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Thursday, June 11, 2020

reimbursement of the amount of sales tax levied in respect of the works contracts executed by it. The High Court also directed the Opposite Parties to grant appropriate reimbursement as claimed by the writ petitioner in terms of Clause 45.2 of the General Conditions of Contract2 under the National Competitive Bidding Contract3 while quashing the clarification Circular dated 07.11.2001 issued by the Government of Orissa in its Department of Water Resources.

REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2516 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 32044 of 2011)
STATE OF ORISSA …APPELLANT(S)

 Vs.
M/S B. ENGINEERS & BUILDERS LTD. & ORS. …RESPONDENT(S)
JUDGMENT
Dinesh Maheshwari, J.
1. Before entering into the subject matter, we may notice at the
outset that this petition for special leave to appeal is barred by limitation
by a period of 274 days. Though objections have been raised on behalf of
the contesting respondent against the prayer for condonation of delay but,
the record shows that notices on the application seeking condonation of
delay as also on the petition for leave to appeal were issued way back on
18.11.2011 and for a long time, the matter remained pending while
awaiting service on the respondents. Ultimately, after completion of
service, we had heard learned counsel for the contesting parties on
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merits. Having regard to the circumstances of the case and after having
heard the contesting parties on merits, we find no reason to close the
matter only on the ground of delay. Accordingly, delay in filing is
condoned.
1.1. Leave granted.
2. This appeal by special leave is directed against the judgment and
order dated 05.08.2008 as passed by the Orissa High Court at Cuttack in
W.P. (C) No. 8857 of 2003, whereby the High Court accepted the claim of
the respondent No. 1 of present appeal1
, for reimbursement of the
amount of sales tax levied in respect of the works contracts executed by
it. The High Court also directed the Opposite Parties to grant appropriate
reimbursement as claimed by the writ petitioner in terms of Clause 45.2 of
the General Conditions of Contract2
 under the National Competitive
Bidding Contract3
 while quashing the clarification Circular dated
07.11.2001 issued by the Government of Orissa in its Department of
Water Resources.
2.1. The appellant State of Orissa has challenged the order so passed
by the High Court while essentially raising the questions concerning the
nature and implication of the sales tax, levied in relation to the works
contracts executed by the writ petitioner, under the Orissa Sales Tax Act,
19474
 as amended in terms of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment)
1 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the writ petitioner’ or ‘the contractor company’.
2 ‘GCC’ for short
3 ‘NCB’ for short
4 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the Act of 1947’
2
Act, 19825
; and concerning the operation and import of the relevant
stipulations in the contracts in question.
3. The factual and background aspects of the matter, being not of
much dispute and confined to a narrow compass, may be noticed, in brief,
as follows:
3.1. The respondent No. 1 of this appeal, said to be a company of
engineers and builders, who had been engaged in undertaking various
works contracts, responded to the tenders floated by the respondent Nos.
6 to 18 (various offices of the Government of Orissa) and, on being
determined as the lowest tenderer, was awarded the contracts from time
to time.
3.2. It is not in dispute that the aforesaid contracts awarded to the
respondent No. 1 carried the stipulations regarding taxes in Clause 45 of
GCC. The claim of the respondent No. 1 for reimbursement of sales tax
had been essentially based on Clause 45.2 of GCC, which carried the
stipulation that any Central or State sales tax and other taxes on
completed items of works (excluding penalty), as may be levied and paid
by the contractor shall be reimbursed by the employer on proof of
payment (and) on production of assessment certificate.
3.3. The sales tax regime in the State of Orissa is primarily governed
by the Act of 1947. By way of the Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act,
1984 and the Orissa Sales Tax (Amendment) Act, 19856
, the
5 Hereinafter also referred to as ‘the forty-sixth amendment’
6 These amendments were introduced after the forty-sixth amendment of the Constitution whereby,
Clause (29-A) was inserted to Article 366 and it was, inter alia, provided that the expression “tax on
the sale or purchase of goods” includes a tax on the transfer of property in goods involved in the
3
amendments were brought about in the Act of 1947 with effect from
07.04.1984 whereby, inter alia, the definition of expression “Works
contract” was inserted; the definition of the expression “Sale” was
expanded so as to include therein the transfer of property in goods
involved in the execution of a works contract; and specific meaning was
also assigned to the expression “taxable turnover” in respect of a works
contract for the purpose of the rate of tax payable by a dealer. The rate of
tax payable by a dealer on the “taxable turnover” in respect of “works
contract” was fixed at 4%.
3.4. On 04.11.1986, the Government of Orissa, in its Department of
Irrigation and Power, issued a Circular to the effect that in case of works
contract executed on or after 07.04.1984, containing the specific clause
for reimbursement of sales tax, the Department of Irrigation and Power
would be liable for reimbursement of the amount of sales tax actually paid
by the concerned contractor on production of necessary documentary
evidence. Pursuant to these observations and directions, reimbursement
of the sales tax paid by the contractor company in respect of assessment
years 1995-1996 to 1997-1998 was allowed.
3.5. Later on, the State Government issued a notification under
Section 5 of the Act of 1947 whereby, the rate of tax payable by a dealer
on the taxable turnover in respect of the works contract was increased to
8%. Thereafter, by way of the orders of assessment for the years 1998-
1999 to 2000-2001, the Assessing Authority levied sales tax @ 8% on the
execution of a works contract.
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taxable turnover in respect of the works contracts executed by the
contractor company. With reference to such assessments, the contractor
company claimed reimbursement of the sales tax paid in respect of the
works contracts executed by it.
3.6. However, in the meantime, the Government of Orissa, in its
Department of Water Resources, issued another Circular dated
27.01.2000 to the Engineers-incharge of various offices and projects that
the question as to whether sales tax deducted from the bills of the
contractor and paid to the sales tax officer will be again reimbursed to the
contractor whose quoted price was inclusive of all taxes as per Clause
13.3 of the Instructions to Bidders7
, was under active consideration; and it
was directed that no reimbursement of sales tax be made under Clause
45.2 of GCC until clarification was communicated in that regard.
3.7. Thereafter, on 07.11.2001, the State Government, in its
Department of Water Resources, issued the impugned Circular, said to be
a clarificatory one, stating that a completed item of works, for which the
contractor had entered into an agreement with the department, was either
an immovable property or a works contract and in either case, was not
exigible to sales tax; and therefore, the question of payment of sales tax
on such immovable property or works contract and consequential
reimbursement by the department as per Clause 45.2 of the General
Conditions of Contract, or similar provision in other contracts, did not
arise. Accordingly, the State Government instructed its Engineers7 ‘ITB’ for short
5
incharge not to reimburse the sales tax levied on cement, steel etc.; and
also directed for recovery of the amount from the contractor wherever any
such amount of sales tax had been reimbursed. These directions of the
Government were followed up by another Circular dated 19.06.2002 to
the same effect.
3.8. In view of the aforementioned Circulars dated 07.11.2001 and
19.06.2002, its claim, for reimbursement of the sales tax paid, being in
jeopardy and rather, the proposition for recovery of the amount already
reimbursed looming large, the contractor company preferred the writ
petition leading to this appeal, while seeking the following reliefs: –
“(i) Issue a Rule Nisi Calling upon the Opposite Parties to
show cause as to why the alleged clarification dated
07.11.2001 under Annexure-1, and the subsequent direction
for recovery of the amount earlier reimbursed, vide letter
dated 19.6.2002 under Annexure-3 ought not to be declared
illegal, invalid and non-est in the eyes of law;
And
(ii) issue a further Rule Nisi Calling upon the Opp. Parties to
show cause as to why the reimbursement claims made by
the petitioner under Annexure-5 series may not be granted
with a period stipulated by this Hon’ble Court;
And
(iii) in the event the Opp. Parties fail to show cause or show
insufficient cause make the said Rule Nisi absolute and issue
an appropriate writ of Mandamus or a writ of certiorari in line
with the aforesaid Rule Nisi;
And/or
(iv) further be pleased to direct either of the Opp. Parties i.e.,
the contracting parties (Opp. Parties 6-18) or the Sales-tax
Authorities (Opp. Parties 3-5) to effect reimbursement or
refund along with interest from the date of deposit of tax;
And
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(v) to pass any other writ/writs, order/orders as this Hon’ble
Court may deem just and proper.”
4. The High Court in its impugned order dated 05.08.2008, examined
the contentions of the parties and granted the prayers of the writ
petitioner while observing and holding, inter alia, as under:-
“8…… The petitioner now claims reimbursement of tax paid
by it on actual turnover of the works contract and not on the
tax paid by it on the materials procured by it, which have
gone into for the purpose of execution of the works contract.
The further admitted fact that O.Ps. 6 to 18 have, in fact,
deducted the sales tax at source from the bills raised by the
petitioner from time to time in due progress of the work and
the same have in turn been deposited with the Sales Tax
Department.
**** **** ****
10. Now Annexure-1, which is sought to be quashed, is a
clarification but not in supersession of Annexure-10, as it is
projected by the State Government. The said clarification
cannot take away the effect of the statutory provision. The
orders of assessment in Annexure-4 series indicate that after
deducting the labour charges, services charges, amount of
tax paid, materials used in the execution of works contract,
from the gross turn over of the assessment year, the balance
has been put to tax by the Sales Tax Authority. The tax, as we
find, has been imposed in the light of the decision in Gannon
Dunkerly (supra).
 From the discussion made above, the irresistible
conclusion is that the sales tax has been levied in the orders
of assessment in respect of the amount received pertaining
to items of work completed during the financial year. The
clarification in Annexure-1, which unilaterally takes away the
claim of the petitioner for reimbursement, is contrary to
Clause-45.2 of the General Conditions of the Contract and
Section 5 (2) (AA) of the Orissa Sales Tax Act as well as the
decision of the apex Court in Gannon Dunkerly (supra).
Accordingly, the clarification letter dated 7.11.2001
(Annexure-1) issued by the Financial Adviser-cum-Additional
Secretary to Government, Department of Water Resources is
quashed and the O.Ps. are directed to grant appropriate
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reimbursement in terms of Clause-45.2 of the General
Conditions of Contract, as claimed by the petitioner.”
5. Assailing the order so passed by the High Court, learned senior
counsel for the appellant has strenuously argued that the impugned order
is contrary to the facts of the case as also the principles of law applicable
and hence, deserves to be set aside.
5.1. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has referred to
Clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution of India; and the principles
enunciated by this Court in the cases of Builders’ Association of India
and Ors. v. Union of India and Ors.: (1989) 2 SCC 645 and Gannon
Dunkerley and Co. and Ors. v. State of Rajasthan and Ors.: (1993) 1
SCC 364 to submit that by the forty-sixth amendment of Constitution, a
fiction was created for treating the works contract as deemed sale on
which, sales tax would be leviable but, only on the value of goods which
went into the execution of any works contract.
5.2. Further, with reference to the definitions of “sale”, “goods” and
“works contract” as contained in the Act of 1947 as also Section 5(2)(AA)
thereof and the relevant clauses governing the contracts in question, the
learned counsel has submitted that any payment against the monthly
running bill to the contractor does not constitute payment for any
“completed item of work”; and the only meaning of the nomenclature
“completed item of work” is the completion of the works contract as such.
Learned counsel would maintain that sales tax is not leviable on the
“completed item of work” in a works contract but, the contractor is bound
8
to pay sales tax on “taxable turnover” which, for the purpose of sales tax,
could only be on the value of goods utilised in completion of the works
contract.
5.3. The learned senior counsel has elaborated on the aforesaid
aspects with the submissions that every amount of sales tax on the
“taxable turnover”, which is required to be paid by the contractor, is
achieved either by deduction of such amount of sales tax from the
monthly running bills by the employer for deposit of the same with the
Sales Tax Department or by way of payment by the contractor directly to
the Sales Tax Department. According to the learned counsel, where the
amount payable as sales tax by the contractor is deducted by the
employer at the time of making payment of monthly running bills and is
deposited by the employer with the Sales Tax Department, there would
not arise any question of making any reimbursement of the amount so
deducted and paid to the Sales Tax Department back to the contractor
because the liability to pay sales tax on the value of material/goods
utilised in any works contract is that of the contractor; and the claim for its
reimbursement is entirely impermissible.
5.4. The learned senior counsel for the appellant has strenuously
argued that the High Court has failed to examine the import and effect of
Clause 13.3 of the Instructions to Bidders and Clause 45.1 of the General
Conditions of Contract which make it clear that the bid price quoted by the
contractor is inclusive of all duties, taxes and other levies, including
9
royalties on all materials to be used in performance of the works contract.
Hence, according to the learned counsel, when sales tax on the
goods/materials forms a part of contract price, the claim for
reimbursement has rightly been denied by the Government.
5.5. As regards Clause 45.2 of the General Conditions of Contract, the
learned counsel would re-emphasise that thereunder, reimbursement is
permissible when there is any sales tax levied on a “completed item of
work” but in the context of a works contract in a construction project,
there is no sales tax on the “completed item of work” which is an
immovable property. The learned counsel would submit that earlier, the
Circular dated 04.11.1986 came to be issued on an erroneous
understanding of Clause 45.2 in relation to works contract but
subsequently, clarificatory Circulars dated 07.11.2001 and 19.06.2002
were issued, stating the correct position of law that the said Clause 45.2
applied only to the sales tax on “completed item of work”; and the sales
tax levied in terms of Section 5(2)(AA) of the Act of 1947 was not
reimbursable and had to be borne by the contractor in view of clear
stipulation in Clause 45.1 of the General Conditions of Contract.
According to the learned counsel, reliance on the Circular dated
04.11.1986 on behalf of the respondent No. 1 is entirely misplaced and
the said Circular, by no means, could be construed as that of amending
the contractual terms as also the liability of the contractor in terms of
Section 5(2)(AA) of the Act of 1947.
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6. Per contra, learned senior counsel for the contractor company (the
respondent No. 1 herein) has duly supported the order impugned with
reference to the reasonings therein.
6.1. Learned senior counsel for the contractor company has contended
that the argument made on behalf of the appellant, that the deduction in
the running bills had only been of the sales tax payable on various items,
is contrary to the record because the deductions were made on a deemed
sale on turnover basis and not item-wise and such a recovery of sales tax
is squarely covered by Clause 45.2 of GCC whereunder, the contractor
company is entitled to the claimed reimbursement.
6.2. The learned senior counsel has again referred to the decision of
this Court in the case of Gannon Dunkerley (supra) and the provisions
contained in Section 5 (2) (AA) of the Act of 1947 as also the said Clause
45.2 of GCC and the Circular dated 04.11.1986 to submit that deduction
of sales tax on turnover basis pre-supposes the existence of sale and
therefore, the contractor company is entitled to the reimbursement as
claimed. According to the learned counsel, the Circular dated 07.11.2001
had been directly against the statutory provisions as also the contractual
stipulations and the same has rightly been disapproved by the High
Court. The learned counsel has also referred to various decisions
including that in the case of State of U.P. and Ors. v. P.N.C.
Construction C. Ltd. and Ors.: (2007) 7 SCC 320.
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7. We have heard learned counsel for the parties at sufficient length
and have examined the record with reference to the law applicable.
8. Having regard to the issues raised, appropriate it would be to take
note of the relevant provisions of law; the referred conditions governing
the contractual relations of the parties; and the referred Circulars issued
by the Government of Orissa.
8.1. By way of the Constitution (Forty-sixth Amendment) Act, 1982,
Clause (29-A) came to be inserted to Article 366 of the Constitution of
India, providing for inclusive definition of the expression “tax on the sale
or purchase of goods” in relation to various transactions and dealings. As
regards “works contract”, the said expression came to be assigned the
meaning in sub-clause (b) thereof, which reads as under:-
“(29-A) “tax on the sale or purchase of goods” includes-
(a)… … …
(b) a tax on the transfer of property in goods
(whether as goods or in some other form)
involved in the execution of a works contract;
(c) to (f) … … …”
8.1.1. The constitutional validity of the aforementioned provisions by
which the legislatures of the States were empowered to levy sales tax on
certain transactions described in sub-clauses (a) to (f) of Clause (29-A) of
Article 366 of the Constitution as also the question, as to whether the
power of the State legislature to levy tax on the transfer of property in
goods involved in the execution of works contracts is subject to the
restrictions and conditions contained in Article 286 of the Constitution,
12
were considered and decided by the Constitution Bench of this Court in
the case of Builders’ Association (supra). Therein, while upholding the
constitutional validity of the aforementioned provisions, the Constitution
Bench explained the unique features of a composite contract relating to
work and materials; and expounded on the meaning, effect and amplitude
as also contours of the provisions pertaining to the taxing power of the
States in relation to works contract in the following words: -
“38. In Benjamin’s Sale of Goods (3rd Edn.) in para 43 at p.
36 it is stated thus:
“Chattel to be affixed to land or another chattel.—
Where work is to be done on the land of the employer
or on a chattel belonging to him, which involves the
use or affixing of materials belonging to the person
employed, the contract will ordinarily be one for work
and materials, the property in the latter passing to the
employer by accession and not under any contract of
sale. Sometimes, however, there may instead be a
sale of an article with an additional and subsidiary
agreement to affix it. The property then passes before
the article is affixed, by virtue of the contract of sale
itself or an appropriation made under it.”
39. In view of the foregoing statements with regard to the
passing of the property in goods which are involved in works
contract and the legal fiction created by clause (29-A) of
Article 366 of the Constitution it is difficult to agree with the
contention of the States that the properties that are
transferred to the owner in the execution of a works contract
are not the goods involved in the execution of the works
contract, but a conglomerate, that is the entire building that is
actually constructed. After the 46th Amendment it is not
possible to accede to the plea of the States that what is
transferred in a works contract is the right in the immovable
property.
40. We are surprised at the attitude of the States which have
put forward the plea that on the passing of the 46th
Amendment the Constitution had conferred on the States a
larger freedom than what they had before in regard to their
power to levy sales tax under Entry 54 of the State List. The
13
46th Amendment does no more than making it possible for
the States to levy sales tax on the price of goods and
materials used in works contracts as if there was a sale of
such goods and materials. We do not accept the argument
that sub-clause (b) of Article 366(29-A) should be read as
being equivalent to a separate entry in List II of the Seventh
Schedule to the Constitution enabling the States to levy tax
on sales and purchases independent of Entry 54 thereof. As
the Constitution exists today the power of the States to levy
taxes on sales and purchases of goods including the
“deemed” sales and purchases of goods under clause (29-A)
of Article 366 is to be found only in Entry 54 and not outside
it. We may recapitulate here the observations of the
Constitution Bench in the case of Bengal Immunity Co. Ltd.
[AIR 1955 SC 661 in which this Court has held that the
operative provisions of the several parts of Article 286 which
imposes restrictions on the levy of sales tax by the States are
intended to deal with different topics and one could not be
projected or read into another and each one of them has to
be obeyed while any sale or purchase is taxed under Entry
54 of the State List.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.1.2. In the case of Gannon Dunkerley (supra), while dealing with the
scope of the legislative power of State under Entry 54 of the State List
contained in Seventh Schedule to the Constitution, particularly in the
context of inter-State trade or commerce, another Constitution Bench of
this Court found no reason to reopen the issues covered by the decision
in Builders’ Association case (supra) and held on the limitations of the
powers of State legislature as under:-
“31…..the legislative power conferred under Entry 54 of the
State List does not extend to imposing tax on a sale or
purchase of goods which takes place outside the State or
which takes place in the course of import or export of goods.
In view of the aforesaid limitations imposed by the
Constitution on the legislative power of the States under
Entry 54 of the State List, it is beyond the competence of the
State Legislature to make a law imposing or authorising the
imposition of a tax on transfer of property in goods involved in
14
the execution of a works contract, with the aid of sub-clause
(b) of clause (29-A) of Article 366, in respect of transactions
which take place in the course of inter-State trade or
commerce or transactions which constitute sales outside the
State or sales in the course of import or export.
**** **** ****
41. It must, therefore, be held that while enacting a law
imposing a tax on sale or purchase of goods under Entry 54
of the State List read with sub-clause (b) of clause (29-A) of
Article 366 of the Constitution, it is not permissible for the
State Legislature to make a law imposing tax on such a
deemed sale which constitutes a sale in the course of interState trade or commerce under Section 3 of the Central
Sales Tax Act or an outside sale under Section 4 of the
Central Sales Tax Act or sale in the course of import or export
under Section 5 of the Central Sales Tax Act. So also it is not
permissible for the State Legislature to impose a tax on
goods declared to be of special importance in inter-State
trade or commerce under Section 14 of the Central Sales Tax
Act except in accordance with the restrictions and conditions
contained in Section 15 of the Central Sales Tax Act.”
8.1.3. In the said case of Gannon Dunkerley, the Constitution Bench
explained the purport and effect of the legal fiction introduced by subclause (b) of Clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution and also
enunciated the principles for its operation as follows: -
“36. If the legal fiction introduced by Article 366(29-A)(b) is
carried to its logical end it follows that even in a single and
indivisible works contract there is a deemed sale of the goods
which are involved in the execution of a works contract. Such
a deemed sale has all the incidents of a sale of goods
involved in the execution of a works contract where the
contract is divisible into one for sale of goods and the other
for supply of labour and services.
**** **** ****
47……..The value of the goods involved in the execution of a
works contract will, therefore, have to be determined by
taking into account the value of the entire works contract and
deducting therefrom the charges towards labour and services
which would cover—
(a) Labour charges for execution of the works;
15
(b) amount paid to a sub-contractor for labour and services;
(c) charges for planning, designing and architect’s fees;
(d) charges for obtaining on hire or otherwise machinery and
tools used for the execution of the works contract;
(e) cost of consumables such as water, electricity, fuel, etc.
used in the execution of the works contract the property in
which is not transferred in the course of execution of a works
contract; and
(f) cost of establishment of the contractor to the extent it is
relatable to supply of labour and services;
(g) other similar expenses relatable to supply of labour and
services;
(h) profit earned by the contractor to the extent it is relatable
to supply of labour and services.
The amounts deductible under these heads will have to be
determined in the light of the facts of a particular case on the
basis of the material produced by the contractor.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.1.4. The salient features of the legal fiction introduced by sub-clause
(b) of Clause (29-A) of Article 366 of the Constitution and the co-related
concept of “value addition” came to be succinctly explained by this Court
in the case of P.N.C. Construction Co. (supra) in the following words: -
“21. “Value addition” is an important concept which has
arisen after the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution.
Prior to the said Amendment this Court had taken the view in
State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd
[AIR 1958 SC 560] that “works contract” was an indivisible
contract and the turnover of the goods used in the execution
of the works contract could not, therefore, become exigible to
sales tax. To overcome the effect of the said decision, the
concept of “deemed sale” was introduced by Parliament by
introducing sub-clause (b) of Clause 29-A in Article 366 of the
Constitution which states that the tax on sale or purchase of
goods would include a tax on transfer of property in goods
involved in the execution of works contract. The emphasis is
on the expression “transfer of property in goods (whether
goods as such or in some other form)”. Therefore, after the
Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution, the works
contract which was an indivisible contract is, by a legal
fiction, divided into two parts—one for sale of goods and the
16
other for supply of labour and services. Therefore, after the
Forty-sixth Amendment, it became possible for the States to
levy sales tax on the value of the goods involved in a works
contract in the same way in which the sales tax was leviable
on the price of the goods supplied in a building contract. This
is where the concept of “value addition” comes in. It is on
account of the Forty-sixth Amendment to the Constitution that
the State Government is empowered to levy sales tax on the
contract value which earlier was not possible.”
(emphasis supplied)
8.2. Having thus noticed the source of power of the State legislature to
levy sales tax in relation to the works contract but only on the value of the
goods/materials involved therein, we may also take note of the relevant
amended provisions of the Orissa Sales Tax Act, 1947, which read as
under:-
“Section 2(g) “Sale” means with all its grammatical variations
and cognate expression, any transfer of property in goods for
cash or deferred, payment or other valuable consideration
and includes,--
(i) … … …
(ii) (ii) transfer of property in goods (whether as goods or
in some other form) involved in the execution of a
works contract;
(iii) to (vi) … … …
Section 2(jj)- “Works Contract” includes any agreement for
carrying out, for cash or deferred payment or other valuable
consideration, the building, construction, manufacture,
processing, fabrication, erection, installation, fitting out,
improvement, modification, repair or commissioning of any
moveable or immoveable property.
S.5(2)(AA)- Notwithstanding anything contained in subsection (2)(A), “taxable turnover” in respect of:
(i) ‘works contract’ shall be deemed to be the gross value
received or receivable by dealer for carrying out such
contract, less the amount of labour charges and service
charges incurred for the execution of this contract… … …”
17
8.3. As noticed, the claim for reimbursement made by the contractor
company is based on Clause 45.2 of GCC whereas this claim is being
resisted by the appellant State with reference to Clause 13.3 of ITB and
Clause 45.1 of GCC. The referred clauses, as placed before us for
consideration, read as under: -
Clause 13.3 of ITB
“13.3 All duties, taxes and other levies including royalty
payable by the contractor under the contract or for any other
cause shall be included in the rates, price and total bid price
submitted by the bidder.”
Clauses 45.1 and 45.2 of GCC
“45.1 The rates quoted by the contractor shall be deemed to
be inclusive of the sales and other taxes including royalties
on all materials that the contractor will have to purchase for
performance of this contract.
45.2 Any Central or State Sales Tax and other taxes on
completed items of works of this contract as may be levied
excluding penalty levied for Contractor’s fault and paid by the
Contractor shall be reimbursed by the Employer to the
Contractor on proof of payment on production of assessment
certificate on every financial year. During the course of
contract period, deductions of sales tax on works contract
turnover at the source, shall be made from each bill at such
rate and conditions as may be required under the provisions
of Orissa Sales Tax Act and Rules.”(sic)
8.4. Now, the three Circulars issued by the Government of Orissa in
regard to the acceptance and then denial of the claim for reimbursement
of sales tax in works contract, which form the part of controversy herein,
may also be noticed.
8.4.1. In its initial Circular dated 04.11.1986, the State Government
issued directions and guidance for such reimbursement of sales tax in
18
relation to the existing work contracts; and also directed that any such
clause for reimbursement be not included in future contracts.. This
Circular dated 04.11.1986 reads as under:-
“Government of Orissa
Irrigation and Power Department
48154/Dated 4th No November, 1986
No. FA-1-11/86
From
Shri P.K. Das
Financial Adviser-cumJoint Secretary to Government
To
The Engineer-in-Chief, Irrigation, Orissa/Chief Engineer,
Delta and Flood Control/ Chief Engineer, Medium IrrigationI/Chief Engineer, Medium Irrigation-II/Chief Engineer,
Rengali, Gohira and Samkoi Projects/ Chief Engineer,
Rengali Irrigation Project, Samal/ Chief Engineer, Mahanadi
Birupa Barrage Project/Chief Engineer, Upper Kolab Project,
Bariniput/Chief Engineer, Potteru Irrigation Project/Chief
Engineer, Electricity-cum-Chief Engineer, Electrical Projects,
Orissa/General Manager, Upper Indravati Project/Chief
Engineer (Ele.) Upper Kolab Hydro Ele. Project.
Sub: RE-IMBURSEMENT OF SALES TAX ON WORKS
CONTRACTS
Sir,
1. I am directed to say that in accordance with the Orissa Sales
Tax (Amendment) Act, 1984 read with Orissa Sales Tax
(Amendment) Ordinance, 1985, Sales Tax has become
payable on the turn over of Works Contracts with effect from
07.04.1984.
2. Under the Law, Sales Tax is payable by the concerned
contractor/dealer, and not by this Department. Yet, a question
arose as to whether this Department was legally liable to
reimburse the amount of sale tax actually paid or payable by
the Contractor/dealers in so far as the contracts relating to
this Department are concerned. After due consideration of
the legal aspects of the problem, the following instructions
are issued for information and guidance of all concerned.
19
(i) In case of Works- Contracts executed on or after
07.04.1984 which contained specific clauses for
reimbursement of Sales Tax, this Department is liable
to reimburse the amount of sale tax actually paid by the
concerned contractor on production of necessary
documentary evidence in token of making such
payment, after obtaining an undertaking from the
concerned contractor to the following effect:-
If the Contractor prefers or has preferred
appeal/revision before the concerned appellate
authority under the Sales Tax Law for remission of the
Sales Tax dues paid by him and said appeal/revision
results in any reduction of such dues, the differential
amount, the amount of Sales Tax reimbursed and the
amount of Sales Tax reimbursed and the amount of
Sales Tax payable as decided on appeal/revision will
be refunded back to Government by the Contractor.
(ii) Similar reimbursement will also be permissible and in
the same manner as indicated in Sl. (i) above in case
of contracts executed prior to 07.04.1984 where the
work was in progress beyond that date, which
contained specific clause for such reimbursement.
(iii) The amount of penalty levied if any, under the Sales
Tax Law on any count and paid by the Contractordealer shall not be reimbursed by the Department to
the concerned Contractor.
(iv) No clause either for reimbursement for Sales Tax or
payment of such Tax by the department to the
Contractor should be inserted in the Notice Inviting
Tenders or Tender document and no tender containing
any clause or condition to the above effect should be
accepted.
3. I am to request that the above guideline may be brought to
the notice of all concerned.
4. If any amount of Sales Tax has been reimbursed/paid to any
Contractor in any case, not in conformity with the guidelines
as noted vide paragraph-2 above, a proposal should be
furnished to this Department seeking Government approval
to that effect, furnishing full facts and figures on that score,
clearly indicating the extent and manner of deviation from any
of the guidelines as noted above Sls. (i) to (iv) of Paragraph-2
20
above. This may please be treated as urgent and the
proposal(s) should be submitted to Government in all such
cases by 30.11.1986 at latest. If there is no need for
furnishing any proposal on the above score, a Nil report
should be submitted by the aforesaid target date.
5. Receipt of the letter may please be acknowledged by
return of post.
Yours faithfully
Sd/- 04.11.1986
FA-cum-Joint Secretary to Govt.”
8.4.2. However, in the Circular dated 27.01.2000, the State Government
asked the Engineers-incharge to await its decision on the queries raised
on the issue pertaining to such reimbursement of the amount of sales tax
in relation to the works contracts. This Circular dated 27.01.2000 reads as
under:-
“Government of Orissa
Department of Water Resources
No. IIT-RVN-11/2000-5295 Dated: 27.01.2000
From
Shri N. Behera,
FA-cum-Addl. Secretary to Government
To
The Engineer-in-Chief, Water Resources/
Engineer-in-Chief, Planning & Designs/
Engineer-in-Chief, Rengali Irrigation Project/
All the Chief Engineers & Basin Manages/
All the Chief Engineers/
All the Chief Construction Engineers/
Director, Ground Water Survey and Investigation
Sub: Reimbursement of Sales Tax on Works contract.
Sir,
21
I am directed to say that clause 13.3 of ITB of the NCB bid
document approved by World Bank stipulates that “All duties,
taxes and other levies including royalty payable by the
contractor under the contract or for any other cause shall be
included in the rates, prices and total bid price submitted by
the Bidder.”
The clause 45.2 at G.C.C. of the said document stipulates
that “Any Central or State Sales Tax and other Taxes on
completed item of work of this contract as may be levied
excluding penalty levied for contractor’s default and paid by
the contractors shall be reimbursed by the employer to the
contractor on proof of payment. During the course of contract
period deduction of Sales Tax on works contract turn over at
the sources shall be made from each bill at such rate and
conditions as may be required under the provision of Orissa
Sales Tax Act and Rules.”
Some Chief Engineers have sought for clarification as to
whether Sales Tax deducted from the bills of the contractor
and paid to the sales tax officer will be again reimbursed to
the contractor whose quoted price is inclusive of all taxes as
per clause 13.3 of ITB. In some cases, A. G. Audit has raised
objection against such reimbursement. This is under active
consideration of govt. for issuing necessary clarification.
Therefore, you are hereby instructed that no
reimbursement of sales tax should be made under clause
45.2 of G. C. C. of NCB agreements for World Bank works
and works covered under similar contracts till clarification is
communicated by Government.
This may please be brought to the notice of all
Subordinate Officers under your control.
Receipt of the letter may please be acknowledged.
Yours faithfully
Sd/-
 FA-cum-Addl. Secretary to Government”
8.4.3. Thereafter, by the impugned Circular dated 07.11.2001, the State
Government purportedly came out with the clarification but, in effect,
issued directions squarely opposite to those contained in the earlier
Circular dated 04.11.1986, while asserting that no such claim for
22
reimbursement of the amount of sales tax pertaining to works contract
was admissible. This Circular dated 07.11.2001 reads as under: -
“Government of Orissa
Department of Water Resources
No. IIT RVN. 11/2000-42711/UR Dated 07.11.2001
From
Shri B. Pradhan,
FA-cum-Addl. Secretary to Government.
To
The Engineer in Chief, Water Resources/
Engineer in Chief, Planning and Designs/
Engineer in Chief, Rengali Irrigation Project/
All the Chief Engineers and Basin Manager/
All the Chief Engineers/
All the Chief Construction Engineer/
Director, Ground Water Survey and Investigation.
Sub: Clarification on reimbursement of sales tax in
respect of works contracts
Sir,
In continuation of this Department letter no.5295 dt.5295
dt.27.01.2000 on the subject mentioned above, I am directed
to say that as per Orissa Sales Tax Act transfer of property in
execution of works contracts (Whether as goods or in some
other form) is subject to levy of Sales Tax. When a building, a
bridge, a road, a canal, a plant etc., is constructed, the
ingredients like cement, iron & steel, bricks, stones etc.
involved in execution of the contract are subject to levy of
sales tax. The completed item i.e., a bridge, a building, a
road, or a canal, as the case may be, is not subjected to levy
of sales tax because after construction these become
immovable property not susceptible to transfer of property for
the purpose of sales tax assessment.
23
As per clause 13.3 of I.T.B. of the NCB bid document read
with clause 45.1 of the general conditions of the contract the
rates quoted by the contractor shall be deemed to be
inclusive of sales and other taxes including royalties on all
materials that the contractor will have to purchase for
performance of the contract.
Clause 45.2 of the G.C.C. speaks that any Central or State
Sales Tax and other taxes on completed items of work of the
contract as may be levied, excluding penalty levied for
contractors default and paid by the contractor shall be
reimbursed by the employer to the contractor on proof of
payment. It is clarified that a completed item of work for
which the contractor has entered into agreement with the
department is either immovable property or a works contract
and in either case is not exigible to sales tax. Therefore, the
question of payment of sales tax on such immovable property
and consequential reimbursement of the sales tax by the
department as per clause 45.2 of the G.C.C. or similar
provision existing in other contracts does not arise. A
contractor may, however, have to pay sales tax as assessed
by the sales tax officer on items which go into construction of
the work. This tax is not reimbursable since the contractor is
expected to have built it into his rates.
In view of the above, you are hereby instructed not to
reimburse sales tax levied on cement, steel etc.,
misinterpreting clause 45.2 of the G.C.C. of N.C.B.
agreement for World Bank assisted works and the works
covered under other agreement containing similar clause.
Besides if any amount of sales tax has already been
reimbursed, immediate steps should be taken for recovery of
the amount from the contractors.
This has been concurred in by Finance Department in their
U.O.R.No.3896/ SF. Dt. 24.09.2001.
Yours faithfully,
Sd/-
Financial Adviser-cum-Addl. Secretary to Government”
9. Now, while taking up the points arising for determination, we may
usefully summarise the relevant aspects pertaining to this case.
24
9.1. It is evident that the contractor company (respondent No. 1 herein)
seeks to assert its right to claim reimbursement of the amount of sales tax
levied in respect of the works contracts executed by it on the strength of
the stipulations contained in Clause 45.2 of GCC of NCB bid documents.
On the other hand, the appellant State seeks to resist the right so claimed
by the contractor company with reference to the principles enunciated in
the cited decisions that after the forty-sixth amendment and insertion of
sub-clause (b) of Clause (29-A) to Article 366, the State could levy sales
tax on the price of goods and materials used in works contract as if there
was a sale of such goods and materials and then, on two-fold assertions
on that basis: one, that in the context of a works contract, there is no
sales tax on the “completed item of work” which is an immovable property
and, therefore, question of any reimbursement does not arise; and
second, that in works contract, the contractor may have to pay sales tax
assessed on the items which go into the construction but, such amount of
sales tax is not reimbursable because the contractor is supposed to have
provided for the same in its rates, as envisaged by Clauses 13.3 of ITB
and 45.1 of GCC.
9.2. So far as the basic factual aspects are concerned, it is not in
dispute that the respondent No. 1 indeed undertook execution of various
works contracts with the respective offices of the appellant State of
Orissa. It remains indisputable that in relation to such contracts, Clause
13.3 of ITB stipulated that all duties, taxes and other levies including
25
royalties payable by the contractor were to be included in the bid price
and Clause 45.1 of GCC specifically provided that the rates quoted by the
contractor shall be deemed to be inclusive of the sales and other taxes
including royalties on all materials that the contractor was to purchase for
performance of the contract. However, and at the same time, it is also
indisputable that as per Clause 45.2 of GCC, any Central or State Sales
Tax and other taxes on “completed items of works” of the contract as
might be levied upon, and paid by, the contractor (excluding penalty
levied for contractor’s fault) were to be reimbursed to the contractor on
proof of payment and assessment. This Clause 45.2 further envisaged
that during the course of contract period, deductions of sales tax on
“works contract turnover” was to be made at the source, from each bill as
per the rate and conditions prescribed under the provisions of Act of
1947. It is also not in dispute that in the course of execution of such
contracts, various running bill payments were made to the respondent No.
1 and while making such payments, deductions were indeed made
towards the amount of sales tax; and such deducted amount of sales tax
was deposited with the Sales Tax Department of the Government of
Orissa. Further, it is also borne out that reimbursement of the sales tax so
levied upon, and paid by, the respondent No. 1 in respect of the
assessments for the years 1995-1996 to 1997-1998 was allowed; but
such claim for reimbursement by the respondent No. 1 in respect of the
assessments for the years 1998-1999 to 2000-2001 was declined.
26
9.3. As noticed, after the amendments were brought about in the Act of
1947 for levying sales tax on works contract with effect from 07.04.1984,
the Circular dated 04.11.1986 was issued by the Government of Orissa to
the effect that in case of works contract executed on or after 07.04.1984,
containing the specific clause for reimbursement of sales tax, the
Department of Irrigation and Power would be liable for reimbursement of
the amount of sales tax actually paid by the concerned contractor on
production of necessary documentary evidence. The aforementioned
reimbursements were allowed to the respondent No. 1 pursuant to these
observations and directions in the Circular dated 04.11.1986. However,
by way of the subsequent Circular dated 07.11.2001, the Government of
Orissa came out with total volte-face on its opinion in relation to the claim
for reimbursement of sales tax paid by the contractors while stating that a
“completed item of work” in relation to a works contract was not exigible
to sales tax and, as regards the sales tax on the items which go into the
work, the contractor is expected to have included the same in the rates. It
was, therefore, observed that the question of reimbursement as per
Clause 45.2 of GCC or similar provision in other contracts did not arise.
 9.4. The High Court, in its impugned order dated 05.08.2008, has
rejected the contentions of the appellant State and has disapproved the
aforesaid Circular dated 07.11.2001 essentially with reference to the fact
that the claim for reimbursement was being made of the tax that was
levied on the turnover of the works contracts and not of the tax paid by
27
the contractor on the materials procured by it. The High Court has also
found that the sales tax was levied after necessary deductions and in
accordance with the decision in Gannon Dunkerley (supra) for which,
the contractor was entitled to claim reimbursement under Clause 45.2 of
GCC and that the clarification Circular dated 07.11.2001 cannot take
away the effect of statutory provisions.
10. Having taken all the relevant aspects in comprehension and
having examined the matter in its totality, we are clearly of the view that
the High Court has rightly allowed the writ petition filed by the respondent
No. 1 and no case for interference in this appeal is made out.
11. Before proceeding further, we may at once observe that so far as
the aforesaid Circulars are concerned, neither of them could be decisive
of the issues at hand. As noticed, in the Circular dated 04.11.1986, the
State Government expressed the view that the reimbursement in question
was required to be allowed in terms of Clause 45.2 of GCC but later on, in
the Circular dated 07.11.2001, the State Government took a diametrically
opposite view to say that such reimbursement was not to be allowed in
relation to the works contract. Obviously, the said Circulars had been
based on the given day understanding of the State Government on the
operation of the relevant provisions of law and the terms of contract. Such
vacillating understanding on the part of the State Government cannot be
determinative of the contractual obligations of the parties, which are
required to be decided with reference to the principles of law applicable
28
and on true construction of the terms of contract. Therefore, we would
ignore the said Circulars while dealing with the principal issues involved in
this matter but shall refer to them at a later and appropriate stage.
12. Reverting to the core issues, it remains rather indisputable that as
per Clause 45.2 of GCC, the amount of sales tax on completed items of
works of the contract, as might have been levied upon, and paid by, the
contractor, except the penalty levied for contractor’s own fault, was to be
reimbursed to the contractor on proof of payment and assessment. It was
also provided in Clause 45.2 itself that, during the course of contract
period, deductions of sales tax on works contract turnover would be made
from the running bills at the prescribed rates and conditions. As noticed, it
is not in dispute that while making payment of various running bills in the
course of execution of contracts by the respondent No. 1, deductions
were indeed made towards the amount of sales tax and such deducted
amount of sales tax was deposited with the Sales Tax Department of the
Government of Orissa. Such deductions and deposits with Sales Tax
Department had clearly been in accordance with the stipulation contained
in the second part of Clause 45.2 ibid. However, and even after making
deductions in terms of the second part of Clause 45.2, the appellant State
seeks to deny the operation of first part of this Clause 45.2 (whereby the
contractor is entitled to reimbursement of the amount of sales tax) on the
grounds that: (a) the reimbursement is envisaged of the sales tax levied
on the “completed item of work” but, in works contract, such “completed
29
item” is not exigible to sales tax and hence, the question of
reimbursement does not arise; and (b) that as per Clause 45.1 of GCC
read with Clause 13.3 of ITB, the contractor is deemed to have provided
for the leviable amount of sales tax on goods/materials in its rates and
hence, the contractor cannot claim any reimbursement thereof. The
question is as to whether such contentions of the appellant against the
operation of first part of Clause 45.2 of GCC could be countenanced? In
our view, the answer could only be in the negative.
13. Taking up the main plank of the case of the appellant about the
nature, extent and implication of the levy of sales tax in relation to a works
contract, it could be usefully recapitulated that in view of the forty–sixth
amendment to the Constitution of India, Clause (29-A) came to be
inserted to Article 366; and, by virtue of sub-clause (b) thereof, it became
permissible for the States to levy sales tax on the price of goods and
materials used in works contracts as if there was a sale of such goods
and materials. In other words, after the forty-sixth amendment to the
Constitution, the works contract is divided into two parts by a legal fiction:
one for sale of goods/materials and other for supply of labour/services;
and it is possible for the States to levy sales tax on the value of
goods/materials involved in such works contract. These features have
been expounded and explained by this Court in the referred cases of
Builders’ Association, Gannon Dunkerley and P.N.C. Construction
Co. (supra) and need no further enlargement.
30
13.1. As regards the relevant provisions of the State enactment, it is at
once clear that after the aforesaid forty-sixth amendment to the
Constitution, the State of Orissa also proceeded to carry out the
necessary amendment to the Act of 1947 and provided for levy of sales
tax in relation to a works contract, inter alia, by expanding the definition
of “Sale” so as to include therein the transfer of property in goods
involved in the execution of a works contract; and by specifying that
“taxable turnover” in respect of works contract shall be deemed to be the
gross value received or receivable by dealer for carrying out such
contract less the amount of labour and service charges incurred in
execution of the contract. On their essence and intent, what turns out of
these amended provisions of the Act of 1947 is that in relation to a works
contract, there would be deemed to be the sale of goods involved in
execution thereof; and sales tax would be leviable on the taxable turnover
(and not on the gross turnover) of such works contract.
13.2. As noticed, it has been the consistent case of the respondent No.
1 that in the running bill payments, the amount of sales tax was deducted
and the same was deposited with the Sales Tax Department. It has also
been the consistent case of the respondent No. 1 that in the referred
orders of assessment, sales tax was levied on the applicable rates on the
“taxable turnover” in respect of the works contracts executed by it and the
claim for reimbursement was made of the amount of sales tax so levied
and paid. The High Court has also recorded a categorical finding that
31
after deducting the labour charges, service charges and the tax paid from
the gross turnover, the balance had been put to tax by the Assessing
Authority. These assertions of the respondent No. 1 as also the findings of
the High Court are not the subject matter of dispute. That being the
position, it is but evident that in relation to the works contracts executed
by the respondent No. 1, the appellant and its offices have indeed levied
the sales tax on the taxable turnover that was arrived at after due
deduction of labour/service charges, in conformity with Section 5(2)(AA)
of the Act of 1947. There had neither been any levy of the sales tax on
the entire turnover of the works contracts nor any such levy could have
been effected because, as noticed, the taxing event of sale in a works
contract is confined to the use of the goods/materials in execution of the
contract.
14. While the aforesaid legal and factual aspects remain more or less
indisputable, what the appellant seeks to contend is that the
reimbursement envisaged by the first part of Clause 45.2 of GCC is of the
tax levied on the “completed item of work” but in a works contract, sales
tax is not levied on the completed item of work because such completed
item in a works contract becomes an immovable property. Such a
contention of the appellant remains wholly untenable in view of the
scheme of levy of sales tax in a works contract as also the scheme of
reimbursement envisaged by Clause 45.2 of GCC.
32
14.1. Contextually read, it is but apparent that the expression
“completed item of work” in Clause 45.2 ibid., signifies the intent that
reimbursement would be permissible only after execution of a particular
item of work has been completed and accomplished. In other words, this
expression is clearly intended to contradistinguish the cases where any
item of work remains incomplete and yet any claim for reimbursement of
the sales tax levied is sought for. This expression cannot be read to mean
as if signifying the levy of sales tax itself on the completed item of work
because such reading of this expression would be totally disjunct from the
context and would be entirely detached from the real intent.
14.2. Viewed from another angle, it would appear that if the contention
on the part of the appellant as regards interpretation of the first part of
Clause 45.2 is accepted, it would practically result in holding that the said
Clause 45.2 is not at all applicable to a works contract. Such a result
cannot be countenanced for two major reasons: First, that if such a
clause was not to be applied to the works contract, there was no reason
to have retained the same in relation to the works contracts awarded to
the respondent No. 1. When such a stipulation forms the part of contract,
it would be rather preposterous to say that the same would stand but
would not operate. Secondly, and more significantly, in the second part of
this very Clause 45.2, it has specifically been provided that deductions of
sales tax on works contract turnover at source shall be made from each
bill. It is not far to seek, and is rather evident on a bare reading of Clause
33
45.2 in its entirety, that it is to apply in relation to the sales tax on works
contract too. As noticed, the second part of Clause 45.2 had indeed been
applied and enforced by the appellant and its offices by regularly making
deduction of the amount of sales tax in the running payments of the
respondent no. 1 and by regularly depositing the same with the Sales Tax
Department. It would again be preposterous, nay absurd, to say that the
second part of Clause 45.2 entitling the appellant and its offices to make
deduction of sales tax on works contract turnover at source could be
enforced but when it comes to reimbursement, the first part of this very
Clause 45.2 would not apply to a works contract.
14.3. Viewed from any angle, we are satisfied that heavy reliance on
behalf of the appellant on the expression “completed item of work”, as
occurring in the first part of Clause 45.2, is entirely misplaced. The only
implication of this expression is that a claim for reimbursement of sales
tax cannot be made in relation to a particular work or item whose
execution is pending or is in progress and has not been completed. So far
the levy of sales tax in relation to a works contract is concerned, the same
is on “taxable turnover” and not on the entire turnover. It follows
necessarily that the claim for reimbursement could only be made of the
amount of sales tax that had been levied; and had been paid by the
contractor. Hence, the suggestion as if the expression “completed item of
work” refers to the end-product of a works contract is without any
34
substance. The contentions urged in that regard are required to be, and
are, rejected.
15. We may now take up the other line of argument on behalf of the
appellant that as per Clause 45.1 of GCC read with Clause 13.3 of ITB,
the contractor is deemed to have provided for the leviable amount of
sales tax on goods/materials in its rates and hence, the contractor cannot
claim any reimbursement thereof.
15.1. It remains trite that the terms of contract bind the parties thereto
and unless there be any case of ambiguity or violation of law, ordinarily,
the terms of contract, revealing the intent of parties, are required to be
given effect to. The submission on the part of the appellant, that first part
of Clause 45.2 of GCC would not operate because of Clause 45.1 of GCC
read with Clause 13.3 of ITB, remains entirely baseless and appears to
be of a desperate attempt to wriggle out of the contractual obligations.
Even when the contractors were given instructions in the said Clause
13.3 of ITB to include all duties taxes and other levies in the bid price and
even when the said Clause 45.1 of GCC provided that the rates quoted
by the contractor shall be deemed to be inclusive of the taxes and
royalties on all the materials which were to be procured for performance
of the contract, it was yet provided in the first part of Clause 45.2 of GCC
that the sales tax and other taxes on completed items of work, as may be
levied upon, and paid by, the contractor shall be reimbursed to the
contractor on proof of payment/on production of assessment certificate. It
35
is, therefore, crystal clear that even when the contract provided that the
rates quoted by the contractor shall be deemed to be inclusive of sales
and other taxes and royalties on the materials, it was agreed to between
the parties that sales tax and other taxes under completed items of work,
as paid by the contractor were to be reimbursed.
15.2. It would at once appear that if the contention on the part of the
appellant on the operation of Clauses 13.3 of ITB and 45.1 of GCC is
accepted in the manner that when the rates quoted by the contractor are
inclusive of the taxes on the goods/materials to be used in performance of
the contract, reimbursement of the sales tax levied upon, and paid by, the
contractor is not to be allowed, it would practically result in rendering the
first part of Clause 45.2 otiose and redundant. Neither that had been the
intent of the parties nor could the terms of contract be construed in this
manner.
15.3. In our view, the implication and effect of Clauses 13.3 of ITB and
45.1 of GCC had only been that while making the bid and quoting the
rates, the contractor was supposed to include the taxes, duties, royalties
etc. payable by it over the materials to be procured and utilised in
performance of the contract and hence, while raising the bills, the
contractor was not entitled to claim any amount towards any such
tax/duty/royalty paid by it on the materials purchased for performance of
the contract. These clauses, i.e., Clause 13.3 of ITB and 45.1 of GCC,
which prohibit the contractor from demanding taxes, duties, royalties etc.
36
on the materials procured by it for performance of the contract do not, and
cannot, conversely operate over the sales tax which is levied upon the
contractor and which is primarily recovered with deductions from the
running bill payments. In other words, in our view, on a plain reading of
the aforesaid relevant terms of the contract, it is clear that while the
contractor cannot claim any payment towards the taxes/duties/royalties
etc. on the goods/materials purchased by it for performance of the
contract but that does not disentitle the contractor from claiming
reimbursement of the sales tax levied upon it by the employer, of course
after proof of payment/assessment. It is also pertinent to mention that the
respondent No.1 only claimed reimbursement of the sales tax paid by it
on the turnover of the works contract and not of any tax or duty or royalty
paid by it on the material procured for the purpose of execution of the
works contract. Therefore, the contentions urged on behalf of the
appellant on the operation of Clauses 13.3 of ITB and 45.1 of GCC over
the claim of the contractor also deserve to be, and are, rejected.
16. To summarise the discussion in the preceding paragraphs, we are
clearly of the view that by virtue of Clause 45.2 of GCC, the contractor
company is rightfully entitled to claim reimbursement of the amount of
sales tax levied on the taxable turnover of the works contracts executed
by it. A fortiori, the grounds on which the appellant seeks to resist the
claim of the contractor company for such reimbursement, i.e., with
reference to the expression “completed item of work” in the said Clause
37
45.2 and with reference to the stipulations contained in Clauses 13.3 of
ITB and 45.1 of GCC, are wholly untenable and the appellant and its
contracting offices are under obligation to honour the claim so made by
the contractor company.
17. Before finally concluding on this matter, we are inclined to make a
few comments as regards the Circulars issued by the State Government
pertaining to the subject of reimbursement of sales tax in works contracts.
While noticing that diametrically opposite views were expressed by the
State Government in the two main Circulars dated 04.11.1986 and
07.11.2001, we had observed in the earlier part of this judgment that the
said Circulars were based on the given day understanding of the State
Government but such vacillating understanding of the State Government
was not determinative of the matter; and hence, we had ignored the said
Circulars while dealing with the principal issues involved in this matter, but
had also indicated that we shall refer to the said Circulars at a later and
appropriate stage.
17.1. The basic reason for which we feel impelled to refer to these
Circulars now and at this concluding stage is borne out of the contents of
the Circular dated 04.11.1986, which was issued by the State
Government closely following the amendment of the Act of 1947 with
insertion of the provisions aimed at facilitating the levy of sales tax on the
goods involved in a works contract. Being aware of its obligation in terms
38
of the said Clause 45.2 of GCC (or similar clause/s in other contracts), the
instructions were issued by the State Government in the said Circular
dated 04.11.1986 for: (a) making reimbursement of the amount of sales
tax actually paid by the contractor on production of necessary
documentary evidence of such payment; (b) not making reimbursement
against the amount of penalty, if any, levied upon the contractor; and (c)
obtaining undertaking from the contractor to refund the excess amount of
reimbursement, in case of reduction of its liability towards sales tax in
appeal or revision [vide sub-paragraphs (i) to (iii) of paragraph 2 of the
Circular dated 04.11.1986]. However, the significant feature is that in the
second set of instructions in this very Circular, as contained in subparagraph (iv) of paragraph 2 thereof, the Engineers-incharge were
instructed that no such clause for reimbursement of sales tax or payment
of such tax by the department to the contractor be inserted in the Notice
Inviting Tenders or Tender document; and no tender containing any
clause or condition to that effect be accepted. The said second set of
instructions in sub-paragraph (iv) of paragraph 2 of this Circular was,
obviously, meant for future contracts, but, its contrast with the first set of
instructions in the preceding sub-paragraphs fortifies the conclusion that
the State Government was fully conscious of its obligation to make
reimbursement in relation to the existing contracts which carried such
reimbursement clause/s.
39
17.2. As to what stipulations, terms and conditions are to form the part of
contract remains a matter essentially in the domain of the contracting
parties (of course, subject to the applicable requirements of law) and no
comments as regards future contracts are requisite herein but, on a
comprehensive reading of the Circular dated 04.11.1986, it is evident that
the State Government was fully conscious of its obligation towards
reimbursement under the existing terms of contracts and hence, issued
directions for due discharge of such obligation with necessary safeguards
and, at the same time, provided that henceforth, neither such a clause be
inserted in the contract documents nor any tender containing such a
clause or condition be accepted.
17.3. Evidently, the doubts at the later stage, as indicated in the Circular
dated 27.01.2000, and converse decision against the obligation of
reimbursement, as stated in the Circular dated 07.11.2001, had only been
of unwarranted attempts to wriggle out of the contractual obligations with
rather perverse construction of the plain terms of the existing contracts.
Be that as it may, the propositions in the said ill-advised Circular dated
07.11.2001 stand disapproved with the conclusions reached by us
hereinbefore. We say no more.
18. In the result, this appeal fails and is, therefore, dismissed with no
40
order as to costs. Pending interlocutory applications also stand disposed
of.
.……………..………….J.
 (A.M.KHANWILKAR)
 .………..…………….….J.
 (INDIRA BANERJEE)
..………..………….…….J.
 (DINESH MAHESHWARI)
New Delhi,
Dated: 5th June, 2020.
41

rejection of the plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the CPC”), instituted by the appellant/plaintiff. The Additional District & Sessions Judge, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, vide order dated 23.7.2016 in R.C.A. No. 61794/2016 had also affirmed the order of rejecting the plaint. The appellant had filed the stated suit on 23.2.2005 for a decree for rendition of true and correct accounts in respect of the interest/commission charged and deducted by the respondent­Bank relating to current account No. CCM 20225 of the appellant for the period between 1.4.1997 and 31.12.2000 and also for recovery of the excess amount charged by the respondent­Bank consequent to rendition of accounts with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the date of deduction including interest pendente lite realization of the amount and future interest.

1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2514 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30209/2017)
Shakti Bhog Food Industries Ltd. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
The Central Bank of India & Anr.        ...Respondent(s)
With
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2515 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30210/2017)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2514 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30209/2017)
1. Leave granted.
2. This   appeal   takes   exception   to   the   judgment   and   order
dated 2.1.2017 passed by the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi
(for short, “the High Court”) in R.S.A. No. 391/2016, whereby the
High Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Civil Judge–05,
2
Central District, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, dated 6.1.2016 in C.S.
No.   950/2014   allowing   the   application   filed   by   the
respondents/defendants for rejection of the plaint under Order
VII Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (for short, “the
CPC”),   instituted   by   the   appellant/plaintiff.     The   Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Central, Tis Hazari Courts, Delhi, vide
order   dated   23.7.2016   in   R.C.A.   No.   61794/2016   had   also
affirmed the order of rejecting the plaint.  The appellant had filed
the stated suit on 23.2.2005 for a decree for rendition of true and
correct accounts in respect of the interest/commission charged
and   deducted   by   the   respondent­Bank   relating   to   current
account No. CCM 20225 of the appellant for the period between
1.4.1997 and 31.12.2000 and also for recovery of the excess
amount charged by the respondent­Bank consequent to rendition
of accounts with interest at the rate of 18% per annum from the
date of deduction including interest  pendente lite  realization of
the amount and future interest.
3. The plaint came to be rejected by the trial Court under
Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC on the ground that it was barred
by law of limitation, as it was filed beyond the period of three
years prescribed in Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (for
3
short, “the 1963 Act”), as applicable to the present case, from the
date when the right to sue accrued to the appellant in October,
2000.  The entire discussion of the trial Court in that regard can
be traced to paragraphs 10 and 11, which read thus: ­
‘‘10. As stated above the plaintiff by way of present
suit has sought two reliefs i.e. rendition of account
and repayment of excess money.   Limitation Act,
1963   does   not   provide   any   specific   article   with
regard to time period within which accounts can be
sought by party from its bank. As such, Article 113
of Limitation Act came into picture which provides a
limitation period of three years for suits for which no
limitation period is provided, from the date when
right to sue accrues.
11. In the present case in hand, as per averments
made by the plaintiff in his plaint, the facility was
availed   by   the   plaintiff   from   the   defendants   till
October 2000. Further as per averments made in the
plaint   the   alleged   amount   so   charged   by   the
defendant from the plaintiff, in excess from agreed
amount, was till October, 2000. As such, at best can
be said right to sue accrues in favour of the plaintiff
in October, 2000.  Considering the law as stated in
above   paragraph,   plaintiff   could   have   filed   the
present   suit   i.e.   for   rendition   of   account   and
repayment of excess amount till October 2003. ...”
After so observing, the trial Court considered the submission of
the   appellant   that   the   cause   of   action   had   accrued   to   the
appellant   only   upon   rejection   of   the   representation   by   the
respondent­Bank   entailing   in   refusal   or   denial   of   liability,
communicated to the appellant vide letters dated 19.9.2002 and
3.6.2003 and after the final legal notice was served upon the
4
respondents on 7.1.2005.  That contention has been rejected by
adverting to the decision of the same High Court in C.P. Kapur
vs. The Chairman & Ors.1
, wherein it is held that exchange of
correspondence between the parties cannot extend the limitation
period for institution of a suit, once the right to sue had accrued,
which in this case had accrued in October, 2000, as has been
asserted   even   in   the   plaint.     Whereas,   the   suit   was   filed   in
February, 2005 beyond the period of three years from the date on
which right to sue accrued to the appellant, as prescribed in
Article 113 of the 1963 Act.  The view so taken by the trial Court
commended to the District Court in first appeal and also the High
Court in second appeal, which judgment is the subject matter of
challenge in the present appeal.
4.  We have heard Mr. Nischal Kumar Neeraj, learned counsel
for the appellant and Mr. Anuj Jain, learned counsel for the
respondents.
5. Be it noted that the appellant had relied on Articles 2, 3 and
22 of the 1963 Act to urge that the suit filed in February, 2005
was within limitation.   This plea, however, did not impress the
trial Court, the first appellate Court or the High Court.   The
1 (2013) 198 DLT 56
5
Courts proceeded on the basis that Article 113 is attracted in the
facts of the present case, as the reliefs claimed by the appellant
were not covered under any specific Article with regard to time
period within which accounts can be sought by party from its
bank, as noted by the trial Court in paragraph 10 of its judgment
reproduced above. 
6. The central question is: whether the plaint as filed by the
appellant could have been rejected by invoking Order VII Rule
11(d) of the CPC?   Indeed, Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC gives
ample   power   to   the   Court   to   reject   the   plaint,   if   from   the
averments in the plaint, it is evident that the suit is barred by
any law including the law of limitation.  This position is no more
res integra.  We may usefully refer to the decision of this Court in
Ram   Prakash   Gupta   vs.   Rajiv   Kumar   Gupta  &   Ors.2
.   In
paragraph  Nos. 13 to  20 of the reported  decision,  the  Court
observed as follows: ­
“13. As per Order 7 Rule 11, the plaint is liable to
be rejected in the following cases:
“(a)  where   it   does   not   disclose   a   cause   of
action;
(b)  where the relief claimed is undervalued,
and the plaintiff, on being required by the
court   to   correct   the   valuation   within   a
2 (2007) 10 SCC 59
6
time to be fixed by the court, fails to do
so;
(c)  where   the   relief   claimed   is   properly
valued   but   the   plaint   is   written   upon
paper   insufficiently   stamped,   and   the
plaintiff, on being required by the court to
supply the requisite stamp paper within a
time to be fixed by the court, fails to do
so;
(d)  where   the   suit   appears   from   the
statement in the plaint to be barred by
any law;
(e)  where it is not filed in duplicate;
(f)  where the plaintiff fails to comply with the
provisions of Rule 9.”
14. In Saleem   Bhai   v.   State   of   Maharashtra
[(2003) 1 SCC 557] it was held with reference to
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code that
“9. … the relevant facts which need to be
looked   into   for   deciding   an   application
thereunder   are   the   averments   in   the
plaint.   The   trial   court   can   exercise   the
power … at any stage of the suit — before
registering   the   plaint   or   after   issuing
summons   to   the   defendant   at   any   time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under
Clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7
CPC,   the   averments   in   the   plaint   are
germane; the pleas taken by the defendant
in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant at that stage,…” (SCC p. 560,
para 9).
15. In I.T.C.   Ltd. v. Debts   Recovery   Appellate
Tribunal [(1998) 2 SCC 70] it was held that the basic
question   to   be   decided   while   dealing   with   an
application filed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code
is whether a real cause of action has been set out in
the   plaint   or   something   purely   illusory   has   been
stated with a view to get out of Order 7 Rule 11 of
the Code.
16. “The trial court must remember that if on a
meaningful—no formal—reading of the plaint it is
manifestly vexatious and meritless in the sense of
7
not disclosing a clear right to sue, it should exercise
its power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC taking care to
see that the ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. If
clever drafting has created the illusion of a cause of
action, [it has to be nipped] in the bud at the first
hearing by examining the party searchingly under
Order 10 CPC.”
(See T. Arivandandam v. T.V. Satyapal [(1977) 4 SCC
467], SCC p. 468.).
17. It is trite law that not any particular plea has
to be considered, and the whole plaint has to be
read. As was observed by this Court in Roop  Lal
Sathi v. Nachhattar   Singh   Gill [(1982)   3   SCC   487],
only a part of the plaint cannot be rejected and if no
cause of action is disclosed, the plaint as a whole
must be rejected.
18. In Raptakos   Brett   &   Co.   Ltd. v. Ganesh
Property [(1998) 7 SCC 184] it was observed that the
averments in the plaint as a whole have to be seen
to find out whether Clause (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7
was applicable.
19. In Sopan   Sukhdeo   Sable v. Asstt.   Charity
Commr. [(2004) 3 SCC 137] this Court held thus:
(SCC pp. 146­47, para 15)
“15. There   cannot   be   any
compartmentalisation,   dissection,
segregation and inversions of the language of
various paragraphs in the plaint. If such a
course is adopted it would run counter to
the   cardinal   canon   of   interpretation
according to which a pleading has to be read
as a whole to ascertain its true import. It is
not permissible to cull out a sentence or a
passage and to read it out of the context in
isolation. Although it is the substance and
not merely the form that has to be looked
into, the pleading has to be construed as it
stands   without   addition   or   subtraction   or
words or change of its apparent grammatical
sense. The intention of the party concerned
is to be gathered primarily from the tenor
and terms of his pleadings taken as a whole.
At the same time it should be borne in mind
that   no   pedantic   approach   should   be
8
adopted   to   defeat   justice   on   hair­splitting
technicalities.”
20. For   our   purpose,   Clause   (d)   is   relevant.   It
makes it clear that if the plaint does not contain
necessary averments relating to limitation, the same
is liable to be rejected. For the said purpose, it is the
duty of the person who files such an application to
satisfy the court that the plaint does not disclose
how the same is in time. In order to answer the said
question, it is incumbent on the part of the court to
verify the entire plaint. Order 7 Rule 12 mandates
where a plaint is rejected, the court has to record
the order to that effect with the reasons for such
order.”
On the same lines, this Court in Church of Christ Charitable
Trust   &   Educational   Charitable   Society   vs.   Ponniamman
Educational Trust3
, observed as follows: ­
“10 …  It is clear from the above that where the plaint
does not disclose a cause of action, the relief claimed is
undervalued and not corrected within the time allowed by
the court, insufficiently stamped and not rectified within
the time fixed by the court, barred by any law, failed to
enclose   the   required   copies   and   the   plaintiff   fails   to
comply with the provisions of Rule 9, the court has no
other option except to reject the same. A reading of the
above   provision   also   makes   it   clear   that   power   under
Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code can be exercised at any stage
of the suit either before registering the plaint or after the
issuance of summons to the defendants or at any time
before the conclusion of the trial.
11. This   position   was   explained   by   this   Court   in
Saleem Bhai vs. State of Maharashtra, (2003) 1 SCC 557,
in which, while considering Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code,
it was held as under: (SCC p. 560, para 9)
“9.   A   perusal   of   Order   7   Rule   11   CPC
makes   it   clear   that   the   relevant   facts
which need to be looked into for deciding
an   application   thereunder   are   the
3 (2012) 8 SCC 706
9
averments   in  the  plaint.  The  trial  court
can exercise the power under Order 7 Rule
11 CPC at any stage of the suit — before
registering   the   plaint   or   after   issuing
summons   to   the   defendant   at   any   time
before the conclusion of the trial. For the
purposes of deciding an application under
clauses (a) and (d) of Rule 11 of Order 7
CPC,   the   averments   in   the   plaint   are
germane; the pleas taken by the defendant
in the written statement would be wholly
irrelevant   at   that   stage,   therefore,   a
direction   to   file   the   written   statement
without   deciding   the   application   under
Order   7   Rule   11   CPC   cannot   but   be
procedural   irregularity   touching   the
exercise of jurisdiction by the trial court.”
It is clear that in order to consider Order 7 Rule 11, the
court has to look into the averments in the plaint and the
same can be exercised by the trial court at any stage of
the suit. It is also clear that the averments in the written
statement are immaterial and it is the duty of the Court
to scrutinize the averments/pleas in the plaint. In other
words, what needs to be looked into in deciding such an
application are the averments in the plaint. At that stage,
the pleas taken by the defendant in the written statement
are wholly irrelevant and the matter is to be decided only
on   the   plaint   averments.   These   principles   have   been
reiterated   in  Raptakos   Brett   &   Co.   Ltd.   vs.   Ganesh
Property,  (1998) 7 SCC 184 and  Mayar (H.K.) Ltd. vs.
Vessel M.V. Fortune Express, (2006) 3 SCC 100.
12. It   is   also   useful   to   refer   the   judgment   in  T.
Arivandandam   vs.   T.V.   Satyapal,   (1977)   4   SCC   467,
wherein while considering the very same provision i.e.
Order   7   Rule   11   and   the   duty   of   the   trial   court   in
considering such application, this Court has reminded
the trial Judges with the following observation: (SCC p.
470, para 5)
“5. …  The learned Munsif must remember
that   if   on   a   meaningful   –   not   formal   –
reading   of   the   plaint   it   is   manifestly
vexatious, and meritless, in the sense of
not   disclosing   a   clear   right   to   sue,   he
should exercise his power under Order 7,
Rule 11 C.P.C. taking care to see that the
10
ground mentioned therein is fulfilled. And,
if clever drafting has created the illusion of
a cause of action, nip it in the bud at the
first   hearing   by   examining   the   party
searchingly   under   Order   10,   C.P.C.   An
activist   Judge   is   the   answer   to
irresponsible   law   suits.   The   trial   courts
would   insist   imperatively   on   examining
the party at the first hearing so that bogus
litigation can be shot down at the earliest
stage. The Penal Code is also resourceful
enough to meet such men, (Chapter XI)
and must be triggered against them.”
It   is   clear   that   if   the   allegations   are   vexatious   and
meritless and not disclosing a clear right or material(s) to
sue, it is the duty of the trial Judge to exercise his power
under Order 7 Rule 11. If clever drafting has created the
illusion of a cause of action as observed by Krishna Iyer
J., in the above referred decision, it should be nipped in
the bud  at  the  first  hearing by examining the parties
under Order 10 of the Code.”
We may also advert to the exposition of this Court in Madanuri
Sri Rama Chandra Murthy vs. Syed Jalal4
.  In paragraph 7 of
the said decision, this Court has succinctly restated the legal
position as follows: ­
“7.  The plaint can be rejected under Order 7 Rule 11 if
conditions enumerated in the said provision are fulfilled.
It is needless to observe that the power under Order 7
Rule 11, CPC can be exercised by the Court at any stage
of the suit. The relevant facts which need to be looked
into for deciding the application are the averments of the
plaint only. If on an entire and meaningful reading of the
plaint, it is found that the suit is manifestly vexatious and
meritless in the sense of not disclosing any right to sue,
the court should exercise power under Order 7 Rule 11
CPC. Since the power conferred on the Court to terminate
civil   action   at   the   threshold   is   drastic,   the   conditions
enumerated under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC to the exercise of
4 (2017) 13 SCC 174
11
power of rejection of plaint have to be strictly adhered to.
The averments of the plaint have to be read as a whole to
find out whether the averments disclose a cause of action
or whether the suit is barred by any law. It is needless to
observe that the question as to whether the suit is barred
by any law, would always depend upon the facts and
circumstances of each case. The averments in the written
statement as well as the contentions of the defendant are
wholly   immaterial   while   considering   the   prayer   of   the
defendant   for   rejection   of   the   plaint.   Even   when   the
allegations made in the plaint are taken to be correct as a
whole on their face value, if they show that the suit is
barred by any law, or do not disclose cause of action, the
application for rejection of plaint can be entertained and
the power under Order 7 Rule 11 CPC can be exercised. If
clever drafting of the plaint has created the illusion of a
cause of action, the court will nip it in the bud at the
earliest so that bogus litigation will end at the earlier
stage.”
Keeping in  mind  the  well settled legal  position, we may now
proceed to analyse the averments in the plaint, as filed by the
appellant, to discern whether it was a fit case for rejection of the
plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC.  As noticed from
the trial Court judgment, it is evident that the trial Court did not
make any attempt to analyse the plaint in the manner predicated
in the aforesaid decisions.  Even the District Court dealing with
first appeal and the High Court with second appeal omitted to do
so.  It is the bounden duty of the Court to examine the plaint as a
whole and not selected averments therein.  For that, we need to
advert to the averments in the plaint.  Paragraphs 8 to 15 of the
12
plaint, which according to us, are the relevant averments, read as
follows:­
‘‘8. That the facility as referred to in the foregoing paras
was extended with effect from 01.04.1997 and somewhere
in the month of July, 2000 it was noticed by the Plaintiff
that the Defendants were charging interest/commission
@   Rs.4/­   per   thousand   rupees   on   local   cheques   and
drafts   in   an   arbitrary   manner   in   violation   of   the
assurance given to the Plaintiff.
9. That   after   the   detection   of   the   above
overcharging   of   interest/commission   the   Plaintiff
sent   a   letter   to   the   Defendants   on   21.07.2000
complaining   about   the   overcharging   and   thereafter
the   interest/commission   was   charged   as   per
assurance given.
10. That   the   amount   overcharged   as
commission/interest was not refunded to the Plaintiff and
the Plaintiff sent the following letters addressed to the
Bank i.e. General Manager and Senior Manager indicating
therein that amount overcharged should be refunded to
the Plaintiff with interest thereon: ­
Letter   dated   12.10.2000,   24.10.2000,   30.10.2000,
7.11.2000,   24.12.2000,   01.03.2001,   28.03.2001,
22.5.2001   and   20.06.2001.     In   all   the   above   letters
requests were made to clarify as to how the commission
were calculated and deducted from the Plaintiff.
11. That   the   Assistant   General   Manager,   Sh.   P.S.
Bawa   of   Regional   Office­B,   Delhi   vide   letter   dated
9.7.2001 informed the Plaintiff that the comments of
the   Branch   Office   have   been   invited   on   the
representation of the Plaintiff in respect of the local
cheques/DDs   discounted   during   the   relevant   period
and the matter will be decided as early as possible. No
progress was made in the matter and the Plaintiff had
to   submit   letter   dated   31.10.2001   to   the   Hon’ble
Finance Minister, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
13
12. That the Defendants have charged interest for some
time for the actual number of days for the Defendants
remained out of funds.
13. That   vide   letter   dated   08.05.2002,   the   Senior
Manager informed the Plaintiff that the cheques were
being   purchased   at   the   prevailing   rates.   That   reply
was   given   to   sidetrack   the   real   issue   in   respect   of
which letter dated 09.07.2001 was received from Shri
P.S.   Bawa,   Assistant   General   Manager   of   Regional
Office as referred to in the foregoing paras.
14. That,   thereafter,   the   Plaintiff   sent   letters   dated
12.07.2002, 22.09.2002, 24.3.2003 alongwith which the
details of the proposed/estimated excess amount charged
were   given   and   it   was   requested   that   a   sum   of
Rs.31,57,484/­   approximately   appears   to   have   been
charged   in   excess   of   what   should   have   been   actually
charged and the exact amount should be calculated and
refunded to the Plaintiff.  No reply was given by the Bank
to these letters.
15. That   Senior   Manager   of   the   Defendant   No.   2
vide   letter   dated   19.09.2002   had   informed   that
everything   was   done   according   to   rules   and   the
matters   need   not   to   be   pursued   any   further   and
thereafter   the   Plaintiff   sent   another   letter   dated
03.06.2003.”
(emphasis supplied)
Again, in paragraph 28 of the plaint, it is stated as follows: ­
“28. That the cause of action to file the suit accrued in
favour of the Plaintiff and against the Defendants when
the   illegal   recoveries   were   noticed   and   letter   dated
21.07.2000 was sent to the Defendants to clarify as to
how the interest was being calculated and recovered and
on various other dates when the letters were sent to the
Defendants with request for refund of the excess amounts
charged   and   on   9.7.2001   when   assurance   for   proper
calculation and refund was conveyed to the Plaintiff and
on   8.5.2002,   12.7.2002   and   22.9.2002   when   requests
were   again   made   to   settle   the   matter   on   19.9.2002,
3.6.2003 and the cause of action arose on 23.12.2003
when the legal notice was served upon the Defendant and
on 28.12.2003 when the reply to the notice was received
14
and   finally   on   07.01.2005.   When   the   legal   notice   for
rendition of accounts was served upon the Defendants
and the cause of action still subsists as the accounts
have not been rendered so far nor the excess amount
charged has been refunded by the Defendants.”
From the averments in the plaint, if read as a whole, it would
appear that the assertion of the appellant is that the respondents
had   extended   financial   facility   with   effect   from   1.4.1997   till
October, 2007, but somewhere in the month of July, 2000, the
appellant noticed that the respondents were unilaterally charging
interest/commission at the rate of Rs.4 per thousand rupees on
local cheques and drafts in an arbitrary manner in violation of
the assurance given to the appellant.  Immediately thereafter, the
appellant   wrote   to   the   respondent­Bank   vide   letter   dated
21.7.2000   for   taking   corrective   steps   in   the   matter.     Then
correspondence ensued between the parties in that regard and
the   appellant   was   assured   by   the   Regional   Office   of   the
respondent­Bank that an appropriate decision will be taken at
the earliest.   The relevant assertion in that regard is found in
paragraph 11 of the plaint, wherein it is mentioned that the
Assistant General Manager ­ Shri P.S. Bawa of Regional Office­B,
Delhi,   vide   letter   dated   9.7.2001   informed   the   appellant   that
comments from the concerned Branch Office have been invited
15
and appropriate decision will be taken on its representation as
early as possible.  Thereafter, on 8.5.2002, the Senior Manager of
the respondent­Bank informed the appellant that the cheques
were   being   purchased   at   the   prevailing   rates;   which   plea,
according   to   the   appellant,   was   to   deviate   from   the   position
stated by the Assistant General Manager of Regional Office in his
letter   dated   9.7.2001   referred   to   earlier.     Resultantly,   the
appellant   wrote   to   the   officials   of   the   respondent­Bank   vide
letters dated 12.7.2002, 22.9.2002 and 24.3.2003.  Notably, it is
averred in paragraph 15 of the plaint that the Senior Manager of
the respondent­Bank vide letter dated 19.9.2002 had informed
the appellant that everything was being done in accordance with
the rules and the appellant need not pursue the matter any
further.  It is asserted that despite this intimation, the appellant
continued   to   correspond   with   the   respondent­Bank   with   a
sanguine hope that the issue will be resolved at the appropriate
level by the Bank and finally issued a legal notice on 28.11.2003,
which   was   duly   responded   to   by   the   respondent­Bank   vide
Advocate’s letter dated 23.12.2003.  Nevertheless, the appellant
gave another legal notice on 7.1.2005 and thereafter, proceeded
to file the subject suit in February, 2005. 
16
7. All these events have been reiterated in paragraph 28 of the
plaint, dealing with the cause of action for filing of the suit.
Indeed, the said paragraph opens with the expression “the cause
of action to file the suit accrued in favour of the plaintiff and
against the defendants when the illegal recoveries were noticed
and letter dated 21.7.2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify
as to how the interest was being calculated.”   This averment
cannot be read in isolation.  As aforesaid, on reading the plaint
as a whole, it is seen that the gravamen of the case made out in
the plaint is that the appellant noticed the discrepancy in July,
2000 and immediately took up the matter with the officials of the
respondent­Bank   at   different   levels   and   in   response,   the
Assistant General Manager of Regional Office of the Bank had
communicated   in   writing   to   the   appellant   vide   letter   dated
9.7.2001   that   its   representation   was   being   examined   and
comments   of   the   Branch   Office   have   been   invited   and   after
receipt thereof the matter will be decided as early as possible.  As
no further communication was received by the appellant, it had
to make a representation to the Finance Minister, Government of
India, vide letter dated 31.10.2001 and presumably because of
that, the appellant received a communication from the Senior
17
Manager vide letter dated 8.5.2002 informing the appellant that
the cheques were being purchased at the prevailing rates.  This
stand taken by the Senior Manager was to side­track the issue
pending   consideration   before   the   Assistant   General   Manager,
Regional Office referred to in his letter dated 9.7.2001.  The case
made   out   by   the   appellant   is   that   no   communication   was
received by the appellant from the Assistant General Manager,
Regional Office and instead, for the first time it was informed vide
letter   dated   19.9.2002   sent   by   the   Senior   Manager   of   the
respondent­Bank, that all actions taken by the Bank are as per
the rules and, therefore, the appellant need not correspond in
this regard any further.  This response of the Bank could also be
regarded as a firm denial or refusal by the authorised official of
the Bank, giving rise to cause of action to sue the Bank.
8. Thus   understood,   the   letter   dated   8.5.2002   sent   by   the
Senior Manager of the respondent­Bank, at best, be reckoned as
accrual   of   the   cause   of   action   to   the   appellant   to   sue   the
respondent­Bank.  It is then stated that the appellant received a
communication dated 19.9.2002, informing the appellant that it
should not carry on any further correspondence with the Bank
18
relating to the subject matter.   Until then, the appellant was
having   a   sanguine   hope   of   favourable   resolution   of   its   claim
including   by   the   Regional   Office   of   the   respondents.     The
appellant, therefore, had to send a legal notice on 28.11.2003, to
which   the   Bank   responded   on   23.12.2003.     Reckoning   these
dates, the plaint filed on 23.2.2005 was within limitation, as
stated in paragraph 28 of the plaint.  Resultantly, the question of
rejecting such a plaint under Order VII Rule 11(d) of the CPC did
not arise.
9. The expression used in Article 113 of the 1963 Act is “when
the right to sue accrues”, which is markedly distinct from the
expression used in other Articles in First Division of the Schedule
dealing with suits, which unambiguously refer to the happening
of a specified event.   Whereas, Article 113 being a residuary
clause and which has been invoked by all the three Courts in this
case, does not specify happening of particular event as such, but
merely refers to the accrual of cause of action on the basis of
which the right to sue would accrue. 
10. Concededly, the expression used in Article 113 is distinct
from the expressions used in other Articles in the First Division
19
dealing with suits such as Article 58 (when the right to sue “first”
accrues), Article 59 (when the facts entitling the plaintiff to have
the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or the contract
rescinded “first” become known to him) and Article 104 (when the
plaintiff is “first” refused the enjoyment of the right).   The view
taken by the trial Court, which commended to the first appellate
Court and the High Court in second appeal, would inevitably
entail in reading the expression in Article 113 as – when the right
to sue (first) accrues.  This would be re­writing of that provision
and doing violence to the legislative intent.  We must assume that
the   Parliament   was   conscious   of   the   distinction   between   the
provisions   referred   to   above   and   had   advisedly   used   generic
expression “when the right to sue accrues” in Article 113 of the
1963 Act.  Inasmuch as, it would also cover cases falling under
Section 22 of the 1963 Act, to wit, continuing breaches and torts.
11. We may usefully refer to the dictum of a three­Judge Bench
of this Court in Union of India & Ors. vs. West Coast Paper
Mills Ltd. & Anr.
5
, which has had an occasion to examine the
expression used in Article 58 in contradistinction to Article 113 of
5 (2004) 2 SCC 747
20
the 1963 Act.  We may advert to paragraphs 19 to 21 of the said
decision, which read thus: ­
“19.  Articles 58 and 113 of the Limitation Act read thus:
Description of suit Period   of
limitation
Time   from   which
period   begins   to
run
58. To   obtain   any
other declaration.
Three
years
When the right to
sue first accrues.
* * *
113. Any suit for which
no   period   of
limitation   is
provided elsewhere
in this Schedule.
Three
years
When the right to
sue accrues.
20.  It was not a case where the respondents prayed for
a declaration of their rights. The declaration sought for by
them as regards unreasonableness in the levy of freight
was granted by the Tribunal.
21.  A distinction furthermore, which is required to be
noticed is that whereas in terms of Article 58 the period of
three years is to be counted from the date when “the right
to sue first accrues”, in terms of Article 113 thereof, the
period of limitation would be counted from the date “when
the   right   to   sue   accrues”.    The   distinction   between
Article 58 and Article 113 is, thus, apparent inasmuch
as the right to sue may accrue to a suitor in a given
case at different points of time and, thus, whereas in
terms of Article 58 the period of limitation would be
reckoned from the date on which the cause of action
arose first, in the latter the period of limitation would
be differently computed depending upon the last day
when the cause of action therefor arose.”
(emphasis supplied)
12. Similarly, in  Khatri  Hotels  Private  Limited  &  Anr.  Vs.
Union  of   India  &  Anr.6
, this Court considered the expression
6 (2011) 9 SCC 126
21
used in Article 58 in contradistinction to Article 120 of the old
Limitation Act (the Indian Limitation Act, 1908).   In paragraph
24, the Court noted thus: ­
“24. The Limitation Act, 1963 (for short “the 1963 Act”)
prescribes time limit for all conceivable suits, appeals,
etc. Section 2(j) of that Act defines the expression “period
of limitation” to mean the period of limitation prescribed
in the Schedule for suit, appeal or application. Section 3
lays down that every suit instituted, appeal preferred or
application   made   after   the   prescribed   period   shall,
subject to the provisions of Sections 4 to 24, be dismissed
even though limitation may not have been set up as a
defence. If a suit is not covered by any specific article,
then it would fall within the residuary article. In other
words, the residuary article is applicable to every kind
of suit not otherwise provided for in the Schedule.”
(emphasis supplied)
The distinction between the two Articles (Article 58 and Article
120) has been expounded in paragraphs 27 to 30 of the reported
decision, which read thus: ­
“27. The   differences   which   are   discernible   from   the
language of the above reproduced two articles are:
(i)  The   period   of   limitation   prescribed   under
Article 120 of the 1908 Act was six years whereas
the period of limitation prescribed under the 1963
Act is three years and,
(ii)  Under   Article   120   of   the   1908   Act,   the
period of limitation commenced when the right
to   sue   accrues.   As   against   this,   the   period
prescribed under Article 58 begins to run when
the right to sue first accrues.
28.  Article 120 of the 1908 Act was interpreted by the
Judicial Committee in  Bolo  v.  Koklan  [(1929­30) 57 IA
325: AIR 1930 PC 270] and it was held: (IA p. 331)
22
“There can be no ‘right to sue’ until there is an
accrual of the right asserted in the suit and its
infringement, or at least a clear and unequivocal
threat   to   infringe   that   right,   by   the   defendant
against whom the suit is instituted.”   The same
view   was   reiterated   in  Annamalai   Chettiar  v.
Muthukaruppan Chettiar  [ILR (1930) 8 Rang 645]
and  Gobinda   Narayan   Singh  v.  Sham   Lal   Singh
[(1930­31) 58 IA 125] .
29.  In Rukhmabai v. Lala Laxminarayan (AIR 1960 SC
335),   the   three­Judge   Bench   noticed   the   earlier
judgments   and   summed   up   the   legal   position   in   the
following words: (Rukhmabai case [AIR 1960 SC 335, AIR
p. 349, para 33)
“33. … The right to sue under Article 120 of the
[1908   Act]   accrues   when   the   defendant   has
clearly  or  unequivocally  threatened   to   infringe
the   right   asserted   by   the  plaintiff   in   the   suit.
Every threat by a party to such a right, however
ineffective and innocuous it may be, cannot be
considered to be a clear and unequivocal threat
so   as   to   compel  him   to   file   a   suit.  Whether   a
particular   threat   gives   rise   to   a   compulsory
cause   of   action   depends   upon   the   question
whether   that   threat   effectively   invades   or
jeopardizes the said right.”
30.  While   enacting   Article   58   of   the   1963   Act,   the
legislature   has   designedly   made   a   departure   from   the
language of Article 120 of the 1908 Act. The word “first”
has been used between the words “sue” and “accrued”.
This   would   mean   that   if   a   suit   is   based   on   multiple
causes of action, the period of limitation will begin to run
from the date when the right to sue first accrues. To put
it differently, successive violation of the right will not give
rise   to   fresh   cause   and   the   suit   will   be   liable   to   be
dismissed if it is beyond the period of limitation counted
from the day when the right to sue first accrued.”
(emphasis supplied)
Notably, the expression used in Article 113 is similar to that in
Article 120, namely, “when the right to sue accrues”.  Hence, the
23
principle   underlying   this   dictum   must   apply  proprio   vigore  to
Article 113.
13. It is well established position that the cause of action for
filing a suit would consist of bundle of facts.  Further, the factum
of suit being barred by limitation, ordinarily, would be a mixed
question of fact and law.  Even for that reason, invoking Order
VII Rule 11 of the CPC is ruled out.   In the present case, the
assertion in the plaint is that the appellant verily believed that its
claim   was   being   processed   by   the   Regional   Office   and   the
Regional   Office   would   be   taking   appropriate   decision   at   the
earliest.  That belief was shaken after receipt of letter from the
Senior Manager of the Bank, dated 8.5.2002 followed by another
letter dated 19.9.2002 to the effect that the action taken by the
Bank was in accordance with the rules and the appellant need
not correspond with the Bank in that regard any further.  This
firm response from the respondent­Bank could trigger the right of
the appellant to sue the respondent­Bank.   Moreover, the fact
that   the   appellant   had   eventually   sent   a   legal   notice   on
28.11.2003 and again on 7.1.2005 and then filed the suit on
23.2.2005,   is   also   invoked   as   giving   rise   to   cause   of   action.
Whether   this   plea   taken   by   the   appellant   is   genuine   and
24
legitimate, would be a mixed question of fact and law, depending
on the response of the respondents.
14. Reverting   to   the   argument   that   exchange   of   letters   or
correspondence   between   the   parties   cannot   be   the   basis   to
extend the period of limitation, in our opinion, for the view taken
by us hitherto, the same need not be dilated further.  Inasmuch
as, having noticed from the averments in the plaint that the right
to sue accrued to the appellant on receiving letter from the Senior
Manager,   dated   8.5.2002,   and   in   particular   letter   dated
19.9.2002, and again on firm refusal by the respondents vide
Advocate’s letter dated 23.12.2003 in response to the legal notice
sent by the appellant on 28.11.2003; and once again on the
follow up legal notice on 7.1.2005, the plaint filed in February,
2005 would be well within limitation.   Considering the former
events of firm response by the respondents on 8.5.2002 and in
particular,   19.9.2002,   the   correspondence   ensued   thereafter
including the two legal notices sent by the appellant, even if
disregarded, the plaint/suit filed on 23.2.2005 would be within
limitation in terms of Article 113. 
25
15. The respondents had relied on the exposition of this Court
in  Boota Mal  vs.  Union  of  India7
,  S.S.  Rathore  vs.  State  of
Madhya  Pradesh8
,  Venkappa  Gurappa  Hosur   vs.  Kasawwa
C/o   Rangappa   Kulgod9
, and  Kandimalla   Raghavaiah   &
Company   vs.  National   Insurance  Company  &  Anr.10 and of
Delhi High Court in  C.P.  Kapur  (supra), to buttress the above
argument,   which,   as   aforesaid,   is   unavailable   in   light   of   the
averments in the plaint under consideration.  Suffice it to observe
that going by the averments in the plaint, the argument of the
respondents   that   the   appellant   had   placed   reliance   on   the
correspondence   to   get   extension   of   the   limitation   period,   is
untenable.     The   averments   in   the   plaint,   however,   are   very
explicit to the effect that the grievance of the appellant about
unilateral charging of interest/commission by the respondentBank was firmly denied or refused by the Senior Manager of the
respondent­Bank  vide  letter  dated  8.5.2002  and  in   particular
letter   dated   19.9.2002   and   again   by   Advocate’s   letter   on
23.12.2003, giving rise to cause of action and accrual of right to
sue.
7 AIR 1962 SC 1716
8 (1989) 4 SCC 582
9 (1997) 10 SCC 66
10 (2009) 7 SCC 768
26
16. The respondents had also relied on the dictum of this Court
in  Fatehji   And  Company  &   Anr.   vs.  L.M.  Nagpal  &  Ors.11
.
Indeed, in that case, this Court upheld the order of rejection of
plaint on the finding that the suit was barred by limitation under
Article 54 of the 1963 Act, in the fact situation of that case.  The
Court   was   dealing   with   a   suit   for   specific   performance   of   a
written agreement of sale dated 2.7.1973 and as per the terms,
the performance of the contract was fixed for 2.12.1973.  In that
background,   the   Court   noted   that   the   subsequent   letters
exchanged between the parties cannot be the basis to extend the
period of limitation.   Moreover, the Court dealt with the case
governed by Article 54 of the 1963 Act, which stipulates the
timeline for commencement of period of limitation, being the date
fixed for the performance, or, if no such date is fixed, when the
plaintiff   has   notice   that   performance   is   refused.     In   cases
governed by Article 113 of the 1963 Act, such as the present
case, however, what is required to be noted is – “when the right
to sue accrues” (and not when the right to sue “first” accrues). 
11 (2015) 8 SCC 390
27
17. Similarly, in the case of  Hardesh  Ores  (P)  Ltd.  vs.  Hede
and   Company12,   this   Court   upheld   the   order   of   rejection   of
plaint under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC concerning a suit for
injunction in reference to Article 58, which expressly postulates
that time from which period begins to run is when the right to
sue “first” accrues.   The argument of the appellant therein to
apply Article 113 of the 1963 Act has been noted in paragraph 33
and rejected.  In that view of the matter, the exposition in this
decision will be of no avail to the respondents.
18. Reverting   to   the   decision   in  Kandimalla   Raghavaiah
(supra),   the   Court   interpreted   Section   24A   of   the   Consumer
Protection Act, 1986, which defines the period of limitation to be
within two years from the date on which the cause of action had
arisen.  In light of that provision, the Court noted that the cause
of   action   in   respect   of   subject   insurance   policy   arose   on
22/23.3.1988, when fire in the godown took place, damaging the
tobacco stocks hypothecated with the Bank in whose account the
policy had been taken by the appellant therein.  In other words,
the stipulation in Section 24A of the Consumer Protection Act,
1986 is analogous to the time frame specified in other Articles
12 (2007) 5 SCC 614
28
covered under First Division of the Schedule to the 1963 Act
regarding suits relating to accounts; and not similar to Article
113, which envisages three years’ time from the period when the
right   to   sue   accrues   (and   not   when   the   right   to   sue   “first”
accrues).
19. As regards  Boota  Mal  (supra) and  The   East   and  West
Steamship,   Georgetown,   Madras   vs.   S.K.   Ramalingam
Chettiar13, the Court was dealing with a case relating to Article
31 of the old Limitation Act, which provided that the time from
which period begins to run, is when the goods sought to be
delivered.   Even these decisions will be of no avail to the fact
situation of the present case, which is governed by Article 113 of
the 1963 Act and for the reasons already recorded hereinbefore.
20. Similarly, in  S.S.  Rathore  (supra), the Court was dealing
with   a   case   governed   by   Article   58   of   the   1963   Act,   which
specifically provides that time begins to run when the right to sue
“first” accrues.  In Ram Prakash Gupta (supra), the Court dealt
with   a   case   governed   by   Article   59   of   the   1963   Act,   which
provides that the suit could be filed when the facts entitling the
13 AIR 1960 SC 1058
29
plaintiff to have the instrument or decree cancelled or set aside or
the contract rescinded “first” become known to him.  The Court
opined that the knowledge mentioned in the concerned plaint
could not be termed as inadequate and incomplete.  The Court
reversed the judgment of the Civil Judge and the High Court
rejecting the plaint.  This Court also noted that while deciding the
application under Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC, few lines or
passage from the plaint should not be read in isolation and the
pleadings   ought   to   be   read   as   a   whole   to   ascertain   its   true
import.   Even in that case, the trial Court and the High Court
had failed to advert to the relevant averments, as stated in the
plaint, which approach was disapproved by this Court.   In the
present case, as noticed earlier, the trial Court had failed to
advert to and analyse the averments in the plaint, but selectively
took notice of the assertion in the plaint in question that the
appellant became aware about the discrepancies in July, 2000,
and then proceeded to reject the plaint being barred by law of
limitation having been filed in February, 2005.
21. Taking overall view of the matter, therefore, we are of the
considered opinion that the decisions of the trial Court, the first
appellate Court and the High Court in the fact situation of the
30
present case, rejecting the plaint in question under Order VII
Rule 11(d) of the CPC, cannot be sustained.   As a result, the
same are quashed and set aside.
22. In view of the above, this appeal succeeds and the plaint
stands restored to the file of the trial Court to its original number
for being proceeded  in accordance  with  law.    All contentions
available to both parties are kept open including the issue of
limitation to be decided alongwith other issues on the basis of
plea taken in the written statement and the evidence produced by
the parties in that behalf uninfluenced by the observations made
in the present judgment on factual matters.  There shall be no
order as to costs.  Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall
stand disposed of.
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2515 OF 2020
(Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30210/2017)
1. Leave granted.
2. In the present appeal, the factual narration in the plaint is
similar in material respects, if not identical to the plaint in the
companion appeal arising from SLP(C) No. 30209/2017.  To wit,
it is apposite to reproduce relevant averments from the plaint in
question, which read as follows: ­
31
“8. That the facility as referred to in the foregoing paras
was extended with effect from the month of November,
1997 to December, 1999 and somewhere in the month of
July,   2000   it   was   noticed   by   the   plaintiff   that   the
defendants were charging interest/commission @ Rs.4/­
per thousand rupees on local cheques and drafts in an
arbitrary manner in violation of the assurance given to
the plaintiff.
9. That   after   the   detection   of   the   above
overcharging   the   interest/commission   the   plaintiff
sent   a   letter   to   the   defendants   on   21.7.2000
complaining   about   the   overcharging   and   thereafter
the   interest/commission   was   charged   as   per
assurance given.
10. That   the   amount   overcharged   as
commission/interest was not refunded to the plaintiff and
the plaintiff sent the following letters addressed to the
Bank i.e. General Manager and Senior Manager indicating
therein that the amount overcharged should be refunded
to the plaintiff with interest thereon: ­
Letter   dated   12.10.2000,   24.10.2000,   30.10.2000,
7.11.2000,   24.12.2000,   01.03.2001,   28.03.2001,
22.05.2001 and 20.06.2001.
In all the above letters requests were made to clarify as
to how the commission was calculated and deducted from
the plaintiff.
11. That   the   Assistant   General   Manager,   Sh.   P.S.
Bawa   of   Regional   Office­B,   Delhi   vide   letter   dated
9.7.2001 informed the plaintiff that the comments of
the   Branch   Office   have   been   invited   on   the
representation of the plaintiff in respect of the local
cheques/DDs   discounted   during   the   relevant   period
and the matter will be decided as early as possible. No
progress was made in the matter and the plaintiff had
to   submit   letter   dated   31.10.2001   to   the   Hon’ble
Finance Minister, Govt. of India, New Delhi.
12. That the defendants have charged interest for some
time for the actual number of days for the defendants
remained out of funds.
32
13. That   vide   letter   dated   08.05.2002,   the   Senior
Manager informed the plaintiff that the cheques were
being   purchased   at   the   prevailing   rates.   That   reply
was   given   to   sidetrack   the   real   issue   in   respect   of
which letter dated 09.07.2001 was received from Sh.
P.S.   Bawa,   Assistant   General   Manager   of   Regional
Office as referred to in the foregoing paras.
14. That,   thereafter,   the   plaintiff   sent   letters   dated
12.07.2002,   22.07.2002,   24.03.2003   along   with   which
the   details   of   the   proposed/estimated   excess   amount
charged were given and it was requested that a sum of
Rs.5,39,902/­   approximately   appears   to   have   been
charged   in   excess   of   what   should   have   been   actually
charged and the exact amount should be calculated and
refunded to the plaintiff. No reply was given by the bank
to these letters.
15. That Senior Manager of the defendant No.2 vide
letter dated 19.09.2002 had informed that everything
was done according to rules and the matters need not
to be pursued any further and thereafter the plaintiff
sent another letter dated 3.06.2003.
16. That   the   excess   amounts   have   been
recovered/charged   from   the   plaintiff   in   an   arbitrary
manner,   in   utter   violation   of   the   assurances,   rules,
regulations   and   established   cannons   of   business
dealings; and  inspite of the protracted correspondence
made   from   21.07.2000   to   03.06.2003,   the   defendants
have failed to account for or to justify the recovery of
amounts   made   in   an   arbitrary   manner   by   citing   any
rules, regulations or any other authority.
xxx xxx xxx
18.   That   thereafter,   the   plaintiff   got   a   legal   notice
served upon the defendant vide registered letter No.6672
dated 03.12.2003 containing all the details relating to the
transactions   as   could   be   gathered   from   the   books   of
accounts of the plaintiff.
19. That reply to the above noted notice was sent by
the   defendants   through   Sh.   Sanjeev   Kumar   Gupta,
Advocate, vide letter dated 23.12.2003 wherein averments
relating to the excess charges were denied and it was
stated that the interest was charged on DD/cheques as
per   Central   Officer   Circular   No.   C094­95;   233   upto
33
01.12.1999   and   thereafter   as   per   Circular   No.
CO/OPR/SCHGS/CIR/LET/2000­2001   dated
18.08.2000.”
(emphasis supplied)
Again, in paragraph 28, it is stated as follows: ­
“28. That the cause of action to file the suit accrued in
favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants when
the   illegal   recoveries   were   noticed   and   letter   dated
21.07.2000 was sent to the defendants to clarify as to
how the interest was being calculated and recovered and
on various other dates when the letters were sent to the
defendants with request for refund of the excess amounts
charged   and   on   9.7.2001   when   assurance   for   proper
calculation and refund was conveyed to the plaintiff and
on   8.5.2002,   12.7.2002   and   22.9.2002   when   requests
were   again   made   to   settle   the   matter   on   19.9.2002,
3.6.2003 and their cause of action arose on 28.12.2003
where the legal notice was served upon the defendant and
on 23.12.2003 when the reply to the notice was received
and   finally   on   08.01.2005   when   the   legal   notice   for
rendition of accounts was served upon the defendants
and the cause of action still subsists as the accounts
have not been rendered so far nor the excess amount
charged has been refunded by the Defendants.”
3. We have considered the factual position in the present case,
which is similar to the facts in the companion appeal.  Therefore,
for  the  reasons   stated  in   the  judgment  in   companion   appeal
arising from SLP(C) No. 30209/2017, even this appeal should
succeed on the same terms.   Accordingly, this appeal is also
allowed and the impugned judgment and order of the trial Court,
the first appellate Court and the High Court in second appeal are
set aside and the plaint is restored to the file of the trial Court to
be disposed of on the same terms as indicated in the companion
34
appeal (arising from SLP(C) No. 30209/2017).  There shall be no
order as to costs.  Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall
stand disposed of.
..................................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)
..................................J.
 (Indira Banerjee)
..................................J.
(Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
June 05, 2020.