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Saturday, September 19, 2020

Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC, which reads as under: “3-A. Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days – Else be considered as refusal to excercise jurisdiction

Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC, which reads as under: “3-A. Court to dispose of application for injunction within thirty days – Else be considered as refusal to excercise jurisdiction

Where an injunction has been granted without giving notice to the opposite party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally dispose of the application within thirty days from the date on which the injunction was granted; and where it is unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such inability.”

The Courts are expected to dispose of Interlocutory Applications within one month, if an interim injunction is granted as per Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC.

In this matter, the trial Court having jurisdiction to entertain the application and dispose of the same within one month, has not followed the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC, and dispose of the same within stipulated time. Therefore, it has refused to exercise its jurisdiction. Hence, the trial Court can be directed to dispose of the application expeditiously by following the provision under Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC. 

AP HIGH COURT

CRP/957/2020

Siripurapu Sai Babu
Versus
Siripurapu Srinivas,

* HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. SHYAM PRASAD

+ CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.957 OF 2020

% 24-07-2020

# 1. Siripurapu Sai Babu S/o Tirapayya, aged 63 years

 Occ: Agriculture, R/o D.No.3-100, Narasaraju

 Nagar, Jinnuru, Poduru Mandal, West Godavari District

 2. Siripurapu Rajesh S/o Sai Babu, aged 42 years

 R/o D.No.3-100, Narasaraju Nagar,

 Jinnuru, Poduru Mandal, West Godavari District

 3. Smt Siripurapu Rangamma W/o Sai Babu, aged 53 years

 R/o D.No.3-100, Narasaraju Nagar,

 Jinnuru, Poduru Mandal, West Godavari District

 … Petitioners/Defendants.

vs.

$ Siripurapu Srinivas S/o Sai Babu, age 38 years

 Occ: Business, Narasaraju Nagar, Jinnuru,

 Poduru Mandal, West Godavari District.

 … Respondent/Plaintiff

!Counsel for the petitioners : Sri K.V.L Narasimha Rao


^Counsel for the Respondent :


<Gist :

>Head Note :

? Cases referred : 1. AIR 2003 SC 3044

 2. (1991) 3 SCC 141

3. AIR 1964 SC 1320

 

 2

 HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. SHYAM PRASAD

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.957 OF 2020

ORDER:-

 This Revision is filed under Article 227 of the

Constitution of India, seeking for a direction to the trial Court

to dispose of the Interlocutory Application in I.A.No.1893 of

2019 in O.S.No.216 of 2019 on the file of Principal Junior

Civil Judge, Palakol.

[

2. Heard arguments of the learned counsel for the

petitioners.

3. This Court is of the view that no notice is required

to be issued to the respondent since a direction sought by the

petitioners is to the trial Court to dispose of the I.A.No.1893

of 2019. The Courts are expected to dispose of Interlocutory

Applications within one month, if an interim injunction is

granted as per Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC.

Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC, which reads as under:

“3-A. Court to dispose of application for

injunction within thirty days: – Where an injunction

has been granted without giving notice to the opposite

party, the Court shall make an endeavour to finally

dispose of the application within thirty days from the date

on which the injunction was granted; and where it is

unable so to do, it shall record its reasons for such

inability.” 

 3

4. Article 227 of Constitution of India is

supervisory jurisdiction of High Court which can be

exercised in the following circumstances :

“The exercise of supervisory jurisdiction is not

available to correct mere errors of fact or of law unless (i)

the eroor is manifest and apparent of the face of the

proceedings such as when it is based on clear ignorance

or utter disregard of the provisions of law, and (ii) a grave

injustice or gross failure of justice has occasioned thereby

in Surya Dev Rai v. Ram Cahnder Rai1

7. In the exercise of jurisdiction under Art.227, the

High Court can set aside or ignore the findings of fact of

an inferior Court or tribunal if there was no evidence to

justify such a conclusion and if no reasonable person

could possibly have come to the conclusion which the

Court or tribunal has come to, or, in other words, it is a

finding which was perverse in law. Except to this limited

extent, the High Court has no jurisdiction to interfere with

the findings of fact in Duruwala Mani Nariman v. Bhatena

Phiroz, N.2

8. This means that the High Court can interfere,

under Art.227, in cases of :

(a) Erroneous assumption or excess of jurisdiction

(Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu (AIR

1963 SC 1895)

(b) Refusal to exercise jurisdiction (Dahya Lal v.

RAsul Mohammed Abdul Rahim (AIR 1964 SC 1320)

(c ) Error of law apparent on the face of the record

(Satyanarayana Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjuna

Bhavanappa Tirumale (AIR 1960 SC 137), but not in

concurrent finding of the fact (Fatimabibi Usmal Patel v.

Manguben Pranbhai Thakkar (1995 Supp (3) SCC 193

(para 9) as distinguished from a mere mistake of law or

error of law relating to jurisdiction (Provincial Transport

Service v. State Industrial Court, (AIR 1963 SC 114).


1

 AIR 2003 SC 3044

2

 (1991) 3 SCC 141 

 4

(d) Violation of the principles of natural justice

(Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim (AIR 1964

SC 1320)

(e) Arbitrary or capricious exercise of authority, or

discretion (Santosh Kumar v. Mool Simngh Bhai(AIR 1958

SC 321)

(f) Arriving at a finding which is perverse or based

on no material (Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath

Ghughu (AIR 1963 SC 1895)

(g) A patent or flagrant error in procedure *(Trimbak

Gangadhar TElang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide (AIR

1977 SC 1222)

(h) Order resulting in manifest injustice (Trimbak

Gangadhar Telang v. Ramchandra Ganesh Bhide (AIR

1977 SC 1222)

(i) Error both on facts and in law or even

otherwise(State of Kerala v. K.Sarojini Amma (2003) 8

SCC 526)”

5. In Dahya Lal v. Rasul Mohammed Abdul Rahim3,

when the Court refuses to exercise the jurisdiction, a

direction can be given under Article 227 of the Constitution of

India to exercise its jurisdiction.

6. In this matter, the trial Court having jurisdiction to

entertain the application and dispose of the same within one

month, has not followed the provision under Order XXXIX

Rule 3-A of CPC, and dispose of the same within stipulated

time. Therefore, it has refused to exercise its jurisdiction.

Hence, the trial Court can be directed to dispose of the

application expeditiously by following the provision under

Order XXXIX Rule 3-A of CPC.


3

 AIR 1964 SC 1320 

 5

7. Considering the submissions of the counsel for the

petitioners, the trial Court is directed to dispose of the

I.A.No.1893 of 2019 in O.S.No.216 of 2019, expeditiously,

preferably, within three (03) months, in the light of the

present situation of pandemic of Covid-19 in the world.

8. With these observations, the Civil Revision Petition

is disposed of. There shall be no order as to costs.

 Miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending shall also stand

closed.

 _______________________

 G. SHYAM PRASAD,J

Date: 24.07.2020

Note: L.R copy to be marked.

(b/o)

SJ/Gvl 

 6

HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. SHYAM PRASAD

CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.957 OF 2020

Date: 24.07.2020

SJ/Gvl 

service of notice on the respondent - Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, service by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business is self sufficient service, is permitted by law.

 service of notice on the respondent - Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, service by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business is self sufficient service, is permitted by law.

Rule 2 Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is extracted as hereunder:- Rule 2 Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 "Service on corporation" Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process, where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served. 2 (a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the corporation, (or) (b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business. 4. The dispute is only with regard to service of notice on the respondent, but the order impugned in the Civil Revision Petition is contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908, service by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the place where the corporation carries on business is self sufficient service, is permitted by law. 5. Here, the petitioner complied with the procedure prescribed under the Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by sending notice to the registered office. Proof of service on the registered office is also placed on record, but still the Special Judge for trial of Commercial Disputes held that the service is not sufficient and ordered fresh notice. The impugned order is apparently illegal and contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908. On this ground alone the order is liable to be set aside.

In view of our discussion the order under challenge is illegal and contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 and such order was passed by the Special Judge for trial of Commercial Disputes, exceeding his jurisdiction. Hence, the order impugned in this Civil Revision Petition is liable to be set asidewhile holding that the service of notice on the respondent is sufficient, and the Special Judge for trial of Commercial Disputes is directed to proceed in accordance with law. 

AP HIGH COURT 

CRP/969/2020

GE Power India Limited
Versus
Navayuga Engineering Company Limited,

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

&

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.969 OF 2020

ORDER: (Per Hon’ble Sri Justice M.Satyanarayana Murthy)

This petition under Article 227 of the Constitution of India is

filed questioning the order dated 27.07.2020 in

C.A.O.P.No.2 of 2020 passed by the Special Judge for trial of

Commercial Disputes, Ibrahimpatnam, Vijayawada.

2. The Special Judge for trial of Commercial Disputes,

Ibrahimpatnam, Vijayawada ordered notice to the respondent and

accordingly the petitioner appears to have sent the notice to the

respondent, but the trial Court by the order impugned in the Civil

Revision Petition held that ‘the notice is not served on the Managing

Director of the company. Hence, the service is not proper service. Issue

fresh notice to respondent personally and by post, and for counter

posted COP on 03.08.2020’.

3. This order is assailed on the ground that it is contrary to

Rule 2 Order XXIX of CPC, on the sole ground the petitioner sought

to set aside the impugned order. For better appreciation Rule 2

Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 is extracted as

hereunder:-

Rule 2 Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 "Service on

corporation"

Subject to any statutory provision regulating service of process,

where the suit is against a corporation, the summons may be served. 

2

(a) on the secretary, or on any director, or other principal officer of the

corporation, (or)

(b) by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the corporation at

the registered office, or if there is no registered office then at the

place where the corporation carries on business.

4. The dispute is only with regard to service of notice on the

respondent, but the order impugned in the Civil Revision Petition is

contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908,

service by leaving it or sending it by post addressed to the

corporation at the registered office, or if there is no registered office

then at the place where the corporation carries on business is self

sufficient service, is permitted by law.

5. Here, the petitioner complied with the procedure prescribed

under the Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure 1908 by

sending notice to the registered office. Proof of service on the

registered office is also placed on record, but still the Special Judge

for trial of Commercial Disputes held that the service is not sufficient

and ordered fresh notice. The impugned order is apparently illegal

and contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure

1908. On this ground alone the order is liable to be set aside.

6. During hearing learned counsel for the respondent fairly

conceded that the respondent will appear before the trial Court

even without sending the notice afresh and the same is recorded.


7. In view of our discussion the order under challenge is illegal

and contrary to Rule 2 (b) Order XXIX of Code of Civil Procedure

1908 and such order was passed by the Special Judge for trial of

Commercial Disputes, exceeding his jurisdiction. Hence, the order

impugned in this Civil Revision Petition is liable to be set aside. 

3

8. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed setting aside

the order dated 27.07.2020 in C.A.O.P.No.2 of 2020 passed by the

Special Judge for trial of Commercial Disputes, Ibrahimpatnam,

Vijayawada, while holding that the service of notice on the

respondent is sufficient, and the Special Judge for trial of

Commercial Disputes is directed to proceed in accordance with law.

No costs.

 Consequently miscellaneous applications pending, if any, shall

also stand closed.

_________________________________________

JUSTICE M. SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

__________________________________

JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

Date: 31.07.2020

IS 

4

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.SATYANARAYANA MURTHY

&

THE HON’BLE SMT JUSTICE LALITHA KANNEGANTI

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.969 OF 2020

Date: 31-07-2020.

IS 

Or. 39 rule 1 & 2 CPC - prima facie when the petitioner could not establish his possession in the above said I.A., the relief could not be granted, unless the matter is further gone into the merits with regard to the title and possession in the main suit.

Or. 39 rule 1 & 2 CPC - prima facie when the petitioner could not establish his possession in the above said I.A., the relief could not be granted, unless the matter is further gone into the merits with regard to the title and possession in the main suit. 

Trial Court

Unregistered Will -vs- Registered Will

In such circumstances, no temporary injunction can be granted at this juncture the trial court came to a conclusion that the factum of possession would be decided in the main suit and thus the petitioner has failed to establish his prima-facie case and balance of convenience in his favour and as such, the petitioner is not entitled for temporary injunction as prayed for and there would be no irreparable loss to the petitioner, even if temporary injunction is refused

CMA

After hearing both sides, the IX Additional District Judge, Machilipatnam observed that as per the proceedings of Revenue Divisional officer, dated 20.09.2019, Pattadar pass book issued in favour of the petitioner was cancelled and his family member certificate was also cancelled and as such, he is not entitled for equitable relief of injunction. The petitioner as well as the respondents are claiming title over the petition schedule property. When there is a serious dispute with regard to the title between the parties, simple suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. In these circumstances, it is not just and proper to grant temporary injunction in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CMA was dismissed,

CRP

Having regard to the facts and circumstances, since both the Courts below have come to a conclusion on prima facie that the petitioner could not establish his possession in the above said I.A., the relief could not be granted, unless the matter is further gone into the merits with regard to the title and possession in the main suit. In such circumstances, no temporary injunction can be granted at this juncture and as such, this Court is not interfering with the orders of the Courts below. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed

AP HIGH COURT

CRP/982/2020

Gokapai Gandhi,
Versus
Bandi Karunakar,

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.KRISHNA MOHAN

CIVIL REVISION PETITION NO.982 of 2020

ORDER:

 This Civil Revision Petition is filed challenging the

order in CMA No.8 of 2019 on the file of the Court of the IX Additional

District Judge, Machilipatnam, dated 25.02.2020 confirming the

order in I.A.No.738 of 2018 in O.S.103 of 2018, dated 16.07.2019 on

the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda.

2. Heard the learned counsel for the petitioner.

3. The petitioner herein is the plaintiff in Original Suit No.103 of

2018 on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda. The said suit

is filed seeking permanent injunction against the defendants therein

with respect to item Nos.1 and 2 of the Plaint schedule property.

Pending suit, the petitioner also filed I.A.738 of 2018 before the Senior

Civil Judge, Avanigadda under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 CPC and

Section 151 of CPC seeking to grant temporary injunction restraining

the respondents, their followers and successors from interfering with

the petition schedule property, contending that the petitioner’s father

said to have executed an unregistered Will, dated 19.11.2016

bequeathing the petition schedule property and he died later on

19.09.2017 and ever since, the petitioner has been in possession and

enjoyment of the petition schedule property. While so, the

respondents/defendants are trying to trespass into the schedule

property under the guise of a registered Will said to have been

executed by their father, dated 23.09.2016.

4. After hearing both the parties in I.A No.738 of 2018 and relying

upon the documents submitted before the trial court, the trial court 

2

came to a conclusion that the factum of possession would be decided

in the main suit and thus the petitioner has failed to establish his

prima-facie case and balance of convenience in his favour and as

such, the petitioner is not entitled for temporary injunction as prayed

for and there would be no irreparable loss to the petitioner, even if

temporary injunction is refused. Accordingly, the I.A.No.738 of 2018

was dismissed on 16.07.2019.

5. Aggrieved by the order in I.A.No.738 of 2018 in O.S.103 of 2018

on the file of the Senior Civil Judge, Avanigadda, dated 16.07.2019,

the petitioner filed CMA No.8 of 2019 on the file of the IX Additional

District Judge, Machilipatnam, Krishna District.

6. After hearing both sides, the IX Additional District Judge,

Machilipatnam observed that as per the proceedings of Revenue

Divisional officer, dated 20.09.2019, Pattadar pass book issued in

favour of the petitioner was cancelled and his family member

certificate was also cancelled and as such, he is not entitled for

equitable relief of injunction. The petitioner as well as the respondents

are claiming title over the petition schedule property. When there is a

serious dispute with regard to the title between the parties, simple

suit for permanent injunction is not maintainable. In these

circumstances, it is not just and proper to grant temporary injunction

in favour of the petitioner. Accordingly, the CMA was dismissed, vide

order, dated 25.02.2020.

7. Aggrieved by the order of the IX Additional District Judge,

Machilipatnam, Krishna District in CMA No.8 of 2019, dated

25.02.2020, the present Civil Revision Petition is filed by the

petitioner. 

3

8. The learned counsel for the petitioner contends that before the

Courts below, there was an exparte injunction, upon filing the vacate

stay applications, on merits, the I.A was dismissed, since the suit

itself is for permanent injunction, the courts below ought not have

gone into the aspect of title to the property and denied grant of

injunction to the petitioner and sought for protection of the

possession.

9. Having regard to the facts and circumstances, since both the

Courts below have come to a conclusion on prima facie that the

petitioner could not establish his possession in the above said I.A.,

the relief could not be granted, unless the matter is further gone into

the merits with regard to the title and possession in the main suit. In

such circumstances, no temporary injunction can be granted at this

juncture and as such, this Court is not interfering with the orders of

the Courts below.

10. Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is dismissed. However,

the trial Court is directed to proceed with the suit by giving due

opportunity to all the parties concerned as expeditiously as possible

and dispose of the same in accordance with law. There shall be no

order as to costs of the Civil Revision Petition.

 As a sequel thereto, miscellaneous petitions, if any, pending in

the Civil Revision Petition shall stand closed.

_______________________________

JUSTICE B. KRISHNA MOHAN

13.08.2020

mp 

The marking of documents in an interlocutory application is more a ministerial Act done for the purposes of identifying the documents which are being considered by the Court for a prima facie case and does not amount to formal marking of documents as required under the provision of Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act.

The marking of documents in an interlocutory application is more a ministerial Act done for the purposes of identifying the documents which are being considered by the Court for a prima facie case and does not amount to formal marking of documents as required under the provision of Civil Procedure Code or the Evidence Act. 

The Appellate Court while considering the appeal could not have allowed the appeal merely on the ground that such documents were not marked. At best, it is a case for remand to the trial Court for marking the documents in the interlocutory application for purposes of identification. 

AP HIGH COURT

CRP/996/2020

KASARAPU SANKARIAH
Versus
KADAPA CHAN BEE @ SANKARAMMA

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

C.R.P No.996 of 2020

ORDER:-

 The petitioner/plaintiff had filed O.S.No.56 of 2015 in the

Court of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Rajampet, against the

respondent/defendant, for an injunction restraining the

respondent from interfering with his peaceful possession and

enjoyment of a passage said to be situated between the houses

of the petitioner and the respondent. The injunction was sought

on the basis of a claim of easementary right which is said to be

reflected in some documents.

 The petitioner also filed I.A.No.186 of 2015, for a

temporary injunction pending suit and the same was allowed by

the Court of the learned Junior Civil Judge, Rajampet by an

order dated 16.03.2020.

 Aggrieved by the same, the respondent herein had filed

C.M.A.No.1 of 2019 on the file of the Court of learned III

Additional District Judge, Rajampet. This appeal was allowed

by the learned III Additional District Judge, Rajampet by an

order dated 16.3.2020. Aggrieved by the said order, the

petitioner has now filed present Civil Revision Petition.

The contention of the petitioner is that the Appellate Court

allowed the appeal essentially on the ground that the trial Judge

while considering and disposing of the interim application, had

not marked any of the documents presented before the Court as 

2

exhibits and in the absence of such marking, an order ought not

to have been given.

The learned counsel for the petitioner also submits that

the learned Appellate Judge while holding that the trial Court

could not have gone into the documents presented by either

party, however, proceedings to consider the very same

documents and pass orders on merits also.

Sri N.Aswini Kumar, learned counsel appearing for Sri

Eerla Satish Kumar, learned counsel for the respondent draws

my attention to paragraph 16 of the order of the Appellate

Court, which records that there are no structures in the land

and the question of easementary right of passage to a latrine

need to be demonstrated by the petitioner.

Heard both sides.

The marking of documents in an interlocutory application

is more a ministerial Act done for the purposes of identifying the

documents which are being considered by the Court for a

prima facie case and does not amount to formal marking of

documents as required under the provision of Civil Procedure

Code or the Evidence Act. The Appellate Court while

considering the appeal could not have allowed the appeal merely

on the ground that such documents were not marked. At best,

it is a case for remand to the trial Court for marking the

documents in the interlocutory application for purposes of

identification. 

3

In these circumstances, it would be appropriate to allow

the Civil Revision Petition and set-aside the orders of both the

Appellate Court in C.M.A.No.1 of 2019 dated 16.03.2020 and

the trial Court in I.A.No.186 of 2015 in O.S.NO.56 of 2015,

dated 06.12.2018 and direct the trial Court to consider and

pass orders in I.A.No.186 of 2015 in O.S.No.56 of 2015 after

marking documents produced by either side, only for the

purpose of identification, in the interlocutory application and to

pass orders within a period of three (3) weeks from the date of

receipt of a copy of this order.

Admittedly, there were no constructions in the disputed

site till March, 2020. In these circumstances, Status-quo

existing as on today shall be maintained till the trial Court

disposes of the application.

 Accordingly, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. There

shall be no order as to costs.

 Miscellaneous Petitions, if any pending, in this Civil

Revision Petition, shall stand closed.

 ________________________________

 JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

Date : 27-08-2020

RJS 

4

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE R.RAGHUNANDAN RAO

C.R.P No.996 of 2020

Date : 27-08-2020

RJS 

Friday, September 18, 2020

Compensation towards caregiver - Medical Attendant charges (Bystandercharges) and future Treatment cost

 Compensation towards caregiver - Medical   Attendant   charges   (Bystandercharges) and future Treatment cost

The defence of the insurance  company for keeping the said sum at that negligible level is that no evidence had been led as regards expenses incurred towards any medical attendant.   But going by the work the victim was doing and his physical state of being resulting from his injuries, conclusion has to be inevitable that he required and still requires caregiver round­the­clock and round the year to remain barely functional.  Judging by the stratum of the society he comes from, it would be irrational to expect that he would have been in a position to directly engage a caregiver after his accident. It would not be an unreasonable assumption that his family members must have had to fit into that role. They could perform the role of caregiver   only   by   diverting   their   own   time   from   any   form   of gainful employment which could have generated some income. We   proceed   on   the   same   assumption   on   his   requirement   of continued medical treatment post­discharge from the hospital. There is observation in the judgment of the High Court that he was undergoing treatment in “Aarogya Keralam” Palliative Caring Scheme. We are of the opinion that Rs.7,00,000/­ ought to be awarded as lumpsum, composite amount for medical attendant charges and future medical treatment. In the case of  Kajal  vs. Jagdish Chand & Ors. [(2020) 4 SCC 413] for attendant charges, Page 12 of 16 a Bench of two­Judges of this Court has held that the multiplier methodology ought to be applied. On the other hand, in the case of  Parminder   Singh  (supra)   a   lumpsum   amount   has   been awarded.  In the facts of the given case, we are of the opinion that award of lumpsum would be the proper course considering the fact that the first appellant was a daily labourer. In traumatic times   after   his   accident,   his   family   was   unlikely   to   maintain detailed records of the expenses incurred.  

We   accordingly   modify   the   award   as   made   by   the   High

Court and direct the respondent­insurance company to make

Page 14 of 16

payment as compensation under the following heads (which also

includes   the   heads   under   which   sums   were   awarded   by   the

Tribunal and the High Court) :­

Compensation Heads Amount (in Rs.)

Compensation   for   permanent   disability

and loss of future earning

  

9,40,800

Medical   Attendant   charges   (Bystander

charges) and future Treatment cost 

7,00,000

Pain and suffering 3,00,000

Medicines & Treatment charges    68,000

Transportation Charges      6,000

Extra Nourishment      1500

Damage to Clothing        500

Loss of Amenities      10,000

                                            Total 20, 26,800

11. The aforesaid sum will carry interest @ 9% per annum.


 [Non­Reportable]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2855 OF 2020

      (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.2131 of 2018)

Lalan D. @ Lal & Anr.                                          ..…Appellant(s)

Vs.

The Oriental Insurance Company Ltd.                …Respondent(s)

         J U D G M E N T

ANIRUDDHA BOSE, J.

The appellants before us are a victim of a road accident and

his wife.  The first appellant is the victim. The accident occurred

on 31st  December 2003 while the victim was riding his bicycle

along   the   side   of   Alappuzha­Kolam   highway.   At   the   time   of

institution   of   the   claim   petition   before   the   Motor   Accidents

Claims   Tribunal,   Alappuzha   under   Section   166   of   the   Motor

Vehicles Act, 1988 (the Act), out of which this appeal arises, the

first appellant was unconscious and was represented by his wife

as   the   legal   guardian   and   next   friend.     She   was   also   a   coPage 1 of 16

applicant before the Tribunal. It was claimed before the forum of

first instance that the victim was skilled labourer in a building

construction project. His date of birth is 20th May 1969.  Before

the Tribunal, his age at the time of accident was found to be

above 34 years. He suffered, inter­alia, head injury causing brain

concussion, brain stems injury, diffuse axonial injury on left side.

He had to undergo extensive treatment in two hospitals, being

Medical College Hospital, Vandanam, Alappuzha and thereafter

at Medical Trust Hospital, Ernakulam. He had to spend about six

weeks   in   these   two   hospitals.   Thereafter   also   his   treatment

continued.  The claim was not contested by the first respondent –

the owner of the vehicle and was decided ex­parte against him.

Before us also, it was only the insurance company who contested

the appeal. The first respondent was deleted from the array of the

parties by an order of this Court passed on 9th April, 2019.   The

Tribunal   found   involvement   of   the   vehicle   registered   as   KL2/No.9779.     Rash and negligent driving by the driver of that

vehicle   was   also   proved.   As   regards   condition   of   the   first

appellant, the Tribunal, in its award, found that the victim had

“right aided Hemiparalesis and there is weakness on the other

side also. He is completely bed ridden and he could not speak

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properly and he has some mental problem also. Tube was fitted

for the passage of urine……”. The Tribunal in its award made on

20th  January,   2009   assessed   permanent   disability   of   the

appellant to be 50%. 

2. Compensation was awarded by the Tribunal under following

heads, applying the multiplier of 17:

Compensation for loss of earning Rs.20,000/­

Cost of medicine and treatment charges Rs.68,000/­

Transportation charges Rs. 6,000/­

Bystander expenses Rs. 6,000/­

Extra nourishment Rs. 1,500/­

Damage to clothing Rs.  500/­

Compensation for pain and suffering Rs.30,000/­

Compensation for permanent disability

And loss of earning power Rs.2,55,500/­

Compensation for loss of amenities Rs.10,000/­

Compensation for future treatment Rs. 2,500/­

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

         Total       Rs.4,00,000/­

­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­­

3. The victim and his wife appealed to the High Court of Kerala

at Ernakulam seeking enhancement of compensation.  The High

Court considered certain additional documents. The appellant

established   before   the   High   Court   the   need   to   continue   his

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treatment subsequent to the award of the Tribunal. It was opined

in the judgment of the High Court delivered on 16th March, 2017,

that the condition of the appellant was such that it was more

than sufficient to arrive at a finding that he was virtually lying as

vegetable. The victim had permanent locomotor disability of right

hemiplegia   sequelae   of   head   injury   which   was   not   likely   to

improve. The High Court found that the victim needed a full­time

caregiver as he was not in a position to move around on free will.

The High Court assessed the degree of disability to be reckoned

as 100% for working out proper compensation and applied the

multiplier of 16 considering his age.  We shall reproduce the High

Court’s   decision   on   quantum   of   compensation   in   the   next

paragraph of this judgment. 

4. The   Medical   Board   at   the   Medical   College   Hospital,

Alappuzha had certified the victim’s permanent disability to be

50%,   which   was   the   basis   for   assessment   of   degree   of   his

disability by the Tribunal. The Tribunal’s award was made, as we

have already indicated, in the year 2009.   But considering the

position of the victim, while hearing the appeal in the year 2017,

the High Court attributed the percentage of his disability to be

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100%.  The High Court enhanced his notional monthly income to

Rs.3500/­   per   month.   In   the   judgment   under   appeal,   it   was

observed and held:

“It is true that the accident was in the

year 2003, but it was on the last day of the

year and by the dawn of the next day, it was to

begin   with   the   year   2004.   Evidently,   the

injured was maintaining a family of his own,

consisting   of   his   wife,   who   is   the   second

appellant/second   claimant.   By   virtue   of   the

present state of affairs, it can be reasonably

presumed that the wife will not be in a position

to move about for getting some job and she has

to be near her husband throughout, to give

constant care and attention, even for meeting

the   calls   of   nature,   for   administration   of

medicines   and   for   food   intake.   In   the   said

circumstance,   we   find   that   the   notional

monthly income fixed by the Tribunal requires

some modification. We enhance the same to

Rs.3500/­ per month. The proper multiplier, as

rightly pointed out by the learned Sr. counsel

appearing for the Insurer is ‘16’; in view of the

date of birth of the injured being 25.9.1969.

On   re­working   the   compensation   towards

disability, it comes to Rs.6,72,000/­ (3500 x 12

x 16 x 100/100). After giving credit to the sum

of Rs.2,55,000/­ awarded by the Tribunal, the

balance comes to Rs.4,17,000/­. Since we have

awarded compensation for disability, reckoning

it as 100%, the compensation of loss of earning

awarded   by   the   Tribunal   becomes   irrelevant

and insignificant and hence the said amount of

Rs.20000/­is   deleted.   Hence   the   balance

payable comes to Rs.3,97,000/­.

The compensation under the heads ‘pain and

suffering’ and towards ‘loss of amenities and

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enjoyment   in   life’   also   require   some

modification.   Taking   into   the   totality   of   the

facts and circumstances, we award a further

sum of Rs.10,000/­ under the head ‘pain and

suffering’ and a sum of Rs.40,000/­ towards

loss of amenities and enjoyment in life. Thus,

the   total   balance   compensation   comes   to

Rs.4,47,000/­ (Rupees four lakhs forty seven

thousand only), which shall be satisfied with

interest   at   the   rate   of   9%   from   the   date   of

petition till realisation, within ‘one month’ from

the date of receipt of a copy of the judgment.”

5. The   appellants   have   asked   for   further   enhancement   of

compensation before us. Grievance of the appellants is that the

victim has been under­compensated, having regard to the degree

of injury suffered by him. He has specifically raised the plea for

award   of   compensation   under   the   head   of   loss   of   future

prospects. It is also his case that the High Court erred in law in

applying the multiplier of 16.  It has been urged on behalf of the

appellants   that   the   multiplier   17   as   per   the   award   of   the

Tribunal, should have been retained. 

6. On   behalf   of   the   insurance   company,   prayer   of   the

appellants for enhancement of compensation has been opposed.

It has been argued that there was contributory negligence on the

part of the first appellant in that he was under the influence of

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liquor at the time of accident. On that count, they want reduction

of 50% of the compensation from the judgment and order under

appeal. Quantification of his monthly income as Rs.3,500/­ has

also been questioned by the insurance company in their counteraffidavit. The case of  Sri  Ramachandrappa  vs.  The  Manager,

Royal Sundaram Alliance Insurance Company Ltd. [(2011) 13

SCC 236] has been referred to in this regard. On the question as

to what would constitute just compensation, the cases of Arvind

Kumar Mishra vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Anr. [(2010)

10   SCC   254]   and  National   Insurance   Company   Ltd.   vs.

Kusuma and Anr.  [(2011) 13 SCC 306] have been cited on their

behalf.   It has also been argued that as he was a construction

worker,   he   must   have   had   received   compensation   under   the

Building and other Construction Workers Welfare Cess Act, 1966

as   also   Workmen   Compensation   Act,   1923.   The   insurance

company’s case is that personal expenses of the victim ought to

have been taken to be one­fourth of the loss of income assessed.

The plea for attendant charges has been resisted on the ground

that no service by any bystander had been proved and no bill for

expenses for surgery or hospitalisation during the last 17 years

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had been produced.  The insurance company, however, has not

come up in appeal questioning the High Court’s finding on the

heads of compensation and quantum of compensation awarded

under   these   heads.     These   submissions   of   the   insurance

company we cannot entertain at this stage while dealing with the

victim’s   appeal   for   enhancement   of   compensation.   Otherwise

also, we do not think these submissions have any legal basis in

the context of the present appeal. The forum of first instance or

the High Court did not return any finding on the first appellant

being   under   influence   of   alcohol.   In   the   victim’s   appeal,   we

cannot permit the insurance company to raise this plea at this

stage. Moreover, submission that the appellant must have drawn

compensation under different welfare statutes is inferential. The

insurance company has not disclosed any evidence to sustain

their stand on this count. 

7. The High Court has assessed monthly income of the victim

to   be   Rs.3500/­.   This   was   enhanced   from   the   Tribunal’s

quantification   of   Rs.2,500/­   per   month.     We   do  not   want   to

disturb the finding of the High Court on this point.   This is

essentially   a   finding   on   question   of   fact.   The   respondent

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insurance company has cited the case of Mohan Soni vs. Ram

Avatar Tomar & Ors. [(2012) 2 SCC 267] to contend that in the

context  of loss  of future  earning,  physical  disability resulting

from an accident ought to be judged with reference to the nature

of work being performed by the person suffering the disability.

The approach of the Tribunal as also the High Court in the case

of the victim has been in that line only. The respondents also

sought to rely upon the decision of this Court in the case of Priya

Vasant Kalgutkar vs. Murad Shaikh & Ors. [(2009) 15 SCC 54].

This case, however, relates to computation of compensation for

injuries   suffered   by   a   minor.     Ratio   of   this   decision   has   no

application in the facts of this case. We are, however, also of the

opinion that the High Court went wrong in not awarding any sum

under   the   head   of   loss   of   future   prospects.   In   the   case   of

National   Insurance   Company   Ltd.   vs.   Pranay   Sethi   &   Ors.

[(2017) 16 SCC 680], a Constitution Bench has opined that the

standardisation of just compensation is to include addition of

future   prospects   to   the   income   of   the   victim   at   the   time   of

occurrence of the accident. This was a case where the victim had

succumbed to the injuries. The present appeal relates to a victim,

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who   has   survived   the   accident   but   his   disability   has   been

assessed to be 100% by the High Court. We confirm this finding

of the High Court.   In the case of  Parminder  Singh   vs.  New

India Assurance Co. Ltd. & Ors.  [(2019) 7 SCC 217], a Bench

comprising of two Judges of this Court found 50% of the income

of the victim was to be assessed as loss of future prospects.

Earlier, this Court broadly took the same view in the case of

Sanjay Verma vs. Haryana Roadways [(2014) 3 SCC 210].  The

course mandated by this Court in the case of Parminder Singh

(supra) is addition to the monthly income of the victim, 50%

thereof as loss of future prospects to arrive at compensation for

loss of income for the purpose of application of the multiplier.

This method of computation is based on sound logic and we

choose to apply the same methodology in this appeal also. The

loss of earning capacity of the first appellant is 100%.  On this

basis, his loss of future earning would have to be calculated

treating income of the victim to be Rs.3,500/­ per month, to

which loss of future prospects at the rate of 40% thereof is to be

added, which would make it Rs.4900/­ per month. This is the

computation method directed by the Constitution Bench in the

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case of Pranay Sethi (supra) so far as self­employed persons are

concerned. We direct addition of 40% as there is no material

before us to prove that the victim had a permanent job. Evidence

before  the   Tribunal   was   that   he  was   a  skilled  labourer  in   a

building construction project. There was no evidence that he was

on their permanent roll. The multiplier to be applicable in this

case would be 16 following the specification contained in the case

of Sarla Verma & Ors. vs. Delhi Transport Corporation & Anr.

[(2009) 6 SCC 121].  Accordingly, his loss of future earning would

have   to   be   calculated   first   by   multiplying   Rs.4,900/­   by   12,

which  would  come  to  Rs.58,800/­  This  would  be his   annual

income.   Once   multiplier   of   16   is   applied,   his   loss   of   future

earning would come to Rs.9,40,800/­, considering that degree of

his disability is 100%.  As the appellant has survived though at

present in almost “coma stage” as observed by the High Court, we

reject the insurance company’s plea for making any deduction

towards personal living expenses. 

8. We   also   find   that   there   was   no   compensation   awarded

towards   expenses   for   a   caregiver   barring   a   paltry   sum   of

Rs.6,000/­ as bystander expenses. The defence of the insurance

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company for keeping the said sum at that negligible level is that

no evidence had been led as regards expenses incurred towards

any medical attendant.   But going by the work the victim was

doing and his physical state of being resulting from his injuries,

conclusion has to be inevitable that he required and still requires

caregiver round­the­clock and round the year to remain barely

functional.  Judging by the stratum of the society he comes from,

it would be irrational to expect that he would have been in a

position to directly engage a caregiver after his accident. It would

not be an unreasonable assumption that his family members

must have had to fit into that role. They could perform the role of

caregiver   only   by   diverting   their   own   time   from   any   form   of

gainful employment which could have generated some income.

We   proceed   on   the   same   assumption   on   his   requirement   of

continued medical treatment post­discharge from the hospital.

There is observation in the judgment of the High Court that he

was undergoing treatment in “Aarogya Keralam” Palliative Caring

Scheme. We are of the opinion that Rs.7,00,000/­ ought to be

awarded as lumpsum, composite amount for medical attendant

charges and future medical treatment. In the case of  Kajal  vs.

Jagdish Chand & Ors. [(2020) 4 SCC 413] for attendant charges,

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a Bench of two­Judges of this Court has held that the multiplier

methodology ought to be applied. On the other hand, in the case

of  Parminder   Singh  (supra)   a   lumpsum   amount   has   been

awarded.  In the facts of the given case, we are of the opinion that

award of lumpsum would be the proper course considering the

fact that the first appellant was a daily labourer. In traumatic

times   after   his   accident,   his   family   was   unlikely   to   maintain

detailed records of the expenses incurred.  

9. Under   the   head   pain   and   suffering   the   High   Court   has

awarded a sum of Rs.40,000/­. The appellants want this sum to

be raised to Rs.6,00,000/­ relying on a judgment of this Court in

the   case   of  Mallikaarjun   Vs.   Divisional   Manager,   National

Insurance  Company  Ltd.  &  Anr.  [(2014) 14 SCC 396]. In the

case of  Kajal  (supra), where the victim was a young girl of 12

years having suffered 100% disability, the amount awarded was

Rs.15,00,000/­ under the heads pain and suffering and loss of

amenities.  But this judgment qualified such award with a caveat

that the sum was awarded in peculiar facts and circumstances of

the case. In the case of  Raj  Kumar   vs.   Ajay  Kumar  &   Anr.

[(2011) 1 SCC 343] it has been observed that when compensation

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is awarded by treating loss of future earning capacity to be 100%

or   even   anything   more   than   50%   the   need   to   award

compensation separately under the head of loss of amenities or

loss of expectation of life may disappear. As a result, only a token

or nominal amount may have to be awarded under those heads.

It   is   a   fact   that   in   the   cases   of  Kajal  (supra)   and

Mallikaarjun (supra), the victims were minor children.  Their loss

of income and permanent disability compensation were computed

treating their income to be Rs.15,000/­ per annum. So far as the

present appeal is concerned, the High Court has assessed the

annual income to be Rs.42,000/­ (Rs.3500x12). But this very fact

cannot altogether deprive the victim from compensation under

the   head   pain   and   suffering.   The   High   Court   had   awarded

Rs.10,000/­only   under   this   head.   We   assess   the  same   to   be

Rs.3,00,000/­.  Considering the observations made in the case of

Raj Kumar (supra), to which we have already referred, we reduce

the sum awarded by the High Court under the head loss of

amenities from Rs.40,000/­ to Rs.10,000/­.

10. We   accordingly   modify   the   award   as   made   by   the   High

Court and direct the respondent­insurance company to make

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payment as compensation under the following heads (which also

includes   the   heads   under   which   sums   were   awarded   by   the

Tribunal and the High Court) :­

Compensation Heads Amount (in Rs.)

Compensation   for   permanent   disability

and loss of future earning

  

9,40,800

Medical   Attendant   charges   (Bystander

charges) and future Treatment cost 

7,00,000

Pain and suffering 3,00,000

Medicines & Treatment charges    68,000

Transportation Charges      6,000

Extra Nourishment      1500

Damage to Clothing        500

Loss of Amenities      10,000

                                            Total 20, 26,800

11. The aforesaid sum will carry interest @ 9% per annum.

Upon   adjusting   the   sum   already   paid,   the   amount   we   have

awarded   shall   be   released   to   the   appellants.   Interest   on   the

differential sum shall be computed from the date of filing of the

application under Section 166 of the Act.  The said amount shall

be invested in an interest bearing fixed deposit account of a

Nationalised Bank for a period of one year in the name of the first

appellant within eight weeks. The appellants shall be entitled to

withdraw the interest therefrom on a regular basis during the

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tenure of the fixed deposit.  Thereafter, the entire sum shall be

paid over to the appellants.

12. The appeal is disposed of in the above terms.   Pending

applications, if any, shall stand disposed of. There shall be no

order as to costs.

……………………………….J.

  (Sanjay Kishan Kaul)

……………………………….J.

   (Ajay Rastogi)

……………………………….J.

   (Aniruddha Bose)

New Delhi,

Dated: 17th September, 2020.

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