whether the High Court in exercise of its writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole 1 For short, “the High Court” 2 ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stood foreclosed by the law of limitation?

whether   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   writ jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole 1 For short, “the High Court” 2 ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order stood foreclosed by the law of limitation?

1
 REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2413/2020
(Arising out of SLP(C) No. 12892/2019)
Assistant Commissioner (CT)
LTU, Kakinada & Ors. …Appellant(s)
Versus
M/s. Glaxo Smith Kline Consumer
Health Care Limited           ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. Leave granted.
2. The   moot   question   in   this   appeal   emanating   from   the
judgment   and   order   dated   19.11.2018   in   Writ   Petition   No.
39418/2018   passed   by   the   High   Court   of   Judicature   at
Hyderabad  for the State of Telangana and the State of Andhra
Pradesh1
  is:   whether   the   High   Court   in   exercise   of   its   writ
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India ought
to entertain a challenge to the assessment order on the sole
1 For short, “the High Court”
2
ground that the statutory remedy of appeal against that order
stood foreclosed by the law of limitation?
3. The   respondent   is   a   registered   dealer   on   the   rolls   of
Assistant Commissioner of Commercial Taxes, Large Tax Payer
Unit   at   Kakinada   Division2
  under   the   provisions   of   Andhra
Pradesh Value Added Tax Act, 20053
 and the Central Sales Tax
Act, 19564
 and is engaged in the business of manufacturing and
sale of Horlicks, Boost, Biscuits, Ghee, Ayurvedic Medicines etc.
The Assistant Commissioner had called upon the respondent to
produce books of accounts for the assessment year 2013­14 for
finalisation of assessment under the 1956 Act.  The authorised
representative of the respondent produced declaration in Form
“F” in support of its claim that certain transactions are interState transfers.   The information and declaration furnished by
the   respondent   was   duly   verified   and   after   giving   personal
hearing to the respondent, final assessment order came to be
passed   by   the   Assistant   Commissioner   on   21.6.2017,   raising
demand   of   Rs.76,73,197/­   (Rupees   seventy   six   lakhs   seventy
three thousand one hundred ninety seven only) against turnover
2 For short, “the Assistant Commissioner”
3 For short, ”the 2005 Act”
4 For short, “the 1956 Act”
3
of Rs.3,44,15,240/­ (Rupees three crores forty four lakhs fifteen
thousand   two   hundred   forty   only)   on   the   finding   that   the
respondent had failed to submit Form “F” to the tune of the
turnover reported in the Central Sales Tax (CST) return.   This
assessment   order   was   duly   served   on   the   respondent   on
22.6.2017.     The   respondent   did   not   file   appeal   against   this
assessment order within the statutory period.  Instead, amount
equivalent to 12.5% of the demand was deposited on 12.9.2017.
The respondent then filed an application under Rule 60 of the
Andhra Pradesh Value Added Tax Rules, 20055
, highlighting the
error made in raising the demand based on incorrect turnover
reported by the respondent.   This application was filed only on
8.5.2018,   which   came   to   be   rejected   by   the   Assistant
Commissioner   vide   order   dated   11.5.2018.     Aggrieved   by   the
decision dated 11.5.2018, the respondent filed an appeal before
the   Appellate   Deputy   Commissioner   of   Commercial   Taxes,
Vijayawada6
  on   28.5.2018,   which   came   to   be   rejected   on
17.8.2018.   It is only thereafter, the respondent­assessee was
advised to file appeal before the Appellate Deputy Commissioner
5 For short, “the 2005 Rules”
6 For short, “the Appellate Deputy Commissioner” or “the appellate authority”, as the
case may be”
4
on 24.9.2018 against the assessment order dated 21.6.2017.  In
the meantime, another assessment order came to be passed on
31.3.2018 in relation to the Audit taken up for the tax period
from 1.4.2013 to 31.3.2017.  We are not concerned with the said
order in the present appeal. 
4. Reverting to the appeal filed by the respondent against the
assessment order dated 21.6.2017, the same was dismissed on
25.10.2018   being   barred   by   limitation   and   also   because   no
sufficient cause was made out.  The respondent was then advised
to file writ petition before the High Court being Writ Petition No.
39418/2018, solely for quashing and setting aside of assessment
order dated 21.6.2017 for tax period – April, 2013 to March, 2014
(CST) being contrary to law, without jurisdiction and in violation
of principles of natural justice to the extent of levy on the Branch
Transfer turnovers and to direct the Assistant Commissioner (CT)
to re­do the assessment and reckon the correct Branch Transfer
turnover and grant exemption on the basis of Form “F”.   The
respondent did not challenge the order passed by the Appellate
Deputy Commissioner, rejecting the statutory appeal preferred by
the respondent against the assessment order dated 21.6.2017,
5
for reasons best known to the respondent.  The Division Bench of
the High Court, on 8.11.2018, noted that the respondent had
already paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, for the purpose of filing
an appeal.  It also noted the stand taken by the respondent that
the   employee   who   was   in   charge   of   the   tax   matters   of   the
respondent, had defaulted and was subsequently suspended in
contemplation of disciplinary proceedings, as a result of which
statutory appeal could not be filed within the prescribed time.
The Division Bench of the High Court directed the respondent to
pay an additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax
within one week and posted the matter for 19.11.2018.  This was
an ex­parte order.  The respondent, in terms of the stated order,
deposited   an   additional   amount   equivalent   to   12.5%   of   the
disputed tax amount.   The writ petition was then taken up for
hearing on 19.11.2018, when after hearing the counsel for the
parties, the writ petition came to be allowed and the order passed
by   the   Assistant   Commissioner,   dated   21.6.2017   has   been
quashed and set aside and the respondent relegated before the
Assistant Commissioner for reconsideration of the matter afresh
after giving personal hearing to the respondent to explain the
discrepancies.  This order has also noted that the respondent had
6
paid Rs.9,59,190/­ (Rupees nine lakhs fifty­nine thousand one
hundred ninety only) equivalent to the 12.5% of the taxes in the
year 2013­14 (CST) on 13.11.2018.
5. Feeling   aggrieved,   the   appellants   have   filed   the   present
appeal.  It is urged that the respondent having failed to avail of
statutory remedy of appeal within the prescribed time and also
because the delay in filing appeal had not been satisfactorily
explained, the High Court ought not to have entertained the writ
petition at the instance of such person and moreso, because the
respondent   had   allowed   the   order   passed   by   the   appellate
authority rejecting the appeal on the ground of delay to become
final.     In   substance,   the   argument   is   that   the   High   Court
exceeded its jurisdiction and committed manifest error in setting
aside   the   assessment   order   dated   21.6.2017   passed   by   the
Assistant Commissioner.
6. The respondent, on the other hand, would urge that the
High   Court   has   had   ample   power   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution of India to grant relief to the respondent considering
the   peculiar   facts   of   the   present   case   being   an   exceptional
situation which if not remedied, would result in failure of justice.
7
7. We have heard Mr. G.N. Reddy, learned counsel for the
appellants and Mr. V. Lakshmikumaran, learned counsel for the
respondent.
8. From   the   indisputable   facts,   it   is   evident   that   the
assessment   order   dated   21.6.2017   was   challenged   by   the
respondent   by   way   of   statutory   appeal   before   the   Appellate
Deputy Commissioner only on 24.9.2018.  Section 31 of the 2005
Act  provides  for  the  statutory  remedy against   an  assessment
order.  The same, as applicable at the relevant time, reads thus: ­
“31. (1) Any   VAT   dealer   or   TOT   dealer   or   any   other
dealer   objecting   to   any   order   passed   or   proceeding
recorded by any authority under the provisions of the Act
other than an order passed or proceeding recorded by an
Additional   Commissioner   or   Joint   Commissioner   or
Deputy Commissioner, may within thirty days from the
date on which the order or proceeding was served on him,
appeal to such authority as may be prescribed:
Provided that the appellate authority may within a
further period of thirty days admit the appeal preferred
after a period of thirty days if he is satisfied that the VAT
dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer had sufficient
cause for not preferring the appeal within that period:
Provided further that an appeal so preferred shall
not   be   admitted   by   the   appellate   authority   concerned
unless the dealer produces the proof of payment of tax,
penalty, interest or any other amount admitted to be due,
or of such instalments as have been granted, and the
proof   of   payment   of   twelve   and   half   percent   of   the
difference   of   the   tax,   penalty,   interest   or   any   other
amount, assessed by the authority prescribed and the
tax, penalty, interest or any other amount admitted by
the appellant, for the relevant tax period, in respect of
which the appeal is preferred.
8
(2) The appeal shall be in such form, and verified in
such   manner,   as   may   be   prescribed   and   shall   be
accompanied   by   a   fee   which   shall   not   be   less   than
Rs.50/­ (Rupees fifty only) but shall not exceed Rs.1000/­
(Rupees one thousand only) as may be prescribed.
(3) (a)   Where an appeal is admitted under sub­section
(1), the appellate authority may, on an application filed by
the appellant and subject to furnishing of such security
or on payment of such part of the disputed tax within
such time as may be specified, order stay of collection of
balance of the tax under dispute pending disposal of the
appeal;
(b) Against   an   order   passed   by   the   appellate
authority refusing to order stay under clause (a), the
appellant may prefer a revision petition within thirty
days from the date of the order of such refusal to the
Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner
who may subject to such terms and conditions as he
may think fit, order stay of collection of balance of the
tax under dispute pending disposal of the appeal by
the appellate authority;
(c) Notwithstanding   anything   in   clauses   (a)   or   (b),
where a VAT dealer or TOT dealer or any other dealer
has   preferred   an   appeal   to   the   Appellate   Tribunal
under   Section   33,   the   stay,   if   any,   ordered   under
clause (b) shall be operative till the disposal of the
appeal by such Tribunal, and, the stay, if any ordered
under clause (a) shall be operative till the disposal of
the appeal by such Tribunal, only in case where the
Additional Commissioner or the Joint Commissioner
on an application made to him by the dealer in the
prescribed manner, makes specific order to that effect.
(4) The appellate authority may, within a period of two
years from the date of admission of such appeal, after
giving the appellant an opportunity of being heard and
subject to such rules as may be prescribed:
(a) confirm,   reduce,   enhance   or   annul   the
assessment or the penalty, or both; or
(b) set aside the assessment or penalty, or both,
and direct  the authority prescribed to pass a
fresh order after such further enquiry as may be
directed; or
(c)  pass such other orders as it may think fit.
9
(4A) Where any proceeding under this section has been
deferred on account of any stay orders granted by the
High Court or Supreme Court in any case or by reason of
the fact that an appeal or other proceeding is pending
before the High Court or the Supreme Court involving a
question of law having a direct bearing on the order or
proceeding in question, the period during which the stay
order is in force or the period during which such appeal
or   proceeding   is   pending,   shall   be   excluded,   while
computing the period of two years specified in sub­section
(4) for the purpose of passing appeal order under this
section.
(5) Before  passing  orders  under  sub­section  (4),   the
appellate authority may make such enquiry as it deems
fit   or   remand   the   case   to   any   subordinate   officer   or
authority for an inquiry and report on any specified point
or points.
(6) Every order passed in appeal under this section
shall, subject to the provisions of sections 32, 33, 34 and
35 be final.”
Going by the text of this provision, it is evident that the statutory
appeal is required to be filed within 30 days from the date on
which the order or proceeding was served on the assessee.  If the
appeal is filed after expiry of prescribed period, the appellate
authority is empowered to condone the delay in filing the appeal,
only if it is filed within a further period of not exceeding 30 days
and   sufficient   cause   for   not   preferring   the   appeal   within
prescribed  time  is  made out.    The appellate authority is not
empowered to condone delay beyond the aggregate period of 60
days   from   the   date   of   order   or   service   of   proceeding   on   the
assessee, as the case may be.  In the present case, admittedly,
10
the   appeal   was   filed   way   beyond   the   total   60   days’   period
specified in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act.   In that, the
respondent had filed the appeal accompanied by an application
for   condonation   of  delay   setting  out   reasons   in   the  following
words: ­
“2. It is submitted that the impugned Order­in­Original
dated   21.06.2017   was   received   by   the   Applicant   on
22.06.2017 and the appeal ought to have been filed by
the applicant on 21.07.2017 in terms of section 31 of the
Andhra Pradesh VAT Act, 2005. Thus, there is delay in
filing the appeal. The Applicants further submits that the
delay   is   not   due   to   any   negligence   on   part   of   the
Applicant.
3. It   is   submitted   that   the   impugned   order   was
received by Mr. P. Sriram Murthy, but the receipt of this
assessment order was not informed to any other person
of the company.
4. Mr. P. Sriram Murthy was authorized to handle day
to day affairs of sales tax (VAT), service tax and excise
and   he   was   also   authorized   to   sign   and   submit
documents with the tax departments, file periodic tax
returns and represent the company before Concerned tax
authorities.
5. However, the company has alleged Mr. P. Sriram
Murthy   with   committing   certain   irregularities   for   past
more   than   12   months   and   initiated   disciplinary
proceedings against him. He has been suspended from
his official duties with effect from 26th July 2018.
6. It is only post his suspension that the Applicant
came to know about the receipt of impugned order. Also,
the Appellant has come to know that Mr. Murthy paid the
12.5% of the demand amount on 12.09.2017 as if it is a
regular tax payment. Further, since he did not file the
appeal   in   time,   therefore   to   protect   himself   from   the
disciplinary action, he adopted alternate route and filed
rectification   application   under   rule   60   which   is   not
permissible under law in case demand has been raised
on technical grounds.
11
7. A separate affidavit as to the facts of the case is also
attached herewith.
8. It   is   stated   that   in   view   of   the   facts   and
circumstances   mentioned   above   and   in   the   attached
affidavit, your honor would appreciate that the delay in
filing the appeal is completely unintentional and for the
bona fide reasons stated above. The applicant company
should not be imposed with tax liabilities due to inaction
and malafide intention on one employee. The Applicants
further   submit   that   if   the   delay   in   filing   the   above
numbered appeal is not condoned, the Applicant would
be put to great injustice and irreparable injury. On the
other hand, no prejudice would be caused if the delay is
condoned.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the Ld. Appellate
Joint   Commissioner   (ST)   be   pleased   to   allow   the
application for condonation of delay as prayed for.”
As stated in the application for condonation of delay in filing the
statutory   appeal,   the   respondent   caused   to   file   affidavit   of
Mr. Sreedhar Routh, son of Late Mr. R. Seetha Rama Swamy,
who was working as Site Director in the respondent company.  In
this affidavit, in support of the application for condonation of
delay, it is averred thus: ­
“…..
That  Mr.  P. Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager­Finance,
was authorized to handle day to day affairs of sales tax
(VAT), service tax and excise. He was also authorized to
sign and submit documents with the tax departments,
file   periodic   tax   returns   and   represent   the   company
before concerned tax authorities.
that   the  CST   assessment   for  the   period   2013­14  was
completed   by   the   Assistant   Commissioner   (CT)   LTU
raising demand of Rs.76,73,197/­ vide assessment order
dated 21.06.2017.
12
that the assessment order was received by Mr. P. Sriram
Murthy. But, the receipt of this assessment order was not
informed to any other person of the company.
that Mr. P. Sriram Murthy filed application under Rule 60
of the Andhra Pradesh Act, 2005 without informing the
company about such filing.
that   Mr.   P.   Sriram   Murthy   also   engaged   a   Chartered
Accountant   and   filed   an   appeal   against   rejection   of
application   filed   under   rule   60.   The   appointment   of
Chartered Accountant and filing this appeal was also not
informed to the company.
that the company has alleged Mr. P. Sriram Murthy with
committing   certain   irregularities   and   initiated
disciplinary proceedings against him.
that Mr. P. Sriram Murthy has been suspended from his
official   duties   with   effect   from   26th  July   2018.
Investigation in this matter is going on.
that it is only post his suspension that we have come to
know about the demand of Rs.76,73,197/­ lakhs raised
vide CST assessment order for the year 2013­2014 and
therefore could not respond or take any action in respect
of this order/demand.
It is prayed that the Ld. Appellate Joint Commissioner
(ST) be pleased to allow the application for condonation of
delay as prayed for."
The appellate authority vide order dated 25.10.2018, considered
the reasons offered by the respondent for the delay in filing of the
appeal and concluded that the same were not substantiated with
sufficient cause.  On that finding including that the delay beyond
the period of 60 days from the date of service of the assessment
order   on   the   respondent­assessee   cannot   be   condoned,   the
appellate authority observed thus: ­
13
“However, to abide the principles of natural justice, the
appellant has been issued notices dated 03.10.2018 and
19.10.2018 to appear for admission hearings to be held
on 10.10.2018 and 25.10.2018 respectively, in the office
of Appellate Deputy Commissioner (CT), Vijayawada for
explaining reasons and his contentions in support of the
admission of appeal petition. The A.R. appeared for the
admission   hearing   on   25.10.2018   and   prayed   for
admission  of  appeal petition, but  not submitted any
reliable   grounds   and   substantial   documentary
evidence   in   support   of   their   submission   that   they
were   unaware   of   the   receipt   of   original   assessment
order.
It   is   further   pertinent   here   to   record   that   after
receiving the original assessment order, the appellantdealer   has   filed   a   request   letter   before   the   assessing
authority   for   re­assessment   under   rule   60   of   APVAT
Rules,  2005. However,  the  AA  has  not  considered  reassessment   request,   and   issued   an   endorsement
dt.11.05.2018, rejecting the re­assessment request. The
appellant also filed an appeal on such endorsement. That
appeal petition based on endorsement has also not been
admitted in this office and rejected vide ADC’s orders no.
3470,   dt.   17.08.2018.   Therefore,   cannot   be   assumed
under   any   circumstances,   and   by   no   stretch   of
imagination that the appellant­dealer was not aware of
the service of original assessment orders. Hence, it is to
be   affirmed   that   the   causes   put­forth   for   delay
condonation are not rational and against the facts of the
case. It is also relevant here to state that whatever may
be circumstances, the delay beyond 60 days could not be
condonable   in   the   hands   of   the   appellate   authority,
therefore, such request prima­facie is not in tune with
the provisions of the Act, hence, liable to be rejected.
From the aforesaid discussion, it is construed that no
favourable grounds can be made to admit the appeal,
since   the   appellant   have   failed   to   file   appeal   petition
within the prescribed time under APVAT Act, 2005. It is
also pertinent here to note that the Department has duly
served   the   original   assessment   order   to   the   appellant
without any procedural lapse, and also the appellant has
admitted   that   the   original   orders   were   received   on
22.06.2017.
In view of the above, since the appellant failed to prefer
an   appeal   on   the   original   assessment   order   dated
21.06.2017, which was duly served on the appellant, and
14
as such the original assessment order has become final,
and   the   present   appeal   filed   by   the   appellant   on
24.09.2018 with a delay of 1 year 62 days, hence cannot
be admitted.
Further   the   appellants   have   not   submitted   any
valid  reasons/sufficient  cause   for  not  preferring  the
appeal   within   the   prescribed   &   condonable   time   of
30+30=60 days of  receipt of the original assessment
order. Hence the appeal petition is hereby REJECTED
as per the provisions of Section 31 of APVAT Act.”
(emphasis supplied)
The appellate authority was pleased to reject the explanation that
the respondent was not aware of the service of assessment order,
as it remained unsubstantiated by the respondent.   When the
matter travelled to the  High Court, the Division  Bench, after
hearing the respondent, proceeded to pass an ex­parte order on
8.11.2018, which reads thus: ­
“ORDER:
It   is   represented   by   Mr.   S.   Dwarakanath,   learned
counsel for the petitioner that the petitioner has already
paid 12.5% of the disputed tax, for the purpose of filing
an appeal. But, the employee, who was incharge and who
was   subsequently,   suspended   in   contemplation   of
disciplinary   proceedings,   failed   to   file   the   appeal.   The
contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that
the issue lies in a narrow campus.
Since   the   petitioner   has   already   paid   12.5%   of   the
disputed tax, the request of the petitioner for granting
one more opportunity would be considered favourably, if
the petitioner pays an additional amount equivalent to
12.5%   of   the   disputed   tax.   The   petitioner   shall   make
such payment within a period of one week.
Post on 19.11.2018 for orders.”
15
Be it noted that the respondent was advised to file writ petition
merely for setting aside of the assessment order dated 21.6.2017,
presumably, in light of the decision of Full bench of the same
High Court in Electronics Corporation of India Ltd. vs. Union
of India & Ors.7
.
9. We may advert to the assertions made in the writ petition
(on the basis of which the High Court was pleased to grant relief
to the respondent), to explain the delay in filing of the statutory
appeal including the reason why the respondent should be given
one opportunity.  The same read thus: ­
“…..
7. From the above, it can be summarized that the total
disputed demand has arisen on account of two reasons.
Firstly,   the   1st  Respondent   has   considered   the   total
branch transfer turnover as per monthly CST returns
and ignored the revised turnover as per VAT 200­B. Even
though,   the   such   revised   stock   transfer   value   was
considered by the 1st  Respondent while computing the
ITC credit as per rule 20 (8) of AP VAT act. Secondly,
receipt of excess forms on account of inclusion of value of
freebies, free samples etc. by receiving state while issuing
the F Forms. The 1st Respondent treated these excess F
Forms value as concealment by the petitioner and levied
tax even, on this branch transfer value duly covered by F
Forms which is [sic] grossly against the principle of law.
8. It is submitted that the order was served on the
petitioner   on   22.6.2017   against   which,   the   Petitioner
could have preferred appeal before the 2nd  Respondent
within   30  days   from   the  said   date.   Unfortunately,   no
steps were taken to file any appeal within the due date
for the reason that the day to day affairs of the Sales Tax,
7 2018 (361) ELT 22(A.P.)
16
Service Tax and Excise Law was being handled by one
Mr.  P.  Sri Ram Murthy,  who  was  working as  Deputy
Manager (Finance) in the Company, who failed to take
‘appropriate steps to prefer an appeal within time, by his
negligence. Excepting Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy, there was
no other person who was well conversant with the facts
and the steps to be taken against the assessment order.
The   other   person   Mr.   Siddhant   Belgaonker,   Senior
Manager (Finance) who attended the assessment hearing
also   left   the   services   of   the   Petitioner   on   31.1.2018.
Consequently,   the   assessment   order   remained
uncontested.
9. It is respectfully submitted that apart from this act
of  negligence,  Mr. P. Sri Ram  Murthy also committed
certain   other   irregularities   over   a   period   of   one   year,
which   came   to   the   light   of   the   Management   of   the
Company   in   the   month   of   July,   2018.   Immediately,
disciplinary proceedings were initiated against him, by
issuing   a   notice   on   26.7.2018   (ex.   P­3)   and   also
suspending   him   from   official   duties   with   immediate
effect.
10. It is submitted that the Petitioner was not aware of
the impugned order since that fact was not brought to
the notice by its own employee, due to this negligence.
11. It appears, the said Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy having
realized his negligence, made further mistake, by filing an
application under Rule 60 of the APVAT Rules read with
Rule 14­A(10) of the CST (AP) Rules on 9.5.2018 (Ex. P­4)
contending,   inter­alia,   that   the   revised   value   of   stock
transfer as per VAT 200­B should have been considered
instead   of   Rs.866,25,15,490/­.     In   the   said
representation,   it   is   claimed   that   it   has   filed   revised
returns under the VAT Act, disclosing the correct ‘F’ form
turnover   for   the   purposes   of   restricting  the   input   tax
credit while filing Form 200­B at the end of the year. The
ITC   credit   under   VAT   was   also   allowed   by   the   1st
Respondent, considering the stock transfer turnover as
Rs.863,33,95,259/­. In the said representation, it was
contended that the turnover of Rs.1,85,03,360/­, could
not have been levied with the tax since it is admittedly
covered by ‘F’ forms.
12. The representation of the Petitioner under Rule 60
was   rejected   by   the   1st  Respondent,   by   endorsement,
dated 11.5.2018 (Ex. P­5) on the ground, that it is not a
case for considering it as a mistake rectifiable under Rule
60.   It   is   also   submitted   that   Mr.   P.   Sri  Ram  Murthy
17
appear to have filed an appeal against the endorsement of
the 1st Respondent dated 11.5.2018 to 2nd Respondent on
28.5.2018.   This   was   also   without   knowledge   of   the
petitioner’s management.
13. It is submitted that the Petitioner was not aware of
these developments till the misdeeds of Mr. P. Sri Ram
Murthy were being enquired into. It is submitted that Mr.
P. Sri Ram Murthy has in fact, remitted an amount of
Rs.9,59,150/­ being 12.5% of the disputed tax in the
assessment   order   online,   on   12.9.2017   (Ex.   P­6).   The
payment was made as if it is towards miscellaneous tax
payment for June, 2014. When the Petitioner was seeking
to reconcile as to how this amount was deposited and
under   what   account   it   came   to   known   it   is   for   the
purpose of preferring an appeal against the impugned
order. All this verification happened post suspension of
Mr. P. Sri Ram Murthy.
14. The Petitioner faced with this unfortunate situation,
filed   an   appeal   under   Section   31   of   the   VAT   Act   on
24.9.2018 on the bona fide belief that there are good
grounds for condonation of the delay since the Petitioner
cannot   suffer   for   the   errors   committed   by   one   of   its
employees.
15. It is submitted that the 2nd Respondent, vide order,
dated 25.10.2018 (Ex. P­7), rejected the appeal on the
ground   that   he   has   no   power   to   condone   the   delay
beyond 30 days. It is also observed in the said order that
appeal against the Endorsement was also dismissed by
him on 17.8.2018. However, copy of the order is not yet
served on the petitioner. The 2nd  Respondent observed
that   the   Petitioner   cannot   dispute   the   service   of
assessment order on 22.6.2017 and failure to file the
appeal within 60 days would mean that the assessment
order has attained finality.
16. The petitioner submits that filing of a further appeal
to the APVAT Appellate Tribunal at Visakhapatnam is a
futile exercise, since as a creature under the Act, the
Tribunal cannot find fault with the 2nd Respondent for not
condoning the delay beyond 30 days.
17. The   petitioner   has   lost   the   appellate   remedy   by
efflux of time. It does not mean that the Petitioner should
be   left   remediless.   The   petitioner   submits   that   a   full
Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Electronics Corporation of
India Limited (Writ Petition Nos. 9482 and 9485 of 2017,
18
dated 13.3.2018, dealing with similar situation, under
Central Excise Act, held that even if the appeal time
under   the   Act   has   expired,   it   does   not   prevent   the
assessee from preferring a  Writ  Petition under Article
226 of the Constitution.”
10. The High Court finally allowed the writ petition vide the
impugned judgment and order on the ground that the statutory
remedy had become ineffective for the respondent (writ petitioner)
due   to   expiry   of   60   days   from   the   date   of   service   of   the
assessment order.  Inasmuch as, the appellate authority had no
jurisdiction to condone the delay after expiry of 60 days, despite
the   reason   mentioned   by   the   respondent   of   an   extraordinary
situation   due   to   the   act   of   commission   and   omission   of   its
employee   who   was   in   charge   of   the   tax   matters,   forcing   the
management   to   suspend   him   and   initiate   disciplinary
proceedings against him.  Soon after becoming aware about the
assessment order, the respondent had filed the appeal, but that
was after expiry of 60 days’ period.   The High Court was also
impressed   by   the   contention   pressed   into   service   by   the
respondent that it ought to be given one opportunity to explain to
the authority (Assistant Commissioner) about the discrepancies
between the value reported in the CST returns and the amount
indicated in Form “F” relating to the turnover.   The additional
19
reason as can be discerned from the impugned order is that the
respondent   had   already   deposited   an   additional   amount
equivalent to 12.5% of the disputed tax amount in terms of the
earlier order.   We deem it apposite to reproduce the impugned
order of the High Court.  The same reads thus: ­
“…..
The impugned order of assessment is dated 21.6.2017.
As against the said order the petitioner filed an appeal
with a delay. Since the delay was beyond the period after
which it can be condoned, the same was not entertained.
Therefore, the petitioner has come up with the above writ
petition.
The reason stated by the petitioner is that one of the
employees who was in charge, indulged in malpractices
forcing   the   management   to   suspend   him   and   initiate
disciplinary proceedings. The petitioner claims that they
were not aware of these orders. Therefore, the petitioner
seeks one opportunity.
The reason why the petitioner seeks one opportunity is
that ‘F’ forms submitted by the petitioner were rejected by
the Assessing Officer, on the ground that the value of the
goods   transferred   to   branch   office   have   not   been
disclosed in ‘F’ forms. But the claim of the petitioner is
that the value was wrongly reported in the CST returns
and that the amount indicated in the ‘F’ forms was more
than the turnover. Therefore, they seek one opportunity
to explain this discrepancy.
In   view   of   the   peculiar   circumstances,   even   while
granting an opportunity to the petitioner, we wanted to
put   them   on   condition.   Therefore,   on   8.11.2018   we
passed an interim order to the following effect,
“It is represented by Mr. S. Dwarakanath,
learned   counsel   for   the   petitioner   that   the
petitioner   has   already   paid   12.5%   of   the
disputed tax, for the purpose of filing an appeal.
But, the employee, who was incharge and who
was subsequently, suspended in contemplation
of   disciplinary   proceedings,   failed   to   file   the
20
appeal. The contention of the learned counsel
for   the   petitioner   is   that   the   issue   lies   in   a
narrow campus.
Since the petitioner has already paid 12.5%
of the disputed tax, the request of the petitioner
for   granting   one   more   opportunity   would   be
considered favourably, if the petitioner pays an
additional amount equivalent to 12.5% of the
disputed tax. The petitioner shall make such
payment within a period of one week.
Post on 19.11.2018 for orders.”
Pursuant to the aforesaid order, the petitioner made
payment   of   Rs.9,59,190/­,   representing   12.5%   of   the
taxes for the year 2013­2014 (CST). The amount was paid
on 13.11.2018.
Therefore, the writ petition is ordered, the impugned
order is set aside and the matter is remanded back to the
1
st respondent. The petitioner shall appear before the 1st
respondent on 10.12.2018 and explain the discrepancies.
After such personal hearing, the 1st respondent may pass
orders afresh.
As a sequel, pending miscellaneous petitions, if any,
shall stand closed. No costs.”
11. In   the   backdrop   of   these   facts,   the   central   question   is:
whether   the   High   Court   ought   to   have   entertained   the   writ
petition filed by the respondent?   As regards the power of the
High Court to issue directions, orders or writs in exercise of its
jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, the
same is no more res integra.  Even though the High Court can
entertain   a   writ   petition   against   any   order   or   direction
passed/action   taken   by   the   State   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution, it ought not to do so as a matter of course when the
21
aggrieved person could have availed of an effective alternative
remedy in the manner prescribed by law (see Baburam Prakash
Chandra  Maheshwari   vs.   Antarim  Zila  Parishad  now  Zila
Parishad,   Muzaffarnagar8 and   also  Nivedita   Sharma   vs.
Cellular   Operators   Association   of   India   &   Ors.9
).     In
Thansingh   Nathmal   &   Ors.   vs.   Superintendent   of   Taxes,
Dhubri & Ors.10, the Constitution Bench of this Court made it
amply clear that although the power of the High Court under
Article  226  of  the  Constitution  is  very  wide,  the  Court  must
exercise self­imposed restraint and not entertain the writ petition,
if an alternative effective remedy is available to the aggrieved
person.  In paragraph 7, the Court observed thus: ­
“7. Against the order of the Commissioner an order for
reference   could   have   been   claimed   if   the   appellants
satisfied   the   Commissioner   or   the   High   Court   that   a
question of law arose out of the order. But the procedure
provided by the Act to invoke the jurisdiction of the High
Court   was   bypassed,   the   appellants   moved   the   High
Court   challenging   the   competence   of   the   Provincial
Legislature to extend the concept of sale, and invoked the
extraordinary jurisdiction of the High Court under Article
226  and   sought   to  reopen  the  decision  of   the   Taxing
Authorities on question of fact. The jurisdiction of the
High   Court   under   Article   226   of   the   Constitution   is
couched in wide terms and the exercise thereof is not
subject   to   any   restrictions   except   the   territorial
restrictions which are expressly provided in the Articles.
8 AIR 1969 SC 556
9 (2011) 14 SCC 337
10 AIR 1964 SC 1419
22
But the exercise of the jurisdiction is discretionary: it
is not exercised merely because it is lawful to do so.
The very amplitude of the jurisdiction demands that
it will ordinarily be exercised subject to certain selfimposed   limitations.   Resort   that   jurisdiction   is  not
intended   as   an   alternative   remedy   for   relief   which
may be obtained in a suit or other mode prescribed by
statute.   Ordinarily   the   Court   will   not   entertain   a
petition   for   a   writ   under   Article   226,   where   the
petitioner has an  alternative  remedy, which  without
being unduly onerous, provides an equally efficacious
remedy. Again the High Court does not generally enter
upon   a   determination   of   questions   which   demand   an
elaborate examination of evidence to establish the right to
enforce which the writ is claimed. The High Court does
not   therefore   act   as   a   court   of   appeal   against   the
decision  of   a   court  or   tribunal,   to   correct   errors  of
fact,   and   does   not   by   assuming   jurisdiction   under
Article   226   trench   upon   an   alternative   remedy
provided  by   statute   for  obtaining  relief.  Where   it   is
open   to   the   aggrieved   petitioner   to   move   another
tribunal,   or   even   itself   in   another   jurisdiction   for
obtaining   redress   in   the   manner   provided   by   a
statute,  the  High  Court  normally  will  not  permit  by
entertaining   a   petition   under   Article   226   of   the
Constitution the machinery created under the statute
to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it
to seek resort to the machinery so set up.”
(emphasis supplied)
We may usefully refer to the exposition of this Court in Titaghur
Paper  Mills   Co.   Ltd.  &   Anr.  Vs.   State   of   Orissa  &   Ors.11
,
wherein it is observed that where a right or liability is created by
a   statute,   which   gives   a   special   remedy   for   enforcing   it,   the
remedy provided by that statute must only be availed of.   In
paragraph 11, the Court observed thus: ­
11 (1983) 2 SCC 433
23
“11. Under the scheme of the Act, there is a hierarchy of
authorities before which the petitioners can get adequate
redress   against   the   wrongful   acts   complained   of.   The
petitioners have the right to prefer an appeal before the
Prescribed Authority under sub­section (1) of Section 23
of   the  Act.   If   the   petitioners   are   dissatisfied   with   the
decision in the appeal, they can prefer a further appeal to
the Tribunal under sub­section (3) of Section 23 of the
Act, and then ask for a case to be stated upon a question
of law for the opinion of the High Court under Section 24
of the Act. The Act provides for a complete machinery
to   challenge   an   order   of   assessment,   and   the
impugned   orders   of   assessment   can   only   be
challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not
by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It
is now well recognised that where a right or liability
is created by a statute which gives a special remedy
for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute
only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great
clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks
Co. v. Hawkesford [(1859)   6   CBNS   336,   356]   in   the
following passage:
There   are   three   classes   of   cases   in   which   a
liability   may   be   established   founded   upon
statute.   .  .   .  But   there  is  a   third  class,  viz.
where a liability not existing at common law is
created by a statute which at the same time
gives   a   special   and   particular   remedy   for
enforcing   it….   The   remedy   provided   by   the
statute   must   be   followed,   and   it   is   not
competent to the party to pursue the course
applicable   to   cases   of   the   second   class.   The
form given by the statute must be adopted and
adhered to.
The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the
House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers
Ltd. (1919 AC 368) and has been reaffirmed by the Privy
Council   in Attorney­General   of   Trinidad   and
Tobago v. Gordon   Grant   &   Co.   Ltd. (1935   AC   532)
and Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. (AIR 1940 PC 105).
It   has   also   been   held   to   be   equally   applicable   to
enforcement   of   rights,   and   has   been   followed   by   this
Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified
in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.”
24
(emphasis supplied)
In the subsequent decision in Mafatlal Industries Ltd. & Ors.
vs. Union of India & Ors.12, this Court went on to observe that
an Act cannot bar and curtail remedy under Article 226 or 32 of
the Constitution.  The Court, however, added a word of caution
and expounded that the constitutional Court would certainly take
note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the
Act   and   would   exercise   its   jurisdiction   consistent   with   the
provisions of the enactment.  To put it differently, the fact that
the High Court has wide jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution, does not mean that it can disregard the substantive
provisions of a statute and pass orders which can be settled only
through a mechanism prescribed by the statute. 
12. Indubitably, the powers of the High Court under Article 226
of the Constitution are wide, but certainly not wider than the
plenary powers bestowed on this Court under Article 142 of the
Constitution.  Article 142 is a conglomeration and repository of
the entire judicial powers under the Constitution, to do complete
justice to the parties.   Even while exercising that power, this
Court is required to bear in mind the legislative intent and not to
12 (1997) 5 SCC 536
25
render the statutory provision otiose.   In a recent decision of a
three­Judge   Bench   of   this   Court   in  Oil   and   Natural   Gas
Corporation   Limited   vs.   Gujarat   Energy   Transmission
Corporation Limited & Ors.13, the statutory appeal filed before
this Court was barred by 71 days and the maximum time limit
for condoning the delay in terms of Section 125 of the Electricity
Act, 2003 was only 60 days.   In other words, the appeal was
presented beyond the condonable period of 60 days.  As a result,
this   Court   could   not   have   condoned   the   delay   of   71   days.
Notably, while admitting the appeal, the Court had condoned the
delay in filing the appeal.   However, at the final hearing of the
appeal, an objection regarding appeal being barred by limitation
was allowed to be raised being a jurisdictional issue and while
dealing   with   the   said   objection,   the   Court   referred   to   the
decisions in  Singh  Enterprises  vs.  Commissioner  of  Central
Excise, Jamshedpur & Ors.14, Commissioner of Customs and
Central   Excise   vs.   Hongo   India   Private   Limited  &   Anr.15
,
Chhattisgarh State Electricity Board vs. Central Electricity
13 (2017) 5 SCC 42
14 (2008) 3 SCC 70
15 (2009) 5 SCC 791
26
Regulatory   Commission   &   Ors.16 and  Suryachakra   Power
Corporation Limited vs. Electricity Department represented
by   its   Superintending   Engineer,   Port   Blair   &   Ors.17 and
concluded that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 cannot be
invoked   by   the   Court   for   maintaining   an   appeal   beyond
maximum prescribed period in Section 125 of the Electricity Act.
13. The principle underlying the dictum in this decision would
apply proprio vigore to Section 31 of the 2005 Act including to the
powers of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution.
Notably, in this decision, a submission was canvassed by the
assessee that in the peculiar facts of that case (as urged in the
present   case),   the   Court   may   exercise   its   jurisdiction   under
Article 142 of the Constitution, so that complete justice can be
done.  This argument has been considered and plainly rejected in
the following words: ­
“12. In A.R. Antulay v. R.S. Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602,
while   explicating  and   elaborating  the   principles   under
Article   142,   Sabyasachi   Mukharji,   J.   (as   his   Lordship
then was) opined thus: (SCC p. 656, para 50)
“50. … The fact that the rule was discretionary
did not alter the position. Though Article 142(1)
empowers the Supreme Court to pass any order
to do complete justice between the parties, the
16 (2010) 5 SCC 23
17 (2016) 16 SCC 152
27
court cannot make an order inconsistent with
the fundamental rights guaranteed by Part III of
the Constitution. No question of inconsistency
between   Article 142(1)   and   Article   32   arose.
Gajendragadkar,   J.,   speaking   [Prem   Chand
Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996] for
the majority of the Judges of this Court said
that Article 142(1) did not confer any power on
this   Court   to   contravene   the   provisions   of
Article 32 of the Constitution. Nor did Article
145   confer   power   upon   this   Court   to   make
rules,   empowering   it   to   contravene   the
provisions of the fundamental right. At AIR pp.
1002­03, para 12 : SCR p. 899 of the Report,
Gajendragadkar, J., reiterated that the powers
of this Court are no doubt very wide and they
are intended and “will always be exercised in
the interests of justice”. But that is not to say
that an order can be made by this Court which
is   inconsistent   with   the   fundamental   rights
guaranteed by Part III of the Constitution. It
was emphasised that an order which this Court
could   make   in   order   to   do   complete   justice
between the parties, must not only be consistent
with the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
Constitution, but it cannot even be inconsistent
with the substantive provisions of the relevant
statutory laws. The court therefore, held that it
was   not   possible   to   hold   that   Article   142(1)
conferred upon this Court powers which could
contravene the provisions of Article 32.”
(emphasis in original)
13. The   said   decision   has   been   clarified   by   a
Constitution Bench in Union Carbide Corpn. v. Union of
India, (1991) 4 SCC 584, wherein M.N. Venkatachaliah,
J. (as his Lordship then was) speaking for the majority,
ruled that: (SCC pp. 634­35, para 83)
“83. It   is   necessary   to   set   at   rest   certain
misconceptions in the arguments touching the
scope of the powers of this Court under Article
142(1)   of   the   Constitution.   These   issues   are
matters   of   serious   public   importance.   The
proposition that a provision in any ordinary law
irrespective   of   the   importance   of   the   public
policy on which it is founded, operates to limit
28
the   powers   of   the   Apex   Court   under   Article
142(1) is unsound and erroneous. In both Prem
Chand   Garg v. Excise   Commr.,   AIR   1963   SC
996,   as   well   as A.R.   Antulay v. R.S.   Nayak,
(1988) 2 SCC 602, cases the point was one of
violation   of   constitutional   provisions   and
constitutional rights. The observations as to the
effect of inconsistency with statutory provisions
were really unnecessary in those cases as the
decisions in the ultimate analysis turned on the
breach of constitutional rights. We agree with
Shri Nariman that the power of the Court under
Article   142   insofar   as   quashing   of   criminal
proceedings are concerned is not exhausted by
Section 320 or 321 or 482 CrPC or all of them
put together. The power under Article 142 is at
an   entirely   different   level   and   of   a   different
quality. Prohibitions or limitations or provisions
contained in ordinary laws cannot, ipso facto,
act   as   prohibitions   or   limitations   on   the
constitutional powers under Article 142. Such
prohibitions or limitations in the statutes might
embody and reflect the scheme of a particular
law, taking into account the nature and status
of   the   authority   or   the   court   on   which
conferment   of   powers   —   limited   in   some
appropriate   way   —   is   contemplated.   The
limitations   may   not   necessarily   reflect   or   be
based   on   any   fundamental   considerations   of
public policy. Shri Sorabjee, learned Attorney
General,   referring   to Garg   case [Prem   Chand
Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996], said
that limitation on the powers under Article 142
arising   from   “inconsistency   with   express
statutory provisions of substantive law” must
really mean and be understood as some express
prohibition   contained   in   any   substantive
statutory   law.   He   suggested   that   if   the
expression   “prohibition”   is   read   in   place   of
“provision”   that   would   perhaps   convey   the
appropriate   idea.   But we   think   that   such
prohibition should also be shown to be based on
some   underlying   fundamental   and   general
issues of public policy and not merely incidental
to a particular statutory scheme or pattern. It
will again be wholly incorrect to say that powers
under   Article 142   are   subject   to   such   express
29
statutory   prohibitions.   That   would   convey   the
idea   that   statutory   provisions   override   a
constitutional provision. Perhaps, the proper way
of   expressing   the   idea   is   that   in   exercising
powers under Article 142 and in assessing the
needs of “complete justice” of a cause or matter,
the   Apex   Court   will   take   note   of   the   express
prohibitions   in   any   substantive   statutory
provision based on some fundamental principles
of public policy and regulate the exercise of its
power   and   discretion   accordingly.   The
proposition does not relate to the powers of the
Court under Article 142, but only to what is or
is not “complete justice” of a cause or matter
and in the ultimate analysis of the propriety of
the exercise of the power. No question of lack of
jurisdiction or of nullity can arise.”
(emphasis in original)
14. In   this   regard,   another   Constitution   Bench
in Supreme Court  Bar Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4
SCC 409] opined: (SCC pp. 437­38, para 56)
“56. As a matter of fact, the observations
on which emphasis has been placed by us from
the   Union   Carbide   case [Union   Carbide
Corpn. v. Union   of   India,   (1991)   4   SCC
584], A.R.   Antulay   case [A.R.   Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, (1988) 2 SCC 602] and Delhi Judicial
Service Assn. v. State of Gujarat, (1991) 4 SCC
406, go   to   show   that   they   do   not   strictly
speaking   come   into   any   conflict   with   the
observations   of   the   majority   made   in   Prem
Chand   Garg   case [Prem   Chand   Garg v. Excise
Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996]. It is one thing to
say   that   “prohibitions   or   limitations   in   a
statute” cannot come in the way of exercise of
jurisdiction   under   Article 142 to   do   complete
justice between   the   parties   in   the   pending
“cause or matter” arising out of that statute,
but   quite  a   different  thing  to  say  that   while
exercising jurisdiction under Article 142, this
Court   can   altogether ignore the   substantive
provisions of a statute, dealing with the subject
and pass orders concerning an issue which can
be settled only through a mechanism prescribed
30
in another statute. This Court did not say so
in Union   Carbide   case [Union   Carbide
Corpn. v. Union   of   India,   (1991)   4   SCC   584]
either expressly or by implication and on the
contrary   it   has   been   held   that   the   Apex
Court will take note of the express provisions of
any substantive statutory law and regulate the
exercise of its power and discretion accordingly.
…”
(emphasis in original)
15. From the aforesaid decisions, it is clear as crystal
that   the   Constitution   Bench   in Supreme   Court   Bar
Assn. v. Union of India, (1998) 4 SCC 409, has ruled that
there   is   no   conflict   of   opinion   in Antulay   case [A.R.
Antulay v. R.S.   Nayak,   (1988)   2   SCC   602]  or   in Union
Carbide   Corpn.   case [Union   Carbide   Corpn. v. Union   of
India, (1991) 4 SCC 584] with the principle set down
in Prem Chand Garg v. Excise Commr., AIR 1963 SC 996.
Be   it  noted,  when  there   is  a  statutory  command  by
the legislation as regards limitation and there is the
postulate   that   delay   can   be   condoned   for   a   further
period not exceeding sixty days, needless to say, it is
based   on   certain   underlined,   fundamental,   general
issues   of   public   policy  as   has   been   held   in Union
Carbide   Corpn.   case [Union   Carbide   Corpn. v. Union   of
India,   (1991)   4   SCC   584].   As   the   pronouncement
in Chhattisgarh   SEB v. Central   Electricity   Regulatory
Commission, (2010) 5 SCC 23, lays down quite clearly
that   the   policy   behind   the   Act   emphasising   on   the
constitution of a special adjudicatory forum, is meant to
expeditiously decide the grievances of a person who may
be aggrieved by an order of the adjudicatory officer or by
an   appropriate   Commission.   The   Act   is   a   special
legislation   within   the  meaning   of   Section   29(2)   of   the
Limitation   Act   and,   therefore,   the   prescription   with
regard to the limitation has to be the binding effect and
the   same   has   to   be   followed   regard   being   had   to   its
mandatory nature.  To   put   it   in   a   different   way,   the
prescription of limitation in a case of present nature,
when   the   statute   commands   that   this   Court   may
condone   the   further   delay   not   beyond   60   days,   it
would   come   within   the   ambit   and   sweep   of   the
provisions and policy of legislation. It is equivalent to
Section   3   of   the   Limitation   Act.   Therefore,   it   is
31
uncondonable   and   it   cannot   be   condoned   taking
recourse to Article 142 of the Constitution.
16. We had stated earlier that we will be adverting to
the   passage   in Suryachakra   Power   Corpn.
Ltd. v. Electricity Deptt., (2016) 16 SCC 152.   There, the
Court had referred to Section 14 of the Limitation Act. It
fundamentally relied on M.P. Steel Corpn. v. CCE, (2015)
7 SCC 58, wherein the Court after referring to certain
authorities, analysed thus: (M.P. Steel Corpn. Case), SCC
p. 91, para 43)
“43. …   when   a   certain   period   is   excluded   by
applying the principles contained in Section 14,
there   is   no   delay   to   be   attributed   to   the
appellant and the limitation period provided by
the statute concerned continues to be the stated
period and not more than the stated period. We
conclude, therefore, that the principle of Section
14 which is a principle based on advancing the
cause of justice would certainly apply to exclude
time taken in prosecuting proceedings which are
bona fide and with due diligence pursued, which
ultimately end without a decision on the merits
of the case.””
(emphasis in italics – in original, and in bold – supplied)
Similarly, in  State   vs.  Mushtaq   Ahmad  &  Ors.18, this Court
opined that where minimum sentence is provided for an offence
then   no   Court   can   impose   lesser   punishment   on   ground   of
mitigating factors. 
14. A priori, we have no hesitation in taking the view that what
this Court cannot do in exercise of its plenary powers under
Article 142 of the Constitution, it is unfathomable as to how the
High   Court   can   take   a   different   approach   in   the   matter   in
18 (2016) 1 SCC 315
32
reference   to   Article   226   of   the   Constitution.     The   principle
underlying the rejection of such argument by this Court would
apply on all fours to the exercise of power by the High Court
under Article 226 of the Constitution. 
15. We may now revert to the Full Bench decision of the Andhra
Pradesh High Court in  Electronics  Corporation of India Ltd.
(supra), which had adopted the view taken by the Full Bench of
the Gujarat High Court in Panoli Intermediate (India) Pvt. Ltd.
vs.  Union  of   India  &  Ors.19  and also of the Karnataka High
Court   in  Phoenix   Plasts   Company   vs.   Commissioner   of
Central   Excise  (Appeal­I),   Bangalore20.   The logic applied in
these   decisions   proceeds   on   fallacious   premise.     For,   these
decisions   are   premised   on   the   logic   that   provision   such   as
Section 31 of the 1995 Act, cannot curtail the jurisdiction of the
High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution.  This
approach   is   faulty.     It   is   not   a   matter   of   taking   away   the
jurisdiction of the High Court.  In a given case, the assessee may
approach the High Court before the statutory period of appeal
expires to challenge the assessment order by way of writ petition
19 AIR 2015 Guj 97
20 2013 (298) ELT 481 (Kar.)
33
on the ground that the same is without jurisdiction or passed in
excess of jurisdiction ­ by overstepping or crossing the limits of
jurisdiction including in flagrant disregard of law and rules of
procedure or in violation of principles of natural justice, where no
procedure is specified.   The High Court may accede to such a
challenge and can also non­suit the petitioner on the ground that
alternative efficacious remedy is available and that be invoked by
the writ petitioner.   However, if the writ petitioner choses to
approach the High Court after expiry of the maximum limitation
period of 60 days prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act,
the   High   Court   cannot   disregard   the   statutory   period   for
redressal of the grievance and entertain the writ petition of such
a party as a matter of course.  Doing so would be in the teeth of
the principle underlying the dictum of a three­Judge Bench of
this   Court   in  Oil   and   Natural   Gas   Corporation   Limited
(supra).  In other words, the fact that the High Court has wide
powers, does not mean that it would issue a writ which may be
inconsistent with the legislative intent regarding the dispensation
explicitly prescribed under Section 31 of the 2005 Act.   That
would render the legislative scheme and intention behind the
stated provision otiose.
34
16. The respondent had relied on the decision of this Court in
K.S.   Rashid   &   Son   vs.   the   Income   Tax   Investigation
Commission21.     This   decision   of   the   Constitution   Bench,   no
doubt, deals with the extent of power of the High Court under
Article 226 of the Constitution and the situation when the High
Court   can   refuse   to   exercise   its   discretion,   such   as   when
alternative efficacious remedy is available to the aggrieved party.
In paragraph 4 (last paragraph) of this decision, however, the
Court plainly noted that it was not necessary to express any final
opinion   on   the   question   as   to   whether   Section   8(5)   of   the
Taxation on Income (Investigation Commission) Act, 1947 (Act
XXX of 1947) is to be regarded as providing the only remedy
available to the aggrieved party and that it excludes altogether
the remedy provided for under Article 226 of the Constitution. 
17. Reliance was then placed on a three­Judge Bench decision
of this Court in ITC Ltd. & Anr. Vs. Union of India22.  In that
case,  the  High   Court  had  dismissed  the  writ  petition   on  the
ground that the petitioner therein had an adequate alternative
remedy by way of an appeal under Section 35 of the Central
21 AIR 1954 SC 207
22 (1998) 8 SCC 610
35
Excise Act.  Concededly, this Court was pleased to uphold that
opinion   of   the   High   Court.     However,   whilst   considering   the
difficulty expressed by the petitioner therein that the statutory
remedy   of   appeal   had   now   become   time   barred   during   the
pendency of the proceedings before the High Court and before
this Court, the Court permitted the petitioner therein to resort to
remedy of statutory appeal and directed the appellate authority
to decide the appeal on merits.  This obviously was done on the
basis   of   concession   given   by   the   counsel   appearing   for   the
Revenue as noted in paragraph 2(1) of the order, which reads
thus: ­
“2.  The High Court has dismissed the writ petition filed
by the petitioner on the ground that there is an adequate
alternative remedy by way of an appeal under Section 35
of   the   Central   Excise   Act.   Learned   counsel   for   the
petitioner  submits that  the  petitioner will  face  certain
difficulties in pursuing this remedy:
(1) This   remedy   may   not   be   any   longer
available to it because the appeal has to be filed
within a period of three months from the date of
the   assessment   order   and   delay   can   be
condoned   only   to   the   extent   of   three   more
months by the Collector under Section 35 of the
Act. It is pointed out that the petitioner did not
file an appeal because the Collector (Appeal) at
Madras had taken a view in a similar matter
that   an   appeal   was   not   maintainable.   That
apart, the petitioner in view of the huge demand
involved filed a writ petition and so did not file
an appeal. In the circumstances of the case, we
are of the opinion that the ends of justice will
be   met   if   we   permit   the   petitioner   to   file   a
36
belated   appeal  within   one   month  from   today
with an application for condonation of delay,
whereon   the   appeal   may   be   entertained.
Learned counsel for the Revenue has stated
before us that the Revenue will not object to
the   entertainment   of   the   appeal   on   the
ground that it is barred by time. In view of
this direction and concession, the petitioner
will have an effective alternative remedy by
way of an appeal.
(emphasis supplied)
In that case, it appears that the writ petition was filed within
statutory period and legal remedy was being pursued in good
faith by the assessee (appellant). 
18. Suffice it to observe that this decision is on the facts of that
case   and   cannot   be   cited   as   a   precedent   in   support   of   an
argument that the High Court is free to entertain the writ petition
assailing the assessment order even if filed beyond the statutory
period of maximum 60 days in filing appeal.   The remedy of
appeal is creature of statute.  If the appeal is presented by the
assessee beyond the extended statutory limitation period of 60
days in terms of Section 31 of the 2005 Act and is, therefore, not
entertained, it is incomprehensible as to how it would become a
case of violation of fundamental right, much less statutory or
legal right as such.
37
19. Arguendo,   reverting   to   the   factual   matrix   of   the   present
case, it is noticed that the respondent had asserted that it was
not   aware   about   the   passing   of   assessment   order   dated
21.6.2017 although it is admitted that the same was served on
the authorised representative of the respondent on 22.6.2017.
The date on which the respondent became aware about the order
is not expressly stated either in the application for condonation of
delay filed before the appellate authority, the affidavit filed in
support of the said application or for that matter, in the memo of
writ petition.   On the other hand, it is seen that the amount
equivalent to 12.5% of the tax amount came to be deposited on
12.9.2017 for and  on  behalf  of respondent,  without filing  an
appeal and without any demur ­ after the expiry of statutory
period of maximum 60 days, prescribed under Section 31 of the
2005 Act.  Not only that, the respondent filed a formal application
under Rule 60 of the 2005 Rules on 8.5.2018 and pursued the
same in appeal, which was rejected on 17.8.2018.  Furthermore,
the appeal in question against the assessment order came to be
filed only on 24.9.2018 without disclosing the date on which the
respondent   in   fact   became   aware   about   the   existence   of   the
assessment order dated 21.6.2017.   On the other hand, in the
affidavit of Mr. Sreedhar Routh, Site Director of the respondent
38
company (filed in support of the application for condonation of
delay   before   the   appellate   authority),   it   is   stated   that   the
company became aware about the irregularities committed by its
erring official (Mr. P. Sriram Murthy) in the month of July, 2018,
which   pre­supposes   that   the   respondent   must   have   become
aware about the assessment order, at least in July, 2018.  In the
same affidavit, it is asserted that the respondent company was
not aware about the assessment order, as it was not brought to
its notice by the employee concerned due to his negligence.  The
respondent in the writ petition has averred that the appeal was
rejected by the appellate authority on the ground that it had no
power to condone the delay beyond 30 days, when in fact, the
order   examines   the   cause   set   out   by   the   respondent   and
concludes that the same was unsubstantiated by the respondent.
That finding has not been examined by the High Court in the
impugned judgment and order at all, but the High Court was
more impressed by the fact that the respondent was in a position
to offer some explanation about the discrepancies in respect of
the  volume of turnover and  that the  respondent  had  already
deposited   12.5%   of   the   additional   amount   in   terms   of   the
previous order passed by it.  That reason can have no bearing on
the justification for non­filing of the appeal within the statutory
39
period.  Notably, the respondent had relied on the affidavit of the
Site   Director   and   no   affidavit   of   the   concerned   employee   (P.
Sriram Murthy, Deputy Manager­Finance) or at least the other
employee [Siddhant Belgaonker, Senior Manager (Finance)], who
was   associated   with   the   erring   employee   during   the   relevant
period,   has   been   filed   in   support   of   the   stand   taken   in   the
application for condonation of delay.  Pertinently, no finding has
been recorded by the High Court that it was a case of violation of
principles   of   natural   justice   or   non­compliance   of   statutory
requirements   in   any   manner.     Be   that   as   it   may,   since   the
statutory period specified for filing of appeal had expired long
back in August, 2017 itself and the appeal came to be filed by the
respondent only on 24.9.2018, without substantiating the plea
about   inability   to   file   appeal   within   the   prescribed   time,   no
indulgence could be shown to the respondent at all.
20. Reverting   to   the   contention   that   the   respondent   having
failed to assail the order passed by the appellate authority, dated
25.10.2018 rejecting the application for condonation of delay, the
assessment order passed by the Assistant Commissioner, dated
21.6.2017   stood   merged,   need   not   detain   us   in   view   of   the
exposition of this Court in Raja Mechanical Company Private
40
Limited  vs.  Commissioner  of  Central  Excise,  Delhi­I23.   It is
well settled that rejection of delay application by the appellate
forum does not entail in merger of the assessment order with that
order.
21. Taking any view of the matter, therefore, the High Court
ought not to have entertained the subject writ petition filed by
the respondent herein.  The same deserved to be rejected at the
threshold.
22. Accordingly,   we   allow   this   appeal   and   set   aside   the
impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court and
dismiss the writ petition.   There shall be no order as to costs.
Pending interlocutory applications, if any, shall stand disposed
of.
..................................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)
..................................J.
           (Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
May 6, 2020.

23 (2012) 12 SCC 613

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976+ Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993 = Family of the said Parsottambhai Patel - declared surplus/excessland to the tune of 12385 square meters. - itwill be acquired as andwhen required by the Government and till then, the holders may continue to remain in possession thereof.-Thereafter, on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985, a notification under Section 10(1) of the 1976 Act was issued proposing acquisition of surplus/excess land. -an application for exemption under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was filed byAmbalal Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel on 22.8.1985. While the said application under Section 21 was pending consideration, notification under Section10(5) of the 1976 Act came to be issued on 17.12.1985 to handover possession of the vacant land. -The application filed by the land owners under Section 21 ofthe1976 Act came to be rejected on 15.12.1986.-During the pendency of the remanded proceedings (arisingfrom application under Section 21), the repeal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993 came into force from 30.3.1999. The land owners then filed an application dated 30.4.1999 before the competent authority to give NoObjection Certificate to the effect that vide order dated 19.9.1998 passed by the Urban Land Tribunal/Ex­Officio Additional ChiefSecretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat, all the earlier orders or notifications stood quashed and set aside and the land no longer vested in the Government in any manner. Pursuant to the said application, the competent authority vide order dated 19.5.1999, held that such No Objection Certificate cannot be given to the land owners, as the land had already been declared surplus and 3 For short, “the repeal Act” 9 steps have been taken under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the 1976 Act, which have attained finality. hence the writ =The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from laches. We are in agreement with the said view taken by the High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case.

Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 1976+ Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993 =
Family of the said Parsottambhai Patel - declared surplus/excessland to the tune of 12385 square meters. - itwill be acquired as andwhen required by the Government and till then, the holders may  continue   to   remain   in   possession   thereof.-Thereafter,   on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985, a notification  under Section  10(1) of the 1976  Act  was   issued   proposing  acquisition   of  surplus/excess land. -an application for exemption under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was filed byAmbalal Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel on 22.8.1985.  While the said application under Section 21 was pending   consideration,   notification   under   Section10(5)   of   the 1976   Act   came   to   be   issued   on   17.12.1985   to   handover possession of the vacant land.   -The application filed by the land owners under Section 21 ofthe1976 Act came to be rejected on 15.12.1986.-During the pendency of the remanded proceedings (arisingfrom application under Section 21), the repeal Act, namely, the Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993  came into force from 30.3.1999.  The land owners then filed an application dated   30.4.1999   before   the   competent   authority   to   give   NoObjection Certificate to the effect that vide order dated 19.9.1998 passed by the Urban Land Tribunal/Ex­Officio Additional ChiefSecretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat, all the earlier orders or notifications stood quashed and set aside and the land no longer vested in the Government in any manner.  Pursuant to the said application, the competent authority vide order dated 19.5.1999, held that such No Objection Certificate cannot be given to the land owners, as the land had already been declared surplus and 3 For short, “the repeal Act” 9 steps have been taken under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and 10(6) of the 1976 Act, which have attained finality. hence the writ =The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after lapse of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered from laches.  We are in agreement with the said view taken by the High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case. 
1
REPORTABLE
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6380 OF 2012
Kapilaben Ambalal Patel & Ors. ...Appellant(s)
Versus
State of Gujarat & Anr.       ...Respondent(s)
J U D G M E N T
A.M. Khanwilkar, J.
1. This   appeal   takes   exception   to   the   judgment   and   order
dated 26.4.2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court
of Gujarat at Ahmedabad1
  in Letters Patent Appeal (LPA) No.
233/2006,   whereby,   the   writ   petition   being   Special   Civil
Application No. 12602/2001 filed by the appellants came to be
dismissed   whilst   setting   aside   the   judgment   and   order   dated
21.12.2005 passed by the learned single Judge of the High Court
in the said writ petition.  By the said writ petition, the appellants
had sought following reliefs: ­
“8. The   petitioners   pray   that   this   Hon’ble   Court   be
pleased to issue a writ of mandamus or a writ in the
1 For short, “the High Court”
2
nature   of   mandamus   or   any   other   appropriate   writ,
direction and/or order and be pleased:
(A) to declare that the Panchnama dated 20.03.1986,
(Annexure   D)   and   the   purported   action   of   the
respondents to take possession, purported constructive
or actual of the lands mentioned in para (c) hereinabove
is contrary to law and of no legal effect.
(B) to   permanently   restrain   the   respondents   from
disturbing or taking possession of the petitioners lands
admeasuring   12,385   sq.   mts.   or   any   part   thereof
mentioned in Panchnama dated 20.03.1986 (Annexure
D).
(C) commanding the respondents to deliver back to the
petitioners possession of the said lands, if they are held
to be in possession de facto or dejure thereof.
(D) to   restrain   the   respondents   from   taking   any
proceedings in respect of the said lands pursuant to the
order dated 01.02.85 of the Competent Authority.
(E) to restrain pending the hearing and final disposal of
this   Petition   the   respondents   from   in   any   manner
disturbing or interfering with the possession of the said
lands which are in joint possession of the petitioners and
other joint holders.
(F) to   grant   such   other   and   further   reliefs   as   this
Honourable Court in the facts and circumstances of the
case deems fit and proper.
(G) to provide for the costs of this petition.”
2. The backdrop in which the writ petition was filed can be
stated thus. 
3. The   appellants   claim   to   be   legal   representatives   of   the
original owner of the land in question, namely, Parsottambhai
Patel, who died on 28.1.1976 before the commencement of the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Act, 19762
  in the State of
Gujarat i.e., with effect from 17th  February, 1976.   He had five
sons, namely, (i) Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, (ii) Maganbhai
2 For short, “the 1976 Act”
3
Parsottambhai   Patel,   (iii)   Babarbhai   Parsottambhai   Patel,   (iv)
Bhailalbhai   Parsottambhai   Patel   and   (v)   Ramanbhai
Parsottambhai Patel.  Family of the said Parsottambhai Patel filed
statements under Section 6 of the 1976 Act on 13.8.1976 in the
name(s)   of   (i)   Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel,   (ii)   Bhikhabhai
Maganbhai   Patel,   son   of   deceased   Maganbhai   Parsottambhai
Patel, (iii) Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel and Jethabhai Babarbhai
Patel,   sons   of   deceased   Babarbhai   Parsottambhai   Patel,   (iv)
Natvarbhai   Bhailalbhai   Patel,   son   of   deceased   Bhailalbhai
Parsottambhai Patel and (v) Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel as
owners of land admeasuring 30385.10 square meters bearing
Survey Nos. 362, 378, 592, 593/1, 593/2 (Final Plot numbers
280,   287,   108,   115   and   116)   of   Village   Manjalpur,   District
Vadodara in the State of Gujarat.  The statements disclosed that
other persons were also interested in the stated land.  Later, an
application came to be filed on behalf of the five brothers for
exemption under Section 20(1)(a) of the 1976 Act.   That was
granted vide order dated 6.3.1980/29.11.1980 by the Deputy
Collector   and   Under   Secretary,   Revenue   Department,
Government of Gujarat.   On 8.6.1981, in response to the draft
statements,   objections   were   filed   in   the   name   of   Ambalal
4
Parsottambhai   Patel   through   Power   of   Attorney   holder   ­
Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel.  Pursuant to request made by
the land owners to cancel the agriculture exemption, an order
was passed by the office of competent authority and Additional
Collector   (ULC),   Vadodara   on   7.11.1983.     The   competent
authority, pursuant  to the  statements submitted by the land
owners and considering the objections to the draft statement,
issued final statement under Section 9 of the 1976 Act, declaring
12 persons as holders of surplus/excess land to the tune of
12385 square meters, particulars whereof have been noted in the
order dated 1.2.1985, as follows: ­
“Particulars of surplus land.
=========================
Village S.No. Final
Plot No.
Extent Zone
Manjalpu
r
362 280
Paiki
2672.3 Residentia
l
” 378 287 3035.0 ”
” 592 108 2747.0 ”
” 593/1 115 1546.0 ”
” 593/2 116 2385.0 ”
12385.3
12385 Square metres”
The land owners were duly informed that the surplus/excess
land referred to in the final statement will be acquired as and
when required by the Government and till then, the holders may
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continue   to   remain   in   possession   thereof.     Thereafter,   on
8.3.1985/21.3.1985, a notification  under Section  10(1) of the
1976  Act  was   issued   proposing  acquisition   of  surplus/excess
land.   The said notification included only four (4) names being
Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel,   Bhikhabhai   Maganbhai   Patel,
Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel
and   excluded   the   names   of   eight   (8)   other   joint   owners,   as
referred to in the order dated 1.2.1985, who were also the legal
representatives of the original owner and members of family of
deceased Parsottambhai Patel.   A follow up notification (dated
31.5.1985) under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act was published in
the Gazette on 25.7.1985.  Only after the issuance of notification
under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act, whereby, the surplus/excess
land came to be vested in the State Government, an application
for exemption under Section 21 of the 1976 Act was filed by
Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel
on 22.8.1985.  While the said application under Section 21 was
pending   consideration,   notification   under   Section10(5)   of   the
1976   Act   came   to   be   issued   on   17.12.1985   to   handover
possession of the vacant land.  The same was duly served upon
Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel   on   26.12.1985   as   per   the
6
endorsement   shown   in   Annexure   A­11   and   on   Jayantibhai
Babarbhai   Patel   on   the   same   date   as   per   endorsement   in
Annexure A­12.  After service of notification/notice under Section
10(5) of the 1976 Act, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel expired on
31.12.1985.  Despite that, another notice came to be issued on
23.1.1986 under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act mentioning the
names of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai
Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai
Patel.   In the said notice, it was mentioned that the date of
handing over possession was fixed on 1.2.1986 at 11.00 hrs. and
the addressees were called upon to remain present at the site for
handing over possession.  According to the appellants, this notice
was issued only to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel and not to other
land owners.  The respondent­State has, however, countered this
factual   narrative   of   the   appellants   and   have   relied   on
acknowledgments   produced   alongwith   Written   Submissions   in
Annexure R­2.   However, it is not disputed by the respondentState that the notice sent to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was
returned   on   2.2.1986   with   endorsement   “said   owner   has
expired”.  The possession of the surplus/excess land was taken
over   under   a   Panchanama   dated   20.3.1986   signed   by   two
7
independent witnesses.   On 11.4.1986, the Mamlatdar, Baroda
City was requested to enter the name of the State Government in
the   Revenue   record   concerning  the   stated  lands.     Thereafter,
notice dated 17.5.1986 under Section 11 of the 1976 Act was
issued to Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel being heir of the deceased
Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel   to   appear   on   27.5.1986   for
determination   of   compensation   amount.     The   competent
authority   determined   the   compensation   amount   on   6.8.1986.
The application filed by the land owners under Section 21 of the
1976 Act came to be rejected on 15.12.1986.
4. The   above   decision   was   challenged   by   the   land   owners
through   their   Power   of   Attorney   holders   Ramanbhai
Parsottambhai Patel and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel by way of
appeal under Section 33 of the 1976 Act.   In this appeal, the
competent authority had filed reply on 4.4.1988, stating that the
application under Section 21 was not maintainable, as the land
had already vested in the State Government, as a consequence of
notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act.  The aforesaid
appeal  was  rejected  by  the  appellate  authority on  28.8.1995.
However, one Devikaben Chandubhai Bhailalbhai (daughter of
8
Chandubhai   Bhailalbhai   Patel,   who   in   turn   was   son   of
Bhailalbhai   Parsottambhai   Patel)   alongwith   her   three   siblings
filed review application against the order passed by the appellate
authority dated 28.8.1995 after lapse of over two years i.e. on
29.4.1998.   That review application was allowed on 19.9.1998
and   the   proceedings   came   to   be   remanded   to   the  competent
authority for consideration afresh on merits. 
5. During the pendency of the remanded proceedings (arising
from application under Section 21), the repeal Act, namely, the
Urban Land (Ceiling and Regulation) Repeal Act, 19993
 came into
force from 30.3.1999.  The land owners then filed an application
dated   30.4.1999   before   the   competent   authority   to   give   No
Objection Certificate to the effect that vide order dated 19.9.1998
passed by the Urban Land Tribunal/Ex­Officio Additional Chief
Secretary, Revenue Department, Gujarat, all the earlier orders or
notifications stood quashed and set aside and the land no longer
vested in the Government in any manner.  Pursuant to the said
application, the competent authority vide order dated 19.5.1999,
held that such No Objection Certificate cannot be given to the
land owners, as the land had already been declared surplus and
3 For short, “the repeal Act”
9
steps have been taken under Sections 10(1), 10(3), 10(5) and
10(6) of the 1976 Act, which have attained finality. 
6. After   this   decision,   one   Kamleshbhai   Parekh,   Power   of
Attorney holder of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was advised to
file   writ   petition   being   Special   Civil   Application   (SCA)   No.
8402/1999,   challenging   the   Possession   Panchnama   dated
20.3.1986.  The learned single Judge, partly allowed the said writ
petition   vide   judgment   and   order   dated   5.12.2000.     Feeling
aggrieved by  that  decision, the  State  Government carried  the
matter in appeal by way of LPA No. 460/2002 before the Division
Bench of the High Court on the ground, amongst others, that
Kamleshbhai Parekh had no subsisting right or locus to file the
writ petition on account of the death of Ambalal Parsottambhai
Patel on 31.12.1985, as a result of which the authority to file
such a petition had come to an end.  When the said appeal was
pending,   the   appellants   herein   were   advised   to   file   an
independent writ petition for the same relief(s), being SCA No.
12602/2001.     The   reliefs   in   this   writ   petition   have   been
reproduced in paragraph 1 above. 
10
7. Finally, the appeal filed by the State Government being LPA
No. 460/2002 came to be allowed by the Division Bench of the
High   Court   on   16.8.2005,   accepting   the   objection   regarding
maintainability   of   the   writ   petition   by   the   Power   of   Attorney
holder of the deceased Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel.   However,
all other questions were left open. 
8. Be that as it may, the writ petition filed by the appellants
herein being SCA No. 12602/2001 was allowed by the learned
single Judge of the High Court vide judgment and order dated
21.12.2005 for reasons noted therein.  That decision was assailed
by the State Government by way of LPA No. 233/2006 before the
Division Bench of the High Court, which came to be allowed vide
impugned judgment and order dated 26.4.2011. 
9. The   Division   Bench   first   proceeded   to   hold   that   the
application filed by the land owners under Section 21 of the 1976
Act was barred by limitation having been filed after 1139 days
from the date of commencement of the 1976 Act.  It ought to have
been filed before 3.4.1979, whereas, it was filed on 22.8.1985
and there was no power bestowed on the competent authority to
entertain such delayed application.  Having said that, it went on
11
to hold that all the land owners had not challenged the decision
of   the   competent   authority.     The   appeal   under   Section   33,
however, was preferred only by Ramanbhai Parsottambhai Patel
and Tribhovandas Chotabhai Patel, the Power of Attorney holders
of   Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel.     No   other   appellant   had
preferred the said appeal and thus they allowed the order dated
15.12.1986 rejecting the application under Section 21 to attain
finality.     The   Division   Bench   then   proceeded   to   consider   the
objection taken by the State regarding delay in filing the subject
writ   petition   by   these   appellants,   to   question   the   Possession
Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 after lapse of 14 years, in 2001.
While considering this objection, the Division Bench noted thus: ­
“41. The appellant­State has taken specific plea that the
order taking possession was never challenged before the
appellate authority or the reviewing authority. It was only
challenged in the writ petition after a long delay. Though
the   aforesaid   stand   was   taken   before   the   learned
Single Judge, it was not properly discussed.
42. The appellant­State has taken specific plea that the
order taking possession was never challenged before the
appellate authority or the reviewing authority. It was only
challenged in the writ petition after long delay. Though
the   aforesaid   stand   was   taken,   but   not   properly
discussed by the learned Single Judge.
43. In   the   case   of   Shivgonda   Anna   Patil   v.   State   of
Maharashtra reported in AIR 1990 SC 2281 the Supreme
Court while dealing Sec. 10 of the Act held that the writ
petition under Article 226 for reopening the proceeding
on   the   ground   that   the   competent   authority   had   not
taken into consideration certain fact, filed after ten years,
after the excess land was vested in the State Government
was rightly summarily dismissed by the High Court.
12
44. While deciding the question of delay and laches in
preferring the petition under Article 226, Supreme Court
in the case of The Municipal Council, Ahmednagar v.
Shah Hyder Beig reported in JT 1999 (10) SC 336 held
that the equitable doctrine, namely, ‘delay defects equity’
has its fullest application in the matter of grant of relief
under Article 226 of the Constitution. The discretionary
relief can be had provided one has not by his act or
conduct given a go­bye to his rights. Equity favours a
vigilant rather than an indolent litigant and this being
the basic tenet of law.
45. In   the   present   case,   we   have   noticed   that
possession of the land was taken on 20th March 1986.
The order rejecting the application u/Sec. 21 reached
finality   on   15th  December   1986   against   all   the
petitioners,   except   one   Ramanbhai   Purshottambhai
Patel.   The   writ   petition   was   preferred   against   the
petitioners   being   not   vigilant   in   exercise   of   their
rights,   learned   Single   Judge   ought   not   to   have
entertained   the   petition   against   the   order   taking
possession after such a long delay.”
(emphasis supplied)
The Division Bench accordingly allowed the appeal preferred by
the State and dismissed the writ petition filed by the appellants
herein by setting aside the judgment and order of the learned
single Judge and declaring that the possession of the land has
been rightly taken over by the competent authority of the State
on 20.3.1986.
10. Feeling aggrieved, the land owners have approached this
Court.     It   is   urged   that   there   is   no   tittle   of   evidence   to
substantiate   the   fact   asserted   by   the   respondent­State   that
physical possession of the land in question has been taken over
on 20.3.1986.  It was merely a paper­possession in the form of
13
Possession Panchnama.   According to the appellants,  de facto
possession of the subject land as on the date of the repeal Act is
crucial and entail in abatement of all the actions of the State
authorities under the 1976 Act.   Mere issuance of notification
under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act regarding deemed vesting of
the land in the State is not enough for the purposes of the repeal
Act.  Reliance has been placed on Vinayak Kashinath Shilkar
vs. Deputy Collector and Competent Authority & Ors.4
, State
of  Uttar  Pradesh  vs.  Hari Ram5
,  Gajanan  Kamlya Patil  vs.
Additional Collector and Competent Authority (ULC) & Ors.6
and  Mangalsen   vs.   State   of   Uttar   Pradesh   &   Anr.7
.     The
consistent view of this Court is that physical possession must be
taken by the State authorities, failing which the proceedings shall
abate on account of the repeal Act.  The appellants have relied on
Revenue records to show that the continued possession remained
with   the   appellants/land   owners   even   after   the   Possession
Panchnama was made on 20.3.1986.  The Revenue entries have
presumptive value and the respondent State had failed to rebut
the same.  It is further contended that the purported Possession
4 (2012) 4 SCC 718 (paragraphs 9 to 11)
5 (2013) 4 SCC 280 (paragraphs 36-37)
6 (2014) 12 SCC 523 (paragraphs 10 and 12)
7 (2014) 15 SCC 332 (paragraphs 10 to 14)
14
Panchnama dated 20.3.1986 is not a reliable document at all.  It
is vague and bereft of details.  Its authenticity and contents have
been disputed by the appellants.  It is intriguing that although
the subject land is dispersed and not one continuous piece of
land, yet one common Possession Panchnama is drawn without
any explanation as to the manner in which the possession of five
non­contiguous   plots   came   to   be   taken   by   the   authorities
concerned.  Further, the Panchnama does not bear any time.  All
these deficiencies lead to the only conclusion that the Possession
Panchnama was prepared by the officials sitting in their office
without visiting the site.   Secondly, the Possession Panchnama
has not been signed by any of the twelve (12) land owners.  The
appellants   are   also   relying   on   the   observations   made   by   the
learned single Judge recording the factum of possession being in
favour of the appellants to hold that the Possession Panchnama
was illegal.  It is then urged that the authorities could not have
recorded   Possession   Panchnama   until   the   application   under
Section 21 of the 1976 Act was finally decided by the competent
authority.     Admittedly,   the   said   application   was   filed   on
22.8.1985 and was pending on 20.3.1986.  This is impermissible
in law and the action is vitiated even on that count.  To bolster
15
this position, reliance is placed on the dictum in Full Bench of
the High Court in  M/s.   Avanti   Organisation   vs.   Competent
Authority  &  Additional  Collector,  Urban  Land  Ceiling  Act,
Rajkot & Anr.8
 and also on Samrathben Manilal Chokshi &
Anr. vs. State of Gujarat & Anr.9
 and Savitaben Ramanbhai
Patel vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.10.  Reliance is also placed on
the decision of this Court in Darothi Clare Parreira (Smt.) &
Ors.   vs.   State   of   Maharashtra   &   Ors.11.     Reliance   is   also
placed   on  South India   Corporation   (P)   Ltd.   vs.   Secretary,
Board of Trivandrum & Anr.12
, wherein it is held that Sections
10 and 21, both, fall under Chapter III of the Act, and thus,
Section 21 operates “in spite of Section 10”.   Reliance is also
placed   on  Special   Officer   &   Competent   Authority,   Urban
Land Ceilings, Hyderabad & Anr. vs. P.S. Rao13, wherein it is
observed that unless the quantum of excess land is determined,
the land owner cannot be expected to surrender the excess land
or seek exemption under Sections 20 or 21 or 22 of the 1976 Act.
8 AIR 1989 Guj 129
9 (1994) 35(1) GLR 203
10 (1999) 40(1) GLR 860
11 (1996) 9 SCC 633 (paragraphs 5 and 6)
12 AIR 1964 SC 207 (paragraph 19)
13 (2000) 2 SCC 451 (paragraph 4)
16
Moreover, the period of filing the application under Section 21
ought   to   be   reckoned   from   the   date   of   withdrawal   of   the
exemption under Section 20 of the 1976 Act and not from the
date of commencement of the Act i.e. 17.2.1976, as such.  It is
urged that notice was not served upon all the land owners in
respect of action(s) under Section 10 of the 1976 Act.  Hence, the
Possession Panchnama would be of no avail and is void and
illegal.     This   Court   in  Hariram  (supra)  has   expounded   that
requirement of giving notice under Section 10(5) and/or 10(6) is
mandatory and failure to do so would entail in the land owner
being   dispossessed   without   notice,   which   cannot   be
countenanced.  It is urged that the respective shares of the four
(4) noticees are as follows: ­
S.
No
.
Individual Total land
owned
(sq. mt.)
Land
permitted
under ULC
Act
(sq. mt.)
Excess
Land
(sq. mt.)
1. Ambalal 7329.50 1500 5829.50
2. Bhikhabhai 2613.50 1500 1113.50
3. Natwarbhai 1546.40 1500     46.40
4. Jayantibha
i
1758.30 1500   258.30
Although the competent authority recognised twelve (12) land
owners, it chose to issue notice only to selected four (4) land
owners.  The notice served on them cannot bind the other land
17
owners.  In absence of notice, plea regarding vesting of land qua
such land owners cannot be countenanced.   Reliance is placed
on Ramanlal Bhailal Patel & Ors. vs. State of Gujarat14 and
Har   Pyari   (Smt.)   vs.   IInd   Additional  Judge,  Moradabad  &
Ors.15.  As regards Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, he had expired
on   31.12.1985.     As   a   result,   notice   issued   to   Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel admittedly remained unserved on his legal
representatives.  Further, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel’s share is
5829.50 square meters of total surplus/excess land, which must
be excluded and no further action can be taken in that regard in
view of the repeal Act.   In substance, the grievance is that the
Division Bench ought not to have interfered with the decision of
the learned single Judge, which was a well­considered decision
and a just approach, considering the facts of the present case.
11. The respondent State, on the other hand, would urge that
the writ petition filed by the appellants was hopelessly delayed
and suffered from laches.  The possession of the suit land was
taken under the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986.  That
fact was within the knowledge of the appellants as is evident from
14 (2008) 5 SCC 449 (paras 27 and 29)
15 (2001) 10 SCC 525 (paragraphs 3 and 4)
18
the   record   and   in   particular   from   the   stand   taken   by   the
respondent­State   to   oppose   review   application   in   relation   to
application under Section 21 of the 1976 Act.   It was clearly
stated   by   the   respondent   in   the   said   proceedings   that   the
appellants   were   not   entitled   for   any   relief   as   possession   has
already been taken on 20.3.1986 and that the subject land had
already vested in the State.  Thus, it was within the knowledge of
the appellants being party to the said proceedings.  That fact has
been recorded in the order dated 19.9.1998 in review application
while   remanding   the   application   (under   Section   21)   for
reconsideration by the competent authority.   The present writ
petition, however, has been filed only in 2001 without disclosing
any   cause   for   such   delay   and   laches,   much   less   plausible
explanation.     The   Division   Bench   of   the   High   Court   was,
therefore, justified in non­suiting the appellants including on the
ground of delay and laches in filing of the writ petition.   That
finding   is   unexceptionable.     It   is   urged   that   before   taking
possession vide Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, notices
were duly issued to the land owners under Section 10(5) of the
1976 Act.  The first notice was issued on 17.12.1985 to Ambalal
Parsottambhai Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai
19
Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel.   This was
duly served.  The second notice dated 23.1.1986 was also issued
to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel,
Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel.
The second notice sent to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel returned
with endorsement “said owner has expired”.  However, the other
noticees – Bhikhabhai Maganbhai Patel, Natvarbhai Bhailalbhai
Patel   and   Jayantibhai   Babarbhai   were   duly   served   with   the
second notice and their acknowledgments have been produced on
record.  Despite those notices, the concerned appellants failed to
remain present for handing over the possession on the specified
date.  Therefore, after waiting for 30 days’ period, the authority
proceeded   to   take   forcible   possession   on   20.3.1986   vide
Possession Panchnama.  That is permissible in law and was the
only course open to the authority to take forward the acquisition
process of the excess/surplus land.  It is urged that none of the
appellants   challenged   the   said   notices   or   the   Possession
Panchnama of 1986.  Further, the appellants have not asked for
further   relief   of   declaration   regarding   the   other   proceedings,
which   have   become   final   or   for   that   matter   that   the   entire
proceedings stood abated in terms of the repeal Act, knowing
20
fully well that such a plea would not be available to them in light
of   having   lost   possession   of   the   surplus/excess   land   on
20.3.1986. 
12. The respondent has placed reliance on State of Assam vs.
Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma & Ors.16 and also on Larsen & Toubro
Ltd.   vs.   State   of   Gujarat   &   Ors.17.     According   to   the
respondent,   pendency   of   application   under   Section   21   of   the
1976 Act is no bar for proceeding beyond Section 10(3) of the
1976 Act, as is contended by the appellants.  This legal position
is no more res integra and in fact, has been plainly rejected by
this Court in  Darothi   Clare  Parreira  (supra).   Moreover, the
pendency of application under Section 21 is not saved by the
repeal Act, as in those proceedings, the claim of the owners is for
acquiring   a   right   and   not   for   enforcement   of   accrued   right.
Reliance is placed on  State  of  Gujarat  & Anr.  vs.    Gyanaba
Dilavarsinh   Jadega18  and  Madhusudan   Bhanuprasad
Pandya vs. State of Gujarat & Ors.19
. 
16 (2015) 5 SCC 321 (paragraphs 13 to 17)
17 (1998) 4 SCC 387 (paragraphs 14 to 16)
18 (2013) 11 SCC 486 (paragraph 13)
19 (2019) SCC Online SC 1050 (paragraphs 14 and 16)
21
13. It is urged that the State authorities have already taken
possession   of   the   land   as   is   evident   from   the   Possession
Panchnama and also from the Revenue record, as the name of
the State has been entered therein qua Survey No. 362, Final Plot
No. 280 on 26.9.1989 and for other surplus lands on 15.2.2000
pursuant to the request made to the Mamlatdar, Baroda City vide
communication   dated   11.4.1986.     This   application  was  made
much before coming into force of the repeal Act.  In other words,
after the final statement was drawn on 1.2.1985, soon thereafter
notice under Section 10(1) was issued on 8.3.1985/21.3.1985
and   under   Section   10(3),   on   25.7.1985   followed   by
notification/notice under Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act, dated
17.12.1985   and   again   on   23.1.1986   before   taking   forcible
possession on 20.3.1986.   Soon thereafter, request was sent to
the Mamlatdar, Baroda City for entering name of the State in the
Revenue records on 11.4.1986.   Pursuant thereto, the entry in
the name of the State was effected in the revenue record in due
course.  Further, the fact of possession having been taken was
noted even in the Review proceedings in September, 1998 and
despite that, the subject writ petition was filed only in 2001 to
assail   the   Possession   Panchnama   dated   20.3.1986.     It   is,
22
therefore, urged by the respondent that the appeal be dismissed
and the decision of the Division Bench ought to be upheld on this
count alone.
14. We have heard Mr. Shyam Divan, learned senior counsel for
the appellants and Ms. Deepanwita Priyanka, learned counsel for
the respondent.
15. After cogitating over the rival submissions and the relevant
record, it is manifest that the appellants have resorted to all
possible pleas.  First, the application for exemption under Section
20   of   the   1976   Act   was   moved,   which   was   allowed   by   the
competent authority on 6.3.1980, but the appellants chose to
withdraw the same.  That request was eventually granted by the
competent authority on 1.2.1985.  The appellants then waited till
the notification under Section 10(3) of the 1976 Act was issued
on 25.7.1985 and opted for remedy of exemption under Section
21   by   filing   an   application   on   22.8.1985.     That   came   to   be
rejected   on   15.12.1986   against   which   decision   a   review
application was filed only by Devikaben Chandubhai Bhailalbhai
alongwith   her   three   siblings,   after   lapse   of   two   years.
Nevertheless,   the   same   was   entertained   by   the   authority
23
concerned   and   after   quashing   the   entire   order   in   appeal,   a
remand order came to be passed on 19.9.1998.  Even in review
proceedings, the fact of State authorities having taken forcible
possession   of   the   surplus/excess   land   on   20.3.1986   vide
Possession Panchnama, was reiterated, as can be discerned from
the   order   dated   19.9.1998.     It   is   not   clear   as   to   why   the
appellants did not take clue at least from such unambiguous
stand taken by the respondent and forthwith proceed to assail
the   stated   stand   of   the   State  (of   having   taken   over   forcible
possession   on   20.3.1986).     Besides   taking   possession,   the
respondent had determined the compensation for which notice
under Section 11 was issued to the appellants on 17.5.1986.  It
is not the case of the appellants that they were unaware even
about that development until 2001.  No such plea is taken by the
appellants in the writ petition filed in the year 2001.  It is only
after   the   competent   authority   declined   to   issue   No   Objection
Certificate vide order dated 19.5.1999, they thought of changing
the track by taking advantage of the repeal Act having come into
force on 30.3.1999.  However, they chose to file the writ petition
only in the name of Kamleshbhai Parekh in the capacity of Power
of Attorney holder of late Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel, being
24
SCA No. 8402/1999, little realizing that the authority given by
Ambalal   Parsottambhai   Patel   had   come   to   an   end   after   his
demise on 31.12.1985 itself.  No doubt the learned single Judge
was   persuaded   to   quash   the   entire   proceedings   which   had
culminated with taking forcible possession of the surplus/excess
land vide Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986, being vitiated
and/or abated.   However, it is only after the other appellants
realised that the decision of the learned single Judge in SCA No.
8402/1999 was flawed and has been justly assailed by the State
Government on that count by way of LPA No. 460/2002, they
chose to file the present writ petition (SCA No. 12602/2001).  In
the said writ petition, however, no disclosure has been made as
to why these appellants did not assail the Possession Panchnama
dated   20.3.1986   in   earlier   point   of   time   including   when   the
existence   of   this   document   was   specifically   pleaded   by   the
respondent­State, in particular, in the review application.  In the
writ petition, the only assertion made regarding delay and laches
can be discerned from paragraph 5, which reads thus: ­
“5. The petitioners have approached this Hon’ble Court
without   any   delay   or   laches.  The   petitioners   had
remained   under   an   impression   that   the  matter  was
being looked after by the late Ambalal Purshottamdas
Patel’s constituted attorney and that therefore it was
25
not   necessary   for   them   to   approach   this   Hon’ble
Court   in  the  matter. The petitioners are agriculturists
and not conversant with the intricacies of law were not
aware that on Ambalal Purshottamdas Patel’s death the
Authority of his constituted attorney Kamlesh Parekh had
come   to   an   end.   Though   Kamleshbhai   Parekh   has
informed   the   petitioners   of   the   objections   likely   to   be
raised   on   behalf   of   the   appellants   in   the   said   Letters
Patent Appeal, he has also informed the petitioners that
he was not aware that he could not rely upon the power
of attorney given by Ambalal Purshottamdas Patel after
his death and in fact has regretted putting the petitioners
in   the   awkward   position.   The   petitioners   submit   that
under   the   circumstances   the   time   taken   in   the
prosecution of the Special Civil Application No. 8402 of
1999 and the said Civil Application and the Letters Patent
Appeal by the respondents be excluded in considering the
time taken by the petitioners to approach this Hon’ble
Court in the matter. The petitioners submit that they
are   approaching   this  Hon’ble  Court   as   expeditiously
as  the  circumstances  of  the  case  would  permit.  The
petitioners  further  submit  that  the  delay,   if  any,  on
the part of the petitioners in approaching this Hon’ble
Court has not in any manner caused any prejudice or
detriment to the respondents. The petitioners submit
that   this  Hon’ble  Court  be  pleased   to   entertain   the
Petition and not to reject it on the ground of  delay,
acquiescence or laches.”
(emphasis supplied)
The   earlier   part   of   the   writ   petition   deals   with   the   factual
background and assertion that the appellants still continue to be
in physical possession of the stated land and was using it for
agricultural purpose, as can be noticed from the Revenue record.
Indeed, the Revenue record may have presumptive value, but
that can be rebutted, which in this case has been done by the
respondent­State by relying on the Possession Panchnama and
the subsequent proceedings including the application submitted
26
to the Mamlatdar, Baroda City in right earnest for entering the
name of the State Government in the Revenue records, dated
11.4.1986, and pursuant to which entries had been effected on
26.9.1989 and 15.2.2000 respectively. 
16. Obviously,   therefore,   the   appellants   thought   of   the   last
attempt to assail the Possession Panchnama dated 20.3.1986
itself without seeking any further relief of declaration regarding
the earlier proceedings which had attained finality. 
17. The Division Bench, in our opinion, therefore, was right in
concluding that the writ petition filed by the appellants after
lapse of 14 years was hopelessly barred by delay and suffered
from laches.  We are in agreement with the said view taken by the
High Court in the peculiar facts of the present case. 
18. Strikingly, in this appeal by special leave, a vague ground
has been raised to challenge the said conclusion of the Division
Bench.     Further,   no   substantial   question   of   law   has   been
formulated   in   the   appeal   by   special   leave   in   that   regard.
Furthermore, in the grounds all that is asserted is that the High
Court erred in holding that there was delay of 14 years in filing of
writ   petition   and   in   not   appreciating   that   the   notice   under
27
Section 10(5) of the 1976 Act, dated 23.1.1986, was not served
upon Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel as he had already expired on
31.12.1985 and the notice sent to him was returned back on
2.2.1986   unserved   with   remark   “said   owner   has   expired”.
Further, the legal heirs of Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel ought to
have been served with the said notice.  From the factual matrix
already stated hitherto, these grounds, in our opinion, are of no
avail to the appellants.  It is manifest from the acknowledgement
produced by  the  respondent­State  that  the  first  notice  under
Section 10(5) issued to Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel was duly
served on 26.12.1985.  By the time second notice under Section
10(5) was issued on 23.1.1986, Ambalal Parsottambhai Patel had
died (on 31.12.1985).   The second notice was also issued to
others,   namely,   Bhikhabhai   Maganbhai   Patel,   Natvarbhai
Bhailalbhai Patel and Jayantibhai Babarbhai Patel.  Be that as it
may, we are not inclined to reverse the conclusion recorded by
the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ petition filed
by   the   appellants   was   hopelessly   delayed   and   suffered   from
laches.  That is a possible view in the facts of the present case. 
19. The respondents had additionally relied on the decision of
this Court in Larsen & Toubro Ltd. (supra), wherein the Court
28
adverted to the exposition in  Balwant   Narayan   Bhagde   vs.
M.D. Bhagwat & Ors.20
, Balmokand Khatri Educational and
Industrial   Trust   vs.   State   of   Punjab21 and  Tamil   Nadu
Housing  Board vs. A. Viswam (Dead) by  LRs.22  regarding the
settled legal position that it is difficult to take physical possession
of the land under compulsory acquisition.   Further, that the
normal mode of taking possession is drafting the Panchnama in
the   presence   of   Panchas   and   taking   possession   and   giving
delivery   to   the   beneficiaries   is   accepted   mode   of   taking
possession of the land.   Subsequent thereto, the retention of
possession   would   tantamount   only   to   illegal   or   unlawful
possession.   Reliance is also placed on paragraphs 14 to 16 of
Bhaskar Jyoti Sarma (supra).  However, it is not necessary for
us to dilate on these aspects having agreed with the conclusion
recorded by the Division Bench of the High Court that the writ
petition filed in the year 2001 by the appellants with limited relief
of   questioning   the   Possession   Panchnama   dated   20.3.1986,
suffered from laches.   The Division Bench of the High Court
noted that the learned single Judge completely glossed over this
20 (1976) 1 SCC 700 (paragraph 28)
21 (1996) 4 SCC 212 (paragraph 4)
22 (1996) 8 SCC 259 (paragraph 9)
29
crucial aspect of the matter, and we find no reason to depart
from that conclusion.
20. In view of the above, it is not necessary for us to dilate on
other contentions raised by the appellants or by the respondentState on merits.
21. Having said thus, it must follow that the present appeal is
devoid of merits and the impugned decision of the Division Bench
of the High Court ought to be upheld on the threshold ground of
writ petition being barred by laches. 
22. Accordingly, this appeal must fail.  The same is dismissed
with no order as to costs.  Pending interlocutory applications, if
any, shall stand disposed of.
..................................J.
  (A.M. Khanwilkar)
..................................J.
           (Dinesh Maheshwari)
New Delhi;
May 6, 2020.