LawforAll

advocatemmmohan

My photo
since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

Just for legal information but not form as legal opinion

WELCOME TO MY LEGAL WORLD - SHARE THE KNOWLEDGE

Friday, January 8, 2021

Sections 396, 412 of IPC1 and under Section 3(2)(v) of the SC/ST2 Act and Section 25 of the Arms Act,= both Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju were unknown faces to PW5 Ujjwal, and were not subjected to any Test Identification. Apart from identification by PW5 Ujjwal in Court for the first time, there is no other material to establish their presence. Thus, even if we accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction. These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt.

1

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1256 OF 2017

HARI OM @ HERO …APPELLANT

VERSUS

STATE OF U.P. …RESPONDENT


WITH

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 3 OF 2021

 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.9087 OF 2017)

AND

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 4 OF 2021

 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRL.) NO.9088 OF 2017)

J U D G M E N T

Uday Umesh Lalit, J.

1. In Sessions Trial No.234 of 2008, six accused persons, namely,

Sanjay @ Sonu, Rijwan, Haseen Khan, Hari Om @ Hero, Saurabh @ Sanju, 

2

Rafique @ Bhaiye @ Fareed were tried for having committed offences

punishable under Sections 396, 412 of IPC1

and under Section 3(2)(v) of the

SC/ST2 Act. These six accused were also tried by the Trial Court3

for

offences under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 in Sessions Trial Nos.235

of 2008, 239 of 2008, 237 of 2008, 238 of 2008, 236 of 2008 and 504 of

2011 respectively. By its common judgment in said seven trials, the Trial

Court recorded as under: -

“Convict Hariom @ Hero is awarded death sentence for the

offence u/S 396 IPC. He shall be hanged till death. This

order related to death sentence shall be in accordance with

the confirmation of the Hon’ble High Court u/S 366 Cr.P.C.

Accused Hariom @ Hero is acquitted from Section 412 IPC

and Section 3(2) 5 of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled

Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and from Section 25

Arms act in Crime No.371/2008.

Convicting accused persons Rijwan, Haseen, Bhaiye @

Fareed @ Rafique, Sanjay @ Sonu, Saurab @ Sanju u/S

396 IPC, they are awarded life imprisonment and

Rs.25,000/- fine to each of the accused.

Accused persons Rijwan, Haseen, Bhaiye @ Fareed @

Rafique, Sanjay @ Sonu, Saurabh @ Sanju are discharged

u/S 412 IPC and Section 3(2) 5 of Scheduled Castes and

Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act and

accused Rijwan is acquitted from the offence u/S 25 Arms

Act in Crime No.369/08, accused Haseen is acquitted from

the offence under Section 25 Arms Act in Crime

No.370/08, accused Bhaiye @ Fareed is acquitted from the

offence under Section 25 Arms Act in Crime No.381/08,

accused Sanjay @ Sonu is acquitted from the offence under

Section 25 Arms Act in Crime No. 368/08 and accused

1

 Indian Penal Code

2

 The Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989

3 Additional Sessions Judge-2, Firozabad

3

Saurabh @ Sanju is acquitted from the offence under

Section 25 Arms Act in Crime No.372/08.

75% of the amount of fine shall be given to the sole

surviving member of the victim family i.e. Ujjawal. In case

of default of payment of fine, accused persons shall serve 6

months of additional imprisonment.”

2. Death sentence having been awarded to accused Hari Om, the matter

stood referred to the High Court4 by way Reference No.8 of 2015. All the

aforementioned six accused also filed Criminal Appeal Nos.3316 of 2015,

3265 of 2015, 3317 of 2015, 3836 of 2015, Capital Appeal No.3086 of 2015

and Criminal Appeal No.3512 of 2015 respectively challenging their

convictions and sentences.

3. The High Court by its common judgment and order dated 03.03.2017

passed in the aforestated Reference and Appeals: -

(a) affirmed the conviction and sentence of death imposed upon

accused Hari Om and dismissed his Appeal.

(b) affirmed the conviction and sentence awarded to accused

Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju and dismissed their

Appeals.

4

 The High Court of Judicature at Allahabad 

4

(c) accepted the Appeals of accused Haseen Khan, Rafique @

Bhaiye and Rijwan and acquitted them of the charges leveled

against them.

4. Criminal Appeal No.1256 of 2017 is preferred by Hari Om while

Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.9087 and 9088 of 2017 are preferred

by Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju respectively challenging the

judgment and order dated 03.03.2017 passed by the High Court. No appeal

has been preferred by the State challenging acquittal of Rijwan, Haseen

Khan, Rafique @ Bhaiye.

5. Leave granted in aforesaid Special Leave Petitions.

6. The initial reporting in the instant matter was made by Kotwal Singh

(later examined as PW1) at about 7.40 am on 28.10.2008 as under:-

“It is submitted that family of my elder brother Shaheed late

Sh. Rajpal Singh had constructed a house in Nagla Mirja

Bada and were living there. Today, in the night of 27 &

28/10 some unknown persons have committed murder of

my sister-in-law Smt. Nirdosh Devi age 40 years, niece Ku.

Poonam age 18 years, nephew Ashish age 12 years and

nephew Anshul age 10 years in which neck of my sister-inlaw is cut and murder of all the three has been committed

by pressing neck/throttling. The incident has come to

knowledge in the morning today when milkman came. All

the four dead-bodies are lying separately in both two rooms

and after breaking box, almirah, suitcase etc. they have

taken away all the house-hold articles, jewellery and cash.

List of articles looted will be submitted subsequently.

Report be registered and necessary action be taken.”

5

Crime No.367 of 2008 under Section 394, 302 IPC was, therefore,

registered with P.S. Ramgarh, Firozabad against unknown persons.

7. Thereafter, following steps were taken on 28.10.2008:-

A. The investigation into the crime was taken up by PW10 S.O.

Gautam, who prepared Site Map (Ext.Ka-20). On the same day

PW9 Sub-Inspector Ram Prasad conducted inquest on the dead

bodies of Smt. Nirdosh Devi, Kumari Poonam, Masters Ashish and

Anshul and sent them for autopsy. He had found these four dead

bodies lying in supine condition.

B. In the presence of two witnesses, namely, PW3 Harpal

Singh and one Mukesh Kumar:-

(i) Blood-stained earth from the floor below the cot where

the body of Smt. Nirdosh Devi was lying and the portion of blood

stained “baan” (rope) of the cot were taken (vide Ext. Ka-6).

(ii) Finger prints from certain articles like utensils, glasses

from the house of the deceased were taken by Constable

Dharmender Singh, DCRB (vide Ext. Ka-7).

6

C. Statements of Ompal Singh (later examined as PW2), Ram

Prakash, Raju (owner of the house where accused Hari Om used

to live) and Manoj Kumari (wife of Hari Om) were also recorded,

which disclosed possible involvement of Hari Om and his

associates.

D. The Post-Mortem on the dead bodies of Smt. Nirdosh Devi

and Kumari Poonam was jointly conducted by PW7 Dr. R.A.

Sharma and Dr. Ajay Agarwal, while the Post Mortem on the dead

bodies of Masters Anshul and Ashish was conducted by PW7 Dr. R.

A. Sharma. The injuries on the dead bodies were described by the

High Court as under:-

 “a. Smt. Nirdosh Devi: aged 40 years

“i. Incised wound 11 cm x 4 cm on lower part front

of neck, more on left side, left side blood vessels cut

trachea cut, right and left side muscle cut. Wound

horizontal, marquis clean cut.

ii. Abraded contusion over right side of nose 1 cm x

0.1 cm.

On internal examination, trachea was found cut.

Semi digested food was found in stomach. Brain was

noted pale. Cause of death was due to shock and

hemorrhage as a result of ante mortem injuries.

Vaginal smear made. Slide prepared and sent to

Pathologist SNMH Firozabad through S.O., P.S.

Ramgarh.”

b. Kumari Poonam: aged 18 years

7

“i. Ligature mark 13 cm x 1.5 cm oblique, lower

part of neck in middle part and extending upto right

side upper part of neck. On dissection underlying

muscles contused.

On internal examination membranes and brain

were found congested, pleaura, Jarynx, trachea were

found congested. Hyoid bone was found fractured.

Both lungs congested. Semi digested food was found

in stomach. Cause of death was due to Asphyxia as a

result of strangulation. Vaginal smear made. Slide

prepared and sent to Pathologist SNMH Firozabad

through S.O., P.S. Ramgarh.”

c. Master Ashish: aged 12 years

“i. Multiple contusion on right side, front of neck in

an area 6 cm x 3 cm, Average size 1.5 cm x 03. Cm

ii. Contusion 3 cm x 1.5 cm on left side front of neck,

middle part.

iii. Multiple contusion left side of face 6 cm x 3 cm,

average size 1 cm x 0.3 cm.

Cricoid cartilage and Thyroid cartilage found

fractured. Death was due to Asphyxia as a result of

throttling.”

d. Master Anshul: aged 10 years

i. Contusion brown dry over front of neck 12 cm x 5

cm over left side of neck, 2 cm over right side of neck.

ii. Contusion 1 cm x 2 cm below jaw left side.

iii. Contusion 1.5 cm x 2 cm lower part of neck left

side.

On internal examination, cricoid cartilage,

thyroid cartilage, Hyoid bone were found fractured.

Pleura, trachea were found congested. Membranes,

brain congested. Semi digested food present in

stomach. Spleen and kidneys were noted congested.

Cause of death was due to Asphyxia as a result of

throttling.”

8

8. Steps taken on the next day i.e. 29.10.2008, were:-

A) Pursuant to information received from the complainant,

PW10 S.O. G.P. Gautam along with police party and the

complainant went to “Sailai Choraha” and at about 11 a.m.

apprehended five out of aforesaid six persons while one of them,

namely, Rafiq @ Bhaiye ran away. These persons were found to

be travelling in a Red Tavera vehicle bearing No.UP83J/7948.

From the personal search of these five persons following articles

were recovered:-

(a) from Sanjay @ Sonu : country made pistol and two

live cartridges

(b) from Rijwan : one country made pistol of 12 Bore

and 4 live country made cartridges

(c) from Haseen Khan: one country made pistol of 3.15

Bore with 3 live cartridges

(d) from Hari Om @ Hero: Double Barrel Pauna rifle and

one live cartridge, one Nokia Mobile set of black

colour (which was stated to be belonging to the

deceased Smt. Nirdosh Devi)

(e) from Saurabh @ Sanju: a chhuri (knife).

9

From the collective possession of these five persons, following

articles5 were also recovered:

“one polythene bag containing one identity card of

Rajpal and Pass-Book of Nirdosh Devi & one PassBook of joint account of Manju Devi & Sanjay, one

Pass Book of joint account of Nirdosh Devi and

Rajpal of Indian State Bank; two bangles of yellow

metal (gold) from red colored Shaneel purse; a ring of

yellow metal (gold) were recovered with cash of

Rs.5,000/-; 02 ladies wrist watches from yellow

colored Shaneel purse, one silver Kardhani (of 5 Lar)

of white metal weighing about 250 gms from red

Shaneel purse, one ½ silver Kardhani from Badami

coloured Shaneel purse and one yellow metal of

golden colour were recovered from red coloured

Shaneel purse.”

B. Crime Nos.368 to 372 of 2008 for the offences punishable

under Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959 were thereafter registered

against Sanjay @ Sonu, Rijwan, Hari Om @ Hero, Haseen Khan

and Saurabh @ Sanju respectively.

C. Apart from the arrest of the aforesaid five persons, the

statement of Ujjwal, five years old son of Smt. Nirdosh Devi (the

lone survivor) was recorded. According to the record, his statement

could not be recorded on the previous day as Ujjwal was under

shock and unable to make any statement.

5 As stated by PW10 S.O. Gautam in his deposition

10

D. A chhuri/knife was recovered at the pointing of accused Hari

Om in the presence of Panchas.

E. The registration of Crime No.367 of 2008 was altered to that

under Sections 396 and 412 IPC and in respect of offences

punishable under the SC/ST Act.

9. On 30.10.2008 the investigation was taken over by PW11 Dr. B.K.

Singh, Circle Officer, Firozabad during the course of which, he recorded

statements of various persons. On 24.11.2008, he recorded the statements

of PW1 Kotwal Singh, PW4 Shankar Lal (milkman), Dr. Satya Pal (elder

brother of PW1 Kotwal Singh) and constables Dharmendra, Ramesh

Chandra, Malkhan and Mawadh Singh.

10. The sixth person Rafique @ Bhaiye was apprehended on

05.11.2008.

11. On 03.12.2008, charge-sheet dated 24.11.2008 was filed by PW11

Dr. B. K. Singh. The basic information about the crime was stated as

under:-

“Statement of Complainant of case, confirmed seizurememo, statement of Shankar Lal, milkman, confirmed place

of incident, statement of family doctor of deceased, Dr.

Satyapal, confirmed statement of constable Shankar,

statement of Constable Dharmendra Singh, confirmed

finger-prints report, statement of the Constable who got 

11

conducted PM, confirmed PM, investigation against

accused persons viz. Sanjay @ Sonu Sharma, Rizwan,

Hassen Khan, Hariom @ Hero, Saurav @ Sanju, Bhaiye @

Fareed Khan.

Sd/-

24/11/2008

Charge-sheet u/S 396, 412 IPC & 3(2) 5 SC/ST Act

No.261

-----------

24/11/08

Sent/proceeding of fingerprints match is remaining to be

done for examination of case property.”

It is relevant to note that in the charge-sheet there was no reference

to the statement dated 29.10.2008 of Ujjwal, the youngest child of Smt.

Nirdosh Devi nor did it say or suggest that he was a relevant witness.

12. On 04.12.2008 PW11 Dr. B. K. Singh sent the finger prints lifted

from various articles, from inside the house of the deceased as well as

sample finger prints of Sanjay @ Sonu, Rijwan, Haseen Khan, Hari Om @

Hero and Saurabh @ Sanju for analysis.

13. By its report dated 18.05.2009 the Office of the Director, Finger

Print Bureau, Lucknow intimated to the Trial Court, the result of finger

prints examination. The relevant portion of the report was as under:

“DISPUTED FINGER PRINTS: finger prints lifted through

lifting tape were affixed on four papers. Finger prints have

been marked as No.8898 to 8922.

12

Sample of Finger prints: Sample finger prints of Sh. Sanju

@ Saurabh, Bhaiye @ Farid, Rijwan, Hariom @ Hero,

Sanju @ Sonu Sharma and Haseen Khan taken on

slips/parchi dated 4.12.08. All the right & left 10 fingers

print have been marked as No.8923 to 8982 respectively.

Sd/- (Illegible)

Sd/- (Illegible)

Sd/- (Illegible)

2. Examination of all the records was conducted in this

office, result with reasons are as under :-

D.F.I./P. No.8909 is similar/identical to sample F.I.

No.8923. Its formation and line pattern are same. In

enlarged pictures, identical lining pattern have been shown

in red lines. Details of which are mentioned in Matching

list.

Para 2: D.F.P. impression No.8914 is similar/identical to

Sample F.P. No.8963. Its formation and lining are same. In

the enlarged picture, similar/identical lining pattern have

been shown in red lines. Details of which are mentioned in

Matching list.

Para 3 : D.F.P. impression No.8917 is similar/identical to

Sample F.P. No.8964. its formation and lining pattern are

same. Identical lining pattern have been shown in red lines

(illegible) in enlarged pictures. Details of which are

mentioned in Matching list.

Para 4 : Lining characteristic are not sufficient in disputed

finger prints No.8904, 8905, 8906, 8907, 8908, 8916, 8919,

& 8920 for giving definite opinion.

Para 5: Disputed Finger Prints No.8898 to 8903, 8910 to

8913, 8915, 8918, 8921, 8922 are not clear for matching.”

It must be stated here that the disputed finger print No.8909 lifted

from a glass in the kitchen of the house matched with the thumb impression

of right hand, being sample No.8923, of Sanju @ Saurabh while the

disputed finger print impressions 8914 and 8917 from another glass

13

matched with the sample impressions of the thumb and index finger of right

hand being sample Nos.8963 and 8964 of Sanjay @ Sonu.

14. Appropriate charges were framed on 23.11.2009 against all six

accused. The charges framed in Sessions Trial No.234 of 2008 were as

under:-

“I, Lukmanul Haque, Special Sessions Judge, Court no.4,

Firozabad charge you accused persons namely Sanjay alias

Sonu, Rijwan, Haseen Khan, Hari Om alias Hero, Saurabh

alias Sanju, Fareed alias Rafique with following charges.”

First:- This that on 28.10.2008 at the night, time

unknown, place Nagla Mirza Bada at the house of deceased

under Ramgarh police station area, District Firozabad, you

murdered the complainant’s sister-in-law, nephews, niece

and decamped with the jewelry, cash etc which were kept

at the house. This way you have committed an offence

which is punishable u/s 396 of the IPC and is in cognizance

of this Court.

Second:- This that the articles which were lotted on the

above date, time and place. Cash jewelry, watch etc were

recovered from the possession of you people near the Sailai

culvert at 11:00 on 29-10-08 under Ramgarh Police Station,

District Firozabad, even after knowing that these items

were looted you had kept these with you. This way, you

committed an offence which is a punishable offence u/s 412

of the IPC and is in cognizance of this Court.

Third:- This that on the above date, time and place of

occurrence, you committed heinous crimes like loot and

murder on people of Scheduled Caste. This way, you

committed such an offence which is punishable u/s 3(2)5 of

the S.C.S.T. Act and is in cognizance of this Court.

I, hereby direct you be tried by this Court under the

above charges.”

14

They were tried by the Trial Court in Sessions Trial No.234 of 2008

and Nos.235-239 of 2008 and No.504 of 2011.

15. The Prosecution examined fifteen witnesses and produced the

relevant material in support of its case, while two witnesses were examined

on behalf of the Defence.

16. The relevant portions from the testimony of some of the

Prosecution witnesses were as under:-

A. PW1 Kotwal Singh, brother in law of Smt. Nirdosh Devi,

stated in his examination in chief:-

“My brother had become martyr in year 2005. His

family consisted of wife Smt. Nirdosh Devi, daughter

Ku. Poonam and sons viz. Ashish, Anshul and

Ujjawal.

In the night of 27/28.10.2008, murder of my

sister-in-law Nirdosh Devi, niece Poonam and

nephews Ashish and Anshul was committed by

miscreants in their house only. Sister-in-law was

murdered by slitting throat, while others were

murdered by throttling (strangulating), younger

nephew Ujjwal was throttled to death but survived.

This incident came into knowledge when

milkman arrived. I had also gone to the site of

incident to see where all four dead-bodies were lying

separately in different rooms. House-hold articles,

box, Almirah and suitcase etc. were lying broken and

its articles were scattered. Miscreants had looted cash

and jewellery. The articles looted were in my

knowledge and I had seen. I had submitted a written

report of this incident to Police Station.” 

15

In his cross examination, the witness stated:-

“I came to know about the incident through my elder

brother. My elder brother did not come to inform

about the incident. Someone from the colony had

given information. The said person had come to me

in the morning at 6.45 am. This person had come to

the house of my brother on foot; I do not know name

of the person whom my brother Satyapal had sent to

pass information. There were 4-6 more persons with

the said person whose names I do no know. I reached

the site of incident by running with these persons

only, all reached by running. We had reached the site

of incident within 5-7 minute. When I reached the

site of incident, at that time main door of the house

was open. Only my elder brother Satyapal was there

inside the house, none else from the family. Family

members from Nagau reached within an hour, they

had been informed by elder brother through phone.”

… … …

“I had gone to police station to give information on

the day of incident and thereafter, I did not go again

to police station. I wrote Exhibit Ka-1 by sitting on

Kharanja outside the incident. I, after writing Exhibit

3, submitted in the evening at about 7 O’clock. I had

taken advice of elder brother Dr. Satyapal in writing

it”

… … …

“Till today I do not know name and residence of the

milkman through whom I received information. The

fact of receiving information from my brother Dr.

Satyapal, is not written in Exhibit Ka-1. Milkman had

informed my brother. My brother Satyapal informed

me.”

B. PW2 Ompal Singh who lived in the same neighbourhood

stated in examination in chief:-

“…In the night of 27/28.10.2008 at about 11 P.M. and

Ramprakash were returning back from home from

work. House of Mulayam Singh is near house of

Nirdosh Devi. Near to it, red colour four wheeler

vehicle was parked. 4-5 people were sitting inside it.

Hari Om @ Hero, one of them, was standing near the 

16

vehicle and he was talking on phone. I asked Hari

Om, ‘brother why are you standing at this time’

whereupon Hari Om replied that I am talking to

Faujin Nirdosh Devi. Then we left for our home. I

knew Hari Om @ Hero because he had been tenant at

the place of Nirdosh Devi. In the same night, the

incident had taken place. I had received information

in the morning. I became sure that Hari Om @ Hero

and his accomplices committed murder of Nirdosh

Kumari and her three children and the miscreants

committed loot.”

This witness also proved recovery memo Ext.Ka-5 and

deposed that on 29.10.2008 at about 05.00 p.m., accused Hari Om

had taken out a chhuri/knife from the bricks lying near the southern

wall of the house of one Sikia.

Nothing was suggested to the witness in his cross

examination that Hari Om had not been the tenant of Smt. Nirdosh

Devi. In his cross examination conducted on 01.03.2011, the

witness stated:-

“On 28.10.08, when police came on the spot then I

was on the spot. Then, neither I had any conversation

with police nor made any attempt to talk to the police.

I did not tell to the police about the Tavera vehicle

being parked on 28.10.08.”

But in his cross examination dated 10.03.2011, the witness

stated:-

“On 1.3.11 I had given the statement that I did not

have any conversation with police and I did not make

any attempt to talk to the police. I had conversation

with the police at police station and it did not take

place on the spot.

17

I had been in police station from 28.10.08 to

29.10.08. I had seen all the accused persons in police

station. I cannot say the name of any other persons

except Hari Om. Neither I had seen any person

talking on mobile near the vehicle at the spot on

28.10.08 nor did I have any conversation with the

person talking on mobile.”

C. PW3 Harpal Singh, witness in respect of Exhibits Ka-6 and

Ka-7, proved those documents and stated:-

“Darogaji had collected the fingerprint on shelf, box,

attachee, utensils and glasses of the kitchen form the

spot in my presence as specimen. On it, my signature

and the signature of Mukesh Kumar were taken. One

Diwanji was also present with Darogaji. Memo was

prepared on the spot. This witness has recognised

signature on Memo (Paper No.5A/2). On this,

Exhibit Ka 7 was marked.”

D. PW4 Shankarlal, milkman stated in his examination in

chief:-

“Family of late Fauzi Rajpal comprised of his wife, a

daughter and three sons. I knew everyone. The date

was 28th in the year 08. It was Deepawali festival. I

had gone to the house of Fauzi Rajpal Singh to deliver

the milk at about 6:45 AM.

I made a call at the entrance of their house. No one

responded. I knocked the door even then no one

responded. I pushed door whereupon door opened.

Then, (Ujjwal) small child of late Rajpal came to me

weeping from inside. Then I peeped inside the room

of the house and found wife and elder son of Fauzi

Rajpal lying dead on the cot. Blood was lying there.

A girl and a boy were lying dead in the other room.

On seeing them, I got perturbed. I took Ujjwal in my

arms and informed Dr. Satyapal who is brother of

Fauzi. Then I returned to the place of incident with

him. By then, crowd had gathered. Thereafter, I had 

18

gone to deliver the milk to some other place from my

bicycle.”

The witness, in his cross examination, stated: -

“I did not have the meeting with Kotwal Singh on that

day. I did not have meeting, therefore, I did not give

any information to Kotwal Singh.

… … …

I took Ujjawal on my lap and went to Satya Pal.

He had a ligature mark of marpeet on his neck.

Neither I told this fact to CO nor he asked me. I’m

telling this fact for the first time in the court.

… … …

Satya Pal did not go to PS to give information

in my presence. I had given information about the

incident to Satya Pal. Satya Pal had returned to the

spot with me. Even them, I did not have any meeting

with Kotwal Singh.

… … …

…I could not see the cloth of Faujin because she was

inside the quilt (lihaaf). Ashish had worn chaukhane

shirt and nicker. Ashish was lying dead on the cot. I

did not see by touching. Blood was oozing out.

Poonam was also inside the quilt. Her face was also

visible. She was lying on the ground. Blood was

oozing out. Blood had not dried up. I had seen the

body of fauzin and her daughter. The blood was

oozing out from their bodies. They had not dried.”

E. PW5 Ujjwal, the youngest child of Smt. Nirdosh Devi, was

of five years of age when the incident had occurred and about eight

years of age when he was examined in Court. In his examinationin-chief, the witness stated:-

“It was Deepawali at the time of incident. The

incident took place in the night. I was sleeping at my

house. The phone of my mother rang on which my

19

mother went to open the door. Thereafter, on opening

the gate, Hari Om uncle and 5 other persons came

inside the house. 5 uncle (persons) sat on the takht

and Hari Om uncle sat on the cot. At that time, I was

awake. Mother asked them for tea and water but these

persons did not take tea. My sister Poonam came with

6 glasses of water and offered them water. Hari Om

uncle demanded the key of almirah from my mother.

I already knew Hari Om because he had been tenant

at my house in the past.

My mother did not give the key when it was

demanded by Hari Om. Then, Hari Om caught hold

of the neck of my mother. 2 persons among the

persons accompanying Hari Om held the hands and

legs of my mother and Hari Om uncle cut the neck of

my mother with iron knife.

One of the persons accompanying Hari Om caught

the neck of my sister and killed my sister Poonam.

One uncle pressed the neck of my brother Ashish.

Thereafter, one uncle pressed the neck of my other

brother Anshul. Then, Hari Om uncle and other 5

persons accompanying him i.e. total 6 persons looted

the articles of my house and went. Hari Om uncle

also pressed my neck and threw but I remained lying

silently. On identifying Hari Om present in the court,

stated that accused Hari Om is present in the court

today.

On looking at accused persons present in the court,

said that 5 other persons apart from Hari Om were

involved in the incident. Today, they are present in

the court.”

… … …

“On next day of incident, in the morning, milkman

came and milkman uncle pushed the door and gate

opened. On the opening of gate, I narrated the entire

facts to the milkman uncle.”

In his cross examination, the witness stated:-

“…Witness was read over the statement u/s 161 CrPC

with the help of ADGC and Shri Maheshwari,

Counsel for the complainant. Then, the witness stated

that in the morning, milkman uncle came. He pushed 

20

the door and opened the door. I had got this fact

recorded to the police in my statement that I went to

him and narrated entire facts. I cannot state the reason

as to why it was not recorded.”

… … …

“Darogaji has recorded this fact incorrect in my

statement that in the morning, after rising of the Sun,

my neighbours took me out from the house. Then I

saw that my uncle Doctor Saab and many persons

with him had come to the house. I cannot say as to

how this fact got recorded.”

… … …

“When I reached the house of my Tau then my uncle

Kotwal also reached there and I narrated the entire

incident of the night to Tau and Uncle and also told

that Hari Om uncle and 5 other have committed the

incident and also told that I witnessed the incident.

After narrating entire facts to Tau and uncle, I went to

my house with Milkman uncle and Tau and when

police came after 5 minutes, in the morning, police

came. Then, they were told that Hari Om and 5 uncles

came in the night. They committed the incident. I

have witnessed the incident. Told the incident to

milkman uncle in the morning.”

… … …

“After meeting milkman, met Tauji (elder brother of

father). When I returned then police had come.

Police stayed till evening and police had asked in my

presence as to where mother was lying? Where was

brother lying, where was sister lying and after

throttling, where were (they) thrown. Police did not

ask the milkman, my uncle Kotwal and elder uncle

Satyapal. I had told all these facts to the police.”

… … …

“I was sleeping on the takht. I had told this fact to the

police. If Darogaji did not record this fact in my

statement then I could not state the reason. I had told

this fact to Darogaji cutting the neck with iron knife.

If the fact of iron knife is not recorded in my

statement then I cannot state the reason.

I had told police that two uncles (persons) were

holding the hand and legs of my mother. I cannot 

21

state the reasons as to why this fact is not recorded in

my statement.

I had told Darogaji in my statement as such that

one uncle was pressing the neck of my sister. One

uncle pressed the neck of Ashish. This fact is also not

recorded separately in my statement then I cannot

state the reason. I had also told Darogaji that Hari Om

had pressed my neck and threw in the other room. If

this fact that Hari Om pressed my neck and threw in

other room is not recorded, then I cannot state its

reason. Hari Om demanded key from my mother. If

it is not recorded then I cannot state the reason.

When the neck of my mother was cut, mother

had been overpowered by them. Then, we brothers

and sisters screamed loudly. The house of Hori Lal

Darogaji does not exist opposite to my house. Even

there is no house of Ram Prakash. No one came on

our hue and cry. Hari Om tuned the TV in full

volume. I had told this fact about the screaming of us

(siblings) loudly and Hari Om opening TV and tuning

with full volume to my uncle Kotwal Singh and my

elder uncle Satyapal as well as to the police. These

facts were also told to milkman. If this fact is not

recorded then I cannot state the reason.

All the six glasses in which my sister carried

the water, were kept in kitchen. The time when the

neck of my sister Poonam was throttled then at that

time she was lying in her room. When the neck of my

sister was pressed then I was in my mother’s room.

The neck of Anshul was pressed and the neck of

Poonam was pressed. After pressing the neck

(illegible), I was thrown on the takht in my mother’s

room and I was sleeping on the takht itself.

When the accused persons went then I had

gone to see my sister and brother. I had told this fact

to Darogaji that after the departure of accused

persons, I had gone to see my brother and sister. If

this fact is not recorded in my statement then I cannot

state the reason.

I had voluntarily gone to see my brother and

sister. I was not sent by anyone. I was not thrown in

the room of my brother and sister. I was thrown on

the takht itself. This was the same room where I was 

22

sleeping. It was not other room. After seeing brother

and sister, I again sat on the takht and began weeping.

Thereafter, I slept. When the milkman pushed the

door then I got up.”

F. PW7 Dr. R.A. Sharma, who had conduced Post Mortem as

stated hereinabove, proved the concerned Reports.

In his cross examination in relation to questions about the

injury on the body of Smt. Nirdosh Devi, the witness stated:-

“This fact is correct that injury of neck was clean cut

and in a single cut and it was more on left side and

less on right side. It is possible that the time when the

injury was caused, at that time, if the person had been

lying. Left portion of the neck would be above and

right part would be under where it was cut. On that

side, it is possible to cause injury from heavy sharpedged weapon. Such type of injury is possible if

inflicted on the person who is sleeping or

unconscious.”

G. PW9 SI Ram Prasad who conducted inquest on the dead body

of Smt. Nirdosh Devi, stated in his cross examination: -

“It is correct that at the time of Panchnama, four

bangles in each hand of deceased were unbroken. It

is correct that no broken bangle was found near

deceased.”

H. PW10 SO Gautam, who had conducted the investigation at

the initial state, stated in his examination-in-chief:-

“On 29.10.08. Parcha No.2 was prepared in which

arrest of 5 accused persons namely Sanjay @ Sonu,

Rizwan, Hasin Khan, Hari Om @ Hero and Saurabh

@ Sanju and the statement of eye-witness Ujjwal and

copy of memo of Arrest of accused persons, recovery

of illegal weapons and cartridges and the case

properties of Crime No.367/08 were mentioned and 

23

Tavera vehicle bearing No.U.P 83J/7948 used in

murder was seized.”

In his cross examination, the witness stated:-

“It is correct that on 28.10.08, in Parcha No.IA, I

recorded the statement of Ompal Singh s/o Hukum

Singh, Om Prakash s/o Leeladhar and the name of

Hari Om @ Hero is mentioned in those statements.

Besides this, in the statement of Raju s/o Ram Kishan

also, name of Hari Om @ Hero is mentioned and the

fact that 4-5 boys were sitting in Tavera vehicle is

mentioned in these three statements.”

… … …

“First Parcha is in my hand-writing and second is in

the hand-writing of Sub-Inspector whose name I do

not recollect. This Parcha was written after the

alleged recovery. It is incorrect to say that some foul

play has been done.”

… … …

“It is also correct to say that on 28.10.08, neither any

search for milkman was made nor his name and

address came into the light till the accused persons

were arrested. Whereas apart from milkman, there

was no other witness to give information to the

complainant of the case.”

… … …

“It is correct that it is not mentioned in FIR that child

Ujjwal was left alive and he was the eye-witnesses.

In site-map (Exhibit Ka-20), presence of child Ujjwal

at the time of incident is not mentioned. In the

statement u/s 161 Cr.P.C. of child Ujjwal, I had

recorded that accused persons pressed the neck of

Ujjwal but no medical examination of child Ujjwal

has been got conducted in this regard as to whether

there is any pressing mark on the neck or not.”

… … …

“In my investigation, I did not find any quilt lying at

the place of incident on the dead-bodies of Smt.

Nirdosh and Kumari Poonam.”

24

I. PW11 Dr. B. K. Singh, Circle Officer stated in his

examination-in-chief:-

“On 24.11.08, I recorded the statement of

complainant Kotwal Singh, witness Shankar Lal, Dr.

Satya Pal, C/Dharmendra, C/Ramesh Chandra,

C/Malkhan, C/Mawadh Singh….

… … …

“In the instant case, the gold and silver ornaments

concerned with the alleged loot were stated to have

been recovered, whether said ornament were of gold

and silver, no such examination was got conducted

from the Forensic Science Laboratory in this regard.

Recovered alleged looted article had not been got

identified by Ujjwal (age 7 years).”

… … …

“I had perused record and statements written by

previous Investigating Officer. I did not enquire

Ujjwal, neither statement of Ujjwal was verified by

previous Investigating Officer after reading over, nor

I met with Ujjwal during investigation. I had read

statement of Ujjwal written by G. P. Gautam

(previous I.O.).”

… … …

“Owner of Tavera vehicle has not been identified in

the investigation. I cannot say as to whether accused

in Tavera vehicle were its owner or not.”

… … …

“Witness Satyapal had also given statement that after

receiving information, he at first reached the place of

incident along with Kotwal Singh.

Statement of witness Shankar Lal was recorded

26 days after the incident. He was the same Shankar

Lal who had informed the Complainant. After

informing, he stated to have gone again on the spot

along with Kotwal and Satyapal.”

17. Smt. Manoj Kumari, wife of Hari Om was examined as DW1, who

stated that she and her husband were not tenants of Smt. Nirdosh Devi at 

25

any time. Ms. Pratibha, Junior clerk working in Road Transport Office of

District Firozabad was examined as DW2 who stated that as per official

record, the owner of Tavera vehicle bearing No.UP83J7948, at the time the

incident had occurred, was one Sunil Kumar s/o Om Prakash Aggarwal.

18. The Trial Court by its judgment dated 06.07.2015 accepted the case

of prosecution against all six accused in so far as the offence punishable

under Section 396 of the IPC was concerned. It, however, acquitted all the

accused of the other offences with which they were charged. It was

observed that no disclosure statement of the accused Hari Om in relation to

recovery of knife was recorded, and as such the requirement of Section 27

of the Indian Evidence Act (“the Act”, for short) were not satisfied,

however, the recovery could still be admissible under Section 8 of the Act.

It was also observed that there were certain omissions in the statement of

Ujjawal recorded during investigation which were brought out in his cross

examination, but those omissions were not enough to reject his evidence.

By its order dated 13.07.015, sentences as quoted in paragraph 1

hereinabove were imposed by the Trial Court.

19. All six convicted accused preferred criminal appeals as stated

earlier challenging their convictions and sentences and so also Reference 

26

No.8 of 2015 was made to the High Court for confirmation of the death

sentence awarded to the accused Hari Om.

The High Court by its judgment and order presently under appeal

affirmed the conviction and sentence of the accused Hari Om, Sanjay @

Sonu, Saurabh @ Sanju and acquitted the other three accused named

Haseen Khan, Rijwan and Rafique @ Bhaiye of the charges levelled against

them. The reason for their acquittal was:-

“As far as the accused-appellants Haseen Khan,

Rijwan and Bhaiye are concerned, they were neither named

nor the recovery from them, was proved beyond reasonable

doubt, hence, the same was disbelieved and they were

acquitted under Section 412 IPC and their fingerprints were

also, did not tally with the disputed fingerprints collected

from the spot. They were also not named by witness Ujjwal

or any other witnesses. According to evidence against

them, during investigation there was recovery and first time

they were identified before the court by the witness Ujjwal

along with other accused. It is also clear from the record

that the accused-appellants appeared before the trial court

on previous dates and on subsequent date, witness Ujjawal

identified them. Hence, there was sufficient time and

opportunity to identify them. No identification parade took

place in the present case. The incident is of the year 2008

and after about three years they were identified by child

witness Ujjawal first time before the court, hence, this

evidence is doubtful. Considering the entire facts and

circumstances, including the identification for the first time

before the court, it is clear that the prosecution failed to

prove the case beyond doubt against the appellants Haseen

Khan, Rijwan and Bhaiye alias Farid alias Rafique and they

are entitled for acquittal.”

27

20. In these appeals Mr. B. H. Marlapalle, learned Senior Advocate

appeared as Amicus Curiae on behalf of the accused. His principal

submissions were:-

a) In the face of glaring inconsistencies in the version given by

PW5 Ujjawal and in the face of record as it stood, it would be

extremely hazardous to accept the testimony of PW5 Ujjwal and

make it the basis of conviction of accused Hari Om.

b) There was no link evidence suggesting that the fingerprints

were correctly lifted from the house of the deceased, and were duly

preserved before sending them for fingerprints expert’s opinion.

c) The only material against accused Sanjay @ Sonu and

Saurabh @ Sanju was the fact that their sample fingerprints tallied

with those lifted from the house of the deceased. In the absence of

any substantive evidence, this fact alone would be insufficient to

sustain their conviction and sentence. Reliance was placed on the

decision of this Court in Musheer Khan alias Badshah Khan and

another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh.

6

d) Out of six named accused charged of having committed the

offence of dacoity, three accused having being acquitted, whose

acquittal was not challenged, the remaining three accused

6

 (2010) 2 SCC 748

28

could not be convicted under Section 396 IPC. Reliance was placed

on the decisions of this Court in Ram Shankar Singh and Others

vs. State of Uttar Pradesh7

and Saktu and Another vs. State of

Uttar Pradesh8

.

21. Ms. Aishwarya Bhati, learned Additional Solicitor General

appearing for the State, on the other hand, submitted that the testimony of

PW5 Ujjwal was completely worthy of reliance and that even going by the

rule of prudence, version given by PW5 Ujjwal was fully corroborated on

material particulars. She relied upon the decisions of this Court in

Suryanarayana vs. State of Karnataka9

, State of Uttar Pradesh vs.

Krishna Master and Others10 and Manmeet Singh alias Goldie vs. State

of Punjab11

.

22. At the outset, we must note the perspective from which the evidence

of a child witness is to be considered. The caution expressed by this Court

in Suryanarayana9

that “corroboration of the testimony of a child witness

is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence” is a well-accepted

7

 AIR (1956) SC 441

8

 (1973) 1 SCC 202

9

 (2001) 9 SCC 129

10

 (2010) 12 SCC 324

11 (2015) 7 SCC 167

29

principle. While applying said principle to the facts of that case, this Court

in Suryanarayana9 observed:-

“5. Admittedly, Bhavya (PW 2), who at the time of

occurrence was about four years of age, is the only solitary

eyewitness who was rightly not given the oath. The time

and place of the occurrence and the attending circumstances

of the case suggest no possibility of there being any other

person as an eyewitness. The evidence of the child witness

cannot be rejected per se, but the court, as a rule of

prudence, is required to consider such evidence with close

scrutiny and only on being convinced about the quality of

the statements and its reliability, base conviction by

accepting the statement of the child witness. The evidence

of PW 2 cannot be discarded only on the ground of her

being of tender age. The fact of PW 2 being a child witness

would require the court to scrutinise her evidence with care

and caution. If she is shown to have stood the test of crossexamination and there is no infirmity in her evidence, the

prosecution can rightly claim a conviction based upon her

testimony alone. Corroboration of the testimony of a child

witness is not a rule but a measure of caution and prudence.

Some discrepancies in the statement of a child witness

cannot be made the basis for discarding the testimony.

Discrepancies in the deposition, if not in material

particulars, would lend credence to the testimony of a child

witness who, under the normal circumstances, would like to

mix-up what the witness saw with what he or she is likely

to imagine to have seen. While appreciating the evidence of

the child witness, the courts are required to rule out the

possibility of the child being tutored. In the absence of any

allegation regarding tutoring or using the child witness for

ulterior purposes of the prosecution, the courts have no

option but to rely upon the confidence inspiring testimony

of such witness for the purposes of holding the accused

guilty or not.

6. This Court in Panchhi v. State of U.P.12 held that the

evidence of the child witness must be evaluated more

carefully and with greater circumspection because a child is

susceptible to be swayed by what others tell him and thus

an easy prey to tutoring. The evidence of the child witness

must find adequate corroboration before it is relied upon, as

the rule of corroboration is of practical wisdom than of law

12

 (1998) 7 SCC 177 : 1998 SCC (Cri) 1561

30

(vide Prakash v. State of M.P.13; Baby Kandayanathil v.

State of Kerala14; Raja Ram Yadav v. State of Bihar15;

Dattu Ramrao Sakhare v. State of Maharashtra16).

7. To the same effect is the judgment in State of U.P. v.

Ashok Dixit17

.

8. In this case Bhavya (PW 2) when appeared before the

trial court was of 6 years of age. After questioning the

witness, the Sessions Judge found, “though the girl is 6

years old she is active and she understands everything”.

Without administering the oath to the witness her statement

was recorded wherein she stated:

“I know Saroja, I call her as ammayi, she

is my aunt. The person sitting in the court box is

my uncle. His name is Suryanarayana. Since I

call him as uncle, he is my uncle.

My aunt Saroja is now dead. I know how

she died. Several days back after taking lunch

my ammayi i.e. my aunt Saroja and myself went

to the lake to wash the clothes and to take bath.

On that day, my uncle Suryanarayana sitting in

the court pierced with a knife the stomach and

neck of my ammayi. Hence she suffered injuries

and her entire body covered with blood. My

ammayi while running after being injured, fell

down, I screamed. Immediately I ran and told my

father and mother that uncle killed the aunt. If

the knife is shown I can identify (a white cloth

bag sealed, was opened). I have seen the knife

now. With the same knife that day my uncle

pierced my ammayi (this was marked as Ext. P01) on that day. Police asked me as to what

happened, I have told everything to the police.”

9. In her cross-examination the witness stated that before

the date of occurrence the deceased was living with her

(witness) parents. At the time of occurrence the witness

used to go to aanganwadi school. The witness denied the

suggestion that she had not gone with the deceased to wash

13

 (1992) 4 SCC 225 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 853

14

 1993 Supp (3) SCC 667 : 1993 SCC (Cri) 1084

15

 (1996) 9 SCC 287 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 1004

16

 (1997) 5 SCC 341 : 1997 SCC (Cri) 685

17 (2000) 3 SCC 70 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 579

31

the clothes. Nothing favouring the defence could be

extracted out of her in the cross-examination. She denied

the suggestion that “my uncle did not pierce my aunt with

the knife. It is not correct that I have not seen the knife in

the hands of my uncle”. The trial court as well as the High

Court accepted her testimony as no inherent defect was

pointed out by the defence. We also find no reason to take

a contrary view. The mere fact that her mother had told that

she did not know any other language except Malyalam and

that the words spoken to by her were not in that language

cannot be used as a ground to reject her testimony. The

child and her parents conversed in Malyalam language at

their residence which was explained to the investigating

officer in the language which was understood by him. There

is no ground of doubting the veracity of the testimony of

this child witness as we find that her name is mentioned in

the FIR which is proved to have been recorded immediately

after the occurrence. P.H. Krishnappa, the Tahsildar who

prepared the inquest report is also proved to have recorded

the statement of this child witness, wherein, she is shown to

have made similar deposition. Otherwise also there is

sufficient corroboration on record to rule out the possibility

of PW 2 being tutored or used for ulterior purposes by some

alleged interested persons. In the absence of any inherent

defect we do not find any substance in the plea to reject the

testimony of this child witness. The statement of PW 2

shows that the deceased and the appellant were living

together as husband and wife and she used to address them

as uncle and aunt. Her testimony to the effect of the

deceased living with PW 1 is sufficiently corroborated by

the other evidence led in the case. The factum of the

deceased having received stabbed wound with a knife is

proved by the medical evidence. The recovery of the knife

at the instance of the appellant, in consequence of his

disclosure statement, leaves no doubt to believe her

statement. The place of occurrence being near the water

tank has not been seriously disputed. The report received

from FSL as per Exhibit P-15 shows that blouse (MO 2),

towel (MO 3) and the bangle pieces (MO 4) of the deceased

and the knife (MO 1) which was used in the commission of

the crime, the towel (MO 7), lungi (MO 6) and shirt (MO

5) of the appellant were found to be stained with blood. Dr

Ram Dass (PW 12) has opined that the injuries found on the

dead body of the deceased could be caused with a weapon

like MO 1.”

(emphasis supplied)

32

23. We may now consider the evidence of PW5 Ujjwal in the backdrop

of the principles discernible from the decisions of this Court as stated

above.

(A) The points on which the testimony of PW5 Ujjwal gets

corroborated by other pieces of material or evidence on record are:

i) According to him, a call was received on mobile of his

mother, whereafter she opened the door and let the accused in.

The mobile of his mother bearing number 9411926017

definitely received a call at about 9.27 p.m. from a mobile bearing

number 9758835941. The call lasted for 20 seconds.

However, there is nothing on record that the concerned

mobile was that of accused Hari Om, or any of the accused. The

record does not throw any light, nor any efforts were made by the

investigating machinery to trace the name of the person holding this

mobile phone number.

However, there is some corroboration available from the

testimony of PW2 Ompal Singh that on 28.10.2008 he had found

Hari Om standing near a vehicle in the vicinity of the house of the

deceased; and upon being asked, accused Hari Om had replied that

he was calling Smt. Nirdosh Devi. However, according to PW2 

33

Ompal Singh, that was at about 11.00 p.m. and not at or about 9.27

p.m.

ii) After being admitted into the house, tea and water was

offered to accused Hari Om and his associates.

There were glasses which were found in the kitchen which

fact certainly corroborates the version given by PW5 Ujjwal.

iii) It was stated that his mother was overpowered by two of the

accomplices and her throat was slit by accused Hari Om.

Thereafter, his three siblings were throttled to death, and an attempt

was also made to throttle PW5 Ujjwal.

The manner in which his mother and siblings were done to

death is corroborated by the medical evidence on record.

However, if the mother was being overpowered, there were

no signs of struggle and none of her bangles was broken. Further,

if her throat was slit and her left side blood vessels of the neck and

trachea were cut, the blood would have instantaneously gushed out.

But, there were no blood spots anywhere else except below the cot

where the body of Smt. Nirdosh Devi was found lying in supine

condition.

34

One more striking feature of the matter is that there was no

medical evidence either in the form of any documents, pictures or

even a statement of any medical professional that PW5 Ujjwal was

given medical attention as a result of attempts of throttling.

iv) The location of dead bodies, as mentioned by him, is

undoubtedly corroborated by the site map, inquest panchanama and

other material.

(B) Having dealt with the features which get corroborated to some

extent, we will now deal with certain inconsistencies or infirmities which

are evident from the record.

i) According to PW5 Ujjwal, in the morning of 29.10.2008, the

first person to see him was PW4 Shankar Lal (milkman), who took

him to the house of his doctor uncle (Dr. Satyapal Singh).

However, according to his statement recorded during

investigation, he was taken to the house of his uncle by the

neighbours.

ii) According to his court statement, after reaching the house of

said uncle, he had narrated the entire incident to his other uncle

PW1 Kotwal Singh and said Dr. Satyapal Singh and told them that 

35

Hari Om and his associates had committed the murders and also

told them that he had witnessed the incident.

However, the FIR lodged by PW1 Kotwal Singh spoke

otherwise. According to the reporting, the accused were unknown

persons. The reporting also did not disclose that PW5 Ujjwal had

survived, despite being attempted to be murdered, and that he had

witnessed the incident. As a matter of fact the FIR did not make

any reference to PW5 Ujjwal.

iii) According to PW5 Ujjwal, he had narrated the entire incident

to PW4 Shankar Lal (milkman) and Darogaji.

On this score also, the record spoke otherwise, according to

which, till 29.10.2008 the names of Hari Om and his associates had

not surfaced as suspects at all. The initial registration of crime was

against unknown persons.

iv) There are other inconsistencies and omissions with regard to

the manner in which his siblings were done to death.

(C) Apart from the aspects referred to hereinabove touching upon the

comparison of the version given in court, as against his statement recorded 

36

during investigation, certain other features are available from the record

which must be noted at this stage.

i) If PW5 Ujjwal was attempted to be murdered and as

disclosed by PW4 Shankar Lal (milkman) he had seen a ligature

mark on the neck of PW5 Ujjwal, there was nothing on record

supporting this fact.

ii) Parcha No.2 which was part of papers pertaining to

investigation, did make a reference to the statement of PW5 Ujjwal

recorded during investigation. However, as stated by PW10 S.O.

Gautam, the said Parcha was not in his handwriting, though, he was

incharge of investigation. He could not give any answer as to who

had written that Parcha.

iii) If according to the Prosecution, PW4 Shankar Lal was the

first person to reach the place of occurrence, his statement was

recorded 26 days after the incident. The response given by the

concerned Investigating Officer shows that no attempts were made

to trace said Shankar Lal.

iv) The versions given by PW1 Kotwal Singh and PW4 Shankar

Lal in court did not, in any way, suggest that the names of

suspects were narrated to them by PW5 Ujjwal, or that he had told 

37

them about the entire incident. As a matter of fact, PW1 Kotwal

Singh went to the extent of asserting that it was through Dr.

Satyapal Singh that he came to know about the incident.

v) Thus, the version given by PW5 Ujjwal that he had narrated

the entire incident to PW1 Kotwal Singh, PW4 Shankar Lal and

Darogaji was not supported by any of them. Moreover, the

other person namely Dr. Satyapal Singh to whom similar narration

was given by PW5 Ujjwal, was not even examined by the

prosecution.

vi) The charge-sheet did indicate Dr. Satyapal Singh to be one

of the relevant witnesses, and yet he was not examined. On the

other hand, the charge-sheet did not even speak of PW5 Ujjwal to

be a relevant and material witness.

24. Having culled out the essential features emerging from the record,

we must state that we find it difficult to place reliance upon the testimony

of PW5 Ujjwal and in our view, the said version can not be made the basis

of conviction of Hari Om.

It is true that the assertion made by him that Hari Om used to be a

tenant in their house was supported by PW2 Ompal Singh. Even if we 

38

accept that accused Hari Om was a known face to PW5 Ujjwal, and the fact

that the incident occurred inside the house where PW5 Ujjwal would

naturally be available, but on the issue whether he had witnessed the

incident, the glaring inconsistencies on record cannot be discarded. In

Suryanarayana9

after setting out the guiding principlesfor appreciation and

consideration of the evidence of a child witness, this Court had found in

paragraph 9, that there were no doubts at all with regard to the veracity to

the testimony of the child witness, nor were there any inherent defects. The

name of the child witness figured in that case in the FIR and Inquest; and

right from the initial stages, her presence was adverted to, which is why no

doubts could be entertained. However, such doubts and defects are quite

evident in the present matter.

25. In Digamber Vaishnav and Another vs. State of Chhattisgarh18

, a

bench of three Judges of this Court, while considering the matter in the light

of the fact that the child witness had not disclosed about the accused in the

first instance, observed:-

“…..None of the other witnesses have identified the

appellants. Therefore, heavy reliance was placed on the

testimony of PW 8. She did not tell PW 1, Badridas about

the appellants while disclosing about the incident for the

first time. This is reflected from the FIR which has been

registered against unknown persons. In such circumstances,

it is risky to rely on the uncorroborated identification of the

appellants at the instance of PW 8, who has not disclosed

18 (2019) 4 SCC 522

39

about the appellants at the first instance before PW 1

Badridas.”

Similarly, in Radhey Shyam vs. State of Rajasthan19, the evidence

of a child witness was not found to be inspiring confidence because of

inconsistencies in the version of the witness, as well as because of the

absence of corroboration from the other prosecution witnesses.

26. In the circumstances, we do not find it safe to rely on the version

given by the child witness in the instant case, who was about five years of

age when the incident had occurred.

27. There are other features from the evidence touching upon the

involvement of accused Hari Om such as:-

(I) A chhuri or knife was said to have been recovered upon being

pointed by accused Hari Om. In the absence of any memorandum,

the trial court rejected the theory that such recovery would be

admissible under Section 27 of the Act. It was however observed

that such recovery would be admissible under Section 8 of the Act.

Though the conclusion arrived at by the Trial Court is not

inconsistent with some of the decisions rendered by this Court,

19 (2014) 5 SCC 389

40

the evidence in that behalf, by itself may not be enough to sustain

the finding of guilt. It will be one of the factors to be taken into

account in the ultimate analysis.

(II) Accused Hari Om was seen in the neighbourhood, or near the

house of Smt. Nirdosh Devi next to a red Tavera vehicle by PW2

Ompal Singh and one Ram Prakash. During investigation,

statement of one Raju, owner of the house where accused Hari Om

resided, was also recorded. Ram Prakash and Raju were not

examined during trial and, as such, apart from the statement of PW2

Ompal Singh, we do not have any material to support the version

that accused Hari Om was either in the neighbourhood of Smt.

Nirdosh Devi, or was moving about in a red Tavera vehicle on

28.10.2008. If the names of accused Hari Om and his associates

were not known as suspects to the police on 28.10.2008, which is

the case of the prosecution, the link in that behalf has to be either

through PW2 Ompal Singh or through Ram Prakash or Raju. When

latter two were not examined at all, we have to rely only on the

testimony of PW2 Ompal Singh. His cross-examination reveals

that he made no attempts to talk to the police on 28.10.2008, though

he asserted in his examination-in-chief that in the morning of 

41

28.10.2008 he was sure that the culprits were accused Hari Om and

his associates. The version given by PW2 Ompal Singh is,

therefore, not free from doubt.

(III) The sample fingerprints of accused Hari Om did not match

with any of the fingerprints taken from the house of the deceased.

(IV) With the acquittal of all the accused in respect of offences

punishable under Section 412 IPC and under the Arms Act, there is

no other material pointing towards the involvement of accused Hari

Om.

28. Thus, out of three features which could possibly be put against

accused Hari Om, the version given by the child witness being unworthy to

be relied upon, we are left with the evidence of recovery of a knife, and the

evidence of PW2 that he had spotted accused Hari Om near a red Tavera

vehicle in the neighbourhood. The prosecution did not attempt to prove that

the call received by Smt. Nirdosh Devi could be associated with accused

Hari Om. Secondly, the time given by PW2 Ompal Singh again did not

match with the time of the call received by Smt. Nirdosh Devi. Further, the

evidence of PW2 Ompal Singh also contains inherent inconsistencies. In

the premises, we do not find the material on record sufficient to record 

42

conviction of accused Hari Om for the offence under Section 396 IPC, and

he must be held entitled to benefit of doubt.

29. We now turn to the submissions b) and c) of Mr. Marlapalle, learned

amicus curiae.

Insofar as accused Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju are

concerned, apart from the material that their sample fingerprints matched

with those lifted from the house of the deceased, nothing was brought on

record to suggest or suspect the involvement of said two accused. They

were acquitted of the charges under Section 412 of IPC and under the Arms

Act. Whether their liability in the instant case can be fastened with the help

of the fingerprint expert’s report is the question.

30. According to the record, Exhibit Ka 7 was the Panchnama testifying

the lifting of the fingerprints from the house of the deceased by Constable

Dharmender Singh. If the fingerprints were picked from the glasses there

is nothing to indicate what method was applied to lift the fingerprints from

the glasses allegedly used by the accused when they were offered water.

What the record indicates is that some photographs were sent to the office

of the Director, Fingerprint Bureau, Lucknow and nothing more. It does

not show the procedure adopted for taking such photographs, and

whether such method is a trusted and tested one. The concerned person was 

43

not examined, who could have thrown light on these issues. The record also

does not show whether those glasses by themselves were made available for

appropriate analysis. There is, thus, no clarity in the process adopted by the

investigating machinery.

31. In Prakash vs. State of Karnataka20, the evidence concerning

fingerprints was examined in the light of the procedure prescribed under the

relevant manual and it was observed:-

“33. Our attention was drawn to the Karnataka Police

Manual and it appears that Nanaiah followed the guidelines

laid down therein and perhaps acted in an overly cautious

manner. Guideline 1543 provides as follows:

“1543. The opinion of the fingerprint expert is of

paramount importance in the investigation of

various crimes. The following instructions should

be followed regarding chance finger and

footprints and their developments, preservation of

the scene, method of packing and other matters:”

34. Guideline 1544 in the Manual contains various

provisions and clause (iv) and clause (v) are relevant for our

purposes. They read as follows:

“1544. (i)-(iii) * * *

(iv) If latent prints are found on portable articles

they should be seized under a detailed

panchnama duly packed and labelled and sent

to the Fingerprint Bureau with a police officer

with instructions regarding the care of the

package during the journey.

(v) In sending the articles containing latent

prints to the Bureau, proper attention must be

20(2014) 12 SCC 133 

44

given to their package. The following essential

points should be borne in mind:

• It should be ensured that no

portion of the article where prints

may be found should get into

contact with anything else and

• The articles should be securely

packed in a suitable container.”

Clause (iv) was clearly not followed when Nanaiah

took the plastic cover along with him and this is an

extremely serious lapse. However, we give him the

benefit of doubt and assume that it is perhaps with

clause (v) in mind that Nanaiah took the plastic cover

along with him.

35. While we completely disapprove of the manner in

which Ext. P-18 was taken away by Nanaiah (and the

investigating officer did nothing about it), the case of the

prosecution does not get strengthened even if a valid

procedure was followed, since there is nothing on record to

show that the “admitted” fingerprints on Ext. P-20 were

those of Prakash which could be compared with the

fingerprints on Ext. P-18 and the enlarged photograph being

Ext. P-19.

36. Assuming that Ext. P-20 was a valid piece of evidence

validly obtained, there is no explanation why it was kept by

the investigating officer from 14-11-1990 till 9-1-1991

when it was received by Nanaiah. The Karnataka Police

Manual highlights the importance of keeping safe an article

containing fingerprints. In view of its importance, Nanaiah

did not trust anyone with the plastic cover bearing the

inscription “Canara Bank” (Ext. P-18) and carefully took it

along with him to avoid its getting damaged by getting into

contact with anything else. On the other hand, we have the

investigating officer keeping Ext. P-20 with him for almost

two months and in circumstances that seem unclear. We

cannot rule out the possibility of Ext. P-20 getting damaged

due to careless handling.

37. We are of the opinion that there is no fingerprint

evidence worth it linking Prakash to the murder of

Gangamma.”

45

32. The procedure detailed in the Karnataka Police Manual captures the

importance of development and preservation as well as the method of

packing and safe keeping. Such a procedure, if adopted, will not raise any

doubts. Secondly, in the aforesaid decision, the conduct of the Investigating

Officer in keeping the concerned material with him for almost two months,

was not approved by this Court. In the present case, Constable Dharmender

Singh was not examined by the Prosecution. There is nothing on record

regarding the competence of said Dharmender Singh, and whether he was

adequately trained, or was an expert in lifting the fingerprints from material

such as glasses; nor was any evidence led detailing out the procedure

adopted by him. In the absence of any such material, it is extremely difficult

to rely on the report that the lifted fingerprints from the glasses matched

with the sample fingerprints of accused Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @

Sanju.

33. In any case, apart from the fingerprints, there was nothing else on

record against these two accused. It was observed by this Court in Musheer

Khan alias Badshah Khan and another vs. State of Madhya Pradesh6

:

“34. It will be noticed that under the Evidence Act, the word

“admissibility” has very rarely been used. The emphasis is

on relevant facts. In a way relevancy and admissibility have

been virtually equated under the Evidence Act. But one

thing is clear that evidence of fingerprint expert is not 

46

substantive evidence. Such evidence can only be used to

corroborate some items of substantive evidence which are

otherwise on record.”

34. In Hukam Singh vs. State of Rajasthan21

, the only circumstance

against the concerned accused pertained to his fingerprints on a mirror. That

circumstance by itself was not found to be sufficient by this Court to sustain

the finding of guilt under Section 302 IPC against the accused. It was

observed:-

“6. The last circumstance on which reliance was placed on

behalf of the prosecution was the presence of fingerprints

of the appellant on the mirror Ex. 1. We fail to see how this

circumstance can be regarded as necessarily implicating the

appellant in the commission of the murders. It was admitted

by Sujan Singh that the appellant was on visiting terms with

this family and it is, therefore, possible that during one of

his visits, the appellant might have touched the mirror Ex.

1 and left his fingerprints on it. It is also not altogether

unlikely that even when the appellant was in the hutment of

Sujan Singh for the purpose of committing the theft of

ornaments and other articles belonging to Sujan Singh after

the quadruple murders had been committed by some other

persons, he might have touched the mirror Ex. 1 and in the

process left his fingerprints upon it. The presence of the

fingerprints on the mirror Ex. 1 is not such a circumstance

as would necessarily lead to the inference that the appellant

must have committed the murders of these four members of

Sujan Singh’s family.

7. It is now settled law that in case of circumstantial

evidence, all the incriminating facts and circumstances

should be fully established by cogent and reliable evidence

and the facts so established must be consistent with the guilt

of the accused and should not be capable of being explained

away on any other reasonable hypothesis than that of his

guilt. In short, the circumstantial evidence should

unmistakably point to one and one conclusion only that the

accused person and none other perpetrated the alleged

21 (1977) 2 SCC 99

47

crime. If the circumstances proved in a particular case are

not inconsistent with the innocence of the accused and if

they are susceptible of any rational explanation, no

conviction can lie. Judged from this standpoint, it is not

possible to affirm the conviction of the appellant for the

offence of murder of any one or more of Bhanwar Singh,

Roop Singh, Lad Kanwar and Inder Kanwar. The three

circumstances relied upon by the prosecution are not

incompatible with the innocence of the appellant insofar as

the murders of these four persons are concerned. They are

capable of being explained away on a hypothesis other than

that of guilt of the appellant. We may point out that in any

event the view taken by the Sessions Court that the

circumstances were not sufficient to found the conviction

of the appellant was a reasonable view and the High Court

was not justified in reversing it.”

35. It must be stated that both Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju

were unknown faces to PW5 Ujjwal, and were not subjected to any Test

Identification. Apart from identification by PW5 Ujjwal in Court for the

first time, there is no other material to establish their presence. Thus, even

if we accept that fingerprints lifted from the house of the deceased could be

associated with the said two accused, that by itself, in the absence of any

substantive piece of evidence, cannot be made the basis of their conviction.

These accused are therefore entitled to the benefit of doubt.

36. Having come to the conclusion that all three appellants are entitled

to benefit of doubt, we need not go into the fourth submission advanced by

Mr. Marlapalle, learned Amicus Curiae.

48

37. In the premises, we accept the appeals preferred by accused Hari

Om, Sanjay @ Sonu and Saurabh @ Sanju. While setting aside the orders of

conviction and sentence recorded against them, we acquit them of all the

charges levelled against them. They be set at liberty, unless their custody is

required in connection with any other offence.

38. Before we part, we must record our appreciation for the sincere

efforts put in by Mr. B.H. Marlapalle, learned Amicus Curiae and for the

assistance rendered by him.

………………………J.

[Uday Umesh Lalit]

………………………J.

[Indu Malhotra]

………………………J.

[Krishna Murari]

New Delhi;

January 05, 2021.

calculation of notional income for homemakers and the grant of future prospects with respect to them, for the purposes of grant of compensation which can be summarized as follows: a. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. b. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a homemaker attains special significance. It becomes a recognition of the work, labour and sacrifices of homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring dignity to all. c. Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts and circumstances of the case. d. The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. e. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income calculated in such cases, is a component of just compensation.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NOS.19­20 of 2021

[Arising out of Special Leave Petition(C) Nos.18728­29 of 2018]

Kirti & Anr. Etc. ..... Appellant(s)

                                       VERSUS

Oriental Insurance Company Ltd. ..... Respondent(s)

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J:

Leave Granted. 

2. These   civil   appeals,   which   have   been   heard   through   video

conferencing, have been filed by three surviving dependents (who are

two minor daughters and father) of the two deceased, impugning the

judgment dated 17.07.2017 of the High Court of Delhi through which

the motor accident compensation of Rs 40.71 lakhs awarded by the

Motor Accident Claims Tribunal, Rohini (hereinafter, “Tribunal”) on

24.12.2016 under Section 168 of the Motor Vehicle Act, 1988 (“MV

Page | 1

Act”), was reduced to Rs 22 lakhs.

FACTUAL MATRIX

3. The deceased couple, Vinod and Poonam, while commuting on a

motorcycle in Delhi at around 7AM on 12.04.2014 were hit at an

intersection by a Santro Car bearing registration ‘DL 7CA 1053’. The

impact immediately incapacitated both the deceased and they soon

passed away from cranio­cerebral damage and haemorrhagic shock

caused by the accident’s blunt­force trauma.  

4. An FIR was registered under Sections 279 and 304 of the Indian

Penal   Code,   1860   (hereinafter,   “IPC”)   against   the   driver,   and   the

statement of an independent eyewitness (Constable Vishnu Dutt) was

recorded, which evidenced rash driving and negligence on part of the

car­driver. Subsequently, a claim petition was filed under Section 166

of   the   MV   Act   by   the   two   toddler­daughters   and   septuagenarianparents of the deceased. This was contested by the driver and owner

claiming that the deceased were themselves driving negligently and

the accident was as a result of their very own actions. Two witnesses

were   examined   by   the   appellant­claimants   and   none   by   the

respondents. The insurance company (Respondent No. 1) offered as

settlement a compensation of Rs 6.47 lakhs for the death of Poonam

and Rs 10.71 lakhs for Vinod.

Page | 2

5. The Tribunal took note of the chargesheet filed against the driver

in the criminal case and also his failure to step­into the witness box.

Relying on the strong testimony of the independent witness, it was

concluded that the car­driver was indeed  driving rashly and thus

liability ought to be fastened on the respondent­insurer. Regarding the

quantum of compensation, the Tribunal began by determining the

ages of Poonam and Vinod as being 26 and 29 years respectively.

Consequently,   an   age­multiplier   of   17   was   adopted.   Although   the

deceased’s father took a plea that Vinod was earning Rs 14,000 every

month as a teacher at the Pratap Public School in Delhi, but he was

unable   to   substantiate   his   claim   with   any   documentary   evidence.

Thus, minimum wage in Delhi was adopted for computation of loss of

dependency.   An   additional   25%   income   was   accounted   for   future

prospects   of   Poonam,   and   1/3rd  of   Vinod’s   salary   was   deducted

towards personal expenses. Rs 2.50 lakhs was given for each deceased

as compensation for loss of love and affection, estate, and funeral

charges. Thus, the Tribunal awarded a total sum of Rs 40.71 lakhs for

both deceased to the claimants.

6. This   computation   was   challenged   by   the   respondent­insurer

before the High Court, on grounds that the Tribunal had erroneously

relied upon the minimum wage as notified by Government of Delhi as

there was no proof that the deceased were employed in Delhi. Instead,

Page | 3

given   their   established   residence   in   Haryana,   the   minimum   wage

notified for that State ought to be the basis for calculation of loss of

dependency. Simultaneously, addition of future prospects as well as

non­deduction of personal expenses for Poonam was prayed to be

reversed. Further, compensation was sought to be halved on grounds

of   contributory   negligence.   A   categorical   submission   was   made

highlighting the then divergent law on the issue of payment of ‘future

prospects’ to non­permanent employees, pending resolution of which,

it was prayed that no such addition be granted to the claimants.

7. The   High   Court   concurred   with   these   contentions   and

consequently   reduced   the   notional   income   for   both   deceased   by

adopting the lowest minimum wage applicable for unskilled workers in

Haryana, instead of Delhi. Similarly, 1/3rd  of Poonam’s income was

deducted towards personal expenses and future prospects were denied

to both deceased. However, given the totality of circumstances and

Poonam’s contribution to her household, 25% additional gratuitous

income was added to her salary. The High Court thus brought down

the total compensation payable to the claimants to Rs 22 lakhs.

CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES

8. This reduction has been assailed before us by learned counsel

for the claimants. Re­computation is sought of compensation for loss

Page | 4

of dependency consequent to the decision of the Constitutional Bench

of this Court in National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi1

, which

authoritatively settles the law on future prospects for non­permanent

employees as well. Furthermore, the anomaly between the gratuitous

increase of income between Vinod and Poonam, and the usage of

unskilled minimum wage for Vinod have been brought to our notice. 

9. Learned Counsel for the respondent­insurer, on the other hand,

has sought to forestall any increase in compensation, including under

the ground of future prospects. It is claimed that the High Court’s

decision was a consent order, and that the counsel for the appellants

had   conceded   to   a   lower   computation   under   the   head   of   loss   of

dependency, which thus cannot be challenged before this Court.

ANALYSIS

I. Deduction for Personal Expenses

10. We   have   thoughtfully   considered   the   rival   submissions.     It

cannot be disputed that at the time of death, there in fact were four

dependents of the deceased and not three. The subsequent death of

the   deceased’s   dependent   mother   ought   not   to   be   a   reason   for

reduction of motor accident compensation. Claims and legal liabilities

crystallise at the time of the accident itself, and changes post thereto

1

 (2017) 16 SCC 680.

Page | 5

ought   not   to   ordinarily   affect   pending   proceedings.   Just   like   how

appellant­claimants   cannot   rely   upon   subsequent   increases   in

minimum wages, the respondent­insurer too cannot seek benefit of

the subsequent death of a dependent during the pendency of legal

proceedings. Similarly, any concession in law made in this regard by

either counsel would not bind the parties, as it is legally settled that

advocates cannot throw­away legal rights or enter into arrangements

contrary to law.2

11. Any   compensation   awarded   by   a   Court   ought   to   be   just,

reasonable   and   consequently   must   undoubtedly   be   guided   by

principles of fairness, equity, and good conscience.3

 Not only did the

family of the deceased consist of septuagenarian parents, but there

were also two toddler­girls, aged merely 3 and 4 years; each of whom

requires exceptional care and expenditure till they reach the stage of

self­dependency. Tragically,  in  addition to  the  married couple, the

negligence of the driver also extinguished the life of the family’s third

child who was a foetus in Poonam’s womb at the time of the accident.

Thus, the appropriate deduction for personal expenses for both Vinod

and Poonam ought to be 1/4th only, and not 1/3rd as applied by the

Tribunal and the High Court, more so when there were four family

members dependent on the deceased.

2  Director of Elementary Education v. Pramod Kumar Sahoo, (2019) 10 SCC 674, ¶ 11.

3  See, Helen C Rebello v. Maharashtra State Road Transport Corp, (1999) 1 SCC 90, ¶ 28.

Page | 6

II. Assessment of monthly income

12. Second,   although   it   is   correct   that   the   claimants   have   been

unable to produce any document evidencing Vinod’s income, nor have

they established his employment as a teacher; but that doesn’t justify

adoption of the lowest­tier of minimum wage while computing his

income. From the statement of witnesses, documentary evidence­onrecord and circumstances of the accident, it is apparent that Vinod

was comparatively more educationally qualified and skilled. Further,

he   maintained   a   reasonable   standard   of   living   for   his   family   as

evidenced by his use of a motorcycle for commuting. Preserving the

existing standard of living of a deceased’s family is a fundamental

endeavour of motor accident compensation law.4

  Thus, at the very

least, the minimum wage of Rs 6197 as applicable to skilled workers

during April 2014 in the State of Haryana ought to be applied in his

case. 

III. Addition of Future Prospects

13. Third  and   most   importantly,   it   is   unfair   on   part   of   the

respondent­insurer to contest grant of future prospects considering

their submission before the High Court that such compensation ought

not   to   be   paid   pending   outcome   of   the  Pranay   Sethi   (supra)

4 See, RK Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2019) 14 SCC 1, ¶ 9.

Page | 7

reference. Nevertheless, the law on this point is no longer res integra,

and stands crystalised,  as is clear from the following extract of the

afore­cited Constitutional Bench judgment5

:

“59.4. In case the deceased was self­employed or on a fixed

salary, an addition of 40% of the established income should

be the warrant where the deceased was below the age of 40

years. An  addition of 25% where the deceased  was between

the age of 40 to 50 years and 10% where the deceased was

between the age of 50 to 60 years should be regarded as the

necessary  method   of   computation.   The   established   income

means the income minus the tax component.”

[Emphasis supplied]

14.   Given how both deceased were below 40 years and how they

have   not   been   established   to   be   permanent   employees,   future

prospects to the tune of 40% must be paid. The argument that no

such future prospects ought to be allowed for those with notional

income, is both incorrect in law6

  and without merit considering the

constant inflation­induced increase in wages. It would be sufficient to

quote   the   observations   of   this   Court   in  Hem   Raj   v.   Oriental

Insurance Co. Ltd.

7

, as it puts at rest any argument concerning nonpayment of future prospects to the deceased in the present case: 

“7. We are of the view that there cannot be distinction where

there   is   positive   evidence   of   income   and   where   minimum

5

 National Insurance Co Ltd v. Pranay Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680, ¶ 59.4.

6  Sunita Tokas v. New India Insurance Co Ltd, 2019 SCC OnLine SC 1045.

7

(2018) 15 SCC 654.

Page | 8

income   is   determined   on   guesswork   in   the   facts   and

circumstances   of   a   case.   Both   the   situations   stand   at   the

same   footing.  Accordingly,   in   the  present   case,  addition  of

40% to the income assessed by the Tribunal is required to be

made..”

[Emphasis supplied]

IV. Other heads and division of compensation

15. Finally,   given   the   lack   of   arguments   on   the   other   heads   of

funeral charges, loss of estate, love, and affection; there arises no

cause of alteration. We similarly see no infirmity with the High Court’s

adoption of 17 as the age­multiplier, award of 9% interest, calculation

of Poonam’s notional income or the division of total compensation in

the ratio of 1:2:2 between the grandfather and the two girls. For ready

reference, a comparative table of revised compensation after suitable

increases would thus be as follows:

TRIBUNAL HIGH COURT SUPREME COURT

Head Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam Vinod Poonam

A Monthly Income 8554 9438 5547.1 5547.1 6197.1 5547.1

B

Deduction 

towards Personal 

Expenses

33% None 33% 33% 25% 25%

C Age Multiplier 17 17 17 17 17 17

D

Adjustment for 

Future Prospects None 25% None None 40% 40%

E

Increase for 

Special 

Circumstances

None None None 25% None 25%

F

Funeral Charges 

& Loss of Estate 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000 250000

Page | 9

G

Total per 

deceased 1413344 2656690 1004406 1193007 1577419 1735236

(rounded off) 1414000 2657000 1005000 1195000 1580000 1740000

Total 

compensation 4071000 2200000 3320000

CONCLUSION

16. For the reasons afore­stated, the appeals are allowed in­part.

The total motor accident compensation of Rs 22 lakhs awarded by the

High Court to the claimant­appellants is increased by Rs 11.20 lakhs

to reach a new total of Rs 33.20 lakhs. The enhanced amount of

compensation shall be paid within two months along with interest @

9% p.a. from the date of filing of the Detailed Accident Report i.e.

23.05.2014, and shall be apportioned per the terms laid down by the

Tribunal.

…………………………….. J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………… J.

(S. ABDUL NAZEER)

…………………………...J.

(SURYA KANT)

NEW DELHI

DATED : 05.01.2021

Page | 10

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 19­20 OF 2021

(ARISING OUT OF SLP (C) NOS. 18728­18729 OF 2018)

KIRTI & ANR. ETC.             …APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

ORIENTAL INSURANCE CO. LTD.                         …RESPONDENT

    JUDGMENT

    N.V. RAMANA, J.

1. I have had the advantage of perusing the judgment prepared

by   my   learned   brother,   Surya   Kant,   J.,   and   am   in   complete

agreement   with   him.   However,   I   thought   to   supplement   the

reasoning   in   his   judgment,   with   respect   to   the   question   of

notional income of a housewife and whether future prospects

should apply to the same or not. 

2. There are two distinct categories of situations wherein the

Court usually determines notional income of a victim. The first

category   of   cases   relates   to   those   wherein   the   victim   was

employed, but the claimants are not able to prove her actual

income,   before   the   Court.   In   such   a   situation,   the   Court

1

Reportable

“guesses” the income of the victim on the basis of the evidence on

record, like the quality of life being led by the victim and her

family, the general earning of an individual employed in that field,

the qualifications of the victim, and other considerations.

3. The   second   category   of   cases   relates   to   those   situations

wherein the Court is called upon to determine the income of a

non­earning victim, such as a child, a student or a homemaker.

Needless to say, compensation in such cases is extremely difficult

to quantify.

4. The Court often follows different principles for determining

the compensation towards a non­earning victim in order to arrive

at an amount which would be just in the facts and circumstances

of the case. Some of these involve the determination of notional

income. Whenever notional income is determined in such cases,

different considerations and factors are taken into account. For

instance, for students, the Court often considers the course that

they   are   studying,   their   academic   proficiency,   the   family

background, etc., to determine and fix what they could earn in

the future. [See M. R. Krishna Murthi v. New India Assurance

Co. Ltd., 2019 SCC OnLine SC 315] 

5. One category of non­earning victims that Courts are often

2

called upon to calculate the compensation for are homemakers.

The granting of compensation for homemakers on a pecuniary

basis, as in the present case, has been considered by this Court

earlier   on   numerous   occasions.   A   three­Judge   Bench   of   this

Court in Lata Wadhwa v. State of Bihar, (2001) 8 SCC 197,

while dealing with compensation for the victims of a fire during a

function, granted compensation to housewives on the basis of the

services  rendered  by  them  in  the  house,  and  their  age.  This

Court, in that case, held as follows:

“10. So   far   as   the  deceased   housewives   are

concerned, in the absence of any data and as

the housewives were not earning any income,

attempt   has   been   made   to   determine   the

compensation   on   the   basis   of   services

rendered by them to the house. On the basis of

the   age   group   of   the   housewives,   appropriate

multiplier has been applied, but the estimation of

the value of services rendered to the house by the

housewives, which has been arrived at Rs 12,000

per annum in cases of some and Rs 10,000 for

others, appears to us to be grossly low. It is true

that the claimants, who ought to have given data

for determination of compensation, did not assist

in   any   manner   by   providing   the   data   for

estimating the value of services rendered by such

housewives.   But   even   in   the   absence   of   such

data   and  taking   into   consideration   the

multifarious   services   rendered   by   the

housewives   for  managing   the   entire   family,

even   on   a  modest   estimation,   should   be   Rs

3000 per month and Rs 36,000 per annum…”

(emphasis supplied)

3

6. In Arun Kumar Agrawal v. National Insurance Co. Ltd.,

(2010)  9  SCC  218, this Court, while dealing with the grant of

compensation for the death of a housewife due to a motor vehicle

accident, held as follows:

“26. In India the courts have recognised that

the   contribution   made   by   the   wife   to   the

house   is   invaluable  and  cannot  be  computed

in   terms   of  money.   The   gratuitous   services

rendered   by   the   wife   with   true   love   and

affection to the children and her husband and

managing   the   household   affairs   cannot   be

equated with the services rendered by others.

A wife/mother does not work by the clock. She is

in   the   constant   attendance   of   the   family

throughout   the   day   and   night   unless   she   is

employed   and   is   required   to   attend   the

employer's work for particular hours. She takes

care of all the requirements of the husband and

children including cooking of food, washing of

clothes,   etc.   She   teaches   small   children   and

provides invaluable guidance to them for their

future life. A housekeeper or maidservant can do

the   household   work,   such   as   cooking   food,

washing clothes and utensils, keeping the house

clean, etc., but she can never be a substitute for

a wife/mother who renders selfless service to her

husband and children.

27. It is not possible to quantify any amount

in   lieu   of   the   services   rendered   by   the

wife/mother   to   the   family   i.e.   the   husband

    and   children.  However,   for   the   purpose   of

award   of   compensation   to   the   dependants,

some  pecuniary   estimate  has   to  be  made  of

the services of the housewife/mother. In that

context,   the   term   “services”   is   required   to   be

given a broad meaning and must be construed by

taking into account the loss of personal care and

4

attention given by the deceased to her children

as a mother and to her husband as a wife. They

are entitled to adequate compensation in lieu of

the loss of gratuitous services rendered by the

deceased. The amount payable to the dependants

cannot be diminished on the ground that some

close relation like a grandmother may volunteer

to render some of the services to the family which

the deceased was giving earlier.”

(emphasis supplied)

The above pronouncement has been followed by this Court in its

recent judgment in Rajendra Singh v. National Insurance Co.

Ltd., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 521, wherein the notional income of

a deceased housewife was calculated for the purposes of granting

compensation in a motor accident case.

7. Before   discussing   this   topic   further,   it   is   necessary   to

comment on its gendered nature. In India, according to the 2011

Census,   nearly   159.85   million   women   stated   that   “household

work”   was   their   main   occupation,   as   compared   to   only   5.79

million men. 

8. In   fact,   the   recently   released   Report   of   the   National

Statistical   Office   of   the   Ministry   of   Statistics   &   Programme

Implementation, Government of India called “Time Use in India2019”, which is the first Time Use Survey in the country and

collates   information   from   1,38,799   households   for   the   period

January,   2019   to   December,   2019,   reflects   the   same   gender

5

disparity.1

  The key findings of the survey suggest that, on an

average,   women   spend   nearly   299   minutes   a   day   on   unpaid

domestic   services   for   household   members   versus   97   minutes

spent by men on average.2

 Similarly, in a day, women on average

spend 134 minutes on unpaid caregiving services for household

members   as   compared   to   the   76   minutes   spent   by   men   on

average.3

 The total time spent on these activities per day makes

the picture in India even more clear­ women on average spent

16.9 and 2.6 percent of their day on unpaid domestic services

and   unpaid   caregiving   services   for   household   members

respectively, while men spent 1.7 and 0.8 percent.4

9. It is curious to note that this is not just a phenomenon

unique to India, but is prevalent all over the world. A 2009 Report

by a Commission set up by the French Government, analyzing

data from six countries,  viz. Germany, Italy, United Kingdom,

France, Finland and the United States of America, highlighted

similar findings:

“117.   Gender   differences   in   time   use   are

significant.   In   each   of   the   countries   under

consideration,  men   spend  more   time   in   paid

work than women and the converse is true for

unpaid   work.   Men   also   spend   more   time   on

leisure   than   women.  The   implication   is   that

1 National Statistical Office, Time Use in India­ 2019 (September, 2020).

2 Id, at 56.

3 Id, at 54.

4 Id, at x.

6

women  provide  household  services  but  other

members of the household benefit…”

5

(emphasis supplied)

10. The sheer amount of time and effort that is dedicated to

household work by individuals, who are more likely to be women

than men, is not surprising when one considers the plethora of

activities   a   housemaker   undertakes.   A   housemaker   often

prepares food for the entire family, manages the procurement of

groceries   and   other   household   shopping   needs,   cleans   and

manages the house and its surroundings, undertakes decoration,

repairs   and   maintenance   work,   looks   after   the   needs   of   the

children   and   any   aged   member   of   the   household,   manages

budgets and so much more. In rural households, they often also

assist in the sowing, harvesting and transplanting activities in

the field, apart from tending cattle [See  Arun Kumar  Agrawal

(supra); National Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Minor Deepika rep. by

her   guardian   and   next   friend,   Ranganathan,   2009   SCC

OnLine Mad 828]. However, despite all the above, the conception

that   housemakers   do   not   “work”   or   that   they   do   not   add

economic value to the household is a problematic idea that has

persisted for many years and must be overcome.   

11. The   concurring   opinion   in   the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal

5 Stiglitz et al., Report of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance and 

Social Progress, 117 (2009).

7

judgment (supra), has highlighted this bias:

“44. This bias is shockingly prevalent in the work

of census. In the Census of 2001 it appears that

those   who   are   doing   household   duties   like

cooking,   cleaning   of   utensils,   looking   after

children, fetching water, collecting firewood have

been   categorised   as   non­workers   and   equated

with   beggars,   prostitutes   and   prisoners   who,

according   to   the   census,   are   not   engaged   in

economically   productive   work.   As   a   result   of

such categorisation about 36 crores (367 million)

women   in   India   have   been   classified   in   the

Census   of   India,   2001   as   non­workers   and

placed in the category of beggars, prostitutes and

prisoners.   This   entire   exercise   of   census

operations is done under an Act of Parliament.”

12. In fact, this unfortunate silence when it comes to the value

of housework has been a problem which was identified as far

back as in 1920, when the economist Pigou noted the oddity and

contradictions when it came to the calculation of the contribution

of women in the national income, by stating that: 

“…the services rendered by women enter into the

dividend when they are rendered in exchange for

wages, whether in the factory or in the home, but

do not enter into it when they are rendered by

mothers   and   wives   gratuitously   to   their   own

families. Thus, if a man marries his housekeeper

or   his   cook,   the   national   dividend   is

diminished”.6

This   issue   was   further   focused   on   by   those   in   the   field   of

feminism economics in the 1970s and 1980s, who criticized the

traditional   labour   statistics   which   did   not   consider   unpaid

6 Cecil Pigou, The Economics of Welfare, 44 (1920).

8

domestic work and therefore undervalued women’s role in the

economy.7

13. On considering the growing awareness around this issue,

the   United   Nations   Committee   on   the   Elimination   of

Discrimination against Women adopted General Recommendation

No.   17   on   the   “Measurement   and   quantification   of   the

unremunerated domestic activities of women and their recognition

in   the   gross   national   product”   in   1991.   The   General

Recommendation   affirmed   that   “the   measurement   and

quantification of the unremunerated domestic activities of women,

which   contribute   to   development   in   each   country,   will   help   to

reveal the de facto economic role of women”.

14. It is worth noting that the above General Recommendation

is passed in furtherance of Article 11 of the Convention on the

Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women which

relates to ending discrimination against women in the field of

employment, a Convention that India has ratified. 

15. The   issue   of   fixing   notional   income   for   a   homemaker,

therefore,   serves   extremely   important   functions.   It   is   a

recognition of the multitude of women who are engaged in this

activity,   whether   by   choice   or   as   a   result   of   social/cultural

7 United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, Guide on Valuing Unpaid Household Service 

Work, 2 (2017).

9

norms. It signals to society at large that the law and the Courts of

the land believe in the value of the labour, services and sacrifices

of   homemakers.   It   is   an   acceptance   of   the   idea   that   these

activities contribute in a very real way to the economic condition

of the family, and the economy of the nation, regardless of the

fact that it may have been traditionally excluded from economic

analyses. It is a reflection of changing attitudes and mindsets and

of our international law obligations. And, most importantly, it is a

step   towards   the   constitutional   vision   of   social   equality   and

ensuring dignity of life to all individuals. 

16. Returning to the question of how such notional income of a

homemaker is to be calculated, there can be no fixed approach. It

is to be understood that in such cases the attempt by the Court

is to fix an approximate economic value for all the work that a

homemaker does, impossible though that task may be. Courts

must keep in mind the idea of awarding just compensation in

such cases, looking to the facts and circumstances [See  R.K.

Malik v. Kiran Pal, (2009) 14 SCC 1]. 

17. One   method   of   computing   the   notional   income   of   a

homemaker   is   by   using   the   formula   provided   in   the   Second

Schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, which has now been

omitted by the Motor Vehicle (Amendment) Act, 2019. The Second

10

Schedule   provided   that   the   income   of   a   spouse   could   be

calculated as one­third of the income of the earning surviving

spouse. This was the method ultimately adopted by the Court in

the  Arun   Kumar   Agrawal  (supra)  case.   However,   rationale

behind fixing the ratio as one­third is not very clear. [See Arun

Kumar Agrawal (supra)]

18. Apart from the above, scholarship around this issue could

provide some guidance as to other methods to determine the

notional income for a homemaker.8

 Some of these methods were

highlighted by a Division Bench of the Madras High Court in the

case of Minor Deepika (supra) which held as follows:

“10. The Second Schedule to the Motor Vehicles

Act gives a value to the compensation payable in

respect of those who had no income prior to the

accident and for a spouse, it says that one­third

of the income of the earning surviving spouse

should be the value. Exploration on the internet

shows that there have been efforts to understand

the value of a homemaker's unpaid labour by

different methods. One is, the opportunity cost

which evaluates her wages by assessing what

she would have earned had she not remained

at   home,   viz.,   the   opportunity   lost.   The

second   is,   the   partnership   method   which

assumes that a marriage is an equal economic

partnership   and   in   this   method,   the

homemaker's   salary   is   valued   at   half   her

husband's   salary.   Yet   another  method   is   to

evaluate   homemaking   by   determining   how

8 See Ann Chadeau, What is Households’ Non­Market Production Worth, OECD ECONOMIC STUDIES

NO. 18 (1992); Also see United Nations Economic Commission for Europe, supra note 7. 

11

much it would cost to replace the homemaker

with   paid   workers.   This   is   called   the

Replacement Method.”

(emphasis supplied)

19. However, it must be remembered that all the above methods

are merely suggestions. There can be no exact calculation or

formula that can magically ascertain the true value provided by

an individual gratuitously for those that they are near and dear

to. The attempt of the Court in such matters should therefore be

towards determining, in the best manner possible, the truest

approximation   of   the   value   added   by   a   homemaker   for   the

purpose of granting monetary compensation. 

20. Whichever method a Court ultimately chooses to value the

activities of a homemaker, would ultimately depend on the facts

and circumstances of the case.  The Court needs to keep in mind

its duty to award just compensation, neither assessing the same

conservatively,   nor   so   liberally   as   to   make   it   a   bounty   to

claimants [National   Insurance   Company   Limited   v.   Pranay

Sethi, (2017) 16 SCC 680;  Kajal v. Jagdish Chand, (2020) 4

SCC 413].

21. Once notional income has been determined, the question

remains as to whether escalation for future prospects should be

granted   with   regard   to   it.   Initially,   the   awarding   of   future

12

prospects by this Court was related to the stability of the job held

by   the   victim   [See  General   Manager,   Kerala   State   Road

Transport   Corporation,   Trivandrum   v.   Susamma   Thomas

(Mrs), (1994) 2 SCC 176; Sarla Dixit (Smt) v. Balwant Yadav,

(1996) 3 SCC 179]. This focus on the stability of the job of the

victim, while awarding future prospects, was continued in the

judgment   of   this   Court   in  Sarla   Verma   (Smt)   v.   Delhi

Transport Corporation,  (2009)  6 SCC  121  wherein the Court

held as follows:  

“24. In Susamma   Thomas [(1994)   2   SCC   176]

this Court increased the income by nearly 100%,

in Sarla Dixit [(1996) 3 SCC 179] the income was

increased   only   by   50%   and   in Abati

Bezbaruah [(2003) 3 SCC 148] the income was

increased   by   a   mere   7%.   In   view   of   the

imponderables   and   uncertainties,   we   are   in

favour   of   adopting   as   a   rule   of   thumb,   an

addition of 50% of actual salary to the actual

salary income of the deceased towards future

prospects,   where   the   deceased   had   a

permanent job and was below 40 years. (Where

the annual income is in the taxable range, the

words “actual salary” should be read as “actual

salary   less   tax”).   The   addition   should   be   only

30% if the age of the deceased was 40 to 50

years. There should be no addition, where the

age   of   the   deceased   is   more   than   50   years.

Though   the   evidence   may   indicate   a   different

percentage   of   increase,   it   is   necessary   to

standardise   the   addition   to   avoid   different

yardsticks being applied or different methods of

calculation being adopted. Where the deceased

was   self­employed   or   was   on   a   fixed   salary

13

(without   provision   for   annual   increments,

etc.),   the   courts   will   usually   take   only   the

actual   income   at   the   time   of   death.   A

departure  therefrom  should  be  made  only   in

rare   and   exceptional   cases   involving   special

circumstances.”

(emphasis supplied)

22. However, there was a shift in jurisprudence regarding future

prospects with the five­Judge Bench decision of this Court in

Pranay Sethi (supra). This Court extended the benefit regarding

future prospects to even self­employed persons, or those on a

fixed salary. The Court held as follows:

“57. Having bestowed our anxious consideration,

we are disposed to think when we accept the

principle of standardisation,  there   is  really  no

rationale not to apply the said principle to the

self­employed  or  a  person  who   is  on   a   fixed

salary.   To   follow   the   doctrine   of   actual

income  at  the  time  of  death  and  not  to  add

any amount with regard to future prospects to

the income for the purpose of determination

of   multiplicand   would   be   unjust.   The

determination   of   income   while   computing

compensation has to include future prospects

so   that   the   method   will   come   within   the

ambit   and   sweep   of   just   compensation   as

postulated  under  Section  168  of   the   Act. In

case of a deceased who had held a permanent job

with inbuilt grant of annual increment, there is

an   acceptable   certainty.   But   to   state   that   the

legal representatives of a deceased who was on a

fixed salary would not be entitled to the benefit of

future prospects for the purpose of computation

of   compensation   would   be   inapposite.   It   is

because the criterion of distinction between the

14

two in that event would be certainty on the one

hand   and   staticness   on   the   other.   One   may

perceive   that   the   comparative   measure   is

certainty on the one hand and uncertainty on the

other but such a perception is fallacious.  It   is

because   the   price   rise   does   affect   a   selfemployed   person;   and   that   apart   there   is

always   an   incessant   effort   to   enhance   one's

income   for   sustenance.   The   purchasing

capacity   of   a   salaried   person   on   permanent

job   when   increases   because   of   grant   of

increments and pay revision or for some other

change in service conditions, there is always a

competing   attitude   in   the   private   sector   to

enhance   the   salary   to   get   better   efficiency

from  the employees. Similarly,  a person who

is   self­employed   is   bound   to   garner   his

resources  and  raise  his   charges/fees   so   that

he  can   live  with  same   facilities.…Taking into

consideration the  cumulative   factors,  namely,

passage   of   time,   the   changing   society,

escalation of price, the change in price index,

the   human   attitude   to   follow   a   particular

pattern of life,  etc., an addition of 40% of the

established   income   of   the   deceased   towards

future   prospects   and   where   the   deceased   was

below 40 years an addition of 25% where the

deceased was between the age of 40 to 50 years

would be reasonable.”

(emphasis supplied)

23. The rationale behind the awarding of future prospects is

therefore no longer merely about the type of profession, whether

permanent or otherwise, although the percentage awarded is still

dependent on the same. The awarding of future prospects is now

a part of the duty of the Court to grant just compensation, taking

into account the realities of life, particularly of inflation, the quest

15

of individuals to better their circumstances and those of their

loved ones, rising wage rates and the impact of experience on the

quality of work.   

24. Taking the above rationale into account, the situation is

quite clear with respect to notional income determined by a Court

in the first category of cases outlined earlier, those where the

victim is proved to be employed but claimants are unable to prove

the income before the Court. Once the victim has been proved to

be employed at some venture, the necessary corollary is that they

would   be   earning   an   income.   It   is   clear   that   no   rational

distinction can be drawn with respect to the granting of future

prospects merely on the basis that their income was not proved,

particularly   when   the   Court   has   determined   their   notional

income. 

25. When it comes to the second category of cases, relating to

notional income for non­earning victims, it is my opinion that the

above principle applies with equal vigor, particularly with respect

to homemakers. Once notional income is determined, the effects

of inflation would equally apply. Further, no one would ever say

that the improvements in skills that come with experience do not

take place in the domain of work within the household. It is

worth noting that, although not extensively discussed, this Court

16

has been granting future prospects even in cases pertaining to

notional income, as has been highlighted by my learned brother,

Surya Kant, J., in his opinion [Hem Raj v. Oriental Insurance

Company Limited, (2018) 15 SCC 654; Sunita Tokas v. New

India Insurance Co. Ltd., (2019) 20 SCC 688].

26. Therefore,   on   the   basis   of   the   above,   certain   general

observations can be made regarding the issue of calculation of

notional   income   for   homemakers   and   the   grant   of   future

prospects  with  respect   to   them,   for  the   purposes  of   grant   of

compensation which can be summarized as follows:

a. Grant of compensation, on a pecuniary basis, with respect

to a homemaker, is a settled proposition of law. 

b. Taking into account the gendered nature of housework, with

an overwhelming percentage of women being engaged in the

same as compared to men, the fixing of notional income of a

homemaker   attains   special   significance.   It   becomes   a

recognition   of   the   work,   labour   and   sacrifices   of

homemakers and a reflection of changing attitudes. It is also

in furtherance of our nation’s international law obligations

and our constitutional vision of social equality and ensuring

dignity to all.

c. Various methods can be employed by the Court to fix the

notional income of a homemaker, depending on the facts

and circumstances of the case.

d. The Court should ensure while choosing the method, and

fixing the notional income, that the same is just in the facts

and circumstances of the particular case, neither assessing

the compensation too conservatively, nor too liberally. 

17

e. The granting of future prospects, on the notional income

calculated   in   such   cases,   is   a   component   of   just

compensation. 

27. With the above observations, I concur with the opinion of

my learned brother.

     ........................J.

(N.V. RAMANA)

NEW DELHI; 

January 05, 2021.

18

whether the present contract, which is composite in nature, falls within the ambit of a works contract under Section 2(k) of the Gujarat Act. This is a question that requires contractual interpretation, and is a matter of evidence, especially when both parties have taken contradictory stands regarding this issue. It is a settled law that the interpretation of contracts in such cases shall generally not be done in the writ jurisdiction. Further, the mere fact that the Gujarat Act might apply may not be sufficient for the writ courts to entertain the plea of Respondent No. 1 to challenge the ruling of the arbitrator under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

1

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO. 14665 OF 2015

BHAVEN CONSTRUCTION THROUGH … APPELLANT

AUTHORISED SIGNATORY PREMJIBHAI K. SHAH

VERSUS

EXECUTIVE ENGINEER SARDAR … RESPONDENTS

SAROVAR NARMADA NIGAM LTD.& ANR.

J U D G M E N T

N.V. RAMANA, J.

1. This Civil Appeal raises an important question of law

concerning arbitration law in India and special enactments

enacted by States concerning public works contract.

2. A brief reference to facts in this case is necessary for the

disposal of the case. On 13.02.1991, Respondent No. 1 entered

into a contract with the Appellant to manufacture and supply

bricks. The aforesaid contract had an arbitration clause. As

some dispute arose regarding payment in furtherance of

manufacturing and supplying of bricks, the Appellant issued

REPORTABLE

2

a notice dated 13.11.1998, seeking appointment of sole

arbitrator in terms of the agreement. Clause 38 of the

agreement provide for arbitration as under:

Clause 38 – Arbitration

All disputes or differences in

respect of which the decision has not

been settled, shall be referred for

arbitration to a sole arbitrator appointed

as follows:

Within thirty days of receipt of

notice from the Contractor of his

intention to refer the dispute to

arbitration the Chief Engineer shall send

to the Contractor a list of three officers

from the list of arbitrator appointment

by the Government. The Contractor

shall within fifteen days of receipt of this

list select and communicate to the Chief

Engineer the name of the person from

the list who shall then be appointed as

the sole arbitrator. If Contractor fails to

communicate his selection of name,

within the stipulated period, the Chief

Engineer, shall without delay select one

officer from the list and appoint him as

the sole arbitrator. If the Chief Engineer

fails to send such a list within thirty

days, as stipulated, the contractor shall

send a similar list to the Chief Engineer

within fifteen days. The Chief Engineer

shall then select one officer form the list 

3

and appoint him as the sole arbitrator

within fifteen days. If the Chief

Engineer fails to do so the contractor

shall communicate to the Chief

Engineer the name of one Officer

from the list, who shall then be the

sole arbitrator.

The arbitration shall be conducted

in accordance with the provision of the

Indian Arbitration Act, 1940 or any

statutory modification thereof. The

decision of the sole arbitrator shall be

final and binding on the parties thereto.

The Arbitrator shall determine the

amount of costs of arbitration to be

awarded to either parties.

Performance under the contract

shall continue during the arbitration

proceedings and payments due to the

contractor by the owner shall not be

withheld, unless they are the subject

matter of the arbitration proceedings.

All awards shall be in writing and in

case of awards amounting to Rs. 1.00

lakh and above, such awards, shall state

reasons for the amounts awards.

Neither party is entitled to bring a

claim to arbitration if the Arbitrator has

not been appointed before the expiration

of thirty days after defect liability period.

(emphasis supplied)

4

3. Respondent No. 1, by replies dated 23.11.1998 and

04.01.1999, did not agree to the Appellant’s request on two

main grounds:

a. That the arbitration was agreed to be conducted in

accordance with the provision of the Indian

Arbitration Act and any statutory modification

thereof. Accordingly, the State of Gujarat had

passed the Gujarat Public Works Contracts

Disputes Arbitration Tribunal Act, 1992 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Gujarat Act”). Therefore, the

disputes between the parties were to be adjudicated

in accordance with the aforesaid statute.

b. That the arbitration was time barred, as Clause 38

mandated that neither party was entitled to claim if

the arbitrator has not been appointed before the

expiration of thirty days after the defect liability

period.

4. In any case, the Appellant appointed Respondent No. 2 to act

as a sole arbitrator for adjudication of the disputes.

Respondent No. 1 preferred an application under Section 16 of

the Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1996 (hereinafter

referred to as “the Arbitration Act”) disputing the jurisdiction

of the sole arbitrator. On 20.10.2001, the sole arbitrator

rejected the application of the Respondent No. 1 and held that

the sole arbitrator had jurisdiction to adjudicate the dispute.

5

5. Aggrieved by the order of the sole arbitrator, Respondent No.

1 preferred Special Civil Application No. 400 of 2002, under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India before the

High Court of Gujarat. The Single Judge, while dismissing the

Special Civil Application, held as under:

“……At this stage, the judgment of the Hon’ble

Supreme Court in the case of Konkan Railway

Corporation Limited v. Mehul Construction Company,

(2000) 7 SCC 201 is also required to be considered

along with the judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme

Court in the case of SBP & Co. v. Patel Engineering

Ltd., (2005) 8 SCC 618. Considering the aforesaid

two judgments of the Hon’ble Supreme Court and

the order passed by the learned sole arbitrator

passed under Section 16(4) of the Act dismissing

the application submitted by the petitioner

challenging the jurisdiction of respondent no. 2 as

a sole arbitrator and challenging his appointment

as a sole arbitrator, it is to be held that the petition

under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of

India against the said order is not maintainable

and/or the same is not required to entertained and

the only remedy available to the petitioner is to wait

till the award is passed by the learned Sole

Arbitrator and to challenge the same under Section

34 of the Act…”

6. Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge, Respondent No. 1

preferred Letters Patent Appeal No. 182 of 2006 in Special Civil 

6

Application No. 400 of 2002. The High Court of Gujarat, by the

impugned order dated 17.09.2012, allowed the appeal and

observed the following:

“11. As discussed hereinabove, ‘the contract’ is a

“works Contract” and a dispute is raised by the

petitioner at the earliest available opportunity

about the ‘forum’ in which the dispute be

adjudicated. It was as early as on 23.11.1998, the

appellant denied that in view of Clause-38, wherein

it is provided that, ‘provision of Indian Arbitration

Act, 1940 and any statutory modification thereof

will be applicable’, the respondent cannot appoint

a sole arbitrator and thereafter cannot contend

that now that the Arbitrator is already appointed

and he (the arbitrator) has already exercised power

under the provisions of the Arbitration and

Conciliation Act, 1996, the petitioner has to wait

till the arbitration award is passed, to challenge the

same under Section 34 and Section 37 of the 1996

Act.”

7. Aggrieved, the Appellant filed this appeal by way of special

leave petition.

8. Counsel for the Appellant argued that the Division Bench of

the High Court erred in interfering with the order of the Single

Judge under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The fact

that the final award has been passed by the sole Arbitrator

and is now challenged under Section 34 of the Arbitration

7

Act clearly shows the attempt of Respondent No. 1 to bypass

the framework laid down under the Arbitration Act. He points

out that Section 16(2) of the Arbitration Act mandates that the

sole arbitrator had the jurisdiction to adjudicate the

preliminary issue of jurisdiction, which can only be challenged

under Section 34 of the Arbitration Act.

9. On the other hand, learned counsel for Respondent No. 1

contended that since the enactment of the Gujarat Act, the

Arbitration Act was substituted with respect to the disputes

arising out of the works contract. It was contended that under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, it was always open

for Respondent No. 1 to invoke the writ jurisdiction of the High

Court to set aside an arbitration which was a nullity as it was

in conflict with the State enactment.

10. Having heard both parties and perusing the material available

on record, the question which needs to be answered is whether

the arbitral process could be interfered under Article 226/227

of the Constitution, and under what circumstance?

11. We need to note that the Arbitration Act is a code in itself. This

phrase is not merely perfunctory, but has definite legal 

8

consequences. One such consequence is spelled out under

Section 5 of the Arbitration Act, which reads as under

“Notwithstanding anything contained in any other law for the

time being in force, in matters governed by this Part, no judicial

authority shall intervene except where so provided in this Part.”

The non-obstante clause is provided to uphold the intention of

the legislature as provided in the Preamble to adopt UNCITRAL

Model Law and Rules, to reduce excessive judicial interference

which is not contemplated under the Arbitration Act.

12. The Arbitration Act itself gives various procedures and forums

to challenge the appointment of an arbitrator. The framework

clearly portrays an intention to address most of the issues

within the ambit of the Act itself, without there being scope for

any extra statutory mechanism to provide just and fair

solutions.

13. Any party can enter into an arbitration agreement for resolving

any disputes capable of being arbitrable. Parties, while

entering into such agreements, need to fulfill the basic

ingredients provided under Section 7 of the Arbitration Act.

Arbitration being a creature of contract, gives a flexible 

9

framework for the parties to agree for their own procedure with

minimalistic stipulations under the Arbitration Act.

14. If parties fail to refer a matter to arbitration or to appoint an

arbitrator in accordance with the procedure agreed by them,

then a party can take recourse for court assistance under

Section 8 or 11 of the Arbitration Act.

15. In this context, we may state that the Appellant acted in

accordance with the procedure laid down under the agreement

to unilaterally appoint a sole arbitrator, without Respondent

No. 1 mounting a judicial challenge at that stage. Respondent

No. 1 then appeared before the sole arbitrator and challenged

the jurisdiction of the sole arbitrator, in terms of Section 16(2)

of the Arbitration Act.

16. Thereafter, Respondent No. 1 chose to impugn the order

passed by the arbitrator under Section 16(2) of the Arbitration

Act through a petition under Article 226/227 of the Indian

Constitution. In the usual course, the Arbitration Act provides

for a mechanism of challenge under Section 34. The opening

phase of Section 34 reads as ‘Recourse to a Court against an

arbitral award may be made only by an application for setting 

10

aside such award in accordance with sub-section (2) and subsection (3)’. The use of term ‘only’ as occurring under the

provision serves two purposes of making the enactment a

complete code and lay down the procedure.

17. In any case, the hierarchy in our legal framework, mandates

that a legislative enactment cannot curtail a Constitutional

right. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators

Association of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court referred

to several judgments and held:

“11. We have considered the respective

arguments/submissions. There cannot

be any dispute that the power of the High

Courts to issue directions, orders or writs

including writs in the nature of habeas

corpus, certiorari, mandamus, quo

warranto and prohibition under Article

226 of the Constitution is a basic feature

of the Constitution and cannot be

curtailed by parliamentary legislation - L.

Chandra Kumar v. Union of India, (1997)

3 SCC 261. However, it is one thing to

say that in exercise of the power

vested in it under Article 226 of the

Constitution, the High Court can

entertain a writ petition against any

order passed by or action taken by the

State and/or its agency/

instrumentality or any public

authority or order passed by a quasijudicial body/authority, and it is an 

11

altogether different thing to say that

each and every petition filed under

Article 226 of the Constitution must

be entertained by the High Court as a

matter of course ignoring the fact that

the aggrieved person has an effective

alternative remedy. Rather, it is settled

law that when a statutory forum is

created by law for redressal of

grievances, a writ petition should not be

entertained ignoring the statutory

dispensation.

(emphasis supplied)

It is therefore, prudent for a Judge to not exercise discretion

to allow judicial interference beyond the procedure established

under the enactment. This power needs to be exercised in

exceptional rarity, wherein one party is left remediless under

the statute or a clear ‘bad faith’ shown by one of the parties.

This high standard set by this Court is in terms of the

legislative intention to make the arbitration fair and efficient.

18. In this context we may observe M/s. Deep Industries Limited

v. Oil and Natural Gas Corporation Limited, (2019) SCC

Online SC 1602, wherein interplay of Section 5 of the

Arbitration Act and Article 227 of the Constitution was

analyzed as under:

12

“15. Most significant of all is the nonobstante clause contained in Section 5

which states that notwithstanding

anything contained in any other law, in

matters that arise under Part I of the

Arbitration Act, no judicial authority

shall intervene except where so provided

in this Part. Section 37 grants a

constricted right of first appeal against

certain judgments and orders and no

others. Further, the statutory mandate

also provides for one bite at the cherry,

and interdicts a second appeal being

filed (See Section 37(2) of the Act)

16. This being the case, there is no

doubt whatsoever that if petitions were

to be filed under Articles 226/227 of the

Constitution against orders passed in

appeals under Section 37, the entire

arbitral process would be derailed and

would not come to fruition for many

years. At the same time, we cannot

forget that Article 227 is a constitutional

provision which remains untouched by

the non-obstante clause of Section 5 of

the Act. In these circumstances, what is

important to note is that though

petitions can be filed under Article 227

against judgments allowing or

dismissing first appeals under Section

37 of the Act, yet the High Court would

be extremely circumspect in

interfering with the same, taking into

account the statutory policy as

adumbrated by us herein above so 

13

that interference is restricted to

orders that are passed which are

patently lacking in inherent

jurisdiction.”

19. In the instant case, Respondent No. 1 has not been able to

show exceptional circumstance or ‘bad faith’ on the part of the

Appellant, to invoke the remedy under Article 227 of the

Constitution. No doubt the ambit of Article 227 is broad and

pervasive, however, the High Court should not have used its

inherent power to interject the arbitral process at this stage. It

is brought to our notice that subsequent to the impugned

order of the sole arbitrator, a final award was rendered by him

on merits, which is challenged by the Respondent No. 1 in a

separate Section 34 application, which is pending.

20. Viewed from a different perspective, the arbitral process is

strictly conditioned upon time limitation and modeled on the

‘principle of unbreakability’. This Court in P. Radha Bai v. P.

Ashok Kumar, (2019) 13 SCC 445, observed:

36.3. Third, Section 34(3) reflects the

principle of unbreakability. Dr Peter

Binder in International Commercial 

14

Arbitration and Conciliation

in UNCITRAL Model Law Jurisdictions,

2nd Edn., observed:

“An application for setting aside an

award can only be made during the

three months following the date on

which the party making the application

has received the award. Only if a party

has made a request for correction or

interpretation of the award under Article

33 does the time-limit of three months

begin after the tribunal has disposed of

the request. This exception from the

three-month time-limit was subject to

criticism in the working group due to

fears that it could be used as a delaying

tactics. However, although “an

unbreakable time-limit for applications

for setting aside” was sought as being

desirable for the sake of “certainty and

expediency” the prevailing view was that

the words ought to be retained “since

they presented the reasonable

consequence of Article 33”.

According to this “unbreakability” of

time-limit and true to the “certainty

and expediency” of the arbitral

awards, any grounds for setting aside

the award that emerge after the threemonth time-limit has expired cannot

be raised.

37. Extending Section 17 of the

Limitation Act would go contrary to the 

15

principle of “unbreakability” enshrined

under Section 34(3) of the Arbitration

Act.

(emphasis supplied)

If the Courts are allowed to interfere with the arbitral process

beyond the ambit of the enactment, then the efficiency of the

process will be diminished.

21. The High Court did not appreciate the limitations under

Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution and reasoned that the

Appellant had undertaken to appoint an arbitrator

unilaterally, thereby rendering the Respondent No. 1

remediless. However, a plain reading of the arbitration

agreement points to the fact that the Appellant herein had

actually acted in accordance with the procedure laid down

without any mala fides.

22. Respondent No. 1 did not take legal recourse against the

appointment of the sole arbitrator, and rather submitted

themselves before the tribunal to adjudicate on the

jurisdiction issue as well as on the merits. In this situation,

the Respondent No. 1 has to endure the natural consequences

of submitting themselves to the jurisdiction of the sole 

16

arbitrator, which can be challenged, through an application

under Section 34. It may be noted that in the present case, the

award has already been passed during the pendency of this

appeal, and the Respondent No. 1 has already preferred a

challenge under Section 34 to the same. Respondent No. 1 has

not been able to show any exceptional circumstance, which

mandates the exercise of jurisdiction under Articles 226 and

227 of the Constitution.

23. The Division Bench further opined that the contract between

the parties was in the nature of a works contract as it held

that the manufacturing of bricks, as required under the

contract, was only an ancillary obligation while the primary

obligation on the Appellant was to supply the bricks. The

Division Bench therefore held that the Gujarat Act holds the

field, and not the Arbitration Act.

24. The Gujarat Act was enacted in 1992 with the object to provide

for the constitution of a tribunal to arbitrate disputes

particularly arising from works contract to which the State

Government or a public undertaking is a party. A works

contract is defined under Section 2(k) of the Gujarat Act. The 

17

definition includes within itself a contract for supply of goods

relating to the execution of any of the works specified under

the section. However, a plain reading of the contract between

the parties indicates that it was for both manufacturing as well

as supply of bricks. Importantly, a contract for manufacture

simpliciter is not a works contract under the definition

provided under Section 2(k). The pertinent question therefore

is whether the present contract, which is composite in nature,

falls within the ambit of a works contract under Section 2(k)

of the Gujarat Act. This is a question that requires contractual

interpretation, and is a matter of evidence, especially when

both parties have taken contradictory stands regarding this

issue. It is a settled law that the interpretation of contracts in

such cases shall generally not be done in the writ jurisdiction.

Further, the mere fact that the Gujarat Act might apply may

not be sufficient for the writ courts to entertain the plea of

Respondent No. 1 to challenge the ruling of the arbitrator

under Section 16 of the Arbitration Act.

25. It must be noted that Section 16 of the Arbitration Act,

necessarily mandates that the issue of jurisdiction must be 

18

dealt first by the tribunal, before the Court examines the same

under Section 34. Respondent No. 1 is therefore not left

remediless, and has statutorily been provided a chance of

appeal. In Deep Industries case (supra), this Court observed

as follows:

“22. One other feature of this case is of

some importance. As stated herein

above, on 09.05.2018, a Section 16

application had been dismissed by the

learned Arbitrator in which

substantially the same contention

which found favour with the High Court

was taken up. The drill of Section 16

of the Act is that where a Section 16

application is dismissed, no appeal is

provided and the challenge to the

Section 16 application being

dismissed must await the passing of a

final award at which stage it may be

raised under Section 34.”

(emphasis supplied)

26. In view of the above reasoning, we are of the considered

opinion that the High Court erred in utilizing its discretionary

power available under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution

herein. Thus, the appeal is allowed and the impugned Order

of the High Court is set aside. There shall be no order as to

costs. Before we part, we make it clear that Respondent No. 1

19

herein is at liberty to raise any legally permissible objections

regarding the jurisdictional question in the pending Section 34

proceedings.

…………………………………………J

(N.V. RAMANA)

…………………………………………J

(SURYA KANT)

…………………………………………J

(HRISHIKESH ROY)

NEW DELHI;

JANUARY 06, 2021.