V. Ravi, (2014) 7 SCC 640 16 in light of the subsequent conduct of the respondent during the pendency of judicial proceedings at various stages.

 Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4984-4985 OF 2021

[Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 17505-17506/2019]

SIVASANKARAN ……APPELLANT

VERSUS

SANTHIMEENAL ….RESPONDENT

J U D G M E N T

SANJAY KISHAN KAUL, J.

1. The appellant-husband and the respondent-wife resolved to tie the

marital knot by solemnising their marriage as per the Hindu rites and

customs on 7.2.2002. It appears there was a crash landing at the take-of

stage itself! The appellant claims that the respondent’s view was that she

had been coerced into marrying the appellant without giving her consent,

and left the marriage hall late at night and went to Pudukkottai. An

endeavour by the relatives of the appellant to persuade her on the very next

day to live with the appellant was not fruitful. The marriage was never

consummated. As the marriage did not work out since its inception, the

appellant issued a notice dated 25.02.2002 seeking divorce on the ground of

1

cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 (hereinafter

referred to as ‘the Act’). Surprisingly, the respondent filed a petition for

restitution of conjugal rights soon thereafter. Respondent’s case was that

the appellant and his family demanded dowry and, on being unable to oblige,

the appellant’s brothers took him away from the Respondent’s company,

rendering consummation of the marriage impossible. She claims that it was

the appellant who refused to cohabit with her. In these circumstances,

appellant filed HMOP 24/2003 on 05.03.2003 under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the

Act, which was later re-numbered as HMOP 10/2005. Post-trial, a decree of

divorce was granted after almost 5 years on 17.3.2008 on the ground of

irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The appellant did not waste much time

and got married a second time on 23.3.2008 after 6 days. The respondent

preferred an appeal before the Addl. District Judge, Pudukkottai. It is her

case that she filed an appeal on 1.7.2008, within the period of limitation after

obtaining all the requisite papers; but the appeal was renumbered as CMA

No.5 and 7 of 2011. The appellate court set aside the decree of divorce

while allowing the petition for restitution of conjugal rights. The third round

took place before the High Court in second appeal and, in terms of judgment

dated 14.9.2018, the decree of divorce granted by the trial court was

restored. Thus, each stage of scrutiny took 5 years, and 15 years passed in

the litigation. In this period, the battle between the parties continued. This

inter alia posed a question mark on the status of the second marriage of the

appellant. The matter, however, did not end at this. The respondent filed a

2

review petition inter alia on the ground that it was not within the jurisdiction

of the High Court or the trial court to grant a decree of divorce on the ground

of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. The High Court noticed some

aspects of alleged cruelty and dissolved the marriage by passing a decree of

divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage. Thus, the

review petition was allowed by the impugned order dated 25.2.2019, which

has been assailed in the present appeal.

2. The endeavour to find a solution through mediation or any acceptable

solution between the parties did not succeed. According to the learned

counsel for the parties, the respondent was not willing to concede the decree

of divorce on any terms even though both the parties are educated and

living their separate lives now for almost two decades. In fact, learned

counsel for the respondent even stated that she was not disturbed by nor

wanted to afect the status of the second marriage; but was unwilling to

concede to a scenario where her marriage with the appellant came to an end

even though in view of the financial status of the parties no maintenance

was being claimed. In these circumstances, we are called upon to take a

view of the matter in the given factual scenario and the subsequent

developments, which are material, during the pendency of the proceedings

at various stages of the judicial process.

3. We have examined the rival contentions of the parties and we have

little doubt that this is one marriage which has not worked and cannot work.

3

This is not only on account of the fact that the appellant has married a

second time but also because the parties are so troubled by each other that

they are not willing to even think of living together. This, despite the fact

that the respondent keeps on claiming that she is and was always willing to

live with him.

4. Insofar as irretrievable breakdown of marriage is concerned, no doubt,

it does not exist as a ground of divorce under the Act. The issue has been

debated by the Law Commission in its various reports. Breakdown of

marriage was incidentally considered by the Law Commission in its 59th

report (1974), but the Commission made no specific recommendations in this

regard. Thereafter in its 71st report (1978), the Law Commission departed

from the fault theory of divorce to recognise situations where a marriage has

completely broken down and there is no possibility of reconciliation. Neither

party need individually be at fault for such a breakdown of the marriage – it

may be the result of prolonged separation, clash of personalities, or

incompatibility of the couple. As the Law Commission pithily noted, such

marriages are ‘merely a shell out of which the substance is gone’. For such

situations, the Commission recommended that the law be amended to

provide for ‘irretrievable breakdown of marriage’ as an additional ground of

divorce. This recommendation was reiterated by the Law Commission in its

217th Report in 2010, after undertaking a suo moto study of the legal issues

involved. So far, the Law Commission’s recommendations have not been

implemented. In 2010, the government introduced the Marriage Laws

4

(Amendment) Bill, 2010, which inter alia proposed to add irretrievable

breakdown of marriage as a new ground for divorce in both the Hindu

Marriage Act, 1955 and the Special Marriage Act, 1954. After receiving

suggestions from relevant stakeholders, the bill was amended and reintroduced as the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Bill, 2013. This bill was never

passed.

5. The result is that, in appropriate cases, this court has granted decrees

of divorce exercising its unique jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India, to do complete justice between the parties. Such a

course is being followed in varied kinds of cases, for instance where there

are inter se allegations between the parties, in order to put a quietus to the

matter, the parties withdraw these allegations and by mutual consent, this

court itself grants divorce. There are also cases where the parties accept

that there is an irretrievable breakdown of marriage and themselves request

for a decree of divorce. One of the more difficult situations is where, in the

opinion of the court, there is irretrievable breakdown of marriage but only

one of the parties is willing to acknowledge the same and accept divorce on

that account, while the other side seeks to oppose it even if it means

carrying on with the marriage.

6. The ground which is often taken to oppose such a decree of divorce,

apart from the absence of legislative mandate, is that the very institution of

marriage is distinctly understood in diferent countries. Under the Hindu

Law, it is sacramental in character and is supposed to be an eternal union of

5

two people - society at large does not accept divorce, given the heightened

importance of marriage as a social institution in India. Or at least, it is far

more difficult for women to retain social acceptance after a decree of

divorce. This, coupled with the law’s failure to guarantee economic and

financial security to women in the event of a breakdown of marriage; is

stated to be the reason for the legislature’s reluctance to introduce

irretrievable breakdown as a ground for divorce – even though there may

have been a change in social norms over a period of time. Not all persons

come from the same social background, and having a uniform legislative

enactment is thus, stated to be difficult. It is in these circumstances that this

court has been exercising its jurisdiction, despite such reservations, under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

7. A marriage is more than a seemingly simple union between two

individuals. As a social institution, all marriages have legal, economic,

cultural, and religious ramifications. The norms of a marriage and the varying

degrees of legitimacy it may acquire are dictated by factors such as marriage

and divorce laws, prevailing social norms, and religious dictates. Functionally,

marriages are seen as a site for the propagation of social and cultural capital

as they help in identifying kinship ties, regulating sexual behaviour, and

consolidating property and social prestige. Families are arranged on the idea

of a mutual expectation of support and amity which is meant to be

experienced and acknowledged amongst its members. Once this amity

6

breaks apart, the results can be highly devastating and stigmatizing. The

primary efects of such breakdown are felt especially by women, who may

find it hard to guarantee the same degree of social adjustment and support

that they enjoyed while they were married.

8. We may notice that the aforesaid exercise has produced diferent

judicial thought processes which have resulted in a reference to a

Constitution Bench of this Court in T.P.(C) No.1118/2014.1

 The reference is on

two grounds – (a) what could be the broad parameters for exercise of powers

under Article 142 of the Constitution to dissolve the marriage between

consenting parties without referring the parties to the family court to wait for

the period prescribed under Section 13-B of the Act, and (b) whether the

exercise of such jurisdiction under Article 142 should be made at all or

whether it should be left to be determined on the facts of each case.

9. In fact, this has been the bedrock of the submissions of the learned

counsel for the respondent who has strongly opposed any endeavour by this

court to exercise jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution to give a

decree of divorce on account of irretrievable breakdown of marriage in the

absence of consent of the parties. However, we must note that the remit of

the questions referred in TP (C) No. 1118/2014 is rather specific. The

reference is limited to cases of divorce on mutual consent, and it raises the

issue of whether the period prescribed under S. 13-B of the Act is mandatory.

The present case involves a divorce petition filed under S. 13(1)(i-a) of the

1 Shilpa Sailesh v. Varun Sreenivasan; order dated 29.06.2016.

7

Act, and at no point of time have both parties been amenable to a divorce on

mutual consent. Lack of consent to divorce in the present matter is also

apparent from the subsequent conduct of one of the parties, as discussed

later in this judgment. The case at hand is therefore, in our opinion, not

covered by the questions referred to the Constitution Bench in T.P. (C) No.

1118/2014.

10. We may further note that despite the reference order dated

29.06.2016, there have been various instances where this court has

exercised its powers to grant divorce in such circumstances.

11. We may initially refer to two judicial pronouncements in R. Srinivas

Kumar v. R. Shametha

2

 and Munish Kakkar v. Nidhi Kakkar

3 where it has been

clearly opined that there is no necessity of consent by both the parties for

exercise of powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India to dissolve

the marriage on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage.

12. In R. Srinivas Kumar,

4

 the parties had been living apart for 22 years

and all endeavours to save the marriage had failed. We may note that in

Hitesh Bhatnagar v. Deepa Bhatnagar

5

, it was opined by this Court that

courts can dissolve a marriage as irretrievably broken down only when it is

impossible to save the marriage, all eforts have been made in that regard,

the Court is convinced beyond any doubt that there is actually no chance of

2 (2019) 9 SCC 409.

3 (2020) 14 SCC 657.

4 Supra

5 (2011) 5 SCC 234.

8

the marriage surviving, and it is broken beyond repair. It could be useful to

reproduce the observations made in para 5.2 to para 8 as under:

“5.2. In Naveen Kohli [Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli,

(2006) 4 SCC 558] , a three-Judge Bench of this Court

has observed as under :

“74. … once the marriage has broken down

beyond repair, it would be unrealistic for the law not

to take notice of that fact, and it would be harmful to

society and injurious to the interests of the parties.

Where there has been a long period of continuous

separation, it may fairly be surmised that the

matrimonial bond is beyond repair. The marriage

becomes a fiction, though supported by a legal tie.

By refusing to sever that tie the law in such cases

does not serve the sanctity of marriage; on the

contrary, it shows scant regard for the feelings and

emotions of the parties.

***

85. Undoubtedly, it is the obligation of the court

and all concerned that the marriage status should, as

far as possible, as long as possible and whenever

possible, be maintained, but when the marriage is

totally dead, in that event, nothing is gained by

trying to keep the parties tied forever to a marriage

which in fact has ceased to exist. …

86. In view of the fact that the parties have been

living separately for more than 10 years and a very

large number of aforementioned criminal and civil

proceedings have been initiated by the respondent

against the appellant and some proceedings have

been initiated by the appellant against the

respondent, the matrimonial bond between the

parties is beyond repair. A marriage between the

parties is only in name. The marriage has been

wrecked beyond the hope of salvage, public interest

and interest of all concerned lies in the recognition of

the fact and to declare defunct de jure what is

already defunct de facto.”

(emphasis supplied)

A similar view has been expressed in Samar

Ghosh [Samar Ghosh v. Jaya Ghosh, (2007) 4 SCC 511].

9

6. In the similar set of facts and circumstances of the

case, this Court in Sukhendu Das [Sukhendu Das v. Rita

Mukherjee, (2017) 9 SCC 632 : (2017) 4 SCC (Civ) 714]

has directed to dissolve the marriage on the ground of

irretrievable breakdown of marriage, in exercise of

powers under Article 142 of the Constitution of India.

7. Now so far as submission on behalf of the

respondent wife that unless there is a consent by both

the parties, even in exercise of powers under Article 142

of the Constitution of India the marriage cannot be

dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of

marriage is concerned, the aforesaid has no substance.

If both the parties to the marriage agree for separation

permanently and/or consent for divorce, in that case,

certainly both the parties can move the competent

court for a decree of divorce by mutual consent. Only in

a case where one of the parties do not agree and give

consent, only then the powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India are required to be invoked to do

substantial justice between the parties, considering the

facts and circumstances of the case. However, at the

same time, the interest of the wife is also required to be

protected financially so that she may not have to sufer

financially in future and she may not have to depend

upon others.

8. This Court, in a series of judgments, has exercised

its inherent powers under Article 142 of the Constitution

of India for dissolution of a marriage where the Court

finds that the marriage is totally unworkable,

emotionally dead, beyond salvage and has broken down

irretrievably, even if the facts of the case do not provide

a ground in law on which the divorce could be granted.

In the present case, admittedly, the appellant husband

and the respondent wife have been living separately for

10

more than 22 years and it will not be possible for the

parties to live together. Therefore, we are of the opinion

that while protecting the interest of the respondent wife

to compensate her by way of lump sum permanent

alimony, this is a fit case to exercise the powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India and to dissolve

the marriage between the parties.”

13. In Munish Kakkar case

6

, the following observations were made:

“19. We may note that in a recent judgment of this

Court, in R. Srinivas Kumar v. R. Shametha, to which

one of us (Sanjay Kishan Kaul, J.) is a party, divorce

was granted on the ground of irretrievable

breakdown of marriage, after examining various

judicial pronouncements. It has been noted that such

powers are exercised not in routine, but in rare

cases, in view of the absence of legislation in this

behalf, where it is found that a marriage is totally

unworkable, emotionally dead, beyond salvage and

has broken down irretrievably. That was a case where

parties had been living apart for the last twenty-two

(22) years and a re-union was found to be

impossible. We are conscious of the fact that this

Court has also extended caution from time to time on

this aspect, apart from noticing 1(2019) 9 SCC 409

10 that it is only this Court which can do so, in

exercise of its powers under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India. If parties agree, they can

always go back to the trial court for a motion by

mutual consent, or this Court has exercised

jurisdiction at times to put the matter at rest quickly.

But that has not been the only circumstance in which

a decree of divorce has been granted by this Court.

In numerous cases, where a marriage is found to be

a dead letter, the Court has exercised its

extraordinary power under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India to bring an end to it.

20. We do believe that not only is the continuity of

this marriage fruitless, but it is causing further

emotional trauma and disturbance to both the

6 supra

11

parties. This is even reflected in the manner of

responses of the parties in the Court. The sooner this

comes to an end, the better it would be, for both the

parties. Our only hope is that with the end of these

proceedings, which culminate in divorce between the

parties, the two sides would see the senselessness of

continuing other legal proceedings and make an

endeavour to even bring those to an end.

21. The provisions of Article 142 of the Constitution

provide a unique power to the Supreme Court, to do

“complete justice” between the parties, i.e., where at

times law or statute may not provide a remedy, the

Court can extend itself to put a quietus to a dispute

in a manner which would befit the facts of the case.

It is with this objective that we find it appropriate to

take recourse to this provision in the present case.

22. We are of the view that an end to this marriage

would permit the parties to go their own way in life

after having spent two decades battling each other,

and there can always be hope, even at this age, for a

better life, if not together, separately. We, thus,

exercising our jurisdiction under Article 142 of the

Constitution of India, grant a decree of divorce and

dissolve the marriage inter se the parties forthwith.”

The aforesaid are two illustrative cases but there are many more spread over

diferent periods of time.7

14. We are conscious that the Constitution Bench is examining the larger

issue but that reference has been pending for the last five years. Living

together is not a compulsory exercise. But marriage is a tie between two

parties. If this tie is not working under any circumstances, we see no

purpose in postponing the inevitability of the situation merely because of the

pendency of the reference.

7 Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee (2017) 9 SCC 632; Parveen Mehta v. Inderjit Mehta (2002)

5 SCC 706.

12

15. However, the aforesaid is not the only issue under which the given

facts of a case can be examined. No doubt, the courts below did not find

adequate material to come to the conclusion that the appellant was entitled

to divorce on grounds of cruelty. However, there are many subsequent

circumstances which have arisen in the present case which necessitated the

examination of this aspect. The question, thus, is whether the respondent’s

conduct after the initial trigger for divorce amounts to mental cruelty. On the

basis of material on record, we endeavour to deal with this aspect and, in

that behalf, we notice the following:

(a) The respondent has resorted to filing multiple cases in courts against

the appellant. It may be noticed that such repeated filing of cases itself has

been held in judicial pronouncements to amount to mental cruelty.8

(b) Respondent filed W.P. No.20407/2013 praying for a writ of mandamus

to initiate disciplinary action against the appellant, who was working as an

Asst. Professor in the Department of History in Government Arts College,

Karur. This writ petition was dismissed on 6.6.2019.

(c) The respondent sought some information from the College vide an RTI

application dated 3.6.2013. She claimed the information received from the

college was insufficient and filed an appeal. She sought the service records

pertaining to the appellant, apart from other documents such as the identity

card issued to the appellant under the Star Health Insurance Scheme and

8 K. Srinivas Rao v. DA Deepa (2013) 5 SCC 226; Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli (2006) 4 SCC

558; Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla Vishwanath Agrawal (2012) SCCOnline SC 489.

13

prior permission obtained by the appellant for purchasing a piece of property

owned by the Tamil Nadu Housing Board etc.

(d) The respondent thereafter filed Writ Petition No. 9516/2014. Even the

information already furnished to her was again sought for. The Madras High

Court opined, in terms of the judgment dated 3.3.2016, that the respondent

had raised unnecessary queries. Her queries sought information about her

husband’s remarriage or whether he was living with somebody else, well

known to her, and the proceedings were found to be an abuse of the process

of the RTI Act.

(e) The respondent made representations to the college authorities

seeking initiation of disciplinary proceedings against the appellant. It was

not confined to even those college authorities, but she made representations

even to the Director of Collegiate Education and the Secretary, Department

of Higher Education (Tamil Nadu). She sought disciplinary proceedings

against the appellant on account of the second marriage despite the fact

that the second marriage took place soon after the decree of divorce. Thus,

she sought to somehow ensure that the appellant loses his job. Filing of such

complaints seeking removal of one’s spouse from job has been opined as

amounting to mental cruelty.9

16. On having succeeded before the first appellate court, the respondent

lodged a criminal complaint against the appellant under Section 494 IPC

even though her appeal was pending before the High Court. She sought to

9 K. Srinivas Rao v. D.A. Deepa, (2013) 5 SCC 226.

14

array and accuse even the persons who had attended the second marriage.

The High Court quashed the criminal proceedings in terms of order dated

18.2.2019.

17. There are episodes of further harassment by the respondent even at

the place of work of the appellant including insulting the appellant in front of

students and professors, as is apparent from the judgment of the Trial Court.

She is stated to have threatened the appellant of physical harm in front of his

colleagues as per the testimony of PW.3 and complained to the appellant’s

employer threatening to file a criminal complaint against him (PW.3). The

first appellate court somehow brushed aside these incidents as having not

been fully established on a perception of wear and tear of marriage. The

moot point is that the marriage has not taken of from its inception. There

can hardly be any ‘wear and tear of marriage’ where parties have not been

living together for a long period of time. The parties, undisputedly, never

lived together even for a day.

18. We are, thus, faced with a marriage which never took of from the first

day. The marriage was never consummated and the parties have been living

separately from the date of marriage for almost 20 years. The appellant

remarried after 6 years of the marriage, 5 years of which were spent in Trial

Court proceedings. The marriage took place soon after the decree of divorce

was granted. All mediation eforts have failed.

15

19. In view of the legal position which we have referred to aforesaid, these

continuing acts of the respondent would amount to cruelty even if the same

had not arisen as a cause prior to the institution of the petition, as was found

by the Trial Court. This conduct shows disintegration of marital unity and

thus disintegration of the marriage.10 In fact, there was no initial integration

itself which would allow disintegration afterwards. The fact that there have

been continued allegations and litigative proceedings and that can amount

to cruelty is an aspect taken note of by this court.11 The marriage having not

taken of from its inception and 5 years having been spent in the Trial Court,

it is difficult to accept that the marriage soon after the decree of divorce,

within 6 days, albeit 6 years after the initial inception of marriage, amounts

to conduct which can be held against the appellant.

20. In the conspectus of all the aforesaid facts, this is one case where both

the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage and the ground of cruelty

on account of subsequent facts would favour the grant of decree of divorce

in favour of the appellant.

21. We are, thus, of the view that a decree of divorce dissolving the

marriage between the parties be passed not only in exercise of powers under

Article 142 of the Constitution of India on account of irretrievable breakdown

of marriage, but also on account of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Act

10 A. Jayachandra v. Aneel Kaur, (2005) 2 SCC 22

11 Malathi Ravi v. B.V. Ravi, (2014) 7 SCC 640

16

in light of the subsequent conduct of the respondent during the pendency of

judicial proceedings at various stages.

22. The decree of divorce is, accordingly, passed. Marriage stands

dissolved.

23. The appeals are allowed in the aforesaid terms leaving the parties to

bear their own costs.

……..……………………………….J.

 [SANJAY KISHAN KAUL]

……..……………………………….J.

 [HRISHIKESH ROY]

NEW DELHI.

September 13, 2021

17

when mining lease was granted as per due procedure - it can not be stayed by misapplication of facts - Insofar as the finding of the learned Tribunal that the area was reduced to 24 hectares from 29 hectares only in order to avoid the rigours of public hearing, is totally erroneous. The appellant had no role to play in the same. It is the authorities who recommended approval in respect of only 24 hectares. Insofar as the mandatory distance from the water body is concerned, the authorities upon survey had found that the mandatory distance of 0.25 km is maintained.

NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3776 OF 2020

DHRUVA ENTERPRISES        ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

C. SRINIVASULU AND OTHERS    ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

B.R. GAVAI, J.

1. The appellant has approached this Court being aggrieved

by the impugned judgment and order dated 17th January 2020,

passed by the National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, Delhi,

thereby allowing the appeal filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and

directing the Ministry of Environment & Forest and Climate

Change to conduct Environment Impact Assessment Appraisal

in terms of EIA Notification 2006, and subsequent amendments

1

thereunder   and   also  to   conduct   public  hearing   and  impose

whatever conditions they may find necessary and appropriate

for carrying out mining operation.  By the impugned judgment

and order, the Tribunal has further directed suspension of the

mining operations until the completion of the said exercise.

2. Facts in brief giving rise to filing of the present appeal are

as under:­

The appellant had applied on 28th  July 2016 for Mining

Lease for Quartz and Feldspar mining over 29 hectares of land

in Sy. No. 330/1, Kalwakole Village, Peddakothapally Mandal,

Mahabubnagar District, State of Telangana.  The total land in

the   said   survey   number   was   109   Acres   and   08   Guntas

(approximately 44 hectares), out of which the appellant had

applied for 29 hectares.   In the application submitted by the

appellant, it was stated that the nearest human habitation was

Yenambetla, existing at a distance of about 1.6 km from the

applied area.  It was further stated in the application that the

2

nearest water body was at a distance of 0.25 km named as

Singotham Lake.

3. The application of the appellant was processed at various

stages   including   the   Revenue   Divisional   Officer   (hereinafter

referred to as the “RDO”), Nagarkurnool, Assistant Director of

Mines and Geology, Mahabubnagar and Director of Mines and

Geology,   Hyderabad,   Government   of   Telangana.     Vide

communication   dated   7th  September   2016,   the   Director   of

Mines   and   Geology,   Hyderabad,   Government   of   Telangana

informed the appellant that after careful examination of the

proposal submitted by the appellant, the Assistant Director of

Mines and Geology, Mahabubnagar had recommended for grant

of   Quarry   Lease   in   favour   of   the   appellant   for   Quartz   and

Feldspar   over   an   area   of   24   hectares   in   Sy.   No.   330/1,

Kalwakole   Village,   Peddakothapally   Mandal,   Mahabubnagar

District, Telangana.   The appellant was directed to submit a

Mining Plan approved by Joint Director of Mines and Geology,

Hyderabad for the proposed area within a period of six months

3

from the date of the said communication.  The appellant was

directed to submit Consent from the Telangana State Pollution

Control Board and also Environmental Clearance (hereinafter

referred to as “EC”) from the Ministry of Environment & Forest

(hereinafter referred to as the “MoEF”) as per the Environment

Impact Assessment Notification (hereinafter referred to as the

“EIA Notification 2006) dated 14th  September 2006 and 15th

January 2016.  It was also stated in the said communication

that if the appellant fails to submit the Approved Mining Plan

within   the   stipulated   period,   it   will   be   presumed   that   the

appellant was not interested in getting the Quarry Lease for the

said   area   and   further   course   of   action   will   be   initiated   in

accordance with law.  Thereafter, the State Environment Impact

Assessment Authority, Telangana (hereinafter referred to as the

“SEIAA”) examined the said proposal in accordance with EIA

Notification 2006 and the subsequent amendments thereof and

exempted the same from the process of public hearing as the

mining   lease   area   was   less   than   25   hectares.     The   SEIAA

4

accorded   EC   on   11th  April   2017,   with   specific   and   general

conditions.

4. Challenging the same, the respondent Nos. 1 to 3 filed an

appeal under Section 16 read with Section 18(1) and Section 15

of the National Green Tribunal Act, 2010 (hereinafter referred to

as the “said Act”) before the National Green Tribunal, Southern

Zone, Chennai being Appeal No. 582 of 2017 (SZ), which was

transferred to National Green Tribunal, Principal Bench, New

Delhi (hereinafter referred to as the “Tribunal”) being Appeal

No. 24 of 2018, wherein a two­fold challenge was made by the

respondent Nos. 1 to 3: first, that the area was reduced from 29

hectares to 24 hectares only in order to avoid the rigours of

public hearing and second, that the Singotham Lake was in

close proximity of the proposed mining area and as such, the

EC granted, was not correct in law.

5. In the said proceedings, the learned Tribunal had passed

an interim order on 24th April 2018, thereby staying the order

challenged   in   the   appeal.     Being   aggrieved   thereby,   the

5

appellant had approached this Court being Civil Appeal No.

8130 of 2019.   This Court vide its order dated 8th  November

2019, requested the learned Tribunal to hear the matter on 22nd

November   2019.     Accordingly,   the   learned   Tribunal   after

hearing the counsel for the parties, found favour with both the

grounds raised by respondent Nos. 1 to 3 and allowed the

appeal   by   passing   the   order   as   aforesaid.     Being   aggrieved

thereby, the appellant has approached this Court.

6. We   have   heard   Mr.   K.V.   Viswanathan,   learned   Senior

Counsel appearing on  behalf  of the  appellant,  Mr. Sandeep

Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent Nos.

1 to 3, Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned ASG appearing on behalf

of respondent No.4­Union of India and Mr. Dhananjay Baijal,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondent No.9­State

Pollution Control Board, Telangana.

7. Mr. Viswanathan, learned Senior Counsel submitted that

the   learned   Tribunal   has   grossly   erred   in   coming   to   the

conclusion that the area was reduced by the appellant from 29

6

hectares to 24 hectares only in order to avoid the rigours of

public hearing.  He submitted that the appellant had no role to

play in such a reduction. As a matter of fact, the appellant had

applied for an area admeasuring 29 hectares.  It was only the

authorities which had reduced the area.  He further submitted

that the ground with regard to Singotham Lake being in the

close proximity to the proposed mining area, is also totally

erroneous.  The learned Senior Counsel, relying on the Google

Maps as well as photographs, would submit that the distance

between the proposed mining area and the Singotham Lake is

0.25 km.  It is therefore submitted that the said distance is in

accordance with the requirements of law.

8. Mr. Viswanathan took us through various documents to

show that while granting EC, the entire procedure required to

be followed under EIA Notification 2006 was followed.   The

proposal   underwent   scrutiny   at   various   stages   and   only

thereafter, the SEIAA had granted EC in favour of the appellant.

7

9. Mr.  Sandeep Singh, learned counsel appearing on behalf

of respondent Nos.1 to 3 submitted that if the distance between

the proposed mining area and the water body is more than 0.25

km,   the   said   respondents   would   not   have   any   objection   of

permitting mining activities.  The learned counsel for the State

as well as the State Pollution Control Board also supported the

case of the appellant.

10. In view of the concession granted by respondent Nos. 1 to

3, we could have very well disposed of the appeal. However,

since the issue involved is with regard to environment, we have

considered the appeal on merits.

11. As   per   the   guidelines   framed   by   the   Government   of

Telangana   dated   19th  January   2015,   for   land   admeasuring

between 15 hectares to 30 hectares, the competent authority,

for issue of ‘No Objection Certificate’ (hereinafter referred to as

the “NOC”), for Mining Lease and Quarry Lease in respect of

Government/Patta Lands, is with the RDO/Sub­Collector. After

the application was made by the appellant for grant of Mining

8

Lease, a letter was addressed by the Assistant Director of Mines

and   Geology,   Mahabubnagar   to   RDO,   Nagarkurnool,

Mahabubnagar on 28th  July 2016.   Vide the said letter, the

RDO was instructed to consider the following aspects while

issuing NOC:­

1. “Extent of Land.

2. Classification of Land.

3. Proximity   to   Forest,   Tank,   Lake   or   Irrigation

Source.

4. Proximity to habitation.

5. Whether mining will affect habitation.

6. Whether   mining   will   affect   agriculture   in

neighbouring lands.”

12. The RDO was required to submit its report within 30 days

from the date of receipt of the said letter.   It further appears

that on 6th August 2016, the Tahsildar, Peddakothapally, after

personally inspecting the site along with the Assistant Revenue

Inspector, Peddakothapally, submitted its report to RDO.  The

relevant part of the said report reads thus:­ 

“In   view   of   the   above   myself   and   ARI   of

Peddakothapally   Mandal   have   been   proceeded   to

the Sy No. 330/1, and found that the said land Sy

No. 330/1 of Kalwakole is a Govt. land (P.P) covered

by hillrock to an extent of Ac 109.08 gts and there

is no objection for allotting the said part of land to

9

M/s Dhruva Enterprises.   Further submitted that

the Mandal surveyor has been prepared sketch and

the extract of Khasra 1954­55, pahani for the year

2015­16   and   same   are   enclosed   herewith.     The

detailed report is as follows:­

1. Extent of Land : AC   109.08

gts.

2. Classification of Land : Govt.   Land

(P.P)

3. Proximity to Forest, Tank,

Lake of Irrigation Source

: The   canal   is

situated 1.00

Km for away

from the said

Sy. No.

4. Proximity to habitation : There   is   no

habitation

nearby.

5. Whether mining will affect

habitation

: Not   affected

to   the

habitation

6. Whether mining will affect

agriculture   in

neighbouring lands

: No,   not

affecting   to

the

Agriculture

lands

I,   therefore,   request   you   to   kindly   lease   may   be

granted in favour of M/s Dhruva Enterprises, rep by

S.  Venkateshwar  Rao   over  the   Sy  No.  330/1   an

extent   109.08   gts   situated   within   the   limits   of

Peddakothapally   mandal   is   feasible   to   lease   the

land.”

10

13. After the report of the Tahsildar was received, the RDO,

Nagarkurnool   granted   ‘NOC’   vide   communication   dated   8th

August 2016.   The relevant part of the said communication

reads thus:­  

“In this regard, the Tahsildar Peddakothapally has

reported that the Sy. No. 330/1, and found that the

said   land   Sy.   No.   330/1   of   Kalwakole   is   a

Government   land   (P.P)   covered   by   hillrock   to   an

extent of Ac. 109.08 gts and there is no objection for

allotting   the   said   part   of   land   to   M/s   Dhruva

Enterprises.     Further,   it   is   submitted   that   the

Mandal Surveyor has been prepared sketch and the

extract   of   Khasra   1954­55,   Pahani   for   the   year

2015­16 and same are enclosed here with.   The

detailed report is as follows:

1.Extent of Land : Ac.   109.08

gts.

2. Classification of Land : Government

Land (P.P)

3. Proximity to Forest, Tank,

Lake of Irrigation Source

: The   canal   is

situated 1.00

KM for away

from the said

Sy. No.

4. Proximity to habitation : There   is   no

habitation

near by, but

existing   1

KM away.

5. Whether mining will affect

habitation

: Not   affected

to   the

11

habitation

6. Whether mining will affect

agriculture   in

neighbouring lands

: No,

agriculture

lands   are

existing   500

Mts.   Away

from the site.

Therefore,   the   Assistant   Director   of   Mines   &

Geology, Mahaboobnagar is requested to grant lease

permission in favour of M/s Dhruva Enterprises,

rep. by S. Venkateshwar Rao over the above Sy. No.

to an extent of Ac. 109.08 gts situated within the

limits   of   Kalwakole   Village   of   Peddakothapally

Mandal as per rules.”

14. Vide   communication   dated   7th  September   2016,   the

Director   of   Mines   and   Geology,   Hyderabad,   Government   of

Telangana granted ‘in­principle’ approval for a Quarry Lease for

Quartz and Feldspar over an extent of 24 hectares.  While doing

so, the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad directed the

appellant   to   submit   a   Mining   Plan   approved   by   the   Joint

Director   of   Mines   and   Geology,   Hyderabad,   Government   of

Telangana within six months from the  date of  issue of the

notice.   It was also directed to submit the Consent from the

State Pollution Control Board, Telangana and EC from MoEF,

as   per   EIA   Notification   2006   and   subsequent   amendments

12

thereof.  The  relevant   part   of  the   said  communication   reads

thus:­  

“After careful examination of the proposals of

the   Asst.   Director   of   Mines   &   Geology,

Mahabubnagar in principle, it has been decided to

grant a Quarry Lease for Quartz and Feldspar over

an   extent   of   24.00   Hect.   in   Sy.   No.   330/1   of

Kalwakole   Village,   Peddakothapally   Mandal,

Mahabubnagar   District   in   favour   of   M/s   Dhruva

Enterprises, Rep: by Sri S. Venkateshwar Rao for a

period   of   20   years   subject   to   submission   of

Approved Mining Plan within a period of (6) months

from the date of issue of this notice as per Rule

12(5)(c)   of   T.S.   Minor   Mineral   Concession   Rules,

1966   alongwith   CFE   from   ESPCB   and

Environmental Clearance from MoEF.

However, the approved mining plan shall also

reflect the restriction to be adopted by the applicant

while   conducting   quarry   operations   due   to   the

existence of structures, like temples railway line,

roads, water bodies such as river, lake etc., and the

stipulated distances as per the various Regulations

prescribed   under   Mines   &   Metalliferous

Regulations, 1961.  The safety measures to be taken

are also to be incorporated.  

In view of the above, M/s. Dhruva Enterprises,

Rep:   by   Sri   S.   Venkateshwar   Rao   is   hereby

requested to submit Mining Plan approved by Joint

Director   of   Mines   &   Geology,   Hyderabad   for   the

proposed precise area within a period of (6) months

from the date of issue of this notice and also along

with   the   Consent   for   Establishment   from   T.S.

Pollution   Control   Board   and   Environmental

Clearance   from   Ministry   of   Environment   and

13

Forests   as   per   Environment   Impact   Assessment

Notification through S.O. 1533, dt: 14.09.2006 read

with S.O. No. 141(E), dated 15.01.2016 to consider

for grant of Quarry lease for Quartz and Feldspar in

the subject area.  If the applicant fails to submit the

Approved Mining Plan within the stipulated period,

it   will   be   presumed   that   the   applicant   is   not

interested   in   getting   the   Quarry   lease   over   the

subject area and further course of action will be

initiated   as   per   Rules.     A   copy   of   the   Surveyed

sketch showing the precise area of 24.00 Hect. in

Sy. No. 330/1 proposed for grant of Quarry Lease

for   Quartz   and   Feldspar   in   the   subject   area   in

favour of the applicant is enclosed herewith.”

15. Accordingly,   the   appellant   submitted   a   detailed   Mining

Plan on 20th October 2016.  The relevant part of the said Mining

Plan reads thus:­  

“(ii) Infrastructure and Communication:

Water:    Sufficient   quantity   of   drinking   water   is

available in the nearby villages from bore wells and

opens wells.

Electricity:  Electricity is available at a distance of

about 800 m from the applied lease area.

Rail   Head:    The   nearest   Railway   station   is

Mahabubnagar   about   100   Km   from   the   applied

Lease area.

14

River Head:  No river a located in the vicinity of the

Lease area.  Singotam Lake is located at a distance

of about 250 m from the applied area.  Numerous

tanks and bore wells constitute the main source of

water in the area.

Communication:  Telephonic Communication, Post

Office,   Bank,   is   available   in   Kalwakole   and

Peddakothapally.

Road:  Road to the quarry is accessible throughout

the year.   Four­wheelers, two­wheelers, buses and

autos ply on the road.”

16. In the meeting held on 30th  December 2016 of the State

Expert   Appraisal   Committee   (hereinafter   referred   to   as   the

“SEAC”), the proposal of the appellant came to be considered.

The relevant part of the said Minutes of the Meeting reads

thus:­  

Agenda

Item:

01

24.00 Ha. Quartz and Feldspar Mine of

M/s.   Dhruva   Enterprises,   Sy.   Nos.

330/1,   Kalwakole   (V),   Peddakothapally

(M),   Mahabubnagar   District   –

Environmental Clearance – Reg.

The representative of the project propone Sri Dr. S.

Venkateshwar Rao; and Sri M. Venkatesh of M/s.

Global   Enviro   Labs   &   Consultants,   Hyderabad

attended and made a presentation before the SEAC.

It is noted that the mine lease area is 24.00 Ha.

which   is   less   than   25.0   Ha.     The   project   is

15

considered under B1 Category as per the guidelines

of the MoEF & CC, GoI.  The proponent submitted

Approved Mining Plan & EMP report.

It is noted from the Notice dt. 07.09.2016 of DMG,

Hyderabad that the proponent obtained in principle

grant of quarry lease for a period of 20 years.  It is

further noted that the quarry lease is not granted

prior to 09.09.2013.  hence, it has to be ascertained

whether any other Mines are located surrounding

500m   as   Cluster,   as   per   S.O.   2269(E),   dt.

01.07.2016 issued by the MoEF & CC, GoI.

The   proponent   stated   that   there   are   no   mining

activities existing within 500m from the periphery of

project.

The   nearest   village   to   the   proposed   site   is

Yenambetla (V) which is existing at a distance of 1.6

Km and Singotham Lake exists at a distance of 0.25

Km from the boundary of the site.”

17. After a detailed discussion, the project was recommended

for grant of EC.  Thereafter, the SEIAA, in its meeting held on

11th April 2017, considered the said proposal and granted EC to

the project of the appellant.   The relevant part of the said

Minutes of the Meeting reads thus:­ 

“I.  This has reference to your application submitted

online   on   14.11.2016   (proposal   No.

SIA/TG/MIN/60426/2016) received on 23.11.2016,

seeking   Environment   Clearance   for   the   proposed

Quartz & Feldspar Mine in favour of M/s. Dhruva

Enterprises,   Sy.   Nos.   330/1,   Kalwakole   (V),

16

Peddakothapally   (M),  Mahabubnagar  District.   It

was   reported   that   the   nearest   human   habitation

viz., Yenambetla (V) exists at a distance of about 1.6

Km from the mine lease area.  It was also reported

that Singotham Lake which is existing at a distance

of 0.25 Km from the mine lease area.  It was noted

that the capital investment of the project is Rs. 2.1

Crores  and maximum capacity of the project is as

follows:

Mining of Quartz – 4,05,842 TPA

II.   It is a semi­mechanized opencast quarry.   The

Blocks   are   cut   by   using   jack   hammer   drilling,

wedge­cutting   and   excavation.     The   separated

blocks are dressed manually.  It is reported that the

life of the Mine is estimated as 18 years.  The total

mine lease area is 24.00 Ha.

III.  The proposal has been examined and processed

in accordance with EIA Notification, 2006 and its

amendments   thereof.     The   State   Level   Expert

Appraisal   Committee   (SEAC)   examined   the

application, in its meeting held on 30.12.2016 &

22.02.2017.   The project is considered under B2

category and exempted from the process of public

hearing as the mining lease area is less than 25

Ha., as per provisions laid under EIA Notification,

2006 & its subsequent amendments.  Based on the

information   furnished,   presentation   made   by   the

proponent and the consultant M/s. Global Enviro

Labs, Hyderabad; In­principle grant of quarry lease

by the DMG, Hyderabad Notice Dt. 07.09.2016 for a

period of 20 years; Approved Mining Plan; Lr. dt.

12.01.2017 of ADMG: Nagarkurnol informing that

there   are   no   mines   surrounding   500   mtrs   as

Cluster, the Committee considered the project and

recommended   for   issue   of   EC.     The   State   Level

17

Environment Impact Assessment Authority (SEIAA),

in its meeting held on 14.03.2017 & 18.03.2017

examined   the   proposal   and   recommendations   of

SEAC,   Telangana   for   issue   of   Environmental

Clearance.     Accordingly,   after   discussions   in   the

matter and considering the recommendations of the

SEAC, Telangana,  the   SEIAA,   Telangana   hereby

accords   prior   Environmental   Clearance   to   the

project  as   mentioned   at   Para   no.   I   under   the

provisions   of   EIA   Notification   2006   and   its

subsequent   amendments   issued   under

Environment   (Protection)   Act,   1986   subject   to

implementation of the following specific and general

conditions.”

18. Thereafter,   vide   order   dated   22nd  April   2017,   the

Government of Telangana granted Quarry Lease for Quartz over

an extent of 24.00 hectares in Sy. No. 330/1 of Kalwakole

Village,   Peddakothapally   Mandal,   Nagarkurnool   (erstwhile

Mahabubnagar) District in favour of the appellant.

19. A perusal of the aforesaid documents would reveal that

the appellant, in fact, had applied for grant of Mining Lease for

29   hectares.     It   is,   however,   the   authorities   including   the

Tahsildar, the RDO, Assistant Director of Mining and Geology,

Mahabubnagar, who had recommended grant of Quarry Lease

18

over 24 hectares.  Insofar as the water body is concerned, the

appellant, in his application as well as Mining Plan, has clearly

mentioned that Singotham Lake is situated at a distance of

0.25 km.  While processing the proposal of the appellant, the

Tahsildar and the Assistant Revenue Inspector of the concerned

area have physically carried out the inspection.  Not only that,

the Assistant Director of Mines and Geology had personally

inspected the area on 11th August 2016, and the Surveyor had

surveyed the applied area with the help of a GPS instrument.  It

is also revealed from the record that the area of 24 hectares in

Sy. No. 330/1, which consists a larger area, was earmarked

after leaving the safety distance of 0.25 km from Singotham

Lake.   In its report, the Surveyor had also reported that the

demarcated area was not overlapping with the existing leases

and there were no pending applications in that area.

20. It could thus be seen that prior to grant of ‘in­principle’

approval by the Director of Mines and Geology, Hyderabad,

Government of Telangana, the proposed area was physically

19

inspected by the Tahsildar along with the Assistant Revenue

Inspector.   The   Assistant   Director   of   Mines   and   Geology,

Mahabubnagar   had   independently   inspected   the   area.     The

area   was   surveyed   by   the   Official   Surveyor   with   the   GPS

instrument and while earmarking the area, the distance of 0.25

km was also maintained.

21. After   ‘in­principle’   approval   was   granted,   the   appellant

submitted its Mining Plan on 20th October 2016.  The proposal

of the appellant was thereafter considered by the SEAC on 30th

December 2016, wherein it was resolved to recommend the

proposal   of   the   appellant   for   grant   of   EC.     Thereafter,   the

SEIAA, in its meeting dated 11h

 April 2017, has granted its EC

after considering all the aspects.  Thereafter, Quarry Lease has

been granted in favour of the appellant on 22nd April 2017. 

22. It could thus be seen that the proposal of the appellant

has undergone scrutiny at various stages.   Only after it was

found that it was in conformity with the provisions of law, the

‘in­principle’   approval   and   EC   for   Quarry   Lease   had   been

20

granted. Thereafter, the appellant has submitted his Mining

Plan which was again duly examined by various authorities.

The proposal of the appellant was initially considered by SEAC

and recommended for grant of EC.   Thereafter, SEIAA, after

considering all the aspects has granted EC to the project of the

appellant.  Only thereafter, the Quarry Lease had been granted

in favour of the appellant. 

23. Insofar as the finding of the learned Tribunal that the area

was reduced to 24 hectares from 29 hectares only in order to

avoid the rigours of public hearing, is totally erroneous.   The

appellant had no role to play in the same. It is the authorities

who   recommended  approval   in   respect  of   only   24   hectares.

Insofar   as   the   mandatory   distance   from   the   water   body   is

concerned, the  authorities  upon  survey  had  found  that  the

mandatory distance of 0.25 km is maintained.

24. In this view of matter, we find that the learned Tribunal

has grossly erred in arriving at a finding that the appellant had

reduced the area to 24 hectares only in order to avoid the

21

rigours of public hearing and further that there was no distance

of   0.25   km   between   the   proposed   mining   area   and   the

Singotham Lake.

25. In   the   result,   the   appeal   succeeds   and   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 17th  January 2020, passed by the

learned Tribunal is quashed and set aside.  No costs.

…..…..….......................J.

   [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

…….........................J.

[B.R. GAVAI]

..…..….......................J.

       [B.V. NAGARATHNA]

NEW DELHI;

SEPTEMBER 15, 2021.

22

The Appellant is a police officer in the State of West Bengal and has made allegation of cruelty and desertion against the 3 | P a g e Respondent. Though the respondent has insisted that she intends to live with the Appellant, no meaningful effort has been made by her for reconciliation. Allegations made by the Respondent relate to adultery by the Appellant which was the reason for her moving out of the matrimonial home. In spite of the best efforts made by Mr. Mukherjee, the Respondent has insisted that she is not willing for dissolution of the marriage. Mr. Mukherjee has brought to our notice that the Respondent has to take care of her son who is suffering from serious ailments. 6. Having scrutinized the material on record and considering the submissions made by Mr. Nikhil Nayyar and Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, learned Amicus Curiae, without commenting on the merits of the matter, the marriage between the parties is emotionally dead and there is no point in persuading them to live together any more. Therefore, this is a fit case for exercise of jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The marriage between the parties is dissolved.

  Non-Reportable

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Civil Appeal No. 5696 of 2021

(@ SLP (C) No.11747 of 2017)

SUBHRANSU SARKAR

.... Appellant(s)

Versus

INDRANI SARKAR (NEE DAS)

…. Respondent (s)

O R D E R

Leave granted.

1. The Appellant married the Respondent on 02.03.1997 and

registered the same under the Special Marriage Act, 1954.

Thereafter, the marriage was solemnized between the parties on

07.12.2000 under the Hindu rites and customs. Alleging cruelty and

desertion by the Respondent, the appellant filed a suit for dissolution

of marriage on 05.03.2007 before the District Judge, Alipore. The

suit was dismissed, aggrieved by which the Appellant filed an appeal

before the High Court of Calcutta. The Respondent did not appear

before the High Court. However, the High Court dismissed the

appeal filed by the appellant upholding the judgment of the Trial

Court. The allegation made by the Appellant against the

Respondent is that she was insisting on his residing separately from

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his parents. Also, the Respondent misbehaved with her in-laws and

that she was frequently leaving the matrimonial home. The

appellant also alleged physical assault by the Respondent when both

of them went to Puri and Shillong for holidays. The Respondent

resisted the Petition filed for dissolution of marriage by denying the

averments made against her. She accused the appellant of adultery

and excessive consumption of alcohol. The Trial Court and the High

Court refused to accept the contentions of the appellant that he is

entitled for divorce by holding that he could not make out a case of

cruelty meted out by the Respondent.

2. It was submitted by Mr. Nikhil Nayyar, learned Senior Counsel

for the Appellant that the Appellant and Respondent have been living

separately for more than 16 years and for all practical purposes the

marriage is dead. He relied upon two judgments of this Court in

Sukhendu Das v. Rita Mukherjee

1

 and Munish Kakkar v.

Nidhi Kakkar

2

 in support of his submission that this Court in

exercise of its power under Article 142 of the Constitution of India

has dissolved marriages when they are totally unworkable and

irretrievable.

3. We have requested Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee to assist this Court

as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the Respondent as she did not engage

an Advocate. Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee informed this Court that the

1 (2017) 9 SCC 632

2 (2020) 14 SCC 657

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Respondent intends to continue to live with the Appellant. Mr.

Mukherjee informed this Court that he spoke to the Respondent

several times and the Respondent is not convinced that an

unworkable marriage should be put to an end. In Sukhendu Das

v. Rita Mukherjee (supra), this Court considered a similar situation

where the marriage between the parties took place on 19.06.1992

and they were living apart from the year 2000. The Trial Court found

that the husband could not prove cruelty by his wife and that he was

not entitled for decree of divorce. The judgment of the Trial Court

was upheld by the High Court and the same was the subject matter

of challenge before this Court. The Respondent failed to appear

before this Court in spite of notice being served. By holding that

there was an irretrievable breakdown of marriage, this Court

dissolved the marriage between the parties therein by observing that

they had been living separately for more than 17 years and no useful

purpose would be served by compelling them to live together in

matrimony.

4. To do complete justice between the parties, this Court in

Munish Kakkar v. Nidhi Kakkar (supra) put an end to the bitter

matrimonial dispute which lingered on for two decades between the

parties therein.

5. The Appellant is a police officer in the State of West Bengal

and has made allegation of cruelty and desertion against the

3 | P a g e

Respondent. Though the respondent has insisted that she intends to

live with the Appellant, no meaningful effort has been made by her

for reconciliation. Allegations made by the Respondent relate to

adultery by the Appellant which was the reason for her moving out of

the matrimonial home. In spite of the best efforts made by Mr.

Mukherjee, the Respondent has insisted that she is not willing for

dissolution of the marriage. Mr. Mukherjee has brought to our notice

that the Respondent has to take care of her son who is suffering from

serious ailments.

6. Having scrutinized the material on record and considering

the submissions made by Mr. Nikhil Nayyar and Mr. Ranjan

Mukherjee, learned Amicus Curiae, without commenting on the

merits of the matter, the marriage between the parties is

emotionally dead and there is no point in persuading them to live

together any more. Therefore, this is a fit case for exercise of

jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India. The

marriage between the parties is dissolved. The Registry is directed

to prepare a decree accordingly. Taking note of the submissions

made by Mr. Ranjan Mukherjee, we direct the Appellant to pay an

amount of Rs.25 Lakhs (Rupees Twenty-Five Lakhs) to the

Respondent within a period of eight weeks from today. The petition

filed by the Respondent under Section 125 Cr. PC for maintenance

shall be withdrawn by the Respondent on receipt of the amount of

4 | P a g e

Rs.25 Lakhs. The payment of the aforesaid amount is in full and final

settlement of all claims of the Respondent against the Appellant.

7. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

 ….............................J.

 [L. NAGESWARA RAO]

 ..……......................J.

 [ B.R. GAVAI ]

New Delhi,

September 14, 2021.

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