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Sunday, August 23, 2020

Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib Act 1956 the notification issued by the State Government on 21 June 2019 was contrary to the provisions of Section 6 (1) (viii) of the Nanded Act 1956. We direct that: (i) Inquiry Application No. 44 of 2019 and Inquiry Application No. 114 of 2019 pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nanded shall be concluded and disposed of in accordance with law within a period of three months from the date of this judgment; (ii) The statutory authority to make a nomination under Section 6(1)(viii) is entrusted to the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. The Diwan signifies the entire body of members, as explained in the text of the judgment; (iii) The process of making the nomination under the provisions of Section 6(1)(viii), as explained above, shall be initiated and completed within a period 25 of three months from the date of this judgment. The Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nanded shall fix a date for the meeting of the Diwan and shall act as an observer at the meeting convened for finalising the nominations. The Assistant Charity Commissioner is entrusted with the authority to determine the members borne on the role of members of the Diwan who are entitled to vote at the ensuing meeting in accordance with the above directions. The Assistant Charity Commissioner is at liberty to adopt appropriate modalities for holding a meeting, including by way of a virtual meeting in view of the outbreak of Covid-19; and (iv) If any further directions of a consequential nature are necessary to implement this judgment, the Assistant Charity Commissioner will be at liberty to move the Aurangabad bench of the Bombay High Court for directions. 33 The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs. 34 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.




1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Civil Appeal No. 2964 of 2020
Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7217 of 2020
Sardar Bahginder Singh ...Appellant
s/o Gurucharan Singh
 Versus
Sardar Manjieeth Singh Jagan Singh and Ors. ...Respondents
With
Civil Appeal No. 2966 of 2020
Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7227 of 2020
And With
Civil Appeal No. 2965 of 2020
Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No. 7219 of 2020
2
J U D G M E N T
Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud, J
1 Leave granted.
2 Prior to the re-organisation of states, the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly
enacted a law called the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur
Apchalnagar Sahib Act 19561
. On receiving the assent of the President on 16
September 1956, the Nanded Act 1956 was published in the Hyderabad
Government Gazette on 20 September 1956. Section 2(c) defines the expression
‘Gurudwara’ thus:
“‘Gurudwara’ means the institution known as the Nanded
Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazur Apchalnagar Sahib
and includes the premises called the Gurudwara with all
buildings contained therein, together with all additions
thereto or alterations thereof which may hereafter be made
from time to time and shrines specified in the schedule.”
3 Chapter II is titled “Control of the Gurudwara”. Section 3 provides for the
constitution of a Board for the administration of the Gurudwara and a Committee of
Management. Section 4 provides for the administration of the affairs of the
Gurudwara by the Board in accordance with the provisions of the Nanded Act 1956.
The Board is constituted by the provisions of Section 5 to be a body corporate. The
 1 “the Nanded Act 1956”
3
controversy in this case turns on the interpretation of Section 6 which provides for
the composition and constitution of the Board. The provision is extracted below:
“Section 6(1) The Board shall consist of:
i) Two members nominated by the Government;
ii) Three members nominated by the Government from
the Sikhs of the State:
Provided that after the expiration of the first term of
the Board these three members shall be elected from
among the Sikhs of the State in such manner as may
be prescribed;
iii) One member nominated by the Government from
among the Sikhs of the cities of Hyderabad and
Secunderabad;
iv) One member nominated by the Shiromani Gurudwara
Prabandhak Committee from among the Sikhs of the
State of Madhya Pradesh;
v) Three members nominated by the Shiromani
Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee;
vi) Two members elected by and from among the Sikh
members of the Parliament;
vii) One member nominated by the Chief Khalsa Diwan of
Amritsar;
viii) Four members nominated by the Suchkhand Hazur
Khalsa Diwan, Nanded.
4
2) The nomination and election of members under this
section shall be made in such manner and within such
period as may be prescribed.
3) i) If the members mentioned in clauses (iv) to (vii)
(both inclusive) of sub-section (1) are not
nominated or elected, as the case may be within
the prescribed period, the Government shall
specify such further period as it may deem fit
within which such members shall be nominated or
elected. If such members are not nominated or
elected within the further period so specified the
Government shall nominate a person or persons
to fill the vacancy or vacancies, as the case may
be and the person or persons so nominated shall
be deemed to be a member or members duly
nominated or elected by the respective body.
ii) The term of office of the members nominated under
clause (i) shall expire at the time at which it would
have expired if he had been nominated or elected, as
the case may be, within the period prescribed under
sub-section (2).
4) After the members have been nominated or elected,
as the case may be, in accordance with the foregoing
provisions the Government shall notify the fact of the
Board having been duly constituted; and the date of
the publication of the notification shall be deemed to
be the date of the constitution of the Board.”
Section 10 provides that where a vacancy occurs in the Board owing to death,
resignation or for any other reason, the new member is to be nominated or elected
in the manner in which the member whose seat is to be filled was nominated or
elected. Section 11 provides for the election of a President. Section 22 (1) provides
for the constitution of a Committee of Management consisting of (i) the Collector of
Nanded or an officer appointed by the government; (ii) the Superintendent of the
5
Gurudwara as an ex officio member; and (iii) three members nominated by the
Board at its first meeting in the prescribed manner from among the Sikhs of Nanded.
Under Section 36(i), the management, control and superintendence of the
administration of the Gurudwara is to vest in the Board. The Board is entrusted with
the duty of ensuring that the Gurudwara and its endowments are properly
maintained, controlled and administered and that its income is duly applied to the
objects and purposes for which they were intended. The Committee carries on day
to day administration of the Gurudwara under Section 37(I) in accordance with the
directions of the Board. The objects on which the funds of the Gurudwara may be
spent are specified in Section 392
.The Government is empowered to supersede the
 2 Section 39:
1) Subject to any rules that may be made by the Government in this behalf, all properties and income of the
Gurudwara shall be under the control of the Board and shall be applied to:-
a) the maintenance or improvement of the Gurudwara.
b) the maintenance of religious worship and the performance and conduct of religious and charitable duties
ceremonies and observances connected with the Gurudwara.
c) the payment of allowances or salaries of officers and servants of the Gurudwara.
d) the fulfilment of the objects of the endowments thereof.
e) the maintenance of the langar.
f) the payment of the cost of audit of the funds and accounts of the Gurudwara.
g) the payment of the salary and allowances of the Secretary and Staff of the Board and the Committee and
the Superintendent of the Gurudwara.
h) the payment of allowances to the President and members of the Board and the Committee and members of
the Committee.
i) the payment of all expenses incurred by the Board in the performance of the duties imposed, and the
exercise of the powers conferred by or under this Act.
2) If any balance remains after meeting the expenditure referred to sub-section [1] the Board may use any
portion of such balance for –
a) the foundation and maintenance of educational or charitable institutions and orphanages for the benefit of
the Sikhs in particular.
b) the establishment of hospitals and dispensaries for the relief of the pilgrim and worshippers resorting to the
Gurudwara.
c) the construction and maintenance of free feeding house and the rest houses for the use of all classes of
pilgrims.
d) the provision of water supply and sanitary arrangements, and the construction and maintenance of roads
and communications and lighting arrangements for the convenience of the pilgrims and worshipper.
e) the establishment and maintenance of a veterinary hospital for the animals of the Gurudwara. Leper asylum
and poor houses for the disabled and helpless.
f) the promotion of the study of the Gurumukhi or any other language and the cultivation of the Indian arts and
architecture , and the prachar of the Sikh religion.
g) the grant of aid to any other deserving religious institution.
h) any other purposes which the Board may deem fit.
6
Board under Section 53 in the event, inter alia, of a default in the performance of
duty or where it has acted in excess or abuse of its powers. Section 61(1) entrusts
a rule making power to the Government. The rule making power extends among
other things to providing the manner in which and the period within which the
members of the Board shall be nominated or elected under Sub-section 1 of Section
6.
4 On 28 December 1951, a society by the name of The Sachkhand Hazuri
Khalsa Diwan Association Society (“Diwan”) was registered under the Hyderabad
Societies’ Registration Act of 1350 Fasli. Its Memorandum of Association specifies
the following objects:
“i). To guide the followers of the Sikh Religion in the
principles of the Sikh faith and to propagate the tenets
of the Sikh religion among other communities
ii). To protect their interest and the interest of
Gurudwara by all possible amicably peaceful means
iii). To be loyal to the Govt. of India
iv). To work and agitate for economic, political
and social rights of the Sikhs of Hyderabad State by
peaceful, amicable and democratic methods wherever
necessary and to adopt such policies which will
improve the standard of Sikhs of Hyderabad State.”
5 The bye-laws of the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded provide for the
constitution of a General Committee consisting of all members of the Diwan. The
7
General Committee is to meet twice each year. A Working Committee consisting of
28 members is contemplated for the management of affairs. The General Committee
is to elect a President at the first meeting. Thereafter, the President will form their
Working Committee. Such elections are to be held in every two years. The Working
Committee is to consist of a President, Vice-President, Secretary and other office
bearers. The President has the power to exercise full supervision over the affairs
and working of the General Committee.
6 On 4 November 1981, an application was filed for the registration of a trust
under the provisions of the Maharashtra Public Trusts Act 19503
. The application
which was numbered as Inquiry Application No. 950/1981 was allowed and a
certificate of registration was issued by an order dated 11 January 1982 of the
Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nanded. The issuance of the registration certificate
became a source of internal disputes between rival factions. The dispute was set at
rest by an order dated 22 January 2014 of a two judge Bench of this Court in Special
Leave Petitions4 under Art. 136 of the Constitution. The order of the court concluded
that the issue of the registration of the Diwan as a trust under the MPT Act has
attained finality. However, the Court noted that the dispute in respect of membership
can be adjudicated upon under the provisions of the MPT Act.
7 The dispute in the present case relates to the nomination of four members in
terms of the provisions of Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Act 1956. Under this
 3 “the MPT Act” 4 Special Leave Petitions (C) Nos. 10139-10149 of 2011- Sardar Jeewansingh (d) Th. Lrs. v. Shersingh & Ors.
8
provision, four members of the Board constituted under Section 5 are nominated by
the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. Sub-Section (2) of Section 6 provides
that the nomination and election of members shall be made in such a manner and
within such period as may be prescribed. Section 2(e) defines the expression
‘prescribed’ thus:
“prescribed’ means prescribed by the rules made by the
Government under this Act and includes the bye-laws made
by the Board under this Act;”
8 On 14 July 1958, the then Government of Bombay notified the Nanded Sikh
Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazuri Apchalnagar Sahib Rules 19585
. Rule 6, inter
alia, provides for the nomination of members under clause (viii) of sub-Section (1) of
Section 6. Under Rule 6, the State Government was to make a request in writing as
soon as may be after the appointed day to the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan,
Nanded to nominate within a period of two months of the date of the receipt of the
request, members on the Board as required.
9 From the affidavit which has been filed by the State of Maharashtra by the
Collector, Nanded, it emerges that on 10 July 2000, the Revenue and Forest
Department of the Government of Maharashtra superseded the Board constituted
under Section 5 of the Nanded Act 1956 due to disputes between two factions of the
Diwan. As a result, the Board was under the Control of the Revenue and Forest
Department of the Government of Maharashtra.
 5 “the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules 1958”
9
10 By a notification dated 15 February 2014, the State Government constituted
an interim Board. On 21 February 2015, the State Government addressed a
communication to the Charity Commissioner enquiring whether Sardar Gurucharan
Singh (the fifth respondent in SLP (C) No. 7219 of 2020) or the first petitioner Sardar
Sardul Singh was authorised to represent the Diwan. The Charity Commissioner
informed the Secretary to the State Government that it was the fifth respondent who
was the President of the Diwan. Upon receiving the reply, the State Government
notified four persons nominated by the fifth respondent as members of the Board.
11 The dispute about who was entitled to be nominated under Section 6(1)(viii)
resurfaced in 2019. Multiple and conflicting nominations were made purportedly with
reference to the provisions of Section 6(1)(viii). The affidavit which has been filed by
the State refers to the receipt of several nominations. It would be instructive to
reproduce an extract:
“9. On 4.1.2019…Shershing Hirasingh Fauji addressed a
letter to the Government of Maharashtra in the alleged
capacity of President of Diwan nominating four persons to the
Board. This letter was not supported by any resolution of the
Diwan.
10. On 4.1.2019, one Sardar Surinder Singh Ajabsingh, as
the Secretary of the Diwan nominated four persons to the
Board. The letter was supported by a resolution of the Diwan.
11. On 9.1.2019…Sardar Gurucharan Singh Uttam Singh
Ghadisaj addressed a letter to the Government of
Maharashtra in the alleged capacity of President of Diwan
10
nominating four persons to the Board. This letter was not
supported by any resolution of the Diwan.”
12 A letter was addressed by the State Government to the Assistant Charity
Commissioner in order to seek a solution to the imbroglio with a query about the
authorised office bearers of the Diwan. The Assistant Charity Commissioner, by a
letter dated 2 February 2019, stated that Inquiry Applications Nos. 44 of 2019 and
114 of 2019 were pending in respect of the Diwan. On 15 June 2019, Sardar
Gurucharansingh Uttamsingh Ghadisa gave a fresh letter allegedly in his capacity as
the President of the Diwan nominating a different set of four persons. Eventually, on
21 June 2019, the State Government nominated four members to the Board under
Section 6(1) viii.
13 The maze of conflicting claims for nomination to the Board under Section
6(1)(viii) led to the institution of proceedings under Art 226 of the Constitution before
the High Court challenging the validity of the notification dated 21 June 2019. The
High Court adverted to the conflicting claims for nomination made to the
government, The High Court held:
“22. In four letters forwarded to the Government for
nomination of the members of the Diwan on the Gurudwara
Board, there does not appear to be consistency. The
Government on its own does not have the authority to
nominate the members of Diwan on the Gurudwara Board.
The Government on its own cannot issue notification
nominating the members of Diwan on the Gurudwara Board.
It is only the Diwan that can nominate the members on the
Gurudwara Board. Considering the inconsistency about the
names to be nominated from the Diwan as members on the
11
Gurudwara Board, the Government could not have issued the
notification nominating the members of Diwan on the
Gurudwara Board. Except the name of the respondent No. 4,
we do not find consistency of other names in all the letters.”
The High Court observed that it was not entering upon the issue of who was the
President and the Secretary of the Diwan. It was considering the dispute only in so
far as it pertained to the nomination of four members of the Diwan on the statutory
Board constituted in terms of the Section 5 of the Nanded Act 1956. The High Court
held that clause (viii) of sub-Section (1) of Section 6 does not authorise the
government to nominate members who will represent the Diwan on the statutory
Board and it was only the Diwan which can do so. Faced with the conflicting claims
that were made to it, the High Court held that:
“30. The State ought to have considered the authenticity of
those letters. In absence of the proper procedure prescribed
in the rules governing nominating members on the
Gurudwara Board, it is not clear as to whether the general
committee and/or executive committee and/or the President
or the Secretary have the powers to nominate the members
on the Gurudwara Board. The bye law and/or the rules of
Diwan are silent in this regard. The member of the Diwan
should take steps to amend the byelaws/ rules to that extent.
The dispute also exists with regard to memberships. As
observed above, we are not entering into the said dispute. It
is for the Assistant Charity Commissioner to decide the
dispute about the membership.
31. The Government cannot arrogate the powers unto itself.
The Government has usurped the powers of the Diwan. In a
system governed by rule of law, the discretion and the
exercise of power has to be confined within the defined limits.
The decision or notification de hors the power under the
statute cannot be sustained. It is well settled that when a
statute requires a particular thing to be done in a particular
manner, it has to be done in that manner only. The
12
notification recommending respondent Nos. 4 to 7 is arbitrary.
Arbitrariness has no role in the society governed by rule of
law. Arbitrariness is antithesis to the rule of law, justice,
equity, fair play and good conscience. The arbitrary action
cannot withstand the test of law.”
14 The notification of the State Government was accordingly set aside.
15 The appellants have questioned the locus standi of the first respondent
(petitioner in the writ proceedings before the High Court) to challenge the
appointment of the members made by the State Government on the ground that he
is not a trustee of the Diwan. It has been submitted that the first respondent was
removed from the post of trustee by Resolution No. 4 of the Working Committee
dated 14 April 2015. A copy of the minutes of the meeting of the Working Committee
on 14 April 2015 has been marked as Annexure 7 to Special Leave Petition (Civil)
No. 7217 of 2020.
16 On behalf of the appellants, a persuasive effort was made by Ms. Meenakshi
Arora, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Shivaji M. Jadhav, learned Counsel to
demonstrate the steps which were taken by the Diwan in its capacity as a public
trust registered under the MPT Act to ensure the due constitution of its managing
body. It has been submitted that in 1984 Gurucharan Singh was appointed as
President of the Diwan and that the Working Committee which was elected under
his presidency consisted of 28 members. Thereafter, at the lapse of two years,
elections are claimed to have been regularly held to the Working Committee.
According to the appellants, S. Jivansingh Ayyasingh Sahu was elected as
13
President of the Trust on 11 November 1980 and 13 November 1982 for two years
on each occasion. Gurucharan Singh became President on 26 October 1984 in
which capacity he was re-elected on 14 October 1986, 15 November 1988, 20
October 1990, 28 October 1992, 4 November 1994 and 20 October 1998. According
to the appellants, after the registration of the Trust, the Working Committee which
was nominated at the time of the initial registration continued from 1984 till 2001.
Inquiry Application No. 44 of 2019 regarding the change report filed by the Trust
under Section 22 of the MPT Act is pending. This pertains to the entry of the
Working Committee in Schedule I, including Sardar Gurucharan Singh as President
(elected purportedly at a general meeting on 9 November 2018). On the other hand,
Inquiry Application No 114 of 2019 initiated by Shersingh Hirasingh Fauji showing
him as the elected President of the Diwan Trust is also pending. Contending that
the elections to the Trust have been held periodically, it has been submitted that
there was a settled practice of Gurcharan Singh nominating the four representatives
of the Board under Section 6(1) viii. Hence Ms. Meenakshi Arora and Mr. Shivaji
Jadhav urged that there was no justification for the High Court to interdict the
notification of the State Government accepting the nomination of four members
under Section 6(1)(viii).
17 On the other hand, the contesting respondents who had moved proceedings
under Article 226 of the Constitution before the High Court have submitted that the
first respondent had the locus standi to initiate such proceedings. It has been urged
in the written submissions filed by the first respondent that Resolution No. 4 dated
14
14 April 2015 purported to be passed by the Working Committee is fabricated on the
ground that the date of expulsion of first respondent from the Working Committee is
mentioned as 25 October 2015, while the resolution is dated 14 April 2015. It has
also been submitted that the change report filed by Gurucharan Singh dated 9
November 2018 shows the first respondent as an outgoing member of the Working
Committee. Further, it has been claimed that till date no change report has been
filed to remove the name of the first respondent from the record maintained in
Schedule I, as a de facto member of the Working Committee. It has been stated that
the issue of locus standi of the first respondent was not raised in the original counter
filed by the appellants before the High Court, rather it was raised through an
additional counter as an afterthought in order to dilute the locus standi of the first
respondent. Hence, it has been submitted that the first respondent is still a trustee
under Section 2(18) of the MTP Act and had the locus standi to move a petition
under Article 226 of the Constitution.
18 The contesting respondents seriously questioned the plea of the appellants in
regard to the management of the public trust. Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned
Senior Counsel submitted that after the decision of this Court dated 22 January
2014 which recognized that the registration of the Trust had attained finality,
Gurucharan Singh filed Miscellaneous Application 833 of 2011 before the Assistant
Charity Commissioner for taking on record an entry in respect of an election which
was held for 2002 - 2004. On 7 March 2015, the Assistant Charity Commissioner
passed an order taking on record the entry pertaining to the election of the
15
committee. According to the contesting respondents, the last entry pertaining to the
Working Committee which was taken on record by the Assistant Charity
Commissioner was for 2002-4. Out of 28 members, nine are stated to be dead while
seventeen continue to subsist on the record maintained in Schedule-I in the office of
the Assistant Charity Commissioner. Hence, it has been submitted that for the
period 2004-6, 2006-8, 2008-10, 2010-12, 2012-14 and 2014-16, neither was any
change report in respect of the election of the President or Working Committee
reported under Section 22 nor has any change been recorded. However, it is
accepted by the respondents that two Inquiry Applications are pending before the
Assistant Charity Commission: (i) Inquiry No. 44 of 2019 filed by Gurucharan Singh
with a claim that he was elected as President or Pradhan and that a Working
Committee of 27 members was elected; and (ii) Inquiry No. 114 of 2019 by
Shersingh Hirasingh Fauji claiming that he was elected as President in 2018 and
that a Working Committee of 27 members has been elected. Both these applications
where there are rival claims for election of the President and for members of the
Working Committee are pending at the stage of evidence.
19 In the written submissions which have been filed on behalf of the First
respondent, the conflicting nominations which were made under Section 6(1)(viii) by
Gurucharan Singh, on the one hand, and by Shersingh Fauji on the other, have
been recorded under the caption “who nominated whom”. For convenience of
reference, the extract is reproduced below:
16
“2. WHO NOMINATED TO WHOM.
I. By letter dated 04/1/2019… Sardar Shersingh
Fauzi nominated to the Sardar Sardulsingh Fauzi and
Sardar Jagwirsingh Shahu (petitioners in SLP No.
7219/2020) and other two persons.
II. On 09/01/2019, by letter dated Sardar
Gurucharansingh s/o Uttamsingh Ghadisaz
nominated himself who is the petitioner in SLP No.
7227/2020 and his son Sardar Bhagendarsingh who
is the petitioner in SLP No. 7217/2020 and nominated
other two persons.
III. Sardar Gurucharansingh s/o Uttamsingh
Ghadisaz by letter dated 09/01/2019 claimed to be
the President of “Diwan” as well as Sardar Shersingh
Fauzi by letter dated 04/01/2019 also claimed to the
President of “Diwan”.”
20 The State Government is stated to have appointed two persons from the letter
dated 9 January 2019 and from the letter dated 4 January 2019. The nominated
members are appellants before this Court since their appointments have been set
aside.
21 Our analysis of the submissions must be prefaced by adverting to the fact that
there is a maze of conflicting claims between the two factions, including the issue of
the alleged removal of the first respondent as a trustee of the Diwan. The High Court
has appropriately not embarked upon an enquiry to adjudicate upon these claims.
Justifiably so, since two inquiry applications which have been filed under Section 22
of the MPT 1960 are pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner. The
change reports, as they are called, being the subject matter of a pending enquiry by
17
the Assistant Charity Commissioner, it is neither appropriate nor proper for this court
to enter into the thicket of factual disputes between the contesting factions.
22 Essentially, the issue which the Court has to decide turns upon the
interpretation of the provisions of Section 6(1)(viii). It is on this that the validity of the
notification of the State government appointing four persons under Section 6(1)(viii)
would rest. Two distinct entities are dramatis personae in the present case. The first
is the public trust which is registered under the provisions of the MPT Act. Its origins
lay in the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan Association Society which was initially
registered under the Hyderabad Societies’ Registration Act of 1350 Fasli6
. This
body was initially registered as a society with the Registrar of Company Law and
Co-operative Societies of the then Government of Hyderabad under registration no.
22 of 1951. The Memorandum of Association of the Diwan indicates that it was
formed to protect and guide the followers of the Sikh religion, protect the interests of
the Gurudwara and to work in the interest of the Sikhs of the then State of
Hyderabad. The name of the society or association was formulated as Sachkhand
Hazuri Khalsa Diwan. The General Committee of the Diwan consists of all the
members of the Diwan who meet bi-annually. The members of the General
Committee of the Khalsa Diwan are alone entitled to vote. For the management of
the affairs, there is a Working Committee consisting of 28 members. The Working
Committee was to be formed by the President or Pradhan at the first meeting.
Elections to the Working Committee are required to be held every two years. The
 6 “1350 Fasli”
18
President is entrusted with supervision over the affairs and working of the General
Committee. Several decades after the reorganisation of States, a registration
certificate was issued under the MPT Act to the society as a public trust on 11
January 1982 by the Assistant Charity Commissioner Nanded in Inquiry Application
No 950/1981. This created a round of disputes between the contesting factions and
it was eventually on 22 January 2014 that this Court concluded the issue by
recording that the registration of the Diwan as a Trust under the MPT Act have
attained finality. Disputes in regard to membership were a separate matter which
could be adjudicated upon in terms of the remedies available under the MPT Act.
As a public trust, the Diwan is governed by the provisions of the MPT Act.
23 The second body with which the present group of appeals is concerned is a
statutory body. This was created when the Hyderabad Legislative Assembly enacted
the Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazuri Apchalnagar Sahib Act 1956.
The statute has defined the expression ‘Gurudwara’ under Section 2(c) to mean the
institution known as Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Sachkhand Shri Hazuri Apchalnagar
Sahib and to include the premises of the Gurudwara together with all its buildings
and the shrines which are specified in the Schedule. A statutory board is constituted
under Section 5 to administer the affairs of the Gurudwara in accordance with the
enactment. The Board consists of seventeen members. Some of them are
nominated by the government (see clauses (i), (ii) and (iii) of sub-section (1) of
Section 6). Some members are nominated by specific bodies: under clause (iv), one
member is nominated by Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee from among
19
the Sikhs of State of Madhya Pradesh; under clause (v) three members are
nominated by the Shiromani Gurudwara Prabandhak Committee; under Clause (vii)
one member is nominated by the Chief Khalsa Diwan of Amritsar and under clause
(viii) four members are nominated by Suchkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. As
regards the elected members, clause (vi) stipulates that two members shall be
elected by and from among Sikh members of Parliament. Sub- Section (2) of
Section 6 stipulates that the nomination and election of members under the
provision “shall be made in such a manner and within such period as may be
prescribed”. The expression ‘prescribed’ is defined by Section 2(e) to mean
prescribed by rules made by the government under the Act and to include the byelaws made by the Board under the statute. The expression ‘Board’ is defined in
Section 2(a) to mean the Board which is constituted under the provisions of Chapter
II. Thus, the modalities for nomination and election can be prescribed by the rules
made by the government under the Act and in the bye-laws framed by the Board.
24 Sub-Section (3) of Section 6 provides that if the members mentioned in
clauses (iv) and (vii) are not nominated or elected within the prescribed period, the
government may specify the period within which the exercise has to be completed. If
the process is not completed within the period so stipulated, the Government is
empowered to nominate a person or persons to fill the vacancy. Significantly, the
provisions of sub-section (3) of Section 6 do not apply to the nomination to be made
under clause (viii) of sub-Section (1) of Section 6. In other words, the exclusive
statutory authority for making the nomination of four members under Section
20
6(1)(viii) is vested in the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. Section 6(1)(viii)
clearly indicates that it is the Diwan alone which has the power to make a
nomination of four members. The State Government cannot assume that power to
itself. That the authority of the Diwan is exclusive is evident from the provisions of
sub-section (3) of Section 6.
25 The Nanded Sikh Gurudwara Rules 1958 contain a provision for the
nomination of members under clauses (iv), (v), (vii) and (viii) of Section 6 (1). Rule 6
is in the following terms:
“6. Nomination of members under clause iv], v], vii] and viii] of
sub-section 1 of section 6, -
1 As soon as may be after the appointed day, the State
Government shall make a request in writing to1] The Shiromani Gurudwara Prabhandhak Committee.
2] The Chief Khalsa Diwan, Amritsar, and
3] The Sachkhand Huzur Khalsa Diwan, Nanded to nominate
within a period of two months from the date of the receipt of
the request members on the Board, as required by clauses
iv], v], vii] and viii] of sub-section 1 of section 6.
2] The members so nominated shall function as the members
on the Board from the date of the constitution of the Board.”
21
26 The provisions contained in Rule 6 indicate that for the purpose of fulfilling the
statutory requirement of a nomination, the State Government is to make a request in
writing, inter alia, to the Diwan under Clause (viii).
27 The power to make a nomination under Section 6(1)(viii) is vested in the
Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. The statute does not expressly define
the expression “Diwan”. The Diwan was constituted as a society initially in 1350
Fasli. It was registered as a public trust under the MPT Act in 1982. The expression
‘Diwan’ needs elaboration. The Memorandum of Association refers to the Khalsa
Diwan General Committee which comprises “of all members of the Diwan”. They
alone are entitled to vote. The Working Committee is a smaller body consisting of 28
members which is elected for a duration of two years on each occasion. The
authority to nominate four representatives under Section 6(1)(viii) of the Nanded Act
1956 is entrusted to the Diwan. The Diwan consists of the collective body of all
members who together are entitled to vote under the Memorandum of Association.
Together they constitute the Diwan. Neither the President individually nor any office
bearer can be equated with the Diwan. The authority to nominate four members to
the Board under Section 6(1)(viii) is not entrusted to an office bearer of the Working
Committee or for that matter to the Working Committee. Ms Meenakshi Arora,
learned Senior Counsel and Mr Shivaji Jadhav, learned Counsel sought to
emphasise that as a matter of practice nominations were made by Gurucharan
Singh from time to time. The practice that was followed cannot be contrary to the
interpretation of the provisions of the statute.
22
28 Evidently, conflicts between the rival factions have spilled over into the
process of making nominations. The State Government was confronted with
conflicting claims. It wrote to the Charity Commissioner seeking some light on the
issue and after receiving a communication that Gurucharan Singh was the
President, proceeded to issue a notification drawing four members from out of the
rival claims that were made by the conflicting factions. The High Court was justified
in disapproving of the process that was followed by the State Government but for the
simple reason that the nominations were not made by the Diwan. Multiple claims
were made in the letters submitted to the State Government. The High Court was
correct in its interpretation of the statute when it observed that it was not open to the
State Government to arrogate the power of nomination to itself or to usurp the
powers of the Diwan. The statute has entrusted the authority to make a nomination
under Section 6(1)(viii) to the Diwan. The Diwan comprises of the collective body of
all members together to whom the power to make a nomination is entrusted. The
provisions of sub-section (2) of Section 6 read with the definition of the expression
“prescribed” in sub-Section 2(e) lead to the conclusion that the nomination and
election of members under Section 6 has to be made in the manner prescribed by
the rules made by the Government under the Act, including the bye-laws made by
the statutory board constituted under the provisions of Chapter II.
29 We therefore hold that in authorising the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan,
Nanded to nominate four members, Section 6(1)(viii) entrusts that authority to the
collective body of members of the Diwan which is entitled to select the four
23
individuals to be nominated to the statutory Board. This process, in our view, must
be initiated forthwith and concluded within a period of three months from the date of
this judgment.
30 The change reports - Inquiry Applications Nos. 44 of 2019 and 114 of 2019 -
must be enquired into by the Assistant Charity Commissioner expeditiously and the
inquiry shall be concluded within a period of three months from the date of this
judgment.
31 Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Shivaji Jadhav,
learned Counsel have made an earnest appeal to this court that pending the
finalization of the process of making nominations under Section 6(1)(viii), the four
members who were notified by the State government on 21 June 2019 may be
allowed to continue. It was urged that during the pendency of these proceedings the
judgment of the High Court was stayed. By an interim order passed on 31 July 2020
a direction was issued restraining the Board from taking any major financial or policy
decisions. The court however made it clear that this shall not affect the distribution of
langar and the activities of the Gurudwara. Hence, it was urged that the four
members who have been notified by the State Government may be permitted to
continue subject to the conditions contained in the interim order. This request has
been opposed by Ms. Vibha Dutta Makhija, learned Senior Counsel. Mr Rahul
Chitnis, Standing Counsel for the State of Maharashtra has also submitted that if the
Court were to hold that the notification issued by the State Government on 21 June
24
2019 is not valid, it would not be appropriate to allow the four members, so
nominated, to continue. We have held the notification dated 21 June 2019 to be
invalid and have upheld the conclusion of the High Court. Hence, we cannot accept
the submission of Ms. Meenakshi Arora, learned Senior Counsel and Mr. Shivaji
Jadhav, learned Counsel permitting the members who were notified on 21 June
2019 to continue to function as an interim arrangement.
32 We accordingly dispose of the appeals by affirming the conclusion of the High
Court that the notification issued by the State Government on 21 June 2019 was
contrary to the provisions of Section 6 (1) (viii) of the Nanded Act 1956. We direct
that:
(i) Inquiry Application No. 44 of 2019 and Inquiry Application No. 114 of 2019
pending before the Assistant Charity Commissioner, Nanded shall be
concluded and disposed of in accordance with law within a period of three
months from the date of this judgment;
(ii) The statutory authority to make a nomination under Section 6(1)(viii) is
entrusted to the Sachkhand Hazuri Khalsa Diwan, Nanded. The Diwan
signifies the entire body of members, as explained in the text of the judgment;
(iii) The process of making the nomination under the provisions of Section
6(1)(viii), as explained above, shall be initiated and completed within a period
25
of three months from the date of this judgment. The Assistant Charity
Commissioner, Nanded shall fix a date for the meeting of the Diwan and shall
act as an observer at the meeting convened for finalising the nominations.
The Assistant Charity Commissioner is entrusted with the authority to
determine the members borne on the role of members of the Diwan who are
entitled to vote at the ensuing meeting in accordance with the above
directions. The Assistant Charity Commissioner is at liberty to adopt
appropriate modalities for holding a meeting, including by way of a virtual
meeting in view of the outbreak of Covid-19; and
(iv) If any further directions of a consequential nature are necessary to implement
this judgment, the Assistant Charity Commissioner will be at liberty to move
the Aurangabad bench of the Bombay High Court for directions.
33 The appeals are disposed of in the above terms. No order as to costs.
34 Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
…….………….…………………...........................J.
 [Dr. Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud]
…….…………………………...............................J.
 [K M Joseph]
New Delhi;
August 20, 2020.

proceedings before the NCLT filed under sections 241 and 242 of the Act should not be entertained because of the pending civil dispute

1
ITEM NO.1501 Virtual Court 3 SECTION XVII
 S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A
 RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS
Civil Appeal No(s). 9340/2019
ARUNA OSWAL Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
PANKAJ OSWAL & ORS. Respondent(s)
([ HEARD BY: HON. ARUN MISHRA AND HON. S. ABDUL NAZEER, JJ.] )
WITH
C.A. No. 9401/2019 (XVII)
C.A. No. 9399/2019 (XVII)
Date : 06-07-2020 These appeals were called on for pronouncement of
Judgment today.
For Appellant(s) Mr. Bhakti Vardhan Singh, AOR
Mr. Aman Jha, Adv.
 Mr. R. C. Kohli, AOR
 Mrs. Swarupama Chaturvedi, AOR

For Respondent(s) Mr. Sidharth Sethi, AOR

 UPON hearing the counsel the Court made the following
 O R D E R
Hon’ble Mr. Justice Arun Mishra pronounced the reportable
Judgment of the Bench comprising His Lordship and Hon’ble Mr.
Justice S. Abdul Nazeer.
The operative portion of the Judgment is reproduced
hereunder :-
“29. We are of the opinion that the
proceedings before the NCLT filed
under sections 241 and 242 of the Act
should not be entertained because of
the pending civil dispute and
2
considering the minuscule extent of
holding of 0.03%, that too, acquired
after filing a civil suit in company
securities, of respondent no. 1. In
the facts and circumstances of the
instant case, in order to maintain the
proceedings, the respondent should
have waited for the decision of the
right, title and interest, in the
civil suit concerning shares in
question. The entitlement of
respondent No.1 is under a cloud of
pending civil dispute. We deem it
appropriate to direct the dropping of
the proceedings filed before the NCLT
regarding oppression and mismanagement
under sections 241 and 242 of the Act
with the liberty to file afresh, on
all the questions, in case of
necessity, if the suit is decreed in
favour of respondent No.1 and
shareholding of respondent No.1
increases to the extent of 10%
required under section 244. We
reiterate that we have left all the
questions to be decided in the pending
civil suit. Impugned orders passed by
the NCLT as well as NCLAT are set
aside, and the appeals are allowed to
the aforesaid extent. We request that
the civil suit be decided as
expeditiously as possible, subject to
cooperation by respondent No.1.
Parties to bear their costs as
incurred.”
3
Pending application(s) is/are disposed of.
(NARENDRA PRASAD) (JAYANT KUMAR ARORA) (JAGDISH CHANDER)
 AR-CUM-PS COURT MASTER ASSISTANT REGISTRAR
(Signed reportable Judgment is placed on the file)

Wednesday, August 19, 2020

Sushant Singh Rajput = Petition under section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure read with Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 with prayer for transfer of the FIR No. 241 of 2020 (dated 25.7.2020) under Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) registered at the Rajeev Nagar Police Station, Patna and all consequential proceedings, from the jurisdiction of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate III, Patna Sadar, Page 2 of 35 to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra Mumbai. The matter relates to the unnatural death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput on 14.6.2020, at his Bandra residence at Mumbai.= when integrity and credibility of the investigation is discernible, the trust, faith and confidence of the common man in the judicial process will resonate. When truth meets sunshine, justice will not prevail on the living alone but after Life’s fitful fever, now the departed will also sleep well. Satyameva Jayate As a Court exercising lawful jurisdiction for the assigned roster, no impediment is seen for exercise of plenary power in the present matter. Therefore while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the Page 35 of 35 surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well. It is ordered accordingly.

Page 1 of 35
[REPORTABLE]
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
Transfer Petition (Crl.) No.225 of 2020
Rhea Chakraborty Petitioner
Versus
State of Bihar & Ors. Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Hrishikesh Roy, J.
1. This Transfer Petition is filed under section 406
of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short
“CrPC”) read with Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court
Rules, 2013 with prayer for transfer of the FIR
No. 241 of 2020 (dated 25.7.2020) under Sections 341,
342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506 and 120B of the Indian
Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) registered at the
Rajeev Nagar Police Station, Patna and all
consequential proceedings, from the jurisdiction of the
Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate III, Patna Sadar,
Page 2 of 35
to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra
Mumbai. The matter relates to the unnatural death of
the actor Sushant Singh Rajput on 14.6.2020, at his
Bandra residence at Mumbai. The deceased resided
within Bandra Police Station jurisdiction and there
itself, the unnatural death under section 174 of CrPC
was reported.
2. The petitioner is a friend of the deceased, and she
too is in the acting field since last many years. As
regards the allegations against the petitioner in the
FIR, the petitioner claims that she has been falsely
implicated in the Patna FIR, filed by Krishan Kishor
Singh (respondent no. 2) – the father of the deceased
actor. The petitioner and the deceased were in a livein relationship but on 8.6.2020, a few days prior to
the death of the actor, she had shifted to her own
residence at Mumbai. According to the petitioner, the
Mumbai Police is competent to undertake the
investigation, even for the FIR lodged at Patna.
3. Heard Mr. Shyam Divan, learned Senior Counsel
appearing for the petitioner, Mr. Maninder Singh,
Page 3 of 35
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
Respondent No. 1 (State of Bihar), Mr. Vikas Singh,
learned Senior Counsel appearing on behalf of
respondent No. 2 (Complainant), Dr. A.M. Singhvi and
Mr. R. Basant, learned Senior Counsel appearing on
behalf of respondent No. 3 (State of Maharashtra) and
Mr. Tushar Mehta, learned Solicitor General of India
appearing on behalf of respondent No. 4 (Union of
India)
4. The petitioner contends that the incidents alleged
in the Complaint lodged by the father of the deceased,
have taken place entirely within the jurisdiction of
State of Maharashtra and therefore, the Complaint as
received, should have been forwarded to the
jurisdictional police station at Bandra, Mumbai for
conducting the investigation. However, despite want of
jurisdiction, the Complaint was registered at Patna
only because of political pressure brought upon the
Bihar Police authorities. Mr Shyam Divan, the learned
Senior Counsel for the Petitioner argues that the
courts in Bihar do not exercise lawful jurisdiction in
the subject matter of the Complaint and since the acts
Page 4 of 35
alleged in the Complaint are relatable to Mumbai
jurisdiction, the mere factum of Complainant being a
resident of Patna, does not confer jurisdiction on the
Bihar police to conduct the investigation. Adverting
to the subsequent transfer of the investigation to the
CBI, Mr. Divan argues that since the Bihar police
lacked jurisdiction to investigate the allegations in
the Complaint, the transfer of the investigation to the
CBI on Bihar Government’s consent, would not amount to
a lawful consent of the State government, under Section
6 of the Delhi Special Police Act, 1946 (for short
“DSPE Act”). The FIR according to the petitioner is
contradictory and the Complaint fails to disclose how
the alleged actions of the petitioner, led to the
suicidal death of the actor. The petitioner projects
that she has fully co-operated with the Mumbai Police
in their inquiry but will have no objection if the
investigation is conducted by the CBI. Mr. Shyam Divan
the learned Senior Counsel submits that justice needs
to be done in this case and powers under Article 142
of the Constitution can be invoked by the Court.
Page 5 of 35
5. Representing the State of Bihar, Mr. Maninder Singh,
the learned Senior Counsel submits that the Complaint
disclosed a cognizable offence and therefore, it was
incumbent for the Patna Police to register the FIR and
proceed with the investigation. Since allegations of
criminal breach of trust, Cheating and defalcation of
money from the account of the deceased are alleged, the
consequences of the offence are projected to be within
the jurisdiction of the State of Bihar. The Senior
Counsel highlights that the Mumbai Police was
conducting the enquiry into the unnatural death of the
actor u/s 174, 175 CrPC and such proceeding being
limited to ascertaining the cause of death, does not
empower Mumbai Police to undertake any investigation,
on the allegations in the Complaint of the Respondent
No 2, without registration of an FIR at Mumbai.
Referring to the non-cooperation and obstruction of the
Maharashtra authorities to the SIT of Bihar Police
which reached Mumbai on 27.07.2020 and the quarantined
detention of the Superintendent of Police, Patna who
had reached Mumbai on 02.08.2020, senior counsel argues
that the Mumbai Police was trying to suppress the real
Page 6 of 35
facts and were not conducting a fair and professional
inquiry. Since no investigation relatable to the
allegations in the complaint was being conducted and
FIR was not registered by the Mumbai Police, the action
of the Bihar Police in registering the Complaint, is
contended to be legally justified. On that basis, the
Bihar Government’s consent for entrustment of the
investigation to the CBI is submitted to satisfy the
requirement of Section 6 of the DSPE Act. Besides, as
the petitioner herself has called for a CBI
investigation and as the CBI has since registered a
case and commenced their investigation, (on the request
of the State of Bihar), the Senior Counsel submits that
this transfer petition is infructuous.
6. Projecting the agony of the deceased’s father, Mr.
Vikas Singh, the learned Senior Counsel submits that
the Complainant has lost his only son under suspicious
circumstances and was naturally interested in a fair
investigation to unravel the truth. The inquiry by
the Mumbai Police under section 174 of the CrPC is not
an investigation of the complainant’s allegations and
therefore the registration of the case and
Page 7 of 35
investigation into those allegations by the Bihar
Police is contended to be justified. Since only an
investigation (not a case or appeal) is pending at
Patna, and a legally competent investigation has
commenced, invocation of Section 406 power by this
Court to transfer the investigation, is projected to
be not merited. When misappropriation and criminal
breach of trust is alleged in respect of the assets of
the deceased actor and the concerned property relatable
to the alleged offence, will have to be accounted
eventually to the Complainant (as a Class I legal heir
of the deceased), the action of the Patna Police is
contended to be within jurisdiction, under Section 179
read with Section 181(4) of the CrPC which speaks of
consequences ensuing at another place, as a result of
the alleged crime.
7. Representing the State of Maharashtra, Dr. Abhishek
Manu Singhvi, the learned Senior Counsel submits that
following the unnatural death of Sushant Singh Rajput
on 14.06.2020 at his Bandra residence, the Mumbai
Police registered an Accidental Death Report(ADR) and
commenced inquiry under Section 174 of the CrPC to
Page 8 of 35
ascertain the cause of death and also to determine
whether the death was the result of some criminal act
committed by some other persons. In course of the
inquiry, the statements of 56 persons were recorded and
other evidence such as the Post Mortem report, Forensic
report etc have been collected. If the inquiry
discloses commission of a cognizable offence, the
Mumbai police will register a FIR. According to Dr.
Singhvi, there can be no outer time limit for
conclusion of Section 174 or Section 175 CrPC
proceedings. The State of Maharashtra Counsel argues
that every offence shall ordinarily be inquired into
and tried by a Court within whose local jurisdiction,
the offence was committed and on that basis, Dr Singhvi
submits, that the Bihar police should have transferred
the Complaint to the Mumbai Police authorities.
Alternately, they could have registered a “zero FIR”
and then should have transferred the case for
investigation to Mumbai police. Pointing towards
potential misuse, Dr. Singhvi submits that if
registration of Complaint in another state is
permitted, it will enable a person to choose the
Page 9 of 35
investigating authority and will obstruct exercise of
lawful jurisdiction by the local police. This will
impact the country’s federal structure. The Senior
Counsel refers to media reports to project that the
Bihar Police were hesitant to register the Complaint
of Respondent No 2 but they were prevailed upon by
political pressure. The Maharashtra counsel submits
that the father and other family members of the
deceased in their statements to the Mumbai Police,
never mentioned about the allegations in the Complaint
and those are projected to be afterthoughts and
improvements. Under the constitutional scheme, the
States have exclusive power to investigate a crime and
the Senior Counsel accordingly argues that crime
investigation cannot be routinely transferred to the
Central Agency. Referring to the reasons (a)
sensitivity and (b) Inter-state ramifications, given
by the Bihar Police for entrusting the investigation
to the CBI, Dr. Singhvi argues that the reasons are
neither germane nor bona fide. He submits that
ordinarily, the local police should conduct
investigation into any reported crime and entrustment
Page 10 of 35
of the investigation to the CBI must be an exception
to meet extraordinary exigencies, but here consent was
given by Bihar government, for political exigencies.
8. Mr Tushar Mehta, the learned Solicitor General of
India, appears for the Union of India and the CBI. He
projects that the Maharashtra Police is yet to register
any FIR but is conducting only a limited inquiry under
section 174 of the CrPC, into the unnatural death of
the actor. In the absence of any FIR by the Mumbai
Police following the death of the actor on 14.06.2020,
the FIR registered at Patna at the instance of the
deceased’s father is projected to be the only one
pending. He therefore contends that the present matter
does not relate to two cases pending in two different
states. Referring to the contradictory stand and the
parallel allegation of state’s Police being influenced
by external factors in both states, Mr. Mehta submits
that this itself justifies entrustment of the
investigation to an independent Central Agency. The
learned Solicitor General then points out that by
acceding to the request made by the State of Bihar, the
CBI has registered the FIR and commenced investigation.
Page 11 of 35
Besides the Directorate of Enforcement, a central
agency, is also acting under the Prevention of Money
Laundering Act, 2002. He therefore argues that a fair
and impartial inquiry can be ensured if the police of
either state are kept away from investigating the
alleged crime, relating to the suspicious death of the
film actor. Adverting to the affidavit of the
Maharashtra Police that they have recorded the
statements of 56 persons in the section 174
proceedings, the Solicitor General submits that since
FIR is not yet registered and the Mumbai Police is
discharging limited functions under section 174 of the
CrPC, the investigation of any alleged crime following
registration of FIR is yet to legally commence in
Mumbai and as such, there is no case pending in the
State of Maharashtra which can justify the invocation
of powers under section 406 of the CrPC.
9. Under the federal design envisaged by the
Constitution, Police is a state subject under List II
of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore,
investigation of a crime should normally be undertaken
by the concerned state’s police, where the case is
Page 12 of 35
registered. There can be situations where a particular
crime by virtue of its nature and ramification, is
legally capable of being investigated by police from
different states or even by other agencies. The
entrustment of investigation to the CBI is permitted
either with consent of the concerned state or on orders
of the constitutional court. However, investigation
of a crime by multiple authorities transgressing into
the others domain, is avoidable.
10. In the instant case, the petitioner repose
confidence on Mumbai police. The records of the case
produced before this Court, does not prima facie
suggest any wrong doing by the Mumbai Police. However,
their obstruction to the Bihar police team at Mumbai
could have been avoided since it gave rise to suspicion
on the bonafide of their inquiry. The Police at Mumbai
were conducting only a limited inquiry into the cause
of unnatural death, under Section 174 CrPC and
therefore, it cannot be said with certainty at this
stage that they will not undertake an investigation on
the other aspects of the unnatural death, by
registering a FIR.
Page 13 of 35
11. Uncertain about the future contingency at Mumbai,
the father of the deceased has filed the Complaint at
Patna, levelling serious allegations against the
petitioner following which, the FIR is registered and
the Bihar Police has started their investigation. The
case is now taken over by the CBI at the request of the
Bihar government. The petitioner has no objection for
investigation by the CBI, but is sceptical about the
bonafide of the steps taken by the Bihar government and
the Patna police.
12. On the other hand, the projection from the side of
the Complainant and the Bihar government is that the
Mumbai Police even during the limited inquiry under
Section 174 CrPC, are attempting to shield the real
culprits under political pressure. This is however,
stoutly refuted by the State of Maharashtra whose stand
is that the Bihar police has no jurisdiction to
investigate the crime where, the incident and criminal
acts if any, have occurred within the State of
Maharashtra.
Page 14 of 35
13. Transfer of investigation to the CBI cannot be a
routine occurrence but should be in exceptional
circumstances. One factor which however is considered
relevant for induction of the Central Agency is to
retain “public confidence in the impartial working of
the State agencies”, as was recently reiterated for
the Bench by Justice Dhananjaya Y Chandrachud, in Arnab
Ranjan Goswami vs. Union of India 2020 SCC Online SC
462. It is also the consistent view of the Court that
it is not for the accused to choose the investigating
agency. In the instant case, political interference
against both states is alleged which has the potential
of discrediting the investigation. The legal process
must therefore be focused upon revelation of the
correct facts through credible and legally acceptable
investigation. It must be determined whether the
unnatural death was the result of some criminal acts.
In order to lend credibility to the investigation and
its conclusion, it would be desirable in my view, to
specify the authority, which should conduct the
investigation in this matter.
Page 15 of 35
14. At this stage, having regard to the respective
stand of the parties, following core issues arise for
consideration in this case:
(a) Whether this Court has power to transfer
investigation (not case or appeal) under Section 406
of the CrPC;
(b) Whether the proceeding under Section 174 CrPC
conducted by the Mumbai Police to inquire into the
unnatural death, can be termed as an investigation;
(c) Whether it was within the jurisdiction of the
Patna Police to register the FIR and commence
investigation of the alleged incidents which took place
in Mumbai? As a corollary, what is the status of the
investigation by the CBI on the consent given by the
Bihar government; and
(d) What is the scope of the power of a single
judge exercising jurisdiction under section 406 of the
CrPC and whether this Court can issue direction for
doing complete justice, in exercise of plenary power.
TRANSFER POWER UNDER SECTION 406 CRPC
15. Section 406 CrPC empowers the Supreme Court to
transfer cases and appeals. The scope of exercise of
Page 16 of 35
this power is for securing the ends of justice. The
precedents suggest that transfer plea under Section 406
CrPC were granted in cases where the Court believed
that the trial may be prejudiced and fair and impartial
proceedings cannot be carried on, if the trial
continues. However, transfer of investigation on the
other hand was negated by this Court in the case of Ram
Chander Singh Sagar and Anr. vs. State of Tamil Nadu,
(1978) 2 SCC 35. Writing the judgment Justice V R
Krishna Iyer, declared that:-
“The Code of Criminal Procedure clothes this Court
with power under Section 406 to transfer a case or
appeal from one High Court or a Court subordinate
to one High Court to another High Court or to a
Court subordinate thereto. But, it does not clothe
this Court with the power to transfer
investigations from one police station to another
in the country simply because the first information
or a remand report is for warded to a Court. The
application before us stems from a misconception
about the scope of Section 406. There is as yet no
case pending before any Court as has been made
clear in the counter affidavit of the State of
Tamil Nadu. In the light of this counter affidavit,
nothing can be done except to dismiss this
petition.
“ 2. If the petitioners are being directed to
appear in a far-off court during investigatory
stage it is for them to move that court for
appropriate orders so that they may not be
tormented by long travel or otherwise teased by
judicial process. If justice is denied there are
other redresses, not under Section 406, though it
Page 17 of 35
is unfortunate that the petitioners have not chosen
to move that court to be absolved from appearance
until necessitated by the circumstances or the
progress of the investigation. To come to this
Court directly seeking an order of transfer is
travelling along the wrong street. We are sure that
if the second petitioner is ailing, as is
represented, and this fact is brought to the notice
of the Court which has directed her appearance,
just orders will be passed in case there is
veracity behind the representation. We need hardly
say courts should use their processes to the
purpose of advancing justice, not to harass
parties. Anyway, so far as the petition for
transfer is concerned. there is no merit we can
see and so we dismiss it.”
16. The contrary references cited by the Petitioner
where transfer of investigation was allowed, do not in
any manner, refer to a determination on the question
of competence to transfer investigation under Section
406. In the cited cases, relief was granted without any
discussion of the law, ignoring the long standing ratio
laid down in Ram Chander Singh Sagar (Supra).
17. Having considered the contour of the power under
section 406 CrPC, it must be concluded that only cases
and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred. The
ratio in Ram Chander Singh Sagar and Anr. (Supra) in
my view, is clearly applicable in the present matter.
Page 18 of 35
SCOPE OF SECTION 174 CRPC PROCEEDING
18. The proceeding under Section 174 CrPC is limited
to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out
the apparent cause of unnatural death. These are not
in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing
of FIR under Section 154 CrPC. In the instant case, in
Mumbai, no FIR has been registered as yet. The Mumbai
Police has neither considered the matter under Section
175 (2) CrPC, suspecting commission of a cognizable
offence nor proceeded for registration of FIR under
Section 154 or referred the matter under Section 157
CrPC, to the nearest magistrate having jurisdiction.
19. On the above aspect, the ratio in Manoj K Sharma
vs. State of Chhatisgarh (2016) 9 SCC 1 will bear
scrutiny. This was a case of suicide by hanging and
Justice M B Lokur, speaking for the Bench held as
follows:-
“19. The proceedings under Section 174 have
a very limited scope. The object of the
proceedings is merely to ascertain whether a
person has died under suspicious
circumstances or an unnatural death and if so
what is the apparent cause of the death. The
question regarding the details as to how the
Page 19 of 35
deceased was assaulted or who assaulted him
or under what circumstances he was assaulted
is foreign to the ambit and scope of the
proceedings under Section 174 of the Code.
Neither in practice nor in law was it
necessary for the police to mention those
details in the inquest report. It is,
therefore, not necessary to enter all the
details of the overt acts in the inquest
report. The procedure under Section 174 is
for the purpose of discovering the cause of
death, and the evidence taken was very
short……
20. …… Sections 174 and 175 of the Code
afford a complete Code in itself for the
purpose of “inquiries” in cases of accidental
or suspicious deaths and are entirely
distinct from the “investigation” under
Section 157 of the Code…..
**** **** **** **** ****
22. In view of the above, we are of the
opinion that the investigation on an inquiry
under Section 174 of the Code is distinct
from the investigation as contemplated under
Section 154 of the Code relating to
commission of a cognizable offence…..”
20. In the present case, the Mumbai Police has
attempted to stretch the purview of Section 174 without
drawing up any FIR and therefore, as it appears, no
investigation pursuant to commission of a cognizable
offence is being carried out by the Mumbai police.
Page 20 of 35
They are yet to register a FIR. Nor they have made a
suitable determination, in terms of Section 175(2)
CrPC. Therefore, it is pre-emptive and premature to
hold that a parallel investigation is being carried out
by the Mumbai Police. In case of a future possibility
of cognizance being taken by two courts in different
jurisdictions, the issue could be resolved under
Section 186 CrPC and other applicable laws. No opinion
is therefore expressed on a future contingency and the
issue is left open to be decided, if needed, in
accordance with law.
21. Following the above, it is declared that the
inquiry conducted under Section 174 CrPC by the Mumbai
police is limited for a definite purpose but is not an
investigation of a crime under Section 157 of the CrPC.
JURISDICTION OF PATNA POLICE TO REGISTER COMPLAINT
22. The Respondent no 2 in his Complaint alleged
commission of a cognizable offence and therefore, it
was incumbent for the police to register the FIR and
commence the investigation. According to the
Complainant, his attempt from Patna to talk to his son
Page 21 of 35
on telephone was thwarted by the accused persons and
the possibility of saving the life of his son through
father son engagement, was missed out. In consequence,
the Complainant lost his only son who at the
appropriate time, as the learned counsel has vividly
submitted, was expected to light the funeral pyre of
the father.
23. Registration of FIR is mandated when information
on cognizable offence is received by the police.
Precedents suggest that at the stage of investigation,
it cannot be said that the concerned police station
does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate
the case. On this aspect the ratio in Lalita Kumari Vs.
Govt. of UP (2014) 2 SCC 1 is relevant where on behalf
of the Constitution Bench, Chief Justice P Sathasivam,
pronounced as under:-
“120.1. The registration of FIR is mandatory under
Section 154 of the Code, if the information
discloses commission of a cognizable offence and
no preliminary inquiry is permissible in such a
situation.
120.2. If the information received does not
disclose a cognizable offence but indicates the
necessity for an inquiry, a preliminary inquiry
may be conducted only to ascertain whether
cognizable offence is disclosed or not.”
Page 22 of 35
24. The interpretation of Sections 177 and 178 of the
CrPC would be relevant on the issue. In Satvinder Kaur
Vs. State (Govt of NCT of Delhi) (1999) 8 SCC 728 for
the Division Bench, Justice M B Shah wrote as under:-
“12. A reading of the aforesaid sections would
make it clear that Section 177 provides for
“ordinary” place of enquiry or trial. Section 178,
inter alia, provides for place of enquiry or trial
when it is uncertain in which of several local
areas an offence was committed or where the offence
was committed partly in one local area and partly
in another and where it consisted of several acts
done in different local areas, it could be enquired
into or tried by a court having jurisdiction over
any of such local areas. Hence, at the stage of
investigation, it cannot be held that the SHO does
not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate
the crime.”
25. Likewise, Justice Arijit Pasayat, in Y Abraham
Ajith vs. Inspector of Police, Chennai & Anr. (2004) 8
SCC 100, writing for the Division Bench pronounced as
follows:-
“12. The crucial question is whether any part
of the cause of action arose within the
jurisdiction of the court concerned. In terms
of Section 177 of the Code, it is the place
where the offence was committed. In essence it
is the cause of action for initiation of the
proceedings against the accused.
Page 23 of 35
13. While in civil cases, normally the
expression “cause of action” is used, in
criminal cases as stated in Section 177 of the
Code, reference is to the local jurisdiction
where the offence is committed. These
variations in etymological expression do not
really make the position different. The
expression “cause of action” is, therefore, not
a stranger to criminal cases.
14. It is settled law that cause of action
consists of a bundle of facts, which give cause
to enforce the legal inquiry for redress in a
court of law. In other words, it is a bundle
of facts, which taken with the law applicable
to them, gives the allegedly affected party a
right to claim relief against the opponent. It
must include some act done by the latter since
in the absence of such an act no cause of action
would possibly accrue or would arise.”
26. When allegation of Criminal Breach of Trust and
Misappropriation is made, on the jurisdictional aspect,
this Court in Asit Bhattacharjee Vs. Hanuman Prasad
Ojha (2007) 5 SCC 786, in the judgment written by
Justice S B Sinha, observed as under:-
“21. Section 181 provides for place of trial in
case of certain offences. Sub-section (4) of
Section 181 was introduced in the Code of Criminal
Procedure in 1973 as there existed conflict in the
decisions of various High Courts as regards
commission of offence of criminal misappropriation
and criminal breach of trust and with that end in
view, it was provided that such an offence may be
inquired into or tried by the court within whose
jurisdiction the accused was bound by law or by
contract to render accounts or return the entrusted
property, but failed to discharge that obligation.
Page 24 of 35
22. The provisions referred to hereinbefore
clearly suggest that even if a part of cause of
action has arisen, the police station concerned
situate within the jurisdiction of the Magistrate
empowered to take cognizance under Section 190(1)
of the Code of Criminal Procedure will have the
jurisdiction to make investigation.”
27. In the later judgment of Naresh Kavarchand Khatri
Vs. State of Gujarat (2008)8 SCC 300, this Court
reiterated the ratio in Satvinder Kaur(supra) and Asit
Bhattacharjee (Supra).
28. Once again, in Rasiklala Dalpatram Thakkar Vs.
State of Gujarat (2010) 1 SCC 1, while approving the
earlier decisions in Satvinder Kaur(supra) in the
judgment rendered by Justice Altamas Kabir as he was
then, the Supreme Court made it very clear that a police
officer cannot refrain from investigating a matter on
territorial ground and the issue can be decided after
conclusion of the investigation. It was thus held:-
“27. In our view, both the trial court as well as
the Bombay High Court had correctly interpreted
the provisions of Section 156 CrPC to hold that it
was not within the jurisdiction of the
investigating agency to refrain itself from
holding a proper and complete investigation merely
upon arriving at a conclusion that the offences
had been committed beyond its territorial
jurisdiction.”
Page 25 of 35
29. Moreover, the allegation relating to criminal
breach of trust and misappropriation of money which
were to be eventually accounted for in Patna (where the
Complainant resides), could prima facie indicate the
lawful jurisdiction of the Patna police. This aspect
was dealt succinctly by Justice J S Khehar, as a member
of the Division Bench in Lee Kun Hee, President,
Samsung Corporation, South Korea and Others Vs. State
of Uttar Pradesh and Ors. (2012) 3 SCC 132 and it was
held as under:-
“38 ******
181. Place of trial in case of certain
offences.—(1)-(3)* * *
(4) Any offence of criminal
misappropriation or of criminal breach of
trust may be inquired into or tried by a
court within whose local jurisdiction the
offence was committed or any part of the
property which is the subject of the
offence was received or retained, or was
required to be returned or accounted for,
by the accused person.”
A perusal of the aforesaid provision leaves
no room for any doubt, that in offences of
the nature as are subject-matter of
consideration in the present controversy,
the court within whose local jurisdiction,
the whole or a part of the consideration
Page 26 of 35
“… were required to be returned or
accounted for.…” would have jurisdiction
in the matter.”
30. Having regard to the law enunciated by this Court
as noted above, it must be held that the Patna police
committed no illegality in registering the Complaint.
Looking at the nature of the allegations in the
Complaint which also relate to misappropriation and
breach of trust, the exercise of jurisdiction by the
Bihar Police appears to be in order. At the stage of
investigation, they were not required to transfer the
FIR to Mumbai police. For the same reason, the Bihar
government was competent to give consent for
entrustment of investigation to the CBI and as such the
ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful.
OPTIONS BEFORE MUMBAI POLICE
31. The Patna police although found to be competent to
investigate the allegation in the Complaint, the FIR
suggests that most of the transactions/incidents
alleged in the Complaint occurred within the
territorial jurisdiction of the State of Maharashtra.
The Mumbai Police was inquiring into the unnatural
Page 27 of 35
death of the complainant’s son under section 174 of the
CrPC. So far, their inquiry has not resulted in any FIR
suggesting commencement of investigation on the
criminal aspects, if any. However, the incidents
referred to in the Complaint does indicate that the
Mumbai police also possess the jurisdiction to
undertake investigation on those circumstances.
Therefore, in the event of a case being registered also
at Mumbai, the consent for the investigation by the CBI
under Section 6 of the DSPE Act can be competently
given by Maharashtra Government.
INVESTIGATION ENTRUSTMENT TO CBI
32. While the CBI cannot conduct any investigation
without the consent of the concerned state as mandated
under section 6, the powers of the Constitutional
Courts are not fettered by the statutory restriction
of the DSPE Act. For this proposition, one can usefully
refer to State of West Bengal Vs. Sampat Lal (1985) 1
SCC 317 where Justice Ranganath Mishra in his judgment
for the 3 judges Bench, held that:-
“13. ……….It is certainly not for this Court at the
present stage to examine and come to a conclusion
as to whether this was a case of suicide or murder.
If as a result of investigation, evidence is
Page 28 of 35
gathered and a trial takes place the Sessions Judge
will decide that controversy and it may be that in
due course such controversy may be canvassed before
this Court in some form or the other. It would,
therefore, be wholly inappropriate at this stage
to enter into such a question.…………In our considered
opinion, Section 6 of the Act does not apply when
the Court gives a direction to the CBI to conduct
an investigation and counsel for the parties
rightly did not dispute this position……………”
33. Similarly, the Constitution Bench in the judgment
authored by Justice D K Jain in State of W B Vs.
Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights (2010) 3
SCC 571 pronounced as follows:-
“68. Thus, having examined the rival contentions
in the context of the constitutional scheme, we
conclude as follows:
(v) Restriction on Parliament by the Constitution
and restriction on the executive by Parliament
under an enactment, do not amount to restriction
on the power of the Judiciary under Articles 32
and 226 of the Constitution.
(vi) If in terms of Entry 2 of List II of the
Seventh Schedule on the one hand and Entry 2-A and
Entry 80 of List I on the other, an investigation
by another agency is permissible subject to grant
of consent by the State concerned, there is no
reason as to why, in an exceptional situation, the
Court would be precluded from exercising the same
power which the Union could exercise in terms of
the provisions of the statute. In our opinion,
exercise of such power by the constitutional courts
would not violate the doctrine of separation of
powers. In fact, if in such a situation the Court
fails to grant relief, it would be failing in its
constitutional duty.
Page 29 of 35
(vii) When the Special Police Act itself provides
that subject to the consent by the State, CBI can
take up investigation in relation to the crime
which was otherwise within the jurisdiction of the
State police, the Court can also exercise its
constitutional power of judicial review and direct
CBI to take up the investigation within the
jurisdiction of the State. The power of the High
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution cannot
be taken away, curtailed or diluted by Section 6
of the Special Police Act. Irrespective of there
being any statutory provision acting as a
restriction on the powers of the Courts, the
restriction imposed by Section 6 of the Special
Police Act on the powers of the Union, cannot be
read as restriction on the powers of the
constitutional courts. Therefore, exercise of
power of judicial review by the High Court, in our
opinion, would not amount to infringement of either
the doctrine of separation of power or the federal
structure.”
34. As noted earlier, the FIR at Patna was subsequently
transferred to the CBI with consent of the Bihar
government during pendency of this Transfer Petition.
However, in future, if commission of cognizable offence
under section 175(2) CrPC is determined, the
possibility of parallel investigation by the Mumbai
Police cannot be ruled out. Section 6 of the DSPE Act,
1946 read with Section 5 prescribe the requirement of
consent from the State government, before entrustment
of investigation to the CBI. As the CBI has already
registered a case and commenced investigation at the
Page 30 of 35
instance of the Bihar government, uncertainty and
confusion must be avoided in the event of Mumbai Police
also deciding to simultaneously investigate the
cognizable offence, based on their finding in the
inquiry proceeding. Therefore, it would be appropriate
to decide at this stage itself as to who should conduct
the investigation on all the attending circumstances
relating to the death of the actor Sushant Singh
Rajput. This issue becomes relevant only if another FIR
is registered on the same issue, at Mumbai. A decision
by this Court on the point would confer legitimacy to
the investigation.
DIRECTION ON INVESTIGATION
35. The conflict between the two State governments on,
who amongst the two is competent to investigate the
case, is apparent here. In K.V. Rajendran Vs.
Superintendent of Police, CBCID, Chennai & Ors. (2013)
12 SCC 480, the 3 judges Bench in the judgment authored
by Justice Dr B S Chauhan held that transfer of
investigation must be in rare and exceptional cases in
order to do complete justice between the parties and
to instil straight confidence in the public mind.
Page 31 of 35
While the steps taken by the Mumbai police in the
limited inquiry under Section 174 CrPC may not be
faulted on the material available before this Court,
considering the apprehension voiced by the stakeholders
of unfair investigation, this Court must strive to
ensure that search for the truth is undertaken by an
independent agency, not controlled by either of the two
state governments. Most importantly, the credibility
of the investigation and the investigating authority,
must be protected.
36. The ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be
lawful. In the event a new case is registered at Mumbai
on the same issue, in the fitness of things, it would
be appropriate if the latter case too gets investigated
by the same agency, on the strength of this Court’s
order. Such enabling order will make it possible for
the CBI to investigate the new case, avoiding the
rigors of Section 6 of the DSPE Act, requiring consent
from the State of Maharashtra.
37. In Monica Kumar (Dr.) and Anr. Vs. State of Uttar
Pradesh and Others (2008) 8 SCC 781, Justice L.S. Panta
Page 32 of 35
in his judgment, referred to the inherent power
conferred on this Court and stated the following:-
“45. Under Article 142 of the
Constitution this Court in exercise of
its jurisdiction may pass such decree or
make such order as is necessary for doing
complete justice in any “cause” or
“matter” pending before it. The
expression “cause” or “matter” would
include any proceeding pending in court
and it would cover almost every kind of
proceeding in court including civil or
criminal. ………………………..This Court's power
under Article 142(1) to do “complete
justice” is entirely of different level
and of a different quality. What would be
the need of “complete justice” in a cause
or matter would depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case and while
exercising that power the Court would
take into consideration the express
provisions of a substantive statute. Any
prohibition or restriction contained in
ordinary laws cannot act as a limitation
on the constitutional power of this
Court. Once this Court has seisin of a
cause or matter before it, it has power
to issue any order or direction to do
“complete justice” in the matter.”
38. The above ratio makes it amply clear that the
Supreme Court in a deserving case, can invoke Article
142 powers to render justice. The peculiar
circumstances in this case require that complete
justice is done in this matter. How this is to be
achieved must now be decided.
Page 33 of 35
39. As noted earlier, as because both states are making
acrimonious allegations of political interference
against each other, the legitimacy of the investigation
has come under a cloud. Accusing fingers are being
pointed and people have taken the liberty to put out
their own conjectures and theories. Such comments,
responsible or otherwise, have led to speculative
public discourse which have hogged media limelight.
These developments unfortunately have the propensity
to delay and misdirect the investigation. In such
situation, there is reasonable apprehension of truth
being a casualty and justice becoming a victim.
40. The actor Sushant Singh Rajput was a talented actor
in the Mumbai film world and died well before his full
potential could be realised. His family, friends and
admirers are keenly waiting the outcome of the
investigation so that all the speculations floating
around can be put to rest. Therefore a fair, competent
and impartial investigation is the need of the hour.
The expected outcome then would be, a measure of
justice for the Complainant, who lost his only son.
Page 34 of 35
For the petitioner too, it will be the desired justice
as she herself called for a CBI investigation. The
dissemination of the real facts through unbiased
investigation would certainly result in justice for the
innocents, who might be the target of vilification
campaign. Equally importantly, when integrity and
credibility of the investigation is discernible, the
trust, faith and confidence of the common man in the
judicial process will resonate. When truth meets
sunshine, justice will not prevail on the living alone
but after Life’s fitful fever, now the departed will
also sleep well. Satyameva Jayate.
41. In such backdrop, to ensure public confidence in
the investigation and to do complete justice in the
matter, this Court considers it appropriate to invoke
the powers conferred by Article 142 of the
Constitution. As a Court exercising lawful jurisdiction
for the assigned roster, no impediment is seen for
exercise of plenary power in the present matter.
Therefore while according approval for the ongoing CBI
investigation, if any other case is registered on the
death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the
Page 35 of 35
surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the
CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well.
It is ordered accordingly.
42. Before parting, it is made clear that the
conclusion and observations in this order is only for
disposal of this petition and should have no bearing
for any other purpose.
43. The Transfer Petition is disposed of with the above
order.
…………………………………………J.
 [HRISHIKESH ROY]
NEW DELHI
AUGUST 19, 2020

when the allegations of bias made by him against the members of the Commission merely on the basis of newspaper reports and nothing more, are liable to be rejected outright.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION
      CRL. M.P. No.70798/2020
                        IN
WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 177 OF 2020
Ghanshyam Upadhyay            .…  Petitioner(s)
Versus
State of U.P. & Ors.                  …. Respondent(s)
O R D E R
1. The   petitioner   in   this   Criminal   Miscellaneous
Petition/application   is   the   petitioner   in   W.P   (Crl.)
No.177/2020.  The said writ petition was filed under Article
32   of  the   Constitution   of   India,   in   the  nature   of   public
interest seeking for issue of Writ of Mandamus and direct
the respondent Nos.1 to 3 in the writ petition to initiate
action with regard to the destruction of  residential building
and   other   properties   of   accused   –Vikas   Dubey   and   to
safeguard the life of the accused.   Before the petition was
taken up for consideration certain other developments had
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
2
occurred, inasmuch as the said Vikas Dubey was killed by
the police in an alleged encounter.  Along with the said writ
petition, certain other writ petitions which were also filed in
public interest seeking for an appropriate enquiry in that
regard were tagged.  All the related writ petitions were taken
up for consideration together.  The State Government in a
reply filed to the said writ petitions, apart from referring to
the other aspects of the matter had also indicated that the
Government   having   taken   serious   cognizance   of   all   the
events, apart from constituting a Special Investigation Team
had also constituted a Commission of Inquiry under the
Commission   of   Inquiries   Act,   1951   headed   by   a   former
Judge of  Allahabad High Court.  In that regard it is to be
noted that Shri Justice Shashikant Agrawal, a former Judge
had been appointed.
2.   In the course of the proceedings before this Court,
based   on   a   suggestion   made   by   this   Court,   the   State
Government   had   undertaken   the   exercise   to   expand   the
composition of the Commission. Accordingly, in addition to
the former High Court Judge who had been appointed the
State Government suggested the name of Dr. Justice B.S.
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
3
Chauhan, a former Judge of this Court to be the Chairman
and Mr. K.L. Gupta, IPS, Former Director General of Police
to   be   a   Member.     This   Court   having   considered   it
appropriate   had   through   the   order   dated   22.07.2020
accepted the constitution of the Commission of Inquiry in
the said manner and the writ petition was directed to be
listed   along   with   the   report   of   the   Commission.     The
petitioners were also granted the liberty of applying to the
Inquiry Commission to be heard in the matter.   
3. When   this   is   the   position   the   instant   criminal
miscellaneous petition is filed by the petitioner seeking that
the   Judicial   Commission   constituted   by   the   State   be
scrapped   and   a   SIT   as   sought   by   the   petitioner   be
constituted by this Court to carry out investigation on all
issues raised by the petitioner.  The said prayer is made by
the petitioner alleging conflict of interest and likely bias on
the part of the Chairman, Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan and
Shri K.L. Gupta, the Member.  The petitioner in that regard
has relied upon an Article published in “The Wire” dated
29.07.2020. 
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
4
4. We have heard the petitioner­in­person and perused
the petition papers.
5. At   the   outset   it   is   necessary   to   notice   that   the
petitioner   herein   had   filed   the   applications   in   I.A.
No.68207/2020   and   I.A.   No.67940/2020   after   the
constitution   of   the   Inquiry   Commission   raising   certain
objections with regard to Shri K.L. Gupta being the Member
of the Commission since according to the petitioner he had
made   certain   comments   in   favour   of   the   police   in   the
interview given to the media.  This Court having considered
the same and on not finding it objectionable, dismissed the
application through the order dated 28.07.2020 holding the
application to be devoid of merits.   Despite the same, the
very same contentions are urged in the instant application
as well and has also raised an additional contention that the
said Shri K.L. Gupta is related to Shri Mohit Agarwal, the IG
of   Kanpur   Zone.     Further,   objection   is   raised   to   the
continuation of Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan as the Chairman
of the Commission since the news report relied on by the
petitioner states that his brother and relative are legislators
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
5
from the Bhartiya Janata Party which runs the Government
in Uttar Pradesh. 
6. As noted, the entire basis for making the allegations as
contained in the miscellaneous petition is an Article relied
on by the petitioner said to have been published in the
newspaper.  There is no other material on record to confirm
the   truth   or   otherwise   of   the   statement   made   in   the
newspaper.   In our view this Court will have to be very
circumspect while accepting such contentions based only on
certain   newspaper   reports.     This   Court   in   a   series   of
decisions   has   repeatedly   held   that   the   newspaper   item
without any further proof is of no evidentiary value.   The
said principle laid down has thereafter been taken note in
several public interest litigations to reject the allegations
contained in the petition supported by newspaper report.  It
would be appropriate to notice the decision in the case of
Kushum Lata vs. Union of India & Ors. (2006) 6 SCC 180
wherein it is observed thus, “….  It is also noticed that the
petitions   are   based   on   newspaper   reports   without   any
attempt to verify their authenticity.  As observed by this Court
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
6
in   several   cases,   newspaper   reports   do   not   constitute
evidence.   A petition based on unconfirmed news reports,
without verifying their authenticity should not normally be
entertained.   As noted above, such petitions do not provide
any basis for verifying the correctness of statements made
and information given in the petition.”     
7. This Court in the case of Rohit Pandey vs. Union of
India  (2005) 13 SCC 702 while considering the petition
purporting to be in public interest filed by a Member of the
Legal Fraternity had come down heavily on the petitioner
since the said petition was based only on two newspaper
reports without further verification. 
8. In the above backdrop, in the instant case it is to be
noticed   that   the   Chairman   and   a   Member   of   the
Commission   had   held   high   Constitutional   positions   and
while making allegations the petitioner has based his claim
only on the newspaper report and the manner in which the
averments are made in the application is unacceptable.
9. In   any   case,   the   allegation   that   the   brother   of   the
chairman of the Commission is a legislator belonging to or
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
7
supporting the party in power and that the member of the
Commission is related to the IG of Police (Kanpur Range) are
not sufficient to come to the conclusion that it would lead to
bias   or   conflict   of   interest   since   there   is   no   indication
whatsoever   as   to   the   nature   of   influence   such   of   those
relatives would be able to exert and as to whether they are
in a dominant position.
10. It must be remembered that we are dealing here with
an Inquiry Commission constituted under the Commissions
of Inquiry Act, whose functions and role are by now well
defined.   As   held   by   the   Constitution   Bench   in  Ram
Krishna Dalmia vs. Justice S. R. Tendolkar, 1959 SCR
279, a commission constituted under the Commissions of
Inquiry Act, 1952 is empowered merely to investigate, record
its   findings   and   make   its   recommendations.   These
recommendations   are   not   enforceable  proprio   vigore.  The
view taken in  Ram  Krishna  Dalmia, was reinforced by a
larger bench in  State  of  Karnataka  vs.  Union  of   India,
(1977) 4 SCC 608. In fact, this Court went in Sham Kant
vs. State of Maharashtra, 1992 Suppl. (2) SCC 521, to the
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
8
extent   of   holding   that   the   findings   of   the   Inquiry
Commission are not binding on the Court, while dealing
with an appeal arising out of conviction and sentence of a
police officer. The police officer who was the appellant before
this Court in the said case sought to rely upon the findings
of   the   Inquiry   Commission   that   the   victim   of   custodial
violence could have sustained injuries prior to his arrest.
But  this  Court  refused  to   rely  upon  the  findings  of  the
Inquiry Commission to overturn the conviction of the police
officer.
11. In  K.   Vijaya   Bhaskar   Reddy   vs.   Government   of
Andhra Pradesh, AIR 1996 AP 62, a Division Bench of the
Andhra Pradesh High Court had an occasion to deal with
the challenge to the appointment of a one­man Commission
of Inquiry under the Commissions of Inquiry Act, 1952. One
of the grounds of challenge was bias on the part of the
appointee. After pointing out that bias by interest which
disqualifies a Judge, may fall into two broad classes namely,
(i) bias arising out of pecuniary interest, and (ii) bias arising
out of personal interest in the outcome, on account of the
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
9
Judge’s relationship with one of the parties, the Division
Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court quoted Massey
from his Treatise on Administrative Law to the following
effect:  “personal   bias   arises   from   a   certain   relationship
equation   between   the   deciding   authority   and   the   parties
which incline him unfavourably or otherwise on the side of
one of the parties before him”.
12. Though a contention was raised in K. Vijaya Bhaskar
Reddy  that   the   principle   has   no   application   to   the
proceedings   before   an   Inquiry   Commission,   which   are
basically inquisitorial and not judicial or quasi­judicial or
adversarial, the Division Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High
Court held that the duty to act fairly and impartially flowed
out   of   the   principles   of   natural   justice.   Therefore,   the
Andhra   Pradesh   High   Court   upheld   the   right   of   the
petitioner therein to raise the plea of bias. However, the
Court   held   that   to   sustain   a   plea   of   reasonable
apprehension   of   bias,   (i)   there   must   be   cogent,
uncontroverted and undisputed material, and (ii) the court
cannot go by vague, whimsical and capricious suspicion.
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
10
Applying these principles, the Andhra Pradesh High Court
rejected the challenge made by a former Chief Minister of
the state, to the appointment of a retired Judge as one­man
Commission   to   inquire   into   certain   alleged   irregularities
committed by him while in office.
13. Thus, even in a case where the petitioner before the
Court   was   a   person   against   whom   the   Commission   of
Inquiry was constituted, the Court applied strict standards,
for testing the allegation of personal bias against the Inquiry
Commission.
14. In the  case on  hand, the Petitioner is a lawyer by
profession who practices in Mumbai and has come up by
way of Public Interest Litigation. Therefore, the allegations of
bias made by him against the members of the Commission
merely on the basis of newspaper reports and nothing more,
are liable to be rejected outright.
15. The petitioner has relied on the decision of this Court
in the case of  Ranjit  Thakur  vs. Union of India & Ors.
(1987) 4 SCC 611 to contend that this Court held that the
Likelihood   of   bias   in   the   mind   of   the   party   would   be
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
11
sufficient to complain.  The facts in the said case led to such
conclusion   inasmuch   as   the   nature   of   involvement   of
respondent No.4 in punishing the appellant in that case and
thereafter participating lead to bias and that position was
accepted. The facts involved herein are entirely different.
The proceedings herein are not an inter se determination of
legal issues between the parties but a fact­finding exercise.
The petitioner herein is an advocate who practices law in
Mumbai, Maharashtra and is in no way connected to the
incident in question which took place in U.P.  However, the
petition filed by him in public interest was accepted and the
Commission of Inquiry consisting of persons who had held
high position has been constituted.  The enquiry held would
be in public domain and the petitioner has already been
granted the liberty of participating therein.   The report of
the enquiry is ordered to be filed in the petitions which were
filed before this Court.  Therefore, there would be sufficient
safeguard to the manner in which the inquiry would be
held.     We   find   that   the   petitioner   has   been   raising
unnecessary apprehensions and repeated applications are
being filed which in fact is hampering the process of inquiry.
WP (Crl) No.177/2020
12
16. For all the aforestated reasons we are of the opinion
that the instant petition/application is without any merit
and the same is accordingly dismissed.
..…………....................CJI.
      (S. A. Bobde)
…..…………....................J.
     (A. S. Bopanna)
..…..………......................J
      (V. Ramasubramanian)
AUGUST 19, 2020
NEW DELHI
WP (Crl) No.177/2020

As per the FIR three ‘unidentified’ persons had robbed the victim but PW-1 admitted during his cross-examination that he previously knew Mohd Aslam who was a friend of his children - is entitled for benefit of doubt



REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1551 of 2010
[Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 3388 of 2010]
Mohd. Anwar ..... Appellant(s)
 VERSUS
The State (N.C.T. of Delhi) .....Respondent(s)
JUDGMENT
Surya Kant, J:
The present criminal appeal, which has been heard through video
conferencing, is at the instance of Mohd. Anwar who impugnes the
judgment dated 22.02.2010 of the High Court of Delhi whereby his appeal
against a judgment dated 27/29.04.2004 of the Additional Sessions Judge,
Karkardooma, convicting and sentencing him under Section 394 of the
Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”) and Section 25 of the Arms Act, 1959, was
turned down.
FACTS & CASE HISTORY
2. The case of the prosecution is that the victim-complainant, Tabban
Khan (PW-1), was riding his motorcycle on the main road near Shahdara
around 11:30PM on 17.05.2001, when he stopped to ease himself near a
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fishpond. Suddenly, three boys (including the appellant) caught hold of him
and started assaulting him. They were armed with a knife and revolver.
Upon extortion, the complainant handed over a bundle of five-hundredrupees notes totalling around thirty thousand (Rs 30,000) to the boys, who
then contemplated murdering him by stabbing, so that he would not report
the matter to the police. Hearing commotion of passers-by, the three boys
left the complainant and ran towards a warehouse. The complainant then
returned to his home and reported the matter to the jurisdictional police the
following evening. This complaint was subsequently converted into an FIR
on 20.05.2001 at 7:45PM.
3. A police party, on 20.05.2001 at about 8:30PM, during routine
checking of buses near GT Road, noticed three boys surreptitiously
deboarding a bus through the rear door. On suspicion, Constable Vinod
Kumar (PW-4) and Constable Prakash Chand (PW-7) chased and
apprehended them, and recovered a prohibited buttondar knife from the
appellant and his co-accused. They also confessed to having robbed the
present complainant. All three were arrested and produced before the
Metropolitan Magistrate for a Test Identification Parade (“TIP”) the following
day, which they refused to undergo.
4. The prosecution examined twelve witnesses during trial which
included the victim-complainant (PW-1), the Metropolitan Magistrate who
sought to conduct the TIP proceedings (PW-10) and a total of ten
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policemen. Sketches of the knife, arrest memos, site plans, and recovered
money and weapons were admitted in evidence. The appellant and his coaccused plainly denied the allegations and claimed that the case was
planted by the police upon their failure to pay a bribe of rupees twenty-five
thousand. They, however, led no evidence in defence.
5. The trial Court discarded the defence plea for want of supporting
material, and further found the likelihood of false implication being remote.
All twelve prosecution witnesses were noted to have withstood crossexamination and their testimonies were designated as being stellar. The
trial Court explained the absence of any public witness as being nothing
abnormal given the circumstances of the case. The unreasoned refusal of
the accused to take part in the TIP proceedings was found to be highly
incriminating and substantiating their guilt.
6. The trial Court, thus, held all three accused guilty of robbery with
attempt to cause grievous hurt and sentenced them to seven years
rigorous imprisonment under Section 397/34 of IPC, five years rigorous
imprisonment under Section 392/34 of IPC, two years rigorous
imprisonment under Section 25 of the Arms Act and fine of rupees five
thousand (or imprisonment of six months in lieu thereof).
7. The appellant approached the High Court which dismissed the
charge under Section 397 of IPC, and instead convicted him under Section
394 with a reduced sentence of only two years rigorous imprisonment.
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Another co-accused, Mohd Aslam, was acquitted on charges of robbery as
the version of the complainant qua him was found doubtful. The High Court
noted that although as per the FIR three ‘unidentified’ persons had robbed
the victim but PW-1 admitted during his cross-examination that he
previously knew Mohd Aslam who was a friend of his children.
8. As far as the present appellant was concerned, the High Court
specifically noted that no animosity or motive for false implication had been
proferred by him, and that there were no contradictions in the testimonies
of the witnesses as regards his role in the crime. The minor delay in lodging
of the FIR was considered insignificant, for it was a late time occurrence
and the victim could therefore not be expected to visit a police station in
such terrorised mental state of mind. Use of a revolver was considered an
improvement for it had not been mentioned in the FIR. Considering the
absence of any specific weapon being attributed to the appellant, charges
of robbery with grievous hurt or attempt to murder were dropped.
9. Learned counsel for the appellant raised new arguments of juvenility
and insanity before the High Court. It was claimed that Mohd Anwar was
merely 15 years at the time of occurence and was undergoing treatment for
a mental disorder at a government hospital. This was supported through a
copy of an OPD card and the testimony of the appellant’s mother who
stated that he sometimes had to be kept chained at home to prevent harm
to himself and others. The High Court took notice of the appellant’s age
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being 21 years at the time of recording of his Section 313 Cr.P.C. statement
in March 2004 and concluded that the appellant would therefore have been
an able-minded major at the time of incident in May, 2001.
CONTENTIONS OF PARTIES
10. These very same arguments have again been canvassed before us
by learned counsel for the appellant. Assailing the judgments of the High
Court and the trial Court on the charge of robbery, he urged that the
prosecution failed to discharge its burden of proof beyond reasonable
doubt. He asserted that lack of independent witnesses, absence of injuries
on the person of the complainant as well as the inconsistency in the
complainant’s version regarding his knowledge of co-accused Mohd Aslam,
all together evidenced that no incident of robbery ever took place. Further,
the FIR had been lodged after an unexplained delay of three days, despite
the police station being walking distance from the site of the incident, thus
suggesting that the entire proceedings were concocted.
11. Learned Additional Solicitor General, on the other hand, buttressed
the judgment of the High Court by highlighting the various evidences and
consistent testimonies of the twelve witnesses. He maintained that the
belated defences of juvenility and insanity were an afterthought, and that
the High Court had already taken a lenient view by reducing the sentence
from seven to two years.
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ANALYSIS
12. At the outset, it must be highlighted that appellate Courts ought not to
routinely re-appreciate the evidence in a criminal case. This is not only for
reasons of procedure, expediency, or finality; but because the trial Court is
best placed to holistically appreciate the demeanour of a witness and other
evidence on record. Given the concurrent finding of the Courts below on
key aspects of the robbery, we do not find it a fit case for such re-appraisal
of evidence.
13. Further, the testimonies of the witnesses are indeed impeccable and
corroborative of each other. The crime of robbery with hurt has been
established by the testimony of PW-1 and the other evidence on record.
The complainant (PW-1) had no motive to falsely implicate the appellate
and/or to allow the real culprits to go scot-free. The refusal to participate in
the TIP proceedings and the lack of any reasons on the spot, undoubtedly
establish the appellant’s guilty conscience and ought to be given
substantial weight.1
 The three-day delay in registration of FIR, as projected
by the appellant, is devoid of factual basis. The original record shows that
the complaint was, in fact, registered within a few hours of the incident on
18.05.2001. It was because of preliminary police enquiry that another two
days passed between reporting and subsequent lodging of FIR on
1
 Ashwani Kumar v. State of Punjab, (2015) 6 SCC 308, ¶ 19.
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20.05.2001.
14. Pleas of unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of IPC or mitigating
circumstances like juvenility of age, ordinarily ought to be raised during trial
itself. Belated claims not only prevent proper production and appreciation of
evidence, but they also undermine the genuineness of the defence’s case.
15. As noted by the High Court, no evidence in the form of a birth
certificate, school record or medical test was brought forth; nor any expert
examination has been sought by the appellant. Instead, the statement
recorded under Section 313 CrPC shows that the appellant was above 18
years around the time of the incident, which is a far departure from the
claimed age of 15 years.
16. The plea of mental disorder too remains unsubstantiated. No
deposition was made by any witness, nor did the appellant himself claim
any such impairment during his Section 313 CrPC statement. On the
contrary, his conduct of running away from the spot of the crime on
17.05.2001 as well as the attempt to escape from the bus on 20.05.2001
evidence an elevated level of mental intellect. The answers recorded in
response to the questions put forth by the Additional Sessions Judge at the
Sec 313 CrPC stage are also not mechanical or laconic. For example, the
appellant explains his refusal to participate in the TIP proceedings by
alleging that his face had already been shown by the police to the
complainant.
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17. Mere production of photocopy of an OPD card and statement of
mother on affidavit have little, if any, evidentiary value. In order to
successfully claim defence of mental unsoundness under Section 84 of
IPC, the accused must show by preponderance of probabilities that he/she
suffered from a serious-enough mental disease or infirmity which would
affect the individual’s ability to distinguish right from wrong.2
 Further, it must
be established that the accused was afflicted by such disability particularly
at the time of the crime and that but for such impairment, the crime would
not have been committed. The reasons given by the High Court for
disbelieving these defences are thus well reasoned and unimpeachable.
18. Regardless thereto and given the ingrained principles of our criminal
law jurisprudence which mandates that substantive justice triumph
limitations of procedure, this Court on 22.07.2020 tried to enquire into the
mental health of the appellant, by requesting the learned Additional Solicitor
General to get the appellant mentally examined. However, notwithstanding
such efforts, the appellant who had been granted bail by this Court earlier,
is untraceable. The government counsel submits that the appellant is not
residing at his claimed address since the past eight years, and even the
appellant’s own counsel fairly admitted to not having received any
instructions from his client since the past ten years. We are thus left with no
option but to hold that the plea of mental illness is nothing but a made-up
story, and is far from genuine.
2 TN Lakshmaiah v. State of Karnataka, (2002) 1 SCC 219, ¶ 9.
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CONCLUSION
19. Given such inability of the appellant to establish juvenility or insanity,
raise any doubt regarding guilt; and considering the detailed reasons
accorded by the High Court, the reliable testimony of twelve witnesses as
well as the leniency shown in sentencing, we see no reasons to interfere
with the impugned order(s). The appeal is accordingly dismissed. The
appellant’s bail bonds are cancelled and the respondent-State is directed to
take the appellant into custody to serve the remainder of his sentence.
…………………………….. J.
(N.V. RAMANA)
…………………………… J.
(S. ABDUL NAZEER)
…………………………...J.
(SURYA KANT)
NEW DELHI
DATED : 19.08.2020
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