LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Sunday, January 31, 2021

whether an award in respect of the first respondent’s land was approved by the State Government on 05.03.2010.= in Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors. 5 has also affirmed that once possession is taken by the State, the land vests absolutely with the State and the title of the landowner ceases. We find no reason to deviate from this settled position of law and thus are unable to agree with the High Court’s reliance on the letters dated 21.07.2012 and 06.01.2014 to nullify the original award and allow fresh acquisition proceedings in respect of the first respondent’s land which had already been acquired and has been under the possession of the appellant since 11.06.2010

 .1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO(S). 251-252 of 2021

(Arising out of S.L.P.(C) No.14266-14267 of 2019)

ASSAM INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION LTD. …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

GILLAPUKRI TEA COMPANY LIMITED

 & ORS. ETC. …RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

S. ABDUL NAZEER, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Assam Industrial Development Corporation Limited has

filed these appeals challenging the judgment and order in Writ

Appeal Nos. 219 & 220 of 2017 dated 14.03.2019 whereby the

Division Bench of the High Court of Guwahati has dismissed the

2

said appeals confirming the order of the Learned Single Judge in

Review Petition Nos. 79 & 80 of 2016.

3. Brief facts necessary for disposal of these appeals are as

under.

4. In order to set up a plastic park, the Government of Assam

decided to acquire a portion of the land belonging to the first

respondent situated at Gillapukri Tea Estate, Village Gillapukri,

Tinsukia, Assam. The Government of Assam, in exercise of the

power vested in it under Section 4 of the Land Acquisition Act,

1894 (for short ‘L.A. Act’) issued a notification dated

04.08.2008, which was published in the Assam Gazette on

08.08.2008, expressing its intention to acquire 1,166 biggas, 1

katha, 14 lessas of land of the aforesaid Gillapukri Tea Estate.

The proceedings being L.A Case No. 1 of 2008 were also

initiated for the purpose of acquisition before the District

Collector, Tinsukia and, for that purpose, declaration dated

17.06.2009 in terms of Section 6(1) of the L.A. Act was

published in the Assam Gazette. The appellant was appointed

as the nodal agency to deal with the acquisition proceedings

vide appointment letter dated 24.06.2009.

3

5. The Deputy Commissioner and Collector, District Tinsukia,

addressed a letter dated 30.01.2010 to the Principal Secretary

to the Government of Assam, Revenue Department to seek

approval of the award and the land acquisition estimate which

were enclosed therewith in the prescribed Form No. 15 and

Form No. 5 respectively. In response, the Commissioner and

Secretary to the Government of Assam, Revenue Department,

addressed a letter dated 05.03.2010 to the Deputy

Commissioner whereby approval, as sought vide the aforesaid

letter dated 30.01.2010, was granted. As will be seen in the

following paragraphs, the controversy between the parties

before us is whether this letter was approval of both the award

and the estimate or only the estimate. Thereafter, the owner of

the land, i.e. the first respondent herein, addressed a letter

dated 05.05.2010 to the Commissioner seeking reference of the

matter to the District Judge, Tinsukia, under Section 18 of the

L.A. Act for reassessment of the compensation awarded to it. It

is contended that other similar applications were also received

from different families at different levels. It is further contended

that in the letter dated 05.05.2010, the first respondent

admitted that it had received a sum of Rs. 4.95 crores on

4

08.04.2010 by a crossed cheque immediately after the letter

for approval dated 05.03.2010 was passed by the

Commissioner. It is also contended that vide possession

certificate dated 21.05.2010, possession was delivered to the

Deputy Commissioner, and thereafter on 11.06.2010,

possession of the land was handed over to the appellant by the

Deputy Commissioner.

6. The first respondent has not disputed the issuance of the

preliminary and final notification. However, it is contended that

no award was approved pursuant to the letter dated

05.03.2010. It is the first respondent’s case that vide this letter,

only the land acquisition estimate was approved and not the

award. This, in the first respondent’s view, led to lapsing of the

proceedings and initiation of fresh acquisition proceedings in

2012 which culminated in approval of the award for the first

time on 04.01.2014. For this purpose, a fresh notification under

Section 4 of the L.A. Act was published on 07.08.2012 and a

declaration was also issued on 20.11.2012. Thereafter, the

Commissioner issued a notice purportedly under Section 9 of

the L.A. Act to the persons interested in the land to submit their

objections and claims. On 04.01.2014, a fresh award was

5

passed and the Deputy Secretary, Government of Assam,

Revenue Department addressed a letter dated 06.01.2014 to

the Deputy Commissioner conveying approval of the said fresh

award. The first respondent contends that a comparison of this

approval letter dated 06.01.2014 with the approval letter dated

05.03.2010 under the original acquisition proceedings would

clearly indicate that under the letter dated 05.03.2010, only the

estimate was approved and not the award. Since the award

under the fresh proceedings was approved and made after

coming into force of the Right to Fair Compensation and

Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

Resettlement Act, 2013 (for short ‘2013 Act’), the first

respondent approached the Deputy Commissioner to seek a

fresh award by determining the compensation payable in terms

of Section 24(1)(a) of the 2013 Act.

7. The first respondent has denied the claim of the appellant

that an award had been approved on 05.03.2010 and has

mainly rested its case on the letter dated 21.07.2012

addressed by the Deputy Secretary, Government of Assam,

Revenue Department to the Deputy Commissioner wherein the

Deputy Secretary admitted to not having drawn the award

6

within two years from the date of publication of the declaration

under the original acquisition proceedings. The first respondent

has also relied upon the letter dated 06.01.2014 sent by the

Deputy Secretary to the Government of Assam which, as per

the first respondent, suggests that no award had been

approved under the original acquisition proceedings.

8. On the contrary, the State Government has taken a stand

that an award was approved by the State Government on

05.03.2010 and that the same had been made within two years

of the declaration. It is also contended that pursuant to the

award, possession of the land was taken from the first

respondent by the acquiring authority and the land was then

handed over to the appellant. It was also submitted that the

entire compensation had been paid to the first respondent. The

State Government contends that the need for an additional

award arose only because some of the land owners of the land

initially proposed to be acquired were left out in the original

award that was approved on 05.03.2010.

9. Appearing for the appellant Shri Jayant Bhushan, learned

senior counsel has submitted that the award had been passed

in Form No. 15 of the Assam Land Acquisition Manual and was

7

approved by the State on 05.03.2010. Possession of the land

was also handed over by the first respondent to the acquiring

authority on 21.05.2010 and was thereafter handed over to the

appellant on 11.06.2010. Shri Bhushan submitted that the

compensation was also received by the first respondent and, in

fact, the first respondent had also sought enhancement of the

compensation allowed under the said award. It is Shri

Bhushan’s submission that once the land stood vested in the

State, it could not have been acquired again. Therefore, any

issuance of fresh notification under Section 4 and 6 or even

preparing of a fresh award by the State Government in respect

of the first respondent’s land will be non est or infructuous. He

further submits that the letters dated 21.07.2012 and

06.01.2014 relied upon by the High Court could not have had

the effect of re-acquiring the land in question since it already

stood vested in the State Government.

10. Learned counsel appearing for the State of Assam has

supported the stand of the appellant.

11. However, Shri Senthil Jagadeesan, learned counsel for the

first respondent submits that the aforesaid two letters would

conclusively establish that no approval to an award was

8

granted by the State Government under the original acquisition

proceedings. It is his submission that the two aforesaid letters

dated 21.07.2012 and 06.01.2014 which were relied upon by

the Division Bench of the High Court would clearly establish the

same. Therefore, he prays for dismissal of these appeals.

12. We have carefully considered the submissions of the

learned counsel made at the Bar and perused the materials

placed on record. Having regard to the contentions urged, the

crucial question for consideration is whether an award in

respect of the first respondent’s land was approved by the

State Government on 05.03.2010. Needless to say, if the award

was not approved on 05.03.2010, but rather on 06.01.2014 as

contended by the first respondent, then the 2013 Act will be

applicable and the first respondent will be eligible to receive

compensation in accordance therewith.

13. To determine whether the award had indeed been

approved on 05.03.2010, we first have to examine the letter

dated 30.01.2010 through which the State Government’s

approval of the award was sought by the Deputy Commissioner.

It is uncontested that vide this letter both the award and the

land acquisition estimate were sent to the State Government

9

for its approval. It is pertinent to note that the award was in the

format of Form No. 15 which is the statutorily prescribed form

for a land acquisition award under the Assam Land Acquisition

Manual. This is also true of the land acquisition estimate which

was as per the prescribed format of Form No. 5. As such, the

only further action required of the State Government was to

approve the award which was already in the statutorily

prescribed form. This is precisely what was done vide the letter

dated 05.03.2010 issued by the Deputy Secretary to the

Government of Assam, Revenue Department.

14. This letter dated 05.03.2010 was issued in response to the

letter dated 30.01.2010, whereunder approval of the award and

the land acquisition estimate was sought. While this letter only

expressly mentions the land acquisition estimate and not the

award, a combined reading of this letter with the preceding

letter dated 30.01.2010 and the subsequent conduct of the

parties, including the first respondent, make it evident that the

award stood approved by this letter of 05.03.2010. It is

noteworthy that copies of both the letters of 30.01.2010 and

05.03.2010 were also addressed to the Industries & Commerce

Department of the Government of Assam. Vide the initial letter

10

of 30.01.2010, the said Department was requested to arrange

balance funds for making payment to the land owners as per

the award. In furtherance of this, vide the letter of 05.03.2010,

the said Department was directed to place the balance

estimated fund at the disposal of the Deputy Commissioner. We

find strength in the appellant’s submission that if the award

which had been sent for approval alongwith the estimate had

not been approved by the said letter dated 05.03.2010, this

direction for making funds for payment to landowners available

to the Deputy Commissioner would not have been called for.

This view is fortified by the subsequent conduct of the parties,

as particularly evinced by the below mentioned actions.

15. It is undisputed that the award amount was indeed made

available to the Deputy Commissioner and the awarded sum

was duly paid to and received by the first respondent. Not only

did the first respondent receive compensation pursuant to the

award, it in fact sought enhancement of the same vide its

reassessment petition dated 05.05.2010 u/s 18 of the L.A. Act

addressed to the Deputy Commissioner. It is also not contested

that vide possession certificate dated 21.05.2010, the first

respondent handed over possession to the Deputy

11

Commissioner and that on 11.06.2010 possession of the land

was ultimately handed over to the appellant by the Deputy

Commissioner. What clearly emerges from the above is that

after the letter dated 05.03.2010, it was the common belief of

the State Government, the appellant as well as the first

respondent that the award had been approved and that now

actions subsequent thereto viz. payment and receipt of

compensation, handover of possession, seeking reassessment

of the compensation were needed to be undertaken.

16. It is clear from the materials on record that the plastic

project for which the subject Land Acquisition was initiated has

already been developed on the acquired land including

boundary wall, entrance gate, laying of roads, drains and

electrical distribution networks, electrical substation, industrial

sheds and warehouses.

17. In the above scenario, the arguments of the first

respondent are untenable. Once the award has been approved,

compensation has been paid thereunder and possession of the

land has been handed over to the Government, acquisition

proceedings could not have been reopened, including by way of

re-notification of the already acquired land under Section 4 of

12

the L.A. Act by the Government. Contrary to the first

respondent’s contention, the question of lapsing under Section

24 of the L.A. Act could not have arisen in this case once the

award was approved on 05.03.2010.

18. So far as the second set of acquisition proceedings are

concerned, without addressing the factual veracity of the State

Government’s contention that the second award was meant to

be only in respect of landowners not covered by the original

award, we are of the opinion that it would not have been

possible for the State Government to initiate acquisition

proceedings in respect of already acquired land such as that of

the first respondent herein. This position has been affirmed by

this Court in D. Hanumanth SA & Ors. v. State of

Karnataka and Ors.

1

 in the following terms:

“17. Even otherwise, if land already stands

acquired by the Government and if the same

stands vested in the Government there is no

question of acquisition of such a land by issuing a

second notification for the Government cannot

acquire its own land. The same is by now settled

by various decision of this Court in a catena of

cases.

18. In State of Orissa v. Brundaban Sharma,

2

 this

Court has held that the Land Acquisition Act does

not contemplate or provide for the acquisition of

any interest belonging to the Government in the

land on acquisition This position was reiterated in

1 (2010) 10 SCC 656.

2 1995 Supp (3) SCC 249.

13

a subsequent decision of this Court in Meher Rusi

Dalal v. Union of India

3

 in paras 15 and 16 of the

said judgment, this Court has held that the High

Court clearly erred in setting aside the order of

the Special Land Acquisition Officer declining a

reference since it is settled law that in land

acquisition proceedings the Government cannot

and does not acquire its own interest. While

laying down the aforesaid law, this Court has

referred to its earlier decision in Collector of

Bombay v. Nusserwanji Rattanji Mistri

4 ”

The recent decision of the Constitution Bench of this Court in

Indore Development Authority v. Manoharlal and Ors.

5

has also affirmed that once possession is taken by the State,

the land vests absolutely with the State and the title of the

landowner ceases. We find no reason to deviate from this

settled position of law and thus are unable to agree with the

High Court’s reliance on the letters dated 21.07.2012 and

06.01.2014 to nullify the original award and allow fresh

acquisition proceedings in respect of the first respondent’s land

which had already been acquired and has been under the

possession of the appellant since 11.06.2010.

19. Therefore, for the foregoing reasons, the appeals succeed

and are accordingly allowed. The orders impugned herein are

3 (2004) 7 SCC 362.

4 AIR 1955 SC 298 : (1955) 1 SCR 1311.

5 (2020) 8 SCC 129.

14

set aside. Pending applications, if any, shall stand disposed of.

The parties shall bear their own costs.

…….……………………………J.

 (S. ABDUL NAZEER)

…….……………………………J.

 (SANJIV KHANNA)

New Delhi;

January 28, 2021.

Saturday, January 30, 2021

calculation of notional income for homemakers and the grant of future prospects with respect to them, for the purposes of grant of compensation which can be summarized as follows: a. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. b. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a homemaker attains special significance. It becomes a recognition of the work, labour and sacrifices of homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring dignity to all. c. Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. d. The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. 17 e. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income calculated in such cases, is a component of just compensation.

 REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.19­20 of 2021

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) Nos.18728­29 of 2018]

Kirti & Anr. Etc. ..... Appellant(s)

                                       VERSUS

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ..... Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J:

Leave Granted. 

2. These   civil   appeals,   which   have   been   heard   through   video

conferencing, have been filed by three surviving dependents (who are

two minor daughters and father) of the two deceased, impugning the

judgment dated 17.07.2017 of the High Court of Delhi through which

the motor accident compensation of Rs 40.71 lakhs awarded by the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohini (hereinafter, “Tribunal”) on

24.12.2016 under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (“MV

Page | 1

Act”), was reduced to Rs 22 lakhs.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The deceased couple, Vinod and Poonam, while commuting on a

motorcycle in Delhi at around 7AM on 12.04.2014 were hit at an

intersection by a Santro Car bearing registration ‘DL 7CA 1053’. The

impact immediately incapacitated both the deceased and they soon

passed away from cranio­cerebral damage and haemorrhagic shock

caused by the accident’s blunt­force trauma.  

4. An FIR was registered under Sections 279 and 304 of the Indian

Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter,   “IPC”)   against   the   driver,   and   the

statement of an independent eyewitness (Constable Vishnu Dutt) was

recorded, which evidenced rash driving and negligence on part of the

car­driver. Subsequently, a claim petition was filed under Section 166

of   the   MV   Act   by   the   two   toddler­daughters   and   septuagenarianparents of the deceased. This was contested by the driver and owner

claiming that the deceased were themselves driving negligently and

the accident was as a result of their very own actions. Two witnesses

were   examined   by   the   appellant­claimants   and   none   by   the

respondents. The insurance company (Respondent No. 1) offered as

settlement a compensation of Rs 6.47 lakhs for the death of Poonam

and Rs 10.71 lakhs for Vinod.

Page | 2

5. The Tribunal took note of the chargesheet filed against the driver

in the criminal case and also his failure to step­into the witness box.

Relying on the strong testimony of the independent witness, it was

concluded that the car­driver was indeed  driving rashly and thus

liability ought to be fastened on the respondent­insurer. Regarding the

quantum of compensation, the Tribunal began by determining the

ages of Poonam and Vinod as being 26 and 29 years respectively.

Consequently,   an   age­multiplier   of   17   was   adopted.   Although   the

deceased’s father took a plea that Vinod was earning Rs 14,000 every

month as a teacher at the Pratap Public School in Delhi, but he was

unable   to   substantiate   his   claim   with   any   documentary   evidence.

Thus, minimum wage in Delhi was adopted for computation of loss of

dependency.   An   additional   25%   income   was   accounted   for   future

prospects   of   Poonam,   and   1/3rd  of   Vinod’s   salary   was   deducted

towards personal expenses. Rs 2.50 lakhs was given for each deceased

as compensation for loss of love and affection, estate, and funeral

charges. Thus, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs 40.71 lakhs for

both deceased to the claimants.

6. This   computation   was   challenged   by   the   respondent­insurer

before the High Court, on grounds that the Tribunal had erroneously

relied upon the minimum wage as notified by Government of Delhi as

there was no proof that the deceased were employed in Delhi. Instead,

Page | 3

given   their   established   residence   in   Haryana,   the   minimum   wage

notified for that State ought to be the basis for calculation of loss of

dependency. Simultaneously, addition of future prospects as well as

non­deduction of personal expenses for Poonam was prayed to be

reversed. Further, compensation was sought to be halved on grounds

of   contributory   negligence.   A   categorical   submission   was   made

highlighting the then divergent law on the issue of payment of ‘future

prospects’ to non­permanent employees, pending resolution of which,

it was prayed that no such addition be granted to the claimants.

7. The   High   Court   concurred   with   these   contentions   and

consequently   reduced   the   notional   income   for   both   deceased   by

adopting the lowest minimum wage applicable for unskilled workers in

Haryana, instead of Delhi. Similarly, 1/3rd  of Poonam’s income was

deducted towards personal expenses and future prospects were denied

to both deceased. However, given the totality of circumstances and

Poonam’s contribution to her household, 25% additional gratuitous

income was added to her salary. The High Court thus brought down

the total compensation payable to the claimants to Rs 22 lakhs.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

8. This reduction has been assailed before us by learned counsel

for the claimants. Re­computation is sought of compensation for loss

Page | 4

of dependency consequent to the decision of the Constitutional Bench

of this Court in National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi1

, which

authoritatively settles the law on future prospects for non­permanent

employees as well. Furthermore, the anomaly between the gratuitous

increase of income between Vinod and Poonam, and the usage of

unskilled minimum wage for Vinod have been brought to our notice. 

9. Learned Counsel for the respondent­insurer, on the other hand,

has sought to forestall any increase in compensation, including under

the ground of future prospects. It is claimed that the High Court’s

decision was a consent order, and that the counsel for the appellants

had   conceded   to   a   lower   computation   under   the   head   of   loss   of

dependency, which thus cannot be challenged before this Court.

ANALYSIS

I. Deduction for Personal Expenses

10. We   have   thoughtfully   considered   the   rival   submissions.     It

cannot be disputed that at the time of death, there in fact were four

dependents of the deceased and not three. The subsequent death of

the   deceased’s   dependent   mother   ought   not   to   be   a   reason   for

reduction of motor accident compensation. Claims and legal liabilities

crystallise at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto

1

 (2017) 16 SCC 680.

Page | 5

ought   not   to   ordinarily   affect   pending   proceedings.   Just   like   how

appellant­claimants   cannot   rely   upon   subsequent   increases   in

minimum wages, the respondent­insurer too cannot seek benefit of

the subsequent death of a dependent during the pendency of legal

proceedings. Similarly, any concession in law made in this regard by

either counsel would not bind the parties, as it is legally settled that

advocates cannot throw­away legal rights or enter into arrangements

contrary to law.2

11. Any   compensation   awarded   by   a   Court   ought   to   be   just,

reasonable   and   consequently   must   undoubtedly   be   guided   by

principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience.3

 Not only did the

family of the deceased consist of septuagenarian parents, but there

were also two toddler­girls, aged merely 3 and 4 years; each of whom

requires exceptional care and expenditure till they reach the stage of

self­dependency. Tragically,  in  addition to  the  married couple, the

negligence of the driver also extinguished the life of the family’s third

child who was a foetus in Poonam’s womb at the time of the accident.

Thus, the appropriate deduction for personal expenses for both Vinod

and Poonam ought to be 1/4th only, and not 1/3rd as applied by the

Tribunal and the High Court, more so when there were four family

members dependent on the deceased.

2  Director of Elementary Education v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo, (2019) 10 SCC 674, ¶ 11.

3  See, Helen C Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corp, (1999) 1 SCC 90, ¶ 28.

Page | 6

II. Assessment of monthly income

12. Second,   although   it   is   correct   that   the   claimants   have   been

unable to produce any document evidencing Vinod’s income, nor have

they established his employment as a teacher; but that doesn’t justify

adoption of the lowest­tier of minimum wage while computing his

income. From the statement of witnesses, documentary evidence­onrecord and circumstances of the accident, it is apparent that Vinod

was comparatively more educationally qualified and skilled. Further,

he   maintained   a   reasonable   standard   of   living   for   his   family   as

evidenced by his use of a motorcycle for commuting. Preserving the

existing standard of living of a deceased’s family is a fundamental

endeavour of motor accident compensation law.4

  Thus, at the very

least, the minimum wage of Rs 6197 as applicable to skilled workers

during April 2014 in the State of Haryana ought to be applied in his

case. 

III. Addition of Future Prospects

13. Third  and   most   importantly,   it   is   unfair   on   part   of   the

respondent­insurer to contest grant of future prospects considering

their submission before the High Court that such compensation ought

not   to   be   paid   pending   outcome   of   the  Pranay   Sethi   (supra)

4 See, RK Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2019) 14 SCC 1, ¶ 9.

Page | 7

reference. Nevertheless, the law on this point is no longer res integra,

and stands crystalised,  as is clear from the following extract of the

afore­cited Constitutional Bench judgment5

:

“59.4. In case the deceased was self­employed or on a fixed

salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should

be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40

years. An  addition of 25% where the deceased  was between

the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was

between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the

necessary  method   of   computation.   The   established   income

means the income minus the tax component.”

[Emphasis supplied]

14.   Given how both deceased were below 40 years and how they

have   not   been   established   to   be   permanent   employees,   future

prospects to the tune of 40% must be paid. The argument that no

such future prospects ought to be allowed for those with notional

income, is both incorrect in law6

  and without merit considering the

constant inflation­induced increase in wages. It would be sufficient to

quote   the   observations   of   this   Court   in  Hem   Raj   v.   Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd.

7

, as it puts at rest any argument concerning nonpayment of future prospects to the deceased in the present case: 

“7. We are of the view that there cannot be distinction where

there   is   positive   evidence   of   income   and   where   minimum

5

 National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, ¶ 59.4.

6  Sunita Tokas v. New India Insurance Co Ltd, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1045.

7

(2018) 15 SCC 654.

Page | 8

income   is   determined   on   guesswork   in   the   facts   and

circumstances   of   a   case.   Both   the   situations   stand   at   the

same   footing.  Accordingly,   in   the  present   case,  addition  of

40% to the income assessed by the Tribunal is required to be

made..”

[Emphasis supplied]

IV. Other heads and division of compensation

15. Finally,   given   the   lack   of   arguments   on   the   other   heads   of

funeral charges, loss of estate, love, and affection; there arises no

cause of alteration. We similarly see no infirmity with the High Court’s

adoption of 17 as the age­multiplier, award of 9% interest, calculation

of Poonam’s notional income or the division of total compensation in

the ratio of 1:2:2 between the grandfather and the two girls. For ready

reference, a comparative table of revised compensation after suitable

increases would thus be as follows:

TRIBUNAL HIGH COURT SUPREME COURT

Head Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam

A Monthly Income 8554 9438 5547.1 5547.1 6197.1 5547.1

B

Deduction 

towards Personal 

Expenses

33% None 33% 33% 25% 25%

C Age Multiplier 17 17 17 17 17 17

D

Adjustment for 

Future Prospects None 25% None None 40% 40%

E

Increase for 

Special 

Circumstances

None None None 25% None 25%

F

Funeral Charges 

& Loss of Estate 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000

Page | 9

G

Total per 

deceased 1413344 2656690 1004406 1193007 1577419 1735236

(rounded off) 1414000 2657000 1005000 1195000 1580000 1740000

Total 

compensation 4071000 2200000 3320000

CONCLUSION

16. For the reasons afore­stated, the appeals are allowed in­part.

The total motor accident compensation of Rs 22 lakhs awarded by the

High Court to the claimant­appellants is increased by Rs 11.20 lakhs

to reach a new total of Rs 33.20 lakhs. The enhanced amount of

compensation shall be paid within two months along with interest @

9% p.a. from the date of filing of the Detailed Accident Report i.e.

23.05.2014, and shall be apportioned per the terms laid down by the

Tribunal.

…………………………….. J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………… J.

(S. ABDUL NAZEER)

…………………………...J.

(SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 05.01.2021

Page | 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 19­20 OF 2021

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 18728­18729 OF 2018)

KIRTI & ANR. ETC.             …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                         …RESPONDENT

    JUDGMENT

    N.V. RAMANA, J.

1. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared

by   my   learned   brother,   Surya   Kant,   J.,   and   am   in   complete

agreement   with   him.   However,   I   thought   to   supplement   the

reasoning   in   his   judgment,   with   respect   to   the   question   of

notional income of a housewife and whether future prospects

should apply to the same or not. 

2. There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the

Court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first

category   of   cases   relates   to   those   wherein   the   victim   was

employed, but the claimants are not able to prove her actual

income,   before   the   Court.   In   such   a   situation,   the   Court

1

Reportable

“guesses” the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on

record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her

family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field,

the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations.

3. The   second   category   of   cases   relates   to   those   situations

wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a

non­earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker.

Needless to say, compensation in such cases is extremely difficult

to quantify.

4. The Court often follows different principles for determining

the compensation towards a non­earning victim in order to arrive

at an amount which would be just in the facts and circumstances

of the case. Some of these involve the determination of notional

income. Whenever notional income is determined in such cases,

different considerations and factors are taken into account. For

instance, for students, the Court often considers the course that

they   are   studying,   their   academic   proficiency,   the   family

background, etc., to determine and fix what they could earn in

the future. [See M. R. Krishna Murthi v. New India Assurance

Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 315] 

5. One category of non­earning victims that Courts are often

2

called upon to calculate the compensation for are homemakers.

The granting of compensation for homemakers on a pecuniary

basis, as in the present case, has been considered by this Court

earlier   on   numerous   occasions.   A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this

Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197,

while dealing with compensation for the victims of a fire during a

function, granted compensation to housewives on the basis of the

services  rendered  by  them  in  the  house,  and  their  age.  This

Court, in that case, held as follows:

“10. So   far   as   the  deceased   housewives   are

concerned, in the absence of any data and as

the housewives were not earning any income,

attempt   has   been   made   to   determine   the

compensation   on   the   basis   of   services

rendered by them to the house. On the basis of

the   age   group   of   the   housewives,   appropriate

multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of

the value of services rendered to the house by the

housewives, which has been arrived at Rs 12,000

per annum in cases of some and Rs 10,000 for

others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true

that the claimants, who ought to have given data

for determination of compensation, did not assist

in   any   manner   by   providing   the   data   for

estimating the value of services rendered by such

housewives.   But   even   in   the   absence   of   such

data   and  taking   into   consideration   the

multifarious   services   rendered   by   the

housewives   for  managing   the   entire   family,

even   on   a  modest   estimation,   should   be   Rs

3000 per month and Rs 36,000 per annum…”

(emphasis supplied)

3

6. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,

(2010)  9  SCC  218, this Court, while dealing with the grant of

compensation for the death of a housewife due to a motor vehicle

accident, held as follows:

“26. In India the courts have recognised that

the   contribution   made   by   the   wife   to   the

house   is   invaluable  and  cannot  be  computed

in   terms   of  money.   The   gratuitous   services

rendered   by   the   wife   with   true   love   and

affection to the children and her husband and

managing   the   household   affairs   cannot   be

equated with the services rendered by others.

A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is

in   the   constant   attendance   of   the   family

throughout   the   day   and   night   unless   she   is

employed   and   is   required   to   attend   the

employer's work for particular hours. She takes

care of all the requirements of the husband and

children including cooking of food, washing of

clothes,   etc.   She   teaches   small   children   and

provides invaluable guidance to them for their

future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do

the   household   work,   such   as   cooking   food,

washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house

clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for

a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her

husband and children.

27. It is not possible to quantify any amount

in   lieu   of   the   services   rendered   by   the

wife/mother   to   the   family   i.e.   the   husband

    and   children.  However,   for   the   purpose   of

award   of   compensation   to   the   dependants,

some  pecuniary   estimate  has   to  be  made  of

the services of the housewife/mother. In that

context,   the   term   “services”   is   required   to   be

given a broad meaning and must be construed by

taking into account the loss of personal care and

4

attention given by the deceased to her children

as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They

are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of

the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the

deceased. The amount payable to the dependants

cannot be diminished on the ground that some

close relation like a grandmother may volunteer

to render some of the services to the family which

the deceased was giving earlier.”

(emphasis supplied)

The above pronouncement has been followed by this Court in its

recent judgment in Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co.

Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 521, wherein the notional income of

a deceased housewife was calculated for the purposes of granting

compensation in a motor accident case.

7. Before   discussing   this   topic   further,   it   is   necessary   to

comment on its gendered nature. In India, according to the 2011

Census,   nearly   159.85   million   women   stated   that   “household

work”   was   their   main   occupation,   as   compared   to   only   5.79

million men. 

8. In   fact,   the   recently   released   Report   of   the   National

Statistical   Office   of   the   Ministry   of   Statistics   &   Programme

Implementation, Government of India called “Time Use in India2019”, which is the first Time Use Survey in the country and

collates   information   from   1,38,799   households   for   the   period

January,   2019   to   December,   2019,   reflects   the   same   gender

5

disparity.1

  The key findings of the survey suggest that, on an

average,   women   spend   nearly   299   minutes   a   day   on   unpaid

domestic   services   for   household   members   versus   97   minutes

spent by men on average.2

 Similarly, in a day, women on average

spend 134 minutes on unpaid caregiving services for household

members   as   compared   to   the   76   minutes   spent   by   men   on

average.3

 The total time spent on these activities per day makes

the picture in India even more clear­ women on average spent

16.9 and 2.6 percent of their day on unpaid domestic services

and   unpaid   caregiving   services   for   household   members

respectively, while men spent 1.7 and 0.8 percent.4

9. It is curious to note that this is not just a phenomenon

unique to India, but is prevalent all over the world. A 2009 Report

by a Commission set up by the French Government, analyzing

data from six countries,  viz. Germany, Italy, United Kingdom,

France, Finland and the United States of America, highlighted

similar findings:

“117.   Gender   differences   in   time   use   are

significant.   In   each   of   the   countries   under

consideration,  men   spend  more   time   in   paid

work than women and the converse is true for

unpaid   work.   Men   also   spend   more   time   on

leisure   than   women.  The   implication   is   that

1 National Statistical Office, Time Use in India­ 2019 (September, 2020).

2 Id, at 56.

3 Id, at 54.

4 Id, at x.

6

women  provide  household  services  but  other

members of the household benefit…”

5

(emphasis supplied)

10. The sheer amount of time and effort that is dedicated to

household work by individuals, who are more likely to be women

than men, is not surprising when one considers the plethora of

activities   a   housemaker   undertakes.   A   housemaker   often

prepares food for the entire family, manages the procurement of

groceries   and   other   household   shopping   needs,   cleans   and

manages the house and its surroundings, undertakes decoration,

repairs   and   maintenance   work,   looks   after   the   needs   of   the

children   and   any   aged   member   of   the   household,   manages

budgets and so much more. In rural households, they often also

assist in the sowing, harvesting and transplanting activities in

the field, apart from tending cattle [See  Arun Kumar  Agrawal

(supra); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Minor Deepika rep. by

her   guardian   and   next   friend,   Ranganathan,   2009   SCC

OnLine Mad 828]. However, despite all the above, the conception

that   housemakers   do   not   “work”   or   that   they   do   not   add

economic value to the household is a problematic idea that has

persisted for many years and must be overcome.   

11. The   concurring   opinion   in   the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal

5 Stiglitz et al., Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 

Social Progress, 117 (2009).

7

judgment (supra), has highlighted this bias:

“44. This bias is shockingly prevalent in the work

of census. In the Census of 2001 it appears that

those   who   are   doing   household   duties   like

cooking,   cleaning   of   utensils,   looking   after

children, fetching water, collecting firewood have

been   categorised   as   non­workers   and   equated

with   beggars,   prostitutes   and   prisoners   who,

according   to   the   census,   are   not   engaged   in

economically   productive   work.   As   a   result   of

such categorisation about 36 crores (367 million)

women   in   India   have   been   classified   in   the

Census   of   India,   2001   as   non­workers   and

placed in the category of beggars, prostitutes and

prisoners.   This   entire   exercise   of   census

operations is done under an Act of Parliament.”

12. In fact, this unfortunate silence when it comes to the value

of housework has been a problem which was identified as far

back as in 1920, when the economist Pigou noted the oddity and

contradictions when it came to the calculation of the contribution

of women in the national income, by stating that: 

“…the services rendered by women enter into the

dividend when they are rendered in exchange for

wages, whether in the factory or in the home, but

do not enter into it when they are rendered by

mothers   and   wives   gratuitously   to   their   own

families. Thus, if a man marries his housekeeper

or   his   cook,   the   national   dividend   is

diminished”.6

This   issue   was   further   focused   on   by   those   in   the   field   of

feminism economics in the 1970s and 1980s, who criticized the

traditional   labour   statistics   which   did   not   consider   unpaid

6 Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 44 (1920).

8

domestic work and therefore undervalued women’s role in the

economy.7

13. On considering the growing awareness around this issue,

the   United   Nations   Committee   on   the   Elimination   of

Discrimination against Women adopted General Recommendation

No.   17   on   the   “Measurement   and   quantification   of   the

unremunerated domestic activities of women and their recognition

in   the   gross   national   product”   in   1991.   The   General

Recommendation   affirmed   that   “the   measurement   and

quantification of the unremunerated domestic activities of women,

which   contribute   to   development   in   each   country,   will   help   to

reveal the de facto economic role of women”.

14. It is worth noting that the above General Recommendation

is passed in furtherance of Article 11 of the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women which

relates to ending discrimination against women in the field of

employment, a Convention that India has ratified. 

15. The   issue   of   fixing   notional   income   for   a   homemaker,

therefore,   serves   extremely   important   functions.   It   is   a

recognition of the multitude of women who are engaged in this

activity,   whether   by   choice   or   as   a   result   of   social/cultural

7 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Guide on Valuing Unpaid Household Service 

Work, 2 (2017).

9

norms. It signals to society at large that the law and the Courts of

the land believe in the value of the labour, services and sacrifices

of   homemakers.   It   is   an   acceptance   of   the   idea   that   these

activities contribute in a very real way to the economic condition

of the family, and the economy of the nation, regardless of the

fact that it may have been traditionally excluded from economic

analyses. It is a reflection of changing attitudes and mindsets and

of our international law obligations. And, most importantly, it is a

step   towards   the   constitutional   vision   of   social   equality   and

ensuring dignity of life to all individuals. 

16. Returning to the question of how such notional income of a

homemaker is to be calculated, there can be no fixed approach. It

is to be understood that in such cases the attempt by the Court

is to fix an approximate economic value for all the work that a

homemaker does, impossible though that task may be. Courts

must keep in mind the idea of awarding just compensation in

such cases, looking to the facts and circumstances [See  R.K.

Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1]. 

17. One   method   of   computing   the   notional   income   of   a

homemaker   is   by   using   the   formula   provided   in   the   Second

Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which has now been

omitted by the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019. The Second

10

Schedule   provided   that   the   income   of   a   spouse   could   be

calculated as one­third of the income of the earning surviving

spouse. This was the method ultimately adopted by the Court in

the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal  (supra)  case.   However,   rationale

behind fixing the ratio as one­third is not very clear. [See Arun

Kumar Agrawal (supra)]

18. Apart from the above, scholarship around this issue could

provide some guidance as to other methods to determine the

notional income for a homemaker.8

 Some of these methods were

highlighted by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the

case of Minor Deepika (supra) which held as follows:

“10. The Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles

Act gives a value to the compensation payable in

respect of those who had no income prior to the

accident and for a spouse, it says that one­third

of the income of the earning surviving spouse

should be the value. Exploration on the internet

shows that there have been efforts to understand

the value of a homemaker's unpaid labour by

different methods. One is, the opportunity cost

which evaluates her wages by assessing what

she would have earned had she not remained

at   home,   viz.,   the   opportunity   lost.   The

second   is,   the   partnership   method   which

assumes that a marriage is an equal economic

partnership   and   in   this   method,   the

homemaker's   salary   is   valued   at   half   her

husband's   salary.   Yet   another  method   is   to

evaluate   homemaking   by   determining   how

8 See Ann Chadeau, What is Households’ Non­Market Production Worth, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES

NO. 18 (1992); Also see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supra note 7. 

11

much it would cost to replace the homemaker

with   paid   workers.   This   is   called   the

Replacement Method.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. However, it must be remembered that all the above methods

are merely suggestions. There can be no exact calculation or

formula that can magically ascertain the true value provided by

an individual gratuitously for those that they are near and dear

to. The attempt of the Court in such matters should therefore be

towards determining, in the best manner possible, the truest

approximation   of   the   value   added   by   a   homemaker   for   the

purpose of granting monetary compensation. 

20. Whichever method a Court ultimately chooses to value the

activities of a homemaker, would ultimately depend on the facts

and circumstances of the case.  The Court needs to keep in mind

its duty to award just compensation, neither assessing the same

conservatively,   nor   so   liberally   as   to   make   it   a   bounty   to

claimants [National   Insurance   Company   Limited   v.   Pranay

Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680;  Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4

SCC 413].

21. Once notional income has been determined, the question

remains as to whether escalation for future prospects should be

granted   with   regard   to   it.   Initially,   the   awarding   of   future

12

prospects by this Court was related to the stability of the job held

by   the   victim   [See  General   Manager,   Kerala   State   Road

Transport   Corporation,   Trivandrum   v.   Susamma   Thomas

(Mrs), (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit (Smt) v. Balwant Yadav,

(1996) 3 SCC 179]. This focus on the stability of the job of the

victim, while awarding future prospects, was continued in the

judgment   of   this   Court   in  Sarla   Verma   (Smt)   v.   Delhi

Transport Corporation,  (2009)  6 SCC  121  wherein the Court

held as follows:  

“24. In Susamma   Thomas [(1994)   2   SCC   176]

this Court increased the income by nearly 100%,

in Sarla Dixit [(1996) 3 SCC 179] the income was

increased   only   by   50%   and   in Abati

Bezbaruah [(2003) 3 SCC 148] the income was

increased   by   a   mere   7%.   In   view   of   the

imponderables   and   uncertainties,   we   are   in

favour   of   adopting   as   a   rule   of   thumb,   an

addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual

salary income of the deceased towards future

prospects,   where   the   deceased   had   a

permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where

the annual income is in the taxable range, the

words “actual salary” should be read as “actual

salary   less   tax”).   The   addition   should   be   only

30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50

years. There should be no addition, where the

age   of   the   deceased   is   more   than   50   years.

Though   the   evidence   may   indicate   a   different

percentage   of   increase,   it   is   necessary   to

standardise   the   addition   to   avoid   different

yardsticks being applied or different methods of

calculation being adopted. Where the deceased

was   self­employed   or   was   on   a   fixed   salary

13

(without   provision   for   annual   increments,

etc.),   the   courts   will   usually   take   only   the

actual   income   at   the   time   of   death.   A

departure  therefrom  should  be  made  only   in

rare   and   exceptional   cases   involving   special

circumstances.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. However, there was a shift in jurisprudence regarding future

prospects with the five­Judge Bench decision of this Court in

Pranay Sethi (supra). This Court extended the benefit regarding

future prospects to even self­employed persons, or those on a

fixed salary. The Court held as follows:

“57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration,

we are disposed to think when we accept the

principle of standardisation,  there   is  really  no

rationale not to apply the said principle to the

self­employed  or  a  person  who   is  on   a   fixed

salary.   To   follow   the   doctrine   of   actual

income  at  the  time  of  death  and  not  to  add

any amount with regard to future prospects to

the income for the purpose of determination

of   multiplicand   would   be   unjust.   The

determination   of   income   while   computing

compensation has to include future prospects

so   that   the   method   will   come   within   the

ambit   and   sweep   of   just   compensation   as

postulated  under  Section  168  of   the   Act. In

case of a deceased who had held a permanent job

with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is

an   acceptable   certainty.   But   to   state   that   the

legal representatives of a deceased who was on a

fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of

future prospects for the purpose of computation

of   compensation   would   be   inapposite.   It   is

because the criterion of distinction between the

14

two in that event would be certainty on the one

hand   and   staticness   on   the   other.   One   may

perceive   that   the   comparative   measure   is

certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the

other but such a perception is fallacious.  It   is

because   the   price   rise   does   affect   a   selfemployed   person;   and   that   apart   there   is

always   an   incessant   effort   to   enhance   one's

income   for   sustenance.   The   purchasing

capacity   of   a   salaried   person   on   permanent

job   when   increases   because   of   grant   of

increments and pay revision or for some other

change in service conditions, there is always a

competing   attitude   in   the   private   sector   to

enhance   the   salary   to   get   better   efficiency

from  the employees. Similarly,  a person who

is   self­employed   is   bound   to   garner   his

resources  and  raise  his   charges/fees   so   that

he  can   live  with  same   facilities.…Taking into

consideration the  cumulative   factors,  namely,

passage   of   time,   the   changing   society,

escalation of price, the change in price index,

the   human   attitude   to   follow   a   particular

pattern of life,  etc., an addition of 40% of the

established   income   of   the   deceased   towards

future   prospects   and   where   the   deceased   was

below 40 years an addition of 25% where the

deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years

would be reasonable.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. The rationale behind the awarding of future prospects is

therefore no longer merely about the type of profession, whether

permanent or otherwise, although the percentage awarded is still

dependent on the same. The awarding of future prospects is now

a part of the duty of the Court to grant just compensation, taking

into account the realities of life, particularly of inflation, the quest

15

of individuals to better their circumstances and those of their

loved ones, rising wage rates and the impact of experience on the

quality of work.   

24. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is

quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a Court

in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where the

victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable to prove

the income before the Court. Once the victim has been proved to

be employed at some venture, the necessary corollary is that they

would   be   earning   an   income.   It   is   clear   that   no   rational

distinction can be drawn with respect to the granting of future

prospects merely on the basis that their income was not proved,

particularly   when   the   Court   has   determined   their   notional

income. 

25. When it comes to the second category of cases, relating to

notional income for non­earning victims, it is my opinion that the

above principle applies with equal vigor, particularly with respect

to homemakers. Once notional income is determined, the effects

of inflation would equally apply. Further, no one would ever say

that the improvements in skills that come with experience do not

take place in the domain of work within the household. It is

worth noting that, although not extensively discussed, this Court

16

has been granting future prospects even in cases pertaining to

notional income, as has been highlighted by my learned brother,

Surya Kant, J., in his opinion [Hem Raj v. Oriental Insurance

Company Limited, (2018) 15 SCC 654; Sunita Tokas v. New

India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 688].

26. Therefore,   on   the   basis   of   the   above,   certain   general

observations can be made regarding the issue of calculation of

notional   income   for   homemakers   and   the   grant   of   future

prospects  with  respect   to   them,   for  the   purposes  of   grant   of

compensation which can be summarized as follows:

a. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect

to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. 

b. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with

an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the

same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a

homemaker   attains   special   significance.   It   becomes   a

recognition   of   the   work,   labour   and   sacrifices   of

homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also

in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations

and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring

dignity to all.

c. Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the

notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts

and circumstances of the case.

d. The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and

fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts

and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing

the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. 

17

e. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income

calculated   in   such   cases,   is   a   component   of   just

compensation. 

27. With the above observations, I concur with the opinion of

my learned brother.

     ........................J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI; 

January 05, 2021.

18

the sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment imposed by the learned Special Court while convicting the accused for the offences under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988, confirmed by the High Court, is hereby reduced to one year and one­month rigorous imprisonment. The order of fine is not upset.

 NON­REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.            OF 2021

    (Arising from SLP(Criminal) No.5832/2019)

S.Sundara Kumar …Appellant

Versus

State Represented by

The Inspector of Police, Vigilance

And Anti­Corruption, Thoothukudi District,

Tamil Nadu …Respondent

J U D G M E N T

M.R. SHAH, J.

1. Leave granted.

2. Feeling   aggrieved   and   dissatisfied   with   the   impugned

judgment and order dated 23.11.2018 passed by the Madurai

Bench of the Madras High Court in Criminal Appeal (MD) No. 357

of 2008, by which the High Court has dismissed the said appeal

preferred by the appellant herein – original accused and has

confirmed the judgment and order of conviction and sentence

passed   by   the   learned   Special   Judge­cum­Chief   Judicial

1

Magistrate,   Thoothukudi   dated   23.07.2008   passed   in   Special

Case No.2 of 2004, convicting the accused – appellant herein for

the offences under Sections 7, 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the

Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 and by which the learned

Special   Judge   sentenced   the   accused   to   undergo   rigorous

imprisonment for a period of two years with fine of Rs.5,000/­,

the original accused has preferred the present appeal.

3. At the outset, it is required to be noted that earlier by order

dated   02.12.2019,   this   Court   issued   the   limited   notice   on

quantum of sentence only. Meaning thereby the conviction of the

appellant – original accused came to be confirmed by this Court.

Therefore, now the present appeal is required to be considered

qua the quantum of sentence only.

4. Learned   counsel   appearing   on   behalf   of   the   appellant   –

original   accused   has   submitted   that   by   now   the   appellant   –

original accused has undergone approximately one year and onemonth rigorous imprisonment.  It is submitted that the accusedappellant is already dismissed from service on being convicted for

the   offences   under   the   Prevention   of   Corruption   Act.     It   is

submitted that the appellant is a senior citizen aged about 69/70

years.  Therefore, it is prayed to reduce the sentence imposed by

2

the learned Special Court, confirmed by the High Court, to the

sentence already undergone.

5. Learned   counsel   appearing  on   behalf   of   the   respondentState, as such, has opposed the prayer and has submitted that

the   appellant   has   been   convicted   for   the   offences   under   the

Prevention of Corruption Act and therefore no leniency may be

shown in favour of the accused.

6. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and in the

facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that

out of two years sentence imposed by the learned Special Court,

confirmed   by   the   High   Court,   the   appellant   has   already

undergone   approximately   one   year   and   one­month   and

considering the fact that the appellant is a senior citizen aged

about 70 years and that he is already dismissed from service, we

are of the opinion that the ends of justice would be met if the

sentence of two years rigorous imprisonment as imposed by the

learned Special Court, confirmed by the High Court, is reduced to

that of one year and one­month rigorous imprisonment.

7. In view of the above and in the facts and circumstances of

the case, the appeal is partly allowed.  The judgment and order of

conviction passed by the learned Special Court, confirmed by the

3

High Court, is hereby confirmed.  However, the sentence of two

years   rigorous   imprisonment   imposed   by   the   learned   Special

Court   while   convicting   the   accused   for   the   offences   under

Sections   7,   13(2)   read   with   13(1)(d)   of   the   Prevention   of

Corruption Act, 1988, confirmed by the High Court, is hereby

reduced to one year and one­month rigorous imprisonment.  The

order of fine is not upset.  The appellant herein be released on

completion of one year and one­month rigorous imprisonment, if

not required in any other case.

………………………………..J.

[ASHOK BHUSHAN]

………………………………..J.

[R. SUBHASH REDDY]

NEW DELHI; ………………………………..J.

JANUARY 13, 2021. [M.R. SHAH]

4

the seniority of the contesting respondents will be decided not on the basis of the date of their promotion but on the basis of the date of their acquiring the qualification while occupying the promoted posts.

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5189­5192  0F 2017

ASHOK KUMAR AND ORS. ETC. ETC. …   APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

THE STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR &

ORS.                               …  RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CONTEMPT PETITION (C) NOs.392­395 OF 2019

in 

CIVIL APPEAL NOs.5189­5192  0F 2017

J U D G M E N T

V. Ramasubramanian, J.

1. Challenging  a  common  order  passed in   a  batch  of  Letters

Patent   Appeals   confirming   the   Judgment   of   the   learned   Single

Judge,   quashing   an   administrative   Order   of   the   Chief   Justice

prescribing certain qualifications for promotion to the post of Head

Assistant along with a power of relaxation, persons who were fully

1

qualified as per the rules at the time of appointment, have come up

with the above Civil Appeals.

2. We have heard the learned Counsel for the appellants, the

learned Counsel for the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir and the

learned Counsel for the contesting respondents.  

3. The contesting private respondents were originally appointed

as   peons   (Class­IV)   during   the   period   1989­1995.   They   were

promoted as Junior Assistants in the year 1997 and as Senior

Assistants in 1998­1999. Up to this stage of their career, there were

no hiccups.

4. In   contrast,   the   appellants   in   these   appeals   were   directly

recruited to the post of Junior Assistants in the year 1998. They

were promoted as Senior Assistants on various dates in the years

2001, 2005, 2006 and 2008. 

5. The High Court of Jammu & Kashmir is a creation of the

Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir.  Section 108 of the Constitution

of   Jammu   &   Kashmir   which   is   similar   to   Article   229   of   the

Constitution of India deals with “Officers and servants of the High

Court”.  Under   Sub­section   (1)   of   Section   108,   appointments   of

2

officers and servants of the High Court shall be made by the Chief

Justice of the Court or such other person as the Chief Justice may

direct. The conditions of Service of the officers and servants of the

High   Court,   as   per   Sub­section   (2),   shall   be   such   as   may   be

prescribed by the Rules made by the High Court with the approval

of the Governor. Sub­sections (1) and (2) of Section 108 reads as

follows:

“108.  Officers and servants of the High Court. ­ (1) Appointments

of officers and servants of the High Court shall be made by the

Chief Justice of the Court or such other Judge or officer of the

Court as he may direct;

Provided that the Governor may by rule require that in such cases

as may be specified in the rule no person not already attached to

the Court shall be appointed to any office connected with the Court

save after consultation with the State Public Service Commission;

(2) Subject to the provisions of any law made by the Legislature,

the conditions of service of the officers and servants of the High

Court shall be such as may be prescribed by rules made by the

High Court with the approval of the Governor.”

6. In   exercise   of   the   powers   conferred   by   Sub­section   (2)   of

Section 108, the High Court issued a set of Rules known as the

Jammu & Kashmir High Court Staff (Conditions of Service) Rules,

1968, with the approval of the Governor of the State. While Rule 4

stipulates   that   all   appointments   of   the   staff   of   the   High   Court

3

including promotions shall be made by the Chief Justice, the power

to   lay   down   the   qualifications   and   to   determine   the   mode   of

recruitment is conferred by Rule 6 upon the Chief Justice.  Rule 6

reads as follows:

“6. Qualifications and mode of recruitment. – The Chief Justice may

from  time  to time  lay down the  qualifications  of  a  member  of

service and determine the mode of recruitment.”

7. In exercise of the power conferred by Rule 6, the Chief Justice

of the High Court of Jammu & Kashmir issued an Office Order

No.579 dated 24.10.2008, prescribing the qualifications as well as

the mode of recruitment for appointment and promotion to various

posts in the High Court. The method of recruitment, the minimum

qualification required, the experience, if any, and the pay scales

stipulated for three posts, namely, the posts of Head Assistant,

Senior Assistant and Junior Assistant, in the Table contained in the

Chief Justice’s Order dated 24.10.2008 are of importance for the

appeals on hand and hence they are reproduced as follows:­

Post Method of

recruitment

Minimum

Educational

Qualification

Experience

, if any

Pay Scale

Head By   promotion Graduate   from   a Two years 5000­8000

4

Assistant from   amongst

Senior   Assistants

on   the   basis   of

seniority­cummerit

recognised

University

Senior

Assistant

By   promotion

from   amongst

Junior   Assistants

on   the   basis   of

merit­cumSeniority

Graduate   from   a

recognised

University

Two years 4000­6000

Junior

Assistant

(A) 75% by direct

recruitment

(B)   25%   by

promotion   from

amongst   Class­IV

employees   on   the

basis of Senioritycum­merit

(A) Graduate from

a   recognised

University

(B) Matriculation

­ 3050­4910

8. The Office Order No.579 dated 24.10.2008 issued by the Chief

Justice of the State of Jammu & Kashmir, contained a Note towards

the end.  The Note reads as follows:

“1. If the candidate(s) is/are not available from the relevant feeding

cadre then the selection/appointment shall be made from amongst

the candidates from other equivalent cadre(s).

2. Since the requirement of graduation for entry into the High

Court service was prescribed vide Notification dated 25.4.1987, at

that time officials having qualification less than graduation entered

the   service.   Such   officials   having   during   this   period   gained

sufficient   experience   in   the   working   of   the   administration,   the

Chief   Justice   may   on   his   own   or   on   the   recommendations   of

committee,   if   soconstituted,   relax   the   qualification   in   cases

ofofficers/officials who have made their entry into the service on or

before   the   25th  April,   1987.     Further   the   minimum   period   of

experience   can   also   be   relaxed   in   exceptional   and   appropriate

cases.  The officials can get only one relaxation at the time.”

5

9. It is relevant to note at this stage that the prescription of the

minimum educational qualification of a graduation, was not an

innovation by the Chief Justice, made all of a sudden in the year

2008. It appears that even way back on 25.04.1987, graduation was

prescribed as a qualification for promotion to the post of Head

Assistant.   Keeping   this   in   mind,   let   us   now   go   back   to   the

background in which the controversy on hand arose.

10. On 26.10.2008, persons like the appellants who were directly

recruited as Junior Assistants in year 1998 with the qualification of

graduation, were promoted as Head Assistants from the post of

Senior   Assistants.   It   appears   that   still   some   vacancies   were

available and hence the contesting respondents­herein who entered

service as Class­IV employees and who had risen upto the position

of   Senior   Assistants,   were   also   promoted   as   Head   Assistants.

However,  such   promotions   were  intended  to   fill  up   the  gap  till

eligible candidates were available.

11. Challenging   the   promotions   so   granted   to   the   contesting

respondents­herein, on the ground that they were not qualified at

6

the relevant point of time, a writ petition in Writ Petition No.1751 of

2008 was filed. On 22.04.2010 the writ petition was allowed and

the   Order  of  the   promotion  dated  24.11.2008  of  the  contesting

respondents was set aside.

12. The affected parties filed appeals in LPA Nos.45 and 84 of

2010,   but   those   appeals   were   dismissed   on   30.08.2011.   As   a

consequence thereof, all persons like the appellants­herein,  who

were   left   out   earlier,   were   promoted   on   30.08.2011   as   Head

Assistants.

13. Finding that the benefit promotion that came to them was

short lived and also finding that this was on account of the office

Order   dated   24.10.2008   of   the   Chief   Justice,   the   contesting

respondents­herein  filed   a   set   of   writ   petitions   in   Writ   Petition

Nos.489 of 2010, 2681 of 2011, 2344 of 2011 and 501 of 2012.

14. By a common Order dated 30.08.2013, a learned Judge of the

High Court allowed the set of four writ petitions and quashed the

Chief Justice’s Order dated 24.10.2008. Primarily, the reasoning of

the   learned   Judge   was  (i)  that   all   persons   working   as   Senior

Assistants constituted a homogenous group and hence there cannot

7

be   any   differentiation   among   them   on   the   basis   of   educational

qualifications;  (ii)  that the Chief Justice’s order dated 24.10.2008

was not put up before the Full Court for approval; (iii) that Note­2

of   the   Chief   Justice’s   Order   restricts   the   power   of   relaxation

available to the Chief Justice only to cases of persons appointed

before 25.04.1987 and hence it is invalid; and (iv) that the Order of

the Chief Justice had the effect of affecting individuals adversely

with retrospective effect.

15. Challenging   the   Order   of   learned   Judge   dated   30.08.2013

passed   in   favour   of   the   contesting   respondents­herein,  the

appellants­herein  filed   a   set   of   Letters   Patent   Appeals.   These

appeals were dismissed by a Division Bench of the High Court by a

final Order dated 16.04.2016. It is against the said Order that the

appellants are before us.

16. On 13.05.2016, notice was ordered by this Court in the special

leave petitions. An interim stay of the Order of the Division Bench of

the High Court was also granted. Subsequently leave was granted

and the appeals are before us.

8

17. It appears that after this Court granted an interim stay on

13.05.2016, an office order was issued on 29.06.2016 regularising

the services of a candidate who was an undergraduate and who was

given out of turn promotion.   Subsequently a few more orders of

similar nature were issued forcing the appellants to move contempt

petitions in Contempt Petition (C) Nos.392­395 of 2019.   These

contempt petitions were also taken up along with the main appeals.

18. The impugned Judgment is assailed on the grounds inter alia:

(i)  that a classification is permissible on the basis of educational

qualifications, even within a homogenous group, for the purpose of

promotion to a higher post; (ii) that an order passed by the Chief

Justice in exercise of the power conferred by Rule 6 need not go

before the Full Court; (iii) that the order of the Chief Justice dated

24.10.2008 does not curtail the power of relaxation available to the

Chief Justice; and (iv) that the order of the Chief Justice was not

actually retrospective in nature.

19. In addition to the above contentions, it is also submitted by

the   learned   Counsel   for   the   appellants   that   as   on   date,   those

9

contesting respondents who are now in service, have all acquired a

degree and that therefore the question that remains to be answered

is only one of seniority.  Therefore, it is submitted by the learned

counsel for the appellants that if no one is reverted and if the power

of the Chief Justice to prescribe the qualifications under Rule 6 is

upheld, then the long standing lis  can be put to an end by fixing

seniority on the basis of possession of qualifications at the time of

appointment/promotion to the relevant post.

20. However, it is contended by the learned Counsel appearing for

the   contesting   respondents   that   once   a   person   has   been

appointed/promoted,   he   becomes   part   of   a   homogenous   class

within   which   there   can   be   no   differentiation   and   that   what   is

applicable to the case on hand is only Rule 5 of the Jammu &

Kashmir Civil Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules,

1956, (hereinafter referred to as “CCA Rules, 1956”) under which the

power of relaxation vests with  the Government and that under Rule

18   of   these   Rules,   it   is   for   the   Government   to   prescribe   the

qualifications for appointment to any service.

21. We have carefully considered the rival contentions.

10

22. Before we proceed to analyse the rival contentions, it must be

kept in mind that the contesting respondents­herein have actually

secured a second lease of life, after having failed in the first round

of litigation. After the office Order dated 24.10.2008 was issued by

the   Chief   Justice   prescribing   the   qualifications   for   direct

recruitment/promotion to various posts, the contesting respondents

got   promoted   as   Head   Assistants   on   24.11.2008   only   because

suitable eligible candidates were not available. Their appointments

were set aside in Writ Petition No.1751 of 2008. The appeals filed

against the said Order in LPA Nos.45 and 84 of 2010 were also

dismissed.

23. It is only after their promotion was set aside in the first writ

petition   filed   by   the   qualified   candidates,   that   the   contesting

respondents   woke   up   from   the   slumber   and   initiated   a   second

round of litigation by challenging the Order of the Chief Justice.

24. As a matter of fact, the Order of promotion dated 24.11.2008

promoting the contesting respondents as Head Assistants made it

clear that their appointments were only till eligible and suitable

candidates   are   posted   to   these   posts   and   that   they   can   be

11

considered for regularisation/appointment only if they attain the

qualification   and   experience   prescribed   for   the   post.   But   the

contesting respondents did not choose to challenge the Order of

Chief Justice dated 24.10.2008, until the writ petition filed against

their promotion was allowed by the single Judge and the Order also

got confirmed in writ appeal by the Division Bench.

25. If we come to the grounds of attack to the impugned order of

the Chief Justice, it is clear that the power of the Chief Justice

clearly flowed out of Rule 6 of the Jammu & Kashmir High Court

Staff (Conditions of Service) Rules, 1968. These Rules were issued

by the High Court in exercise of the power conferred by Section

108(2) of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir. These Rules had

the approval of the Governor also. Therefore, the contention of the

respondents that the office order issued by the Chief Justice was

ultra vires, is completely untenable.

26. The CCA Rules, 1956 will have only limited application to the

employees of the High Court. These Rules, by themselves, do not

stipulate   the   qualifications   required   for   appointment   to   any

particular post in the High Court. Rule 18 of the CCA Rules relied

12

upon by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents reads

as follows:

“18. Special Qualification

No person shall be eligible for appointment to any service, class,

category or grade or any post on the cadre thereof unless he­

(a) Possesses such qualification and has passed such special tests

as may be prescribed in that behalf by the Government, or

(b) Possesses such other qualification as may be considered by the

Government to be equivalent to the said special qualifications or

special tests.”

27. But the above Rule has no application to the staff of the High

Court, as Section 108(2) of the Constitution of Jammu & Kashmir

leaves this issue to the High Court.

28. Similarly Rule 5 of the CCA Rules on which reliance is placed

by the learned Counsel for the contesting respondents, also has no

application to the case on hand.  This Rule 5 reads as follows:

“5. Relaxation of rules

Any   of   these   rules   made   under   them,   may   for   reasons   to   be

recorded in writing, be relaxed by the Government in individual

cases if Government is satisfied that a strict application of the rule

would cause hardship to the individual concerned or confer undue

benefit on him.”

13

29. In so far as the staff of the High Court are concerned, Rule 5

has no application. When the Rule making power is vested with the

High Court (subject to the approval of the Governor) and when the

Chief   Justice   is   specifically   empowered   to   prescribe   the

qualifications and method of recruitment, the CCA Rules which are

general in nature cannot be replicated.

30. The High Court was wrong in thinking that Note­2 of the Order

of the Chief Justice curtailed or restricted the power of relaxation

available with him. If the authority conferred with the power to

relax, chooses to regulate the manner of exercise of his own power,

the same cannot be assailed as arbitrary. The notification dated

25.04.1987 prescribed for the first time, graduation as a necessary

qualification. This is why, the Chief Justice chose by his Order, to

limit his own power of relaxation to cases where appointments were

made before the cut off date.

31. The contention that the Order of the Chief Justice affects the

staff adversely with retrospective effect, is completely incorrect. The

Order dated 24.10.2008 did not at all impact the promotions gained

by persons upto 24.10.2008. We are concerned in this case with the

14

competing claims of the appellants and the contesting respondents

for promotion to the post of Head Assistant. The entitlement of

unqualified   candidates   to   seek   promotion   to   the   post   of   Head

Assistant after 24.10.2008, is what was impacted by the Order of

the Chief Justice.

32. The High Court erred in thinking that the impugned action of

the   Chief   Justice   violated   Article   14   by   creating   a   distinction

between graduates and non graduates among the same category of

persons who constituted a homogenous class.  

33. Way Back in 1968, the Constitution Bench of this Court held

in the State of Mysore & Anr. vs. P. Narasinga Rao1

, that Article

16(1)   does   not   bar   a   reasonable   classification   of   employees   or

reasonable  test for their  selection.  It was  further  held that  the

provisions of Article 14 or Article 16 do not exclude the laying down

of selective tests nor do they preclude the Government from laying

down qualifications for the post in question. Despite the fact that

the competing parties who were before this Court in the said case

were   employed   as   Tracers,   carrying   out   the   same   duties   and

1 AIR 1968 SC 349

15

responsibilities, the Bench held in that case that the classification

of Tracers, into two types with different grades of pay, on the basis

that   one   type   consisted   of   matriculates   and   the   other   nonmatriculates, is not violative of Articles 14 and 16.  Again in State of

Jammu  &   Kashmir  vs.  Triloki   Nath   Khosa  &   Ors.

2

, another

Constitution Bench considered the question whether persons drawn

from   different   sources   and   integrated   into   one   class   can   be

classified   on   the   basis   of   their   educational   qualifications   for

promotion. The Constitution Bench answered the question in the

affirmative   holding   that   the   Rule   providing   for   graduates   to   be

eligible for promotion to the exclusion of diploma holders is not

violative of Articles 14 and 16 of the Constitution.

34. In T.R. Kothandaraman vs. Tamil Nadu Water Supply and

Drainage Board3

, the legal position in this regard was summarised

as   follows:­  (i)  Higher   educational   qualification   is   a   permissible

basis of classification, acceptability of which will depend on the

facts and circumstances;  (ii)  Higher educational qualification can

2(1974) 1 SCC 19

3(1994) 6 SCC 282

16

be the basis not only for barring promotion, but also for restricting

the scope of promotion; (iii) restriction placed cannot however go to

the extent of seriously jeopardising the chances of promotion.

35. As pointed out in  T.R.Kothandaraman (supra), the Court

shall have to be conscious about the need for maintaining efficiency

in service, while judging the validity of the classification. Though

the High Court took note of these decisions, the High Court fell into

an error in thinking that in the facts and circumstances of the case,

the   High   Court   could   not   establish   the   necessity   for   higher

qualification for the efficient discharge of the functions of higher

posts. It is apparent from the facts and circumstances of the case

that   the   non   graduates   have   had   opportunities   to   qualify

themselves, which they have also done. Therefore, the prescription

of graduation as a qualification for promotion to the post of Head

Assistant cannot be held as violative of Articles 14 and 16.  

36. In view of the above, the appeals are allowed and the judgment

of the Division Bench of the High Court is set aside. However, in

view of the fact that the contesting respondents have been working

in the post of Head Assistants for quite some time and have also

17

acquired the necessary qualifications, they need not be reverted at

this   stage.   But   the   seniority   of   the   appellants  vis   a   vis  the

contesting respondents shall be based on the dates of acquisition of

such qualification and the length of service taken together. In other

words, the seniority of the contesting respondents will be decided

not on the basis of the date of their promotion but on the basis of

the date of their acquiring the qualification while occupying the

promoted posts. There will be no order as to costs. 

37. In so far as the Contempt Petitions are concerned, no further

orders are necessary in view of the Orders passed in the appeals

and the directions issued therein.  Hence they are closed.

……………………………..CJI

(S.A. BOBDE)

……………………………….J.

(A.S. BOPANNA)

………………………………..J.

(V. RAMASUBRAMANIAN)

New Delhi

January 18, 2021

18