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Tuesday, September 15, 2020

whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 Cr.P.C. only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried? = an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself, for enforcement of which right her application/suit has to be under Section 20 of Act, 1956.-In facts of the present case the ends of justice be served by giving liberty to the appellant to take recourse to Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father.


whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is entitled to claim maintenance from her father under Section 125 Cr.P.C. only till she attains majority or she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried? = an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself, for enforcement of which right her application/suit has to be under Section 20 of Act, 1956.-In facts of the present case the ends of justice be served by giving liberty to the appellant to take recourse to Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, if so advised, for claiming any maintenance against her father. 

The learned Judicial Magistrate vide its judgment dated 16.02.2011 dismissed the application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. of the applicant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and allowed the same for applicant No.4 (appellant before us) for grant of maintenance till she attains majority.

criminal revision was dismissed by learned Additional Sessions Judge by order dated 17.02.2014 with the only 2 modification that revisionist No.4 (appellant before us) shall be entitled to maintenance till 26.04.2005 when she attains majority.Learned Additional Sessions Judge held that as per provision of Section 125 Cr.P.C., the children, who had attained majority are entitled to maintenance, if by reason of any physical or mental abnormality or injury, they are unable to maintain themselves. Learned Additional Sessions Judge also held that the revisionist No.4 (i.e. appellant) is not suffering from any physical, mental abnormality or injury, therefore, she is entitled to maintenance only till 26.04.2005 i.e., till she attains majority.

High Court by the impugned judgment dated 16.02.2018 dismissed the application filed 3 under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by making following observations:- “Both the Courts are consistent with regard to declining maintenance to petitioners No. 1 to 3. As regards grant of maintenance to Abhilasha by the trial Court, the order regarding it was modified by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari observing that she was entitled to get maintenance till attaining majority and not thereafter since she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or injury, in those eventualities a child, who though has attained majority but is unable to maintain itself is entitled to get maintenance. I do not find any illegality or infirmity in the judgment passed by learned Additional Sessions Judge, Rewari, which might have called for interference by this Court while exercising jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Therefore, the petition stands dismissed.”

Apex court held that (i).Whether the appellant, who although had attained majority and is still unmarried is entitled to claim maintenance from her father in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from any physical or mental abnormality/injury? (ii) Whether the orders passed by learned Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Revisional Court limiting the claim of the appellant to claim maintenance till she attains majority on 26.04.2005 deserves to be set aside with direction to the respondent No.1 to continue to give maintenance even after 26.04.2005 till the appellant remains unmarried?

The purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. as noted above is to provide immediate relief to applicant in a summary proceedings, whereas right under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956 contains larger right, which needs determination by a Civil Court, hence for the larger claims as enshrined under Section 20, the proceedings need to be initiated under Section 20 of the Act and the legislature never contemplated to burden the Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under 34 Section 125 Cr.P.C. to determine the claims contemplated by Act, 1956. 37. There are three more reasons due to which we are satisfied that the orders passed by the learned Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Additional Sessions Judge in the revision was not required to be interfered with by the High Court in exercise of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The reasons are as follows:- (i) The application was filed by the mother of the appellant in the year 2002 claiming maintenance on her behalf as well as on behalf of her two sons and appellant, who was minor at that time. The appellant being minor at that time when application was filed on 17.10.2002, there was no occasion for any pleading on behalf of the appellant that she was not able to maintain herself even after attaining the majority. Section 20 of the Act, 1956 on which reliance has been placed by learned counsel 35 for the appellant recognising the right of maintenance of unmarried daughter by a person subject to the condition when “the parents or the unmarried daughter, as the case may be, is unable to maintain themselves/herself out of their/her own earnings or other property”. The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed the submission of the respondent that appellant did not come in the witness box even when she had attained majority to claim that she was unable to maintain herself, which contention has been noted in paragraph 12 of the judgment of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. (ii) From the judgment of the learned Judicial Magistrate, another fact, which is relevant to be noticed is that applicant Nos. 2 to 4, which included the appellant also had filed the proceedings under Section 20 of the Act, 1956 being Suit No. 6 of 2001, which was dismissed as withdrawn on 17.12.2012. 36 (iii) Another factor, which need to be noticed that in the counter affidavit filed in this appeal, there was a specific pleading of the respondent that a plot of land was purchased in name of the appellant admeasuring 214 sq. Yds. In the rejoinder affidavit filed by the appellant, it has been admitted that the plot was purchased on 31.07.2000 from the joint income earned by mother and father of the appellant, which had been agreed to be sold in the year 2012 for a total sale consideration of Rs.11,77,000/-. In the rejoinder affidavit, an affidavit of prospective purchaser has been filed by the appellant, where it is mentioned that agreement to sell had taken place between appellant and Arjun on 31.07.2000 for a sale consideration of Rs.11,77,000/-, out of which appellant had received Rs.10,89,000 as earnest money. We, thus, accept the submission of the learned counsel for the appellant that as a preposition of law, an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim maintenance from her father till she is married relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain herself, for enforcement of which right her application/suit has to be under Section 20 of Act, 1956.

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 615 of 2020

(arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.8260/2018)

ABHILASHA ...APPELLANT(S)

VERSUS

PARKASH & ORS. ...RESPONDENT(S)

J U D G M E N T

 ASHOK BHUSHAN,J.

Leave granted.

2. This appeal has been filed by the appellant,

daughter of respondent Nos. 1 and 2, challenging the

order of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at

Chandigarh dated 16.08.2018 by which order the High

Court dismissed the application under Section 482

Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant praying for setting

aside the order of the Judicial Magistrate First

Class, Rewari dated 16.02.2011 as well as the order

dated 17.02.2014 passed by the Additional Sessions

Judge, Rewari.

1

3. The brief facts necessary to be noticed for

deciding this appeal are:-

3.1 The respondent No.2, mother of the appellant,

on her behalf, as well as on behalf of her

two sons and the appellant daughter, filed an

application under Section 125 Cr.P.C. against

her husband, the respondent No.1, Parkash,

claiming maintenance for herself and her

three children. The learned Judicial

Magistrate vide its judgment dated 16.02.2011

dismissed the application under Section 125

Cr.P.C. of the applicant Nos. 1, 2 and 3 and

allowed the same for applicant No.4

(appellant before us) for grant of

maintenance till she attains majority.

3.2 Aggrieved against the judgment dated

16.02.2011, all the four applicants filed a

criminal revision before the Court of

Sessions Judge, which criminal revision was

dismissed by learned Additional Sessions

Judge by order dated 17.02.2014 with the only

2

modification that revisionist No.4 (appellant

before us) shall be entitled to maintenance

till 26.04.2005 when she attains majority.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge held that

as per provision of Section 125 Cr.P.C., the

children, who had attained majority are

entitled to maintenance, if by reason of any

physical or mental abnormality or injury,

they are unable to maintain themselves.

Learned Additional Sessions Judge also held

that the revisionist No.4 (i.e. appellant) is

not suffering from any physical, mental

abnormality or injury, therefore, she is

entitled to maintenance only till 26.04.2005

i.e., till she attains majority.

3.3 Challenging the order of Sessions Judge as

well as the Judicial Magistrate, an

application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was

filed before the High court by all the

applicants including the appellant. High

Court by the impugned judgment dated

16.02.2018 dismissed the application filed

3

under Section 482 Cr.P.C. by making following

observations:-

“Both the Courts are

consistent with regard to

declining maintenance to

petitioners No. 1 to 3. As regards

grant of maintenance to Abhilasha

by the trial Court, the order

regarding it was modified by

learned Additional Sessions Judge,

Rewari observing that she was

entitled to get maintenance till

attaining majority and not

thereafter since she is not

suffering from any physical or

mental abnormality or injury, in

those eventualities a child, who

though has attained majority but

is unable to maintain itself is

entitled to get maintenance.

I do not find any illegality

or infirmity in the judgment

passed by learned Additional

Sessions Judge, Rewari, which

might have called for interference

by this Court while exercising

jurisdiction under Section 482

Cr.P.C.

Therefore, the petition stands

dismissed.”

3.4 This appeal has been filed challenging the

judgment of the High Court.

4

4. Ms. Vibha Datta Makhija, learned senior counsel

appearing for the appellant submits that even though

the appellant had attained majority on 26.04.2005 but

since she is unmarried, she is entitled to claim

maintenance from her father. Learned senior counsel

contends that High Court committed error in

dismissing the application filed under Section 482

Cr.P.C. of the appellant on wrong premise that since

appellant has attained majority and is not suffering

from any physical or mental abnormality, she is not

entitled for any maintenance. Ms. Makhija has relied

on provisions of Section 20 of the Hindu Adoptions &

Maintenance Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as

“Act, 1956”) and submits that as per Section 20

obligation of a person to maintain his daughter, who

is unmarried, extends till she is married. Ms.

Makhija relies on judgment of this Court in Jagdish

Jugtawat Vs. Manju Lata and Others, (2002) 5 SCC 422

in support of her submission. She submits that High

Court committed error in taking a contrary view to

the above judgment of this Court. Ms. Makhija

submits that appellant is still unemployed, hence,

she is entitled to claim maintenance from her father.

5

5. Learned counsel for the respondent refuting the

submission of the learned senior counsel for the

appellant contends that Courts below have rightly

confined the claim of the maintenance of the

appellant till she attains majority on 26.04.2005.

It is submitted that as per Section 125 Cr.P.C.

entitlement to claim maintenance by daughter, who has

attained majority is confined to case where the

person by reason of any physical or mental

abnormality or injury unable to maintain herself.

Revisional Court has returned a finding that there is

no case that appellant is by reason of any physical

or mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain

herself. It is submitted that High Court has rightly

dismissed the application filed under Section 482

Cr.P.C. of the appellant since no case was made out

to interfere in orders passed by the Judicial

Magistrate and learned Revisional Court in exercise

of jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

6. We have considered the submissions of the learned

counsel for the parties and have perused the records.

6

7. From the submissions of the learned counsel for

the parties, following two questions arise for

consideration in this appeal:-

(i) Whether the appellant, who although had

attained majority and is still unmarried is

entitled to claim maintenance from her

father in proceedings under Section 125

Cr.P.C. although she is not suffering from

any physical or mental abnormality/injury?

(ii) Whether the orders passed by learned

Judicial Magistrate as well as learned

Revisional Court limiting the claim of the

appellant to claim maintenance till she

attains majority on 26.04.2005 deserves to

be set aside with direction to the

respondent No.1 to continue to give

maintenance even after 26.04.2005 till the

appellant remains unmarried?

8. Both the questions being interconnected, we

proceed to take them together. Application under

Section 125 Cr.P.C. was filed on 17.10.2002 by the

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applicants including the appellant as applicant No.4

against Parkash, father of the appellant. The date

of birth of the appellant being 26.04.1987, she was

minor at the time when the application was filed.

Learned Judicial Magistrate allowed the application

of the appellant for maintenance till she attains

majority. Learned Revisional Court has also affirmed

the judgment with modification that appellant was

entitled to receive maintenance till 26.04.2005

instead of 07.02.2005, which is date when she attains

majority. In support of application under Section

125 Cr.P.C., applicant had examined Surya Dev Pandey

as PW1, Chunni Lal Saini as PW2, Vikas Saini as PW3

and Dr. Raj Saini as PW4. The claim of the applicant

Nos. 1, 2 and 3 was rejected, which was also affirmed

by Courts below and is not subject matter of this

appeal.

9. The question to be answered in the present case

is as to whether a Hindu unmarried daughter is

entitled to claim maintenance from her father under

Section 125 Cr.P.C. only till she attains majority or

she can claim maintenance till she remains unmarried.

8

Section 125(1) Cr.P.C., which is relevant for the

present case is as follows:-

“125. Order for maintenance of wives,

children and parents.--(1) If any person

having sufficient means neglects or

refuses to maintain-

(a) his wife, unable to maintain

herself, or

(b) his legitimate or illegitimate

minor child, whether married or

not, unable to maintain itself, or

(c) his legitimate or illegitimate

child (not being a married

daughter) who has attained

majority, where such child is, by

reason of any physical or mental

abnormality or injury unable to

maintain itself, or

(d) his father or mother, unable

to maintain himself or herself,

XXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX”

10. The claim of maintenance of applicant No.4 was

filed at the time when she was minor. During

pendency of the application, she became major on

26.04.2005. The learned Judicial Magistrate,

therefore, allowed the application of the appellant

for maintenance till she attains majority on

26.04.2005.

9

11. Learned counsel for the appellant contends that

the appellant is entitled to receive maintenance till

she remains unmarried but said argument was rejected

only on the ground that appellant is not suffering

from any physical or mental abnormality or injury,

therefore, she is not entitled for maintenance. The

provision on which learned counsel for the appellant

has placed reliance, i.e., Section 20 of the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956, needs to be

noted, which provides for maintenance of children and

aged parents, which is as follows:-

“20. Maintenance of children and aged

parents.— (1) Subject to the provisions of

this section a Hindu is bound, during his

or her lifetime, to maintain his or her

legitimate or illegitimate children and

his or her aged or infirm parents.

(2) A legitimate or illegitimate child may

claim maintenance from his or her father

or mother so long as the child is a minor.

(3) The obligation of a person to maintain

his or her aged or infirm parent or a

daughter who is unmarried extends in so

far as the parent or the unmarried

daughter, as the case may be, is unable to

maintain himself or herself out of his or

her own earnings or other property.

Explanation.— In this section “parent”

includes a childless step-mother.”

10

12. The Act, 1956 was enacted to amend and codify the

law relating to adoptions and maintenance among

Hindus. A bare perusal of Section 125(1) Cr.P.C. as

well as Section 20 of Act, 1956 indicates that

whereas Section 125 Cr.P.C. limits the claim of

maintenance of a child until he or she attains

majority. By virtue of Section 125(1)(c), an

unmarried daughter even though she has attained

majority is entitled for maintenance, where such

unmarried daughter is by reason of any physical or

mental abnormality or injury is unable to maintain

itself. The Scheme under Section 125(1) Cr.P.C.,

thus, contemplate that claim of maintenance by a

daughter, who has attained majority is admissible

only when by reason of any physical or mental

abnormality or injury, she is unable to maintain

herself. In the present case, the Revisional Court

has returned a finding that appellant is not

suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or

injury due to which she is unable to maintain

herself. The above findings are not even questioned

before us. What is contended that even if she is not

suffering from any physical or mental abnormality or

11

injury, by virtue of Section 20 of Act, 1956, she is

entitled to claim maintenance till she is unmarried.

13. For answering the question as noted above, we

need to examine the nature, extent and scope of

Section 125 Cr.P.C. In the Code of Criminal

Procedure, 1898, Section 488 Cr.P.C. was the

provision governing the maintenance of wife or

legitimate or illegitimate child of any person.

Section 488(1) Cr.P.C. provided:

“488(1). If any person having sufficient

means neglects or refuses to maintain his

wife or his legitimate or illegitimate

child unable to maintain itself, the

District Magistrate, a Presidency

Magistrate, a Sub-divisional Magistrate or

a Magistrate of the first class may, upon

proof of such neglect or refusal, order

such person to make a monthly allowance

for the maintenance of his wife or such

child, at such monthly rate, not exceeding

five hundred rupees in the whole, as such

Magistrate thinks fit, and to pay the same

to such person as the Magistrate from time

to time directs.”

14. Section 488 Cr.P.C. sought to inhibit negligence

of woman and children with intent to serve a social

purpose. The provision provided for summary

proceeding to enable a deserted wife or helpless

12

child, legitimate or illegitimate, to get urgent

relief. The laws are nothing but collective

consciousness of community. It is in the interest of

the community and social order that woman and child

who are neglected be maintained and should be

provided a forum to obtain urgent relief to enable

them to sustain.

15. This Court in Nanank Chand Vs. Chandra Kishore

Aggarwal and Others, (1969) 3 SCC 802 had occasion to

consider the provision of Section 488 Cr.P.C., 1898

The Court had occasion to consider the nature of

proceedings under Section 488 Cr.P.C. in reference to

provisions of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act,

1956, which provided for overriding effect of Act.

Section 4 of the Act, 1956 is to the following

effect:

“Section 4. Overriding effect of ActSave as otherwise expressly provided in

this Act,-

(a) any text, rule or interpretation

of Hindu law or any custom or usage as

part of that law in force immediately

before the commencement of this Act shall

cease to have effect with respect to any

matter for which provision is made in this

Act;

13

(b) any other law in force immediately

before the commencement of this Act shall

cease to apply to Hindus in so far as it

is inconsistent with any of the provisions

contained in this Act.”

16. In Nanak Chand’s case the question arose as to

whether by virtue of Section 4 of Act, 1956, the

provision of Section 488 Cr.P.C. shall be overridden.

In the above case this Court explained the provisions

of Section 488 Cr.P.C. as well as Section 20 of the

Act, 1956. This Court held that there is no

inconsistency between Section 488 Cr.P.c. and the

Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act and both can

stand together. This Court further held that Section

488 Cr.P.C. provides a summary remedy and is

applicable to all persons belonging to all religions

and has no relationship with the personal law of the

parties. Following was laid down in paragraph 4:

“4.....The learned Counsel says that

Section 488 Cr.P.C., insofar as it

provides for the grant of maintenance to a

Hindu, is inconsistent with Chapter III of

the Maintenance Act, and in particular,

Section 20, which provides for maintenance

to children. We are unable to see any

inconsistency between the Maintenance Act

and Section 488, Cr.P.C. Both can stand

together. The Maintenance Act is an act to

amend and codify the law relating to

14

adoptions and maintenance among Hindus.

The law was substantially similar before

and nobody ever suggested that Hindu Law,

as in force immediately before the

commencement of this Act, insofar as it

dealt with the maintenance of children,

was in any way inconsistent with Section

488, Cr.P.C. The scope of the two laws is

different. Section 488 provides a summary

remedy and is applicable to all persons

belonging to all religions and has no

relationship with the personal law of the

parties. Recently the question came before

the Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh v.

State, AIR 1963 All 355 , before the

Calcutta High Court in Mahabir Agarwalla

v. Gita Roy [1962] 2 Cr. L.J.528 and

before the Patna High Court in Nalini

Ranjan v. Kiran Rani, AIR 1965 Pat 442.

The three High Courts have, in our view,

correctly come to the conclusion that

Section 4(b) of the Maintenance Act does

not repeal or affect in any manner the

provisions contained in Section 488,

Cr.P.C.”

17. In Nanak Chand (supra) this Court had approved

the judgments of Allahabad High Court in Ram Singh

Vs. State, AIR 1963 All 355, judgment of Patna High

Court in Nalini Ranjan Vs. Kiran Rani, AIR 1965 Pat.

442 and judgment of Calcutta High Court in Mahabir

Agarwalla Vs. Gita Roy, [1962] 2 Cr. L.J.528. This

Court in Mst. Zohara Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Ibrahim,

(1981) 2 SCC 509, after noticing the judgment of this

Court in Nanak Chand’s case extracted relevant

portions of judgments of Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwalla

15

and Nalini Ranjan (supra) which were approved by this

Court in Nanak Chand. In Ram Singh’s case, Allahabad

High Court took the view that Section 18 of Act, 1956

cannot be substituted for Section 488 Cr.P.C. In

Nalini Ranjan, Patna High Court held that Section 488

Cr.P.C. provided a separate remedy and Section 488

Cr.P.C. covered the civil liability of a husband

under the personal law. It is useful to extract

paragraphs 8, 9 and 10 of the judgment of this Court

in Zohara Khatoon which are to the following effect:

“8. It would be seen that this Court

approved of the decisions in the cases of

Ram Singh, Mahabir Agarwalla and Nalini

Ranjan mentioned in the observations

extracted above. In order to understand

the proper scope of Section 488 of the

1898 Code which is almost the same as that

of Section 125 of the 1973 Code, it may be

necessary to examine the decisions which

were referred to with approval by this

Court in Nanak Chand's case (supra). In

Ram Singh v. State and Anr. Kailash

Prasad, J. observed as follows :-

“There is nothing in the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act to

suggest expressly or by necessary

implication that the Act is

intended to be a substitute for

the provisions of Section 488

Cr.P.C. In fact the provisions of

Section 18 of the Act cannot be a

substitute for Section 488 Cr.P.C.

The latter provision is general

and is applicable to a wife,

irrespective of her religion, but

16

the former is applicable to the

case of Hindus only. It could not,

therefore, be intended to be a

substitute for Section 488 Cr.P.C.

To the same effect is the decision of the

Patna High Court in Nalini Ranjan

Chakravarty v. Smt. Kiran Rani

Chakravarty, AIR 1965 Pat 442 where the

following observations were made :-

Before the enactment of 1956,

it was well settled that the right

conferred by Section 488 Cr.P.C.

was independent of the personal

law of the parties. The right of

maintenance under Section 488 was

irrespective of the nationality or

creed of the parties, the only

condition precedent to the

possession of that right being in

the case of a wife the acceptance

of the conjugal relation. Further,

Section 488 provided for only a

speedy remedy and a summary

procedure before a Magistrate

against starvation of a deserted

wife or child. This section did

not cover the civil liability of a

husband or a father under his

personal law to maintain his wife

and children.

9. The Calcutta High Court also took

the same view in Mahabir Agarwalla v. Gita

Roy [1962] 2 Cr. L.J. 528 where the

following observations were made :-

An alternative but not

inconsistent summary remedy was

provided by Section 488 of the

CrPC not only to the Hindu wife

but generally to wives

irrespective of religion for

recovery of maintenance from the

17

husband. The two remedies were,

however, not co-extensive.

10. Thus, on a consideration of the

authorities mentioned above, it is clear

that the 1898 Code by virtue of Section

488 provided a summary remedy for awarding

maintenance to neglected wives

irrespective of caste, creed, community or

religion to which they belonged. It was in

this context that the Courts referred to

above considered the effect of Hindu

Adoption and Maintenance Act and other

similar Acts.”

18. This Court in Yamunabai Anantrao Adhav Vs.

Anantrao Shivram Adhav and Another, (1988) 1 SCC 530,

held that personal law applicable to the parties

cannot altogether be excluded from consideration in

proceeding under Section 125 Cr.P.C.

19. In Yamunabai’s case (supra), the question

involved was as to whether a Hindu woman who is

married after coming into force of Hindu Marriage

Act, 1955 to a Hindu male having a living lawfully

wedded wife, can maintain an application for

maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. This Court in

the above case held the marriage of Yamunabai to be

null and void from its very inception. In the above

context, this Court referred to provision of Hindu

18

Marriage Act, 1955 to find out marital status. In

paragraphs 5 and 6, following was laid down:

“5. It has been contended on behalf of

the appellant that the term 'wife ' in

Section 125 of the Code should be given a

wider and extended meaning so as to

include therein not only a lawfully wedded

wife but also a woman married in fact by

performance of necessary rites or

following the procedure laid down under

the law. Relying upon the decision of this

Court in Mohd. Ahmed khan v. Shah Bano

Beghum, 1985 Cri LJ 875 it was argued that

the personal law of the parties to a

proceeding under Section 125 of the Code

should be completely excluded from

consideration. The relationship of husband

and wife comes to an end on divorce, but a

divorcee has been held to be entitled to

the benefits of the section, it was urged,

and therefore applying this approach a

woman in the same position as the present

appellant should be brought within the

sweep of the section. We are afraid, the

argument is not well founded. A divorcee

is included within the section on account

of Clause (b) of the Explanation. The

position under the corresponding Section

488 of the code of 1898 was different. A

divorcee could not avail of the summary

remedy. The wife's right to maintenance

depended upon the continuance of her

married status. It was pointed out in Shah

Bano's case that since that right could be

defeated by the husband by divorcing her

unilaterally under the Muslim Personal Law

or by obtaining a decree of divorce under

any other system of law, it was considered

desirable to remove the hardship by

extending the benefit of the provisions of

the section to a divorced woman so long as

she did not remarry, and that was achieved

by including Clause (b) of the

Explanation. Unfortunately for the

19

appellant no corresponding provision was

brought in so as to apply to her. The

legislature decided to bestow the benefit

of the Section even on an illegitimate

child by express words but none are found

to apply to a de facto wife where the

marriage is void ab initio.

6. The attempt to exclude altogether the

personal law applicable to the parties

from consideration also has to be

repelled. The section has been enacted in

the interest of a wife, and one who

intends to take benefit under Sub-section

(1)(a) has to establish the necessary

condition, namely, that she is the wife of

the person concerned. This issue can be

decided only by a reference to the law

applicable to the parties. It is only

where an applicant establishes her status

on relationship with reference to the

personal law that an application for

maintenance can be maintained. Once the

right under the section is established by

proof of necessary conditions mentioned

therein, it cannot be defeated by further

reference to the personal law. The issue

whether the section is attracted or not

cannot be answered except by the reference

to the appropriate law governing the

parties. In our view the judgment in Shah

Bano's case does not help the appellant.

It may be observed that for the purpose of

extending the benefit of the section to a

divorced woman and an illegitimate child

the Parliament considered it necessary to

include in the section specific provisions

to that effect, but has not done so with

respect to women not lawfully married.”

20. It is to be noted that in the above case personal

law was looked into to find out as to whether an

20

application filed by the appellant Yamunabai claiming

to be his wife was maintainable or not. Another

judgment which needs to be noted is Kirtikant D.

Vadodaria Vs. State of Gujarat and Another, (1996) 4

SCC 479. The question which came for consideration

before this Court was as to whether expression

“mother” used in clause (d) of sub-section (1) of

Section 125 Cr.P.C. includes stepmother. This Court

referring to Section 125 Cr.P.C. as well as provision

of Section 20 of Act, 1956 held that stepmother can

claim maintenance from her stepson provided she is

widow of her husband, if living, and also incapable

of maintaining and supporting her.

21. Now, we come to the Three Judge Bench judgment of

this Court as relied by learned counsel for the

appellant, i.e., Jagdish Jugtawat (supra). In the

above case, the respondent No.3 was a minor unmarried

girl of the petitioner. The wife of the petitioner,

i.e., mother of respondent No.3 filed an application

under Section 125 Cr.P.C. claiming maintenance @

Rs.500/- per month to each of the applicant, which

was granted by the Family Court. A revision was filed

21

before the High Court assailing the order contending

that the respondent No.3, Kumari Rakhi was entitled

to maintenance only till she attains majority and not

thereafter. High Court although accepted the legal

position that under Section 125 Cr.P.C., a minor

daughter is entitled to maintenance from her parents

only till she attains majority but declined to

interfere with the orders passed by the Family Court

taking the cue from Section 20(3) of the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act. The facts of the case

and observations of the High Court have been made in

the paragraph 2 of the judgment, which is to the

following effect:-

“2. The Petitioner is the father of Kumari

Rakhi, Respondent 3 herein, who is a minor

unmarried girl. Considering the

application filed under Section 125 of the

Criminal Procedure Code by Respondent 1,

wife of the Petitioner and mother of

Respondent 3, claiming maintenance for

herself and her two children, the Family

Court by order dated 22.7.2000 granted

maintenance @ Rs.500 per month to each of

the Applicants. The Petitioner herein

filed a revision petition before the High

Court assailing the order of the Family

Court on the ground, inter alia, that

Respondent 3 was entitled to maintenance

only till she attains majority and not

thereafter. Considering the point the

learned Single Judge of the High Court

accepted, the legal position that under

Section-125, CrPC, a minor daughter is

22

entitled to maintenance from her parents

only till she attains majority, but

declined to interfere with the order

passed by the Family Court taking the cue

from Section 20(3) of the Hindu Adoptions

and Maintenance Act under which the right

of maintenance is given to a minor

daughter till her marriage. The learned

Single Judge was persuaded to maintain the

order of the Family Court with a view to

avoid multiplicity of proceedings. The

relevant portion of the judgment of the

High Court is quoted here:

“Thus, in view of the above,

though it cannot be said that the

order impugned runs counter to the

law laid down by the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, the provisions of

Section 125 CrPC are applicable

irrespective of the personal law

and it does not make any

distinction whether the daughter

claiming maintenance is a Hindu or

a Muslim. However, taking an

overall view of the matter, I,

with all respect to the Hon'ble

Court, am of the candid view that

the provisions require literal

interpretation and a daughter

would cease to have the benefit of

the provisions under Section 125

CrPC on attaining majority, though

she would be entitled to claim the

benefits further under the

statute/personal law. But the

Court is not inclined to

interfere, as the order does not

result in miscarriage of justice,

rather interfering with the order

would create great inconvenience

to Respondent 3 as she would be

forced to file another petition

under sub-section (3) of Section

20 of the Act of 1956 for further

maintenance etc. Thus, in order to

23

avoid multiplicity of litigations,

the order impugned does not

warrant interference.”

(underlined by us)

22. The judgment of this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat

(supra) is sheet anchor of learned counsel for the

appellant. The question which came for consideration

before this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat’s case has

been noted in paragraph 3 of the judgment which is to

the following effect:

“3. In view of the finding recorded and

the observations made by the learned

Single Judge of the High Court, the only

question that arises for consideration is

whether the order calls for

interference. .....”

23. This Court answered the question noticed in

paragraph 3 as above in paragraph 4 in the following

words:

“4. Applying the principle to the facts

and circumstances of the case in hand, it

is manifest that the right of a minor girl

for maintenance from parents after

attaining majority till her marriage is

recognized in Section 20(3) of the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act. Therefore,

no exception can be taken to the

judgment/order passed by the learned

Single Judge for maintaining the order

passed by the Family Court which is based

on a combined reading of Section 125, Code

24

of Criminal Procedure and Section 20(3) of

the Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance Act.

For the reasons aforestated we are of the

view that on facts and in the

circumstances of the case no interference

with the impugned judgment order of the

High Court is called for.”

24. In the above case, an order was passed by the

Family Court by granting maintenance which was based

on combined reading of Section 125 Cr.P.C. and

Section 20 of Act, 1956. Although, the High Court and

this Court had declined to interfere with the order

of the Family Court taking the cue from Section 20(3)

of the Act, 1956 under which the right of maintenance

is given to a minor daughter till her marriage, but

the judgment of this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat

(supra) cannot be read to laying down the ratio that

in proceedings under Section 125 Cr.P.C. filed by the

daughter against her father, she is entitled to

maintenance relying on the liability of the father to

maintain her unmarried daughter as contained in

Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956. The High Court in

exercise of Criminal Revisional jurisdiction can very

well refuse to interfere with the judgment of Courts

below by which maintenance was granted to unmarried

25

daughter. This Court while hearing criminal appeal

against the above judgment of High Court was

exercising jurisdiction under Article 136 of the

Constitution of India, and in the facts of that case,

this Court refused to interfere with the judgment of

High Court but in refusal to interfere by this Court,

no ratio can be read in the judgment of Jagdish

Jugtawat (supra) as contended by learned counsel for

the appellant.

25. In Classical Hindu Law prior to codification, a

Hindu male was always held morally and legally liable

to maintain his aged parents, a virtuous wife and

infant child. Hindu Law always recognised the

liability of father to maintain an unmarried

daughter. In this context, we refer to paragraph 539

and 543 of Mulla – Hindu Law – 22nd Edition, which is

as follows:-

"539. Personal liability: liability of

father, husband and son.-- A Hindu is

under a legal obligation to maintain his

wife, his minor sons, his unmarried

daughters, and his aged parents whether he

possesses any property or not. The

obligation to maintain these relations is

personal in character and arises from the

26

very existence of the relation between the

parties.

Section 18 and 20 of the Hindu

Adoptions and Maintenance Act, 1956 deal

with the question of maintenance of wife,

children and aged parents. Reference may

be made to the notes under those sections.

543. Daughter. – (1) A father is bound to

maintain his unmarried daughters. On the

death of the father, they are entitled to

be maintained out of his estate.

XXXXXXXXXXXXXX”

26. Muslim Law also recognises the obligation of

father to maintain his daughters until they are

married. Referring to Mulla’s Principle of

Mohammedan Law, this Court in State of Haryana and

Others Vs. Santra (Smt.), (2000) 5 SCC 182 in

paragraph 40 held:-

“40. Similarly, under the Mohammedan Law,

a father is bound to maintain his sons

until they have attained the age of

puberty. He is also bound to maintain his

daughters until they are married. [See:

Mulla's Principles of Mohammedan Law (19th

Edn.) page 300]......................”

27. Section 20(3) of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance

Act, 1956 is nothing but recognition of principles of

Hindu Law regarding maintenance of children and aged

27

parents. Section 20(3) now makes it statutory

obligation of a Hindu to maintain his or her

daughter, who is unmarried and is unable to maintain

herself out of her own earnings or other property.

28. Section 20 of Hindu Adoptions and Maintenance

Act, 1956 cast a statutory obligation on a Hindu to

maintain his daughter who is unmarried and unable to

maintain herself out of her own earnings or other

property. As noted above, Hindu Law prior to

enactment of Act, 1956 always obliged a Hindu to

maintain unmarried daughter, who is unable to

maintain herself. The obligation, which is cast on

the father to maintain his unmarried daughter, can be

enforced by her against her father, if she is unable

to maintain herself by enforcing her right under

Section 20.

29. We may also notice another judgment of this Court

in Noor Saba Khatoon Vs. Mohd. Quasim, (1997) 6 SCC

233, which was a case under Section 125 Cr.P.C. A

Muslim wife with her two daughters and a son filed an

application claiming maintenance under Section 125

28

Cr.P.C. The trial court allowed the maintenance to

the wife and children from her husband. The husband

after divorcing the wife filed application in the

trial court seeking modification of the order in view

of the provisions of the Muslim Women (Protection of

Rights on Divorce) Act, 1986. The trial court

modified the order insofar as the grant of

maintenance of wife was concerned but maintained the

order of maintenance to each of the three minor

children. The husband challenged the order by means

of revision, which was dismissed by the Revisional

Court. An application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was

filed in the High Court. The High Court accepted the

claim of husband and relying on provision of Section

3(1)(b) of the Act, 1986 held that a Muslim wife is

entitled to claim maintenance from her previous

husband for her children only for a period of two

years from the date of birth of the child concerned.

The High Court held that minor children were not

entitled for maintenance under Section 125, Cr.P.C.

A special leave to appeal was filed questioning the

judgment. This Court dealing with Section 125 Cr.P.C.

as well as Act, 1986 held that effect of a beneficial

29

legislation like Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot be

allowed to be defeated except through clear

provisions of a statute. This Court held that there

is no conflict between the two provisions.

30. This Court noticed the provisions of Section 3 of

Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act,

1986 and Section 125 Cr.P.C. It is relevant to refer

to the following observations made by this Court in

paragraph 7 of the above judgment:

“7....Under Section 125, CrPC the

maintenance of the children is obligatory

on the father (irrespective of his

religion) and as long as he is in a

position to do so and the children have no

independent means of their own, it remains

his absolute obligation to provide for

them. Insofar as children born of Muslim

parents are concerned there is nothing in

Section 125 CrPC which exempts a Muslim

father from his obligation to maintain the

children. These provisions are not

affected by Clause (b) of Section 3(1) of

the 1986 Act and indeed it would be

unreasonable, unfair, inequitable and even

preposterous to deny the benefit of

Section 125 CrPC to the children only on

the ground that they are born of Muslim

parents. The effect of a beneficial

legislation like Section 125 CrPC, cannot

be allowed to be defeated except through

clear provisions of a statute. We do not

find manifestation of any such intention

in the 1986 Act to take away the

independent rights of the children to

claim maintenance under Section 125 CrPC

30

where they are minor and are unable to

maintain themselves. A Muslim father's

obligation, like that of a Hindu father,

to maintain his minor children as

contained in Section 125 CrPC is absolute

and is not at all affected by Section 3(1)

(b) of the 1986 Act. ......”

31. The provision of Section 20 of Act, 1956 cast

clear statutory obligation on a Hindu to maintain his

unmarried daughter who is unable to maintain herself.

The right of unmarried daughter under Section 20 to

claim maintenance from her father when she is unable

to maintain herself is absolute and the right given

to unmarried daughter under Section 20 is right

granted under personal law, which can very well be

enforced by her against her father. The judgment of

this Court in Jagdish Jugtawat (supra) laid down that

Section 20(3) of Act, 1956 recognised the right of a

minor girl to claim maintenance after she attains

majority till her marriage from her father. Unmarried

daughter is clearly entitled for maintenance from her

father till she is married even though she has become

major, which is a statutory right recognised by

Section 20(3) and can be enforced by unmarried

daughter in accordance with law.

31

32. After enactment of Family Courts Act, 1984, a

Family Court shall also have the jurisdiction

exercisable by a Magistrate of the First Class under

Chapter IX of Cr.P.C. relating to order for

maintenance of wife, children and parents. Family

Courts shall have the jurisdiction only with respect

to city or town whose population exceeds one million,

where there is no Family Courts, proceedings under

Section 125 Cr.P.C. shall have to be before the

Magistrate of the First Class. In an area where the

Family Court is not established, a suit or

proceedings for maintenance including the proceedings

under Section 20 of the Act, 1956 shall only be

before the District Court or any subordinate Civil

Court.

33. There may be a case where the Family Court has

jurisdiction to decide a case under Section 125

Cr.P.C. as well as the suit under Section 20 of Act,

1956, in such eventuality, Family Court can exercise

jurisdiction under both the Acts and in an

appropriate case can grant maintenance to unmarried

daughter even though she has become major enforcing

32

her right under Section 20 of Act, 1956 so as to

avoid multiplicity of proceedings as observed by this

Court in the case of Jagdish Jugtawat (supra).

However the Magistrate in exercise of powers under

Section 125 Cr.P.C. cannot pass such order.

34. In the case before us, the application was filed

under Section 125 Cr.P.C. before Judicial Magistrate

First Class, Rewari who passed the order dated

16.02.2011. The Magistrate while deciding proceedings

under Section 125 Cr.P.C. could not have exercised

the jurisdiction under Section 20(3) of Act, 1956 and

the submission of the appellant cannot be accepted

that the Court below should have allowed the

application for maintenance even though she has

become major. We do not find any infirmity in the

order of the Judicial Magistrate First Class as well

as learned Additional Magistrate in not granting

maintenance to appellant who had become major.

35. The maintenance as contemplated under Act, 1956

is a larger concept as compared to concept of

maintenance under Section 125 Cr.P.C. Section 3(b)

33

while defining maintenance gives an inclusive

definition including marriage expenses in following

words:-

“3. Definitions- In this Act unless the

context otherwise requiresXXXXXXXXXXXXXXX

(b) "Maintenance" includes-

(i) in all cases, provision for food,

clothing, residence, education and

medical attendance and treatment;

(ii) in the case of an unmarried

daughter also the reasonable

expenses of and incident to her

marriage;

(c) "minor" means a person who has not

completed his or her age of

eighteen years.”

36. The purpose and object of Section 125 Cr.P.C. as

noted above is to provide immediate relief to

applicant in a summary proceedings, whereas right

under Section 20 read with Section 3(b) of Act, 1956

contains larger right, which needs determination by a

Civil Court, hence for the larger claims as enshrined

under Section 20, the proceedings need to be

initiated under Section 20 of the Act and the

legislature never contemplated to burden the

Magistrate while exercising jurisdiction under

34

Section 125 Cr.P.C. to determine the claims

contemplated by Act, 1956.

37. There are three more reasons due to which we are

satisfied that the orders passed by the learned

Judicial Magistrate as well as learned Additional

Sessions Judge in the revision was not required to be

interfered with by the High Court in exercise of

jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The reasons

are as follows:-

(i) The application was filed by the mother of

the appellant in the year 2002 claiming

maintenance on her behalf as well as on

behalf of her two sons and appellant, who

was minor at that time. The appellant

being minor at that time when application

was filed on 17.10.2002, there was no

occasion for any pleading on behalf of the

appellant that she was not able to maintain

herself even after attaining the majority.

Section 20 of the Act, 1956 on which

reliance has been placed by learned counsel

35

for the appellant recognising the right of

maintenance of unmarried daughter by a

person subject to the condition when “the

parents or the unmarried daughter, as the

case may be, is unable to maintain

themselves/herself out of their/her own

earnings or other property”. The learned

Additional Sessions Judge noticed the

submission of the respondent that appellant

did not come in the witness box even when

she had attained majority to claim that she

was unable to maintain herself, which

contention has been noted in paragraph 12

of the judgment of the learned Additional

Sessions Judge.

(ii) From the judgment of the learned Judicial

Magistrate, another fact, which is relevant

to be noticed is that applicant Nos. 2 to

4, which included the appellant also had

filed the proceedings under Section 20 of

the Act, 1956 being Suit No. 6 of 2001,

which was dismissed as withdrawn on

17.12.2012.

36

(iii) Another factor, which need to be noticed

that in the counter affidavit filed in this

appeal, there was a specific pleading of

the respondent that a plot of land was

purchased in name of the appellant

admeasuring 214 sq. Yds. In the rejoinder

affidavit filed by the appellant, it has

been admitted that the plot was purchased

on 31.07.2000 from the joint income earned

by mother and father of the appellant,

which had been agreed to be sold in the

year 2012 for a total sale consideration of

Rs.11,77,000/-. In the rejoinder affidavit,

an affidavit of prospective purchaser has

been filed by the appellant, where it is

mentioned that agreement to sell had taken

place between appellant and Arjun on

31.07.2000 for a sale consideration of

Rs.11,77,000/-, out of which appellant had

received Rs.10,89,000 as earnest money.

38. We, thus, accept the submission of the learned

counsel for the appellant that as a preposition of

law, an unmarried Hindu daughter can claim

37

maintenance from her father till she is married

relying on Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, provided

she pleads and proves that she is unable to maintain

herself, for enforcement of which right her

application/suit has to be under Section 20 of Act,

1956.

39. In facts of the present case the ends of justice

be served by giving liberty to the appellant to take

recourse to Section 20(3) of the Act, 1956, if so

advised, for claiming any maintenance against her

father. Subject to liberty as above, the appeal is

dismissed.

......................J.

 ( ASHOK BHUSHAN )

......................J.

 ( R. SUBHASH REDDY )

......................J.

 ( M.R. SHAH )

New Delhi,

September 15, 2020.

38

Generally the appellate court would not interfere with the judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible but at the same time whether the findings recorded by the trial court in support of acquittal are valid or not is a matter which is to be considered with reference to facts of each case and evidence on record.

 Generally the appellate court would not interfere with the judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible but at the same time whether the findings recorded by the trial court in support of acquittal are valid or not is a matter which is to be considered with reference to facts of each case and evidence on record.

Then notice under Section 50 of the NDPS Act was given to the accused and appellant has consented to search the same by the NCB officials. Thereafter the bag was searched and the officers have found 13 Kg. of charas. The charas was divided into two portions of 6½ Kg. each and two packets were made which were marked as ‘X’ and ‘Y’ respectively. From each of these packets, two samples of 25 grams were drawn. The 2 Crl.A.No.688 of 2013 samples drawn from the packet – Mark ‘X’ – were marked as ‘X1’ and ‘X2’ and the samples drawn from packet – Mark ‘Y’ – were marked as ‘Y1’ and ‘Y2’. Thereafter all the four samples were sealed in a polythene bag by heat sealing process and were put in paper envelopes and sealed with paper seals, signed by NCB officials as well as the appellant-accused Jeet Ram. On each sample seal no.6 of NCB was affixed on all the four corners and the bulk charas in packets ‘X’ and ‘Y’ was sealed in paper parcels with six seals each. The seals were handed over to PW-1 and the all the samples and the parcels were signed by NCB officials and accused. Further, in the statement recorded as contemplated under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, the appellant has admitted that for various reasons he was indulged in the trade of charas to increase his income. Thereafter a Panchnama was drawn which was signed by the appellant and he was arrested on 19.06.2001. The two samples of ‘X1’ and ‘Y1’ along with a letter were sent through PW-2 Hayat Singh to Chemical Analyst for analysis, who has vide his report opined that both the samples were of charas. On the said basis, the appellant-accused was charged and challaned for the offence under Section 20 of the NDPS Act. 

acquitted the appellant-accused mainly on the grounds that – the prosecution case was not supported by any independent witness; the prosecution has failed to show that the seized charas was recovered from the dhaba of the appellant-accused and further there is no evidence to show that the appellant-accused was found in possession of the charas, as pleaded by the prosecution; there was non compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; as the samples were handed over to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who himself gave the sample to PW-2 for carrying the same to the Central Laboratory at Delhi and these seals remained with the Director, as such the chances of tampering could not be ruled out and also on the ground that the case of the prosecution was unnatural and improbable.

High Court by reappreciating the evidence on record has come to conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt and also has proved that 13 Kg. of charas was recovered from the possession of the appellant-accused, who was managing the dhaba in question, and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered conviction

Apex court held that  -. Though the ratio laid down that the appellate court would not interfere with the judgment of acquittal only because another view is possible but at the same time whether the findings recorded by the trial court in support of acquittal are valid or not is a matter which is to be considered with reference to facts of each case and evidence on record. - The trial court acquitted the appellant mainly on the ground that prosecution case was not supported by independent witnesses; conscious possession was not proved; non-compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; proper procedure was not followed in sending the samples for examination and the case of the prosecution was unnatural and improbable-Section 50 of the NDPS Act is applicable only in the case of personal search, as such, there is no basis for the findings recorded by the trial court that there was non-compliance of provision under Section 50 of the NDPS Act. Even with regard to the finding of the trial court that the case of the prosecution was not supported by independent witnesses, it is clear from the evidence on record that the incident had happened at about 10:30 p.m. in a dhaba which is away from the village site and all other persons who are found in the dhaba were the servants of the accused. It is also clear from the evidence on record that Suresh Kumar and Attar Singh examined on behalf of the appellant are closely related to the accused, as such, they could not be said to be independent witnesses. - The case of the prosecution was found to be unnatural and improbable by the trial court only on the ground that 13 Kg. of charas was lying in open in a gunny bag. The trial court found that it is not believable that any person would keep such a huge quantity of charas in open condition. - It is clear from the evidence of prosecution witnesses that the officials of NCB got information that trafficking of charas was going on in the area in question.as rightly held by the High Court, that the trial court totally lost sight of the fact that on 19.06.2001 JMIC, Theog had also appended his signatures on the samples as well as bulk parcels and, therefore, there was no chance of tampering of the samples. Further, there was no such suggestion of tampering either put to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal or to PW-2 Hayat Singh.For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the clear view that the view taken by the trial court was not at all possible, having regard to the evidence on record and findings which are erroneously recorded contrary to evidence on record were rightly set aside by the High Court.

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

REPORTABLE

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.688 OF 2013

Jeet Ram …..Appellant

Versus

The Narcotics Control Bureau, Chandigarh …..Respondent

J U D G M E N T

R. Subhash Reddy, J.

1. This appeal is filed by the sole accused, in Sessions Trial No.7-

5/2002 of 2001 on the file of Sessions Judge, Shimla, aggrieved by the

judgment of conviction dated 11.12.2012 and further order of sentencing

the appellant, dated 31.12.2012, passed by the High Court of Himachal

Pradesh, Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.493 of 2003.

2. The appellant-accused was tried for a charge punishable under

Section 20 of Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances Act, 1985

(for short, ‘NDPS Act’). The Sessions Judge, Shimla by judgment dated

30.06.2003 acquitted the accused by recording a finding that the case of

prosecution was not free from doubt and there were many infirmities in

the case of the prosecution to hold that the accused was found to be in

possession of charas, as alleged by the prosecution.

1

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

3. The case as put forth by the prosecution, briefly stated, is as

under:

On 18.06.2001 the Intelligence Officer in the Narcotics Control

Bureau (NCB), Chandigarh, by name – R.P. Singh (PW-4) was

proceeding to Theog from Shimla. He was travelling along with PW-3 –

O.P. Bhatt and other officials. In the transit they stopped at the dhaba to

have meals which was near the Nangala Devi Temple. When they

ordered meals and tea and were waiting for the food to be served, the

Intelligence Officer could smell the odour of charas. In the meanwhile,

the Zonal Director of NCB, Chandigarh, by name – Rakesh Goyal, who

was examined as PW-1 also reached the said dhaba. Then they have

questioned the appellant-accused about the smell of charas and on such

questioning he became nervous. As such there was increase of

suspicion of the NCB officials. On asking the owner of the dhaba, he

disclosed his name to be Jeet Ram and on further questioning he tried

to run away. Then he was apprehended and taken to the counter of the

dhaba. Just below the counter of the dhaba a gunny bag was found.

When asked, appellant has replied – there is nothing in it. Then notice

under Section 50 of the NDPS Act was given to the accused and

appellant has consented to search the same by the NCB officials.

Thereafter the bag was searched and the officers have found 13 Kg. of

charas. The charas was divided into two portions of 6½ Kg. each and

two packets were made which were marked as ‘X’ and ‘Y’ respectively.

From each of these packets, two samples of 25 grams were drawn. The

2

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

samples drawn from the packet – Mark ‘X’ – were marked as ‘X1’ and

‘X2’ and the samples drawn from packet – Mark ‘Y’ – were marked as

‘Y1’ and ‘Y2’. Thereafter all the four samples were sealed in a polythene

bag by heat sealing process and were put in paper envelopes and

sealed with paper seals, signed by NCB officials as well as the

appellant-accused Jeet Ram. On each sample seal no.6 of NCB was

affixed on all the four corners and the bulk charas in packets ‘X’ and ‘Y’

was sealed in paper parcels with six seals each. The seals were

handed over to PW-1 and the all the samples and the parcels were

signed by NCB officials and accused. Further, in the statement recorded

as contemplated under Section 67 of the NDPS Act, the appellant has

admitted that for various reasons he was indulged in the trade of charas

to increase his income. Thereafter a Panchnama was drawn which was

signed by the appellant and he was arrested on 19.06.2001. The two

samples of ‘X1’ and ‘Y1’ along with a letter were sent through PW-2

Hayat Singh to Chemical Analyst for analysis, who has vide his report

opined that both the samples were of charas. On the said basis, the

appellant-accused was charged and challaned for the offence under

Section 20 of the NDPS Act.

4. When the charge is denied by the appellant-accused, he was tried

for the aforesaid offence before the Sessions Judge, Shimla. To prove

the guilt of the appellant, the prosecution has examined four witnesses

in all, in support of its case. On behalf of the accused oral evidence was

let in to show that the dhaba in question was not being run by him and

3

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

he was employed as a priest in the nearby temple. After considering the

oral and documentary evidence on record, the trial court by judgment

dated 30.06.2003 acquitted the appellant-accused mainly on the

grounds that – the prosecution case was not supported by any

independent witness; the prosecution has failed to show that the seized

charas was recovered from the dhaba of the appellant-accused and

further there is no evidence to show that the appellant-accused was

found in possession of the charas, as pleaded by the prosecution; there

was non compliance of Section 50 of the NDPS Act; as the samples

were handed over to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who himself gave the sample

to PW-2 for carrying the same to the Central Laboratory at Delhi and

these seals remained with the Director, as such the chances of

tampering could not be ruled out and also on the ground that the case of

the prosecution was unnatural and improbable. 5. Aggrieved by

the judgment of the trial court, the NCB, Chandigarh has filed appeal as

contemplated under Section 36-B of the NDPS Act read with Section

378 of the Code of Criminal Procedure before the High Court of

Himachal Pradesh at Shimla in Criminal Appeal No.493 of 2003. The

High Court by reappreciating the evidence on record has come to

conclusion that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable

doubt and also has proved that 13 Kg. of charas was recovered from the

possession of the appellant-accused, who was managing the dhaba in

question, and set aside the judgment of the trial court and ordered

conviction of the appellant for offence punishable under Section 20 of

4

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

the NDPS Act. By further hearing the appellant, order dated 31.12.2012

was passed sentencing the appellant-accused to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for 15 years and to pay fine of Rs.2,00,000/- and in

default, to undergo further imprisonment of one year. Aggrieved by the

conviction recorded and sentence imposed by the High Court, this

appeal is filed by the accused.

6. We have heard Sri Purushottam Sharma Tripathi, learned counsel

for the appellant and Sri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional Solicitor

General appearing for the respondent-NCB.

7. It is mainly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that

the well considered judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant

from the charge, is reversed by the High Court without recording cogent

reasons. It is submitted that having regard to evidence on record, the

view taken by the trial court was possible view, and even assuming that

other view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with the judgment

of the trial court. The learned counsel, in support of this argument, has

placed reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of Union of

India v. Bal Mukund & Ors.1

; Francis Stanly v. Intelligence Officer,

Narcotic Control Bureau, Thiruvananthapuram2

; and Rangaiah v.

State of Karnataka3

. Further it was contended that the story of the

prosecution is not supported by independent witnesses though it is clear

from the evidence on record that the houses in the village were only at a

1 (2009) 12 SCC 161

2 (2006) 13 SCC 210

3 (2008) 16 SCC 737

5

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

distance of 500 meters from the place of dhaba. He submitted that the

High Court has committed error in relying on the testimony of official

witnesses to hold the appellant-accused guilty of the charge. While

pleading that it is not safe to rely on the testimony of official witnesses,

in absence of any independent witness, learned counsel has placed

reliance on the judgments of this Court in the case of Jagdish v. State

of M.P.4 and Gyan Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P.5

. It is also the

submission of the learned counsel that there is no acceptable evidence

on record to hold that appellant-accused was in exclusive and conscious

possession of the seized material /charas as much as same was seized

from the gunny bag lying near the counter of the dhaba. In support of

the said plea, the learned counsel relied upon the judgments of this

Court in the case of Gopal v. State of M.P.6 and State of Punjab v.

Balkar Singh & Anr.7

. Further it is also stated that search notice issued

to the appellant was not in accordance with Section 50 of the NDPS Act

and placed reliance on the judgment of this Court in the case of K.

Mohanan v. State of Kerala8

. Further pleading that the testimony of the

defence witness was not considered in proper perspective by the High

Court, the learned counsel has submitted that it is a fit case to set aside

the judgment of the High Court and acquit the appellant from the charge

framed. Lastly it is contended by the learned counsel that in any event

the sentence of 15 years’ rigorous imprisonment with fine of

4 (2003) 9 SCC 159

5 1995 Supp. (4) 658

6 (2002) 9 SCC 595

7 (2004) 3 SCC 582

8 (2000) 10 SCC 222

6

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

Rs.2,00,000/- is excessive and disproportionate to the gravity of the

charge having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the

age of the appellant. Further it is submitted that he is a pujari in the

temple, situated near the dhaba.

8. On the other hand, it is argued by Sri Aman Lekhi, learned

Additional Solicitor General appearing for the respondent-NCB, that the

findings recorded by the trial court are erroneous and contrary to

evidence on record, as such, it is always open to the High Court in

appeal to reappreciate the evidence and set aside such erroneous view

taken by the trial court. It is submitted that though prosecution has

proved its case beyond reasonable doubt, on mere surmises and

presumptions the trial court has found that the case of the prosecution is

unnatural and same is correctly overturned by the High Court. Further it

is submitted that the incident had happened at about 10:30 p.m. at the

dhaba which is away from the actual village site, as such, merely

because independent witnesses were not examined, same by itself is no

ground to reject the case of the prosecution. Further it is submitted that

it is admitted position that dhaba was being run by his wife, which is

near to the temple. As the appellant was on the counter during the

relevant time, as such, it cannot be said that the seized material of

charas was not seized from his conscious possession. To support

various contentions learned Additional Solicitor General relied on the

several judgments of this Court.

7

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

o To support his contention that appellate courts have full powers to

review the evidence, upon which order of acquittal is founded and

come to their own conclusion, he relied on the following judgments :

1. Sanwat Singh & Ors. v. State of Rajasthan9

2. Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra10

3. Vinod Kumar v. State of Haryana11

o In support of his contention that merely because independent

witnesses are not examined, same is no ground to reject the case

of the prosecution, learned Additional Solicitor General has relied

on the following judgments of this Court :

1. Dharampal Singh v. State of Punjab12

2. Baldev Singh v. State of Haryana13

o To support his argument that the charas was seized from the

conscious possession of the appellant, the learned ASG has placed

reliance on the following judgments of this Court :

1. Madan Lal & Anr. v. State of H.P.14

2. Mohan Lal v. State of Rajasthan15

9 (1961) 3 SCR 120

10 (1972) 1 SCC 107

11 (2015) 3 SCC 138

12 (2010) 9 SCC 608

13 (2015) 17 SCC 554

14 (2003) 7 SCC 465

15 (2015) 6 SCC 222

8

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

Further, it is submitted that having regard to the nature of offence which

has large repercussions on the society, sentence imposed does not

warrant any interference. Hence, prayed for dismissal of the appeal.

9. Having heard the learned counsel on both sides and on perusal of

the record, we do not find any substance in any of the contentions

advanced by the learned counsel for the appellant, except the

submission on the quantum of sentence.

10. It is mainly contended by learned counsel for the appellant that

the High Court / appellate Court was not justified in interfering with the

judgment of acquittal passed by the trial court merely because another

view is possible. As noted earlier, in support of his argument that merely

because another view is possible, same is no ground to interfere with

the judgment of acquittal by the appellate court, the learned counsel has

relied on judgments of this Court in the case of Bal Mukund1

; Francis

Stanly2

; and Rangaiah3

. To counter the said submission, the learned

Additional Solicitor General Sri Aman Lekhi has submitted that it is

always open to the appellate court to review the evidence on record

upon which order of acquittal is founded and if it comes to conclusion

that the order passed by the trial court is erroneous and unreasonable, it

is always open for the appellate court to interfere with the order of

acquittal. It is contended that the view taken by the trial court is not a

possible view having regard to evidence on record. Such erroneous

finding can be corrected by the appellate court. In support of his

argument, the learned Additional Solicitor General has placed reliance

9

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

on the judgments of this Court in the case of Sanwat Singh9

;

Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad10 and Vinod Kumar11. Though the

ratio laid down in the judgments relied on by the learned counsel for the

appellant is that the appellate court would not interfere with the judgment

of acquittal only because another view is possible but at the same time

whether the findings recorded by the trial court in support of acquittal are

valid or not is a matter which is to be considered with reference to facts

of each case and evidence on record. On close scrutiny of the

depositions of the witnesses examined on behalf of the prosecution as

well as on behalf of the accused, we are of the view that the findings

recorded by the trial court are contrary to evidence on record and view

taken by the trial court was not possible at all, as such the High Court

rightly interfered with the same and recorded its own findings to convict

the appellant. The trial court acquitted the appellant mainly on the

ground that prosecution case was not supported by independent

witnesses; conscious possession was not proved; non-compliance of

Section 50 of the NDPS Act; proper procedure was not followed in

sending the samples for examination and the case of the prosecution

was unnatural and improbable. As rightly held by the High Court, this

Court in the case of State of H.P. v. Pawan Kumar16 has held that

Section 50 of the NDPS Act is applicable only in the case of personal

search, as such, there is no basis for the findings recorded by the trial

court that there was non-compliance of provision under Section 50 of the

16 (2005) 4 SCC 350

10

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

NDPS Act. Even with regard to the finding of the trial court that the case

of the prosecution was not supported by independent witnesses, it is

clear from the evidence on record that the incident had happened at

about 10:30 p.m. in a dhaba which is away from the village site and all

other persons who are found in the dhaba were the servants of the

accused. It is also clear from the evidence on record that Suresh Kumar

and Attar Singh examined on behalf of the appellant are closely related

to the accused, as such, they could not be said to be independent

witnesses. Pappu was the only other person who is none other than the

servant of the dhaba and we cannot expect such a person to be a

witness against his own master. Dealing with the issue of conscious

possession, it is to be noticed that dhaba is constructed on the land

which belongs to Kaushalya Devi who is none other than the wife of the

accused. Further in deposition PW-4 has stated that when the accused

was questioned as to who was the owner of the dhaba, he claimed to be

the owner. The case of the prosecution was found to be unnatural and

improbable by the trial court only on the ground that 13 Kg. of charas

was lying in open in a gunny bag. The trial court found that it is not

believable that any person would keep such a huge quantity of charas in

open condition. It is clear from the evidence of prosecution witnesses

that the officials of NCB got information that trafficking of charas was

going on in the area in question. Two police parties had left for Theog –

one party headed by PW-4 R.P. Singh started earlier and second party

headed by PW-1 Rakesh Goyal left a little later from Shimla. Thus the

11

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

depositions of PW-4 R.P. Singh; PW-3 O.P. Bhat; PW-1 Rakesh Goyal

and PW-2 Hayat Singh are consistent and trustworthy and cannot be

said to be unnatural and improbable. Further it is also to be noted that

the trial court has held that seal with which samples and remaining bulk

of charas was sealed was handed over to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal who

himself gave the sample to PW-2 for carrying to Central Laboratory at

Delhi and since the seals remained with the Director, the chances of

tampering could not be ruled out. In this regard, it is to be noticed, as

rightly held by the High Court, that the trial court totally lost sight of the

fact that on 19.06.2001 JMIC, Theog had also appended his signatures

on the samples as well as bulk parcels and, therefore, there was no

chance of tampering of the samples. Further, there was no such

suggestion of tampering either put to PW-1 Rakesh Goyal or to PW-2

Hayat Singh.

11. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the clear view that the view

taken by the trial court was not at all possible, having regard to the

evidence on record and findings which are erroneously recorded

contrary to evidence on record were rightly set aside by the High Court.

As submitted by the learned Additional Solicitor General appearing for

the prosecution, it is always open to the appellate court to reappreciate

the evidence, on which the order of acquittal is founded, and appellate

courts are vested with the powers to review and come to their own

conclusion. The judgments in the case of Sanwat Singh9

;

Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad10 and Vinod Kumar11 also support

12

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

the case of the respondent. It is relevant to refer to paragraphs 17 and

18 of the judgment in the case of Vinod Kumar11 which read as under :

“17. Before we dwell upon the factual score whether the

prosecution has proven the case to warrant a conviction,

we think it apt to recapitulate the principles relating to

the jurisdiction of the High Court while deciding the

appeal against acquittal. In this context, reproducing a

passage from Jadunath Singh v. State of U.P. [(1971) 3

SCC 577 : 1971 SCC (Cri) 726] would be profitable:

(SCC p. 582, para 22)

“22. This Court has consistently taken the view that

in an appeal against acquittal the High Court has

full power to review at large all the evidence and to

reach the conclusion that upon that evidence the

order of acquittal should be reversed. This power of

the appellate court in an appeal against acquittal

was formulated by the Judicial Committee of the

Privy Council in Sheo Swarup v. King

Emperor [(1933-34) 61 IA 398 : (1934) 40 LW 436 :

AIR 1934 PC 227 (2)] and Nur Mohammed v. King

Emperor [(1945) 58 LW 481 : AIR 1945 PC 151] .

These two decisions have been consistently

referred to in the judgments of this Court as laying

down the true scope of the power of an appellate

court in hearing criminal appeals: see Surajpal

Singh v. State [AIR 1952 SC 52 : 1952 Cri LJ 331]

and Sanwat Singh v. State of Rajasthan [AIR 1961

SC 715 : (1961) 1 Cri LJ 766] .”

Similar view has been expressed in Damodarprasad

Chandrikaprasad v. State of Maharashtra [(1972) 1 SCC

107 : 1972 SCC (Cri) 110] , Shivaji Sahabrao

Bobade v. State of Maharashtra [(1973) 2 SCC 793 :

1973 SCC (Cri) 1033] , State of Karnataka v. K.

Gopalakrishna [(2005) 9 SCC 291 : 2005 SCC (Cri)

1237], Anil Kumar v. State of U.P. [(2004) 13 SCC 257 :

2005 SCC (Cri) 178] , Girja Prasad v. State of

M.P. [(2007) 7 SCC 625 : (2007) 3 SCC (Cri) 475]

and S. Ganesan v. Rama Raghuraman [(2011) 2 SCC

83 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 607] .

18. In this regard, we may fruitfully remind ourselves the

principles culled out in Chandrappa v. State of

13

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

Karnataka [(2007) 4 SCC 415 : (2007) 2 SCC (Cri)

325] : (SCC p. 432, para 42)

“42. From the above decisions, in our considered

view, the following general principles regarding

powers of the appellate court while dealing with an

appeal against an order of acquittal emerge:

(1) An appellate court has full power to review,

reappreciate and reconsider the evidence upon

which the order of acquittal is founded.

(2) The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 puts no

limitation, restriction or condition on exercise of

such power and an appellate court on the evidence

before it may reach its own conclusion, both on

questions of fact and of law.

(3) Various expressions, such as, ‘substantial and

compelling reasons’, ‘good and sufficient grounds’,

‘very strong circumstances’, ‘distorted conclusions’,

‘glaring mistakes’, etc. are not intended to curtail

extensive powers of an appellate court in an appeal

against acquittal. Such phraseologies are more in

the nature of ‘flourishes of language’ to emphasise

the reluctance of an appellate court to interfere with

acquittal than to curtail the power of the court to

review the evidence and to come to its own

conclusion.

(4) An appellate court, however, must bear in mind

that in case of acquittal, there is double

presumption in favour of the accused. Firstly, the

presumption of innocence is available to him under

the fundamental principle of criminal jurisprudence

that every person shall be presumed to be innocent

unless he is proved guilty by a competent court of

law. Secondly, the accused having secured his

acquittal, the presumption of his innocence is

further reinforced, reaffirmed and strengthened by

the trial court.

(5) If two reasonable conclusions are possible on

the basis of the evidence on record, the appellate

court should not disturb the finding of acquittal

recorded by the trial court.”

14

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

For the aforesaid reasons, we reject the submission made by the

learned counsel for the appellant. Even with regard to the plea of the

appellant that the evidence on record on behalf of the prosecution is not

sufficient enough to hold that the appellant-accused was in conscious

possession of the seized material, also cannot be accepted. It is clear

from the evidence on record that the appellant was on the counter of the

dhaba which was constructed on the land owned by his wife near the

temple and the charas was found in the counter of the dhaba in a gunny

bag. The facts of the case show that accused not only had direct

physical control over charas, he had the knowledge of its presence and

character. As rightly contended by Sri Aman Lekhi, learned Additional

Solicitor General in the case of Mohan Lal15 this Court had held that a

functional and flexible approach in defining and understanding

possession as a concept has to be adopted and the word has to be

understood keeping in mind the purpose and object of the enactment. In

the statement recorded under Section 313 of Code of Criminal

Procedure, though the appellant has referred to Brij Lal and Mantu in

support of a version, contrary to that presented by prosecution but he

has not chosen to examine either Brij Lal or Mantu. No defence witness

has deposed to the chain of events, as has been stated by the appellant

in the statement under Section 313, Cr.PC. It is also fairly well settled

that where accused offers false answers in examination under Section

313 Cr.PC, same also can be used against him. Further onus was on

the appellant to explain the possession and in absence of the same

15

Crl.A.No.688 of 2013

being discharged, presumption under Section 54 of the NDPS Act also

will kick in.

12. For the aforesaid reasons, we are of the view that the judgment of

the High Court does not suffer from any infirmity so as to interfere with

the judgment of conviction.

13. At the same time we find force in the submission of the learned

counsel for the appellant in sentencing the appellant for 15 years’

rigorous imprisonment with a fine of Rs.2,00,000/-. Having regard to

peculiar facts and circumstances of the case and in view of the fact that

the incident occurred in the year 2001 and as the appellant claimed to

be a priest in the temple, who is now aged about 65 years, we deem it

appropriate that it is a fit case to modify the sentence imposed on the

appellant. Accordingly, the sentence awarded on the appellant is

reduced to a period of 10 (ten) years, while maintaining the conviction

and the penalty as imposed by the High Court. The order of sentence

dated 31.12.2012 passed by the High Court stands modified. The

appeal is partly allowed to the extent indicated above.

………….………………………………...J.

[ASHOK BHUSHAN]

….…………………………………………J.

[R. SUBHASH REDDY]

….…………………………………………J.

[M.R. SHAH]

New Delhi.

September 15, 2020.

16

Saturday, September 12, 2020

the internecine quarrel between the Corporation and the revenue authorities can not be considered. The appellant cannot be faulted with in the entire episode and needs to be compensated adequately for what became a dead investment by him. The cancellation of the auction sale was not at the behest of the Corporation but was a unilateral act of the State Authorities. The bid amount was never transferred to the Corporation and remained with the revenue authorities. Therefore, the liability for compensating the appellant will as also rest with the revenue authorities alone

the internecine quarrel between the Corporation and the revenue authorities can not be considered. The appellant cannot be faulted with in the entire episode and needs to be compensated adequately for what became a dead investment by him. The cancellation of the auction sale was not at the behest of the Corporation but was a unilateral act of the State Authorities. The bid amount was never transferred to the Corporation and remained with the revenue authorities. Therefore, the liability for compensating the appellant will as also rest with the revenue authorities alone. -

The auction was held as far as back on 12.06.2006, the deposit was made by the appellant in due time, the act of cancellation was not attributable to the appellant in any manner. The Corporation had approved the sale. In the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do not consider that it will be adequate compensation for the appellant to grant him 5% interest on his dues under the Rules. If the Rules have not been complied with by the State Authorities themselves, we see no reason that in the special facts and circumstances of the case, we should not award an interest of 10% on the amount deposited by the appellant. 

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2068 OF 2020

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.20082 of 2017)

ASHOK KUMAR APPELLANT(S)

 VERSUS

STATE OF U.P & ORS. RESPONDENT(S)

WITH

CIVIL APPEAL NO.2069 OF 2020

(Arising out of SLP(Civil) No.16053 of 2017)

O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appellant is aggrieved by the orders of the

High Court declining to interfere with the decision of

the respondent corporation to withdraw the recovery

certificate under Section 32G of the State Financial

Corporation Act, 1951 (hereinafter referred to as "the

SFC Act") against respondent no.8, after the appellant had

been declared the highest bidder at the auction.

The unit of respondent no.8 was put to auction as

it defaulted in repayment of loan to the respondent

Corporation. It issued a notice under Section 29 of SFC

Act on 06.11.1997. The recovery certificate, consequent

1

to the requisition, was then issued on 11.12.2000. The

appellant was the highest bidder in the auction sale on

12.06.2006 for a sum of Rs.20,20,000/-. Subsequently, on

26.06.2006 the auction sale was approved by the

respondent Corporation. On 04.07.2006, one Karnaveer

Singh Sirohi stepped in to offer 24 lakhs for the

property. The state authorities then decided to cancel

the auction on 11.07.2006 to hold fresh auction.

Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.39537/2006

filed by the appellant, challenging the cancellation of

auction sale was dismissed in default on 17.01.2013. On

13.03.2013, the Corporation, in view of the delay being

caused in the recovery proceedings, decided to proceed

under Section 29 of the SFC Act. On 14.03.2013, the writ

petition was restored. On 13.08.2013, the recovery

certificate was returned.

The appellant also challenged the decision of the

respondent Corporation resorting to Section 29 of the SFC

Act in Civil Miscellaneous Writ Petition No.65313 of

2013. The High Court, in the former writ petition

directed refund of the deposit made by the appellant by

the Revenue Authorities/Corporation within four weeks.

The latter writ petition was also dismissed on

29.11.2013.

We have heard counsel for the parties at length.

Limited notice was issued by us on 24.07.2017 confined to

the issue for grant of interest on the refund directed by

2

the High Court.

Learned counsel for the appellant submits that he

has been kept deprived of the benefits of the auction for

no fault of his. The bid amount became a dead investment

with no returns and therefore he needs to be compensated

adequately by grant of 18% interest.

Learned counsel for the Corporation submits that

the auction price having been approved by it, they are

not at fault in any manner and should not be saddled with

any interest. Moreover, the amount deposited by the

appellant with the revenue authorities was never

forwarded to the Corporation.

Learned counsel for the State sought to persuade us

that the decision to cancel the auction sale was bona

fide in view of the higher offer made.

In the limited nature of the order to be passed by

us, we are not concerned with the internecine quarrel

between the Corporation and the revenue authorities. The

appellant cannot be faulted with in the entire episode

and needs to be compensated adequately for what became a

dead investment by him.

The cancellation of the auction sale was not at the

behest of the Corporation but was a unilateral act of the

State Authorities. The bid amount was never transferred

to the Corporation and remained with the revenue

authorities. Therefore, the liability for compensating

the appellant will as also rest with the revenue

3

authorities alone.

Learned counsel for the State has invited our

attention to Rule 285-L of the U.P. Zamindari Abolition

and Land Reforms Rules, 1952 governing the procedure of

the certificate proceedings and submits that the

appellant is entitled at best to an interest of 5% on the

amount deposited by him.

The auction was held as far as back on 12.06.2006,

the deposit was made by the appellant in due time, the

act of cancellation was not attributable to the appellant

in any manner. The Corporation had approved the sale. In

the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case, we do

not consider that it will be adequate compensation for

the appellant to grant him 5% interest on his dues under

the Rules. If the Rules have not been complied with by

the State Authorities themselves, we see no reason that

in the special facts and circumstances of the case, we

should not award an interest of 10% on the amount

deposited by the appellant.

It is, therefore, directed that the appellant shall

be refunded the sum of Rs.20,20,000/- (Rupees Twenty

Lakhs Twenty Thousand Only) by the State Revenue

Authorities with interest at the rate of 10% p.a. from

the date of deposit till the date of actual refund which

we direct to be complied with within a period of six

weeks from today.

4

The appeals are allowed.

...................J.

 (NAVIN SINAH)

...................J.

 (KRISHNA MURARI)

New Delhi;

March 06, 2020

5

ITEM NO.44 COURT NO.14 SECTION XI

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s).20082/2017

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 29-11-2013

in WC No.65313/2013 passed by the High Court Of Judicature At

Allahabad)

ASHOK KUMAR Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

STATE OF U.P & ORS. Respondent(s)

(IA No. 46116/2017 - PERMISSION TO FILE ADDITIONAL

DOCUMENTS/FACTS/ANNEXURES)

WITH

SLP(C) No. 16053/2017 (XI)

Date : 06-03-2020 These matters were called on for hearing today.

CORAM : HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE NAVIN SINHA

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE KRISHNA MURARI

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ali Chaudhary, Adv.

Mr. Ranjay Dubey, Adv.

Mr. Krishna Kumar Singh, AOR


For Respondent(s) Mr. Tanmaya Agarwal, AOR

R-1 to 5 Mr. Chandra Shekhar Suman, Adv.

Mr. Wrick Chatterjee, Adv.

R-6 Mr. Shrish Kumar Misra, AOR

Ms. Deepika Mishra, Adv.

Mr. Ajay Kumar, Adv.

Mr. Bimlesh Pandey, Adv.


 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appeals are allowed in terms of the signed order. Pending

application, if any, stands disposed of.

(ARJUN BISHT) (DIPTI KHURANA)

COURT MASTER (SH) COURT MASTER (NSH)

[Signed order is placed on the file]

6

Injunction - When the property is in a dilapidated condition and when it is not in use for the purpose of running a school for which it was let out. The manner in which the appellant came into possession looses relevance. Hence, without going into the merits of the rival contentions of the parties as to the abandonment, since the respondent - N.D.M.C. is no longer running the school, we deem it appropriate to set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the First Appellate Court. Taking note of the fact that the appellants are in possession of the property, the injunction as granted shall stand affirmed and the appellants would be entitled to retain the property without interference.

Injunction - When the property is in a dilapidated condition and when it is not in use for the purpose of running a school for which it was let out. The manner in which the appellant came into possession looses relevance. Hence, without going into the merits of the rival contentions of the parties as to the abandonment, since the respondent - N.D.M.C. is no longer running the school, we deem it appropriate to set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore the judgment of the First Appellate Court. Taking note of the fact that the appellants are in possession of the property, the injunction as granted shall stand affirmed and the appellants would be entitled to retain the property without interference.

1

 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

 CIVIL APPEAL NO.1579 OF 2020

 (@ SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 1480 OF 2017)

AMRIT MEHTA & ORS. ...APPELLANT(S)

 VERSUS

NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION ...RESPONDENT(S)

O R D E R

Leave granted.

2. Being aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 26.09.2016

passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi in Regular Second

Appeal No. 101 of 2012 in and by which the High Court has allowed

the Second Appeal thereby dismissing the suit filed by the

appellants for injunction against the respondent-North Delhi

Municipal Corporation, the above appeal is filed.

3. The respondent-NDMC has taken the suit property from its

erstwhile owner on rent and was running a school. The respondent

was the tenant in the suit property at monthly rent of Rs.97.96

from the earlier owner Satish Chandra Mathur.

4. The appellants claimed to be owners of the property having

purchased the same by the sale deed dated 17.04.1997. According to

the appellants, the respondent has shifted the school from the said

premises long ago and no longer running the school in the suit

premises. According to the appellants, since the respondent did not

require the premises and did not continue in possession, the

appellants came in possession of the property (which is disputed by

2

NDMC contending that the appellants have taken possession

forcefully). It is claimed by the appellants that the respondent

has failed to pay the rent from 01.05.1997 to 31.08.1997 and began

to interfere with the possession. After issuing legal notice to

the respondent - NDMC on 27.01.1998, the appellants have filed the

suit for permanent injunction restraining NDMC not to interfere

with their possession and for recovery of arrears of rent of

Rs.391.84. The respondent-N.D.M.C. appeared and contested the suit.

5. Upon consideration of the oral and documentary evidence

adduced by the parties, the Trial Court vide order dated 31.10.2011

partly decreed the suit and held that the appellants are entitled

to recovery of rent of Rs.391.84 only from the respondent. Insofar

as the prayer for relief of permanent injunction, the Trial Court

held that the appellants are not entitled for the relief of

permanent injunction as they were required to file the suit for

eviction.

6. Being aggrieved, the appellants had filed an appeal before the

First Appellate Court. The First Appellate Court vide judgment

dated 16.02.2012 allowed the appeal filed by the appellants and

held that the appellants are entitled to the permanent injunction

also. The First Appellate Court held that the photographs of the

suit premises showed that the property was not in a good condition.

The First Appellate Court further held that they were in possession

of the premises since 1997. Referring to the evidence of PW-1, the

First Appellate Court held that the keys of the suit premises

available with the watchmen of the respondent were never handed

over to the appellants. On those findings, the First Appellate

3

Court reversed the judgment of the Trial Court and granted relief

of permanent injunction also in addition to the recovery of rent.

Being aggrieved, the respondent-N.D.M.C filed the Second Appeal

before the High Court which came to be allowed by the impugned

judgment.

7. The High Court held that merely because of the suit premises

are in dilapidated state and not used would not mean that the

tenancy of the suit premises would be abandoned.

8. The High Court further held that mere non user of the premises

would not amount to abandonment of the premises, inter alia, on

various findings, the High Court set aside the judgment of the

First Appellate Court and restored the judgment of the Trial Court

holding that the appellants are entitled only for recovery of Rs.

391.84 towards arrears of rent. Being aggrieved, the appellants

have preferred this appeal.

9. We have heard Mr. Ravinder Sethi, learned senior counsel

appearing on behalf of the appellants as well as Mr. Ajay Bansal,

learned counsel appearing on behalf of the respondent-N.D.M.C. and

perused the impugned judgment and materials on record.

10. There is no dispute that the respondent-N.D.M.C came in

possession as the tenant under the erstwhile owner Satish Chandra

Mathur long ago on the monthly rent of Rs.97.96. It is also not in

dispute that Satish Chandra Mathur had sold the property to the

appellants by Sale Deed dated 17.04.1997. The appellants state

that the tenancy of respondent-N.D.M.C was attorned by the previous

owner by its letter dated 01.05.1997, which is strongly disputed by

the learned counsel for the respondent-N.D.M.C.

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11. Having regard to the photographs and other evidence

produced by the parties, the First Appellate Court rightly held

that the property is in a dilapidated condition and it cannot be

in dispute that it is not in use for the purpose for which it was

let out. The manner in which the appellant came into possession

looses relevance. Hence, without going into the merits of the rival

contentions of the parties as to the abandonment, since the

respondent - N.D.M.C. is no longer running the school, we deem it

appropriate to set aside the judgment of the High Court and restore

the judgment of the First Appellate Court. Taking note of the fact

that the appellants are in possession of the property, the

injunction as granted shall stand affirmed and the appellants would

be entitled to retain the property without interference. Insofar as

relief of decree for recovery of rent, in the facts and

circumstances of the case, we hold that the appellants shall not

seek to recover the amount ordered by the Trial Court nor shall

there be any monetary claim against each other.

12. The appeal is, accordingly, disposed of. There shall be

no order as to costs.

………………………………………………….J.

[R. BANUMATHI]

………………………………………………..J.

[S. ABDUL NAZEER]

NEW DELHI ………………………………………………...J.

13TH FEBRUARY, 2020 [A.S. BOPANNA]

5

ITEM NO.13 COURT NO.5 SECTION XIV

 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A

 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (C) No(s). 1480/2017

(Arising out of impugned final judgment and order dated 26-09-2016

in RSA No. 101/2012 passed by the High Court Of Delhi At New Delhi)

AMRIT MEHTA & ORS. Petitioner(s)

 VERSUS

NORTH DELHI MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Respondent(s)

Date : 13-02-2020 This petition was called on for hearing today.

CORAM :

 HON'BLE MRS. JUSTICE R. BANUMATHI

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. ABDUL NAZEER

 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE A.S. BOPANNA

For Petitioner(s) Mr. Ravinder Sethi,Sr.Adv.

Mr. Puneet Sharma, AOR


For Respondent(s) Mr. Ajay Bansal,Adv.

Mr. Madan Mohan,Adv.

Ms. Archana Sharma,Adv.

Mr. B.C. Santosh Kumar,Adv.

Mr. Lokendra Kumar,Adv.

Mr. Praveen Swarup, AOR

Smt. Veena Bansal,Adv.


 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following

 O R D E R

Leave granted.

The appeal is disposed of in terms of the signed order.

Pending application(s), if any, shall also stand disposed

of.

(MADHU BALA) (BEENA JOLLY)

AR-CUM-PS BRANCH OFFICER

(Signed order is placed on the file)