the appropriate deduction for personal expenses for both Vinod and Poonam ought to be 1/4th only, and not 1/3rd as applied by the Tribunal and the High Court, more so when there were four family members dependent on the deceased ; both deceased were below 40 years and how they have not been established to be permanent employees, future prospects to the tune of 40% must be paid. The argument that no such future prospects ought to be allowed for those with notional income, is both incorrect in law6 and without merit considering the constant inflation­induced increase in wages.;funeral charges, loss of estate, love, and affection; there arises no cause of alteration. We similarly see no infirmity with the High Court’s adoption of 17 as the age­multiplier, award of 9% interest, calculation of Poonam’s notional income or the division of total compensation in the ratio of 1:2:2 between the grandfather and the two girls.;

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.19­20 of 2021

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) Nos.18728­29 of 2018]

Kirti & Anr. Etc. ..... Appellant(s)

                                       VERSUS

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ..... Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J:

Leave Granted. 

2. These   civil   appeals,   which   have   been   heard   through   video

conferencing, have been filed by three surviving dependents (who are

two minor daughters and father) of the two deceased, impugning the

judgment dated 17.07.2017 of the High Court of Delhi through which

the motor accident compensation of Rs 40.71 lakhs awarded by the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohini (hereinafter, “Tribunal”) on

24.12.2016 under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (“MV

Page | 1

Act”), was reduced to Rs 22 lakhs.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The deceased couple, Vinod and Poonam, while commuting on a

motorcycle in Delhi at around 7AM on 12.04.2014 were hit at an

intersection by a Santro Car bearing registration ‘DL 7CA 1053’. The

impact immediately incapacitated both the deceased and they soon

passed away from cranio­cerebral damage and haemorrhagic shock

caused by the accident’s blunt­force trauma.  

4. An FIR was registered under Sections 279 and 304 of the Indian

Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter,   “IPC”)   against   the   driver,   and   the

statement of an independent eyewitness (Constable Vishnu Dutt) was

recorded, which evidenced rash driving and negligence on part of the

car­driver. Subsequently, a claim petition was filed under Section 166

of   the   MV   Act   by   the   two   toddler­daughters   and   septuagenarianparents of the deceased. This was contested by the driver and owner

claiming that the deceased were themselves driving negligently and

the accident was as a result of their very own actions. Two witnesses

were   examined   by   the   appellant­claimants   and   none   by   the

respondents. The insurance company (Respondent No. 1) offered as

settlement a compensation of Rs 6.47 lakhs for the death of Poonam

and Rs 10.71 lakhs for Vinod.

Page | 2

5. The Tribunal took note of the chargesheet filed against the driver

in the criminal case and also his failure to step­into the witness box.

Relying on the strong testimony of the independent witness, it was

concluded that the car­driver was indeed  driving rashly and thus

liability ought to be fastened on the respondent­insurer. Regarding the

quantum of compensation, the Tribunal began by determining the

ages of Poonam and Vinod as being 26 and 29 years respectively.

Consequently,   an   age­multiplier   of   17   was   adopted.   Although   the

deceased’s father took a plea that Vinod was earning Rs 14,000 every

month as a teacher at the Pratap Public School in Delhi, but he was

unable   to   substantiate   his   claim   with   any   documentary   evidence.

Thus, minimum wage in Delhi was adopted for computation of loss of

dependency.   An   additional   25%   income   was   accounted   for   future

prospects   of   Poonam,   and   1/3rd  of   Vinod’s   salary   was   deducted

towards personal expenses. Rs 2.50 lakhs was given for each deceased

as compensation for loss of love and affection, estate, and funeral

charges. Thus, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs 40.71 lakhs for

both deceased to the claimants.

6. This   computation   was   challenged   by   the   respondent­insurer

before the High Court, on grounds that the Tribunal had erroneously

relied upon the minimum wage as notified by Government of Delhi as

there was no proof that the deceased were employed in Delhi. Instead,

Page | 3

given   their   established   residence   in   Haryana,   the   minimum   wage

notified for that State ought to be the basis for calculation of loss of

dependency. Simultaneously, addition of future prospects as well as

non­deduction of personal expenses for Poonam was prayed to be

reversed. Further, compensation was sought to be halved on grounds

of   contributory   negligence.   A   categorical   submission   was   made

highlighting the then divergent law on the issue of payment of ‘future

prospects’ to non­permanent employees, pending resolution of which,

it was prayed that no such addition be granted to the claimants.

7. The   High   Court   concurred   with   these   contentions   and

consequently   reduced   the   notional   income   for   both   deceased   by

adopting the lowest minimum wage applicable for unskilled workers in

Haryana, instead of Delhi. Similarly, 1/3rd  of Poonam’s income was

deducted towards personal expenses and future prospects were denied

to both deceased. However, given the totality of circumstances and

Poonam’s contribution to her household, 25% additional gratuitous

income was added to her salary. The High Court thus brought down

the total compensation payable to the claimants to Rs 22 lakhs.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

8. This reduction has been assailed before us by learned counsel

for the claimants. Re­computation is sought of compensation for loss

Page | 4

of dependency consequent to the decision of the Constitutional Bench

of this Court in National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi1

, which

authoritatively settles the law on future prospects for non­permanent

employees as well. Furthermore, the anomaly between the gratuitous

increase of income between Vinod and Poonam, and the usage of

unskilled minimum wage for Vinod have been brought to our notice. 

9. Learned Counsel for the respondent­insurer, on the other hand,

has sought to forestall any increase in compensation, including under

the ground of future prospects. It is claimed that the High Court’s

decision was a consent order, and that the counsel for the appellants

had   conceded   to   a   lower   computation   under   the   head   of   loss   of

dependency, which thus cannot be challenged before this Court.

ANALYSIS

I. Deduction for Personal Expenses

10. We   have   thoughtfully   considered   the   rival   submissions.     It

cannot be disputed that at the time of death, there in fact were four

dependents of the deceased and not three. The subsequent death of

the   deceased’s   dependent   mother   ought   not   to   be   a   reason   for

reduction of motor accident compensation. Claims and legal liabilities

crystallise at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto

1

 (2017) 16 SCC 680.

Page | 5

ought   not   to   ordinarily   affect   pending   proceedings.   Just   like   how

appellant­claimants   cannot   rely   upon   subsequent   increases   in

minimum wages, the respondent­insurer too cannot seek benefit of

the subsequent death of a dependent during the pendency of legal

proceedings. Similarly, any concession in law made in this regard by

either counsel would not bind the parties, as it is legally settled that

advocates cannot throw­away legal rights or enter into arrangements

contrary to law.2

11. Any   compensation   awarded   by   a   Court   ought   to   be   just,

reasonable   and   consequently   must   undoubtedly   be   guided   by

principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience.3

 Not only did the

family of the deceased consist of septuagenarian parents, but there

were also two toddler­girls, aged merely 3 and 4 years; each of whom

requires exceptional care and expenditure till they reach the stage of

self­dependency. Tragically,  in  addition to  the  married couple, the

negligence of the driver also extinguished the life of the family’s third

child who was a foetus in Poonam’s womb at the time of the accident.

Thus, the appropriate deduction for personal expenses for both Vinod

and Poonam ought to be 1/4th only, and not 1/3rd as applied by the

Tribunal and the High Court, more so when there were four family

members dependent on the deceased.

2  Director of Elementary Education v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo, (2019) 10 SCC 674, ¶ 11.

3  See, Helen C Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corp, (1999) 1 SCC 90, ¶ 28.

Page | 6

II. Assessment of monthly income

12. Second,   although   it   is   correct   that   the   claimants   have   been

unable to produce any document evidencing Vinod’s income, nor have

they established his employment as a teacher; but that doesn’t justify

adoption of the lowest­tier of minimum wage while computing his

income. From the statement of witnesses, documentary evidence­onrecord and circumstances of the accident, it is apparent that Vinod

was comparatively more educationally qualified and skilled. Further,

he   maintained   a   reasonable   standard   of   living   for   his   family   as

evidenced by his use of a motorcycle for commuting. Preserving the

existing standard of living of a deceased’s family is a fundamental

endeavour of motor accident compensation law.4

  Thus, at the very

least, the minimum wage of Rs 6197 as applicable to skilled workers

during April 2014 in the State of Haryana ought to be applied in his

case. 

III. Addition of Future Prospects

13. Third  and   most   importantly,   it   is   unfair   on   part   of   the

respondent­insurer to contest grant of future prospects considering

their submission before the High Court that such compensation ought

not   to   be   paid   pending   outcome   of   the  Pranay   Sethi   (supra)

4 See, RK Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2019) 14 SCC 1, ¶ 9.

Page | 7

reference. Nevertheless, the law on this point is no longer res integra,

and stands crystalised,  as is clear from the following extract of the

afore­cited Constitutional Bench judgment5

:

“59.4. In case the deceased was self­employed or on a fixed

salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should

be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40

years. An  addition of 25% where the deceased  was between

the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was

between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the

necessary  method   of   computation.   The   established   income

means the income minus the tax component.”

[Emphasis supplied]

14.   Given how both deceased were below 40 years and how they

have   not   been   established   to   be   permanent   employees,   future

prospects to the tune of 40% must be paid. The argument that no

such future prospects ought to be allowed for those with notional

income, is both incorrect in law6

  and without merit considering the

constant inflation­induced increase in wages. It would be sufficient to

quote   the   observations   of   this   Court   in  Hem   Raj   v.   Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd.

7

, as it puts at rest any argument concerning nonpayment of future prospects to the deceased in the present case: 

“7. We are of the view that there cannot be distinction where

there   is   positive   evidence   of   income   and   where   minimum

5

 National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, ¶ 59.4.

6  Sunita Tokas v. New India Insurance Co Ltd, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1045.

7

(2018) 15 SCC 654.

Page | 8

income   is   determined   on   guesswork   in   the   facts   and

circumstances   of   a   case.   Both   the   situations   stand   at   the

same   footing.  Accordingly,   in   the  present   case,  addition  of

40% to the income assessed by the Tribunal is required to be

made..”

[Emphasis supplied]

IV. Other heads and division of compensation

15. Finally,   given   the   lack   of   arguments   on   the   other   heads   of

funeral charges, loss of estate, love, and affection; there arises no

cause of alteration. We similarly see no infirmity with the High Court’s

adoption of 17 as the age­multiplier, award of 9% interest, calculation

of Poonam’s notional income or the division of total compensation in

the ratio of 1:2:2 between the grandfather and the two girls. For ready

reference, a comparative table of revised compensation after suitable

increases would thus be as follows:

TRIBUNAL HIGH COURT SUPREME COURT

Head Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam

A Monthly Income 8554 9438 5547.1 5547.1 6197.1 5547.1

B

Deduction 

towards Personal 

Expenses

33% None 33% 33% 25% 25%

C Age Multiplier 17 17 17 17 17 17

D

Adjustment for 

Future Prospects None 25% None None 40% 40%

E

Increase for 

Special 

Circumstances

None None None 25% None 25%

F

Funeral Charges 

& Loss of Estate 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000

Page | 9

G

Total per 

deceased 1413344 2656690 1004406 1193007 1577419 1735236

(rounded off) 1414000 2657000 1005000 1195000 1580000 1740000

Total 

compensation 4071000 2200000 3320000

CONCLUSION

16. For the reasons afore­stated, the appeals are allowed in­part.

The total motor accident compensation of Rs 22 lakhs awarded by the

High Court to the claimant­appellants is increased by Rs 11.20 lakhs

to reach a new total of Rs 33.20 lakhs. The enhanced amount of

compensation shall be paid within two months along with interest @

9% p.a. from the date of filing of the Detailed Accident Report i.e.

23.05.2014, and shall be apportioned per the terms laid down by the

Tribunal.

…………………………….. J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………… J.

(S. ABDUL NAZEER)

…………………………...J.

(SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 05.01.2021

Page | 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 19­20 OF 2021

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 18728­18729 OF 2018)

KIRTI & ANR. ETC.             …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                         …RESPONDENT

    JUDGMENT

    N.V. RAMANA, J.

1. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared

by   my   learned   brother,   Surya   Kant,   J.,   and   am   in   complete

agreement   with   him.   However,   I   thought   to   supplement   the

reasoning   in   his   judgment,   with   respect   to   the   question   of

notional income of a housewife and whether future prospects

should apply to the same or not. 

2. There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the

Court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first

category   of   cases   relates   to   those   wherein   the   victim   was

employed, but the claimants are not able to prove her actual

income,   before   the   Court.   In   such   a   situation,   the   Court

1

Reportable

“guesses” the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on

record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her

family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field,

the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations.

3. The   second   category   of   cases   relates   to   those   situations

wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a

non­earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker.

Needless to say, compensation in such cases is extremely difficult

to quantify.

4. The Court often follows different principles for determining

the compensation towards a non­earning victim in order to arrive

at an amount which would be just in the facts and circumstances

of the case. Some of these involve the determination of notional

income. Whenever notional income is determined in such cases,

different considerations and factors are taken into account. For

instance, for students, the Court often considers the course that

they   are   studying,   their   academic   proficiency,   the   family

background, etc., to determine and fix what they could earn in

the future. [See M. R. Krishna Murthi v. New India Assurance

Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 315] 

5. One category of non­earning victims that Courts are often

2

called upon to calculate the compensation for are homemakers.

The granting of compensation for homemakers on a pecuniary

basis, as in the present case, has been considered by this Court

earlier   on   numerous   occasions.   A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this

Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197,

while dealing with compensation for the victims of a fire during a

function, granted compensation to housewives on the basis of the

services  rendered  by  them  in  the  house,  and  their  age.  This

Court, in that case, held as follows:

“10. So   far   as   the  deceased   housewives   are

concerned, in the absence of any data and as

the housewives were not earning any income,

attempt   has   been   made   to   determine   the

compensation   on   the   basis   of   services

rendered by them to the house. On the basis of

the   age   group   of   the   housewives,   appropriate

multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of

the value of services rendered to the house by the

housewives, which has been arrived at Rs 12,000

per annum in cases of some and Rs 10,000 for

others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true

that the claimants, who ought to have given data

for determination of compensation, did not assist

in   any   manner   by   providing   the   data   for

estimating the value of services rendered by such

housewives.   But   even   in   the   absence   of   such

data   and  taking   into   consideration   the

multifarious   services   rendered   by   the

housewives   for  managing   the   entire   family,

even   on   a  modest   estimation,   should   be   Rs

3000 per month and Rs 36,000 per annum…”

(emphasis supplied)

3

6. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,

(2010)  9  SCC  218, this Court, while dealing with the grant of

compensation for the death of a housewife due to a motor vehicle

accident, held as follows:

“26. In India the courts have recognised that

the   contribution   made   by   the   wife   to   the

house   is   invaluable  and  cannot  be  computed

in   terms   of  money.   The   gratuitous   services

rendered   by   the   wife   with   true   love   and

affection to the children and her husband and

managing   the   household   affairs   cannot   be

equated with the services rendered by others.

A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is

in   the   constant   attendance   of   the   family

throughout   the   day   and   night   unless   she   is

employed   and   is   required   to   attend   the

employer's work for particular hours. She takes

care of all the requirements of the husband and

children including cooking of food, washing of

clothes,   etc.   She   teaches   small   children   and

provides invaluable guidance to them for their

future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do

the   household   work,   such   as   cooking   food,

washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house

clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for

a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her

husband and children.

27. It is not possible to quantify any amount

in   lieu   of   the   services   rendered   by   the

wife/mother   to   the   family   i.e.   the   husband

    and   children.  However,   for   the   purpose   of

award   of   compensation   to   the   dependants,

some  pecuniary   estimate  has   to  be  made  of

the services of the housewife/mother. In that

context,   the   term   “services”   is   required   to   be

given a broad meaning and must be construed by

taking into account the loss of personal care and

4

attention given by the deceased to her children

as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They

are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of

the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the

deceased. The amount payable to the dependants

cannot be diminished on the ground that some

close relation like a grandmother may volunteer

to render some of the services to the family which

the deceased was giving earlier.”

(emphasis supplied)

The above pronouncement has been followed by this Court in its

recent judgment in Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co.

Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 521, wherein the notional income of

a deceased housewife was calculated for the purposes of granting

compensation in a motor accident case.

7. Before   discussing   this   topic   further,   it   is   necessary   to

comment on its gendered nature. In India, according to the 2011

Census,   nearly   159.85   million   women   stated   that   “household

work”   was   their   main   occupation,   as   compared   to   only   5.79

million men. 

8. In   fact,   the   recently   released   Report   of   the   National

Statistical   Office   of   the   Ministry   of   Statistics   &   Programme

Implementation, Government of India called “Time Use in India2019”, which is the first Time Use Survey in the country and

collates   information   from   1,38,799   households   for   the   period

January,   2019   to   December,   2019,   reflects   the   same   gender

5

disparity.1

  The key findings of the survey suggest that, on an

average,   women   spend   nearly   299   minutes   a   day   on   unpaid

domestic   services   for   household   members   versus   97   minutes

spent by men on average.2

 Similarly, in a day, women on average

spend 134 minutes on unpaid caregiving services for household

members   as   compared   to   the   76   minutes   spent   by   men   on

average.3

 The total time spent on these activities per day makes

the picture in India even more clear­ women on average spent

16.9 and 2.6 percent of their day on unpaid domestic services

and   unpaid   caregiving   services   for   household   members

respectively, while men spent 1.7 and 0.8 percent.4

9. It is curious to note that this is not just a phenomenon

unique to India, but is prevalent all over the world. A 2009 Report

by a Commission set up by the French Government, analyzing

data from six countries,  viz. Germany, Italy, United Kingdom,

France, Finland and the United States of America, highlighted

similar findings:

“117.   Gender   differences   in   time   use   are

significant.   In   each   of   the   countries   under

consideration,  men   spend  more   time   in   paid

work than women and the converse is true for

unpaid   work.   Men   also   spend   more   time   on

leisure   than   women.  The   implication   is   that

1 National Statistical Office, Time Use in India­ 2019 (September, 2020).

2 Id, at 56.

3 Id, at 54.

4 Id, at x.

6

women  provide  household  services  but  other

members of the household benefit…”

5

(emphasis supplied)

10. The sheer amount of time and effort that is dedicated to

household work by individuals, who are more likely to be women

than men, is not surprising when one considers the plethora of

activities   a   housemaker   undertakes.   A   housemaker   often

prepares food for the entire family, manages the procurement of

groceries   and   other   household   shopping   needs,   cleans   and

manages the house and its surroundings, undertakes decoration,

repairs   and   maintenance   work,   looks   after   the   needs   of   the

children   and   any   aged   member   of   the   household,   manages

budgets and so much more. In rural households, they often also

assist in the sowing, harvesting and transplanting activities in

the field, apart from tending cattle [See  Arun Kumar  Agrawal

(supra); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Minor Deepika rep. by

her   guardian   and   next   friend,   Ranganathan,   2009   SCC

OnLine Mad 828]. However, despite all the above, the conception

that   housemakers   do   not   “work”   or   that   they   do   not   add

economic value to the household is a problematic idea that has

persisted for many years and must be overcome.   

11. The   concurring   opinion   in   the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal

5 Stiglitz et al., Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 

Social Progress, 117 (2009).

7

judgment (supra), has highlighted this bias:

“44. This bias is shockingly prevalent in the work

of census. In the Census of 2001 it appears that

those   who   are   doing   household   duties   like

cooking,   cleaning   of   utensils,   looking   after

children, fetching water, collecting firewood have

been   categorised   as   non­workers   and   equated

with   beggars,   prostitutes   and   prisoners   who,

according   to   the   census,   are   not   engaged   in

economically   productive   work.   As   a   result   of

such categorisation about 36 crores (367 million)

women   in   India   have   been   classified   in   the

Census   of   India,   2001   as   non­workers   and

placed in the category of beggars, prostitutes and

prisoners.   This   entire   exercise   of   census

operations is done under an Act of Parliament.”

12. In fact, this unfortunate silence when it comes to the value

of housework has been a problem which was identified as far

back as in 1920, when the economist Pigou noted the oddity and

contradictions when it came to the calculation of the contribution

of women in the national income, by stating that: 

“…the services rendered by women enter into the

dividend when they are rendered in exchange for

wages, whether in the factory or in the home, but

do not enter into it when they are rendered by

mothers   and   wives   gratuitously   to   their   own

families. Thus, if a man marries his housekeeper

or   his   cook,   the   national   dividend   is

diminished”.6

This   issue   was   further   focused   on   by   those   in   the   field   of

feminism economics in the 1970s and 1980s, who criticized the

traditional   labour   statistics   which   did   not   consider   unpaid

6 Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 44 (1920).

8

domestic work and therefore undervalued women’s role in the

economy.7

13. On considering the growing awareness around this issue,

the   United   Nations   Committee   on   the   Elimination   of

Discrimination against Women adopted General Recommendation

No.   17   on   the   “Measurement   and   quantification   of   the

unremunerated domestic activities of women and their recognition

in   the   gross   national   product”   in   1991.   The   General

Recommendation   affirmed   that   “the   measurement   and

quantification of the unremunerated domestic activities of women,

which   contribute   to   development   in   each   country,   will   help   to

reveal the de facto economic role of women”.

14. It is worth noting that the above General Recommendation

is passed in furtherance of Article 11 of the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women which

relates to ending discrimination against women in the field of

employment, a Convention that India has ratified. 

15. The   issue   of   fixing   notional   income   for   a   homemaker,

therefore,   serves   extremely   important   functions.   It   is   a

recognition of the multitude of women who are engaged in this

activity,   whether   by   choice   or   as   a   result   of   social/cultural

7 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Guide on Valuing Unpaid Household Service 

Work, 2 (2017).

9

norms. It signals to society at large that the law and the Courts of

the land believe in the value of the labour, services and sacrifices

of   homemakers.   It   is   an   acceptance   of   the   idea   that   these

activities contribute in a very real way to the economic condition

of the family, and the economy of the nation, regardless of the

fact that it may have been traditionally excluded from economic

analyses. It is a reflection of changing attitudes and mindsets and

of our international law obligations. And, most importantly, it is a

step   towards   the   constitutional   vision   of   social   equality   and

ensuring dignity of life to all individuals. 

16. Returning to the question of how such notional income of a

homemaker is to be calculated, there can be no fixed approach. It

is to be understood that in such cases the attempt by the Court

is to fix an approximate economic value for all the work that a

homemaker does, impossible though that task may be. Courts

must keep in mind the idea of awarding just compensation in

such cases, looking to the facts and circumstances [See  R.K.

Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1]. 

17. One   method   of   computing   the   notional   income   of   a

homemaker   is   by   using   the   formula   provided   in   the   Second

Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which has now been

omitted by the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019. The Second

10

Schedule   provided   that   the   income   of   a   spouse   could   be

calculated as one­third of the income of the earning surviving

spouse. This was the method ultimately adopted by the Court in

the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal  (supra)  case.   However,   rationale

behind fixing the ratio as one­third is not very clear. [See Arun

Kumar Agrawal (supra)]

18. Apart from the above, scholarship around this issue could

provide some guidance as to other methods to determine the

notional income for a homemaker.8

 Some of these methods were

highlighted by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the

case of Minor Deepika (supra) which held as follows:

“10. The Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles

Act gives a value to the compensation payable in

respect of those who had no income prior to the

accident and for a spouse, it says that one­third

of the income of the earning surviving spouse

should be the value. Exploration on the internet

shows that there have been efforts to understand

the value of a homemaker's unpaid labour by

different methods. One is, the opportunity cost

which evaluates her wages by assessing what

she would have earned had she not remained

at   home,   viz.,   the   opportunity   lost.   The

second   is,   the   partnership   method   which

assumes that a marriage is an equal economic

partnership   and   in   this   method,   the

homemaker's   salary   is   valued   at   half   her

husband's   salary.   Yet   another  method   is   to

evaluate   homemaking   by   determining   how

8 See Ann Chadeau, What is Households’ Non­Market Production Worth, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES

NO. 18 (1992); Also see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supra note 7. 

11

much it would cost to replace the homemaker

with   paid   workers.   This   is   called   the

Replacement Method.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. However, it must be remembered that all the above methods

are merely suggestions. There can be no exact calculation or

formula that can magically ascertain the true value provided by

an individual gratuitously for those that they are near and dear

to. The attempt of the Court in such matters should therefore be

towards determining, in the best manner possible, the truest

approximation   of   the   value   added   by   a   homemaker   for   the

purpose of granting monetary compensation. 

20. Whichever method a Court ultimately chooses to value the

activities of a homemaker, would ultimately depend on the facts

and circumstances of the case.  The Court needs to keep in mind

its duty to award just compensation, neither assessing the same

conservatively,   nor   so   liberally   as   to   make   it   a   bounty   to

claimants [National   Insurance   Company   Limited   v.   Pranay

Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680;  Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4

SCC 413].

21. Once notional income has been determined, the question

remains as to whether escalation for future prospects should be

granted   with   regard   to   it.   Initially,   the   awarding   of   future

12

prospects by this Court was related to the stability of the job held

by   the   victim   [See  General   Manager,   Kerala   State   Road

Transport   Corporation,   Trivandrum   v.   Susamma   Thomas

(Mrs), (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit (Smt) v. Balwant Yadav,

(1996) 3 SCC 179]. This focus on the stability of the job of the

victim, while awarding future prospects, was continued in the

judgment   of   this   Court   in  Sarla   Verma   (Smt)   v.   Delhi

Transport Corporation,  (2009)  6 SCC  121  wherein the Court

held as follows:  

“24. In Susamma   Thomas [(1994)   2   SCC   176]

this Court increased the income by nearly 100%,

in Sarla Dixit [(1996) 3 SCC 179] the income was

increased   only   by   50%   and   in Abati

Bezbaruah [(2003) 3 SCC 148] the income was

increased   by   a   mere   7%.   In   view   of   the

imponderables   and   uncertainties,   we   are   in

favour   of   adopting   as   a   rule   of   thumb,   an

addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual

salary income of the deceased towards future

prospects,   where   the   deceased   had   a

permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where

the annual income is in the taxable range, the

words “actual salary” should be read as “actual

salary   less   tax”).   The   addition   should   be   only

30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50

years. There should be no addition, where the

age   of   the   deceased   is   more   than   50   years.

Though   the   evidence   may   indicate   a   different

percentage   of   increase,   it   is   necessary   to

standardise   the   addition   to   avoid   different

yardsticks being applied or different methods of

calculation being adopted. Where the deceased

was   self­employed   or   was   on   a   fixed   salary

13

(without   provision   for   annual   increments,

etc.),   the   courts   will   usually   take   only   the

actual   income   at   the   time   of   death.   A

departure  therefrom  should  be  made  only   in

rare   and   exceptional   cases   involving   special

circumstances.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. However, there was a shift in jurisprudence regarding future

prospects with the five­Judge Bench decision of this Court in

Pranay Sethi (supra). This Court extended the benefit regarding

future prospects to even self­employed persons, or those on a

fixed salary. The Court held as follows:

“57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration,

we are disposed to think when we accept the

principle of standardisation,  there   is  really  no

rationale not to apply the said principle to the

self­employed  or  a  person  who   is  on   a   fixed

salary.   To   follow   the   doctrine   of   actual

income  at  the  time  of  death  and  not  to  add

any amount with regard to future prospects to

the income for the purpose of determination

of   multiplicand   would   be   unjust.   The

determination   of   income   while   computing

compensation has to include future prospects

so   that   the   method   will   come   within   the

ambit   and   sweep   of   just   compensation   as

postulated  under  Section  168  of   the   Act. In

case of a deceased who had held a permanent job

with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is

an   acceptable   certainty.   But   to   state   that   the

legal representatives of a deceased who was on a

fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of

future prospects for the purpose of computation

of   compensation   would   be   inapposite.   It   is

because the criterion of distinction between the

14

two in that event would be certainty on the one

hand   and   staticness   on   the   other.   One   may

perceive   that   the   comparative   measure   is

certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the

other but such a perception is fallacious.  It   is

because   the   price   rise   does   affect   a   selfemployed   person;   and   that   apart   there   is

always   an   incessant   effort   to   enhance   one's

income   for   sustenance.   The   purchasing

capacity   of   a   salaried   person   on   permanent

job   when   increases   because   of   grant   of

increments and pay revision or for some other

change in service conditions, there is always a

competing   attitude   in   the   private   sector   to

enhance   the   salary   to   get   better   efficiency

from  the employees. Similarly,  a person who

is   self­employed   is   bound   to   garner   his

resources  and  raise  his   charges/fees   so   that

he  can   live  with  same   facilities.…Taking into

consideration the  cumulative   factors,  namely,

passage   of   time,   the   changing   society,

escalation of price, the change in price index,

the   human   attitude   to   follow   a   particular

pattern of life,  etc., an addition of 40% of the

established   income   of   the   deceased   towards

future   prospects   and   where   the   deceased   was

below 40 years an addition of 25% where the

deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years

would be reasonable.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. The rationale behind the awarding of future prospects is

therefore no longer merely about the type of profession, whether

permanent or otherwise, although the percentage awarded is still

dependent on the same. The awarding of future prospects is now

a part of the duty of the Court to grant just compensation, taking

into account the realities of life, particularly of inflation, the quest

15

of individuals to better their circumstances and those of their

loved ones, rising wage rates and the impact of experience on the

quality of work.   

24. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is

quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a Court

in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where the

victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable to prove

the income before the Court. Once the victim has been proved to

be employed at some venture, the necessary corollary is that they

would   be   earning   an   income.   It   is   clear   that   no   rational

distinction can be drawn with respect to the granting of future

prospects merely on the basis that their income was not proved,

particularly   when   the   Court   has   determined   their   notional

income. 

25. When it comes to the second category of cases, relating to

notional income for non­earning victims, it is my opinion that the

above principle applies with equal vigor, particularly with respect

to homemakers. Once notional income is determined, the effects

of inflation would equally apply. Further, no one would ever say

that the improvements in skills that come with experience do not

take place in the domain of work within the household. It is

worth noting that, although not extensively discussed, this Court

16

has been granting future prospects even in cases pertaining to

notional income, as has been highlighted by my learned brother,

Surya Kant, J., in his opinion [Hem Raj v. Oriental Insurance

Company Limited, (2018) 15 SCC 654; Sunita Tokas v. New

India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 688].

26. Therefore,   on   the   basis   of   the   above,   certain   general

observations can be made regarding the issue of calculation of

notional   income   for   homemakers   and   the   grant   of   future

prospects  with  respect   to   them,   for  the   purposes  of   grant   of

compensation which can be summarized as follows:

a. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect

to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. 

b. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with

an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the

same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a

homemaker   attains   special   significance.   It   becomes   a

recognition   of   the   work,   labour   and   sacrifices   of

homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also

in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations

and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring

dignity to all.

c. Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the

notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts

and circumstances of the case.

d. The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and

fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts

and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing

the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. 

17

e. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income

calculated   in   such   cases,   is   a   component   of   just

compensation. 

27. With the above observations, I concur with the opinion of

my learned brother.

     ........................J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI; 

January 05, 2021.

18

Apex Court has taken note of the compromise between parties to reduce the sentence of the convicts even in serious noncompoundable offences.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.24/2021

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 10813 of 2019]

Murali   .....APPELLANT

        VERSUS

State rep. by the Inspector of Police .....RESPONDENT

WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.25/2021

[Arising out of SLP (Crl.) 10814 of 2019]

Rajavelu .....APPELLANT

           VERSUS

State rep. by the Inspector of Police .....RESPONDENT

ORDER

        Leave granted. 

2. These connected appeals have been preferred against the judgment

dated   01.11.2018   of   the   High   Court   of   Madras   which   upheld   Murali’s

(appellant in SLP (Crl) No 10813/2019) conviction under Sections 324 and

341   of   the   Indian   Penal   Code,   1860   (“IPC”)   with   a   sentence   of   three

Page | 1

months’   rigorous   imprisonment,   and   Rajavelu’s   (appellant   in   SLP   (Crl)

10814/2019) conviction under Sections 307 and 341 of IPC and sentence of

five years’ rigorous imprisonment. 

3. The prosecution case, in brief, is that on 07.08.2005, one Senthil had

a   verbal   altercation   with   Kumar   (original   accused   no.   3)   and   Krishnan

(original accused no. 5) during a volleyball match. The injured­victim (Sathya

@ Sathiyajothi) came to the aid of his friend Senthil and opposed both

Kumar   and   Krishnan.   Thereafter   at   about   2:30PM   on   09.08.2005,   the

appellants – Rajavelu and Murali (original accused nos. 1 and 2) along with

Muthu, Kumar and Krishnan (original accused nos. 3, 4 and 5) cornered the

victim and assaulted him. Murali allegedly struck the victim on his head

with a hockey stick and Rajavelu tried to kill him by giving a neck blow with

a Veechu Aruval (sharp­edged object), which was fortunately blocked by the

victim. In the process, the left hand of the victim and the thumb and finger

of his right hand got severed. The victim was able to escape and the matter

was reported by his friend, PW­1. All five persons were arrested. It further

led   to   registration   of   Crime   No.   531   of   2005   under   Sections

147,148,341,352, 323, 324, 307 and 34 of the IPC. 

4. Relying upon the testimony of the victim (PW­3), which was held to be

unimpeachable   and   stellar,   the   Assistant   Sessions   Judge   ­cum­   Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Cuddalore, vide his judgment dated 28.01.2012 held

Murali guilty of wrongfully restraining the victim and voluntarily causing

Page | 2

hurt   with   a   dangerous   weapon.   Based   upon   the   medical   evidence   and

recovery of the Veechu Aruval from Rajavelu, the trial Court further opined

that the second­appellant (Rajavelu) had a clear intention to murder the

victim and that if not for the victim defending himself, a fatal injury would

have been caused to his neck and he would have died instantaneously.

Consequently,   a   concurrent   sentence   of   three   months’   rigorous

imprisonment   under   Section   324   IPC   and   one­month   rigorous

imprisonment under Section 341 IPC was imposed on Murali, and Rajavelu

was awarded five years’ rigorous imprisonment under Section 307 IPC and

another one month rigorous imprisonment under Section 341 IPC.  Muthu,

Kumar and Krishnan were acquitted as there was no specific allegation by

the victim and no weapon or injury had been attributed to them by the

prosecution.

5. The convict­appellants challenged the  afore­stated  judgment before

two   forums,   both   of   which   unanimously   upheld   their   conviction.   The

Additional District­cum­Sessions Judge dismissed the first appeal through

an order dated 20.08.2013 and their criminal revision petition before the

High Court also met with the same fate vide an order dated 01.11.2018.

6. Unsatisfied still, the appellants have approached this Court seeking

special   leave   to   appeal   against   the   High   Court’s   dismissal   of   their

conviction. However, through an application filed on 22.11.2019, they have

sought to implead the injured­victim and get their offences compounded

Page | 3

based on mutual resolution and peaceful settlement between the parties.

This Court, nevertheless, issued limited notice only on the quantum of

sentence. 

7. The records of the case elicit that the findings of all three preceding

forums are concurrent and without fault. Not only have the appellants been

unable to mount an effective challenge founded upon a question of law,

their   learned   Counsels,   given   the   subsequent   events   and   change   in

circumstances,   have   very  fairly  restricted   their   prayer   qua  reduction   of

sentence only.

8. A   perusal   of   the   applications   for   impleadment   and   compounding

makes it clear that the parties have on the advice of their elders entered into

an amicable settlement. The appellants have admitted their fault, taken

responsibility for their actions, and have maturely sought forgiveness from

the victim. In turn, the victim has benevolently acknowledged the apology,

and considering the young age of the appellants at the time of the incident,

has forgiven the appellants and settled the dispute. Learned Counsel for the

victim­applicant has reiterated the same stance during oral hearings also.

9. There can be no doubt that Section 320 of the Criminal Procedure

Code, 1973 (“CrPC”) does not encapsulate Section 324 and 307 IPC under

its list of compoundable offences. Given the unequivocal language of Section

320(9)   CrPC   which   explicitly   prohibits   any   compounding   except   as

permitted under the said provision, it would not be possible to compound

Page | 4

the appellants’ offences. 

10. Notwithstanding thereto, it appears to us that the fact of amicable

settlement can be a relevant factor for the purpose of reduction in the

quantum of sentence. In somewhat similar circumstances where the parties

decided to forget their past and live amicably, this Court in Ram Pujan v.

State of UP [(1973) 2 SCC 456], held as follows:

“6. The only question with which we are concerned, as mentioned earlier,

is   about   the  sentence. In  this   respect  we  find  that  an  application for

compromise   on   behalf   of   the   injured   prosecution   witnesses   and   the

appellants was filed before the High Court. It was stated in the application

that the appellants and the injured persons, who belong to one family, had

amicably settled their dispute and wanted to live in peace. The High Court

thereupon   referred   the   matter   to   the   trial   court   for   verification   of   the

compromise. After the compromise was got verified, the High Court passed

an order stating that as the offence under Section 326 of the Penal Code,

1860 was non­compoundable, permission to compound the offence could

not be granted. The High Court all the same reduced the sentence for the

offence under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code, 1860

from four years to two years.

7. The appellants during the pendency of the appeal were not released on

bail and are stated to have already undergone a sentence of rigorous

imprisonment for a period of more than four months. As the parties who

belong to one family have settled their dispute, it is, in our opinion, not

necessary to keep the appellants in jail for a longer period.  The  major

offence for which the appellants have been convicted is no doubt

non­compoundable, but  the  fact of  compromise  can  be  taken  into

account in determining the quantum of sentence. It would, in our

Page | 5

opinion, meet the ends of  justice if the sentence of imprisonment

awarded   to   the   appellants   is   reduced   to   the   period   already

undergone  provided each of the appellants pays a fine of Rs 1500 in

addition to the period of imprisonment already undergone for the offence

under Section 326 read with Section 34 of the of the Penal Code, 1860. In

default of payment of fine, each of the appellants shall undergo rigorous

imprisonment for a total period of one year for the offence under Section

326 read with Section 34 of the of the Penal Code, 1860. Out of the fine, if

realised, Rs 2000 should be paid to Ram Sewak and Rs 2000 to Ram

Samujh as compensation. We order accordingly.”

(emphasis supplied)

11. The   afore­cited   view   has   been   consistently   followed   by   this   Court

including in  Ishwar  Singh  v.  State  of  MP  [(2008)  15  SCC  667], laying

down that:

“13. In Jetha Ram v. State of Rajasthan [(2006) 9 SCC 255 : (2006) 2 SCC

(Cri) 561] , Murugesan v. Ganapathy Velar [(2001) 10 SCC 504 : 2003 SCC

(Cri) 1032] and Ishwarlal v. State of M.P. [(2008) 15 SCC 671 : JT (1988) 3

SC 36 (1)] this Court, while taking into account the fact of compromise

between the parties, reduced sentence imposed on the appellant­accused

to already undergone, though the offences were not compoundable. But it

was also stated that in Mahesh Chand v. State of Rajasthan [1990 Supp

SCC 681 : 1991 SCC (Cri) 159 : AIR 1988 SC 2111] such offence was

ordered to be compounded.

14. In our considered opinion, it would not be appropriate to order

compounding   of   an   offence   not   compoundable   under   the   Code

ignoring and keeping aside statutory provisions. In our judgment,

however,   limited   submission   of   the   learned   counsel   for   the

appellant deserves consideration  that while imposing  substantive

Page | 6

sentence, the factum of compromise between the parties is indeed a

relevant circumstance which the Court may keep in mind.

15. In the instant case, the incident took place before more than fifteen

years; the parties are residing in one and the same village and they are

also relatives. The appellant was about 20 years of age at the time of

commission of crime. It was his first offence. After conviction, the petitioner

was taken into custody. During the pendency of appeal before the High

Court, he was enlarged on bail but, after the decision of the High Court, he

again surrendered and is in jail at present. Though he had applied for bail,

the prayer was not granted and he was not released on bail. Considering

the totality of facts and circumstances, in our opinion, the ends of justice

would be met if the sentence of imprisonment awarded to the appellant

(Accused 1) is reduced to the period already undergone.”

(emphasis supplied)

12. In later decisions including in Ram Lal v. State of J&K, [(1999) 2

SCC 213], Bankat v. State of Maharashtra, [(2005) 1 SCC 343], Mohar

Singh v.  State  of  Rajasthan  [(2015)  11  SCC 226],  Nanda  Gopalan  v.

State of Kerala [(2015) 11 SCC 137], Shankar v. State of Maharashtra,

[(2019) 5 SCC 166], this Court has taken note of the compromise between

parties   to   reduce   the   sentence   of   the   convicts   even   in   serious   noncompoundable offences.

13. Given this position of law and the peculiar circumstances arising out

of subsequent events, we are of the considered opinion that it is a fit case to

take a sympathetic view and reconsider the quantum of sentences awarded

to the appellants. We say so because: first, the parties to the dispute have

Page | 7

mutually buried their hatchet. The separate affidavit of the victim inspires

confidence that the apology has voluntarily been accepted given the efflux of

time and owing to the maturity brought about by age. There is no question

of   the   settlement   being as  a result of  any coercion  or inducement.

Considering that the parties are on friendly terms now and they inhabit the

same society, this is a fit case for reduction of sentence. 

14. Second, at the time of the incident, the victim was a college student,

and both appellants too were no older than 20­22 years. The attack was in

pursuance of a verbal altercation during a sports match, with there being no

previous enmity between the parties. It does raise hope that parties would

have grown up and have mended their ways. Indeed, in the present case,

fifteen years have elapsed since the incident. The appellants are today in

their mid­thirties and present little chance of committing the same crime.

15. Third, the appellants have no other criminal antecedents, no previous

enmity, and today are married and have children. They are the sole bread

earners of their family and have significant social obligations to tend to. In

such circumstances, it might not serve the interests of society to keep them

incarcerated any further. 

16. Finally,  both   appellants   have   served   a   significant   portion   of   their

sentences.   Murali   has   undergone   more   than   half   of   his   sentence   and

Rajavelu has been in jail for more than one year and eight months.

Page | 8

17. Considering   all   these   unique   factors,   including   the   compromise

between the parties, we deem it appropriate to reduce the quantum of the

sentence   imposed   on   the   appellants.   The   appeals   are,   therefore,   partly

allowed and  sentence  of  both  the  appellants  is  reduced  to  the  period

already undergone by them. Consequently, they are set free and their bail

bonds, if any, are discharged. Any pending applications are disposed of

accordingly.           

………………………………………….. J.

   (N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………………………… J.

(SURYA KANT)

…………………..………………………. J.

(ANIRUDDHA BOSE)

NEW DELHI

DATED :  05­01­2021

Page | 9

set aside the conviction and sentence of these two appellants under Section 307 of the Code. We hold so primarily on the basis of depositions of the three medical experts, PW­13 (Dr. Shishir Kumar Singh Munda), PW­14 (Dr. Dhananjay Rajak) and PW­15 (Dr. Narendra Kumar Das). Opinion of PW­13, who examined Premchand and Kasi Ram, found both their injuries to be simple, formed of lacerated wound. In examining Premchand, PW­14’s opinion as regards nature of injury was the same. It was simple injury. Premchand’s CT scan, as explained by PW­15, did not show any evidence of intracerebral hemmorhage or fracture. He also found such injury to be simple. Considering the weapons of assault Mihir and Prabhat were meant to have had used in inflicting such injuries, and the nature of injuries they caused on Kasi Ram and Premchand, we do not think the two appellants had the intention or knowledge that their acts could have had caused death of Kasi Ram or Premchand. We also do not find any evidence of 25 commission of offence under Section 341 of the Code. None of the eyewitnesses has stated in course of their examination that Mihir or Prabhat had wrongfully confined them. The appellants are accordingly acquitted of charges under all the aforesaid provisions

Non­Reportable

                  IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

                 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.22­23 OF 2021

    (Arising out of Petition for Special Leave to

Appeal (Criminal) Nos.8973­8974 of 2019)

         

MIHIR GOPE ETC.  …APPELLANTS 

 VERSUS 

THE STATE OF JHARKHAND             …RESPONDENT 

     J U D G M E N T

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

Leave granted.

2. Anil Mahto and Jatu Mahto had died from injuries

received   in   consequence   of   assaults   on   them   on   20th

August, 2005 over a land related dispute. Certain other

members of the appellant’s family were also injured on

account of assault as a result of the same dispute. The

appellants   are   two   sons   of   one   Manohar   Gope,   with

1

whom the dispute had arisen. The cause of the dispute

with   the   members   of   the   deceased   victims’   family   is

specifically   related   to   the   construction   of   a   hut.   The

prosecution’s case is that certain members of the Gope

family were the assailants. The appellants before us are

Mihir Gope (in Petition for Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.)

No.8973   of   2019)   and   Prabhat   Gope   (in   Petition   for

Special Leave to Appeal (Crl.) No.8974 of 2019). They

have   been   held   guilty   by   the   Trial   Court   (Additional

Sessions   Judge,   Fast   Track   Court­IV,   Bokaro)   for

committing offences under Sections 341, 307, 325, and

302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860

(the Code). The Trial Court sentenced the two appellants

to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life for committing

offence   under   Section   302   of   the   Code,   simple

imprisonment for a month in relation to offence under

Section 341 of the Code, rigorous imprisonment for 5

years for offence under Section 325 of the Code, and

rigorous   imprisonment   for   7   years   for   offence   under

2

Section   307   of   the   Code.   The   sentences   had   been

directed   to   run   concurrently   by   the   Trial   Court.

Altogether five persons including the two appellants were

tried for the offences initiated by a fardbeyan of one Kasi

Ram   Mahto   on   20th  August   2005,   being   the   date   of

occurrence   of   the   offence.   In   the   depositions   as

reproduced in the paperbook, he has been referred to in

some places as Kari Ram. Similarly, the deceased victim

Jatu Mahto has been referred to as Jadu, Jethu, Jattu

and Indu by different witnesses. We shall, however, refer

to them as Kasi Ram and Jatu in this judgment, ignoring

these discrepancies. None of the parties has raised any

question or dispute on this count.  On the basis of the

said fardbeyan, First Information Report was registered

on the same date in Pindrajora police station of Bokaro

district in the State of Jharkhand. In this judgment, we

shall also be referring to the accused persons as also

victims and members of their family by their first names

only. Kasi Ram himself was injured in the assault. He

3

was examined as Prosecution Witness no.12 in the trial.

Major part of the assault on the members of the Mahto

family,   particularly   on   Anil,   Jatu   and   Kasi   Ram   was

attributed   to   Manohar   in   the   fardbeyan   and   the

prosecution   witnesses   have   broadly   corroborated   the

content of the fardbeyan. The High Court, in appeals by

the   four   convicted   accused   persons,   sustained   the

judgment of conviction and orders of sentences of these

two appellants. The judgment of conviction of one of the

accused persons, Usha Devi (wife of Mihir), was set aside

by the High Court. The decision of the High Court was

delivered on 10th October, 2018.

3. The   fardbeyan   was   recorded   at   Bokaro   General

Hospital (BGH). It was disclosed therein that Kasi Ram,

the informant, with his wife Puna Devi had reached the

place of occurrence at Obra Mouza from their place of

residence at Bokaro on receiving a phone call from his

brother   Premchand   (PW­11).   The   phone   call   conveyed

4

that Manohar had constructed a hut on the land of the

informant.     Jatu,   Anil,   Premchand,   Puranchand,

Dakshineshwar, Mukteshwar and Vijay­ all members of

the   Mahto   family   had   also   reached   the   place   of

occurrence when Kasi Ram and Puna Devi reached the

spot. On reaching the place of occurrence at about 8 a.m.

on that date, they found a hut with dali­khapra (earthen

roof­tiles) on the land in question. Substantial evidence

was led before the Trial Court on title or ownership of the

land on which the hut was constructed. But that factor is

not of much relevance so far as the present appeals are

concerned,   except   that   the   construction   of   the   hut

formed the genesis of the dispute and could be related to

motive of the crime. Manohar, the main assailant along

with his sons­ Mihir, Prabhat and Kailash were also at

the   place   of   occurrence,   as   it   transpires   from   the

evidence of Kasi Ram and other prosecution witnesses.

There was exchange of words mainly between Manohar

and Kasi Ram, after which Manohar had attacked Anil on

5

his head with an iron rod, as a result of which Anil

collapsed on the ground and became unconscious.   On

the   informant’s   attempt   to   rescue   Anil,   he   was   also

assaulted by Manohar on his hands, head, and back. As

per prosecution evidence, the three sons of ManoharMihir  (first   appellant),   Prabhat  (second   appellant)   and

Kailash were supplied with a tangi (a variant of axe),

sawal (crowbar) and a gupti (a longish sword) by Usha

Devi.   Before   the   assault   started,   Kasi   Ram   wanted

Manohar to go to the police station with him, presumably

to sort out the dispute, but Manohar refused to go there.

Manohar had asserted that it was his land. It was at that

stage Manohar assaulted Anil on his head with the iron

rod.  As regards the sequence in which the assault took

place, Kasi Ram’s evidence is that when “Indu went to tie

Anil with towel then Manohar assaulted him on head

with rod and he became injured”.  The name “Indu”, as

has been recorded in the deposition of Kasi Ram (as it

appears in the paperbook) obviously refers to Jatu. In the

6

sequence of events narrated by the other eye­witnesses,

being PW­2, PW­3, PW­4, PW­5, PW­7 and PW­11, this

particular victim has been referred to as Jatu. 

4. Prosecution   evidence   was   accepted   by   the   Trial

Court   on   the   aspect   of   description   of   assault   by   the

accused   persons  which  resulted   in  death  of  Anil   and

Jatu   and   also   resulted   in   injuries   to   Kasi   Ram,

Premchand and Puranchand. On his plea of juvenility,

the   case   of   Kailash   was   separated   and   sent   to   the

Juvenile Justice Board. Usha Devi was let off by the High

Court on the reasoning that there was no allegation of

assault by her. Anil had passed away on 20th  August,

2005 itself at BGH, whereas Jatu passed away on the

next day, i.e.  21st  August, 2005. The injured  persons

were initially taken to Chas General Hospital and after

initial treatment, referred to BGH.  The former has been

described   as   the   referral   hospital   in   course   of   the

proceedings before the Trial Court and the High Court. 

7

5. In the First Information Report, Manohar and his

three sons, Mihir, Prabhat and Kailash were named as

accused persons. After investigation, charge­sheet was

submitted arraigning four of them as also Usha Devi as

accused persons.   Records pertaining to Kailash were

sent   to   the   Juvenile   Justice   Board.     All   four   were

convicted and sentenced to imprisonment by the Trial

Court. We have already indicated the sentence imposed

on them.  

6. The   prosecution   examined   altogether   sixteen

witnesses. Seven among them, being Puna Devi (PW­2),

Puranchand   (PW­3),   Vijay   Kumar   (PW­4),   Mukteshwar

(PW­5), Dakshineshwar (PW­7),  Premchand (PW­11) and

Kasi Ram (PW­12) deposed as eye­witnesses. The autopsy

surgeon Dr. Pramod Kumar, who was examined as PW­9

attributed the cause of death of the two deceased victims

to severe head injuries and excessive bleeding leading to

shock and cardio respiratory failure. In the case of Jatu,

8

blood coagulate was found in pia and dura mater of skull

leading   to   shock   and   cardio   respiratory   failure.   On

dissection of Anil’s skull, blood clots in “profuse amount”

were   found   in   between   pia   and   dura   mater,   i.e.   the

membranes that envelop the brain and spinal cord and

separate them from the walls of their bony cases (skull

and vertebral column). External injury of Anil, as per

deposition of PW­9 was “lacerated wound with fracture of

occipital bone size 4½”

 X 1” bone deep”. Jatu’s external

injuries were “fracture of occipital bone with swelling;

fracture of left parietal bone with lacerated wound………”.

PW­13, Dr. Shishir Kumar Singh Munda had examined

Premchand   (PW­11,   injured   witness)   and   found   his

injuries to be simple in nature caused by hard blunt

object. There were lacerated wounds on his left hand and

scalp, right fronto parietal region 2” X 1” X 1/3”. The two

other medical witnesses were Dr. Dhananjay Rajak (PW14) and Dr. Narendra Kumar Das (PW­15). Dr. Rajak had

examined Anil and Jatu on the same day at BGH.   He

9

found,  in  case  of  Anil, a  stitched  wound  on  occipital

parietal area 4” long.   In case of Jatu, Dr. Rajak has

deposed that he found “1 stitched wound on occipital

area 3” long”.  The injuries in both cases were attributed

to   hard     blunt   object   by   the   PW­14.     In   case   of

Premchand, he referred to the following injuries in his

statements made in course of examination :­

“i. contusion left shoulder 3” X 1”

ii. contusion scapular left 8” X 1”

iii. contusion scapular region right 8” X 1/2”. 

Another contusion 6” X 1”

iv. stitched wound left hand.”

The injuries of Premchand were found to be simple

in nature caused by hard blunt substance by Dr. Rajak.

Dr. Narendra Kumar Das (PW­15) was the head of the

department of Neurosurgery at BGH at the material point

of time. He assessed the injuries of Anil and Jatu to be

grievous. Injury of Premchand, according to him, was

simple in nature and possibly caused by a hard and

blunt   object.     So   far   as   injuries   of   Kasi   Ram   are

10

concerned,   Dr.   Shishir   Kumar   Singh   Munda   (PW­13)

deposed that he had  lacerated wound on right parieatal

region and on his right palm. According to this medical

witness,   both   the   injuries   were   simple   in   nature   and

caused by hard blunt objects. 

7. The   assessment   of   injuries   of   Jatu,   Anil   and

Premchand by Dr. Narendra Kumar Das would appear

from the following part of his deposition: ­

“1. On 20.08.05 I was posted at BGH in

same capacity. Patient Mr. Jethu Mehto

was   seen   and   treated   by   me.   He   was

treated for severe head injury.

2.  CT scan of brain was done. 

CT scan no. 22305 dated 20.08.05. 

CT   scan   shows   multiple   intracelebral

hemorrhage   in   the   left   temproperital

region with fracture of left parital bone.

The nature of injury was grievous. This

report   is   prepared   and   signed   by   me.

Mark it as Ext. 7/5. 

3. The injury may be caused by hard and

blunt object. 

4. On the same day I had examined Anil

Kr.   Mahto.   His   hospital   number   was

13538.   He   was   treated   for   severe   head

injury. CT scan brain was done. Number

is 22306 dt. 20.08.05.   CT Scan shows

11

multiple intra cerebral hemorrhage with

brain edema and fracture of left parital

and occipital bone. Nature of injury was

grievous   possible   by   hard   and   blunt

object. 

5. This   report   is   prepared   by   me   and

signed by me mark it as Ext. 7/6.

6. On   the   same   day   I   had   examined

Premchand   Mahto.   He   was   treated   for

multiple injuries.

i. Head injury : CT Scan brain was

done.   Number   is   23307   dt.

20.08.05.   CT   scan   shows   no

evidence   of   intra   cerebral

hemorrhage   or   fracture.   The

nature was simple.

ii.   Compound   fracture   of   IInd

metacarpal bone left hand. Nature

was grievous possibly by hard and

blunt   object.   This   report   is

prepared by me. Mark it as Ext.

7/7. 

7. The   injury   on   the   person   of   Jethu

Mahto may be caused if someone fall on

heavy   object.   There   is   no   CT   Scan

separate with this report. On the person

of   Anil   Mahto   also   the   injury   may   be

caused   due   to   fall,   so   with   Premchand

Mahto.”

(quoted verbatim)

8. The   depositions   of   the   eyewitnesses   for   the

prosecution broadly gives the description of events that

12

corresponds   with   the   fardbeyan,   but   there   are

discrepancies on the role of each of the accused persons

in effecting specific strikes on the victims individually.

Prosecution   also   sought   conviction   on   the   basis   of   a

confessional statement of Manohar. Prosecution case is

that Manohar’s statement led to the recovery of a sawal

and   a   stick   from   his   house.   There   were   two   seizure

witnesses   Laxmi   Devi   (PW­1)   and   Gulichand   Mahto

(PW­10).  The latter was presented by the prosecution as

seizure   witness   of   blood­soaked   soil.   At   this   stage,

however, his deposition has insignificant impact on these

appeals   as   prosecution   has   relied   upon   other   direct

evidences, primarily eyewitness account and evidence of

the medical practitioners, and not much turns in these

appeals on recovery of blood­soaked earth.  Laxmi Devi is

the   wife   of   Prabhat   Gope.     She   was   presented   as   a

witness by the prosecution on seizure of the sawal and

the   stick   from   Manohar’s   house.   In   her   deposition,

13

however, she has stated that the paper on which she had

signed was blank. 

9. Two witnesses were examined by the defence, Netai

Gope   and   Shambhu   Gope.   Both   of   them   deposed   as

eyewitnesses. As recorded in the Trial Court’s judgment,

they sought to attribute the injuries to acts on the part of

the informant and his family members only. It was stated

by   them   that   the   informant   and   his   brothers   had

gathered near the hut armed with several weapons, the

likes of which we have already referred to. When they

tried to pull down the tiled hut, the defence witnesses

stated, some of the roof tiles fell on the members of the

informant’s side and that was the cause of the injuries.

The   appellants   sought   to   buttress   this   defence   by

drawing our attention to the depositions of PW­9, PW­13

and   PW­15,   all   medical   professionals.   They   stated   in

their examination that the injuries treated or analysed by

them could be caused due to fall. But this opinion of the

14

medical practitioners was on probable cause. The story of

accidental   injuries   caused   by   the   informant’s   side

themselves however was not believed by either the Trial

Court or the High Court.  We do not find any flaw in the

reasoning of the two courts of fact on this aspect. 

10. The question, in the given context, which falls for

determination is as to whether these two appellants can

be convicted under the aforesaid provisions of the Code.

It is a fact that all the eyewitnesses were related to the

victims, but for that very reason we cannot disbelieve

their version, particularly since the Trial Court and the

High Court found no reason to reject their evidence. The

story of the defence that the injuries of the victims were

unintentionally   inflicted   by   falling   tiles   when   the

members   of   the   victims’   family   were   dismantling   the

structure does not inspire confidence. The prosecution

witnesses   have   been   consistent   and   uniform   in   their

15

version   that   it   was   Manohar   and   his   sons   who   had

caused the injuries. 

11.  The appellants before us are Mihir and Prabhat. The

evidence of the seven prosecution witnesses, who have

deposed as eyewitnesses, being Puna Devi (PW­2), wife of

Kasi   Ram   (the   informant),   Puranchand   (PW­3),   an

injured witness, Vijay Kumar (PW­4), Mukteshwar (PW5), Dakshineshwar (PW­7), Premchand (PW­11) and Kasi

Ram (PW­12) are uniform in that Manohar had dealt the

first blow to Anil, followed by a blow on Kasi Ram and

thereafter on Jatu at the time the latter was attending to

injured Anil. The seven witnesses are also uniform in

saying   that   Manohar   dealt   the   blows   to   these   three

victims using an iron rod.

12.  So far as Mihir and Prabhat are concerned, evidence

of Kasi Ram (PW­12) is that Manohar assaulted Anil first,

then him and thereafter Jatu. He, in his deposition has

referred to sons of Manohar as “boys of Manohar”, and

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assault by them has been specified to be on Puranchand

and Premchand.   PW­2 has also ascribed the blows on

Anil and Jatu to Manohar. At the same time, she has

stated that Mihir had assaulted Anil and Jatu on their

heads. Assault on Anil and Jatu has also been ascribed

to Prabhat. PW­2 and PW­5 have stated that Usha Devi,

whose conviction was set aside by the High Court had

supplied an axe to Mihir, sawal to Prabhat, and a gupti

to Kailash.  Puna Devi has deposed that Mihir as well as

Prabhat   had   assaulted   Anil,   Jatu,   Premchand,

Puranchand and Kasi Ram (her husband­the informant).

Puranchand’s (PW­3) evidence is that Mihir, Prabhat and

Kailash assaulted Anil with an axe on the back of his

head.   He also deposed that all the four accused had

assaulted   Anil,   Premchand   and   Jatu.     To   Mihir,   he

attributed assault by an axe. Vijay Kumar (PW­4) has

attributed collective assault to three sons of Manohar on

Jatu, Premchand and Puranchand.   He also referred to

strikes   by   Manohar   on   Anil,   Kasi   Ram   and   Jatu.

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Evidence of Mukteshwar (PW­5) is that Mihir assaulted

Anil   and   Jatu   with   the   axe   on   their   heads   whereas

Prabhat with another brother assaulted Premchand and

Puranchand.   Dakshineshwar’s   (PW­7)   narration   of   the

assault in his deposition is also broadly similar whereas

Premchand (PW­11) has stated that Jatu was attacked by

Mihir and Manohar using a tangi and Puranchand and

himself were attacked by Kailash and Prabhat with iron

rod. The depositions of the prosecution witnesses thus

are not uniform on the aspect of the role of these two

appellants   in   assaulting   Anil   and   Jatu.   Usha   Devi,

against whom allegation was of supply of weapons to

Mihir, Prabhat and Kailash, has been acquitted by the

High Court.

13. Learned counsel for the appellants has stressed on

the fact that injury records of the referral hospital were

not produced or made exhibits at the stage of the trial.

But   from   the   depositions   of   the   four   medical

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practitioners,   injuries   of   Anil,   Jatu,   Kasi   Ram   and

Premchand are revealed.  There is no medical evidence of

any injury having been caused to Puranchand. While we

analyse the evidence relating to injuries of Anil and Jatu,

we find that the autopsy surgeon (PW­9) found only one

injury on the head of Anil being fractured occipital bone.

This was a lacerated wound. So far as Jatu is concerned,

we   find   from   his   deposition   that   he   had   a   fractured

occipital bone with swelling and fracture of left parietal

bone with lacerated wound. Dr. Shishir Kumar Singh

Munda   (PW­13)   had   examined   Premchand   and   found

lacerated wound on his left hand as also on his scalp in

the right fronto parietal region.  He also examined Kasi

Ram and found two injuries, lacerated wound on right

parietal region and lacerated wound on the right palm.

Dr. Dhananjay Rajak (PW­14) had examined Anil on the

day of occurrence at about 11.30 a.m. in the casualty

department of BGH. His deposition also reveals that Anil

had a stitched wound on the occipital parietal area.  On

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Jatu, he found a 3” long stitched wound on the occipital

area.   As regards injuries of Premchand, he observed

contusions and we have referred to his observations in

earlier part of this judgment. Dr. Narendra Kumar Das

(PW­15) had examined Jatu, and in his deposition he has

stated that his CT scan showed multiple intracerebral

haemorrhage   in   the   left   temporoparietal   region   with

fracture of the left parietal bone.   As regards probable

cause of the injuries, PW­9 stated that injury to Anil

could be caused if he had fallen on a hard surface. Jatu’s

could have been caused if some heavy blunt object fell on

his head.  Cause of the other injury to Jatu, according to

him, could occur if someone smashed on small or heavy

substance.   Dr.   Narendra   Kumar   Das   (PW­15)   on   the

other hand interpreted Jatu’s CT scan in the following

manner:­ 

“CT   scan   shows   multiple   intracelebral

hemorrhage in the left lemproperietal region

with fracture of left partial bone…”

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14. It   would   be   apparent   from   the   evidence   of   the

medical practitioners that there was only one injury on

Anil’s head whereas on Jatu’s head, there is a probability

that he suffered two injuries. But the injuries on Jatu’s

head cannot be said to have been caused by either axe or

tangi,   which   are   sharp   edged   weapons.     Even   if   we

proceed on the basis that both axe and tangi have blunt

sides and such blunt sides were used to strike, that very

fact   cannot   establish   involvement   of   both   Mihir   and

Prabhat in striking Anil and Jatu. Thus, we do not think

the Trial Court and the High Court had rightly concluded

on involvement of Mihir and Prabhat in assault of Anil

and   Jatu   so   as   to   implicate   them   for   murder   under

Section 302 read with Section 34 of the code. The eye

witnesses’ accounts, as we have already observed shows

element of exaggeration and inconsistency in implicating

both Mihir and Prabhat for their strikes on Jatu. There is

apparent   inconsistency  in  the  eye   witness   account   in

describing the assaults by these two appellants on Anil

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and Jatu.  PW­2 has attributed assault on both Anil and

Jatu   to   Manohar   and   all   his   sons.   This   is   a   very

generalised description. PW­3 has stated that Manohar,

Mihir and Prabhat (collectively referring to them with the

pronoun “they”) had assaulted Jatu. P.W. 4’s evidence on

assault against Anil and Jatu is not specific, but general.

PW­5 has stated that Mihir had assaulted Anil and Jatu,

apart from Manohar’s strikes.  PW­7’s deposition is that

both Mihir and Manohar struck Jatu.  PW­11 attributes

strike   by   Mihir   on   Jatu   but   he   has   not   implicated

Prabhat in any form of assault on Anil or Jatu. Thus, if

we compare the number of injuries on Anil and Jatu as it

transpires   from   the   evidence   of   medical   practitioners,

which is three at the most, they do not match with the

number of strikes made by Manohar, Mihir and Prabhat,

as stated on oath by these witnesses. In our opinion, we

cannot rely on the account of assault given by these

witnesses to the extent they relate to strikes by Mihir and

Prabhat.   Barring   PW­12,   the   account   of   the   incident

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narrated by the other eye­witnesses tend to be based on

overall   impression   of   the   strikes   rather   than   factual

narration of events. We consider it safer to rely on the

evidence   of   PW­12,   who   has   given   specific   and

trustworthy account of the individual assaults. We do not

think the prosecution  has been  able to prove  beyond

reasonable doubt involvement of these two appellants,

Mihir and Prabhat in delivering the blows to Anil and

Jatu.

15.   We   also   find   that   though   there   were   assaults   by

Manohar, Mihir and Prabhat prosecution has failed to

establish   on   the   basis   of   evidence   that   these   two

appellants   shared   common   intention   with   Manohar.

Their strikes on the victims can be segregated from those

made by Manohar, as it transpires from evidence. Neither

Mihir nor Prabhat could be held to have been involved in

assault   on   Anil   and   Jatu,   which   forms   the   basis   of

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conviction of the appellants under Section 302 of the

Code.

16. Relying on a decision of a coordinate Bench, Manoj

Kumar   vs  State   of  Himachal  Pradesh  [(2018) 7 SCC

327], it was urged on behalf of the appellants that the

offence   of   the   appellants   could   be   brought   within

exception 4 to Section 300 of the Code and Part II of

Section 304 thereof, could be applied to the appellants.

But having regard to what we have held, the ratio of that

decision does not apply in the facts of this case. 

17. We, accordingly, set aside the judgment of conviction

of   Mihir   and   Prabhat   under   Section   302   read   with

Section 34 of the Code and the order of sentence under

the aforesaid provisions is also set aside.   As we find

from evidence of the medical professionals that injuries

on   Kasi   Ram   and   Premchand   were   simple   in   nature,

judgment   of   the   High   Court   on   their   conviction   and

sentence under Section 325 of the Code is also set aside.

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We also set aside the conviction and sentence of these

two appellants under Section 307 of the Code.  We hold

so   primarily   on   the   basis   of   depositions   of   the   three

medical   experts,   PW­13   (Dr.   Shishir   Kumar   Singh

Munda), PW­14 (Dr. Dhananjay Rajak) and PW­15 (Dr.

Narendra Kumar Das).  Opinion of PW­13, who examined

Premchand and Kasi Ram, found both their injuries to be

simple,   formed   of   lacerated   wound.     In   examining

Premchand, PW­14’s opinion as regards nature of injury

was the same.   It was simple injury.   Premchand’s CT

scan, as explained by PW­15, did not show any evidence

of intracerebral hemmorhage or fracture.  He also found

such injury to be simple.   Considering the weapons of

assault Mihir and Prabhat were meant to have had used

in inflicting such injuries, and the nature of injuries they

caused on Kasi Ram and Premchand, we do not think

the two appellants had the intention or knowledge that

their acts could have had caused death of Kasi Ram or

Premchand.   We   also   do   not   find   any   evidence   of

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commission of offence under Section 341 of the Code.

None of the eyewitnesses has stated in course of their

examination   that   Mihir   or   Prabhat   had   wrongfully

confined them.  The appellants are accordingly acquitted

of charges under all the aforesaid provisions.

18. In our opinion, however, there is sufficient evidence

against Mihir and Prabhat of voluntarily causing hurt by

the instruments we have referred to.  We have discussed

the evidence based on which we come to this conclusion.

We hold both the appellants guilty of committing offence

under Section 324 of the Code.  We impose sentence of

three years rigorous imprisonment on both Mihir and

Prabhat   for   committing   offence   under   the   aforesaid

provision.

19. In the event the appellants or any one of them have

served   out   the   sentence   of   three   years   of   rigorous

imprisonment imposed on them in this judgment, such

appellant or the appellants, as the case may be, shall be

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set free forthwith, unless the custody of the appellants or

any one of them is required in any other case. Otherwise,

the appellants or any one of them, as the case may be,

shall serve out the remaining term.

20.  The appeals are partly allowed, in the above terms.

Pending application(s), if any, stand(s) disposed of. 

…..……………..J.

(N.V. Ramana)

..…..……………..J.

(Surya Kant)

……..……………..J.

(Aniruddha Bose)

New Delhi,

Dated: January 8, 2021

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