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since 1985 practicing as advocate in both civil & criminal laws. This blog is only for information but not for legal opinions

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Saturday, September 19, 2020

right of the parties to get the matter disposed of expeditiously

 right of the parties to get the matter disposed of expeditiously                               particularly in Family Court matters, the trial Court is directed to make an endeavour to dispose of the matter expeditiously. Both parities are directed to cooperate for speedy disposal of the matter. 

the trial Court has been adjourning the matter from time to time without disposing of the matter.No reasons are mentioned by the trial Court for adjourning the matter.it is the right of the parties to get the matter disposed of expeditiously particularly in Family Court matters, the trial Court is directed to make an endeavour to dispose of the matter expeditiously. Both parities are directed to cooperate for speedy disposal of the matter

AP HIGH COURT 

CRP/861/2020

LAGADAPATI VIJAYA BHASKAR
Versus
LAGADAPATI MANJUSHA @ PAMIDI MANJUSHA

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. SHYAM PRASAD

AND

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.861 OF 2020

ORDER:- (per GSP,J)

 The Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner seeking a

direction to the learned Judge, Family Court, Ongole to expedite

the trial for speedy disposal of F.C.O.P.No.86 of 2017.

2. Heard learned counsel for the petitioner at the stage of

admission. As this Court is inclined to dispose of the revision

petition at the stage of admission, no notice is ordered to the

respondent.

3. The submission of the learned counsel for the petitioner is

that the trial Court has been adjourning the matter from time to

time without disposing of the matter. Learned counsel for the

petitioner at page Nos.7 and 8 of the affidavit, gave the details of

the proceedings that took place in FCOP.86 of 2017, date-wise.

The said details reflect that the matter has been adjourned on

several occasions but however trial has not been completed. No

reasons are mentioned by the trial Court for adjourning the matter.

4. However, in the light of the submission made by the learned

counsel for the petitioner that it is the right of the parties to get the

matter disposed of expeditiously particularly in Family Court

matters, the trial Court is directed to make an endeavour to

dispose of the matter expeditiously. Both parities are directed to

cooperate for speedy disposal of the matter.

 

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5. With the above directions, the Civil Revision Petition is

disposed of accordingly. There shall be no order to costs.

 Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall also stand closed.

 _______________________

 G. SHYAM PRASAD,J

 ______________

 D.RAMESH,J

Date: 18.06.2020 

 3

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. SHYAM PRASAD

AND

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE D.RAMESH

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.861 OF 2020

Date: 18.06.2020

RJS 

Order I Rule 10(2) and Section 151 of CPC. - impleading petition by third parties - since there is registered lease agreement between the plaintiffs/landlords herein and the defendant/tenant herein with respect to the plaint schedule property herein, the submission of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties that they have taken the plaint schedule property herein for monthly lease from the plaintiffs/landlords is also found untenable - as the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties are neither necessary nor proper parties to be impleaded in the present suit.- Court dismissed their petition.

Order I Rule 10(2) and Section 151 of CPC. - impleading petition by third parties - since there is registered lease agreement between the plaintiffs/landlords herein and the defendant/tenant herein with respect to the plaint schedule property herein, the submission of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties that they have taken the plaint schedule property herein for monthly lease from the plaintiffs/landlords is also found untenable - as the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties are neither necessary nor proper parties to be impleaded in the present suit.- Court dismissed their petition.

“It is relevant to note here that the present suit in O.S.No.131/2015 is filed by the plaintiffs not basing on any oral lease, but basing on the registered lease deed, dated 05.03.2012 executed by the plaintiffs herein and the defendant herein with respect to the plaint schedule property. The said registered lease agreement, dated 05.03.2012 was also marked as Ex.A2 in the present suit by the plaintiffs herein. The said circumstances support the contention of the plaintiffs herein that the defendants herein with an intention to protract the present case got filed the present petition through her relatives who are the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties. Moreover, since there is registered lease agreement between the plaintiffs/landlords herein and the defendant/tenant herein with respect to the plaint schedule property herein, the submission of the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties that they have taken the plaint schedule property herein for monthly lease from the plaintiffs/landlords is also found untenable. Considering the said circumstances, the copy of plaint in O.S.NO.192/2017, copy of FIR in Cr.No.197/2017 and legal notice concerned in O.S.192/2017 etc., filed by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties along with the present petition are also no way helpful to them to substantiate their submission. In the said circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties are neither necessary nor proper parties to be impleaded in the present suit. Considering the same, the observation made by the Hon’ble High Court of Judicature at Hyderabad (1) in Racharla Thirupathi and others V/s Gundala Shobha Rani and others (reported in 2013(5) ALT 209) that a necessary party is one without whom no order can be made effectively; so also (2) in Jahangirji and others V/s K.Kumar (reported in 2012(4) ALT 253) the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties in the suit cannot be cured by impleading them in the appeal and is fatal to the suit; and (3) in Taddi Chinnayya, S/o late Narasayya and others V/s Tekumalla Purushottam Rao S/o late Ramarao and others (reported in 2015(4) ALT 476) that a necessary party is one whose presence is indispensable in the suit without whom no effective order can be passed, which are relied by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties, are of no avail to them in the instant case. In view of the foregoing discussion, this court find no merits in the petition to implead the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties as parties to the present suit in O.S.NO.131/2015; accordingly, these petitions are dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case, the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties are ordered to pay costs of Rs.500/- to the MLSC, Chirala and to pay costs of Rs.500/- to the other side.” 

 AP HIGH COURT

CRP/916/2020

Mallarapu Bhagya Lakshmi
Versus
Maddala Venkata Veeranjaneya Jagannadha Swamy

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.916 of 2020

ORDER:

 This Civil Revision Petition is filed challenging the

common order, dated 13.02.2020 in I.A.Nos.200 of 2019 and 201 of

2019 in O.S.No.131 of 2015 on the file of Senior Civil Judge, Chirala.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioners and the learned

counsel for the respondents.

3. The petitioners herein filed I.A.Nos. 200 of 2019 and 201 of

2019 in O.S.No.131 of 2015 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge,

Chirala seeking to implead them as defendant Nos.2 to 4 in the suit in

O.S.131 of 2015 as well as in I.A.No.1772 of 2015 under Order I Rule

10(2) and Section 151 of CPC. Initially, the suit in O.S.131 of 2015

was filed before the Senior Civil Judge, Chirala by the respondent

Nos.1 and 2 herein as plaintiffs against the 3rd respondent herein,

who is arrayed as defendant in the suit. When the suit is at the stage

of pronouncement of judgment after hearing the plaintiffs and

defendant, the proposed parties as petitioners filed this implead

petition claiming that there is a dispute between them and with the

3rd respondent/defendant in this suit and the proposed implead

petitioners further stated that they have also filed another suit for

partition in O.S.No.192 of 2017 against the 3rd respondent herein and

the same is pending on the file of the Principal Junior Civil Judge,

Chirala and as such, sought for impleadment in this suit also.

 The trial Court after hearing of the parties categorically

observed as follows:-

 “It is relevant to note here that the present suit in

O.S.No.131/2015 is filed by the plaintiffs not basing on any 

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oral lease, but basing on the registered lease deed, dated

05.03.2012 executed by the plaintiffs herein and the

defendant herein with respect to the plaint schedule

property. The said registered lease agreement, dated

05.03.2012 was also marked as Ex.A2 in the present suit by

the plaintiffs herein. The said circumstances support the

contention of the plaintiffs herein that the defendants herein

with an intention to protract the present case got filed the

present petition through her relatives who are the petitioner

Nos.1 to 3/third parties. Moreover, since there is registered

lease agreement between the plaintiffs/landlords herein and

the defendant/tenant herein with respect to the plaint

schedule property herein, the submission of the petitioner

Nos.1 to 3/third parties that they have taken the plaint

schedule property herein for monthly lease from the

plaintiffs/landlords is also found untenable. Considering the

said circumstances, the copy of plaint in O.S.NO.192/2017,

copy of FIR in Cr.No.197/2017 and legal notice concerned in

O.S.192/2017 etc., filed by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third

parties along with the present petition are also no way

helpful to them to substantiate their submission. In the said

circumstances, this court is of the opinion that the petitioner

Nos.1 to 3/third parties are neither necessary nor proper

parties to be impleaded in the present suit. Considering the

same, the observation made by the Hon’ble High Court of

Judicature at Hyderabad (1) in Racharla Thirupathi and

others V/s Gundala Shobha Rani and others (reported in

2013(5) ALT 209) that a necessary party is one without

whom no order can be made effectively; so also (2) in

Jahangirji and others V/s K.Kumar (reported in 2012(4) ALT

253) the defect of non-joinder of necessary parties in the suit

cannot be cured by impleading them in the appeal and is

fatal to the suit; and (3) in Taddi Chinnayya, S/o late

Narasayya and others V/s Tekumalla Purushottam Rao S/o

late Ramarao and others (reported in 2015(4) ALT 476) that a

necessary party is one whose presence is indispensable in

the suit without whom no effective order can be passed,

which are relied by the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties,

are of no avail to them in the instant case.

 In view of the foregoing discussion, this court find no

merits in the petition to implead the petitioner Nos.1 to

3/third parties as parties to the present suit in

O.S.NO.131/2015; accordingly, these petitions are

dismissed. Considering the facts and circumstances of the

case, the petitioner Nos.1 to 3/third parties are ordered to

pay costs of Rs.500/- to the MLSC, Chirala and to pay costs

of Rs.500/- to the other side.” 

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 Having regard to the facts and circumstances, this Court

does not find any reason or ground to interfere with the order of

the trial court and accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is

dismissed. There shall be no order as to costs of the Civil Revision

Petition.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any,

pending in the Civil Revision Petition shall stand closed.

_______________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

13.08.2020

mp

DOCUMENT PETITION, REOPEN PETITION, RECALL PETITION - when DW.2 clearly referred to the fact that both the attestors to Ex.B1 are no more, in his deposition, it is unnecessary either to reopen the suit, to receive the documents sought to be produced by the 1 st respondent or to recall DW.1 for the purpose of marking them.

 DOCUMENT PETITION, REOPEN PETITION, RECALL PETITION -  when DW.2 clearly referred to the fact that both the attestors to Ex.B1 are no more, in his deposition, it is unnecessary either to reopen the suit, to receive the documents sought to be produced by the 1 st respondent or to recall DW.1 for the purpose of marking them. 

‘whether the petitions filed by the respondents could have been ordered by the learned trial Judge and permitting recall of DW.1 for the purpose ofmarking the documents sought to be produced through him, is

proper?’t

he trial Court could not have come to the conclusion observing that the General Power of Attorney of the 1st respondent could not have known in whose presence his maternal grand father executed Will under Ex.B1. 

When DW.1 entered witness box aware of the nature of the case expected to depose and meet the challenge offered by the other side, the reason assigned by the learned trial Judge is not proper and nor can be supported. 

Merely because the petitioner would have an opportunity to cross examine DW.1, when once these documents are produced and exhibited, it cannot be stated that whatever right or advantage the petitioner had secured on account of nature of evidence let in by the respondents could be allowed to be watered down on such reason assigned by learned trial Judge. Thus, while holding that the respondents are at liberty to rely on the evidence on record in proof of the fact that both the attestors of Ex.B1 are no more, it is unnecessary either to reopen the suit, to receive the documents sought to be produced by the 1 st respondent or to recall DW.1 for the purpose of marking them. Thus, finding no justification in the order of the trial Court, the same has to be set aside. 

AP HIGH COURT 

CRP/944/2020

Achanta Narayana Murthy
Versus
Yalla Surayamma

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 944, 945 and 946 of 2020

COMMON ORDER:

All these three civil revision petitions are filed against the

orders in I.A.Nos.897 of 2019, 898 of 2019 and 896 of 2019 in

O.S.No.8 of 2014 on the file of the Court of learned Principal

Junior Civil Judge, Peddapuram.

2. The above petitions were filed in the trial Court, to

reopen the suit, to recall DW.1 and to receive death certificates

relating to alleged attestors to Ex.B1-Will, respectively. The

plaintiff is the petitioner. The defendants are the respondents.

3. The petitioner filed the suit for permanent injunction

restraining the respondents from interfering with his peaceful

possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land. It is to an

extent of Ac.3.64 cents in Sy.No.27/6 at China Brahmadevam

Village of East Godavari District.

4. The 1st respondent filed a written statement, raising a

counter-claim opposing the suit claim.

5. The suit is at the stage of arguments and both parties have

already let in evidence in respect of the issues involved and

which, they are required to prove.

6. At this stage, all the above three petitions were filed in

the trial Court by the respondents. The reason stated by the

General Power of Attorney of the 1st respondent for this purpose

in his affidavit was that he was advised by their learned counsel

to file these applications in order to produce the death 

2

certificates of alleged attestors to Ex.B1 namely of Sri Vetkuri

Somaraju and Achanta Madhava Rao. To prove these documents,

according to the 1st respondent, she also required that he be

recalled. For such purpose, she requested that the proceedings

in the suit be reopened.

7. The petitioner opposed these three petitions, specifically,

denying the reasons so set out. While referring to the

proceedings in the suit, the petitioner specifically contended

that DW.1 did not speak about the fact as to the presence of

alleged attestors to Ex.B1-Will when it was allegedly executed.

He further contended that filing these petitions at the stage of

arguments was only an attempt to cover up the laches and

lacunae in the evidence of the respondents. Thus, seriously

opposing these petitions, he resisted their claim.

8. Heard Sri S.Subba Reddy, learned counsel for the

petitioner and Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the 1st

respondent. None represented the 2nd respondent.

9. Now the point for determination is, ‘whether the petitions

filed by the respondents could have been ordered by the learned

trial Judge and permitting recall of DW.1 for the purpose of

marking the documents sought to be produced through him, is

proper?’

10. The parties are closely related. The dispute is with

reference to an immovable property. Having regard to the

pleadings set up by both the parties, it is quite manifest that 

3

they were aware of the nature of evidence to be let in in the

suit.

11. When the respondents relied on Ex.B1-Will at the trial, it is

their duty to prove this fact. There are averments clearly setting

out this Will dated 28.09.1976 in the written statement of the 1st

respondent. There is also reference to registered partition deeds

dated 22.03.2006 and also a partition dated 31.07.1976 in the

written statement. Details of these disputed facts having regard

to the scope of these three revision petitions are unnecessary to

consider. A bare reference to these documents is made only to

point out the seriousness of the nature of the dispute and the

nature of evidence expected to be let in by the parties at the

trial in order to discharge the relative burden placed on them in

this respect.

12. With reference to reception of General Power of Attorney

by the 1st respondent in favour of her son namely DW.1-Sri Y.Ram

Babu, it is not in dispute that it was already produced in the suit

in I.A.No.573 of 2019 and permission was granted to DW.1 to

represent his mother as her General Power of Attorney, in the

suit by the order of the trial Court dated 13.09.2019. In fact as

seen from the content of the petition in I.A.No.896 of 2019, this

original General Power of Attorney in favour of DW.1, though was

initially described in the petition it was later scored out. This

fact is specifically pointed out by Sri S.Subba Reddy, learned

counsel for the petitioner. Scoring out this document was for an 

4

obvious reason referred to above, since it was already produced

in the matter.

13. In respect of marking the death certificates of the alleged

attestors to Ex.B1, in the course of hearing, Sri S.Subba Reddy,

learned counsel for the petitioner brought to the notice of this

Court that DW.2 clearly referred to the fact that both the

attestors to Ex.B1 are no more, in his deposition.

14. Sri N.Siva Reddy, learned counsel for the 1st respondent

confirmed this fact, while further stating that this fact of death

of both the attestors, was not disputed at the trial specifically

questioning DW.2 in this respect.

15. In the above circumstances, these facts and circumstances

can well be taken into consideration by the trial Court in

considering the respective claims of the parties. In the presence

of the nature of the reason assigned on behalf of the 1st

respondent to produce these two death certificates, as rightly

contended for the petitioner, the trial Court could not have

come to the conclusion observing that the General Power of

Attorney of the 1st respondent could not have known in whose

presence his maternal grand father executed Will under Ex.B1.

When DW.1 entered witness box aware of the nature of the case

expected to depose and meet the challenge offered by the other

side, the reason assigned by the learned trial Judge is not proper

and nor can be supported. Merely because the petitioner would

have an opportunity to cross examine DW.1, when once these

documents are produced and exhibited, it cannot be stated that 

5

whatever right or advantage the petitioner had secured on

account of nature of evidence let in by the respondents could be

allowed to be watered down on such reason assigned by learned

trial Judge.

16. Thus, while holding that the respondents are at liberty to

rely on the evidence on record in proof of the fact that both the

attestors of Ex.B1 are no more, it is unnecessary either to reopen

the suit, to receive the documents sought to be produced by the

1

st respondent or to recall DW.1 for the purpose of marking

them. Thus, finding no justification in the order of the trial

Court, the same has to be set aside.

17. In the result, all the three Civil Revision Petitions are

allowed setting aside the common order of the Court of learned

Principal Junior Civil Judge, Peddapuram in I.A.Nos.896, 897 and

898 of 2019 in O.S.No.8 of 2014, dated 12.02.2020. The

respondents are at liberty to rely on evidence on record to

canvass their case that the attestors to Ex.B1 are no more. No

costs.

18. Pending miscellaneous petitions if any, shall stand closed.


 ____________________

M.VENKATA RAMANA, J

Date: 14.07.2020

pab 

6

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION Nos. 944, 945 and 946 of 2020

DATE: 14.07.2020

pab 

Or.39 rule 1&2 CPC-Whether the petitioner has made out prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour and against the respondents? - The material in the nature of revenue records produced by the petitioner did make out his case as to possession and enjoyment and as a matter of right, on a prima facie consideration. Therefore, in the given circumstances of the case, failure of the learned trial Judge and the learned 1st appellate Judge to address the issues in this case on the material on record in proper perspective, did affect the process of evaluation and such improper appreciation of material requires interference of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to set the things right and in the interests of justice.

Or.39 rule 1&2 CPC-Whether the petitioner has made out prima facie case and balance of convenience in his favour and against the respondents? - 

The material in the nature of revenue records produced by the petitioner did make out his case as to possession and enjoyment and as a matter of right, on a prima facie consideration.  Therefore, in the given circumstances of the case, failure of the learned trial Judge and the learned 1st appellate Judge to address the issues in this case on the material on record in proper perspective, did affect the process of evaluation and such improper appreciation of material requires interference of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to set the things right and in the interests of justice. 

 The petitioner strongly relied on 

Ex.A2, an extract of adangal for fasli 1426 relatable to the year 2016-17 

Ex.A3 is that extract of 1B register, the entries of which are again relied on by the petitioner. 

The contents of Ex.A2 adangal reflect that during the above fasli, the entire extent of the suit land was recorded in the name of the petitioner as the pattadar and as the person in enjoyment of the suit land. Nature of possession of this land is described in Ex.A3, by inheritance. 

These contents fit in with the case set up by the petitioner as to his possession and enjoyment of the suit land during the above period and on account of acquiring this land from his father being the only son. Ex.A3 reflects the same situation with similar entries. Thus, Ex.A2 and Ex.A3 completely support the case of the petitioner. 

Ex.A4 is pattadar passbook said to have been issued to the petitioner by revenue authorities. 

The contents of this passbook should reflect as is found in 1-B register. 

However, the learned trial Judge choose to reject Ex.A4 on the premise that the signature appearing on the photograph pasted at page No.1 of this document of Mandal Revenue Officer is differing from the signature of Mandal Revenue Officer who subscribed his signature in the same page at the relevant column. Ex.A2 was also rejected by the learned trial judge on the ground that it pertains to the year 2016 and did not reflect the situation as on the date of filing the suit, since the suit was instituted in the year 2018. 

The learned appellate Judge in a way also concurred with the views of the learned trial Judge, in this context. 

On behalf of the respondents, 

Ex.B8 a copy of adangal for fasli 1419 was relied on in the trial Court. It was not an authenticated copy obtained from proper source viz., from the office of the concerned Tahsildar or as an authenticated extract from Mee Seva facility. It was issued by the Village Revenue Officer concerned of Pedda Harivanam village. The reason for failing to obtain an extract similar to Ex.A2 is not explained on behalf of the respondents. It was not explained in the trial Court or in the appellate Court. This Ex.B8 apparently was not countersigned by either Deputy Tahsildar or Tahsildar or Appropriate Authority competent to issue revenue extract. Its contents further reflect that an extent of Ac.4-31 cents each was in possession of Sri Shankarappa and Sri Nagappa during fasli 1419 and the patta stood in the name of Sri K.Basappa. Nature of acquisition of this land as per its entries is recorded ‘under an agreement’. Both the Courts attached any amount of importance to Ex.B8 in this context. 

In the presence of Ex.A2, which bears the signs of authenticity, it is rather ununderstandable how the trial court as well as the 1st appellate Court placed reliance on Ex.B8, which is, as such, an unauthenticated copy. 

In this context, the averments in the written statement should be taken into consideration. It is the version of the 5th respondent in the written statement that the plaintiff got mutated his name in revenue records suppressing Ex.B2-Exchange deed, taking advantage of the innocence of the respondents just before filing the suit. 

A prima facie consideration of these averments in the written statement did indicate the fact that these revenue records in relation to the suit land stood in the name of the petitioner. It is vouched by Ex.A2 and Ex.A3. 

However, the learned trial Judge accepted such version of the respondents and to hold that they are not educated and are not aware of maintenance of revenue records up date. Further observation of the learned trial Judge in his order is that after purchasing the property they could not get the entries in revenue record updated appropriately and which fact could not be ruled out. When the version of the 5th respondent in the written statement and observations so recorded by the learned trial Judge are considered, it presents an unexplainable situation for the respondents with reference to the entries in Ex.B8 adangal. 

When on their own showing, revenue records did not reflect entries in their favour, producing Ex.B8 of such nature, itself is bound to speak of its nature and as the one which was obtained to suit their claim. On this ground Ex.B8 has to be rejected. For the same reasons, Ex.B5 alleged extract of 1-B register issued by VRO concerned, stands rejected. 

Ex.B4 is stated to be a Rythwari Passbook issued in favour of the father of the 5th respondent. It is an old pattadar passbook and of course bears an entry relating to the suit land. In the written statement, it is clearly stated by the 5th respondent that this old Rythwari passbook is now banned after enactment of Andhra Pradesh (Rights in Land) and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971. Of course, a rider is attached in describing this pattadar passbook stating that it is nothing but 10(1) Account/record of rights. When according to the 5th respondent, this Ex.B4-pattadar passbook is no more in existence and a banned substance, it is rather strange that he tried to rely on the same and the learned trial Judge quietly accepted it, confirmed by the learned appellate Judge

Ex.B9 is the sale agreement dated 11.02.1986, under which according to the version of the respondents, father of the 5th respondent Sri Shankarappa had purchased the suit land from one Sri H.K.Parameshwara Achari. Neither there is any pleading nor any clarification given out before the learned trial Judge or 1st appellate court as to the relationship between Sri H.K.Parameshwara Achari and Sri Kammara Basappa, who held this property originally, which was sold under original of Ex.A1 to the father of the petitioner.

The description of Sri Sri H.K.Parameshwara Achari in Ex.B9 is that he was son of Sri Kamsala Basappa. Nonetheless, to consider this document clarification should have been brought out and the pleading set by the respondents either in the counter filed before the trial Court or in the written statement did not offer any clarification in this respect. 

When thus being the background to consider this entire matter,which reflected the situation on the date of filing the suit, when the material produced by the petitioner stands more for acceptance than the material placed by the respondents, it is rather unthinkable as to how either the trial Court or the 1st appellate Court, had drawn conclusions against the petitioner refusing to grant relief in his favour, as sought

 There appear no certain circumstances as to why the land purchased almost fortnight earlier under the original of Ex.A1 was sought to be exchanged by the father of the petitioner from Sri Kammara Basappa from whom he had purchased this land as per Ex.B2. 

Nonetheless, having regard to the nature of the suit being for bare injunction and the stage at which this matter now is considered, it is rather an unnecessary enquiry as to what would have transpired about 60 years ago when this exchange transaction took place. It can be relegated to the stage of the trial. 

The material in the nature of revenue records produced by the petitioner did make out his case as to possession and enjoyment and as a matter of right, on a prima facie consideration. 

 Therefore, in the given circumstances of the case, failure of the learned trial Judge and the learned 1st appellate Judge to address the issues in this case on the material on record in proper perspective, did affect the process of evaluation and such improper appreciation of material requires interference of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to set the things right and in the interests of justice. 

 Thus, the petitioner made out prima facie case in his favour basing on the material produced by him in comparison to the respondents. Balance of convenience also weighs in his favour than the respondents in the circumstances. Thus, this point is held. POINT No.2:- 29. In view of the findings on point No.1 in as much as prima facie case and balance of convenience stood in favour of the petitioner, in the MVR,J CRP.No.947 of 2020 10 event of refusal to grant temporary injunction, he would suffer irreparable loss and injury. Status of the property as claimed by the petitioner should be maintained during trial. However, ultimate result in the suit shall be based on the material and evidence to be produced by the parties in a full-dressed trial. Thus, this point is held in favour of the petitioner and against the respondents. POINT No.3:- 30. In view of the findings on points 1 and 2, 


AP HIGH COURT 

CRP/947/2020

MULLA BELDAR KHASIM SAAB
Versus
KURRA NAGAPPA

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.947 of 2020 

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

ORDER:

 This Civil Revision petition filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India is directed against the order in CMA No.8 of 2019 on

the file of the Court of the learned II Additional District Judge, Kurnool at

Adoni dated 28.02.2020. It was inturn preferred against the order in

I.A.No.46 of 2018 in O.S.No.6 of 2018 of the Court of Principal Junior Civil

Judge, Adoni.

2. The plaintiff is the revision petitioner. He laid the suit against all

the respondents, who are the defendants, for grant of permanent

injunction restraining them from interfering with his alleged peaceful

possession and enjoyment of the plaint schedule land. This land is

described in the plaint schedule as an extent of Ac.8-63 cents in S.No.

926-K1 of Pedda Harivanam village of Kurnool District. Along with the suit,

the petitioner filed I.A.No.46 of 2018 for grant of temporary injunction

under Order-39, Rules 1 and 2 CPC against the respondents restraining

them from interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the

above land during pendency of the suit. This land shall be referred to

hereinafter as, ‘the suit land’ for convenience.

3. The case of the petitioner is that his father Sri Mulla Hussain Sab

purchased the suit land under a registered sale deed on 19.12.1957 from

Sri Kammara Basappa for valuable consideration and that after the death

of his father, being the only son he began to enjoy this land as an

absolute owner. He further claimed that the revenue authorities also

recognized his possession of this land as the owner and issued necessary 

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

2

pattadar passbook as well as title deed while his name is also reflected in

all the revenue records with reference to this land as the owner and

enjoyer. He further alleged that the respondents without any manner of

right tried to interfere with his possession and enjoyment of the suit land,

that constrained him to lay the suit. As seen from the record, an

ad interim injunction was also granted in his favour.

4. The respondents resisted the claim of the petitioner through the

5

th respondent. Their main contention is that the petitioner has

suppressed material fact relating to exchange of the suit land and an

extent of Ac.12-68 cents in S.No.917 under a registered deed dated

30.12.1957, between himself and his vendor viz., Sri Kammara Basappa.

Thus, they contended that though father of the petitioner had purchased

this land as claimed by him, within a few days it was exchanged for

another land as stated above and thus Sri Kammara Basappa retained this

land.

5. The 5th respondent further contended that his father Sri Kuruva

Joharapuram Shankarappa had purchased the suit land from Sri

H.K.Parameshwara Achari, Son of Sri Kammara Basappa under an

agreement for sale on 11.02.1996 for consideration of Rs.22,450/-

(Rupees twenty two thousand four hundred and fifty) and thus Sri

Shakarappa was delivered possession of this land. Thus, it is the claim of

the respondents that through the father of the 5th respondent, this land

came into possession of the 5th respondent after his demise and who

continued to be in possession and enjoyment of this land eversince. Thus

denying that the petitioner was ever in possession and enjoyment of the

suit land and asserting that the revenue records produced by the

petitioner were manipulated just prior to filing this suit to suit his 

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3

convenience taking advantage of their innocence and being uneducated,

they claimed that the petitioner is not entitled for any equitable and

discretionary relief.

6. In the trial court, on behalf of the petitioner, Ex.A1 to Ex.A4 and

on behalf of the contesting respondents Ex.B1 to Ex.B9 were produced.

Basing on the pleadings of the parties as well as these documents, the

learned trial Judge by his order disagreed with the contention of the

petitioner, ultimately dismissing his petition for temporary injunction.

Appeal preferred against the above order was also dismissed by the

appellate Court.

7. Sri S.D.Goud, learned counsel for the petitioner, and Sri

M.Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the contesting respondents,

addressed arguments in this matter basing on the material.

8. Now, the following points arise for determination:

1. Whether the petitioner has made out prima facie case and

balance of convenience in his favour and against the

respondents?

2. Whether the petitioner would suffer irreparable loss and injury

in the event of refusal to grant temporary injunction in his

favour as requested?

3. To what relief?

POINT No.1:-

9. It is admitted that the father of the petitioner Sri Mulla Hussain

Sab purchased the suit land under the original of Ex.A1 on 19.12.1957, a

copy of which is Ex.B1. The fact that there was exchange of this land for

another extent of Ac.12-69 cents in S.No.917 of Pedda Harivanam Village

between Sri Mulla Hussain Saab and Sri Kammara Basappa, is evidenced

by a registered deed dated 30.12.1957 in Ex.B2. Both the transactions 

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4

covered by Ex.A1 and Ex.B2 are reflected in Ex.B3-Encumbrance

Certificate.

10. It is to be noted that these two transactions took place about

60 years ago. It cannot be expected as of now that the situation that

prevailed about 60 years ago, would continue. This is the prime factor

which should be borne in mind in this case. Even though this Civil Revision

Petition is filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, having

regard to the peculiar nature of this case, it needs to go into the fact

situation.

11. However, Sri M.Chalapathi Rao, learned counsel for the

respondents, contends that there is no necessity for this Court to enter

into any discussion particularly to interfere with the concurrent findings

recorded by the trial Court as well as the 1st appellate Court, having

regard to the nature of this matter, since no irregularity or illegality per se

is seen. However, the manner in which both the Courts considered the

fact situation and having regard to the nature of this dispute, such

technicality loses its significance and interests of justice require to address

the fact situation prima facie.

12. In this backdrop, the parameters relating to grant of temporary

injunction in exercise of discretion should be considered. It is settled

proposition that in a matter of this nature, the burden is always on the

petitioner to establish his claim. He cannot as such rely on any weakness

or laches on the part of the respondent. In the process of evaluation of

the material, the Court should also take into consideration whether the

party seeking such discretionary relief of injunction has approached the

Court with clean hands and ex facie made out a bona fide claim. 

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5

Suppression of material facts is a circumstance of significance in this

process.

13. The question of title at this stage of considering a petition for

temporary injunction is not ordinarily addressed to. However, the party

seeking such relief has to establish prima facie case in his favour.

14. The petitioner strongly relied on Ex.A2, an extract of adangal

for fasli 1426 relatable to the year 2016-17. Ex.A3 is that extract of 1B

register, the entries of which are again relied on by the petitioner. The

contents of Ex.A2 adangal reflect that during the above fasli, the entire

extent of the suit land was recorded in the name of the petitioner as the

pattadar and as the person in enjoyment of the suit land. Nature of

possession of this land is described in Ex.A3, by inheritance. These

contents fit in with the case set up by the petitioner as to his possession

and enjoyment of the suit land during the above period and on account of

acquiring this land from his father being the only son. Ex.A3 reflects the

same situation with similar entries. Thus, Ex.A2 and Ex.A3 completely

support the case of the petitioner.

15. Ex.A4 is pattadar passbook said to have been issued to the

petitioner by revenue authorities. The contents of this passbook should

reflect as is found in 1-B register. However, the learned trial Judge choose

to reject Ex.A4 on the premise that the signature appearing on the

photograph pasted at page No.1 of this document of Mandal Revenue

Officer is differing from the signature of Mandal Revenue Officer who

subscribed his signature in the same page at the relevant column. Ex.A2

was also rejected by the learned trial judge on the ground that it pertains

to the year 2016 and did not reflect the situation as on the date of filing 

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

6

the suit, since the suit was instituted in the year 2018. The learned

appellate Judge in a way also concurred with the views of the learned trial

Judge, in this context.

16. On behalf of the respondents, Ex.B8 a copy of adangal for fasli

1419 was relied on in the trial Court. It was not an authenticated copy

obtained from proper source viz., from the office of the concerned

Tahsildar or as an authenticated extract from Mee Seva facility. It was

issued by the Village Revenue Officer concerned of Pedda Harivanam

village. The reason for failing to obtain an extract similar to Ex.A2 is not

explained on behalf of the respondents. It was not explained in the trial

Court or in the appellate Court. This Ex.B8 apparently was not countersigned by either Deputy Tahsildar or Tahsildar or Appropriate Authority

competent to issue revenue extract. Its contents further reflect that an

extent of Ac.4-31 cents each was in possession of Sri Shankarappa and Sri

Nagappa during fasli 1419 and the patta stood in the name of Sri

K.Basappa. Nature of acquisition of this land as per its entries is recorded

‘under an agreement’. Both the Courts attached any amount of

importance to Ex.B8 in this context.

17. In the presence of Ex.A2, which bears the signs of authenticity,

it is rather ununderstandable how the trial court as well as the 1st

appellate Court placed reliance on Ex.B8, which is, as such, an

unauthenticated copy.

18. In this context, the averments in the written statement should

be taken into consideration. It is the version of the 5th respondent in the

written statement that the plaintiff got mutated his name in revenue

records suppressing Ex.B2-Exchange deed, taking advantage of the 

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

7

innocence of the respondents just before filing the suit. A prima facie

consideration of these averments in the written statement did indicate the

fact that these revenue records in relation to the suit land stood in the

name of the petitioner. It is vouched by Ex.A2 and Ex.A3.

19. However, the learned trial Judge accepted such version of the

respondents and to hold that they are not educated and are not aware of

maintenance of revenue records up date. Further observation of the

learned trial Judge in his order is that after purchasing the property they

could not get the entries in revenue record updated appropriately and

which fact could not be ruled out. When the version of the 5th respondent

in the written statement and observations so recorded by the learned trial

Judge are considered, it presents an unexplainable situation for the

respondents with reference to the entries in Ex.B8 adangal. When on their

own showing, revenue records did not reflect entries in their favour,

producing Ex.B8 of such nature, itself is bound to speak of its nature and

as the one which was obtained to suit their claim. On this ground Ex.B8

has to be rejected.

20. For the same reasons, Ex.B5 alleged extract of 1-B register

issued by VRO concerned, stands rejected.

21. Ex.B4 is stated to be a Rythwari Passbook issued in favour of

the father of the 5th respondent. It is an old pattadar passbook and

of course bears an entry relating to the suit land. In the written

statement, it is clearly stated by the 5th respondent that this old Rythwari

passbook is now banned after enactment of Andhra Pradesh (Rights in

Land) and Pattadar Passbooks Act, 1971. Of course, a rider is attached in

describing this pattadar passbook stating that it is nothing but 10(1) 

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

8

Account/record of rights. When according to the 5th respondent, this

Ex.B4-pattadar passbook is no more in existence and a banned substance,

it is rather strange that he tried to rely on the same and the learned trial

Judge quietly accepted it, confirmed by the learned appellate Judge.

22. Ex.B9 is the sale agreement dated 11.02.1986, under which

according to the version of the respondents, father of the 5th respondent

Sri Shankarappa had purchased the suit land from one Sri

H.K.Parameshwara Achari. Neither there is any pleading nor any

clarification given out before the learned trial Judge or 1st appellate court

as to the relationship between Sri H.K.Parameshwara Achari and Sri

Kammara Basappa, who held this property originally, which was sold

under original of Ex.A1 to the father of the petitioner.

 23. The description of Sri Sri H.K.Parameshwara Achari in Ex.B9 is

that he was son of Sri Kamsala Basappa. Nonetheless, to consider this

document clarification should have been brought out and the pleading set

by the respondents either in the counter filed before the trial Court or in

the written statement did not offer any clarification in this respect.

24. When thus being the background to consider this entire

matter,which reflected the situation on the date of filing the suit, when

the material produced by the petitioner stands more for acceptance than

the material placed by the respondents, it is rather unthinkable as to how

either the trial Court or the 1st appellate Court, had drawn conclusions

against the petitioner refusing to grant relief in his favour, as sought.

25. In the course of hearing Sri S.D.Gowd, learned counsel for the

petitioner, contended that the land, which was subject matter of exchange

under the original of Ex.B2 in S.No.917, as per revenue records, belonged 

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

9

to Sri Virupakshaswamy Temple of Hampi. However, there is no material

to support such contention. There appear no certain circumstances as to

why the land purchased almost fortnight earlier under the original of

Ex.A1 was sought to be exchanged by the father of the petitioner from Sri

Kammara Basappa from whom he had purchased this land as per Ex.B2.

Nonetheless, having regard to the nature of the suit being for bare

injunction and the stage at which this matter now is considered, it is

rather an unnecessary enquiry as to what would have transpired about 60

years ago when this exchange transaction took place. It can be relegated

to the stage of the trial.

26. The material in the nature of revenue records produced by the

petitioner did make out his case as to possession and enjoyment and as a

matter of right, on a prima facie consideration.

27. Therefore, in the given circumstances of the case, failure of the

learned trial Judge and the learned 1st appellate Judge to address the

issues in this case on the material on record in proper perspective, did

affect the process of evaluation and such improper appreciation of

material requires interference of this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction to

set the things right and in the interests of justice.

28. Thus, the petitioner made out prima facie case in his favour

basing on the material produced by him in comparison to the

respondents. Balance of convenience also weighs in his favour than the

respondents in the circumstances. Thus, this point is held.

POINT No.2:-

29. In view of the findings on point No.1 in as much as prima facie

case and balance of convenience stood in favour of the petitioner, in the 

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10

event of refusal to grant temporary injunction, he would suffer irreparable

loss and injury. Status of the property as claimed by the petitioner should

be maintained during trial. However, ultimate result in the suit shall be

based on the material and evidence to be produced by the parties in a

full-dressed trial. Thus, this point is held in favour of the petitioner and

against the respondents.

POINT No.3:-

30. In view of the findings on points 1 and 2, the result is that the

petitioner is entitled for temporary injunction as requested against the

respondents. Consequently, the orders of the trial Court as well as the 1st

appellate Court should be interfered with, setting aside the same.

31. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside

the orders of the learned II Additional District Judge, Kurnool, at Adoni in

CMA No.8 of 2019 dated 28.02.2020. Consequently, I.A.No.46 of 2018 in

O.S.No. 6 of 2018 of the Court of the learned Principal Junior Civil Judge,

Adoni stands allowed and temporary injunction is granted in favour of the

petitioner (plaintiff) restraining the respondents (defendants) from

interfering with his peaceful possession and enjoyment of the suit land till

disposal of the suit. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to

costs

 Pending Miscellaneous Petitions, if any, shall stand closed. Interim

Orders, if any, granted earlier shall stand vacated.

________________________

JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

Dt:27.08.2020

RR

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CRP.No.947 of 2020

11

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

CRP No.947 of 2020



Dt:27.08.2020

 RR

Order XXXVIII Rule 5 C.P.C, it is obligatory for the Court to issue a notice before directing attachment. - it is a relief which has to be granted in exceptional cases and in specified circumstances contemplated by Order XXXVIII Rule 5(1) C.P.C.

Order XXXVIII Rule 5 C.P.C, it is obligatory for the Court to issue a notice before directing attachment. - it is a relief which has to be granted in exceptional cases and in specified circumstances contemplated by  Order XXXVIII Rule 5(1) C.P.C.

A party to the suit, namely, the plaintiff cannot as a matter of right insist that there shall be invariably an order to attach the property or the movables, which the party claims being the security or the subject matter of the petition.

 Even otherwise, it is a relief which has to be granted in exceptional cases and in specified circumstances contemplated by  Order XXXVIII Rule 5(1) C.P.C. It cannot be ordered as a matter of course. 

When the trial court has exercised its discretion in this context, to issue a notice to the respondent before directing attachment, it cannot be found fault with any manner. Nor the order under revision can be subjected to any process in terms of Article 227 of the Constitution of India much less in terms of Section 115 C.P.C. 

AP HIIGH COURT 

CRP/948/2020

TADI VENKATA REDDY
Versus
SAHINI VARA PRASADA RAO

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.VENKATA RAMANA

C.R.P.NO.948 OF 2020

ORDER:-

 Heard Sri T.V.Jaggi Reddy, learned counsel for the revision

petitioner.

2. The impugned order in this Civil Revision Petition is with

reference to issuing urgent notice to the respondent in a petition filed

under Order XXXVIII Rule 5 read with 151 C.P.C. in I.A.No.141 of

2020 in O.S.No.57 of 2020 on the file of the court of learned Junior

Civil Judge, Anaparthy, East Godavari District.

3. The petitioner instituted a money claim against the respondent

for recovery of Rs.6,85,250/- on the foot of a promissory note. The

above petition was filed for attachment of a part of terminal benefits

payable to the respondent upon his retirement mainly constituted by

arrears of salary and leave salary, in all Rs.6,00,000/-.

4. Sri T.V.Jaggi Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, now

contends that issuance of notice, without directing attachment of the

above amounts, by the trial court is not proper and if these amounts

are not attached before judgment, the petitioner would not have any

security to realize the suit amount in future in case a decree is passed

in his favour.

5. In terms of Order XXXVIII Rule 5 C.P.C, it is obligatory for the

Court to issue a notice before directing attachment. A party to the suit,

namely, the plaintiff cannot as a matter of right insist that there shall

be invariably an order to attach the property or the movables, which

the party claims being the security or the subject matter of the

petition. Even otherwise, it is a relief which has to be granted in

exceptional cases and in specified circumstances contemplated by 

 2

Order XXXVIII Rule 5(1) C.P.C. It cannot be ordered as a matter of

course.

6. When the trial court has exercised its discretion in this context,

to issue a notice to the respondent before directing attachment, it

cannot be found fault with any manner. Nor the order under revision

can be subjected to any process in terms of Article 227 of the

Constitution of India much less in terms of Section 115 C.P.C.

7. Thus, the Civil Revision Petition has filed is not maintainable, in

given facts and circumstances of the case. Hence, it has to be

rejected.

 In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed as not

maintainable. The trial court shall consider the application before it for

attachment unmindful of the nature of this order and shall decide on

merits. No costs. Miscellaneous Petitions pending, if any, shall stand

closed in consequence.

___________________

M.VENKATA RAMANA,J

24th JUNE, 2020

TSNR